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on external affairs and
national defense.

Minutes of proceedings
and evidence. 1968-69 no. 26-50



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HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

8867

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN


MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 26-50

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1969

Respecting


Policy-defence and external affairs



WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	Macquarrie
³ Anderson	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	MacRae
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Marceau
Brewin	Laniel	Nowlan
Cafik	Laprise	¹ Ouellet
Fairweather	Legault	Penner
Forrestall	Lewis	Prud'homme
Gibson	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	² Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Groos	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)		Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹ Mr. Ouellet replaced Mr. Goyer on February 7, 1969.

² Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*), replaced Mr. Roberts on February 11, 1969.

³ Mr. Anderson replaced Mr. Hymmen on February 12, 1969.

CORRIGENDUM

Issue No. 24 — Wednesday, February 5, 1969

Evidence:

Page 867:

Left-hand column, lines 3 and 4 should read:

through multilateral action *through* the United Nations . . .



[Text]

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, February 12, 1969
(39)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, Macquarrie, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch (22).

Also present: Mr. Hymmen, M.P.

Witness: Professor Charles Foulkes, Visiting Professor, School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.

Mr. Brewin drew attention to an error on page 867 of Issue No. 24 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. The Committee agreed to the correction.

The Vice-Chairman introduced Professor Charles Foulkes who made a brief opening statement. The Committee agreed to print Professor Foulkes' advance presentation entitled *A Canadian Response To Collective Security* and his biography, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix gg*)

Members of the Committee questioned Professor Foulkes on various aspects of Canadian defence policy and in relation to suggestions he had made in his advance presentation.

The division bells rang at approximately 4:50 p.m.

With the division bells ringing and the questioning continuing, the Committee expressed its thanks to Professor Foulkes for his testimony and adjourned at 4:55 p.m. The next meeting will be on Thursday, February 13, 1969 at 11:00 a.m., when the witness will be Professor Michael Brecher.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by
Electronic Apparatus)

Wednesday, 12 February, 1969.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, please come to order.

I regret to inform the Committee that our Chairman, Mr. Wahn, suddenly has been called to Toronto because of serious illness in his immediate family. I have, therefore, been asked to conduct the meeting this afternoon as Chairman, but I find myself in the position of having a previous engagement to be on a panel at 4.00 p.m. Therefore, I ask the indulgence of the Committee, subject to your agreement, to have an Acting Chairman replace me while I am gone for an hour or so. Is it agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

● 1535

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. The witness appearing before the Committee today is one of Canada's most distinguished soldiers. As hon. members know, General Charles Foulkes became Chief of the General Staff in 1945 after a long and successful career in the Canadian Army. You already have details of his career.

In 1951 he was appointed as the first Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, a position he held until May, 1960, a period of nine years. His experience in these two positions, covering the period during which Canada's postwar military orientation was formulated and elaborated, has given him a unique perspective from which to comment on Canadian defence policies.

In 1967 General Foulkes was appointed as an Associate Professor of Strategy at Carleton University, and since that time has completed a number of works, including *Canadian Defence Policy in the Nuclear Age*. As a very articulate professional soldier and now a professional academic—a rare but valuable combination—General Foulkes is undoubtedly one of the best qualified persons in Canada to comment specifically on defence policy options open to Canada. He has been asked to address himself today to the question of whether Canadian defence policy should be based on

regional alliances, or whether Canada should seek to follow a policy of neutrality.

General Foulkes—or should I address you as Professor Foulkes?—your written statement has been circulated in advance to all members of the Committee. Perhaps you would like to make a brief oral statement by way of introduction and then answer questions which members of the Committee will want to put to you on the major choice or choices open to Canada in the orientation of its defence policy.

Professor Charles Foulkes (Associate Professor, Carleton University): Mr. Chairman, I was asked why I was appearing before this Committee with a paper headed "Professor Charles Foulkes". I did that purposely because I wanted to appear before the Committee, not as a has-been, but as someone who is continually studying the question of defence and the question of strategy. I find that the students keep you very wide awake in order to answer all their questions on the subject of strategy today.

Mr. Chairman, I have very little to say about the paper. I took the opportunity of reading the evidence given by Professor Yarmolinsky who was before the Committee last week. He described I think very accurately to you the question of flexible response strategy and I do not think it is necessary to elaborate on that subject.

I would remind you that in the third paragraph of the paper I do mention that NATO strategy has gone the full circle from 1950 to 1968. By that I mean that when NATO was first set up in 1949 it was based on the strategy of the Second World War, and that was a strategy of conventional warfare with conventional forces supported by heavy bombardment from the air. However, the plan at that time was for something like 1,000 divisions and 6,000 tactical aircraft. As you know, the European partners could not raise anything like that number of forces. Therefore, it was reviewed and reduced to about 40 divisions, 25 of which were expected to be raised in peacetime and the others raised after the war began.

That was the time—and I want to emphasize this—when Canada took on the present commitments; it was in 1951 when General Eisenhower took over com-

● 1540

mand of the NATO forces. He came to Canada and pointed out at that time that it was absolutely necessary for Canada to make a contribution to the shield forces in Europe to show that North America was really fully behind NATO. He did make the stipulation that as and when the European economy and defence posture had sufficiently increased, the North American forces would come home. That, of course, was only in 1951. I think we should keep in mind that this commitment was made by the St. Laurent government in 1951 in a more or less temporary capacity; that it was prepared to help at that time with forces in Europe and eventually they would come home. But you recall that when the Eisenhower administration came into being there was a reduction or a change in strategy introduced by the United States. At that time the United States introduced the use of nuclear forces, and Foster Dulles introduced the theory of massive retaliation at places of our own choosing. Now, with this type of strategy where you are only required to have a shield or a trip-wire kind of defence, they were able to reduce the number of conventional forces required and place reliance on massive retaliation.

This pleased the Europeans because this took the pressure off raising conventional forces, and it also reduced the kind of stockpiling that was necessary for a 90-day war. However, when tactical nuclear weapons became possible, Foster Dulles changed these ideas on massive retaliation and put more emphasis on the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

However, a few years after that, when the scientists began to examine what could be done with a tactical nuclear weapon, they began to have second thoughts as to whether these were really the kind of things to use in Europe. As a result of this the United Nations set up a committee to look into this whole question of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The committee issued a report, for which a distinguished Canadian did some of the investigations, Dr. Lewis from Chalk River. They did find, after examining some of the exercises which had been carried out in Europe using mock tactical nuclear weapons, that if about a hundred of those weapons were used—and mind you there are 7,000 of them in Europe today—it would lay waste an area 150 miles long and 50 miles wide. So with that in mind, the United States began to look again at the strategy of using tactical nuclear weapons in the beginning, and this is what really brought them to consider this question of flexible response.

As I mentioned in the paper, the introduction of flexible response forces a close examination of the Canadian commitments, because flexible response real-

ly requires the use of conventional weapons until almost the end of the battle. In other words, as Mr. McNamara describes it, they will not be used until the forces are almost overwhelmed. Therefore, it does require more conventional weapons, and also requires a reserve. As you know, with the kind of professional forces we have in Canada, we can not create a reserve, so that we are not in a position really to carry out the strategy of flexible response, unless the government decides it wants to increase its conventional forces. As you know, we cannot in any way reinforce the brigade in Europe today because there is no equipment, and you cannot get the equipment there in time. So it appeared to me that this was a time when we should have another look at the structure of our contributions. I think the important thing, Mr. Chairman, is to get a consensus on the assumption that I have made, that Canada is not primarily responsible for its own security and that all Canada is required to do is to make contributions to collective defence. If that is agreed to, it makes our problem very much easier because then you can look at what are the best kind of contributions we should make.

I feel very strongly that with the type of professional serviceman we have today, we can reach very high standards of technical and tactical leadership, and

● 1545

we are not making full use of that in the contribution to Europe. We are taking on the task which the conscript in Europe with 18 months training can do, and it seems to me if we are going to make a contribution we should make the best possible contribution and give our forces the kind of job that they can do better than somebody, as I said, who is in for 18 months. That is, Mr. Chairman, the basis of the argument in my paper.

Mr. Winch: Could you outline the efficiency and the technicalities of where you think it should be done?

Professor Foulkes: Well, for one thing I feel that we can operate much better on the flanks than in the position we are in, in the central sector, which can easily be taken over by the Germans with a conscript force. We should be operating on the flanks where it requires a great deal more leadership, where it requires handling of communications and that type of task which is the same kind of task as we would do in North America, and that requires the same kind of forces that we would use in peacekeeping and so forth. In other words, it is getting away from heavy equipment and getting on to a more mobile basis, and I think you would find that the savings that you would make in equipment would be considerable.

Mr. Winch: Then, could I just ask this one question? I was just going to say, does this mean that you

are suggesting a change in the policy of our forces in Europe if Canada remains in NATO? That is basically what you are saying.

Mr. MacLean: On a supplementary question, I take it that this reasoning would not apply to the Air Division. It is the brigade that you are speaking of.

Professor Foulkes: Oh yes. As far as the Air Division is concerned, as you know, this role the Air Division is in now has never been really a very satisfactory role. When this role was first put forward in 1956, the St. Laurent government would have really nothing to do with it, and postponed taking a decision on it. It was only after considerable pressure was put on the incoming government by General Norstad that agreement was reached to do this task.

It has never been a popular task with the public, as far as I can see, and with the introduction now of the strategy of flexible response, with the use of tactical nuclear weapons being postponed a considerable time, if used at all, this role becomes almost one in which they will be destroyed on the ground before they ever get a chance to be used. As I point out in the paper, as you know the Air Division is now being concentrated on two airfields, which makes it much more vulnerable than it was when it was on four airfields. Therefore, this is not in my view a satisfactory task for our Air Force. I do suggest that if we could get the Air Force in another task altogether, with close support and transport so that it could move the suggested mobile force that I have been recommending, it would be a more suitable task, and more palatable. In going around the country, one of the things that I meet all the time is a considerable criticism of Canadian Forces, who are just making a contribution to Western defence, having to be involved in nuclear weapons.

The Vice-Chairman: I have an order of questioners: Mr. Penner, Mr. MacLean—I will put you in next if you wish—and then Mr. Brewin, Mr. Gibson, Mr. Winch and Mr. Cafik. So if we could keep this order, supplementaries will be permitted. Mr. Penner?

Mr. Penner: Professor Foulkes, on page 2 you make reference to the Czech crisis which you state has provided justification for the flexible response positions of our forces in Europe. This point of view is raised quite often, and one of the things we often wonder is how valid is this argument? To what extent can we say that the Soviet threat to Western Europe becomes more obvious because of the Czech crisis? Is

● 1550

it not, perhaps, more accurate to regard this more as an internal struggle within the Warsaw Pact that has very little relevance to the Soviet threat to Western Europe as a whole?

Professor Foulkes: The main reason I was referring to the Czech crisis was in regard to adequate strategic warning. As you know the forces available in Europe on the Western side are about 23 divisions. The Soviet Union has 20 divisions actually in Germany today. Those could be built up to about 40 divisions within a matter of six days. Any reinforcements on the Western side would have to come from moving two brigades back from the United Kingdom to Europe and two brigades from the United States. The fastest that the experts say it can be done is two weeks and it is a question of whether, after watching the way in which the Soviet Union can move its forces around with little notice as it did in the Czech crisis, we would get sufficient strategic warning.

This whole question of whether there is a threat to Europe is one on which there are many, many opinions today. I think we have to bear in mind that when you are trying to assess the threat you have two things to assess. First of all, you assess the capabilities of both sides. This, of course, used to be the cloak-and-dagger job of the intelligence outfits but now that there are satellites around which can take a look at the world every few hours, and because of the practice which has been established in the United States of publishing their strengths, the question of capabilities is not as obscure as it was before. Furthermore, for the expenditure of 10 shillings a year any of you who are interested in knowing what the capabilities are could get from the Institute of Strategic Studies a Military Balance which shows the forces in any country in the world and it is reviewed every year. So there is no question now of being able to tell what the capabilities are of any of the opposing forces.

The other side of this, however, is the question of intentions. This is the one that is much harder to judge than the question of capabilities. In the question of intentions the changing conditions, of course, can change national intentions but because of the risk today of such great destructiveness which the weapons of the super powers possess and the risk of escalation of a minor confrontation developing into all-out nuclear war, most powers will accept today certain things and not take action against them which they would not have thought about accepting 50 years ago. I suggest that if the *Pueblo* incident had occurred 15 years ago there would have been a war but the stakes are so high now that the United States is prepared to negotiate. Therefore while there are capabilities on both sides to wage war in Western Europe I think one would agree that the chances of planned aggression in Western Europe are much less today than they were 10 or 15 years ago.

However, there are still hot spots such as Berlin or Greece or difficulties on the flanks. You might get a situation where uranium is found in some part of northern Norway and the Soviet Union has a feeling that it could snatch off those few acres and that we

would not interfere. Those are the kinds of things which could get us into difficulties. Those are the kinds of situations that might arise and about which I am wondering whether the West will get sufficient warning, sufficient strategic warning to be able to build up their forces as fast as the Warsaw Pact forces can. That is what this paragraph really means.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. MacLean, do you have a question? Mr. Brewin.

• 1555

Mr. Brewin: General Foulkes, if I understand your paper right you reject the idea of neutrality for Canada—I see you are shaking your head—but you do suggest quite a radical revision of our roles to begin with. I am right in that, am I?

Professor Foulkes: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: As I understand it you say we should withdraw our air division because it is highly vulnerable; at least that is one over-riding reason, I take it. Is that correct?

Professor Foulkes: Yes. Not only is it very vulnerable but it is wasting away anyway. It is not being reinforced. They are not buying any more aircraft to replace wastage. It is wasting away. I would just hurry the process.

Mr. Brewin: Yes. Then as far as our ground role is concerned, I understand you to say that we should change from the static role of our brigade in Germany and concentrate on a highly mobile force that could be used in the flanks.

Professor Foulkes: That is correct.

Mr. Brewin: Then I take it that you also say that our antisubmarine role needs to be surveyed, as it were, because of doubts as to whether under present technical conditions it can be effective. Am I right in that?

Professor Foulkes: That is correct.

Mr. Brewin: Then you say—may I put it this way—not these changes as far as you are concerned would not only give Canada a more suitable role but would also incidentally have the great advantage of saving us some money.

Professor Foulkes: That is the intention.

Mr. Brewin: Then at page 11, and perhaps you have really given the answer to this, but I would like it clear, you say:

If it is accepted that Canada is not primarily responsible for its own security, and that all that is required is to provide effective contributions to collective defence, then our contribution should be selective and concentrated on one or two specialized tasks. In this way, the maximum operational element could be provided.

I want to make sure that I understand that paragraph. What do you suggest might be the one or two specialized tasks? You have suggested one very clearly, the mobilized force. Another, I take it, would be a force available for policing the sovereignty of Canadian soil; and one that could be available, I suppose, for peacekeeping operations.

Professor Foulkes: As I state, Mr. Brewin, in my conclusions on page 16, what I tried to do is to suggest a homogeneous force that could do all three tasks in the proportions in which it was required to do them; in other words have a completely homogeneous force in which you could send a battalion off to do peacekeeping, or you could use a brigade here to do exercises ready for the flanks, or if you had to do some other task in NATO it would be this kind of homogeneous force, not separated as we are now with the air division in one part of Germany doing a strike role, the brigade in another part of Germany doing the heavy role in the forward area, and two battalions sitting in Canada waiting to go to the flanks. All those different tasks you get mean that you have to have a different set of schools, a different set of equipment, and these are the ways in which you get into the high costs, as I pointed out. The Strategic Balance shows that Canada really gets less for the money it spends on operational forces than almost any other country in the world. In other words, we are not getting our money's worth.

Mr. Brewin: In your view.

Professor Foulkes: That is in my view. We are getting small packages which require the same overhead as the big packages.

Mr. Brewin: I can scarce forbear to cheer what you are saying. If I may put one more point to you, the way to overcome this is really to change our roles. Is that the advice you are giving?

Professor Foulkes: I would negotiate with NATO for a change of roles. This is not something new. We discussed this way back in 1959. This was thoroughly discussed with General Norstad and agreed to but for some unknown political reason this suggestion was not implemented.

Mr. Brewin: My only comment is that I wish you had done it a long time ago. That is all the questions I have.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Winch: I did not mean that.

● 1600

Mr. Gibson: General Foulkes, with respect to this special force, this mobile force that you are recommending, would you advocate, sir, some type of special task force, perhaps airborne troops associated with the air division?

Professor Foulkes: I am suggesting that that job could be done by somebody else and we could do a better job somewhere else.

Mr. Winch: On the flanks.

Professor Foulkes: Perhaps as you know there is in Europe today a mobile force under the Supreme Allied Commander—as a matter of fact in which a Canadian has been commanding I believe up to just a few weeks ago. This mobile force was set up some years ago as the only reserve the Supreme Allied Commander had. He has no troops at the present time; all he has are promises. Canada promises two battalions if they are needed. This is the force that I am talking about. All you would do would be to have, say, a Canadian brigade there permanently. When I say “permanently” I mean six months at a time. This brigade could be doing exercises on either one flank or the other, but they would be there in Europe ready to take on any of these tasks. It is a question of putting forces there permanently and not just having them come from Canada in the two battalions which we have promised. It would of course mean that our air force would be providing the airlift and the air support for that force.

Professor Foulkes: Again, these forces would not be stationed in Norway. I want to make quite clear that when the Norwegians entered NATO they had to sign a note to the Soviet Union because they were under pressure from the Soviet Union at that time about joining a kind of alliance like NATO. Therefore the Norwegians agreed at that time that they would never have any foreign troops stationed in their country permanently. So you could not move a Canadian brigade up into Norway. You could move them for an exercise or, of course, if the balloon goes up then you can move them in there.

Mr. Gibson: Sir, can you give me some idea what proportion of infantry you envisage in this force?

Professor Foulkes: I am suggesting that they would have three battalions. These would be airportable battalions which have a special establishment, a small headquarters and that kind of thing, and very little transport.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, to a great extent my question has been answered.

General Foulkes, you suggest that our brigade force in Europe is not performing a correct function and should be on the flanks, and that our air force which is strike-recce is basically useless in the military sense. If we stayed in NATO and a change was made and we put our army forces on the flanks, do you anticipate a position of the air force in support of our men on foot or in transport on the flanks outside of strike-recce?

Now I suggest that this force, if it is organized, should all be in Germany in one cantonment, say in Bavaria. If you are going to move the Canadian troops you might as well move them to the best part of Germany, put them in Bavaria where the air force are, and the army would then have a chance at the same amenities that the air force used to be used to. They should be in one cantonment where you would have one set of schools, one set of amenities, and the administrative cost would be very much cheaper. Furthermore, if you only have them there for six months at a time then you could do away with having to move families over there. I do not know what it costs now but I remember looking at this some years ago; it used to cost us \$2 million a year to move families back and forth. That does not increase your military posture one iota. I think once we have the opportunity to station forces in Europe for short times like you could do on this suggestion that I make, then you could do away with the married quarters, with schools and all the rest of it and save a considerable amount of money.

● 1605

Professor Foulkes: Let me make two things clear. I am not suggesting that our brigade in Germany is not doing a good job.

Mr. Winch: Professor Foulkes, in view of your long distinguished fighting record overseas, nine years, the longest record of anyone as Chief of Staff, your continuing interest in strategic studies, is it possible for you to particularize now, because of the important reference from the House of Commons to this Committee to study external affairs and defence policy—particularize for the advice of this Committee what you think should be Canadian defence policy?

Professor Foulkes: Well I thought I had pretty well covered that.

Mr. Winch: No, you have generalized it. Could you do that?

Professor Foulkes: I have tried to point out here that in my view we have really no security problem; what we have is really a political problem. It is a political problem.

Mr. Winch: Sir, that is exactly my reason for asking. You used that term—you said that you had the advice of General Norstad and you said it was a political decision which wiped out an agreement.

Professor Foulkes: Oh no—

Mr. Winch: There was an understanding on Canadian application of forces which had been agreed to by General Norstad which was not accepted because of a political decision. Did I get that wrong?

Professor Foulkes: Well, let me put it the other way. The agreement was made right up to the top on the military side but was never pursued on the political side. In other words, the Supreme Allied Commander had agreed to changing the role of the army brigade. We were only talking about the army brigade at that particular time.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can put my question in a different way. Because of your military experience and having been Chief of Staff for nine years, can you outline the difference between a defence policy military-wise for Canada and a political decision military-wise—or is that unfair, General?

Professor Foulkes: I do not know really what you are—

Mr. Winch: It is a very important question, but I will understand if you say that you cannot answer that.

Professor Foulkes: What I can say is this. There is no real security problem for Canada to face. I think it would be much easier to have a defence policy if you had a security problem because you could say: "This is required for the defence of Canada". But you cannot say that today because we get our defence now under the United States umbrella and whether Canada had any forces or not we would still be defended. But there are certain things that I think Canada has to do and should do itself. I have pointed out about this new arrangement for the air defence of North America which the United States is going to introduce between now and 1975—an airborne early warning system which, as far as I can see, is going to have to operate from certain bases in Canada. Formerly, when we

made the agreement in NORAD, the Canadian Government insisted that Canada should have control of all air operations in Canadian air space. Therefore, in every operational sector of NORAD which infringes on Canadian air space there is either a Canadian commander or a Canadian deputy commander to ensure the control of air forces—not only if the enemy arrives but if an aircraft gets off course that somebody does not take it on. I think this is one of the important things that Canada has to take a share in if it wants to continue to control its own air space.

Now when we get to introducing this new airborne early warning and control system in which aircraft are going to be operating from Thule in Greenland and somewhere in the Canadian North if Canada agrees, then Canada has to have somebody in those aircraft or provide some of those control aircraft that are going

● 1610

to control Canadian air space. I think this is a field in which it is very difficult to say how much you can do and how much you are going to let the United States do. And this is political, this is not military.

Mr. Winch: It is political and not military.

Professor Foulkes: It is political.

Mr. Winch: May I just ask one more question, Mr. Chairman? I was most interested in the statement of General Foulkes that Canada is not getting value for its expenditure on its armed forces. He has outlined certain aspects where he thinks we are not getting it on the strictly military side.

May I ask General Foulkes, from his experience, if, relative to the number of our armed forces, we have too many chiefs in comparison with the number of Indians?

Professor Foulkes: I did not quite put it that way.

Mr. Winch: No; I know you did not, but I am asking you that way.

Professor Foulkes: In my paper I prefer to put that we should have more horse and less harness; but it is saying almost the same thing.

Mr. Harkness: If I may ask a supplementary, for clarification, about the role of the brigades, I think you said it had been agreed by the military people that this role could be changed. But was not that change in role simply from forward brigade position to a reserve position? There was no mobile flank force at this time?

Professor Foulkes: It was proposed that they go into reserve—

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

Professor Foulkes:—but would be available under the Supreme Allied Commander to be used there, or used on the flanks.

Mr. Harkness: The point is, though, that there was no mobile—

Professor Foulkes: . . . force at that time.

Mr. Harkness:—flank force at that time. It was simply a matter of whether they would be in a forward position or in a rear position.

Professor Foulkes: But they were also going to be a mobile force. This issue, as you know, is referred to in the White Paper. At page 21 it states:

A possible course for Canada would be to withdraw from the commitment to maintain a brigade group on the central front in favour of making a contribution of an air portable force based in Europe and available for employment on NATO flanks. After careful consideration it has been decided that this would not be in the best interests of Canada and the Alliance for several important reasons.

Therefore, it was considered again in 1964.

Mr. Harkness: I think probably Mr. Winch thought that there had been the idea of a mobile flank force and that the Canadian brigade could have gone into that role at the time you mention in 1957, 1958 or 1959; but this was not actually the case.

As I say, my question was just for clarification.

Mr. Winch: I want to make sure of that, though. It was a military decision but not carried forward by a political decision. I believe that is the way you put it, General? The military decision was yes, but the political decision was not to carry it forward?

Mr. Harkness: No; the point I was making was that there was no mobile flank force at this time. The decision was simply whether the brigade would be kept in a forward position or would be back in a more rearward position and available as a reserve for the Supreme Commander, to be used in a more mobile role. I think that is essentially it, is it not, General Foulkes?

Mr. Fairweather: I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. I hate to think of a distinguished politician remaining anonymous who had enough sense to say, "Let us try for less harness and more horse". Who was it, sir?

Professor Foulkes: You wonder who it was? He was not a Canadian. I forget his name. He was the U.K.

defence minister in about 1951. I will think of his name.

Mr. Fairweather: Surely he should not remain anonymous.

Professor Foulkes: I have thought of it. It was Emanuel Shinwell.

Mr. Fairweather: Hear, hear.

● 1615

Mr. Cafik: General, first of all, a rather lighthearted remark about a comment on page 4. There is a quote here:

As one former Minister was fond of repeating, there is less chance of rape when there are fifteen in the bed.

I would just comment that I doubt that Czechoslovakia would subscribe to that view. They had quite a few in that bed and they ended up being raped.

To get down to the serious questioning, you made a comment in your oral remarks that in the next few years the United States would be going into an airborne patrol system for early warning and that it would be necessary for them to operate out of Canadian bases.

What would happen, in your view, if Canada did not agree to give them the right to operate out of those bases?

Professor Foulkes: I do not think I said they would have to operate. As I understand the early warning control system—and my information is only what Secretary McNamara told Congress last February—they can operate it from Thule in Greenland and from Alaska. These would be long-range aircraft which could be refueled in the air.

All of you can realize the space between Thule and Alaska. If they could use some air bases in between, such as those on the DEW line, they could do it more efficiently and more cheaply. This may be one of the kinds of contributions Canada may wish to make.

Those airfields are still there and they are not being used; they would have to be improved, but I am sure the United States would be glad to improve them at their own expense.

I also think that the Department of Northern Affairs would be happy about it because it would give employment to the Eskimos up there. This, again, is a political decision, whether Canada wants to contribute to the air defence of its neighbour and be in good standing with the United States.

Mr. Cafik: I believe other witnesses have suggested that in the case of NORAD and North American defence if Canada were reluctant to allow the Americans to use our soil and our air space they would simply walk in and do it. What is your view on that?

Professor Foulkes: That has not been my experience with the United States. In all the dealings we had over setting up the air defence of North America the Americans' attitude—and it was the same relative to the Bomarc—was that they thought it would be better to have those bases up in North America; that they were quite prepared to pay for them; that they were quite prepared for us to do what we wanted about the bases. There has never at any time been any suggestion at all that if we did not agree to this they would come in and do it. I think they have enough problems of their own without trying to take on some more up here.

Mr. Cafik: Yes; I would think so.

My next question relates to your recommended change in the role for Canada within NATO. I am not sure that I am entirely clear on this.

Canada at the present moment has a strike capability in NATO with nuclear tactical weapons, and so on. Do you suggest that this be totally eliminated. Do you suggest that it is outdated for the other forces in Europe, as well?

Professor Foulkes: As you know, the strike bomber forces in Europe have been greatly reduced over the past ten years. As a matter of fact, one of the objections when we started this role was that they were being reduced for other people and brought in more as a Canadian role.

However, as you know, General Norstad had a considerable feeling for the Canadian air force. It was extremely efficient. He felt that he did not want to see this very efficient air force go out of being. As you know, at that time we were doing air defence and the air defence of Europe was being changed because the French were insisting that they do the air defence over their own country. This was where Canada was doing the air defence. Therefore, that role disappeared.

It had always been the desire of the administration that we should have an air defence role because it was thought that if we had such a role we could have the same type of aircraft for Europe as for Canada; but there was no air defence role to carry out.

Norstad did not want to lose the air division and he proposed this role. But relative to the strike role there is now reluctance to use tactical nuclear weapons because of their great destructive power and the possibility that this destruction will take place on our side of the fence. As you can see, one would not want to go to war with the Soviet Union because they were

doing something in Czechoslovakia. We are not going to know that they are going to strike NATO until they come across the border, and when they start doing that it will be a bit late unless you use nuclear weapons immediately. Therefore, the only chance of using nuclear weapons would quite likely be on West Germany; and the Europeans are not very anxious to have even a conventional war fought on their territory, much less a nuclear war; nor do they want to be liberated again, even by Canadians.

Mr. Cafik: In your view, then, NATO would not object to Canada adopting the position that we were going to do away with our nuclear strike force over there?

● 1620

Professor Foulkes: This you would have to negotiate with the Supreme Allied Commander. But we have negotiated with the Supreme Allied Commander before and I am sure they are very anxious to continue to have any kind of contribution from Canada because they are constantly reminded that Canada made this contribution on a temporary basis in 1951, which is 20 years ago, and a lot of people think it is time the forces came home. I do not think you are going to have too much trouble negotiating a change of role.

Mr. Cafik: Do the NATO officials generally agree with your assessment of the Canadian strike force in Europe?

Professor Foulkes: I have not been negotiating with General Lemnitzer so I do not know his view, but certainly we do know that the situation has changed a great deal. You will recall when tactical nuclear weapons were first brought into being it was always expected that the decision to use these tactical nuclear weapons would be taken in Europe, and Mr. McNamara has made it abundantly clear that the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons will be taken in Washington. Certainly it will not be taken in the first few hours of the battle unless it is an all-out attack. If it is, then it will develop into an all-out nuclear war, which is quite a different thing. We are not really talking now about an all-out war at all; it is an incident that happens and you have to take certain action to show that you mean business.

Mr. Cafik: All right then, with your mobile force to operate on the flanks, what size force did you have in mind? You were talking about two battalions. They would both be stationed in Europe, I presume?

Professor Foulkes: I suggest that we have a brigade or three battalions, something like that, in Europe and you might use one at a time on the flank. The flank in Norway is a very—if any of you have been in northern Norway—inhabitable place. It is rough country and

you have to fight on your flat feet and operate where it is very mountainous, rough and cold, and this is a place in which Canada could operate. One thing we should be expert in is Arctic warfare. We should also be expert in operating in rough country and with a small force like that it may mean the difference between whether or not the Soviet Union will try for a *fait accompli* and snatch off a piece of Norway or put pressure on the Norwegians. The Norwegians have a common border with the Soviet Union. They are very vulnerable. They only have a very small force.

Mr. Cafik: So, when you speak of the flank, sir, you are referring to that particular flank.

Professor Foulkes: That is one flank. I think the other flank is also in Greece and Turkey. The situation in Greece, as you know, is very, very uncertain and a situation may develop in the mountains of Greece where it will be necessary to assist the Greeks in putting on a show of force.

Mr. Cafik: In order to attain mobility of this force, would it, in your view, require an enlarging of our transport facilities?

Professor Foulkes: As I understand it, and I got my information from the appearance before this Committee last year of the head of the Air Transport Command, they had an airlift of one battalion and an airlift of one battalion would perhaps be sufficient to operate at that particular time. The more mobility you have, of course, the better the force will be.

Mr. Cafik: So you think you would have to expand the Canadian force?

Professor Foulkes: I do not know exactly what it is today but a battalion lift would certainly be better than what they have today, which is nothing.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Macquarrie: Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct the professor's attention to the paper which was prepared before this meeting. On page 8, the second last paragraph, there is reference to Canada abrogating all its collective defence obligations and proclaiming unarmed neutrality. I presume you are referring there to something such as an enlarged police force and perhaps an extended coast guard. I am referring to page 8, the second last paragraph, beginning with the word "Therefore,".

● 1625

Professor Foulkes: All I was thinking about was the...

Mr. Macquarrie: This would be much less in terms of cost.

Professor Foulkes: Much less.

Mr. Macquarrie: The next paragraph stimulated a considerable amount of interest on my part. It refers to "unarmed neutrality status". Of course, this is something which I neither predict nor proclaim but, for the purposes of this exercise, we must examine. It says here that under these circumstances the United States:

quite rightly would take whatever steps she deemed necessary for the maintenance of her security.

Would you be good enough to elucidate on the sort of steps you had in mind?

Professor Foulkes: No, because I have never given any real serious thought to what the United States would do. This is something that I do not think Canada would ever do, but if for its own security the United States had to take some action, I am sure it would have to take whatever action was necessary. No doubt it would try and get along without bothering Canada. As I pointed out, it will continue to try out its air defences by operating from Thule and from Alaska. It would strain them. If we were to provide some airfields in between they could do it much easier. Of course, I do not think it would improve our relations if we just said we were not going to do anything, and if they could not operate that way and they found it necessary, they might start to negotiate with us for rights to operate from an airfield.

Mr. Macquarrie: I am sure you did not mean that it would improve relations, but this has now become a public document from a very able man. Can we go so far as to suggest that the United States could not—and remain a great power—entertain the idea of an unarmed, neutral Canada?

Professor Foulkes: I do not think any country can remain a great power if it cannot look after its own security. Geography has decided that.

Mr. Macquarrie: Can it look after its own security—to use your words—without denying to this country, which is its northern neighbour and an important one, the status of an unarmed neutral?

Professor Foulkes: It is my opinion that the United States would take whatever actions it felt were necessary. It may feel there is no necessary action it has to take at the present time. You cannot forecast what will be necessary.

Mr. Macquarrie: But you think there would be some steps. I may say, with respect, that I congratulate you for introducing this aspect. So often one reads of discussions of these matters which are geared to the United States being some remote abstraction, which it certainly is not.

I have a couple of further short questions, Mr. Chairman, and then I will be finished. To follow this a little further, I will read from page 10, the last paragraph following Mr. King's quotation:

Canada must not become, through military weakness or otherwise, a direct threat to American security. If this were to happen, Canada would lose her right as an independent nation.

Would you—and I presume you would—equate military weakness with the kind of unarmed neutrality that you discuss on page 10?

I have another question, and this is not to suggest an inconsistency in your paper but perhaps to reveal an inadequacy in my comprehension of it. On pages 4 and 6 reference is made to the bilateral and the multi-lateral performance of Canada. On page 4 you refer to:

... arrangements in collective organizations such as NATO where Canada rates as an equal partner rather than in bilateral arrangements where Canada is very much the junior partner.

This is sort of giving a preference to the multi-lateral. The last sentence of the first paragraph, on page 6 reads:

Canada has been very sensitive about maintaining its sovereignty and in all negotiations for joint defence installation, the matter of Canadian sovereignty has been made unmistakably clear.

● 1630

This leads me to believe that perhaps we are on a more—if I may say so—equal status when we are bilaterally negotiating, and yet from page 4, I thought we were in better shape around a table of 12 or 15.

Professor Foulkes: I drew two examples. When NATO was first formed there was some political pressure on the Chiefs of Staff to take the "anything less" arrangements which had been done under the Ogdensburg rearrangement. As you know, at the end of the war the United States Secretary of War and the United States secretary of the Navy wrote letters to Canada asking that we continue the arrangements for planning the defence of North America in peace time. The government agreed to that, and we immediately planned for the defence of North America under the revised Ogdensburg arrangements. That is what I was referring to.

When NATO was formed the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group was set up and some of our Ministers felt at that time that Canada should get out of the Ogdensburg arrangements and that all its arrangements for the defence of North America—North

America was then part of NATO—should be part of NATO. However the United States Chiefs of Staff did not feel that they wanted to go this far. They placed a great deal of emphasis on the word "permanent", that this was a permanent joint board whereas NATO was only for 20 years and also there was a question as to whether the United States would release to the NATO partners as much of their research and intelligence as they would to Canada because, as you know, there has been, even just lately, some security problems in Europe. This is what I was talking about.

This came up again and you will remember the debates in the House last fall on the NORAD agreement and the question: "Why was not NORAD put under NATO?" This is what I am referring to. There is a feeling, or there was perhaps a feeling among the Ministers at that time, that they could always have a better deal if they were dealing in NATO where they are equals. Yet, when one examines the NORAD agreement, I think Canada got more than it was really entitled to from the United States at that particular time. The Americans, themselves, thought that we had really pulled a fast one.

Mr. Macquarrie: Thank you, Professor.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I would like to ask a supplementary question.

The Acting Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Just for clarification, with regard to the term you used "under armed neutrality", is such a thing feasible? Many people when they speak of neutral countries, without being informed, assume that they are virtually unarmed. But, in fact, most countries which have a policy of neutrality, such as Sweden and Switzerland, actually are quite heavily armed relative to their size.

Professor Foulkes: Sweden spends much more money on defence than Canada.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Yes, this is the point I was making.

Professor Foulkes: Switzerland spends just about the same.

The Acting Chairman: Another supplementary, Professor Foulkes. Is there a figure there which shows the per cent of the gross national product that Switzerland spent?

Professor Foulkes: Yes. Sweden spent 4.4 in 1965, and in 1967 3.9 of the gross national product; defence expenditures per capita in Sweden \$125. Canada is quoted here as 3.2 in 1965, 2.8 in 1966 and 2.7 in 1967. Switzerland spent 4.4 in 1965, 4.2 in 1966 and

3.9 in 1967. Remember, however, those two countries have compulsory military service.

● 1635

The acting Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Foulkes, I would like to talk a little bit about the navy. You seem to indicate in your paper that in regard to maritime role our contribution to this is quite obsolete, that we are not really effective in that role, and it is costing us a great deal of money. Would you say that unless we change this whole thing completely and up-date it that it is worthless and therefore should be scrapped?

Professor Foulkes: I was not going as far as that, because I am not a naval expert. I was pointing out that if you assume that the greatest threat from the submarine today is a missile-carrying submarine, then there is no hope, according to the experts—and I quoted McNamara—that we are going to be able to control that type of submarine in the length of time that would be required in any kind of a conflict. Therefore, I think one has to consider—and there is a great debate going on in the United States on this problem—whether they should spend their money in trying to locate and destroy the base which the missile is fired from, which is a submarine, and which is very difficult to find now because the methods of operating submarines are such that we can always get now, or can achieve in the next few years a quiet submarine. As you know, our location equipment is all based on our being able to pick up the sound from the submarine and therefore the chances of locating it are getting less. In that case, is it better to try and get the platform or try and get the missile after it leaves the submarine? This is what is being debated in the United States today.

I do suggest that even if we stay in this role that we should have a pretty good look at our hardware. I even quoted what I said to this Committee in 1962. We presently have one carrier and I do not believe one of anything is any good to anybody. I think the present carrier has been out of commission for a year, and I do not know what has been taking its place. I did ask somebody the other day whether the United States had loaned us one but I found they had not done so and therefore we apparently for a whole year have been getting along without it. We saw the other day what it is costing to refit it. Our present group of equipment consists of a carrier, and tracker aircraft, and as you are aware, this carrier we have is too short to take jet aircraft. Therefore if you are going to stay in this field you really should get out of the present carrier, and get one big enough to carry jet aircraft. It can only operate really as a helicopter carrier. Also, the ships we are building are slower than the sub-

marines. So that even though they locate the submarine, they will not be able to catch up with it. Therefore I am suggesting, not that we should do away with it, but we should have a pretty close look at it again. I have suggested that it should be subjected to a systems-analysis study where this would be studied in terms of what value you are getting out of it for each dollar you spend. Which is the most valuable—a helicopter on the back of a destroyer or would it be better to have 12 helicopters on the carrier? If our destroyers are only useful to carry one helicopter, that is a pretty expensive way of carrying one helicopter around. Surely we would be better if we had another aircraft carrier capable of carrying 14 or 20 helicopters. These are the kind of things which should be examined in a cost effectiveness study where you would see what you are getting for every dollar you spent on this role. It might give an indication as to where you go in the future.

Now, as I pointed out in this quotation, all we seem to do is replace one ship with another ship. But are we sure that we need a ship or are we sure that we want more helicopters or should we save all our money and go for killer submarines? A recent expert in the United States pointed out that the only real anti-submarine weapon was a killer submarine. Now, if that is true, what are we doing with all this other hardware? I think this should be fully investigated. You may find that we are not getting very much value for the \$280 million we spent. At least I think that we should find out. The ways and means of doing cost effectiveness studies are available now and it seems to me this should be undertaken so that when Ministers and this Committee and so on have to make a decision they can be provided with all this information.

● 1640

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you very much; I tend to agree with you 100 per cent. The point is that the antisubmarine role is somewhat dubious even in the context of the whole continent, and the United States certainly has modern equipment. But in the case of Canada it seems somewhat ludicrous, as you say, with one aircraft carrier, and so on.

I wonder whether you could give us some idea of what you think the priorities would be for our role in defence, General? For example, suppose we have to cut back somewhere and we have to knock out one, two or three of the roles we are playing; how would you line them up in order of importance? For example, would you have NORAD first, NATO second, antisubmarine or peacekeeping third—this kind of thing? Suppose we have to chop off one or two at the bottom, or even three?

Professor Foulkes: I do not think you can answer that question just off the cuff. I think you would have to go into it a bit more thoroughly and find out

exactly what these various roles were and what they were costing.

I think you would find that if an estimate were made of what it would cost to operate a changed role in Europe you might save sufficient funds to be able to do some other role.

My own preference—and I think this does kind of stick out a mile—is that we should co-operate in the defence of North America, and I would say that is more or less priority one. As I have pointed out before, we went into Europe at a time when it was necessary to raise the morale of the Europeans, but their morale, their military posture and their economic position is such that they really should be able to look after their own territorial defence, and that was the original notion of NATO.

The original idea of NATO was the North America would provide only reinforcements and strategic bombing. There was no suggestion originally that Canada—or even the United States—should put forces there. But as far as Canada is concerned, you cannot really make a case. We have to have forces there unless there is some political question that I do not understand.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): So certainly NORAD would be number one.

Professor Foulkes: I would think it would.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Would you place the anti-submarine role down at the bottom of the list?

Professor Foulkes: I would have to have a pretty good look at it to see just how much this kind of role is contributing to the defence of North America. I have some grave doubts about whether it is contributing very much at the present time.

Mr. Laniel: I have a supplementary on that, Mr. Chairman.

The Acting Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: When you speak of antisubmarine warfare, though, you are speaking not only of destroyers and aircraft carriers; you are also speaking of aircraft. Did you get the impression, as some of us did when we went to Halifax and really found out there, that the real protection given to Canada by this role is mainly fulfilled—well fulfilled—by the air force? Could the air force not meet your requirements of re-evaluation, the purpose or the target of an ASN role?

Professor Foulkes: That is why I suggested there should be a thorough examination to find out just what value you get, because there is quite a difference

in price between an Argus aircraft or the replacement of the Argus.

Mr. Laniel: It could be something other than an Argus.

Professor Foulkes: I think we want to get a little closer to see what we are getting per dollar we spend on the antisubmarine role. As I understand it, the Argus is nearly 10 years old now and it will soon need replacing, so these questions about the re-equipping of this force are bound to arise I would say, within the next few years.

It seems to me that one should have a very close look at every element in it, and dollar for dollar just how much value all these different elements in locating the submarines are. You may find that none of them is really satisfactory.

● 1645

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): General, I do not know how intimate a knowledge you have of the Navy's role at present, but a year and a half ago I had the opportunity of seeing the aircraft carrier just after it had come out of its repairs, and they were doing manoeuvres where frogmen had to go under the sea and do certain things. What does this have to do with the defence role; could you enlighten us about that?

Professor Foulkes: I do not know what the frogmen would be doing unless it was thought there was some sabotage or . . .

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): This was a three-month exercise. Of course, it was a nice time of the year to be down in the Caribbean, but I wondered if there were some specific reason for this that has to do with our defence.

Professor Foulkes: Offhand I could not think of any. I agree the Caribbean is a good place to be. As a matter of fact, and perhaps as you know, we had great difficulty once because we found our icebreaker was down in the Caribbean instead of breaking ice outside Seven Islands.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, may I add I was on board the *Bonaventure* for a week on an exercise and I went through all the exercises except one and that was when—you call them frogmen, they call them scuba divers—they went down from the *Bonaventure*, and they went down to repair a leak on a propeller of the *Bonaventure*.

Professor Foulkes: I do know that the Navy can crack ice without an icebreaker.

Mr. Harkness: General Foulkes, you said in your opening remarks that you proceeded on the assumption that Canada did not need to look after her own security and this put us in a much easier position as far as deciding what military roles we would carry out is concerned. I would somewhat question that assumption. Would you not agree that we have to look after our own security in so far as maintaining control of our own land air and surrounding waters are concerned?

Professor Foulkes: Yes, but I do not look at that, really, as security. I look at that as maintaining our sovereignty. I may be . . .

Mr. Harkness: This is the very point I was getting at. In order to maintain any pretense of sovereignty and control over our own land, air and water we must have some defence forces and that, in my view, is part of maintaining our security.

Professor Foulkes: But I think, Mr. Harkness, I did point out on pages 7 and 8 that we did need forces if we are going to be able to do surveillance in the Arctic, to make sure we still have possession of the Arctic Islands, and also that the fishing fleet, the armed trawlers, are going to need some support, and if we start to do exploration on the continental shelf there will have to be enforcement authorities there as well, and it seems to me that you could arm a trawler but if somebody is determined to take things away, an armed trawler will not be much good to you.

Therefore, I am not trying to make a case that there is no reason for internal security. I was looking at security in its bigger aspect; that is, from aggression outside.

Mr. Harkness: Well, this is a point but I think there might have been some misconception that we did not need to maintain forces even for these purposes but, as I say, you are talking of security from the point of view of a large-scale war or something along that line, but as far as minor incursions are concerned—which, in my view, is part of our security and as you have pointed out in your paper—we have to maintain forces for that purpose.

As far as security in the sense that you were talking about is concerned, I think you would agree that we secure that security by the alliances we enter into, particularly the NORAD agreement with the United States and our membership in NATO, and I am glad to see as far as your paper is concerned that you are in favour of maintaining those alliances, because I think this is the only way in which our over-all or basic security can be looked after.

Now when it comes to the matter of NATO, I suggest that the savings you have said you think might be arrived at by a change in roles may be somewhat il-

lusory. Of course, I think everyone agrees that there has to be a change of role and a change of commitment from time to time, particularly as conditions change. As equipment becomes obsolete, and so forth, you have to have a change in role and a change in equipment. I think everybody realizes that, but I would be somewhat doubtful that there would be very much saving of funds as a result of the change in role which you have suggested.

On page 13 you say:

It is suggested that the strike squadrons should be converted to a ground support and transport role for the NATO Mobile Force.

This, of course, would be a big re-equipment program which would take probably at least two or three hundred million dollars.

Professor Foulkes: The CF-5 is being manufactured already; I do not know how much they have paid for it.

● 1650

Mr. Harkness: I know, but it is no good as a transport plane.

Professor Foulkes: No, but it is only used as ground support.

Mr. Harkness: Yes, but you are saying that it should be converted to a ground support and transport role.

Professor Foulkes: That is right, ground support.

Mr. Harkness: As a matter of fact, for a mobile role I think there is no question we need a great deal more air transport. What I am suggesting is that with changes of this kind, while I am not saying they are not desirable—in fact I think that changes are desirable—I doubt very much whether there is going to be a great deal of saving of money as a result.

Professor Foulkes: Well, the main point of my argument is that you would have a homogeneous force. You would not need to have a heavy tank school; when you shut the school up you would not be buying tanks and you would not be dealing in heavy artillery. There would be a whole lot of schools and things you would close up because you would only have one type of force to train. When you come into these multi-various bits of training you need three staff offices in Ottawa, to wit each command kind of thing, a special school to carry out their special training, and the more you go into the various fields, the more you have to put into administration and back up the training establishments. The simpler you get it the cheaper it is.

Mr. Harkness: I agree with the general concept that the simpler you get it the cheaper it is, but I think

with any sort of balanced mobile force you are going to have some type of artillery in it. It will be a light transportable type of artillery, it is true, but you will still need to maintain an artillery school and so forth.

Professor Foulkes: But you are quite likely to go for weapons that are not heavy weapons because this force has to be airportable.

Mr. Harkness: Yes, but any modern, up-to-date, air-portable force has to have some type of artillery. This is just one of the essential arms of an effective mobile brigade. I was just putting out the point that I do not think the Committee should be left with the idea that

a change of role such as you have suggested is going to save us a great deal of money. I would be very doubtful myself on the basis of my own experience whether it would.

The Acting Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we all regret that this meeting has to be cut short due to circumstances. I know we are indebted to Professor Foulkes for his very informative paper and evidence based on his many years of experience and service to the country. On this note I think we will have to adjourn and go to the Chamber. Would the Committee agree that we print Professor Foulkes' advance presentation as an appendix to our minutes?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

APPENDIX GG

A CANADIAN RESPONSE TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY

by Professor Charles Foulkes

At their meeting in Brussels in December, 1967, the North Atlantic Council adopted the strategy of flexible response, with an immediate demand for an increase in conventional forces and the raising of the threshold of tactical nuclear involvement from the combat level to the top of the totem pole.

The exhortations and pressure exerted by Mr. McNamara no doubt raised the quality of the conventional forces, but because of French withdrawal and the reluctances of the other partners, the requirement of the conventional forces fell below what the Supreme Allied Command regarded as necessary to implement NATO forward strategy.

However, in his last presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February last year, Secretary McNamara stated:

"The greatest deficiency in the European NATO forces however, is the lack of adequate mobilization bases. We, in the United States have made great progress in raising the combat readiness of our own reserve forces and in providing the means for their movement, and, I believe, it is most urgent that our European Allies do likewise. By adopting such an approach, the flexibility of the NATO force structure could be greatly enhanced."

You will notice that NATO strategy has gone the full circle from 1950 to 1968, and NATO is back now where it was at the beginning, relying on conventional forces and looking to strategic warning and rapid mobilization to fill the gap between what is required and what the NATO partners are prepared to provide.

No doubt there are some here who will challenge placing such reliance on adequate strategic warning and the ability of NATO to mobilize as fast and as efficiently as Warsaw Pact nations. The recent Czech crisis has provided good enough reason for reconsideration of this theory.

The two aspects of the strategy of flexible response that affect Canadian participation are the necessity to increase conventional force contributions in Europe, and secondly, the establishment of an effective mobilization base. Any substantial increase in the ground force contribution would really involve building up the brigade group to a full division. Canadian insis-

tence in maintaining the identity of its contributions would not tolerate providing, for example, an additional brigade or a few extra battalions to bolster up a British division. But to increase the contribution to a division would entail manpower increase from 6,000 to about 20,000, trebling the equipment and maintenance cost, which is even now exceeding \$45 million. Furthermore, I understand that instead of increasing the conventional commitments, certain quarters in Canada are suggesting a reduction.

Secondly, to re-establish an effective mobilization base would be of little use in producing reinforcing formations quickly, because the professional forces in Canada do not produce trained reserves.

These requirements raised by the implementation of flexible strategy highlight the need for an immediate re-appraisal of Canadian force contributions.

However, before leaving the question of ground force contributions, may I leave this thought with you to ponder over: "Are we exploiting to the full the merits and enhanced capabilities of a professional force when assessing Canada's best contribution to collective defence." In a professional force, it is possible to attain much higher standards of technical, tactical, and leadership skills. In such circumstances, Canada should undertake military tasks which require enhanced skills and proficiency in handling complicated equipment and techniques, and leave to the short-term national service forces the traditional static ground force roles. I will come back to this thought later.

Let us look at the Air Division. The strategy of flexible response imposes a considerable delay in the use of nuclear strike weapons, and as such increases considerably the vulnerability of the nuclear air strike squadrons. This vulnerability has been increased further by the intransigent attitude of De Gaulle, which has forced the crowding of the Canadian nuclear strike squadrons on two bases in Germany. These two bases are well within Medium Range Ballistic Missile capability and may be already targeted for immediate destruction in the initial stage of an encounter while the aircraft are still on the ground. While these aircraft have been given a limited conventional strike capability, the usefulness and viability of this contribution is only marginal. No arrangements

have been made for replacement of wastage, therefore this contribution is wasting away by attrition.

Now let us look at North American defence. The defence arrangements in North America have been influenced more by the rapid technical development than by changes in strategy. The development of the extensive bomber defence system over the past twenty years has created many problems, some of a political nature involving sovereignty, control of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, and the protection of the Eskimos and Indians, etc. There were also problems of command control, which terminated in the establishment of NORAD in 1958.

However, the quite frequent blasts from the Soviet Union, castigating Canada for supporting the operations of the U.S. nuclear strike forces, and referring to Canada as a satellite of the United States, have caused uneasiness in the political sphere. The vicious Soviet attacks, which were usually echoed by anti-American elements here, have influenced the politicians to prefer negotiating defence arrangements in collective organizations such as NATO where Canada rates as an equal partner rather than in bilateral arrangements where Canada is very much the junior partner. As one former Minister was fond of repeating, there is less chance of rape when there are fifteen in the bed. This contention was raised at the time of the formation of NATO in 1949, when there was some political pressure to transfer the defence arrangements concluded under the renewed Ogdensburg agreement to the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of NATO, and again during the debate on the NORAD agreement in Parliament in 1958. However, the U.S. authorities placed a great deal of emphasis on the permanent aspect of the Joint Board on Defence, whereas the NATO treaty was a twenty year agreement. The U.S. Chiefs pointed out that there was also the possibility of a much wider exchange of intelligence and technical information on a bilateral basis than in an alliance of fourteen or fifteen partners, where security may be doubtful. Therefore, North American defence planning has remained under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which appears to be in line with the present official trend in defence planning.

The decreases in the bomber threat and its replacement by the strategic ballistic missile has considerably reduced the importance of Canadian real estate and air space in U.S. security planning. However, the proposed revised bomber defence scheme, which involves the use of air-borne early warning and control aircraft and high performance interception aircraft, will no doubt involve Canada in new joint defence arrangements. In fact, in Secretary McNamara's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he mentioned that "the Canadian government had already indicated that it intends to continue its cooperation in the air defence of the continent." To what extent this cooperation involves Canada has not been revealed. However,

in the past, by making effective contributions to collective defence, Canada has sought, over the past twenty years, to maintain her standing in NATO and with the United States and to continue to have an effective voice in the formulation of the security of the West.

On the other hand, during the recent Canadian election campaign there were frequent references to reductions in force contributions, and suggestions for the withdrawal of Canada from NATO and NORAD. It has been revealed recently that these matters of partnership in NORAD and NATO are under active consideration.

With this in mind, it appears timely to look at the various alternatives in the light of the observations I have made regarding the effects and requirements of the new strategy.

One of the hardy perennial alternatives is the issue of neutrality. For some years there were several groups who continued to clamour for all the Canadian armed forces to be placed under the United Nations for peacekeeping purposes. As succeeding Secretary Generals have turned down such offers of permanent U.N. forces, this aspect of neutrality has fallen into disuse. However, a new neutralist proposal is being advanced which is quite popular with some academics and politicians. This group considers that the greatest threat to security is the unstable condition in the undeveloped countries. Furthermore, they express the view that the security of Canada would be served better by devoting the \$1.7 billion to the welfare of the undeveloped countries than by being spent on our present armed forces. I do not intend to go into all the ramifications of aid to developing countries, which of course has a prominent place in the government program, but I would like to point out that there are some aspects of the defence of Canadian sovereignty which cannot be neglected if Canada is to continue in undisputed control of all Canadian territory. Canada has been very sensitive about maintaining its sovereignty and in all negotiations for joint defence installation, the matter of Canadian sovereignty has been made unmistakably clear.

On the other hand, I believe that the Canadian claim for ownership of the Arctic islands is still not beyond dispute. I was informed recently that even some of the U.S. maps show the Arctic islands within the Canadian sector as "disputed territory." I believe that the U.S. does not subscribe to the sector principle; furthermore, there is some doubt that Canada can lay claim to all the islands on the grounds of discovery or occupation. You may contend that sovereignty over these millions of acres of ice and snow is of little importance. However, very extensive exploration for oil and minerals is already underway. The Department of Northern Development announced recently that "A total of 50.3 million acres of exploration permits have been acquired in the High Islands

and in the Arctic offshore areas." If valuable strikes are made and important minerals are found, ownership and sovereignty may be challenged, and indeed some of the areas might be occupied and remain unobserved for many months unless constant surveillance were undertaken.

I would remind you that this is not a new problem: it was very much in evidence in the critical days of the late forties and early fifties. You will recall that Soviet pressure and intransigence was at its height at this time. The United States became concerned about the possibility of the Soviet Union establishing refueling bases in the Arctic in order to facilitate two-way bombing missions against the United States. Air surveillance by the USAF revealed Soviet occupation of two ice islands drifting about in the Arctic Ocean. Air photographs revealed that each island was equipped with tents, shelters, stockpiles of oil drums, and a short rough runway. From further observations it was concluded that the occupants were scientific personnel carrying out observations of the Arctic Ocean. Although the rough air fields were not long enough to accommodate bomber aircraft, it was not beyond the capacity of present knowledge to extend such ice islands for bomber aircraft use. Actually, the idea of ice airfields was developed during the last year of the war, under what was known under code word "Habbatuk project," where it was proved quite feasible to construct an ice island of a combination of sea ice and sawdust strong enough to support air operations for limited periods of the year.

Thus, as exploration of the Arctic develops and new techniques open up ways and means of delivering the products of the Arctic to market, the necessity for surveillance, control, and policing arise. Sovereignty imposes the obligations of protection and control, as well as the functions of collecting royalties from exploitation.

Similar means of enforcing sovereign rights are required to establish and maintain the twelve-mile fishing limit in both oceans. Furthermore, the development of off-shore exploration on the continental shelf will establish a need for active enforcement authorities in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Even peace-loving NATO partners have been known to make belligerent gestures at one another over fishing rights.

Another aspect of the need for a military presence is in the field of internal security. I am well aware of the rather smug attitude of many Canadians to the question of Civil disorders. Some consider that Canada has taken such an enlightened attitude toward social and racial problems that, while there are civil disorders in other places, it won't happen here. I would remind you that this has not always been the case. In the early twenties the underlying reason for establishment of the permanent army was to be able to deal with increasing prevalence of civil disorders. While I am sure

we all hope that Canada will be spared the ordeal of civil unrest, it would be unsound to ignore the possibility and the need for means of controlling any outbreaks of violence.

Therefore, if Canada was to abrogate all its collective defence obligations and proclaim unarmed neutrality, there are certain aspects of maintaining Canadian sovereignty and control over its territory and territorial waters which are incumbent on every sovereign state and require armed forces.

The final aspect of any unarmed neutrality status is the attitude and reaction of the United States. There is little doubt that our neighbour would be quite disturbed by any such move, and as a great power, the United States quite rightly would take whatever steps she deemed necessary for the maintenance of her security. It must do so, or cease to be a great power.

Perhaps I should explain by means of an illustration. You will recall that in the early fifties the United States was heavily committed in Korea and was faced with a threatening situation in Western Europe, where the only troops available to withstand any Soviet threat were the occupation forces. The Soviet Union had exploded an atomic device several years earlier than had been expected, and although the United States had a four-or five-year lead, there was concern that the Soviet Union would take every measure to catch up to the United States. In such a race, it was considered that the Soviet Union might take any action it could to interfere with U.S. atomic production. During this period, a considerable amount of uranium required for U.S. production was obtained from the Eldorado Mining Company at Great Bear Lake, within easy reach of the Soviet bases in the Kamchatra peninsula. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the production of this mine was vital to U.S. security and that steps must be taken to protect the mine complex from any Soviet air attack by mounting heavy anti-aircraft artillery defence of the area. It was pointed out that if Canada was not able or prepared to establish the anti-aircraft protection, the United States would press for permission to do so. This was a difficult commitment in a most remote area under arctic conditions. Because of the remoteness of the area and the severity of the conditions, frequent rotation of troops would be necessary and many new problems would arise. On the other hand, it was considered untenable to allow U.S. forces to defend a Canadian installation over a prolonged period. However, during the investigation of the problem with the company, it was found that the only vulnerable structure above ground was the derrick. If this equipment was destroyed, the mine could not operate, but the mine management agreed to construct an alternative derrick and to conceal it some distance from the present mine shaft, but readily available if required. The U.S. Chiefs were assured of the continued production of uranium and the issue of anti-aircraft protection was dropped. However, I sug-

gest that the incident shows quite clearly that no nation can afford to ignore any matter which its neighbour considers is vital to its security.

It seems necessary to occasionally remind ourselves that the security advantages which we accrue from the shade of the U.S. umbrella imposes also obligations. Recent events in Czechoslovakia have shown the hazards of living within the orbit of the Eastern super power, and that demonstration should provide sober reflection for those who complain so vocally about privations and perils of our geographical position.

The obligations implicit in sharing the North American continent can perhaps be best summed up by a statement made by the late Mr. King, who by any stretch of imagination could not be described as militant. This is what he said in 1938:

"We, too, as a good friendly neighbour, have our responsibilities, one of them is to see that our country is made immune from possible invasion, as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to make their way, either by land, sea, or air, to the United States across Canadian territory."

These are not idle words; what Mr. King said was that Canada must not become, through military weakness or otherwise, a direct threat to American security. If this were to happen, Canada would lose her right as an independent nation. Therefore, according to Mr. King's dictum, if Canada wishes to abrogate its collective defence commitments and go it alone, one of the elements it must provide is the facility to deter and prevent air and missile attacks over Canada en route to the United States. The realization of such a responsibility should cause a close examination of the merits and advantages of the present collective defence arrangements.

In searching for alternatives to the present contributions to collective security, one is struck by the meagre operational forces Canada produces for the \$1.7 billion it spends. In the current issue of the *Military Balance*, produced by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Canada is shown as producing a smaller quota of operational forces for the amount of money spent than almost any other power. There are of course many contributing factors causing this dilemma.

After the last war, the Canadian forces were set up on the basis of the British Services, with the whole array of headquarters, training establishments, schools, and depots, just like a great power, but with the operational forces very much in "miniature." The integration exercise has eliminated a great deal of the duplication and redundant staffs, but the multiplicity of combat tasks involving increasing arrays of expensive equipment still remains. We seem to wish to dabble in every aspect of military endeavour. It is this wide diversion of military tasks with the accompanying

array of schools, training establishments, and equipment that minimize the effective size of our contributions. Monty once remarked that what it cost the Canadians to provide a brigade, the Turks could field a corps of two divisions.

It is accepted that Canada is not primarily responsible for its own security, and that all that is required is to provide effective contributions to collective defence, then our contribution should be selective and concentrated on one or two specialized tasks. In this way, the maximum operational element could be provided.

Let us look first of all at the contributions in Europe. As I mentioned earlier, the brigade group in the traditional ground role is wasteful, in absorbing in a mundane role the higher standards of technical-tactical and leadership skills available in a professional force. It is suggested that Canada should hand over the traditional ground force role to the British or to the Germans and re-organize the Brigade as a mobile formation, available to the NATO Mobile Force already organized in Allied Command Europe and at present under Canadian command, but without any troops, just promises of forces if and when available. Canada has committed two battalions to this force, but they are stationed in Canada, and I firmly believe that a Canadian presence is still desirable in Europe for some time to come, and here is a real opportunity for Canada to concentrate its effort in Europe in one meaningful role in NATO, instead of three rather dubious commitments.

Such a contribution, based on mobile equipment, could be built up to a full division in an emergency in a short time, by air reinforcement. This kind of role would suit Canadian aptitude, training skills, and advanced leadership and would provide the necessary flexibility to meet U.N. peacekeeping roles as well as re-inforcing Europe on the Northern flank under arctic conditions or in the mountains of Greece or Turkey, or anywhere else where a NATO presence was urgently needed. Such an arrangement would open up the possibility of frequent rotation and eliminate the need for married quarters, schools, and other expensive impedimenta. Under such a plan, it would not cost any more to keep the troops in Europe than in Canada, but would be providing a more useful and flexible contribution at less cost and manpower than the present arrangements.

As I mentioned earlier, the present nuclear strike role is of doubtful and diminishing value under today's strategy; in any event, it is an undesirable contribution that is wasting away. It is suggested that the strike squadrons should be converted to a ground support and transport role for the NATO Mobile Force. As and when the re-organization of these revised roles is implemented, it would then be possible to concentrate all the Canadian elements in one cantonment in Ger-

many, with one administration and one set of amenities, and thus economize on administrative costs.

In North America, the problem is mainly concerned with the implementation of the new airborne early warning and interception system which I mentioned earlier. It may be beyond the capacity of the Canadian defence effort to undertake the provision of all the facilities which may be required on Canadian territory. Therefore, the problem that will arise is just what proportion of the system will Canada provide, and what part, and under what conditions Canada will agree to the United States establishing air defence installations on Canadian soil and to operate in Canadian air space. Perhaps I could make one observation about this aspect of the problem. In the NORAD set up, at each sector headquarters which controls air operations in Canadian air space, the commander or the deputy commander is a Canadian. Therefore I would presume that, in order to continue to exercise control of air operations in Canadian air space, Canada will wish to participate in an authoritative manner in this new system of airborne control of air operations.

It is worth noting that the United States has so arranged its limited anti-missile project so as to avoid the use of Canadian air space and territory, and therefore eliminate any delay or adjustment by having to negotiate with Canada.

However, if the proposed Anti Missile Project is expanded to cover certain cities, some problems may arise in arranging protection of border points such as Detroit, where the siting of the "Sprint" missile and protection from fallout will no doubt require Canadian attention. It will also raise the issue of whether, if it is vital and possible to defend Detroit, what about Toronto and Montreal.

I firmly believe that Canada should take as active an interest as possible in Anti Ballistic Missile Project, so that technical and tactical information can be collected on questions of early warning, fallout, border points, and other matters of pertinent value to Canada.

The last question, which I have not touched on because it does not seem to be effected by the strategy of flexible response, is the defence against the missile launching submarine. Anti-submarine warfare is an activity where Canada and the United States have cooperated very closely for many years, but is also a problem which seems to defy adequate solution.

As Mr. McNamara admitted when discussing counter force strategy, and I quote:

"We know no way to destroy the enemy's missile submarines at the same time. We do not anticipate that either the United States or the Soviet Union will acquire that capability in the foreseeable future."

Most of the experts content that current submarine development indicates that an almost silent submarine is obtainable in the future. As the present methods of locating the submarine are based on acoustic devices, the problem of locating and tracking the nuclear submarine becomes almost impossible. Therefore, unless there is a scientific breakthrough in the means of locating the submarine, the advanced methods of destruction are not of much avail.

There is a school of thought which maintains that, as the present methods of locating the submarine are unrewarding, anti submarine activities should be abandoned and the funds devoted to furthering the development of means of interception and destroying the warhead on its way to the target. It is appreciated that the time of flight of the submarine-launched missile may be quite short, but the proposed ABM system is expected to have a limited capacity to deal with the Polaris type missile.

When giving evidence before this Committee in 1962, I stated the following:

"I am not convinced that we really know what is the most efficient and economical anti submarine force for Canada. There has never been, as far as I know, an unbiased assessment of the relative value of carriers, tracker aircraft, frigates, submarines, helicopters, and long-range maritime aircraft in this anti submarine role. What has happened is that we have replaced the Magnificent by another carrier. the wartime frigates one for one with a \$30 million (I understand that figure is out of date) relatively slow escort vessel. The Lancasters have been replaced with Argus maritime aircraft which need another replacement by 1970. But is this conglomeration of a carrier, tracker aircraft, frigates, helicopters, and long-range maritime aircraft the most efficient, effective and economical grouping for this task? Or is this grouping just a collection of the plans and ambitions of the air force and naval planners I suspect it is?"

In 1969, a lot of the equipment mentioned above is much nearer obsolescence, and the question of its replacement is no doubt arising already. This maritime role costs somewhere in the vicinity of \$280 million; a major re-equipping program would increase considerably the funds required for this activity. As I understand that systems analysis studies are being introduced into the planning procedures at National Defence, it would appear timely to subject the maritime role to a complete system analysis in preparation for objective decisions on its future.

To sum up:

1. The changing NATO strategy which emphasizes the requirement for increased conventional forces, including ready reserves, highlights the need for a reassessment of Canadian contributions. In such a

re-appraisal, full cognizance should be taken of the higher standards of technical-tactical and leadership skills which are obtainable in professional forces.

2. As there are some areas of doubt in the present anti submarine role, it is considered timely and prudent to subject this maritime activity to a complete systems analysis study.
3. There appears to be little to recommend and much to deprecate in any form of neutrality for Canada, but more meaningful and more economical forms of contributions are available if more deliberate thought is given to devising the best possible overall contributions and completely dismissing the notion that the Canadian forces should dabble in all the multifarious forms of military endeavour. Much greater flexibility could be attained if a completely homogeneous force was organized, so that the same basic type of force could be used in various strengths in Europe, North America, with the U.N., or in the arctic. As one distinguished politician remarked, "Let us try for less harness and more horse."

General Charles FOULKES, C.G., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., etc. Former Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

General Foulkes was born in England in 1903, educated in London, Ontario, and was commissioned in the Royal Canadian Regiment in 1926. Following his tour as a regimental officer, he held various staff appointments in Military Districts in Ontario. He graduated from the *Senior Staff College at Camberley, England*, in 1938. In November, 1939, he was appointed Brigade Major, 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, and proceeded overseas with this formation a month later. He returned to Canada late in 1940 to assume the appointment of General Staff Officer, Grade I, with the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and in July, 1941, accompanied this division to England. In the United Kingdom, he commanded the Regina Rifles, and then commanded the 3rd Infantry Brigade in the 1st Division for eight months prior to his appointment as Brigadier, General Staff, First Canadian Army, in April, 1943. His promotion to Major-General and appointment to command the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division dates from January 11, 1944. He led the 2nd Division in the invasion of France. In September, 1944, he took over command of 2nd Canadian Corps, in a temporary capacity,

and fought the battle of Walcheren. In November, 1944, General Foulkes was promoted to Lieutenant-General and left Northwest Europe to take over command of the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy. In February and March of 1945, he took the 1st Canadian Corps to Holland in time to play a leading role in the final battles which brought about the collapse of the German Army. After relinquishing command of the 1st Canadian Corps on July 17, 1945, General Foulkes returned to Canada and was appointed Chief of the General Staff on August 21, a position which he held through the difficult period of demobilization and the reconversion of the Canadian Army to its postwar organization. He was appointed to be the first Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, on 1 February, 1951. He was promoted to the rank of General on January 26, 1954. In 1959, General Foulkes was appointed Colonel of The Royal Canadian Regiment, the regiment which he joined in 1926. For war service he has been granted the following decorations: Companion of the Bath, Commander of the British Empire, Distinguished Service Order, Four mentions in Despatches, and Canadian Forces Decoration. In addition, he received the following foreign awards: *Commandeur de la Légion d'Honneur* and *Croix de Guerre avec Palme*, from France; *Grand Officer of the Order of Orange Nassau*, with *Swords*, from The Netherlands; *Grand Officier de l'Ordre de la Couronne avec Palme and Croix de Guerre 1940 avec Palme*, from Belgium; *Commander of the Legion of Merit*, from the United States of America; *Grand Officer, Military Order of Italy*; and *Grand Cross of the Order of George I*, from Greece. General Foulkes also holds a *Doctorate of Laws from the University of Western Ontario* and a *Doctorate of Science from the Royal Military College of Canada*. General Foulkes is a widower and has a son, who is a metallurgical engineer with the Aluminum Company of Canada. General Foulkes is at present Associate Professor of Strategy at Carleton University.

Publications:

Canadian Defence Policy in the Nuclear Age, published by Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

A Chapter in *Neighbours Taken for Granted on Complications of Continental Defence* (ed. Livingston Merchant), Frederick A. Praeger, New York.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 27

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	MacRae
Anderson	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Marceau
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Nowlan
Brewin	Laniel	Penner
Cafik	Laprise	Prud'homme
Fairweather	Legault	¹ Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Forrestall	Lewis	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Gibson	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Groos	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
² Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Macquarrie	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4)(b):

¹ Mr. Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*) replaced Mr. Ouellet on February 13, 1969.

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 13, 1969

(40)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, Macquarrie, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch (25).

Also present: Messrs. Buchanan, Hymmen and Roberts, M.P.'s.

Witness: Professor Michael Brecher, Department of Economics and Political Science, McGill University, Montreal.

The Vice-Chairman introduced the witness, Professor Michael Brecher of McGill University. Members had received copies of an article by Professor Brecher entitled *Neutrality: An Analysis*, from the *International Journal*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Summer 1962, and Professor Brecher's curriculum vitae.

Professor Brecher made an opening statement and was questioned by members of the Committee.

With the questioning continuing, at 12:55 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until 4:00 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(41)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 4:05 p.m. this day, with the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Cafik, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Macquarrie, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Winch (18).

Also present: Mr. Hymmen, M.P.

Witness: Professor Michael Brecher.

During the afternoon sitting, Members completed their questioning of Professor Brecher on various aspects of Canadian defence and external affairs policies.

On motion of Mr. Allmand,

Agreed,—That the article entitled *Neutrality: An Analysis* and the curriculum vitae of Professor Brecher, be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix hh*)

The Vice-Chairman, on behalf of the Committee, thanked Professor Brecher for his testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m., until Tuesday, February 18, 1969 at 11:00 a.m., when the witness will be Professor Kenneth McNaught.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, February 13, 1969

The Vice-Chairman: Would the meeting come to order, please. Are there any corrections to our record of Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence? If not, the Committee has before it today, as an invited witness, Professor Michael Brecher. Professor Brecher, who is a distinguished Canadian political scientist, has specialized in and has established an enviable reputation in the study of the politics of the third world, particularly with respect to India. His publications, which are listed in the biography already circulated, attest to his expertise in this field.

One of his main interests has been the study of neutralism and non-alignment policies which are prevalent in some of these countries. He has examined the environment, characteristics and attitudes peculiar to each case. His paper entitled "Neutralism: An Analysis", which appeared in the *International Journal* in 1962, has already been sent to members.

As part of our consideration of the choice which is open to Canada of participating in defensive alliances with other states or of pursuing a policy of neutrality, Professor Brecher has been asked to explain, by referring specifically to Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, India and other states, how neutrality or non-alignment or neutralism meets their defensive needs. We hope he will also describe why formerly neutral states, such as Belgium, are now members of alliances.

• 1110

After he has made his introductory remarks, Committee members will then have an opportunity to question Professor Brecher regarding his views. Professor Brecher.

Professor Michael Brecher (Department of Economic and Political Science, McGill University): Thank you, Mr. Ryan. Gentlemen, I think it might be well if I spent a few moments this morning in clarifying what appears to me to be a very considerable misunderstanding about the terms that are used interchangeably to discuss one of the most

significant phenomenon in contemporary international politics.

I think there are four quite distinct terms which may be viewed along the spectrum from isolation to total involvement which relate to the foreign policy of those states that consider themselves neutral, non-aligned, neutralist and neutralized. I should like, in the course of this very brief semantic exercise and by way of introduction to some other observations, to indicate which states fit which designation, what are the conditions under which their particular brand of this phenomenon of non-alignment has flourished or has failed and the reasons for that, and ultimately, if I may, and even prior to the questions, I would like to address myself to the possible relevance of some form of non-alignment to Canadian foreign policy in the immediate future.

I will now very briefly sketch the meaning of these four terms in the following way. Neutrality refers specifically to a legal status which comes into effect once a war has begun, and it simply refers to the posture of any state which, after war has started, takes the position that it will not be a participant or belligerent in that conflict. So, the United States from 1914 to 1917 and again from 1939 to 1941 would be a typical illustration of a neutral state practicing the legal status and policy of neutrality whereby it claims certain rights and assumes certain obligations towards belligerent states. There have been, however, many states, particularly in the post World War II era, that have indicated in advance they do not wish to participate in any possible overt conflicts that might ensue at any time in the future; that is to say, they have taken a posture of non-alignment, non-identification or non-participation, particularly in the conflicts which have ensued and might ensue in the future as between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in their respective blocs. I would suggest that non-alignment of this type is a purely passive foreign policy. Its primary objective, if you wish, is self-protec-

tion by isolation from the contaminating effects or the spill-over effects of interbloc conflict. Of course, we have an outstanding example of this in the case of Sweden. We also have the case of the permanently neutral or neutralized state which declares to everyone that it will not only not involve itself in conflicts which might occur, but that *a priori* it will conduct its foreign policies in such a way that it can never conceivably find itself in a situation where it must align with one or the other.

There are many examples of the permanently neutral state or the neutralized state. Switzerland, of course, is the outstanding one. For the past five centuries it has been, in a sense, the symbol of the permanently neutral or neutralized state which has conducted its foreign policy in such a way that it has never found itself obliged to participate in an external conflict. More recently we have the example of Austria, which was formally neutralized by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1955, and Laos by the powers in 1961. Finally, we have the policy, which is a logical extension of non-alignment, a more active area which we call neutralism, that is to say, this is the conscious decision of a state to pursue a foreign policy which specifically aims at reducing the tensions, frictions and conflicts between the great powers in order to prevent any spill-over effect which could escalate into global conflict and draw this neutralist state into the picture. I am suggesting that you can move along a spectrum from neutrality which fits a wartime situation, non-belligerence, through permanent neutrality or neutralization as with Switzerland, Austria and Laos; or non-alignment, of which Sweden is an example; or neutralism of which the outstanding examples, in an earlier period would have been India in the fifties, the U.A.R., and Ghana. This distinction, I think, is vital to an understanding of the differing behavior of states that have not involved themselves directly in the bloc conflict from 1948 onwards.

• 1115

There are, it seems to me, a number of other distinctions that are terribly important here. First of all, we must differentiate, in a time sense, between long-established non-aligned states and those of very recent vintage. Switzerland has five centuries of successful practice of permanent neutrality or

neutralization; Sweden has two centuries; Belgium has almost a century, from 1831 when it was neutralized by the powers, until 1914 when, despite its preference, it found itself a participant in World War I. And here I might begin some analysis of the reasons that affect these different states in different situations, precisely because one of the parties to that war, Germany, found Belgium's geography and topography of particular value in its short-term objective, which was an assault on France. In other words, Belgium by 1914 had acquired a geographic position which did not lend itself to neutrality, but rather was a distinct liability for that state in that particular constellation of international political forces, with the result that the objective conditions had been undermined. I distinguish, then, between the long-established neutrals and the newly emergent non-aligned states of Asia and Africa; Austria and Yugoslavia, consciously so, from 1945.

The third distinction that I would draw here is between types of states engaging in a policy of non-involvement. Within Europe, if you follow the spectrum that I have suggested earlier, you have Switzerland which is permanently withdrawn from conflict situations; you have Austria, which is unable to involve itself, partly because it has been formally neutralized by the super-powers and because its geographic position in the border zone of the two blocs prevents it from playing any autonomous role; and you have Sweden which, for reasons that I shall indicate in a few moments, can indeed play a very active role in such issues as the Korean peace-keeping operation, UNEF in the Middle East, an active role in the Committee of Eight on the discussions on disarmament in Geneva, and a host of other issues of direct relevance, not only to Sweden but to the international political system as a whole. There is Yugoslavia, which begins ideologically and in power terms as a committed member of one bloc, but from 1948 onwards moves increasingly to a position of non-alignment and then neutralism, actively searching for ways of mediating conflict situations whether it be in the Middle East, or between the blocs, or over the issue of nuclear tests in the early sixties, the whole question of nuclear non-proliferation and the like.

• 1120

That European group has to be differentiated from the Asian-African group of neutralists

or non-aligned states, and here we have, of course, the major cluster. It is in the third world that non-alignment has reached its apogee and its legitimacy as a policy to be pursued. The vast majority of the 70-odd states that have become independent since the end of World War II can be classified at the lowest point in this spectrum. That is to say, they are passively non-aligned, and they are non-aligned for reasons which I think flow from the very character of their emergence into independence.

Essentially, non-aligned states in the Afro-Asian world become non-aligned because they respond to three stimuli. They are internally weak. In a political sense, they lack stability. In a national sense, they are multi-tribal and multi-ethnic societies searching desperately to create a nation out of the conjureries of disparate groups. They are weak economically because of the legacy of colonialism, because they have yet to enter the industrial age. That internal weakness is a major stimulus to non-alignment because non-alignment permits them to concentrate on the mobilization of social, political and economic forces and energies to overcome those sources of internal weakness. They are also responsive to the psychology and the reality of the colonial experience. And it is this which makes them, of necessity and understandably, fearful and distrustful of any attempt by any outside great power to penetrate, in such terms as neo-colonialism, which is simply euphemism for renewed penetration of former colonial regions by a variety of economic aid agreements which, in the minds of the decision-making élite of these new states, constitutes the potential basis for the re-establishment of political control.

The third stimulus that these states respond to is the character of global politics from 1948 to 1962 or thereabouts. That is to say, the two-bloc system, the bi-polarity or, if you wish, the tight bi-polarity that characterizes the relations between the Soviet and Western worlds. That bi-polarity provided both the challenge and the opportunity to play a role for weak states which they would otherwise be unable to play. The challenge was the danger of an escalating conflict which could embroil the entire planet and thereby destroy or retard the efforts of these new states to consolidate, to engage in economic development, to produce political stability. And the opportunity was that in a situation involving

two major conflicting forces, a third would-be mediating element has a potential role of, if you wish, flexible involvement, bridge-building, offering good offices, for which of course there was a good deal of evidence in the international politics of the 1950s.

But even within the Afro-Asian non-aligned group, one has to make some fundamental distinctions. There were the passive non-aligned, the small states who had no pretensions to be active in world politics, and the neutralist states, those who did have pretensions and played what I would regard as a vital positive role at a particular period of time within a particular constellation of world politics. The outstanding examples were India, and, to a lesser extent, Ghana and the U.A.R. Even here one further distinction is in order because Indian neutralism, itself, went through a number of stages as it responded to the new challenges and the new opportunities. India began, in 1947, when it became an independent state, as a neutral, and if you go through Mr. Nehru's speeches, as I have in great detail, what you will find in that period is a continuous expression of hope that India could remain free from overt conflict beyond its borders. The Korean War marks the first divide when India suddenly realized that it is not enough to remain isolated, it must now openly declare that it will not stand with either of the blocs in any over-all conflict situation. By 1952-1953, it moves to a stage of neutralism, mainly the conviction that India has both the obligation and the right to participate actively in cushioning that conflict so as to contribute to world peace.

• 1125

There are some significant differences, even amongst these states, and I would sum them up this way, if I may. India was able, because of its size and its geographic position and its population and its economic potential, and the fact that it was regarded by the super-powers as a crucial variable in the emerging balance, the new balance of the 1950s, it was able to exercise influence disproportionate to its real power. I cite, for example, its crucial role in 1952 in breaking the deadlock in the discussions over the prisoner-of-war issue, which ultimately was to lead to a settlement in Korea. I cite, for example, its catalytic role in the peace negotiations that followed the first Indo-China war, in the con-

ference of 1954. I cite, for another example, its role in the interminable but nonetheless important negotiations over disarmament all through the fifties and, of course, its role in the Committee of Eight in Geneva.

The U.A.R., under President Nasser, used the term "positive neutralism", but it had no pretensions of global character. Rather it was concerned with utilizing its pre-eminent position in the Arab world within the Middle East to extract from the two powers the kind of aid, economic and military, which would strengthen its position of hegemony and also strengthen it in its permanent conflict with Israel.

Ghana's Nkrumah, by contrast, had great pretensions but they were of a continental African type. For Ghana, under Nkrumah, non-alignment or neutralism meant simply an opportunity to build the image and the substance of what is essentially a small state to a position of natural leader in the movement towards a united Africa, which could ultimately play the role, he thought, of a third force in world politics.

I use the dates 1948 to 1962 consciously because by 1962 fundamental changes in the global constellation of power rendered that kind of non-alignment less useful and it is not, indeed, by chance that neutralism has become less and less of a formidable force in the post-1962 period. Essentially, if I may sum it up in these terms, when the world moves from a tight bi-polar conflict relationship to what the academics from time to time call a polycentric or broad-based distribution of power with new centres, in a China, in a Western Europe, France and the like, the role for a third grouping to serve through good offices, as a possible mediator of conflict, is automatically reduced. That is the first reason.

The second reason is that India, the leading exponent and practitioner of non-alignment, found itself in 1962 engaged in direct conflict with its neighbour, China, from which it suffered both psychologically and materially, in military and economic terms, with the result that there was an almost traumatic transformation of the attitudes of the Indian leadership from external affairs to domestic affairs, and a growing preoccupation with solving internal economic, social and political problems.

• 1130

One final distinction, if I may, and that is, some states are non-aligned for all issues,

some states are aligned for all issues, but there are many states that may be non-aligned for one or another kind of issue and may be aligned for others. Switzerland is at one extreme. It is non-aligned in the sense that it is permanently neutralized from all external conflict. So is Austria, for different reasons, weakness, and precarious survival as an independent state at the raw nerve point of interbloc conflict. Laos, too, is permanently neutralized and outside of the ambit of this conflict situation. But Sweden, though it has a pro-Western set of values in culture, though it has a system of government much more akin to that of the West than any member of the Soviet bloc, has become increasingly non-aligned, let us say neutralist, in an active sense. It played a role in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission as one of the five members in Korea. It took an active role in the Middle East UN Emergency Force and in the discussions on disarmament. And to take two very recent examples, it has not been fearful of declaring its position, officially and unofficially, on two issues in which it found itself, so to speak, aligned with the other bloc.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia led to very substantial antagonism in the Swedish press in which Swedish ministers were involved. American policy on Viet Nam found Sweden aligned on the other side. In other words it was, if you wish, a swinging non-alignment or an active neutralist's involvement on one side or the other, depending on the issues.

Yugoslavia has been active on a very wide range of issues once it emerged from membership in the Soviet bloc. Brazil and Mexico are two other examples. We do not think of them as non-aligned states because they are members of the OAS and therefore are generally regarded as part of the American sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere. Yet on the Cuban question, Mexico is the one state in the OAS in the Western Hemisphere that did not break diplomatic relations and that maintains economic as well as other relations with Cuba. Both Brazil and Mexico have played a very active role in the non-aligned Committee of Eight on the disarmament issue. In short what I am suggesting, gentlemen, is that even the image of non-alignment is sometimes blurred by the fact that some

states take the initiative in certain issues where they regard non-alignment as justifiable.

Now briefly on special conditions. Switzerland was able to maintain itself for five centuries as what I call the isolationist non-aligned state for three reasons: particularly its geography—its topography or terrain made it, if you wish, naturally defensible; secondly, as a corollary to that, it was too costly for neighbouring states to invade and attempt to conquer Switzerland relative to whatever benefits might accrue from that conquest; thirdly, in positive terms, Switzerland has for a long time performed the useful function of a state in which representatives of participants can engage either in espionage or negotiations in an area which is not a direct participant in conflict. But clearly the Swiss case is inappropriate for Canada, because the geographic variable does not pertain, the cost factor relative to the benefits to be derived from a conquest of Canada does not pertain and thirdly the role as the sieve for information, so to speak, does not obtain.

Austria is totally passive and what makes that possible is simply the willingness of the super powers to tolerate it. It could be eliminated at any moment at which the buffer function that Austria performs were regarded as no longer valuable. Because it straddles the border zone it is useful. Because the super powers regard the buffer as worthwhile Austria survives in this permanently neutralized sense.

The Belgian case I have already cited. Its permanent neutrality was guaranteed and accepted as long as it suited the powers so to do, and in 1914 when Germany found that Belgium was extremely important as a link to France, then it invaded.

• 1135

The Indian case. Size, geography, the possible effect of India's joining one or another bloc on the balance of power in the world, made it desirable for both the Soviets and the West to court India with economic aid and later military aid, precisely to retain India in a position of independence.

The United Arab Republic in fact is not a non-aligned state. In most issues it is closely aligned with the Soviet bloc by virtue of its dependence on that bloc's military and economic aid from 1955 onwards.

Ghana has ceased to be a non-aligned or neutralist state after the coup of 1966 which brought the military power and expelled Nkrumah.

There remains Sweden, and since I regard Sweden as the one example with possible, and I would suggest high possible relevance to the Canadian case, let me look just for a few minutes at the Swedish case. It is a particularly interesting one—small state in northern Europe which does not have the geographic assets of Switzerland. It does have considerable benefits in terms of its industrial establishments and in terms of its economic and military potential. If it were to move into one or another orbit it would be of great value. Yet Sweden has managed to maintain its posture for almost two centuries. It has paid a price, of course, and that price has been a vast defence establishment. It has also succeeded in doing this by great diplomatic skills and by a cumulatively created image of a useful function performed by remaining outside of world conflicts. It happens to be a near neighbour of the Soviet Union, but it is also a near neighbour of the NATO states; yet it never joined NATO. Its role in the United Nations through peacekeeping, if you wish, through the contributions of a Secretary General, and even now in the Middle East through Ambassador Jarring, has given to Sweden the almost unique position in the contemporary globe of a state non-aligned, with mutual respect, performing a positive function or series of functions contributing to international peace.

Why do I say this has possible relevance for Canada? We will have an opportunity during the question period I hope, to deal with this in detail, but if I may I would like simply to comment on one possible caveat that would be introduced immediately.

If you use the Swedish analogy, does this not suggest that Canada too would have to build a massive defence force, and I am not thereby suggesting that we ought to increase our defence budget rather than to reduce it or to leave it unchanged? I think the answer is rather different. Canada, in a sense, has a geographic asset. I know that this is precisely a reversion of the argument generally given about Canada's position in the world. I suggest that Canada has a geographic asset which Sweden lacks. It is precisely the fact that Canada occupies the northern half of the Western Hemisphere that gives to it a built-in

or inherent or natural protection against any possible incursion from without except from the south, and I do not anticipate this, by which I mean that regardless of what Canada's defence posture is in global terms, the United States is committed by its own interests to the survival of Canada either as an independent state or, in any event, to the prevention of intrusion and ultimately of conquest of Canada from the north or elsewhere. In other words, I would submit, gentlemen, that the defence posture of Canada has always operated on the premise that there must be a substantial defence capability to withstand possible assault, particularly from the north. I would suggest that what we have here is a kind of political or intellectual lag that afflicts a great many decision-makers in this country; that is to say that whereas in the late forties and much of the fifties during a period of rigid bipolarity and direct confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and their blocs, the danger to Canada as perceived was very real, what has happened by the late 1960s is that that tight bipolarity has given way to much greater flexibility and fragmentation within both blocs and that the danger as it was perceived has been replaced by a relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which is at least one of détente and in which the Soviet Union has emerged as essentially a conservative, satisfied state which is perhaps just as concerned with the maintenance of peace as Canada or any other country in the Western world.

• 1140

One might say that Sweden, after all, has benefited from two centuries of this posture. Any possible change of Canada's position now would immediately cause a wrench.

Mr. Chairman, I think I should pause now because this would lead me into a whole series of specific policy proposals about Canadian foreign policy that I may have the opportunity of suggesting in the course of this discussion. But rather than do it in this continuous monologue, I think perhaps we have now established at least a frame of reference in which the question of neutrality to neutralism, theory in practice and applicability to Canada, can perhaps be probed in greater depth.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Professor Brecher.

The first three questioners I have on my list are Messrs. Howard, MacDonald and Allmand. Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, as the speaker went on he answered many of the questions that I had. I was most interested in his comments all the way through as he enlarged very considerably on the paper which he had prepared.

I have one question with regard to comments on page 236 of his paper in which he suggests the channelling of the aggressive instincts of Western nations into development projects in the underdeveloped nations and so on. In the terms in which he discusses it here, if this were carried out to the extent that he suggests I wonder if we would not be in the same position of imperialism, of the charge of imperialism, in this problem of persuading the underdeveloped countries that our aggressive instincts are not directed toward imperialism but rather use a healthy outlet for our own excess energy.

Professor Brecher: Mr. Chairman, I would submit that as one attempts to reconstruct a viable Canadian foreign policy in the next decade, there are two objectives that ought to be uppermost in the minds of Canadians who ponder this question. One which I think is long overdue is the creation of a distinct image in the external world of an autonomous Canadian identity as an actor in the international community. The second is to create the image of a functioning bilingual and multicultural society, successfully groping with its internal problems and capable of utilizing its varied assets for the benefit of that community. I would submit further that the image of Canada despite its posture of the last 20 years as I have experienced it in travel through much of this world, is still one of respect, almost affection, so that Canadian foreign aid is not regarded as the instrument of penetration with the dangers that might follow that are normally associated with the foreign aid made available by the super powers. In a sense Canada has managed to retain the image of a middle power which does not constitute a threat to any state or any region in the world, but rather has not realized the full potential, within the United Nations and outside, of a state which, because of its gifts and talents and characteristics and potentialities, can play a role such as Sweden has, but very few others, which would contribute markedly

to linking the Western and third worlds in a positive way. So that to the question: is there the danger that this would be perceived as simply the expansion of a kind of innate aggressive tendency within Canadian society, I find no evidence whatsoever of that image being prevalent in the world and therefore I do not regard it as an operationally significant constraint on Canada's active non-involvement—that is to say active pursuit of a policy, which I will spell out a little later in answer to some questions, to create that image of a distinctive actor in global policy.

• 1145

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Then your argument is not to consider neutrality but a very aggressive outgoing kind of effort in the world, along the lines of Sweden. Do you see this in relation to a strong military role of a different nature than our alignment in NATO and our alignment in NORAD, for instance? Do you see it in relation to an aggressive development of the total geographical area of Canada—the Northland for instance? Is this the picture that you are painting?

Professor Brecher: I would say that the question of NORAD has to be separated from that of NATO, I think, and NATO has to be related to the over-all defence policy and particularly Canada's role in a United Nations defence policy.

On NORAD there is very little one can say now because in a sense the issue has been pre-empted. And here I might say—and I think others share this view—that some people were perplexed and surprised, perhaps even astonished at the ease with which the extension of the NORAD agreement took place without the kind of public debate which is now taking place in this country on the fundamentals of Canadian defence and foreign policy. So in a sense anything that one might say about NORAD now could not have any actual operational relevance for a period of five years. But I would say this: that I myself would think that in any attempt to extend an ABM system to Canada within the framework of NORAD ought to be resisted by this country because I think its contribution would be counter productive. I do not see it as essential to the defence of this country because I do not see the challenge to Canada, as an independent state, in the terms

in which NORAD in 1957 and beyond has stated this danger to be.

Now in NATO I would suggest, just as in so many other aspects of foreign policy, that there is a kind of perpetual lag in the response of decision-makers to change in reality. NATO in 1949 meant one thing and NATO in 1969 means something quite again. One made the case in 1949 that a weakened community of West European states confronted with a much more powerful Soviet Union then in a stage of expansion and conflict with the West needed that kind of umbrella protection that NATO provided. Some rejected the argument even then, but my point is that if that argument were valid in 1949 it is not *ipso facto* valid in 1969. And I find myself astonished at the ease with which people go over this problem without examining the fundamental premises on which any military organization like NATO has built, at a particular period in a particular frame of reference of international politics.

• 1150

As to Canada's role . . .

Mr. Anderson: May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, in a moment.

Professor Brecher: —I would, if I may, put it bluntly by suggesting that in my judgment Canada really contributes nothing to European defence but spends a great deal in so doing. Let me note that Sweden, which is a European state by geography and culture, is not a member of NATO, yet NATO has flourished without Sweden in so far as it has flourished at all—it has performed whatever functions were assigned to it for better or for worse. But the argument that is often used, the kind of inverted domino theory that a Canadian withdrawal from NATO in 1969 would set in motion a collapse of that organization strikes me again as facile reasoning for it presupposes that the Canadian contribution in substance as well as in image is highly valued—and we are told this very often at the official level. I think it is also true to point out that in recent American statements about the future of NATO the name Canada does not even appear—almost as if the perception of the United States is that Canada is not a member of NATO, or if it is, its role is so infinitesimal that it need

not be placed within the perspective of assessment. So that if the argument is that Canada's withdrawal or presence is a crucial indicator of the survival potential of NATO, I would say that this line of reasoning is shallow and simply is not supported by the evidence that we have.

Now that in itself is not a reason for Canada's withdrawing or staying. I am merely suggesting here that the decision as to what Canada's future posture in Western Europe should be, in my judgment, should be determined by what Canadians would like their foreign policy image to be ten years from now and what steps ought to be taken in order to realize that objective.

Now if, as I argue, the two fundamental objectives are distinctive identity in the world and a viable hopefully successful bilingual and multi-cultural society at work, then the question of NATO has meaning in that context.

The Vice-Chairman: Have you a supplementary, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson: No, it is a bit lost now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Can we follow your theories on this with a reduced defence budget, a defence budget that stays the same, or must we increase it?

Professor Brecher: My answer here would be that this would permit a substantial reduction in the defence budget and that both the reduction of the defence budget and an altered status vis-a-vis Western Europe would permit two independent courses of action which I would regard as significant in terms of those two over-all objectives.

First of all, I would submit that Canada can play a role which has not been played by any other state and that is essentially to activate Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, to take the initiative in signing an agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in which a permanent standby mobile military force would be available to the United Nations for peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Laniel: They do not want it.

An hon. Member: They might want it.

Professor Brecher: Well do we have evidence that they do not want it in the sense that we have ever put it in the terms in which I am putting it now—that is to say, an offer to sign an agreement with the Secre-

tary-General which does not involve the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations or the Security Council directly. This can be done as provided in Article 43, in which a member of the United Nations takes the initiative through an agreement with the United Nations acting through its Secretary-General.

• 1155

But I want to go further and suggest that that reduction of defence budget it seems to me can then make possible two other important national objectives—one anyway. It can contribute, it seems to me, to the permanent tension indeed, which we experienced this very week in our federal internal relationships, by assisting in the process of making it possible for poorer provinces to carry out certain programs and also by making a dent in what is the permanent fiscal problem of this country.

I myself as an educator, if you will permit me, would argue that there is also a fundamental crisis in education in this country of which the financial dimension is often lost sight of and this kind of substantial reduction in the defence budget would also contribute to the amelioration of that problem.

The Vice-Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Thompson, and then Mr. MacLean.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You have already said, sir, that the defence budget of Sweden is, comparatively, a very high budget, that it costs Sweden a lot of money just to maintain its neutrality. If we were to do in Canada what is being done in Sweden it would treble our present defence budget. I fail to see how you can say that a similar position in Canada would reduce our budget. You mentioned having a great land mass. Do you mean then that we just throw off to our neighbour to the south our responsibility for providing ourselves with any defence in order to stand in a neutral position? If what you say is true then it seems to me that we would not save money, we would have to double or triple or quadruple what we are spending today on defence.

Professor Brecher: I think the answer to that is this. When I use the term "a geographic asset" I mean that regardless of what Canada spends for defence its defence is assured—this is the point I am making—and it is assured precisely because of the accident of geography.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Sovereignty is not assured.

Professor Brecher: Yes, I think it is because unless I am totally mistaken the kind of expenditure that Canada indulges in on defence today does not really make any difference whatsoever in its capability either to withstand an assault from the North or from the South. In other words, this is a purely symbolic question for me. Now if you are arguing, and I fail to see that this is valid, that any independent state must have a substantial defence force simply as a symbol of independence, it seems to me that a great many states in the world have tiny defence forces of 3,000 to 5,000 men with the kind of independence in reality and in image that this country has.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, I find our guest inconsistent. He uses Sweden as an example of neutrality and then turns around and contradicts the very basis of Sweden's neutral policy as far as Swedish defence forces are concerned. Do I understand that you equate autonomy with neutrality? Is that what you are saying?

Professor Brecher: No, I would say that many of the states of the third world did equate, and understandably so, autonomy with nonalignment because nonalignment gave them the possibility of preventing a reassertion of influence and possibly control by former colonial powers. I am not so equating though most of the nonaligned states that emerged after the Second World War did so.

• 1200

The Swedish example, it seems to me, has relevance in this sense. Sweden is not a member of NATO, it does not have a NORAD, it has managed to maintain its independence and a degree of respect in the third world with a contribution to the tranquilization, if you wish, of global politics, which is the envy of many. Canada as a member of NATO and a member of NORAD, though it has contributed spasmodically to that tranquilization process, has never achieved that image of a distinctive identity, autonomy, with the result that many of the avenues which would normally be open to Sweden are closed to Canada. The one difference is that Sweden has a massive defence establishment. Canada does not. The reason for that is that Sweden does not have a neighbour like Canada has, which

for its own self-interest is committed to the defence of Sweden as the United States is committed to the defence of Canada, regardless of what Canada's defence posture happens to be. This is a built-in unchanging factor of the landscape of America's position in the world.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You are saying that within a position of neutrality for Canada, we must continue to belong to NATO and NORAD.

Professor Brecher: No. I am saying precisely the contrary, that Canada withdrawing from NORAD and NATO would not alter one iota the United States' commitment in defence of Canada.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Can you eat your cake and have it?

Professor Brecher: Yes, that is precisely what I am arguing, but I would not use the metaphor of eating cake and having it. I would say that Canada in adopting this kind of policy could perform a role which it is denied now, which in the last analysis is of interest not only to Canada, not only in global terms to the general problem of tranquility, but even, if you wish, to the United States. Let me cite an example.

For reasons with which we are all familiar, I think, it has been impossible for United States leaders to bring themselves to the question of a formal relationship with China, for the past 19 years. We are in the midst of this debate, in fact the debate is virtually over. There was a time...

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is it over?

Professor Brecher: In this country.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is it?

Professor Brecher: I think it is. I mean over in the sense that a policy initiative has taken place after spasmodic debate beginning in 1950 in this country, as to whether or not Canada should attempt to establish formal diplomatic relations with Peking. In that sense it is over. The debate will continue as the course of these negotiations proceed, but one fundamental stage of it is over, once a government adopts a policy option, which in this case is to initiate discussions which would lead to negotiations with the aim of establishing diplomatic relations.

There are many people who would argue that what the United States could not do because of the special relationship between the U.S. and China in the 1945-1949 period and even before, Canada could have done and could do now. And indeed there are many people who argue that by so doing it is even contributing to the United States' interests.

Thus, when you raise the question, "How can you alter your posture *vis-à-vis* NATO and NORAD and still expect the United States to perform the kind of function which it has performed in the defence field for 20 years?" The answer is that there are many initiatives that Canada could take in foreign policy which apart from its own national objectives, have wider implications that are beneficial, even to the United States, and that there are Americans, at least some American decision makers, who know this although the constraints of their own policy may make it impossible for them to say so officially.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to go on with a supplementary without getting into other areas. Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. Mr. MacLean.

• 1205

Mr. MacLean: My supplementary has been pretty well answered, but you have said that all Canada has to do is withdraw from NATO and then be in the happy position of Sweden. The happy position Sweden happens to be in is that it is spending more for defence than Canada is, and yet you say Canada will make great savings in defence in this way. Do you ascribe this apparent contradiction entirely to the different geographical situations of the two countries?

Professor Brecher: Yes, I would say entirely. That is to say, I see no contradiction whatsoever in this. I am not suggesting that a simple policy act of withdrawal from NATO would automatically create an idyllic image of Canada in the world. I see this simply as one of the series of steps that would constitute an independent foreign policy for this country and that could achieve tangible goals directed towards this image of distinctive identity.

I would suggest that the kind of contribution that Canada could make in terms of a

United Nations role for the management of force in small-scale conflicts, which it has done to some extent, would be enhanced. The kind of Canadian role in the foreign aid field, both its more positive acceptance and more substantial impact, would be made possible.

I would suggest that it would even contribute to some extent to the great internal debate that is taking place in this country, concerning the future of Canada.

Mr. MacLean: I was thinking more on the specific suggestion that great savings could be made with regard to defence costs.

Professor Brecher: My answer is yes. I see this as a key to substantial savings in defence which could then be used for a number of purposes, external in the foreign aid field, the restructuring of the defence capability to perform an essential mobile peacekeeping operation, and finally, in terms of contributing to the solution or alleviation of the fiscal problems of this country.

Mr. MacLean: Sweden is prevented from doing a number of these things simply because of its geographic location.

Professor Brecher: Precisely.

The Vice-Chairman: We now have Messrs. Laniel and Legault. Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, my supplementary would be on this question of peacekeeping, and I wonder if our witness would agree with the statement first made to our Committee by Mr. Gellner stating that in the future it will become more and more impossible for nations such as Canada, white people, to do some peace-keeping jobs, in Africa especially.

Professor Brecher: My answer would be yes, as long as the image of Canada flowing from its position of unequivocal and unqualified alignment remains.

Mr. Laniel: That is not the point that he made though.

Professor Brecher: I know it is not, but Mr. Gellner and I happen to disagree on this issue.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: My question is supplementary to Mr. MacLean's. In the statement you have given you emphasized the interest of the two major powers in keeping India neutralized in order to maintain a delicate balance. Numer-

ous arguments have been put forth that Canada, by participating in NATO and by being actively interested and present in Europe, has served as a deterrent and helps to maintain that delicate balance, and if withdrawn would create difficulties in the sense that it would unbalance this delicate balance.

You have mentioned the position of Belgium, and that it tried to maintain neutrality, but due to conditions at that time, it was not respected. It has always been the view that Canada's position would be somewhat the same geographically in the present concept of any world conflict.

Would you not believe first that by pulling out of NATO, Canada would break this delicate balance, and secondly that our position, in view of Belgium's experience, cannot be entirely neutral?

• 1210

Professor Brecher: It seems to me that you have raised two distinct questions here. One is the role that NATO may or may not play as a deterrent in Europe. The other is the importance of Canada's membership in NATO in the performance by NATO of that role. I will not address myself to the first question. It is a very long and involved one. I would only say this, that whatever role NATO performs in Europe, the Canadian contribution to that role is of such marginal consequence that it is disfunctional in terms of Canada's identity. Its absence, in my judgment, would barely cause a ripple in that deterrent role that NATO performs. Therefore, I have always regarded this role, from 1949 on, as simply the automatic reflex of Canada being part of a North Atlantic triangle and therefore contributing within that North Atlantic triangle to the defence of Western Europe.

I am suggesting that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, whatever role NATO may play, Canada's presence in it is of no consequence to the achievement of a NATO role. I am suggesting precisely that the Canadian objective, in my judgment, is not to contribute virtually nothing to an organization which can play that role anyway, but rather to contribute something in an altered global environment where the great challenge of the 1970s is going to be the ability of the white Western world to build some kind of dialogue with the third world.

It is precisely the Swedens and the Canadas potentially that can do this. This does not suggest that it would be automatically received, and that it can make the kind of impact which would overcome the passionate racial conflicts that exist. It does suggest only that there is a role for Canada to play which its own people has denied it.

The Belgium case, I think, is not relevant to Canada for the following reason. Belgium was over-run at a time when land warfare was the principal component of military conflicts, 1914. Unless you anticipate a potential enemy of Canada crossing the northern wastes by land in order to attack the populated area of this country on the 100-mile belt north of the United States border, I do not see the analogy at all. The relevant point is Canadian air space. And that presupposes that the kind of conflict that was considered likely or at least possible in the 1950s between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which Canadian air space would be used, is as relevant now as it was in the early fifties.

I suggest, gentlemen, that just as generals very often, in fact usually, fight their current wars by strategies of past wars, we are postulating foreign policy for Canada in the future based upon its relevance 20 years before. And it is the need to rethink the fundamental postulates of Canadian foreign policy interests that leads me to the kind of observation that I have made.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: I understood you, Professor Brecher, to suggest that there would be some advantages to Canada from adopting a non-aligned position on the same style as the Swedish position, partly because we would not have to undertake a great deal of additional military expenditure because we are in a sense under the American umbrella. What I am not clear about is what would prevent us from reducing our commitments within both NORAD and NATO without terminating either of those alliances.

We are quite clear that within NATO the role that Canada can play can be changed by negotiation. Within NORAD we are told we are not committed to any specific type of air defence scheme, but merely to joint consultations, joint operations. I would like you to specify what advantage in these circumstances you see, particularly through the

withdrawal from an alliance which leaves us quite a lot of freedom about the military role we would play, and at the same time gives us some voice, or possible influence, within the policy of these alliances. I have not grasped what great advantage we would have of getting into the Swedish position.

If I may just add one more point that comes in with it. I do not know any reason why we should not stay within our alliances and still adopt a strong line such as Sweden has done in various matters affecting the third world and the security of the world. I have not really found the case about making ourselves similar to Sweden very convincing so far.

Professor Brecher: Let me, if I may, Mr. Brewin, take your second point first. I think in a sense the answer can be summed up in the word "credibility". I simply mean by this that as long as Canada remains formally aligned with a particular bloc military structure its credibility in the third world is undermined. Let me give you an illustration of this. In 1956 at the time of UNEF—in which, after all, Canada played a role of profound initiative and creativity—if one explores the intricacies of the formation of UNEF one will find that it was only with the greatest difficulty that Canada was accepted as a participant in UNEF, despite the fact that Canada proposed it at the United Nations, and there was a period of 72 hours in which—Sweden had no difficulty in this because of the image of Sweden as the non-aligned state—the government of the UAR indicated that it would not accept Canada.

Mr. Brewin: I thought that was because we were sending the Queen's Own and they thought it was kind of a neo-colonial...

Professor Brecher: That only exacerbated the issue. The real reason was that Canada was identified as a NATO state. So, my answer to your question is that the credibility of Canada is a function of the degree to which it is formally aligned or non-aligned with a military bloc. That is point number one.

To return to your first question, which was can we not simply reduce defence expenditure and yet remain within NATO—I will not talk about NORAD now—I would say of course we could, but it seems to me that would serve very little purpose because if one

is talking about a Canadian role in the world, the retention of status within NATO denies that role. What then is to be performed? The possible marginal influence of Canadian ministers at NATO Council meetings or, if you wish, the marginal influence in the strategy for the defence of Western Europe? I regard that, on the balance of a Canadian role in global terms, as inconsequential. Therefore I would say while it is theoretically possible and indeed practical to reduce our defence commitment and remain within NATO, it would not perform what I regard as the crucial objective of charting a path in foreign policy where the benefits are infinitely greater than the cost of this disruption that would ensue.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Nowlan, on a supplementary.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, but from that answer I almost have another question, but I will ask my first question. Do I understand from your interesting discussion this morning that Canada should in fact have no armed forces other than the armed force that should be committed under Article 43 of the United Nations treaty?

• 1220

Professor Brecher: No, I am not taking that extremist position, nor do I think it is necessary. All I am saying is that the preoccupation in this country with the defence question seems to me to be again a kind of lag because no matter whether we spend \$1.6 billion or \$.4 billion, or even \$5 billion, I do not regard that kind of expenditure as contributing markedly to the defence of this country. Therefore my answer to your question is that I can see a place for a minimal—and, frankly, I am not in a position to indicate a numerical figure—defence budget and defence capability but essentially within the terms of internal order, not in terms of external defence, apart from that U.N. role.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, because if you rely on the United States, then to be consistent and logical—and you have been pretty logical in some of your discussion—I felt that perhaps you would say that no forces were necessary other than this mobile force for the United Nations.

Professor Brecher: And that which is necessary primarily for internal order.

Mr. Nowlan: I see. You talk about our defensive barrier in the North and no invasion from the South—it is highly improbable—and I would agree with both points, but so far you have failed to mention the sea on either side, and certainly if you change the direction of our forces in NATO-NORAD and rely upon the American umbrella, are you inferring that the seas should also be protected by the Americans and that we do not need any forces there on either side? In other words, the sovereignty of the sea—what little we have of it today—is one of our basic NATO roles, as you know.

Professor Brecher: I will draw an historical analogy, if I may, which is the role of the British fleet in the nineteenth century in essentially providing moats or a defence perimeter for the United States from, I would say, the early part of the nineteenth century until World War I. I think in a sense that function has now passed to the United States or, if you wish, to the combined NATO naval force. However, in answer to your specific question, I can again see a marginal role which would involve a minimal defence expenditure for what is essentially, if you wish, a coast guard function, but not a major naval involvement.

Mr. Nowlan: I see. One final supplementary which arises from Mr. Brewin's questioning. You mentioned the question of credibility and the basic point that bothers me in your thesis is how credible can Canada ever be—which gets to the basis of your premise of Sweden and Canada—when Canada is right next to the United States and when none of the ingredients, the geography, the history and the trade that we have with the United States, involves the Swedish situation?

Professor Brecher: I would answer by saying that the kind of posture that this would entail would be something that might be called "pro-Western non-alignment". I mean by that that the third world, and indeed any other state in this world, is aware of the fact that of necessity Canada's geographic position, its natural lines of communication and its economic relationships create a relationship with the West in a symbolic sense and with the United States in particular which cannot be sundered, nor is it desirable to do so. Nonetheless, it is possible within those parameters, if you wish, to adopt a set of specific foreign policy postures which permit

the creation of this image of non-alignment—i.e., a distinctive identity—though pro-Western by virtue of cultural and other factors.

Mr. Nowlan: But it very much affects your autonomous actor, which is one of the desires...

Professor Brecher: It affects it in degree but again, it seems to me, the spectrum is necessary here. At the moment total alignment has reduced that credibility to X. If you are trying to suggest this in extreme either/or terms I would agree with you wholeheartedly. No matter what Canada would do, the fact that it is white limits its credibility in the third world. All I am suggesting is a way in which that credibility can be enhanced from X to X plus 10, though it may never reach X plus 50.

• 1225

Mr. Nowlan: I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if Professor Brecher is aware of Professor Eayrs' evidence before the Committee. He suggested that Sweden was not the parallel to Canada; Mexico was the parallel. Would you like to comment on that briefly, if you are aware of the evidence he gave here.

Professor Brecher: I am afraid I have not had an opportunity to read Professor Eayrs' text.

Mr. Nowlan: I must say I find yours a little more logical.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Anderson on a supplementary.

Mr. Anderson: Like some other speakers, Mr. Chairman, my supplementaries come after other supplementaries, but I would like to follow up the point raised by Mr. Brewin and which was further followed up by Mr. Nowlan. I cannot understand, sir, how Canada's credibility in a third world is going to be increased by following the course of action that you suggest, which is to turn over our defence to another nation, namely, the United States of America. I cannot see that any nation in the third world will look to Canada and say that Canada—and not only with those relationships that you mentioned a moment ago, the trade, the economic and the social relationships, but plus all defence being undertaken by another nation—is somehow a better nation to build a bridge. I would say the reverse would be true. That is more a

statement of opinion than a question. Perhaps you would comment on it.

Professor Brecher: I will comment very briefly. I think the error in this comment is the assumption that Canada's defence is not now undertaken by the United States and, secondly, the assumption that in the third world Canada is now regarded as providing its own defence. The image of Canada in the third world now, in so far as it exists at all, varies, I would say, again along the spectrum from a satellite of the United States to a semi-satellite, to one which in any event, in defence terms, is an extension of the United States, so that again whatever changes we would make by reduction of the defence budget would not alter that image at all.

Mr. Anderson: I think you are wrong in that area, sir. In my view those in the third world who saw Canada making efforts to at least preserve some sort of alliances with other nations in Europe, in some way trying to have a counterbalance to this enormous American pressure from the South, might possibly look upon Canada as trying to assert a national identity, which they would not see if we turned over our defence entirely, as you suggest, to the Americans. You may be quite right in your assumption that we are really defended by the Americans now and it does not make much difference if we stand up and admit it and let them take over the northern islands and run things as they wish up there, but I think that our credibility in the third world would be definitely reduced. I just cannot see that that would improve it.

I have another question along this line. You suggest that we acknowledge the facts of life and let the Americans run our defence, but I cannot think of any nation which has allowed another nation to make free use of its airspace and territory for defence purposes and yet preserved its independence. This is an unfair parallel but the most recent example of this is, of course, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. They did not resist and they allowed the Russians to occupy their area, which I think is a pretty clear indication they are not an independent nation. I think we would be considered by others abroad to be in much the same position as Czechoslovakia now vis-à-vis Russia if we allowed the Americans to come in and take over our defence entirely, even though this may be symbolic, even though we are only trying to

do something which is almost impossible, nevertheless we are trying now and I think this does aid our credibility and aid our image abroad.

Professor Brecher: I think you have misread my comments. I may be mistaken but I do not recall having said at any point this morning that we ought to provide unrestricted access through Canadian airspace to the United States or, indeed, to the occupation of a single inch of Canadian soil by the United States. I do not think I said that anywhere, and certainly I did not intend this.

Mr. Anderson: I am sorry. I took the umbrella defence of the Americans to mean—

Professor Brecher: No. There are two relevant points here. At this particular juncture of the glove I do not see a threat to Canadian territorial integrity and political independence in international politics from the North or the South, because if one perceives such a threat one posits that the Soviet Union is prepared to undertake an action in our northern wastes that could lead to global confrontation. If it did not act in 1967, having poured in almost \$3 billion worth of aid to the UAR and if it has not intervened in Viet Nam, or indeed anywhere outside of the Soviet bloc proper, I would argue that there is absolutely no evidence to support the proposition that there is that imminent—or even not so imminent—threat from the North. Therefore the question of a defence posture seems to me to be highly overworked. We are preoccupied with defence when we should be preoccupied with foreign policy. That is my main point. When I talk about the United States being committed to our defence, I do not mean we ought to open up the doors to the presence of an American army in Canada. It is not necessary. I simply mean by that that if there ever should be a threat to Canada the United States, in its own interest, will have to act at that time. Therefore, I do not see an iota of difference in the defensibility of Canada whether we spend \$200 million or \$2 billion.

• 1230

Mr. Anderson: I do not think these fine distinctions will be understood by nations abroad. They will simply see that we are no longer attempting to take on defence in the north, on the assumption that the American umbrella will cover us.

You may be quite right, it may not involve the use of northern islands, or Canadian waters in the north, or American submarines, or anything like that, but I just do not think these fine distinctions will cut much ice in the third world in which I happen to have spent four of the last five and a half years. It will certainly not improve our image there.

Relative to NATO, sir, I am extremely curious about you constantly saying that we are still referring to NATO in terms of the threat to Europe of the late forties. In my opinion, Canadians have long since developed more sophisticated arguments with respect to NATO, generally along the line that NATO provides us a forum whereby, in conjunction with European powers with basically the same problems, we can put the screws to the United States. We could not do it alone; we can do it in concert. This, I would say, is the argument of the late middle-sixties. Whether it is valid or not, I do not know, but in my opinion you are definitely in error in assuming that Canadians generally simply accept NATO and the NATO commitment of manpower simply because it was a good thing back in the late forties.

Mr. Brecher: No; I accept that comment. I would simply add that I am not persuaded that the leverage idea is a valid one; that is to say, that Canada does in fact, through its NATO connection, put that kind of pressure on the United States; and I would add that even if it were valid the cost of achieving this leverage goal, in terms again of a return to this independent role for Canada, is highly disproportionate.

Mr. Anderson: I agree is a point we could discuss, but I am glad that there are aspects other rather than the defence of Europe that can be put forward.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Howard?

Mr. Allmand: I wish to raise a point of order.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Allmand, on a point of order.

Mr. Allmand: We have spent more than half an hour on supplementary questions which have ranged over the whole area of the subject matter. What was the purpose of the original list? It is up to you, as Chairman, to decide how the questions will be asked, but I was second or third on the list...

The Vice-Chairman: You are third on my list.

Mr. Allmand: It seems to me that the supplementary question list has become the main question list.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Allmand, this is a problem we have with a committee of 30 members.

Mr. Allmand: I have a supplementary question, then.

The Vice-Chairman: We started out with the ruling that there would be no supplementary questions, as you will recall, and that prevailed throughout most of the Biafra-Nigeria discussions. Then our Steering Committee, after some discussion, apparently laid down the regulation that supplementary questions be permitted. That is the instruction under which I am operating at the present time, and members can see that it presents a very difficult problem.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): A supplementary question should relate to the original question. I stopped questioning because we were digressing. I think this is where we are amiss.

The Vice-Chairman: The problem is made difficult because, as witness Mr. Nowlan's questioning, it is very easy to continue on from one line of questioning to another.

I think there should be some direction from the Steering Committee because of the particular difficulty we have in this Committee. I think it is largely due to its size. Probably there should be a ruling that no more than three supplementaries be permitted from members relative to a particular question. And that the questioner be limited to not more than two questions.

That will have to be discussed in the Steering Committee and your Chairman will have to take direction from there, and from this Committee on its feeling on the matter.

• 1235

Mr. MacLean: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we voluntarily restrict ourselves on supplementaries, or perhaps have none and revert to the original list at least for a while?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: We will go back to Mr. Howard.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I do not wish to create a problem, Mr. Chairman, but it seems to me that the time at our disposal is relatively short for a Committee of this size, as you have mentioned. Many members are interested in asking questions, and no doubt, some of them are answered on supplementaries before you get to the particular questions, but the fact remains that the witnesses who come before the Committee are very important and many of us—I say this in broad terms—sometimes do not get a chance to put the questions we wish to ask. I think the problem affects everyone.

We started this morning at 11 o'clock, we know that we have to sit in the House at 2 and we have to have lunch in the meantime. I think the timing of the meetings is a little off.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Guay. We did have the problem this morning that the Public Accounts meeting was ahead of us in this room and accommodation is short because of the conference which was just finished.

Can we now go back to Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, in view of what happened when I asked a question half an hour ago I will not ask any more. I yield the floor.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Howard. Mr. MacDonald has left. Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Professor Brecher, yesterday we had General Foulkes as a witness and he made the interesting statement that there was less likelihood of rape with 15 in the bed.

Any question relates to what Mr. Anderson was asking. Would our credibility and our independence be greater if we were completely out of NATO, with no, or very little, military force and relying on the United States to defend us, than by our being in NATO with 15 other nations, where the United States is one among 15 and where the decisions on NATO military matters in relation to the defence of the North Atlantic and so forth are discussed with many nations?

I have the impression that our independence can be just as credible within NATO, that we can serve the role of mediator and that we can initiate the things you say under the United Nations Charter or even more so, perhaps, as Mr. Anderson has suggested—than if we were simply in the position that

you suggest, with the United States protecting us and without our having any say whatsoever.

I can cite certain examples. France, for example, played a role in bringing together the combatants in the Viet Nam war. The fact that France was a member of NATO, although it has changed its military commitment, still served a very useful purpose.

There are other countries in NATO who play different roles internationally despite the fact that they are in NATO, because the rest of the world knows that their NATO alliance—their position in NATO—does not really subject them to all that much control.

I do not know where General Foulkes got the statement, but it expresses the point. In a one-to-one position with the United States we would probably be less credible—and probably our sovereignty and independence would be less—than if we are in a situation where there are 15 and the United States is just one.

Professor Brecher: It seems to me that you have raised a number of questions within this one overall discussion.

• 1240

Credibility has different meanings and different objects of concern. You may talk about credibility vis-à-vis Washington, credibility vis-à-vis the NATO members and credibility vis-à-vis the third world, or the Soviet bloc. I do not think you can lump all these together. Sweden is not a member of NATO and I submit that its credibility within the NATO community would be no less—and would not be increased—if Sweden tomorrow were to join NATO.

In the same way, if at the end of the normal course of the 20-year treaty, Canada were to decide—all this is past now, but it could next year—that it no longer regarded this formal association to be in the national interests of Canada—that these could be served in other ways—this would not alter certain fundamental links that exist between Canada and the United States and Canada and Western Europe.

The whole substance of my argument is that the question of NATO has to be perceived in terms of the over-all objectives of Canadian foreign policy. If that foreign policy is to be narrowed to Canada's role vis-à-vis Western Europe then your point is well taken—I do not dispute it—but I would argue

that this is not the sum of substance of Canadian foreign policy horizons.

We do not live in a world which is narrowly divided between Western Europe and the rest. The kinds of challenges that are going to take place in the seventies make the preoccupation with Western Europe simply out of date and out of tune with what are the great issues of conflict and confrontation between the northern half of the world and the southern half of the world, between the developed and the underdeveloped and between the white and the non-white.

The kind of role that Canada can play in that crossfire of conflicts would be immensely enhanced by the reduction of this narrow-gauge orientation and would be reduced virtually to nil were we to continue to tread the same path that we have trod in the last 20 years.

If, however, you wish to see Canada's role in the world as distinctly a western culture—a Western Europe-North Atlantic area of operations—then your point is well taken.

Mr. Allmand: Yes but I cited the example of France.

Professor Brecher: That is not a good example, I must confess, because Canada is not France. Canada does not have the power of France.

Though France may have retained membership in NATO I think you would agree with me that, under General de Gaulle France, if nothing else, has adopted an independent foreign policy.

Mr. Allmand: I do not know if it was General Foulkes, but some witness said recently that that was not so; that General de Gaulle's exterior policy is quite different in what actually takes place that France is still very, very much part of NATO, and that General de Gaulle's policy is really a façade of being apart from NATO but that he is able to accomplish some very independent actions.

Let us examine two things that Canada does notice the fact that it is in NATO—our initiatives relative to China and our policy on Cuba, of which the United States does not fully approve. It is a different policy...

An hon. Member: And Viet Nam.

Mr. Allmand: Partly with Vietnam, too. We are doing things that are not 100 per cent in line with United States' foreign policy, and the

world recognizes that—I think the world recognizes it.

Professor Brecher: It depends which world we are talking about. Some do and some do not. To go back to the example of France for a moment, I must confess that I would differ profoundly with the interpretation which argues that everything that President de Gaulle has done in the world of foreign policy has been a façade for what is essentially the retention of a NATO outlook. It is true that in issues narrowly affecting Western Europe there remain links between France and the NATO military command, but in every other area of foreign policy France has charted its own path—and I think most would agree—to the benefit of France; that is to say, in narrow national interest terms—in enhancing its prestige and its position in world politics.

On examples you cite of China and Cuba I would comment only briefly that there has been talk of a Canadian relationship with China going back to the spring of 1950. It was interrupted by the Korean war. From 1953 onwards it has been 16 years, with the very occasional trial balloon—which remained only a trial balloon—and with quite clear evidence of pressure emanating from NATO allies and particularly, in this case, from the United States, on the question of China.

• 1245

Does the fact that we are in the midst of a process leading towards relations with China mean that Canada could retain this association and to some extent pursue its own independent policies? My answer would be yes, I agree with you. I think this is a matter of degree, but I would regard the difference in degree one of kind—that qualitatively in the examples you cite, compared to what is possible in another road of foreign policy, the difference is so great as to make these examples not irrelevant but not central to the over-all argument.

Mr. Allmand: I just have a final supplementary. Do your definition of neutrality and neutralism and non-alignment really have as much meaning today in view of the technology of today—the atomic bomb, the intercontinental ballistic missile, radar systems and the use of submarines? To take Switzerland as an example, how really free from the ravages of war is it in a situation where we are tossing ballistic missiles, let us say, on Munich or on

Milan or on Lyons? Switzerland stands a great chance of being destroyed. In past years when wars were limited to conventional weapons it could free itself from the ravages of conflict, but now I think perhaps the Swiss themselves might feel they must reconsider this. It would seem to me that these concepts are becoming passé with this new technology—technology is developing even faster.

Professor Brecher: I would agree with your basic point that the revolution in military technology over the past 20 years has meant that even those states that have traditionally been capable of maintaining themselves aloof from the ravages of conflict might well find themselves, through a spill-over effect, either destroyed or very badly damaged. However, while that is true, it is also true that this would apply in only one contingency of war, that is to say, unrestricted air and nuclear warfare of a global or continental type.

We know very well that we have a scale of war from the minor brush fire war that occurs for a day or two through regional, subcontinental and ultimately to what we call a global nuclear war. Therefore, it is only in that one contingency that the impact of technology, as you described it, would be felt by any state that happens to be, whether it likes it or not, close by the major centres of conflict.

Second, I would argue that your point is valid regardless of what Switzerland's or Canada's defence budget happens to be. The defence budget is irrelevant in that case; ultimately there is no defence against that kind of situation, so whether Canada should maintain a large, medium or small budget is not affected by this one contingency type war.

Finally I would add that I think any policymaker, while he has to take into account the possibility in theoretical terms of this kind of intercontinental nuclear war, it is only one of a number of possibilities and he has to operate on the assumption that it is the most remote one, because if he is wrong, no matter what his defence capability happens to be, it is irrelevant to the outcome.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, we have less than 15 minutes until 1 o'clock and I have six questioners: Messrs. MacLean, Laniel, Thompson, Stewart, Macquarrie and Hymmen in that order. Professor Brecher,

would you be available this afternoon at about 3.30 or 4 o'clock if we could arrange for another meeting?

Professor Brecher: I am told by my hosts for the afternoon that perhaps at 4 o'clock this would be possible.

The Vice-Chairman: Perhaps at 4 o'clock? We will try to arrange a further meeting this afternoon. Apparently there is great interest in your presentation, Professor. We will try to arrange a meeting for 4.00 p.m. We will have word back on that shortly.

I will now call on Mr. MacLean as the next questioner.

Mr. MacLean: I have a lot of questions but I will delete most of them. The ones I will ask will be for clarification of what has already been said. Would you agree that one should not confuse unilateral disarmament with any of these positions of neutrality or neutralism or non-alignment; that countries that follow this policy in many cases spend a great deal on defence?

Professor Brecher: Absolutely correct.

Mr. MacLean: Second, these postures of neutralism and non-alignment are not options that are automatically open to all countries by any means. It depends on the strategic and geographical location and the topography of the country, and so on. In other words, it has worked for Switzerland up to now but it has not worked for Belgium, for example.

Professor Brecher: I would agree that it is not automatically available to all states at all times.

Mr. MacLean: You made the remark in passing that the underdeveloped countries that have gained their independence in recent years are underdeveloped as a legacy of colonialism. Do you really believe that?

Professor Brecher: Yes, I do.

Mr. MacLean: You do? In other words, you are saying that if there had been no contact between Africa, for example, and Europe over the last couple of centuries, Africa would be more developed in relation to Europe than it is today. I think it is a too sweeping statement.

• 1250

Professor Brecher: It may be a too sweeping statement. I am saying simply that the

period of colonial rule of some two centuries or more was accompanied to some extent by the transmission of technology and development, but it was also characterized by a conscious limit on the flow of technology and the possibility of economic development in the interests of the colonial power.

Mr. MacLean: This may be true, and what you state may be true in some cases, but I would say that if it were true in all cases, let us say up until 1500, for example, Africa would have been just as advanced as Europe because it was not colonized by Europe. It would be free to go its own way and create its own development.

Professor Brecher: There are some research scholars who claim that certain societies in Western Africa in the late Middle Ages were perhaps just as advanced as, if not more advanced than, Central Europe.

Mr. MacLean: I have one other brief question. Would you consider that it might be possible, that it is natural, for countries as for individuals to strive for what they consider advancement or pre-eminence, and that over the last few years the détente between the East and the West has come about partially by the fact that national striving has been diverted in both cases away from military objectives to space research and other things of the sort that put a great demand on the national effort?

Professor Brecher: Yes, and I would add to that one of the conditions that made possible this détente was precisely the availability of a third non-aligned world which facilitated peaceful competition in terms of economic and other non-military forms of co-operation, whereby they could expand influence without engaging in direct conflict and confrontation themselves.

Mr. MacLean: Would you agree that further development along those lines should be a prime objective, making reduction in armaments and tension and...

Professor Brecher: That degree of co-operation which you speak of, I think, is a distinct possibility in the coming decade or two.

Mr. MacLean: I will leave it at that. I have a number of other questions. I do not agree with the witness on a number of points but I congratulate him on his presentation. I think if I can say so without being offensive, perhaps he has missed his calling, he should

have been a defence lawyer. He has made a first-class job of presenting a very poor case.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacLean, would you like an opportunity at the end of the list this afternoon?

Mr. MacLean: No, I have finished.

The Vice-Chairman: All right, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: I wonder, Mr. Chairman, with all the members gone for lunch, whether we could not adjourn until 4 o'clock.

The Vice-Chairman: Is that agreed?

Mr. Legault: Concerning the others, they have had their questions answered. If Mr. Laniel is the only one who has a question perhaps we could proceed now.

The Vice-Chairman: The others have gone; that is the trouble, Mr. Legault. Mr. Thompson has left, Mr. Stewart has left, Mr. Macquarrie is still here but Mr. Hymmen has left. These gentlemen anticipate that they will have an opportunity at 4 o'clock this afternoon, I believe. They had this in mind when they left.

Mr. Legault: Oh, I see.

The Vice-Chairman: I wonder, Mr. Laniel, if you might continue with a few questions until such time as we have word on the room for this afternoon's meeting?

Mr. Macquarrie: If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, it makes it very difficult for those of us who have to go not to show apparent discourtesy to our colleague. I have stayed longer than I should have. I wonder whether we would not be wise to call it 1 o'clock so that we can hear Mr. Laniel at 4 o'clock?

The Vice-Chairman: Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: That suggestion is agreed to. We will adjourn until 4 o'clock if we can obtain a room.

AFTERNOON SITTING

Thursday, February 13, 1969

• 1607

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, may we resume. Mr. Thompson and Mr. Stewart do not appear to be with us yet. Possibly we could start with Mr. Macquarrie.

Mr. Macquarrie: Mr. Chairman, I was interested in Professor Brecher's comment about our lack of image, and I think at one time he said we were not regarded as a distinctive identity and another time I think he used an even better expression, a distinctive actor in the world. I thought we had passed this hangup about our country's identity, and while I respect his views tremendously and am neither a Pollyanna nor an apostle of complacency, I am in profound disagreement with his rather dismal view. I have never felt at such international gatherings as I have been able to attend or from noting the international roles that Canada has undertaken, whether it be in reference to disarmament—and I think particularly the 18-nation group—truce supervision or external aid, that there were failures there which were attributable to this lack of separate identity. Whatever boo-boos we have made in external aid—and apparently we have made a good many—I cannot believe that that is one.

• 1610

Another little observation I would like to make is that I am puzzled by the suggestion that our remaining in NATO and our role and performance—and I believe even our posture there—is of such little consequence, and you graphically made that point. I am puzzled as to how the act of withdrawing from such an inconsequential role would be so extremely important and have such profound effects. I could ask directly if you really think that we have had trouble in communicating with members of the non-aligned states because we have not been able to establish the image of the chaste neutral, or if our acceptance on the international scene—and especially with these countries—is all that less than, shall we say, Sweden, even though it is known that we are an ally of the United States. I would like an evaluation of the difference in effectiveness of our role if we should suddenly present the world with a neutral non-NATO status.

Professor Brecher: May I say first, Mr. Chairman, that I yield to Mr. Macquarrie's perceptive remarks, on the basis of his experience at international conferences, about the image of Canada held by political and other leaders of the states. My observation is based on a combination of personal experience at other levels and also from considerable reading over a period of 15 years how

people in the third world look upon Canada. Whether or not it is correct to state, as I do, that this image is not so much a tarred image as a non-existent one, or whether Mr. Macquarrie is correct or not in saying that there is a distinctive identity, I still submit that there is a pronounced perception of Canada as a kind of natural geographic and cultural extension of its southern neighbour. Canada is America "writ large", if you wish. It is true that in some ways Canadian foreign aid is more acceptable and more effective, though of a much smaller dimension, precisely because it is known that relatively speaking Canada is a small power that does not constitute in any sense a threat to the existence of any one of these states as an independent entity, and in a sense—to the extent that an image of Canada exists—it is positive rather than negative. I accept this.

However, to go to your more basic point, I can only reiterate an observation which was made this morning. It seems to me that Sweden by its posture of conscious and, if you wish, committed non-alignment—despite its refusal to sacrifice its basic values, its culture, its democratic political system, its pattern of life which has grown out of its own historic experience and regardless of the pressures that may be placed upon it—has managed through its posture of non-alignment to exert far greater influence of a positive character in links with the third world in her role through the United Nations in peace-keeping enterprises, and I am suggesting that Canada by virtue of its presence in NATO, whether or not it exerts any influence therein, is automatically blurred in the minds of many who look upon NATO as simply one of two bloc military organizations engaged in a long-term conflict, if you wish, for the soul of Europe.

The only answer I can give you, Mr. Macquarrie, is that the classic defence of the continued Canadian membership in NATO is predicated on what I would call the series of essentially outmoded assumptions about the role of NATO, the importance of Canada's participation therein, the kinds of problems that will confront Canadian foreign policy in the next decade or more, and they are focussed upon the role of Canada simply as part of a North Atlantic triangle or a West European-North American geographic region. That may be important but it is not the total frame of reference in which a country like

Canada must operate. I would go further and say that with the increasing stabilization of the East-West conflict in Europe, the challenge to Canada's foreign policy does not lie in Europe but rather in what is emerging as the traumatic conflict of a continental racial level of development character between the West-North, if you wish, and the South and East with all of the racial overtones and the internal instability that characterize these societies and which highly exaggerate perceptions of mistrust. So that you may well be correct in saying that Canada has managed to maintain a distinctive image. Though I disagree with you on this I yield to your superior experience in this but I would argue nonetheless that what is disturbing about the great debate over Canadian foreign policy is that it continues to take place essentially within a mold that fits the world of the 1940s and 50s, not the world of the 1970s, and it is precisely those assumptions that I challenge.

• 1615

Mr. Macquarrie: In reference to image rating, as image building it is an inexact science. I do not know that my phrenology is any better than yours. I am not suggesting that it is; it is pretty imprecise. But are there doors now closed to Canada that are open to Sweden? And what doors would open if we were non-NATOized, or de-NATOized, I suppose.

Professor Brecher: Well, I am struck by the fact that Sweden can maintain diplomatic relations with Peking and establish diplomatic relations with Hanoi and incur, if you wish, displeasure to the extent of a diplomatic note from the United States but maintain a degree of access to the chancelleries of both worlds as well as to the chancelleries of the third world, which is quite unique. And I submit that this is possible because of the skill and because of the posture that Sweden has adopted and maintained with remarkable success over a period, in this case, of two decades since the second world war.

Mr. Macquarrie: But are not members of NATO such as Norway also in that position and still in NATO? I do not know about—you add Hanoi—I should not say that—but certainly with Peking.

Professor Brecher: I think not. For one thing it seems to me that Canada's potential

as a middle power is of considerably greater dimension than Norway, and furthermore the kinds of challenges that I speak of are not such that a relatively small state like Norway can take advantage of in the course of its diplomatic relations. I am not trying to make this into an open and shut case and if I have appeared to create that impression I regret this. I am simply trying to suggest that we must really begin, so to speak, to open our minds to new vistas that we had long assumed to be unthinkable, or as Herman Kahn once put it about nuclear weapons: one must begin to think about the unthinkable. And I suggest that if this debate on Canadian foreign and defence policy is to have the great educational value that I, as an educator, see as one of its fundamental objectives, then it is important to place on the table alternative options in foreign policy which have heretofore been dismissed as theoretical, visionary, unrealistic and irrelevant. I submit that they are precisely the opposite.

Mr. Macquarrie: Be assured—and I do not think I am just speaking for myself—that we are delighted that this is just what you are doing. It is extremely valuable and I do thank you for it. I have a couple more parts here, Mr. Chairman, although I do not want to monopolize the floor.

Mr. Allmand: May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Macquarrie asked about doors that might open or close. Have you considered the amount of trade that Canada has with the United States and the amount of trade that Sweden has with the United States? Is it not possible that we might lose some trade or economic benefits and if so, would you still think it worthwhile to carry through this policy regardless of these ill effects on trade and economics? Is this a door that might close?

• 1620

Professor Brecher: I doubt that very much because it seems to me that economic relationships between states are essentially built and sustained on the basis of mutual benefit that accrues in tangible economic terms. I see no reason whatever why American investments or American trade with Canada should be affected at all by a change in political posture which is not antagonistic to the United States—and I am not suggesting antagonism—which does not imply an antipa-

thy to American policy but rather an assertion of a distinctive Canadian policy which may from time to time, indeed from time to time will find itself very closely akin to that of the United States. What I am inveighing against is what I regard as a kind of automatic responsiveness of Canada, and there are exceptions, but on the whole a responsiveness to American lead in the field of foreign policy which has tended, I think, to wither both the reality and what I call the image of a distinctive Canadian identity. But this is not to suggest that the important ties that link this country with the United States will automatically be sundered. I see no reason whatever for their being sundered because Canada should decide that in certain areas, specific issues, or what I call issue areas of defence and foreign policy, it should go its own way in an attempt not only to achieve its own national interest objectives, but also in global terms to strengthen bonds with a third world which would be prepared to accept on a basis of greater trust that kind of initiative from Canada than has heretofore been the case. So I do not see economic relations as being adversely affected whatsoever.

Mr. Macquarrie: You have discussed with us helpfully the question of our credibility with the non-aligned world. Is our credibility with the aligned world perhaps not worthy of a passing through? Naturally the head of state in NATO cannot publicly say what they think of our present introspection. Poor President Kennedy got into trouble for even saying publicly that it would be nice for us to be in the OAS. So that is that. But I am sure—I am convinced—that there would be no one in the chancelleries of the other 14 states that would welcome our withdrawal. Might there not be some diminution of our credibility with these people if we opted out?

Professor Brecher: Mr. Macquarrie, the only way I can answer this is to say that I agree with you at one level; that is to say, there will be varying degrees of disenchantment, expressed or unexpressed privately or publicly, but almost certainly privately, with what appears to be withdrawal from a club.

I would hope, from my own studies of the way diplomats behave and political leaders behave that this would also be accompanied by a new respect for Canada in the world even among these leaders and chancelleries, particularly because if they have the kind of

intelligence that I attribute to them, they will fully understand that this kind of path that we are now talking about does not *ipso facto* represent hostility to NATO or its members, does not represent a rupture in the relationships, but rather a broadening of Canada's relationships with other areas of the world which involves narrow-gauge withdrawal from direct military alignments but does not otherwise, I think, affect adversely the historic ties between Canada and the countries of Western Europe.

I would go further and say that if we are wrong in attributing that degree of wisdom and understanding to these leaders, I would still argue that the criterion on the basis of which Canadian foreign policy must be formulated is not whether or not other countries like it or dislike it, but whether or not this is in the interests of this country as we define those interests.

Mr. Macquarrie: I am not thinking of a popularity contest, but we could diminish our effectiveness if we decreased credibility with one group in the world community.

Professor Brecher: I must be fair and honest in saying that it is very difficult for me to measure quantitatively the comparative decline of credibility on the one hand, and the comparative rise in credibility elsewhere, in order to plot in quantitative terms an overall cost benefit ratio for Canada's place in world politics.

• 1625

Mr. Macquarrie: I find both of them hard to project at the moment. My final question deals with what I am old-fashioned enough to think is still the most important aspect of our foreign policy, that is bilateral relations with the country to the South. I believe you told someone this morning that you had not said that Canada should offer its air space to the United States. Would you advise that we deny it or attempt to?

Professor Brecher: I would, personally, because I regard it as unnecessary and I regard that as much more of an undermining of *de facto* Canadian sovereignty than the present kind of NORAD arrangement which seems to me to create the image, again, of a mutually satisfying and equally arrived at agreement but which, in effect, in terms of decision-making authority, has granted a

degree of legalized intervention in the defence policy of this country which would be infinitely greater.

Mr. Macquarrie: In recollection of the opening part of your paper, you discuss some of the classic cases of neutral states, and at a certain stage of development the wishes and the interests of some great power in propinquity to them terminated that status rather definitely as in the case of Belgium. I am wondering if, when it is still the point of view of the United States that participation in and over our air space is essential to their self-defence, to say nothing of continental defence, and so long as that prevails, we in fact have this freedom of movement and operation vis-à-vis neutrality, neutralism and non-alignment.

Professor Brecher: I think your point is well taken; that is to say, the United States no less than any other great power in history, indeed no less than any other state, will act in terms of its perception of its own national interests. If it regards control over Canadian air space as vital to those interests, NORAD or no NORAD, non-alignment or no non-alignment, it will act in such a way as to protect those interests. But in the same way, it seems to me to be perfectly compatible to talk about a Canadian posture of non-alignment in certain areas and issues, achieving certain goals, and in others, if you wish *ipso facto* and objectively because of our geographic continuity to the United States, having no control over the question of whether the United States will assert that domination in the presence or absence of a NORAD-type arrangement. I do not see these, in other words, as neat compartments that must at all times coincide with one another. The question of whether the U.S. will act, it seems to me, is irrelevant to the kind of over-all posture that Canada adopts to the rest of the world but the United States. Whether we are aligned or non-aligned, it will act over Canadian air space solely in terms of particular challenges to the United States at particular periods of time.

The question of whether or not we give them access to air space will not deter them. All I am suggesting is that if our concern is with the enhancement of Canadian independence and territorial integrity, a NORAD-type arrangement simply represents for me a façade of an agreement negotiated equally

between two parties in which one grants virtual control over the air space of another in return for protection. That protection will be granted anyway so long as the United States deems it vital, and that protection will terminate so long as the United States deems it no longer relevant to its interests, whether or not NORAD exists.

Mr. Macquarrie: I was thinking not only of military attitudes and performances and actions but of the very clear, cold, and to some, perhaps unwelcome fact that we need the United States economically much more than they need us militarily. At times in recent years we have had to call upon that favorite-nation attitude in order to restrain some undesirable factors in our economy. I can think of some of our ministers rushing to Washington to ask for the non-application of American legislation to Canadian investors. This I think introduces an area of sensitivity that makes us a little different from Switzerland.

• 1630

Professor Brecher: Mr. Macquarrie, if I may speak to that for a moment as someone from Quebec—I think this is a relevant remark. You know that the climate for investment in Quebec has become somewhat cooler in recent months and years, and yet it is striking that during this period the rate and volume of United States investment in Quebec has conspicuously increased. We have an interesting two-flow effect with Canadian funds moving out of Quebec to other parts of Canada and American funds moving into Quebec. This question has been raised rather frequently: how does one explain the willingness of the United States investors to establish branch plants in Quebec while Canadian investors move out? The answer is that to American investors a Quebec, even a separate Quebec, is a much more stable environment for investment than a great many countries in the world where the U.S. does invest. Apropos your point I would argue that regardless of what kind of foreign policy posture Canada pursues, to a would-be investor the climate that exists in Canada is still infinitely more attractive than perhaps 99 per cent of other countries in the world where American investment exists.

Again I would stress that there seems to be a kind of pre-occupation with the conscious

consequences that would follow if Canada were to mark out for itself, whether in whole or in part, a new path in foreign policy. I think this represents a misreading of the mind of the American investor for whom Canada is a natural and hospitable area for investment, regardless of its foreign policy, and I would almost go so far as to say regardless of whether or not Quebec remains an integral part of this country.

I do not know whether you accept this particular line of reasoning but I assure you that there is substantial evidence to suggest that American investors, whether in the Congo or other relatively unstable areas in the world, have not been deterred by much more traumatic events than the mere separation of the part of one country and the establishment of an independent state.

Mr. Macquarrie: A very good point. I suppose it depends really on how much they value the NORAD set up and this, at the moment, I do not know.

Professor Brecher: I cannot judge that really any more than you because here we are in the realm of classified materials and I simply do not have access.

Mr. Macquarrie: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: I have on my list Mr. Laniel, Mr. Thompson is not here so we will have to cross him, then Mr. Stewart, Mr. Hymmen, Mr. Gibson, Mr. Guay, Mr. Cañik and Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Members may be interested in knowing that the stock exchange in Montreal was just blown up. They say it is in shambles.

The Vice-Chairman: Well that may not help the investment climate there. That is a sad supplementary.

• 1635

Mr. Laniel: Professor, on the last point you made in reply to Mr. Macquarrie you spoke of investments but you did not really speak of them in respect of the security or survival of the United States. Do you not think that even though Canada could become a non-aligned country, if at one time or another politicians in the United States felt that for their security or survival they needed, air bases in northern Canada or surveillance of our air space that they would apply sufficient pressure and, because of our economic link, force us into such concessions, which would bring

us to the same point as we are now or closely to it.

Professor Brecher: I would certainly agree that in that extreme situation the United States could certainly impose its will in the matter of access to air space, bases and the like. I would have grave doubts whether or not the military technology and weaponry that exists in the sixties is likely to escalate in the seventies the kind of traditional concept of bases an earlier period will apply. But in theory I think your point is well taken, that there would be really nothing to prevent that kind of imposition of will, as indeed super powers have imposed their will elsewhere in the world.

Mr. Laniel: As Mr. Anderson remarked while you were making that point, we would be in a similar position to that of Czechoslovakia if we were really linked with the United States. Why did the Russians decide to go in—because, as they saw it, it was in their best interests. However, it could be in the best interests of the United States at one time or another. You never know what might develop in the Middle East, let us say, and the United States in such a case might think of doing things like that. The saints are not all on one side and the bad ones on the other, you know.

Professor Brecher: No. The analogy may hold. I cannot deny this. Certainly it is a possibility that one has to contemplate.

Mr. Laniel: I conclude from what you say that you are looking for another role for Canada in the world. I am not sure that you have convinced me. I think we can agree between ourselves that the image of Canada is not that bad right now. I ask myself the question whether it is more important for me as a Canadian to see Canada in a neutral situation working to build up an image in the tiers monde or whether it is not more important to stay within an alliance, as we are now, with perhaps less involvement, and try to influence the alignment.

Do you not feel that Canada can be an influence? Would you agree with me if I said that I have the impression that Canada and other NATO countries might have had an influence on the decision of the United States to sit down around the table and start discussing the problem of Vietnam? Even brush wars

can develop into something much larger, and if they do there must be someone near the big powers within the blocs that will influence and try to bring some relief.

Professor Brecher: Let me comment, if I may, at two levels. On the question of Vietnam, again I am hampered by non access to documentation which my friends in External Affairs have.

Mr. Laniel: We did make a statement though.

Professor Brecher: That is a kind of closed system which I reject.

I think the evidence on the contrary is that the United States decided to set in motion discussions leading to negotiations and what will ultimately be some kind of resolution to that conflict only at the point at which its military advisers have accepted the reality which had been argued for a period of two years or more, that they could not resolve this conflict on the battle field, and all of the efforts that were made by the predecessor regime in this country and the travels back and forth of Canadian members of the ICC and other ex diplomats of the Canadian foreign service, as far as I am concerned, did not have one iota of influence on United States thinking or actions?

• 1640

I often think in this country that we pride ourselves on something which just does not exist and maybe it is necessary simply to solve and to make more meaningful our own role in the world.

I have often been told by people in External Affairs that we really have a significant moderating influence on United States policy. I fail to find it anywhere. It may well be that the United States makes decisions at times which happen to coincide with what Canada would like to do. But it is one thing to establish a causal relationship, it is quite another to establish a coincidental relationship. Great powers take advice only when that advice provides a rationalization for what they want to do anyway. I think that anyone who really assumes that this country exerts a restraining influence on American behaviour in the United Nations, Vietnam or where else is simply engaged in self-delusion. We all know how many statements were made by Mr. Martin in the United Nations and elsewhere on the bombing of North Vietnam, but when did

the bombing stop? It stopped only when the United States came to the conclusion that it no longer served a military or diplomatic purpose. We could then take claim for having pressured the United States into doing this but that, in fact, is a misreading of the situation. But I want to go to a more general point than that. That is on Vietnam.

Mr. Laniel: Does not the same principle apply to Sweden?

Professor Brecher: Let me try and answer it another way, if I may.

A number of members of this Committee have constantly refocussed my attention on Western Europe, NATO, the alliance, membership in the club, and so on. I think if you want to argue the future of Canadian foreign policy within those terms you can make an admirably sophisticated and logical case for the retention of Canadian membership in NATO and NORAD and for virtually no change in Canadian foreign policy. I argue the case in different terms.

Non-alignment for me is not in itself a policy goal. It is merely an instrumental goal. It is a technique by which certain objectives can be achieved. My premise is that as Canada moves into the 1970's the great issues of foreign policy are not East-West European relationships. Those have been stabilized for a variety of reasons which I need not go into here. They will remain stable either by the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in their present form or by their transformation into some kind of all European security system. Canada's presence or absence in that stable relationship is of such marginal consequence that I do not regard it as worthy of debate. It is simply a way of continuing that which we did, and since it is comfortable we can continue to do so.

What I am suggesting is that the challenges for the next decade for Canada and the world are not Europe. The challenges of the next decade are how to bring about new equilibria between a developed West and North and an underdeveloped newly emergent world of some 60 weak, hesitant, distrustful states of non-white peoples who are clammering at the door and are determined that history which denied them much will no longer deny them in the future what they regard as their due. I do not want to get into the question of whether their reading of history is correct. All I am

suggesting is that there is a great challenge in re-establishing on a much more positive and firm foundation linkages between the established and affluent countries of the northern hemisphere and those of the south. Within that context, Canada can play a more meaningful role than in marginal contributions of the perpetuation of an alliance system which will continue to function whether or not Canada is a member. It is in that sense that non-alignment is meaningful to me—just because of the word. The word after all is simply a symptom of an attitude, behaviour, a way of looking at problems and trying to solve these problems. I cannot reiterate this in any more emphatic terms than I have already. To me the question is, do we look backwards to the forties and fifties or forward to the seventies? That is the issue I think on which this debate will ultimately rest.

• 1645

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but you did say in your analysis paper here that there are cases in which an aligned state mediates more effectively. There are cases when a neutralist is so emotionally involved because of its anti-racial anti-colonial issue that it ceases to have the value of a mediator, as in the case of Suez. You mentioned, in reply to the leader of the NDP party this morning, the acceptance of Canada within the UNEF force. You said it took 72 hours. To me 72 hours is immaterial. It is the things that you do. There might be a question, but it was the first time. After that I do not think Canada has been questioned as to its willing sincerely in fulfilling that job, and I think that problem is over now. The United Nations knows what we want to do, whether we are aligned or whether we are not aligned.

Professor Brecher: This, Mr. Laniel, seems to me a matter of interpretation. I respect your interpretation, and I think there are those who would share it and those who would not share it. It is an open question.

As to the earlier point that you read from my paper, I would simply note that that paper was written in 1961. The world has changed, it is almost a decade ago. If I were rewriting that and if I had the time to rewrite it now, I would rewrite that passage among others, simply because the nature of world politics at the end of the 1960s is, I

think, very different from that period of bipolarity at the beginning of the 1960s.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: You were talking about having a non-aligned policy and that, I gather, as a result of it we would be in a better position to work with the many numerous emerging underdeveloped nations in the world. I cannot see that being non-aligned in a technical sense or in the way in which you describe it would change the attitude of those nations to Canada. I do not know that they consider us a colonial power. We certainly are a white power, so the problems that they would have in respect to us in terms of racism would still be there.

In terms of alignment, if we said we were not aligned, I do not think we would fool anybody. All the declarations in the world to say that we are not aligned are not going to create the impression that we are unbiased in our approach to East-West conflicts that might arise.

Is the benefit the fact that we are going to turn more money toward the development of these things? Is it an economic benefit, as opposed to an alignment or non-alignment benefit?

Professor Brecher: There are, I think, two points to be made here. One is that we are dealing with the realm of the intangible. It is very difficult, I think, for a Canadian—any Canadian—to penetrate accurately into the thought processes of people who have lived under colonial rule. You are quite right in saying that most of the newly independent Afro-Asian leaders do not regard Canada as a colonial power. And historically, they know it was not a colonial power.

They do, however, regard Canada as an integral part of a Western, essentially Anglo-American, community. And they have certain objective indices which support the proposition that it remains an integral part of that community. Membership in NATO is one, voting at the United Nations is another, and indices of this kind.

When you ask if such a change in posture means simply a further expansion of Canadian foreign aid, I would hesitate to think that this would be the sole purpose of rationale or outcome of such a change. I am talking rather

of adding to the flexibility in international politics by contributing one more state to the small number which, because of its position—and I am using that word position not solely in geographic terms—but because of its conscious articulated policies, and because of its behaviour at the United Nations and elsewhere, can create links which are literally desperately needed on a planet which is fragmented in a variety of ways and full of fundamental distrust.

• 1650

The fact that Canada was not a colonial power does not *per se* make it acceptable. It may not even be acceptable as a non-aligned state. I am not suggesting that Sweden is now the darling of the third world, because you see, if you push me to that extreme, the change that would ensue is not so fundamental. But that is not the critical issue. The issue is what is the rationale for perpetuating the present policy. I do not find that rationale convincing. It is rather, "We did it before, let us continue to do it in the future".

I want to make clear that I do not wish to exaggerate the consequences of changing credibility, acceptability or influence of Canada in the world. It is rather that I see a dead end in past and present policy. And in terms of the two objectives that I set out in the early part of my remarks, for the next 10 years a distinctive identity and an image of a successful, bilingual and multicultural society—after all, many of these new states have the same kinds of linguistic and cultural problems that we have in a much more aggravated form—those two objectives, I submit, would be better achieved by this kind of departure in policy than the kind of stereotype continuation of a policy which, I feel, has not produced admirable results in Canadian national interest terms, but simply has been in the historic tradition, and that is no longer good enough.

Mr. Cafik: I do not agree with that. It is not a very positive argument, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Professor, many people have taken the habit of speaking of NATO and NORAD in the same breath, and I was glad that you made the point this morning that they should be looked at in two different ways and in separate contexts.

Let us for a moment put NATO aside and speak about NORAD. Mr. Macquarrie covered much of the ground that I had intended to speak about. Your idea seems to be that Canada should withdraw from the bilateral agreement of NORAD, because the United States is going to look after our defence in any case.

If we are in a position where another country is looking after our defence, does this not, by the fact itself, make us aligned?

Professor Brecher: No, I do not see this at all. The kind of argument that I would put forward here is that there seems to me to be a peculiar contradiction in the advocacy simultaneously of a world of non-proliferation in nuclear technology, and at the very same time, almost in the same breath, an extension in certain parts of the world that happens to suit X or Y, of nuclear technology. In other words, we have finally after almost a decade, reached the point where a nuclear non-proliferation agreement is about to take effect, with all kinds of reservations and certain key states not very happy, and indeed not even participating.

Yet, I take it that the United States, through its initiative in such a treaty, has committed itself in public to the proposition that the world is safer to the extent that the extension of the presence of nuclear weapons is reduced. At that very same moment, we have arguments in favour of the extension of nuclear technology to countries like Canada. I am submitting here that consistent with the underlying premises of nuclear non-proliferation as a condition for stability and tranquility, is the concept of de-nuclearization or de-nuclear zones. We have talked about this in Europe, we have also talked about it elsewhere, but thus far we have never really moved forward in this direction.

• 1655

I am submitting here that a pull-back from NORAD at the time at which this is possible, represents a step in the direction of de-nuclearization and the maximalization of the ideas that flow from a nuclear non-proliferation rather than a proliferation.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Of course, the United States could never accept that view and I do not think that I would agree with that view either, because I regard this, as does the United States, as the same as the

defence of one country. I cannot conceive of a defence of the United States or of Canada which does not include the whole of the continent. And I think this was the very reason why NORAD came into existence. The fact that they must have our air space, that they must have a certain amount of control over the radar system and the communication systems that are in this country, is part of the over-all network of the defence of the United States. And as you said, whether we want them here or not, they would be here if they thought it was necessary for their security.

Is it not much better then to have them here with our consent? And not only that, but it seems to me that the United States has been more than generous with Canada because we have a very big say in what goes on at NORAD. One of our senior officers is either the commander or the deputy commander, alternately. And it seems that they have been very, very generous because what we contribute to the defence of North America is practically nothing as compared to what the United States does. And yet they have treated us as an equal partner, practically.

Do you not think that this is a happier situation than if we were to say, "You go it alone, because you are going to look after us anyway, but do not dare come into our air space"? Is this not creating new problems and tension?

Professor Brecher: It is very difficult to answer this kind of comment because I think it really moves us into an area almost of faith and interpretation of United States intentions and Canadian foreign policy aspirations.

I would disagree almost totally with everything you have said about American generosity towards Canada, its equality in the NORAD relationship. My reading of history tells me that great powers are never really generous beyond the point at which generosity happens to fit their interests.

Generosity is not a term, I think, that fits international politics or relationship with these states except as it is consistent with interests. There may be a Canadian deputy commander at NORAD. I daresay, to take an extreme case, if the Canadian Government were not co-operative in a situation in which SAC felt it were absolutely essential to do thus and so, it would do thus and so.

But that does not, I think, represent any kind of meaningful rationale for the per-

petuation of an arrangement which, on the surface, is a voluntaristically arrived-at agreement, but which in reality is a façade for legalized penetration of this country's air space and, to some extent, land space, and the presence of nuclear weapons beyond American soil, and ironically at a time when the United States itself regards the possible enemy for which those original radar installations were created to be no longer the primary enemy. We now talk about a new ABM system which is directed westwards rather than northwards.

In other words, the very purpose for which the radar installations in the north of Canada were originally set up, that purpose is regarded by American military strategists today as secondary, secondary in terms of a threat to the continental United States.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): But not eliminated?

Professor Brecher: Not eliminated. I would still submit that we must decide, not whether the United States will assert its will, and not whether it is in the interest of the United States.

I myself for as long as I can remember, have always been told that ultimately Canada must think in terms of what North America feels and thinks. I submit that the logical conclusion of that position is that Canada ought to merge totally with the United States, a position which I do not accept and which I think most Canadians would not accept.

● 1700

Now, one need not go from one extreme to the other. I am not suggesting that co-operation with one's natural geographic neighbour is undesirable. The question is, at what levels with that intensity, in what situation, as compared with what alternative options of policy present themselves to achieve whatever objectives we set for ourselves. If our objective is not to alienate the United States, then I would agree that everything you have said is a desirable policy. However, I do not think, non-alienation is a sufficiently legitimate foreign policy for an independent state. There must be something beyond that.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Do you not agree that our relationship with the United States is a rather unusual one. It is not like the rela-

tionship between the United States and Mexico or any other country. In fact, they regard Canada as almost part of their own country.

Professor Brecher: I think they do that primarily because, by our behaviour over a longer period in the past than I can possibly remember, we have made it possible for them to so believe. That does not justify its perpetuation in the future.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I would like to make one remark regarding the way Canada is viewed abroad. I believe your opinion is that if we were non-aligned with anyone, that we would perhaps have greater influence in the third world, and particularly in the African and Asian countries. I suppose in theory this can be argued from both sides all night long, but in actual practice I think we have very recently had a very, very good example of this, and it is one with which I am quite familiar. I am referring to the desire on the part of both sides of the Nigerian war to choose Canada over every other country, even though we are white, even though we are North American, even though we are almost a satellite of the United States and even though we are a member of NATO. They would prefer to have us entering into mediation than any other country.

An hon. Member: Ethiopia first.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I do not believe that is so. In fact, Ethiopia has taken that initiative. However, I do not think they prefer Ethiopia. In my discussions with both sides they indicated they would like to see Canada take this role. I do not think in practice your theory necessarily holds up in the Nigerian situation.

Professor Brecher: You may be right in the Nigerian case, and here I yield to your knowledge. I would only say that the Nigerian problem and Canada's policy towards it seems to me to raise even more fundamental questions about Canadian foreign policy. I do not know, Mr. Chairman, whether this is the time or the place to enter into this, but if I were to do so at length—and I will not—I would say that I have followed with astonishment—and I think shame—this government's behaviour in that civil war, particularly with respect to the issue of Biafra. I have written about this in the public press and I find that the degree of indifference in this country to

one of the great human tragedies of this century is something which all Canadians who are conscious of public affairs will look back upon in the years to come as one of the least attractive chapters in the history of Canadian relations with any other part of the world.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): What would you suggest we do?

Mr. Allmand: We should have had Professor Brecher with us when we were studying question before.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The question is by no means solved.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

I am very interested in Professor Brecher's answers and the questioning that is going on, but I am a little concerned as time goes on some of our questioners are going to be missing and perhaps some of the points that people want to bring up will be missed. Would it be possible to speed up the questions and the answers a little more; otherwise we are going to miss some of the things that are going on here today, and I do not want to miss anything.

The Vice-Chairman: I think it would be advisable if the questions were more succinct and probably they could be cut down a bit in scope and number. I do not think we want to get back into Biafra at the moment. I think we should continue more along the lines laid down at the outset.

• 1705

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I only asked two short questions, Mr. Chairman. In fact, since 11 o'clock this morning I have been quite quiet and I have let everyone ask a whole lot of irrelevant supplementaries, and so on.

The Vice-Chairman: I can understand your fears, Mr. Howard—and I share them—that we are going to get into a big discussion of the problem in Nigeria and Biafra.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I do not want to do that, but as our guest has expressed an opinion which perhaps could raise a number of points, possibly we could ask him just to give a short explanation of his view on this matter without pursuing it, and I will not ask any further questions.

The Vice-Chairman: I do not think it should be pursued very far, Mr. Stewart,

because we can get into expressions of opinion as to what other countries are doing in this area, and so on, and it can go very far afield.

Mr. Allmand: We spent nearly a month studying this question, Mr. Chairman. I think these are important questions but we could really range all over the map in foreign affairs.

The Vice-Chairman: Perhaps bearing in mind what is being said...

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I will bow to your decision on that but I do not like to see it left in the air. Professor Brecher has given an opinion in which he has criticized the government and I would like to see that cleared up.

The Vice-Chairman: I think perhaps Mr. Stewart should have an opportunity to put his question. He could make it succinct and perhaps we could have a short answer.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes, I was as concerned about getting answers that were perhaps a little longer than we need as I was about the long questions.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Howard.

Mr. Winch: I do not give a hoot how long the answer is as long as we are getting information.

Professor Brecher: I would merely intervene, if I may, by saying that university lecturers are accustomed to lecturing at great length, so if at times they try your patience, I offer my apologies.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Stewart, could you put your further question.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Professor Brecher, if it would not get us involved to any great extent, could you give us a brief idea of what you think Canada should be doing in this regard?

Professor Brecher: I would like to be quite clear about one point. I think a distinction has to be drawn between a human tragedy and the question of political intervention, although at times that borderline is not easily maintained because any act tends to spill over into other acts. I, as well as many others, have been perplexed and disturbed by what I would regard as a kind of casualness and almost indifference to that human tragedy on the part of many spokesmen in authority. I

think the magnitude of that tragedy is now known and I think anyone who doubts it is simply closing his mind to a stream of authentic evidence that has come out of Biafra through qualified sources. I know there were difficulties in the early stages and yet I cannot help believing that the kind of direct government involvement in the alleviation of that human tragedy that this country was capable of by virtue of its resources and its access to authority in Nigeria would have contributed significantly to the reduction of that distress. I have the feeling that it was very much like Mr. Chamberlains' remark in 1938 at the time of Munich when he was asked about Czechoslovakia; he referred to it as that far-off land. Biafra, too, is a far-off land but in many ways the inability of this country at the level of government to respond to that kind of tragedy I think speaks volumes of words.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you, Professor Brecher.

The Vice-Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): No, thank you.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I will stick to the topic you are here today to discuss and I will not deviate from it. This morning you mentioned the fact that if there was any change in Canada's policy it would affect Sweden. In fact, I believe you said that it would cause a wrench. I thought you could perhaps briefly explain that particular part of your statement.

• 1710

Professor Brecher: It would cause a wrench?

Mr. Guay: A wrench; you used the word "wrench".

Professor Brecher: A wrench in what?

Mr. Guay: I am not sure. I noted the last part of the sentence while you were speaking. It would certainly cause a problem somewhere, in regard to the effect on Sweden, if we were to change our policy. Am I wrong in making that statement?

Professor Brecher: I think perhaps it was in another context. I must confess I do not recall it. It may have been in the context of Canada's withdrawal from NATO, the ques-

tion of whether or not this would cause a wrench in the working of NATO in Europe, and my answer was that it would not; that Canada's presence or absence was marginal to NATO's performance in Europe.

Mr. Guay: All right. You are speaking of neutrality, and would you agree that neutrality exists only as long as no country challenges that neutrality?

Professor Brecher: I do not think that is true. There are certain neutral states which withstand pressures on that neutrality and some are incapable of so doing, as Belgium was in 1914. I think Sweden has persistently resisted pressures which frequently come to the front pages of our press by the Soviet Union on its northern borders, or other states, but particularly in the case of the Soviet Union. It does so, of course, by the presence of substantial military capability. I do not think it is correct to say that neutral states can remain neutral only so long as all other states accept that status.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I was going to say that if we were to follow your suggestion to be neutral, do you not think that possibly we would have to go to the superpowers and ask them to permit us to be neutral?

Professor Brecher: I think what you are referring to here is a permanently neutralized state which conducts its policy in such a way that it can never enter into any kind of alliance which could offend other powers. I am not suggesting permanent neutralization of the Austria type. I am talking about non-alignment with a neutralist active element of the Swedish type as distinct from the Austrian-Swiss-Laos type of permanently neutral or neutralized states.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): If we were aligned with the United States, as we are now, it is because we agree with their policies. Do we have more voice because we contribute, we take part in the NATO program?

Professor Brecher: This is the argument put by defenders of continued Canadian participation in NATO. I do not accept that argument because I find no evidence to support it. There may be evidence but it will not do for the experts to say to us, "We have the evidence but we cannot tell you". If the evidence is there, then we have a right to know what

it is. In the absence of that forthcoming, I will simply conclude there is no evidence.

Mr. Cafik: Professor Brecher, you talked a lot about neutralism and neutrality. I was not here for your opening statement this morning there was another committee meeting I had to attend, but I presume that you at least stick by the general principles outlined in this article that was issued to us. You speak of neutralism as interventionist; in other words, a positive force as opposed to the negative force that you describe as neutrality, which is an isolationist approach to things. You then go on and talk about it as being non-aligned. I presume you mean non-aligned with the superpowers. In other words, you could have a group of aligned, non-aligned states, and this would be quite consistent with your policy or with your approach to things. Does it follow that your approach to neutralism means to be unarmed or unprotected? That does not follow, does it?

Professor Brecher: No, and I fear I made that clear this morning when you were not present. We discussed this matter as to whether or not I was advocating a total abandonment of any defence capability, and I said no.

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Mr. Cafik: I asked some of the members of the Committee just what you said this morning and I got the impression that you had really advocated a kind of limited use of arms, or a limited presence of arms, but I gained the impression that it was not to such a sufficient degree that it would protect that neutrality.

Professor Brecher: That is quite right. I argued in advance that Canada's independence is protected regardless of our own indigenous Canadian defence capability. 21

Mr. Cafik: All right. That is a very odd statement to make. You talk of non-alignments and yet in answer to that question you speak as if we are aligned or would continue to be aligned. If we are already protected, against whom are we protected? Against Russia, against China? If we are not aligned we have to be equally concerned, I presume, about protection against the United States or against NATO or any other power in the world.

Professor Brecher: I mean by that simply that objectively by virtue of Canada's geo-

graphic contiguity to the United States there is built into that situation a posture on the part of the United States which would prevent, in its interests, the control of Canada by any other outside power.

Mr. Cafik: But what about itself?

Professor Brecher: I take it as a high probability that the United States would not, itself, intervene in a direct military sense though I am prepared to argue in theoretical terms that if it ever reached the point where it regarded this as vital to its national survival, it would do so, and it would do so whether or not Canada is formally aligned with it or non-aligned. In other words, that balances out. It is irrelevant to the question of Canada's policy posture in foreign affairs generally. I am arguing that Canada in a sense is the unique recipient of an objective defensibility, not because of its defence budget or size of armed forces, but quite impervious to that, because of that geographic position and because of its importance to the United States. That does not make us consciously or positively aligned. It makes us, in a sense, necessarily dependent for the continued territorial integrity and political independence upon what the United States would do. What the United States would do, it would do regardless of our defence policy.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I can appreciate that and I have no argument with that particular approach, but it seems to me rather an odd thing, recognizing the fact that we have the protection of this American umbrella—and I suppose kind of happy that we are protected because of our geographical position—that we would then, sitting under the umbrella, adopt an approach that we were totally neutral or neutralist?

Professor Brecher: Let me clarify it. There may well be cases in specific policy issues where Canada's interests will coincide with those of the United States—a great many—and in those issues it seems to me to be perfectly logical that if it were a matter of voting at the United Nations, they would vote in the same way; or, elsewhere they would adopt policies which would be virtually indistinguishable one from the other. That, however, is a very different thing from saying that, as a kind of blanket rule, the Canadian participation in alliances of which the United States is the principal member virtually dictates non-

deviation from that policy position. There are minor exceptions. What I am suggesting here is that a policy of non-alignment does not mean Canada would consciously differ from the United States in every policy issue. It may well be that as these policy problems arise, they will find themselves together, but they will do so on the basis of criteria which I regard as very different from those criteria which led to Canadian policy decisions in the past.

Mr. Cafik: Pursuing this a little further, I have the impression that you feel that our alignment in such alliances as NATO and NORAD have a tendency to reduce our flexibility, yet I think the facts would indicate that we have adopted a rather flexible approach. We have opposed the United States in certain areas, such as, in Viet Nam, recommending the reduction and the elimination of bombing, and so on. We have taken independent positions with our allies in terms of the Suez crisis and in other areas, and I am sure we will in the future. So on our over-all policy, although generally speaking it is more favourable toward the disposition of our

• 1720

allies, which I think is true in reverse as well, there are times when we do approach things in a totally independent way. Now, by going through the facade—and I would call it a facade of neutrality—you seem to think it was a facade of having freedom and being able to exercise our rights by membership in NATO. I think to tell the world that we are neutral is a much greater facade when, in fact, the disposition of the people of Canada, in my view, the disposition of the government, is not really neutralist. So I think that is a facade. You do not seem to mind that kind of a facade—or maybe you do not think it is one.

Professor Brecher: No, I do not.

Mr. Cafik: How do you make such a distinction, that one is and the other is not?

Professor Brecher: Much of this is a matter of degree, if I may say so. You are quite right in saying that the fact that Canada has participated in United States-led alliances has not prevented her on occasion from taking quite independent postures on policies. I think this is a matter of degree. It seems to

me that your line of argument logically suggests that there are literally no constraints on the freedom of action of Canada in foreign policy by virtue of its presence or absence in NATO, NORAD or any other such arrangement. I find this logically an indefensible position.

Mr. Cafik: No, I did not say that.

Professor Brecher: No, no. Let me proceed then. If there are constraints, then the question simply is, what is the nature of those constraints? Would those constraints be qualitatively significantly different by non-participation in those alliances? I am arguing that they would be and that, therefore, the range of flexibility and its scope, and the frequency with which Canada would adopt an independent position in foreign policy, would be that much greater than has been the case over the past 20 years, which is not to deny that on occasion it has done so within that framework.

Mr. Cafik: All right. I think this is the last question or it might lead to another supplementary. Again I go back to this point that the neutralist claims, as I quote from your statement here in your document, that it can best remain out of war by preventing war. There are many ways that a neutralist could adopt certain approaches and policies in a positive way to prevent the occurrence of war. If we were a neutralist state, as you envisage, and we feel that one of the greatest contributions we can make to the prevention of war would be to align ourselves with Europe and say that we consider this a vital area, that if an attack is made on that area that we ourselves, although we are not a belligerent, do not want war and do everything positive to avoid it, but we would consider something to be the last straw and would have to go to the defence of that area, that, according to your terms of reference, could be the act of a neutralist state.

Professor Brecher: It could be but I would regard it as a distinctly less significant area of focus for Canada for the simple reason that the evidence is overwhelming during the past 15 years that the kinds of overt conflict likely to lead to escalation, involvement of great powers and superpowers, with the result of not conflicts in Europe, western or central, but in many other regions of the world where we have had these peripheral wars, if you

wish, or brush-fire wars, and it is precisely in that kind of conflict that Canada can make a meaningful contribution, at least in my judgment, far more meaningful than an air brigade in Europe. In other words, I think what we have to weigh here is first, where are the regions of likely conflict...

Mr. Cafik: I agree.

Professor Brecher: ...going to be in the next 20 years, and I am convinced they are not going to be in Europe. I think the evidence is clear on that.

Mr. Cafik: Could I pursue that? Perhaps the reason it is not going to be in Europe is because of NATO.

Professor Brecher: But even, if it is NATO, Canada's role in NATO is of no consequence to whether or not NATO deters or does not deter because its involvement is so small that many people are simply unaware of it. I am distinguishing between NATO in its totality and Canada's role in NATO.

Mr. Cafik: For instance, what is Canada's contribution to NATO in terms of strike force in Europe?

Professor Brecher: You tell me.

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Mr. Cafik: I understand it is 10 per cent. Is that insignificant?

Professor Brecher: I am saying that the United States and other allies in NATO do not regard the Canadian contribution, as distinct from Canadian membership in NATO, as of consequence. The withdrawal of Canada would not affect the Alliance in terms of its tangible deterrent capability in Western Europe.

Mr. Cafik: Would you suggest that other countries in NATO follow the approach you recommend for ourselves?

Professor Brecher: I do not really regard that as within my jurisdiction at least, not this afternoon. I do not think the issue for Canadian foreign policy is what other countries should do. The issue rather is, what are Canadian interests in global terms? Does Canada's participation in NATO contribute to those global interests as compared with alternative options available to Canada? That is the realm I think for at least my legitimate commentary. It is not on what a Norway or a

Belgium or other west European state should do.

Mr. Cafik: This is my last question. There have been, I understand, about 50 sort of localized wars since the end of the Second World War. Not one of them, to my knowledge, has been in Europe. Not one of them has led to an international war. Many people seem to feel that the stakes for the superpowers are highest in Europe. They feel the stakes in Africa are not so high, the stakes in Asia are not quite as direct, and consequently there is real possibility that the superpowers are not going to go to war over some matter that is of no direct and immediate and global significance; they are not going to unleash a nuclear war over such a matter. But the possibility of such a war being unleashed in Europe is very great; in fact, some maintain it is the only way that such a war could ever occur.

Professor Brecher: Well, I think that is antediluvian thinking on the part of those who see Europe as the place where over the past 20 years the greatest danger of world war has come. Let me note that in the last two years alone we have had the kind of perpetual conflict in the Middle East where on more than one occasion we talked about the danger of a Middle East conflict escalating into a global confrontation. It did not, because fortunately the superpowers were intelligent enough to realize that the gains from such a confrontation would be nil; the cost would be so fantastic as not to contemplate it.

Mr. Cafik: That is my argument. Right.

Professor Brecher: But I find not a single shred of evidence, at least in the last 10 years, that anything could break out in Europe which could lead to that kind of nuclear conflict. On the contrary, what I find is a remarkable stabilization process. If you wish to argue that NATO contributed to this, so did the Warsaw Pact; but apart from all that Canada's role in NATO can hardly be described as central to the stabilization process in Europe. You may say, "Well, if all the other 14 members of the club thought the same way, what would happen", and the answer, I think, is that even if that highly remote possibility were to come to pass, the Soviet leadership knows, I am convinced—and there is evidence that it does know—that

in the last analysis, whether a NATO exists in the formalized sense or not, a Western Europe as perceived by the United States in terms of its vital interests is no longer fair game or open country, even if it is penetrable. I think this preoccupation with Europe is really a throwback to an age when Europe was the centre of the universe in interstate conflicts; it is no longer, and it has not been since 1945. It took a Suez war to make the world realize that a United Kingdom, which had emerged from the Second World War with much of its empire still intact, was essentially a second-rate power. It may take another 20 years for us to realize that Europe may be important but it is no longer the area where the gut issues of conflict exist. The areas where those sources of conflict exist are in the essentially unstable, highly demanding, newly emergent states which have not yet achieved the very first foundations of stability to be able to function, in long-run terms, as members of the international community. That is where the brush-fire wars occur; that is where they can escalate without any realization of their consequences.

Mr. Cafik: Do you suggest we get involved in those brush-fire wars?

• 1730

Professor Brecher: No. I am saying that Canada's role ought to be to contribute to the hastening of the time process of moving from colonial rule to stable societies not alone because this is too big a job for Canada or even the United States alone to do it. But that is not the question. It is not in either or terms, nor is it a question of Canada versus the world. The question is rather narrower: does Canada have legitimate, possible, viable, alternative option in world politics? My answer is yes. The costs would be less. Defence budgets, I submit, could be cut. Canada's image could be enhanced. It could make a contribution to the challenges which we can only now dimly foresee which in my judgment are going to dominate international politics for the next one or two decades.

Mr. Cafik: Just a last comment: when you say that the costs could be cut, I think that is open to very serious question.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Professor Brecher, your main suggestion or recommendation is that we

change the emphasis of our foreign policy so that we can act more or less as a bridge to the third world. I am going to put certain propositions to you for your comment.

It has been suggested—some people suggest—that we might be able to do this through other ways more directly and regardless whether or not we withdrew from Europe or NATO. For example, about a year or so ago during the Caribbean conference here in Ottawa it was suggested by many people that we try to form much closer links with the Caribbean countries perhaps even form some kind of economic union with the Leeward Islands. I was one who was very enthusiastic for that. There are still a lot of people in Canada who look forward to the day when perhaps we will have some special links with the Caribbean.

I am suggesting here that we—Canada—become part of the third world and I wanted to hear what your comments are on that. I think you are a specialist in India and Pakistan from reading some of your background, and therefore I want to know your comments on our continuing efforts in the Commonwealth, which is predominantly a black and yellow association.

The white countries are a minority group and actually Britain, which is the biggest country in it, is no longer a great world power, so it is becoming an association dominated by black countries, really—India, Pakistan, and so forth. I would think there is a great area there for us to build bridges and also in the black francophone countries. That is one thing. I think bridges can be built there regardless of what we do in NATO, Caribbean, Commonwealth.

Also you said to look to the seventies, not to the forties and the fifties. It would seem to me that we cannot overlook that in the seventies the United States is going to become one of the biggest and most powerful black countries in the world. I feel that we will not see the end of the seventies before there will either be a black president or vice-president of the United States. That is what I feel. The ambassadors to Europe and to the world in the United States will be probably one-third black before the seventies are finished. Therefore, the United States will become very much part of the third world, much more than Europe will be.

I want to look forward to these alternatives and be a part of it. I will just ask for your

comments on the Caribbean, the Commonwealth possibilities of building these bridges?

Professor Brecher: I think you have stated extremely well the kinds of important and viable options that exist for building these Canadian links with the third world. I would say most emphatically that not only is there a potential vis-a-vis the Caribbean, but there is one which has only recently come into being as a potential departure for Canadian policy, and that is in Latin America.

• 1735

Latin America in a very real sense is part of that third world, because while it is true that independence in the formal political sense came to much of Latin America a century more ago, they represent in terms of economic underdevelopment, social cleavages and the nation-building process, part of that vast third world. I think there is a potential for the expansion of Canadian links in the Caribbean and, along the lines that you suggest, I would agree wholeheartedly. I think in Latin America, primarily through bilateral association, there is an extraordinary potential here that has never been tapped.

As to the Commonwealth, I would agree with you again that this has now become essentially a multi-racial but predominantly non-white forum of some 28 states in which Canada, as a senior and respected member, has a natural entrée and access to much of the third world.

Finally, I would agree with you that the very bicultural and bilingual character of Canada has given this country an asset vis-à-vis the French-speaking states of Africa that was long ignored and has only now belatedly come into the picture of Canadian foreign policy-making.

Now, in all of those avenues I would agree that there are possibilities for growth and development in order to build these links, but if these are to be maximized in terms of Canadian national interests I submit that both because of the defence costs of the retention of existing alignments and the psychological costs that spill over in our relations with the third world, they can be maximized by withdrawing from traditional commitments and redirecting our energies along the lines that you have just suggested.

Mr. Prud'homme: Perhaps you could pass your views to the premiers of the three Prairie Provinces concerning the bilingual charac-

teristics of Canada. Needless to say, I share your view entirely on this point.

The Vice-Chairman: Are there any other question? That concludes our list of questions, Professor Brecher, and on behalf of all the members of this Committee I want to thank you very much indeed for your fine presentation. Certainly it is quite clear that the members of the Committee were very interested; you can tell that from the number of questions asked and the length of time that we have asked you to stay with us. I think you have probably set a record for questions for this Committee.

Mr. Allmand: Could we move to include in our Proceedings the statement of Professor Brecher that was distributed?

The Vice-Chairman: Will it be in order to so move? This is the "Neutralism—an Analysis" statement.

Mr. Allmand: Comments were made about it in our questions and also at the beginning by Professor Brecher.

The Vice-Chairman: It would be in order for you to so move.

Mr. Allmand: I move that it be printed as part of our Proceedings.

Motion agreed to.

APPENDIX HH

Neutrality: An Analysis

Michael Brecher*

The term "neutrality" has evoked strong emotions in recent years. Various words are used interchangeably: neutrality, neutralization, non-alignment and neutralism. The result is widespread obscurity about its meaning and implications for world politics. A brief semantic exercise may set the stage for a more rigorous analysis.

Neutrality is simply a legal status of status of states which demand certain rights of the belligerents in time of war and accept certain obligations towards those belligerents. It is a status which comes into existence only after a war has begun. It is, therefore, a term to designate a particular status in a period of over conflict; and a neutral state is one which practices neutrality, for example, the United States between 1914-17 and between 1939-41.

There are situations in which states proclaim themselves in advance desirous of avoiding participation in any war at any time. These states, if they are favoured with special geographical positions, if they happen to be small enough and not especially attractive to the more rapacious Great Powers, may then be given a status of *permanent neutrality* or *neutralization*; that is to say, in terms of power politics, they are removed from the arena of conflict. In time of war, these states accept the obligations and demand the rights of all other neutral states. In time of peace, they accept the fundamental obligation never to join an alliance which could conceivably involve them in war. In modern history there are four outstanding examples of this type, namely, Switzerland, neutralized in 1815, Belgium in 1831, Luxembourg in 1867 and most recently, Austria, in 1955. Only Austria and Switzerland remain as permanently neutralized states, which in effect have abandoned any pretensions to an active role in world politics, though they claim to be sovereign states and may even, as in the case of Austria, join the United Nations.

Non-alignment, by contrast, is a political status. It refers to a state which declares itself aloof from bloc conflicts; nothing more. It proclaims itself free from *a priori* alliances, notably military entanglements with any bloc or great power anywhere in the world. It also asserts that it will judge all policy issues "on their merits". This is not neutrality, however. It is, rather, the passive, first stage of neutrality.

Neutrality has in common with non-alignment an expressed desire to remain aloof from bloc conflict. But neutrality goes much further, for it involves a positive attitude towards bloc conflicts. A neutralist state assumes an obligation to help reduce tensions between blocs with a view to maintaining peace or bringing about peace, and more particularly to prevent the outbreak of war. In other words, non-alignment is the policy guide of the neutralist state, but neutrality represents an attitude and a policy which are much more activist than non-alignment as such. India is the outstanding example of the *neutralist state*. Sweden is a good example of the *non-aligned state*. And, as I suggested, Switzerland and Austria are *neutralized states*. In time of war, any state, whether it be Turkey or Sweden or the United States, which manages to remain aloof from the conflict, is a *neutral state*. This semantic exercise suggests a crucial link: both neutrality and neutrality derive from the same basic aspiration, though they use fundamentally different techniques because of the changed character of the world political system in which they have to operate. In short, neutrality is a contemporary expression of the time-honoured theme of neutrality.

We may explore this proposition by glancing at the origins and evolution of neutrality. As early as Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, a text on politics and administration in ancient India, there was a recognized concept of neutrality as one of the six possible roles of actors in inter-state politics. The Greek city-state system, of course, had a rather sophisticated view of neutrality both in theory and practice. Thucydides, in his account of the Pelop-

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ponnesian War, refers quite frequently to states that were neutral during that war. If there were no neutrals in the Age of Rome, it was simply because Rome was a hegemonial state that would not countenance the idea of aloofness from conflict. But as we move towards another state system in which there was a multiplicity of units with comparatively equal power, for example, the Italian city-state system, neutrality is revived in theory and practice. And from the 15th to the 19th century neutrality as a legal status emerged full blown as a result of conflicts on the sea. Indeed, it was over trading rights and duties, and the claims of states that wanted to engage in commerce, while others were engaged in open hostilities, that the problem of neutrality arose. A painful conflict developed between neutrals who claimed the right to trade and belligerents who claimed the right to contraband or to take over ships if they interfered with the conduct of hostilities. Over a few hundred years there emerged in international law, both in custom and in treaty, recognized rules of neutrality. These reached their zenith in two important Hague Conventions in 1907 and the Declaration of London in 1916. This represented the high water mark of neutrality.

It was precisely at that point that technological changes in the character of warfare occurred, making neutrality almost passé. In the First and, more particularly, in the Second World War, when the stakes were total and character of the conflict was total, the belligerents were unwilling to accept the niceties and nuances of international law; the result was that they interfered with neutral rights whenever they could. The only states in the Second World War which managed to remain neutral were those that were favoured by geography or were sufficiently armed so that invasion would be more costly than the value of conquest to the invader, or were useful as listening posts, such as Turkey, Sweden and Switzerland. All through history, then, one finds the development of the idea and the status of neutrality. By the Second World War it was no longer respected by belligerents. Nevertheless, the aspiration to neutrality in the past continued. And that aspiration was to remain aloof from war.

It is in this sense that neutralism emerges as a policy version of the classic status of neutrality. There are basic differences, of course. Neutrality is isolationist and neu-

tralism is interventionist. The neutral contends that one can best stay out of war by being impartial towards all the belligerents, claiming certain rights and performing certain duties. The neutralist claims that it can best remain out of war by preventing war. This is the heart of the case for neutralism. For, argues the neutralist, in the changed character of war—the development of nuclear weapons, bi-polarity and ideological conflict—even if one could stay out of war, as the neutral did, it would not be particularly desirable, because one could not neutralize oneself against the adverse consequences of thermonuclear war. Therefore, the only way to remain out of global war is to do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of global war.

It is interesting to note in this connection the policy evolution of the leading neutralist state. From 1947 to 1950, Delhi's posture was strikingly similar to classical neutrality, with the frequent expression of hope that India could remain outside a war, should it occur. After the Korean War, however, there was a realization that non-belligerency or neutrality were not sufficient. And so India moved to the second stage—an open rejection of the leadership of both blocs but still passive in its orientation, that is, non-alignment. In the early 'fifties India moved to the third stage—a positive role in world politics and attempts to alleviate tensions with the ultimate purpose of avoiding a global conflict, in the belief that this was the *sine qua non* of India remaining free from war. Mr. Nehru most recently has gone beyond neutralism because of its verbal associations and called this a "Positive Policy for Peace".

II

Staying out of war, the initial aspiration to neutrality, is one of the sources of neutralism—but it would be a grave error to assume that neutralism is merely a twentieth-century response to that age-old problem. On the contrary, there are many sources *sui generis*. The great merit for the practitioners of neutralism is that the objective source of traditional neutrality and the subjective sources that flow from their conditions happen to coincide, indeed, to blend very well. Together they provide a powerful inducement to the policy of neutralism.

We may now look briefly at some of the specific sources of neutralism, focussing on India as the prototype. This is apart from the external setting—the character of world politics, the presence of nuclear weapons, the technological changes of the last fifteen years, and the awareness that war between the super-powers *ipso facto* means a war for all. These sources fall into two logical categories, material and non-material. The two key material mainsprings are geo-political and economic in character. The geo-political pressures on India are obvious to anyone who looks at a map. Indian statesmen are aware of the overpowering pressure of the Sino-Soviet axis on the Indian subcontinent. This does not mean that they are constantly conscious of hostility, but they are aware of the geo-political facts of life for an India which is essentially weak, which has rarely known unity, which is economically underdeveloped and which finds itself strikingly inferior, both in economic and military terms, to a Moscow-Pekin bloc. In other words, the geo-political conditions leads to a simple policy of non-alienation of two very powerful neighbours, particularly when those neighbours are allied to each other.

That geo-political facet is strengthened by the seeming remoteness of all other countervailing centres of powers. History tends to underpin geo-politics here because of Indian awareness of frequent land invasion of the sub-continent; this is accentuated in turn by the Partition of 1947 and by a weak Pakistan. In other words, the facts of geography and resultant geo-political pressures create in the Indian decision-making élite a powerful inducement to a policy of non-alignment, though not necessarily of neutralism.

The economic factor is no less important. It arises from the objective fact of economic underdevelopment and the subjective aspiration for material progress. That is to say, the desire to expand sources of foreign aid, whether capital or technical assistance, whether co-operative, through international channels, private or public, creates a strong inducement to maintain the lines of communication with both Soviet and Western blocs as the two important sources of economic strength. There is, in addition, a deep conviction that war anywhere, whether in Laos or the Congo or in Cuba, or anywhere else, is dangerous. It raises the level of tension

between the two blocs, heightens the prospects of major war, and therefore reduces the prospects for economic growth, apart from the holocaust effects of global war itself. There is, then, an intertwining of objective and subjective pressures towards a policy of at least non-alignment or passive non-involvement in blocs.

Among the non-material factors, one may mention the legacies of history and philosophy. The legacy of history is twofold, but the two are so closely related that they constitute one driving force in the foreign policy of all neutralist (and most non-aligned) states: "anti-colonialism" and "anti-racialism". These have strong policy implications and overtones. Both derive from experience with the Western World. This is very significant, for both tend to off-set political and economic affinities with the West and lead to greater tolerance of Soviet actions than would otherwise be the case. Whenever any great Western power is involved with a small power, whether in the Western Hemisphere, or more particularly with an Afro-Asian state—where it is accentuated by racial overtones—there is an instinctive response of condemnation. This is not true of Soviet actions, simply because the experience of India and other neutralist states with the Soviet bloc was different; in fact it was non-existent for a long time. These twin elements, "anti-racialism" and "anti-colonialism", are even reflected in something like the neutralists' attitude to Cuba, remote as it is from their interests.

As for the legacy of philosophy and tradition, the notion of tolerance in Hinduism and Buddhism merits attention. This has certain implications for Indian, Burmese and Ceylonese policy. The idea of tolerance is deeply embedded in Hindu-Buddhist society, and it has the political consequence of rejecting automatically all claims to the totality of truth, justice and good in the world. The idea that many different religions have equally valid claims to contributing to the total understanding of truth reflects itself in the political realm in the rejection of the absolute perspectives of either the Marxist ideology or Western democratic beliefs. There is the reluctance to accept any claim to absolute truth, justice or good, with the resultant blunting of the tone of their participation in conflicts that arise between East and West. Tolerance tends also to strengthen the material inducements to non-alignment, namely, to

remain apart from the world outlook of both sides, which claim a totality of truth. Taken together, these external and internal sources create an integrated and powerful inducement to neutralism.

III

Two cases which reveal important aspects of Indian neutralism are the Korean War, and Suez and Hungary.*

The most striking feature of India's role in the Korean truce-making settlement from 1950 onwards is the extent to which it alternated support from one side to another. On the four major issues that arose in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), India's chairman agreed in letter with the Polish and Czech delegates to the Commission but sided with the Swiss and Swedes in *action*. These four examples were on: (1) the use of force at the time of the repatriation of prisoners; (2) the dismantling of prisoner-of-war organizations during that period; (3) the extension of the explanation period when prisoners were being persuaded as to whether they ought to return to their homelands; and finally, (4) the ultimate disposition of the prisoners of war.

From the very outset, in June 1950, India voted for United Nations condemnation of North Korea, but it insisted throughout that North Korea ought to be heard in the Security Council. India opposed the crossing of the 38th parallel, but after all efforts to bring North and South Koreans together at the conference table seemed to be exhausted, India agreed to the crossing. India refused to condemn China as an aggressor in 1951 yet she maintained her ambulance unit in South Korea throughout the war. On the prisoner repatriation question, she drafted a resolution which favoured the Western position for the most part but with enough modifying clauses to make it palatable to the Chinese and North Koreans. As for India's role in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, one finds this curious, perhaps unique, capacity to satisfy both sides on all the major issues—the positive contribution of neutralism in that case.

* A careful and valuable study, from which the following analysis has benefitted greatly, is B. S. Steinberg, *India's Neutralism in Theory and Practice* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1961).

On the breaking-up of the prisoner-of-war organizations, India agreed that this was undesirable; on the other hand, it agreed with the Poles and Czechs that it would be desirable to segregate the leaders of these prisoner-of-war concentrations because of the trouble they were causing; then it proceeded to turn round once more and say that this would be very difficult because it would involve the use of force, and the Commission did not have enough force to do this. On the question of the right to use force, India agreed with the Polish and Czech delegates that there was nothing to prevent it in the terms of reference of the NNRC but added that the use of force was a major, substantive step and should not be taken without unanimity in the Commission. Since this was lacking, force was not used.

Another example concerns the extension of the explanation period, which was to be 90 days. The Polish and Czech members of the Commission pointed out that of the 90 days about 50 days or more were wasted because the U.N. and South Korean Commands were not acting in a way to facilitate explanations. According to the Communist delegates, "90 days means 90 days for explanations, and therefore, the 90-day period ought to be extended until there were 90 full days of explanations". The Indian Chairman agreed "because the prisoners had in reality only 40 days". "On the other hand", said the Swiss and Swedish delegates in effect, "the terms of reference provide specifically for 90 days from the beginning of the explanation period; therefore, explanations must cease exactly 90 days thereafter; according to the letter of the NNRC, the 90 days period has ended, so there must be no extension". Indian agreed.

Finally, the Korean settlement provided for a return of prisoners only after a political conference took place. "Well", said the Polish and Czech delegates, "the prisoners must remain in the compounds until a political conference meets [the proposed 14-power conference]". The political conference never took place. Indian agreed and so it could not officially transfer them to civilian status. But, unilaterally, it did restore the prisoners to the detaining sides without violating the letter of the NNRC.

Is this not a curious type of policy? Not at all. The Indian motive was clear, and I think consistent with neutralism. It was mainly to keep the Commission alive and to achieve the

important objective of a Korean settlement. The phrase "to judge every issue on its merits" does not mean to judge it, in the narrowest sense, on the merits of each tactical issue as it arises; rather, on the larger merits of reducing the level of international tension. By this unusual capacity to satisfy the four delegates to the Left and Right, India did bring off a Korean settlement. Not everybody was satisfied. But the record demonstrates that on the whole the NNRC was a major success in mediation in difficult circumstances.

The significance of the Korean episode in terms of neutralism is something else again. In so far as anyone in the Western World knew what neutralism was, and not many people did—not that many know even now—it seemed rather peculiar. To most people it was neutrality, and neutrality was isolationist. As a result of the NNRC the stigma of isolationism attaching to neutralism was terminated. People began to ask themselves the question, "what kind of neutrality is this, when the neutral state actively intervenes in the settlement of disputes? This is not classical neutrality". Of course it wasn't, but since neutrality and neutralism are almost identical words it was assumed that they were the same policy or status.

In the Suez and Hungary episodes, India's response was strikingly inconsistent. Both of them were clearly invasions; without getting into the legal technicalities of aggression or non-aggression, they were both invasions of foreign territory by alien troops. Yet Indian invoked a peculiar double standard on these two issues. In the case of Hungary, India stressed what it called the broader implications of the problem, and in the case of Suez it adopted a narrower approach. Nor was this purely chance. To Delhi the Suez War was an attempted return of Western powers to an area from which they had recently withdrawn, an act not likely to win support in Asia. Hungary was blurred. Certainly it is always easier for Indians to identify themselves with Egyptians than with Hungarians. To most Asian and African leaders violence between whites and other whites is bad, but violence of whites against non-whites is infinitely worse. And there are two levels of response to overt conflict involving a European and an Asian, or two Europeans. The latter is true of two Asians as well, as revealed by the incapacity to identify Japa-

nese imperialism in the 'thirties and 'forties as of the same *genre* as Western imperialism of earlier epochs. It tended to be relegated to the category of the special case. Because it involved Asians and Asians, it did not have the same emotional impact as the British-French assault on Suez.

There are, I think, two further reasons for this inconsistency. First, criticism is expected in the Western World, Indians assume; that's part of the fabric of a constitutional democracy, they say. Westerners don't really mind it; they tend to flourish on it; and sometimes it has effect, as the criticism of British action by the British Labour Party and certain American and Commonwealth groups revealed. But criticism of the Soviet bloc meets a stone wall and is only likely to alienate without having any positive effect. Secondly, Hungary was viewed as a cold-war dispute which, if exacerbated, would lead to a higher level of tension between the Soviet and Western blocs. Suez was not, Suez involved a weak Afro-Asian state and two powerful Western states (leaving Israel apart, in this context). This was a case that did not have the likelihood of aggravating the cold war, unless the Soviets became directly involved. In short, it differed basically from Hungary, in India's view.

That glaring differences did exist in the Indian response is amply revealed by the records of the United Nations. The Indian reaction to Hungary was mild and slow, painfully slow, painful even for them in 1956. The Indian reaction to Suez was harsh and quick. Within less than 24 hours Mr. Nehru, on the basis of a single press report, used such highly-charged terms as aggression, invasion, dastardly actions and so on. The demand for withdrawal was immediate and sharp in the case of Suez; it was not in the case of Hungary, at least not for a long time.

India's role in Korea reflects one aspect of neutralism—the belief that a neutralist state has a positive role to play in relaxing tensions. Suez and Hungary reveal other aspects, notably the crucial role of "anti-colonialism" and "anti-racialism" in the response of neutralism whenever a former colonial power of the West is involved with a non-Western colonial area.

IV

The criticism that is generally levelled at neutralism is two-fold. One is that it is immoral, that it doesn't distinguish between

good (the West) and evil (the Soviets). The second is that it is, in fact, a basic political error, that self-interest requires full and active participation by neutralist states in military alliances with the West.

On the question of immorality much can be said. Suffice it to note that Indian leaders, because of the legacy of tradition and tolerance, do not accept this conception of absolute morality or absolute immorality in the ideology of the two major blocs in world politics. Their perspective is much more blurred. It is grey and grey rather than black and white; the notion of Soviet immorality seems unproven to the Indian.

Regarding the alleged political error, the following general propositions may be made. First, mediation is not a monopoly of neutralism; indeed, there are cases in which the neutralist state fails when it attempts to mediate. There are even situations when an aligned state mediates much more effectively than a neutralist state. In other words, the pretensions of some neutralists to a monopoly over the mediation of international conflicts is to be seriously questioned.

The Korean, Suez-Hungary and Laos cases reveal that India is more likely to offer mediation in a cold-war dispute involving the super-powers, that this offer is more likely to be accepted in that situation, and that it is more likely to be effective in those conditions. In Korea, India's attempts at mediation between 1950 and 1953 failed on every occasion. It succeeded only when certain conditions had been created, conditions in which there was a clear-cut military deadlock, in which the super-powers were embarrassed and wanted to extricate themselves from an awkward position, because the cost of continuing warfare beyond 1953 was too great in terms of whatever goals could be achieved. It was only in the conditions of stalemate and the desire of the super-powers to find a way out by diplomacy that a neutralist effort at mediation succeeded. In other words, it was the special conditions of Korea in 1953 that made India's effective mediation possible.

There are cases in which an aligned state mediates more effectively. These are cases when a neutralist is so emotionally involved because of anti-racial and anti-colonial issues that it ceases to have the value of a mediator, as in Suez. It was Canada, an aligned state, a participant in Western military alliances, that

was capable of initiating the UNEF proposal which ultimately led to a more tranquil Middle East. India had forfeited any claim to the role of mediator because of its involvement, because of the overlay of the anti-racial and anti-colonial elements.

In the case of Hungary, Indian neutralism didn't succeed, partly because only one super-power was involved, and there wasn't sufficient countervailing strength for the neutralist to intervene. Only under special conditions can India's neutralism make a positive mediatory contribution in international relations.

Nor does the neutralist state have a monopoly in its *desire* to preserve the peace. Other states share this goal. The difference lies in their conception of the appropriate techniques. The aligned state sees virtue in an occasional limited war, the neutralist state never, because of the conviction that limited war is likely to heighten tension. The aligned state sees the preservation of peace as best achieved by a military alliance, by "bargaining from strength". The neutralist sees the preservation of peace in opposition to military alliances on the grounds that they have a vicious-circle effect, one spawning the other.

Thirdly, I think it is true to say that in a normal cold-war dispute like Korea, only the neutralist state has sufficient trust of the super-powers to mediate successfully. Canada couldn't do it in the case of Korea; it could sit as one of the five members of the Commission, but it was identified with South Korea. Similarly Poland couldn't; only India could.

There is a good deal of confusion about the kind of role neutralist states can and do play in international relations. Is neutralism merely a 20th century variation of the balancing process? I think not. The basic difference is that the United Kingdom in the 19th century had sufficient power to prevent the outbreak of war or, if war broke out, to throw its weight into the scales in such a way as to ensure victory for one or another of the participants. Today no state can be a balancer in the 19th century sense simply because the gap between the power of the two super-powers and all others is such that the addition of the power of India or anybody else won't make any difference. In short, neutralists cannot deter global war by their possession of military power. If global war breaks out they can do nothing to determine the outcome.

All they can do is to try, by persuasion and other means of that kind, to prevent the resort to war by the super-powers, because of the realization that only then can they stay out of war itself.

We come now to the final proposition, which is that neutralist states play a stabilizing role in international politics just by being neutralist. First of all, they provide an important channel for diverting the surplus energies of the super-powers from direct conflict to peaceful competition for the support of the neutralists. An analogy may be drawn here with the 19th century, the "Hundred Years Peace" between 1815 and 1914, when there was no global war. One of the major reasons was that the great imperialist powers of Europe at the time were able to divert their energies from direct conflict to the division of much of Africa and Asia into colonial empires. They could avoid direct military conflict because they had enough to keep them happy and busy elsewhere! In the middle of the 20th century, neutralist states in Asia and Africa can perform a similar, though not invidious, role. That is to say, instead of carving them up, the two blocs

can reduce the likelihood of direct conflict by diverting their energies into a very time-consuming and very beneficial competition in the form of economic development and aid among the states of Asia and Africa. It is in the interests of the neutralist states to be non-aligned because, *inter alia*, they derive economic aid from many states, and war is thereby made less likely. It is in the interests of the super-powers, I think, to have a zone of competition and ultimately co-operation, for this zone, the neutralist zone, offers a tolerable alternative to military warfare.

The second facet of this proposition is that a totally bloc world, in other words, a totally bi-polarised world, in which all states are aligned with one or another of the super-powers, is rigid and therefore dangerous, with the temptation to play for the big stakes, since there is only one rival to total domination. The neutralists perform the valuable function of a cushioning effect, increasing the flexibility of the system. They may also provide, as India does, a link between the hostile blocs and sometimes mediation, a necessary role in bi-polarised politics.

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
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 28



TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1969

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Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	MacRae
Anderson	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Marceau
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Nowlan
Brewin	Laniel	Penner
Cafik	Laprise	Prud'homme
Fairweather	Legault	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Forrestall	Lewis	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Gibson	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Groos	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Macquarrie	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

CORRIGENDUM

Issue No. 25—Thursday, February 6, 1969.

Evidence:

Page 904:

Left-hand column, lines 23-25; the statement attributed to Mr. Roberts should be attributed to Professor Eayrs.

Left-hand column, line 29; delete the words *not only a former colleague but I think.*

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

Tuesday, February 18, 1969.

(42)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Macquarrie, MacRae, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(25).

Also present: Messrs. Buchanan, Danson, Gillespie, Roberts, M.P.'s.

Witness: Professor Kenneth McNaught, Department of History, University of Toronto.

Mr. Roberts drew attention to two errors on page 904 of Issue No. 25 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. The Committee agreed to the corrections.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Professor Kenneth McNaught, University of Toronto. Professor McNaught made an opening statement.

Members questioned Professor McNaught, with particular reference to views expressed in his advance presentation to the Committee.

The Committee agreed to print the following as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Professor McNaught's advance presentation entitled *Non-Alignment For Canada* and his curriculum vitae; (*See Appendix ii*)

List of Bilateral Defence Agreements Between Canada And Other Countries (page 882 of the Evidence refers); (*See Appendix jj*)

Letter to Professor McNaught dated July 31, 1967, from the Director, Home Branch, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Ottawa. (*See Appendix kk*)

The Chairman thanked Professor McNaught for his interesting testimony and the Committee adjourned at 1:40 p.m. The next meeting will be on Thursday, February 20, 1969 at 11:00 a.m., when the witness will be Mr. David Golden.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, February 18, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have with us this morning, Professor Kenneth McNaught. A detailed biographical sketch of Professor McNaught and his qualifications has been distributed to members of the Committee. Professor McNaught tells me that he will not be available this afternoon, so we should try to plan on completing our questioning this morning.

Without going into further detail as to his qualifications which are very impressive indeed, I will simply introduce Professor McNaught to you. I might also mention that a summary of his evidence has been distributed to members of the Committee. If anyone does not have copies, the Clerk has additional copies here.

I will call upon Professor McNaught who will summarize the statement that has already been distributed to members of the Committee.

Professor Kenneth McNaught (Department of History, University of Toronto): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Most of you have copies of this and perhaps some of you have even had time to read it. So I will summarize and perhaps read what I think are particularly, from my point of view at any rate, pertinent parts of the argument.

My essential case is that I think it is very important for Canada to develop a policy of non-alignment, and that to do so requires withdrawal from the military alliance system composed essentially of NATO, NORAD, the defence production sharing agreements, and the permanent committee on defence in North America.

At the beginning I argue that one of the principal points put forward by supporters of non-alignment has been that our alliance membership has prevented us from taking such useful initiatives as the recognition of the Chinese Government. I suggest that it might be argued that the fact that we are now apparently engaged in preliminary talks in Stockholm, looking toward the recognition of China, that this may be a counter-argument and may suggest that, in fact, our military alliance commitments have not been as restrictive as some of us argue. So I would like to read this paragraph as part of the argument:

What, then, is the context of our decision to negotiate the recognition of China? We do so in the environment created by acute political crisis in the United States. That crisis resulted directly from the insistent need to end the war in Vietnam. And any permanent settlement in Southeast Asia can scarcely be arranged if the United States continues its demand to maintain the faltering diplomatic ostracism of China. Thus, while Mr. McCloskey clucks disapprovingly in Washington, no one . . .

perhaps I should say nearly no one

. . . in Ottawa takes this as a serious signal to stop the play. Perhaps, but not necessarily, it would be too much to speculate that we had been quietly invited to make our move now. But certainly it would be too much to suggest that the move was a bold assertion of independence and proved that alliance membership does not inhibit us from pursuing policies strongly disapproved by the senior member.

● 1110

And I go on then to argue that that move toward the recognition of China came very belatedly and that we are still inhibited, along all the other lines about non-alignment, from taking what I consider to be proper initiatives. Furthermore, we are, by the military alliance system, necessarily directly associated with some of the most disagreeable actions going on in the world, and I want to read a paragraph on that.

From Greek repression to Portuguese imperialism to American slaughter in Vietnam—we are directly tied by the alliance system. Equally, by that system, we have prevented ourselves from exercising a freedom of action at the United Nations and on other fronts that might well have contributed to a reduction of international tensions.

And I argue that in fact we cannot effectively and convincingly support a non-proliferation nuclear treaty while we, ourselves, argue that we are protected by the largest nuclear power in the world. We can hardly tell Egypt or Israel or Pakistan not to

take the bomb while we glory, apparently and officially, under its protection.

I think then that there is a real credibility gap between the generally conceded knowledge that there is no defence in a nuclear war, and our admitted dependence upon the military alliance based upon the dominant nuclear power.

I argue that there is an historical background for essentially a militarily non-aligned policy in Canada, and it comes from the readings of most of the militia bills of the early years following Confederation, when, in fact—and perhaps I can put this most briefly by reading it—we believed:

that the only danger of attack lay in a breakdown of relations between Britain and the United States—and that the chief burden of defence would therefore be upon Britain. The main difference a hundred years later is that our protector . . .

the United States, not Britain

. . . could not protect us.

I think we could argue that if Macdonald and Cartier had believed that Britain could not protect us, we would have had Dominion status a lot sooner than we did.

But the real point I think is that we should revoke a policy of military alignment because it is defended largely on a myth. And I think it is a core part of my argument—and I go perhaps beyond where some of the other witnesses have gone, who may have vaguely supported this point of view—that we should not argue that withdrawal from the military alliance system results from our belief that the United States has to defend us. It seems to me that that is a credibility gap in some of the arguments.

We should say plainly, if we are to have a realistic and honest policy based on what we know to be the case, that there is no defence. There is only the appalling danger that civilization will be annihilated if all states do not recognize what in fact will happen if nuclear war breaks out.

In other words, I think we ought to use a position of military non-alignment quite consciously as an international image. It should not be an image of aloof Swedish or Swiss neutralism, but an image of genuine concern which reflects, I think, the real beliefs of the Canadian people rather than the tired outdated shibboleths of power.

● 1115

I think you can again sustain the argument for non-alignment by an historical reference. When we

were being pressed by London in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century to join a *kreigsverein* of the British Empire, our argument usually was that the biggest contribution Canada could make to the defence of the Empire, was to make Canada safe and to build Canada up economically. And occasionally someone like Sir Charles Tupper would argue that this building of the CPR was, in fact, a contribution to the military strength of the Empire. But no Canadians really believed that, and certainly no Englishman did.

On one occasion Captain Mahan of the United States, who was to that period of 1890 much like Henry Kissinger is to the 1960s—I would argue a founder of American imperialism—suggested that the completion of the CPR under British aegis in Canada was a dagger pointed at the heart of American military power. But I do not think that many Americans or Canadians really believed that.

In other words, we were non-aligned militarily even while we were members of the Empire, and it was not until we quite unnecessarily aligned ourselves militarily in the South African war that we got into serious racial trouble, and that crisis deepens steadily.

I think there is a real lesson to be learned, and I would put it this way. In periods when the military expenditures which we can afford are insufficient to affect in any significant way the international balance of power, we are best advised to put all our effort into proving that a multi-racial state in the modern world can survive without atomizing itself and can develop a cultural life as rich, or richer, than that which can be afforded by nations which devote preposterous proportions of their national income to doomsday weapons.

Professor Eayrs, and I will not go over his argument, has already proven to my satisfaction, and I do not know to how many members of the Committee that would be equally true, that we could pare about a billion dollars from the present defence budget and still have ready a sufficient para-military force to be used at the service of the U.N. if and when it was needed. These savings, it seems to me, could well be spent on the alleviation of poverty and the enrichment of culture in Canada, and on extensions of our foreign aid program which is now, as Mr. Gellner pointed out earlier, abysmally low amongst the developed nations of the world. It seems to me that it would take a very powerful argument indeed to say that we would not do more for the peace of the world and for even a narrowly conceived Canadian national interest by spending that billion dollars in that way rather than on weaponry and personnel which virtually everybody agrees does not basically affect the power of the alliance structure.

It has been argued, and it is a powerful argument I gather in the East Block, that the real reason for Canada continuing in the military alignment of NATO is so that we can contain West Germany's ambitions both territorial and with respect to gaining nuclear weapons. More recently it has been argued that the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia completely justified that, and I gather that was given as a reason by our present government for not moving faster on any consideration of withdrawal from NATO. I think that argument is not plausible. The intervention of Russia, it seems to me, was a direct response to what Russia considered, rightly or wrongly, a threat emanating from NATO to detach Czechoslovakia from the Communist orbit. So that, objectively, the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia is no different in kind from American intervention in Guatemala or the Dominican Republic or abortively in Cuba. I would agree that it was a reprehensible military action to preserve a sphere of influence, but the point is it was an action of the kind that NATO was never designed to prevent and therefore to use it as a further argument for maintaining NATO, it seems to me, is supremely illogical.

I do not really believe that many Canadians think that West Germany is restrained from military adventures by the fact that we have a few thousand troops in West Germany. It seems to me as part of this argument of non-alignment that it would be fair to put the case on the same grounds as the case for Canada joining OAS, that is to say, the real case is not, should we get out of NATO. The real case is, why are we in? I argue that there are many, many instances of the restrictions which that membership imposes upon us that strongly suggest the desirability of getting out.

● 1120

Membership in NATO has been used often to support our support of the American war effort in Viet Nam, and I want to make a particular point about that because sometimes it is said that we are neutral or objective or do not support it. We do, in fact, and any reading of Hansard shows that we support the theoretical argument for the United States being in Viet Nam. Any reading of the American record shows that because Canada gives aid only to South Viet Nam we are listed by, for example, General Westmoreland as a supporter of the United States, and in the Spring of 1967 when 360 professors sought open repudiation by Canada of the American intervention in Viet Nam and a halt to the export of Canadian arms destined for Viet Nam to the United States, and the letter went to Mr. Pearson, Mr. Pearson replied:

Confidential and quiet arguments by a responsible government are usually more effective than

public ones. . . Too many public declarations and disclosures run the risk of complicating matters for those concerned. . . The more complex and dangerous the problem, the greater is the need for calm and deliberate diplomacy.

Well, that is, of course, the classic defence of quiet diplomacy. Presumably, quiet diplomacy went on in 1967 and 1968 but it had no effect, and it seems to me once again what had an effect was the American political crisis and the kind of action that we were proposing then, that is to say, of trying to block the sending of Canadian arms to the United States for use in Viet Nam, would therefore have had more effect on the ending of the war by helping a little bit to precipitate the American political crisis than the quiet diplomacy that presumably was going on.

The other point, if you agree that quiet diplomacy was not terribly effective, was that a very real part of our policy was effective and that was the active promotion of war contracting for the United States in Canada. The Canadian Commercial Corporation did not falter and did not use very quiet diplomacy. It had some very glossy advertisements and pamphlets showing how to get in on the gravy. I wanted to read a quotation again from Mr. Pearson's letter because it seems to me it is at the heart of the matter as to why we are not non-aligned and of what alignment really means, or why we could not openly repudiate the American invasion of Viet Nam. In that letter he first of all reviewed the extent to which our defence production has been integrated and mentioned the technological and mass production advantages we get from that, and went on:

For a broad range of reasons, therefore, it is clear that the imposition of an embargo on the export of military equipment to the United States, and concomitant termination of the Production Sharing Agreements, would have far-reaching consequences which no Canadian government could contemplate with equanimity. It would be interpreted as a notice of withdrawal on our part from continental defence and even from the collective defence arrangements of the Atlantic Alliance.

I think that is as concise and authoritative a statement as we have yet had on the inter-connection between our actual policy and our military alignment. I think that we have to review, then, all of the implications of that military alignment. They are very subtle and they go even beyond that purely economic inter-relationship to which Mr. Pearson referred so pointedly.

They go into almost all areas of our policy and I want to take only one further example. I know it is an irritating one and I do not do it lightly. I think it is an

important one because it shows the extent of the implications of the military alliance.

● 1125

This concerns our immigration policy. Most Canadians I think have believed that Canada has been in some sense an asylum, as the United States has been, for people from the British Isles and Europe. They believe that as a mark of our independence and liberalism that we have instructed our immigration officials not to enforce foreign laws or not to snoop into the political beliefs or military obligations of intending immigrants. Had we done that previously, a large number of Sir Clifford Sifton's immigrants in sheepskin coats would have been sent back to fight for the Imperial armies of Russia or Austria-Hungary. So that, when young American war-protestors sought asylum here and a number of them had difficulty getting in, the draft dodgers, public concern mounted and the immigration policy was modified and they were allowed in, but at the same time—and this is the important point—the department did make a quiet reservation. It claimed there was a difference between draft-resisters and deserters and it continues, as was demonstrated by four or five impulsive young students from York University a week or so ago, to reject deserters from the American Army. To me, the important point is that it does so as policy, although most Canadians undoubtedly assume that if an American refuses to fight in Viet Nam and deserts when he is ordered overseas he will not on that account be denied admission to Canada.

In the spring of 1967, I asked the department on what grounds it pursued the policy of rejecting, as policy, deserters. At first I was told it was an obligation springing from our NATO commitment. When I objected that I could not find any commitment under NATO arrangements they said it sprang from the NATO Visiting Forces Act. Well, it does not, of course, because that governs forces on service in Canada, and I want to quote from the letter I have which finally cleared the point up. It is an official letter in reply to an official inquiry that I made, and it says:

It is quite true that the NATO Visiting Forces Act is applicable only to foreign military personnel actually on service in Canada, and that consequently a foreign soldier who comes to Canada after deserting somewhere else is not subject to its provisions. I am sure you will agree, however, that neither Canada nor any other member of NATO would be acting in the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty if it granted immunity within its borders to deserters from the military forces of other members of the Alliance.

I think you can go through a very broad range of Canadian policies in all matters and find the direct impact upon our thinking and policy of our military

alignment, and my chief case is that in most cases the impact is illiberal, it works against political independence and it does so unnecessarily because the military alignment does not in any sense protect us. It does, of course, as Mr. Robert McNamara said before a Senate Committee in the United States in 1965, by putting a couple of Bomarc sites here act as missile bait for Russian missiles, but I scarcely see that that is defence.

There is one final point, and that is the argument which I very often hear that because we are so timid within the alliance system we would probably be no bolder if we merely withdrew from the system. That is probably a strong argument. There is an answer, I think, however and that is, if, as a result of this present review, we were to decide upon military non-alignment, that decision would have to rest upon a political debate that would go far beyond these walls. It would be a debate which, as I suggested, would have to concern every substantive issue in domestic and foreign policy, and if that debate were to produce a majority for non-alignment it would also produce a majority which would demand extensive public planning of investment, resources development, cultural growth and the production probably of a limited range of conventional armaments under public ownership in Canada.

I can see no other way than by closely examining the total implications of our military alignment by which we can really define the true interest of this country or, indeed, discover the extent to which Canadians are willing to pursue those interests.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much Professor McNaught. Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: There are just two or three matters I would like to pursue. One is the recognition of China. Do you think there is any validity in the idea that the United States welcomes Canada's initiative and that really to have a press secretary replying to what is a fundamental change in policy shows that the U.S. really rather likes this as a pilot project for their own inevitable recognition of China?

● 1130

Professor McNaught: Mr. Fairweather, I do not like the use of the word "inevitable" as an historian, but in general I think I do agree. We are obviously very much too close to this particular development and have very little documentation on it, but I agree with your surprise about the extremely limited and modified response from the United States to our preliminary talks. Thus, it seems to me at least reasonably open to speculate that our moves toward recognition of China are not disagreeable to the United States and possibly that is part of the reason they are now being made.

Mr. Fairweather: And is it not true that several senior United States senators and other leaders of opinion met as recently as January in Santa Barbara to try to chart a course for American recognition?

Professor McNaught: Yes. I think the pressures from people like Senator Fulbright and the whole range of liberal senators has been very strong to change American policy on this. That being the case, it probably would not be the first time that Canada has moved as a kind of bellwether.

Mr. Fairweather: Would it be a fair analogy to suggest that Canadian initiative in commercial contact with China was in itself welcome in the U.S.?

Professor McNaught: I am not sure how far one would want to go in supporting that argument. It seems to me that the resistance of—and this is very hard to document too, but there is some documentation on it—American branch plants in this country to the development, and particularly the highly initiative development, of sales in Communist countries suggests that up until the present the United States has not been too pleased about extensive commercial relations developing that way.

Mr. Fairweather: In our United States—Canada interparliamentary group I was astounded to find the change in American policy among what might be thought to be almost neutralist, midwestern people who saw that a sale could empty their storage.

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. Fairweather: You mentioned, sir, the freedom of action that non-alignment would give Canada in certain directions. I am not joining issue on this at this time because we have not written our report, but what change would we make, for instance, in the military government of Greece or the imperialism of Portugal in Africa just by withdrawing from NATO? I would like this developed, if you do not mind.

Professor McNaught: Mr. Fairweather, I was not suggesting that Canada could bring about the change of a foreign government. I was resting most of the case upon the desirability of creating a different image of Canada so that she will not be held suspect or hypocritical in the United Nations or elsewhere. It seems to me that our relationship to the non-proliferation treaty might be a good deal more convincing if we abandoned the argument that we were defended by the bomb. The point about even referring to Greece and Portugal is, of course, that some Canadian war material does get through Portuguese channels to help suppress a revolt in Mozambique, and things of that sort. I agree that in practical terms that is not a very significant influence and Portugal can get the weapons somewhere else. However, in terms of the image and

the credibility of Canada being military aligned to Portugal, which is an extremely reactionary military power in Africa, is not a good imagine. It seems to me that in order to defend that military alignment one would have to make a far more convincing case about its absolute necessity for Canada's national interest to be in it.

Mr. Fairweather: You think of us—to use a current advertising cliché—as sort of a worldwide Mr. Clean. This is the Utopian . . .

● 1135

Professor McNaught: I see the thrust of your argument, and heavens knows I am not suggesting that we should further the idea that so many Americans quite properly—many of colleagues and students amongst others—see of terribly self-righteous, prissy Canadians keeping their skirts clean, when in fact they are not. But I am suggesting that the idea of a non-aligned image is not necessarily the idea of moral purity, but that it is in fact a more realistic policy based on a clear recognition of the actual facts of influence and defence and risk that the one of military alignment.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, I would not mind going to the bottom of the list. There are many other people waiting to ask questions.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Fairweather. Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Mr. Chairman, I have a personal comment I would like to make. I was interested in your comparison between Canada of 100 years ago and Canada today. I was rather surprised that you would make such sweeping generalizations of a nation 100 years ago. Surely we are a very different nation today than we were at that time. It would also be very risky to suggest that Britain should base her policies on a position that would be the same as her affairs 100 year ago. In so doing you are an advocate of the free ride in world affairs, as far as Canadian politics are concerned. We have been told by other witnesses—and we believe they are responsible witnesses—that Canada does have an important effect on the military balance in NATO in their conventional forces; that our military forces are important to those forces and that over the past 20 years this has had a significant effect on their peacekeeping abilities in Europe. It seems to me that you jump from this position of taking no stand vis-à-vis the two great powers of the world—we are just going to say, "A plague on both your houses"—to the position of our being really effective as a third force. I do not follow your argument. You say that we would be effective but I do not see in what way we could be effective. Certainly Canadians do not agree with all of the

activities of one of the great powers in world affairs and we do not disagree with all of the activities of the other great power. But somewhere in a hostile world we have to choose up sides, and perhaps it is only the lesser of two evils, and I am speaking of this idea of becoming the third force in world affairs. I just do not follow your argument that we are going to be effective in any way and I would like you to enlarge on that.

Professor McNaught: Sir, let me take those four main points you have made in order. I am particularly sensitive to your charge of bad history, and my argument there is that it seems to me we have gone through—and most of the writing on the history of Canadian relations in world affairs tends to agree with this—a period in which we moved from relatively impotent colonial status and underdevelopment to a period where we made contributions in South Africa and in two world wars of significant military kind and became industrialized. However, we go right through that period to the point at which Melvin Conant, the defence specialist who wrote *The Polar Watch* made the very effective case that once again we are in a position of being quite impotent militarily. As far as the argument of influence on the military balance of NATO is concerned, it seems to me on looking over the evidence of this Committee when Mr. Gellner was here—and I think his information on military matters is very clear and sharp—that he would agree that the influence we have militarily is political influence and not military influence; that we buy influence politically by making a military contribution. However, the essential argument is the comparison with 100 years ago is that in the nuclear age and the missile age and the air age Canada cannot really, without crippling herself economically, make significant military contributions.

● 1140

I will now move from there to your point about the free ride. I think it is tremendously important we make quite clear that we do not believe we are defended by the United States. I for one certainly do not believe it. I feel very nervous indeed when I realize that the diametric range of the Bomarc missile is 400 miles, so it would go 200 miles north and 200 miles south, and 200 miles south of North Bay is at about Rosedale in Toronto, where it might be presumed to intercept an oncoming Russian bomber if indeed the Russians were silly enough to send bombers over at this late date. I do not think we are arguing for a free ride and I for one would argue that we should not only save that billion dollars on defence but add to it and make an honest woman of Canada in the field of external aid. We are very, very far down on the list now and I am not suggesting a free ride; it is quite the reverse. I think we ought to pay our way far more in terms of trying

positively for conciliation and the elimination of those conditions in the third world that lead to frictions and accidental war.

With respect to being neutral on the question of whether Russia is right in a given case and America is right in another case, I do not think that non-alignment implies that kind of intellectual or moral neutrality. I think there is no reason in the world why non-alignment would prevent us from speaking very forcibly against the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, nor would it prevent us from speaking very forcibly against the Russian intervention in Viet Nam, and both things should be done and whatever countervailing action we can take should be followed. It seems to me it is military non-alignment that is the point, and this will free us a good deal for initiatives which might cost us more money than we spend now.

Finally, as to your last point, I do not think that we have to choose sides, in other words.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Macquarrie?

Mr. Macquarrie: I may say that I was delighted by the definiteness of the point of view expressed in Professor McNaught's paper. As a clean living young Canadian I am a little leery about going over to the American Embassy too often or even spending too much time in the East Block!

I wonder if, in the reference in the first part of your paper to our pusillanimous attitude and our fear of offending the United States, in presenting this you gave much thought to the fact that the Canadian government in foreign policy, as in any other policy, must take note of the attitude of its people. Might it not be that for a long time there was a significant body of opinion in Canada which would look with disfavour upon this act of recognition. I discover there is still a body of opinion, and I am inclined to think it is a minority, but there still are people who feel that way. I wonder if you would be prepared to give a decent regard for our point of view in this factor?

● 1145

Professor McNaught: That last piece of phraseology tempts me to say that I do not suppose Prince Edward Islanders favour public ownership very much either! However, it seems to me that a decent regard to Canadian public opinion means testing it precisely, and one of my key arguments is that in putting forward the arguments we do in defence of our present foreign policy we are not really testing Canadian public opinion. That is to say, we tell our electorates that we are defended by the American

nuclear umbrella and by the whole NATO structure, and we tell them that as a semi-developed industrial state we cannot produce the weapons we need for our defence and thus we have to have the defence production sharing agreement. I think both those things are wrong. In fact, I do not think they are true. The point is that if we go to the Canadian people with what I would regard as the facts—and which I suspect you do not, Mr. Macquarrie—I would argue that Canadian opinion will come down on the side of non-alignment, but it depends on how the facts are presented and whether they are presented. I agree that in the present circumstances a Canadian public opinion poll would probably show support for NATO, but it would not be that overwhelming and it seems to me that those people who agree with all or some of this case, and particularly the points about the credibility gaps within our present policy, should go out and politically educate the Canadians as to the reality of the defence and foreign policy situation. It could produce a majority for non-alignment. I have a decent respect for Canadian public opinion, but because I have I think it is open to persuasion, particularly on the basis of facts.

Mr. Macquarrie: I do not think there has really been any presentation of the argument that if we do this we will offend the United States. I do not think, in all fairness, this has actually been the thrust given to the problem. I am most tremulous to suggest that I move in as a mere political scientist when talking with a leading historian, but I am wondering if over the years there has been in this country this penchant for nonalignment, if I may use that expression. Might one not say that the leaders of the state at the time of the Boer War found it very difficult to resist Canadian involvement—recalling Laurier's troubles in that regard. And I recall, too, that Borden felt there was no other choice apart from the legal situation. He felt that even the whole question of conscription was one that was forced upon him. And certainly in the world war, too. In other words, I myself would question—and that is as far as I will go because I defer to your historical knowledge—that there is anything more natural in the Canadian character which would lead us to nonalignment than to an involvement beyond our shores.

Professor McNaught: Even from the history of M. Bourassa?

Mr. Macquarrie: Bourassa was never one who carried public opinion; he carried a portion of it.

Professor McNaught: An important portion, yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: Certainly minorities are always important.

Professor McNaught: They always are.

Mr. Macquarrie: I would like to ask a couple of little questions and then I will pass.

Do you really believe, Professor, that the Soviet Union would have been restrained to any real degree in its movements against Czechoslovakia whether or not their military operation was carried out with multinational group?

Professor McNaught: I think that the diplomatic difficulties which Russia has obviously encountered during and right down to the present in the intervention in Czechoslovakia suggest very strongly that she would be deeply concerned about making that a multinational Warsaw Pact operation and might very well have thought twice about doing it unilaterally, yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: I am impressed by your point of view—I almost said "faith." There is one comment in the quotation about General Westmoreland. I cannot believe that it is not possible for any observer with half an eye to distinguish our role vis a vis the Vietnamese conflict from Australia, South Korea and so on. I thought perhaps that that was an area in which if there were time I would not have disagreed with you.

Professor McNaught: If I may take just one minute on that last point, there is of course a difference between our role and that of Australia in South Viet Nam. However anybody, as you say, with half an eye can see that we send aid only to Saigon, and that we have certainly passed along very useful information to the Americans who are observers on the ICC. Thus, that half eye, looking out of its other quarter, can see the case I am making about our alignment, I think.

● 1150

Mr. Macquarrie: I may say, Mr. Chairman, that the half-eyed observers were the people to whom the professor referred, not to himself.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: Professor, to pursue the point made by Mr. Macquarrie about the origin of our alignment, from 1899, first I do not see how you can come to that conclusion because in 1899 there was actually no conscription. It was a voluntary participation by individuals. Then you referred to the most serious of our racial crisis which has deepened steadily as our alignment and commitments deepened. I do not come at all to that conclusion. I am a Quebecker, a French-speaking Canadian, and I even get the impression that our present policy does get more support in Quebec than it does in many other parts of Canada. What do you call our racial crisis in Canada?

Professor McNaught: Well, sir, I defer to your superior knowledge of French Canadian feeling on it. I can only draw my conclusions from the historical books I have read and from looking at the contemporary press, I suppose, of French Canada.

I would defend the proposition that the intervention in South Africa, although it did not carry with it conscription, did carry a point of view in supporting the British Colonial Empire in trouble that most French Canadians found very distasteful, and that certainly conscription in two world wars did create a racial crisis in the country.

On the question of whether or not Quebec opinion is more forthright in its support of our present military alignment, it is very hard to test exactly but I would say that if one went through the issues of *Cité Libre* when they were heavily contributed to by the present Prime Minister . . .

Mr. Laniel: Read by no one though.

Professor McNaught: Read by the new guard perhaps—that one would find considerable informed expression of Quebec opinion in favour of nonalignment. I think you would find the same in *Le Devoir*.

Mr. Laniel: There are many people in Quebec, like any other province, that speak to themselves and between themselves only.

Professor McNaught: That I suppose has to be a matter of opinion in the absence of a precise opinion poll. But I would argue that even if your case were so that again, as with English-speaking Canada, the presentation of a case based on what in fact are the facts might well, if it were politically pressed, result in a majority for nonalignment.

Mr. Laniel: Would you not agree, though, that part of the problem that you referred to would be related just as much, if we complied with part of your conclusion, to the economic or sentimental relations with the Empire, from the side of French Canadians, who would look at English-speaking Canadians as sometimes forgetting Canada too much for the benefit of the Empire—and that it was only a matter of feeling and lack of communication? So I do not see exactly what our commitments or alignment have to do with that. But now it is being changed and our alignment is more with the United States. Still I am not sure that the Canadian population does come to the same conclusion that you do. Can you really give me an alternative to Canada's progress in the future, or can you tell me really if Canada would have progressed just as much as it has without being aligned.

Professor McNaught: Well this, of course, is the very centre of the argument and it is why I was suggesting that a review of foreign policy, particularly with respect to military alignment, has to be also a review of the whole range of domestic economic social policy. I am very impressed by the findings of the Watkins Report and Mr. Safarian's writing on the extent of the American ownership of Canadian industry. I am also very impressed with the way a country like Sweden can produce for itself all the military equipment it needs and that anything that it has to buy in the way of particular electronic equipment it can buy without putting all its eggs in one country's basket.

It seems to me that what we have done in fact is to allow the economic military relationship to become so intertwined that it is now possible for a man like Professor Underhill to say that in 1940 we moved out of our British century and into our American century and will inevitably have to follow the American lead. It is that kind of interpretation I am trying to contest. I, for one, do not see the inevitability that is attached to it. I, for one, think that a serious commitment to economic planning in this country could render us less dependent than Mr. Pearson suggested in his letter upon defence production-sharing agreements, and I suspect that if the political campaign were put in the right hue that Canadians would support that line of progress.

Mr. Laniel: I do come to the conclusion that your opinions or conclusions are based more on morality than anything else because we hear people, and I believe it, say that nuclear war is impossible and that the danger of war is among unstable nations. You might have different opinions than I have or get a different image, but I believe that the dangers of war exist in small emerging nations, and very often in nations that have instability and a racial crisis—and they are nonaligned countries. So how can you come to a conclusion like that.

Professor McNaught: I do not really see the relationship there. I think that certainly Canada's influence should be toward minimizing the crises and the imbalance and the insecurity of those small nonaligned and underdeveloped countries—although they are not all nonaligned. Pakistan, for example, is aligned. But the fact that they are nonaligned is not the fact which makes them unstable, nor is the fact that we are aligned make us unstable. All I am suggesting is that we can free ourselves to work in precisely those unstable areas more effectively if we accept the argument about the indefensibility of our national interests in the event of a nuclear war. I do not think any of your witnesses probably have suggested that Canada is likely to face a conventional attack.

Mr. Laniel: I will not pursue that line of questioning, Mr. Chairman.

On page 6 you refer to Czechoslovakia and compare it with the American intervention in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and also in Cuba. How can you come to such a conclusion and then say that the Russian intervention was a direct response to what Russia considered, rightly or wrongly, a threat emanating from NATO to Czechoslovakia from the communist orbit. Would you not agree at the same time that that was done by Russia mainly because they were losing control of political Czechoslovakia?

Professor McNaught: Yes, yes, I quite agree, and that of course is why the American interventions take place in Latin America. But the diplomatic argumentation on the Russian side has been that the NATO powers, particularly West Germany, have been luring Czechoslovakia away. Indeed, the Russian argument went well beyond that and said there was heavy infiltration. If I remember correctly, immediately before the August intervention a very great deal of space was given to the NATO war games by the Russian press. As I say, rightly or wrongly—they may be wrong in the fear—but the existence of NATO serves as a very effective justification for the maintenance of the Warsaw Pact and this kind of intervention.

● 1200

Mr. Laniel: An excuse, you mean.

Professor McNaught: An excuse.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, on page 3 there is the expression "American slaughter in Viet Nam", and at the bottom of page 7

... we have no direct treaty obligations to support American aggression ...

and so on. There seems to be a thread throughout this paper that the Professor is vitally concerned with the morality of the United States in international affairs and rightly so, but to me the academic freedom for centuries, I suppose, has been based on the premise that academics search for truth.

To me these seem to be half-truths in the sense that there is no apparent concern about the international morality of other large countries—I am thinking of China and Russia as examples—and there seems to be a lack of concern about the right of independent nations to defend themselves against world communistic infiltration and the stirring up of trouble by international communist parties throughout the world. The presumption would be that the communist world no longer practices this sort of thing; they have suddenly reformed. When would this have taken place?

Professor McNaught: That is not my assumption. Obviously the Soviet Union is prepared to act unilaterally and militarily when it feels its immediate direct interest is threatened, but so is the United States and I assumed that in talking about non-alignment I would be concerning myself principally with the countries with which we are basically aligned. I think there is, of course, a right for independent nations to defend themselves, but we could bog down here for hours on the question of whether or not South Vietnam is an independent nation and on the precise sequence of the infiltration of non-Vietnamese troops.

All I can say in defence of my academic integrity in the matter is that some time ago I came to the conclusion that in fact the only foreign troops in any numbers in Viet Nam are American and their contributing allies and that this does, in fact, constitute invasion.

Mr. MacLean: You assume thereby that there is no objection to North Vietnamese troops being in South Viet Nam.

Professor McNaught: No more objection, sir, than there would be for troops from Catalonia to be in Valencia during the Spanish civil war. I regard the Vietnamese war in exactly the same way as the late President Kennedy did, that this is a civil war and therefore one will probably expect a movement back and forward of various sections of the Vietnamese people trying to resolve their problems. It is not an international boundary and the Geneva Accord spelled that out very precisely in 1954.

● 1205

Mr. MacLean: Therefore you would have to be able to say that there were no foreign troops in any part in Viet Nam.

Professor McNaught: Except for the American troops and the Australians and the South Koreans.

Mr. MacLean: You believe that this is so?

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. MacLean: On page 6 there is a statement:

But it was an action of a sort that NATO was never designed to prevent; and it was an action which, in considerable degree, the existence of NATO made likely and possible.

This concerns the Czechoslovakian affair last summer. How, then, do you account for the *coup* in Czechoslovakia in 1947 before NATO existed.

Professor McNaught: In 1947, of course, central Europe was in a good deal more turmoil than it is now. It is an interesting fact in terms of historical statistics

that the last election held in Czechoslovakia before what you call the *coup* produced a majority for the communist party which was slightly greater than the majority that Abraham Lincoln won in 1860, and which he then proceeded to enforce by force of arms which produced the biggest war of the century in North America.

These things obviously are going to happen but my point is that NATO was not designed to roll back communist power from Czechoslovakia, nor was it designed to roll back communist power in Hungary, and even in the great days of John Foster Dulles it could not be used for that purpose because it was not designed for that purpose. It was designed to protect the sphere of influence that already existed, surely.

Mr. MacLean: I do not want to go into a personal experience, but I was in Czechoslovakia just before the *coup* and I would not say that what was taking place there by any stretch of the imagination could have been called a free declaration of popular support.

On page 7 there is a statement beginning with the following words:

Certainly such a development would rob Russia of much of the rationale for maintaining the Warsaw Pact system.

This is arguable, of course. It sounds quite plausible, but thinking back a bit, what rationale did Russia have compared to the democratic countries—Britain the United States, France and so on—who, after World War II, promptly dismantled their military machines whereas Russia, on the other hand, kept hers up and maintained it almost at the strength it was during World War II and, in the process, connived at the imposition of communist control in Eastern Europe as well as gobbling up the Baltic states when there was virtually no military power of any sort in the rest of Europe? What were they afraid of?

Professor McNaught: What were the Russians afraid of?

Mr. MacLean: Yes, since NATO is the bugbear as far as they are concerned at the present time.

Professor McNaught: I am not suggesting, sir, that the only possibility of friction between Russia and the West lies in the existence of NATO. You can go back to Catherine the Great and Frederick the Great and, indeed, through the entire history of Russia and the Germanies and find an historical and cumulative fear on the part of Russians that they will be invaded by armies tramping across the Pripet Marshes and all the rest of it. That is a built-in and historical condition.

I am arguing that the existence of NATO at the moment gives an additional diplomatic advantage to the Russians in their maintenance of the Warsaw Pact

which is the principal system which they use to maintain their predominant influence over Eastern Europe. Certainly I would not argue that all causes of friction or fear by Russia of Germany would be removed by the removal of NATO. What I am suggesting is that the removal of NATO will reduce friction and will reduce the diplomatic reasons and justification for the Warsaw Pact.

● 1210

Mr. MacLean: What about the other side of the coin, the fear of European countries of Russia?

Professor McNaught: Of course, they are there but again, as I have said I do not believe, nor have I ever seen it argued, except by the late Senator McCarthy, that NATO is designed to roll back communism in Eastern Europe.

Mr. MacLean: No, I am not suggesting that, but it was created and designed, I would submit, to stop the communistic flood across Europe which started with Czechoslovakia.

Professor McNaught: This clearly is a matter of difference of view and I think I come down on the side of George Kennan, and the revisionist history that has been going on and the review of atomic diplomacy, that in fact—and I hesitate to quote, because it is not attributable, a very highly placed person in recent Canadian diplomatic service—it is arguable whether or not there was a Russian military threat against Western Europe beyond Czechoslovakia at any time.

Mr. MacLean: This is likely true. The communist is in the position where he uses other methods which democratic countries do not usually use to subvert the legally constituted governments of other countries.

I have one further question. On page 10 with regard to military deserters from the United States, are you suggesting that these people are all legitimate immigrants who intend to cast their lot irrevocably with Canada and to remain here for the rest of their lives as Canadian citizens, as was the case with Sir Clifford Sifton's men in the sheepskin coats that you referred to?

Professor McNaught: There are two points there. I might say just very briefly on your point that democratic governments do not normally use methods of subverting foreign governments that are commonly used by the Russians, I doubt very much whether the Russians have an organization that is any more efficient than the CIA.

Second, on the question of deserters, it seems to me that it is traditionally and properly not our job

to inquire about their military status and I do not think that we have ever seriously concerned ourselves about a kind of immigrant's pact with God that he will never leave Canada once he comes here.

On the personal level, I can only say that I have a number of draft dodgers and deserters who are both colleagues and graduate students. My own impression is, particularly as I looked over the applications as I did a week or so ago for Canada Council scholarship grants, that draft evaders and draft dodgers are going to turn out to be one of the most invigorating streams of immigration that we have ever had in this country.

Mr. MacLean: Your point of view on this does not surprise me at all, but I think a country surely has a right to assess the purpose of someone coming into the country is to determine whether they are coming as visitors, landed immigrants, or with the purpose of becoming citizens eventually—permanent residents. I will pass now. I have taken up too much time.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos and then Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Groos: Doctor, to put it mildly, I take it you do not place much value on Canada's taking part in mutual defence alliances such as NATO.

Professor McNaught: Yes, sir.

Mr. Groos: Would you agree that a viable defensive alliance is, perhaps, a prerequisite to negotiating a general disarmament, arguing that it is better to negotiate from a position of joint strength rather than divided weakness?

● 1215

Professor McNaught: That is, of course, an argument that is always put forward in defence of the present NATO arrangements and it is one that I might well have added to the argument about containing West Germany: that in fact you cannot negotiate disarmament and security in Western Europe without matching the Warsaw with the NATO arrangements.

My own feeling, I must confess, is that since the Second World War the history of disarmament conferences—the progress towards disarmament, the progress even towards limiting the spread of the nuclear weapon—has been not only nil but retrogressive and has been based on the growth and extension of the military alliance system. My conclusion is that the military alliance system does not lead us very rapidly towards disarmament.

I think when you couple that with what I consider to be the fact of the case that Canada cannot in any

case contribute militarily anything of substance, we have a political responsibility—I will not use the word “moral” if possible—to experiment and to initiate along the other line. You can call it unilateral disarmament if you like. It is a pejorative term—it is not a pejorative term to me, but it will be if it comes up in the press.

I think that Canada, conceding not that she is defended by the United States as many people argued as isolationists in the nineteen-twenties, but conceding that there is not any defence in a military sense should use this as an area of experiment and say: “We do not believe that we are defended. We believe that we are made more vulnerable and more likely to be attacked and we are not going to commit ourselves to any part in the arms race, whether it be by supplying Portugal or the American army in Viet Nam or by even putting Bomarcas at North Bay and La Macaza; that we, in fact, believe the road to serious progress towards disarmament is along the path of creating mutual confidence and the reduction of friction in any way that we can find open to us.”

Mr. Groos: I am not prepared to agree with your assertion that Canada has nothing to offer to NATO by remaining within the Alliance because I think that she has—I will not use the word “morally” either—but let us come a little closer to home and argue the case the other way.

You say that we have nothing to gain by remaining within the Alliance. May I suggest to you that perhaps we have something to lose from the point of view of the security of our people by removing ourselves from the Alliance, or certainly some sort of an alliance with the United States? I noticed yesterday in a paper—and I am speaking personally now—that the United States apparently intends to instal one of what I think are 14 light ABM sites on Bainbridge Island, which happens to be north of Seattle and Tacoma and in the close vicinity of Vancouver and Victoria.

It seems to me that influence on the site of the anti-ballistic missiles is a matter of very practical importance to the people in the Victoria and Vancouver areas and I think it would be a matter of very practical and urgent importance to the people who live pretty well anywhere along the northern United States boundary. I include people who live in Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal. Does it not necessitate some sort of alliance so that you can at least be talking to one another about these sort of things and discussing the position of these sites?

● 1220

Professor McNaught: I agree that there are areas of risk here and I would place the argument basically on the question of balancing the risks. It seems to

me that we are not going to prevent the Americans, whether we are inside or outside of a military alliance with them, from placing any of those ABM sites virtually wherever they want, whether it is outside Detroit, and thus endangering Windsor, or wherever it may be. I do not think they are going to imperil what they consider to be the effectiveness of their system merely because we do not want it too close to Vancouver. I really cannot see the strength of the argument that if we are inside the Alliance we are likely to gain that.

Mr. Groos: As someone who was formerly mixed up in this sort of thing, I disagree with you entirely. I think if it is to our joint advantage to have these moved somewhere else—if we can show that it is to our joint advantage—the Americans will be very quick to respond.

Professor McNaught: I would like to say just one further thing to your argument. Your basic assumption, of course, is that the emplacement of anti-ballistic missile systems can be considered somehow, if it is done rightly, to be to our joint advantage and, of course, really that is the basic point at which we disagree.

I do not, in fact, agree that even with the ABM thin system—or whatever the Americans call it now—we are enhancing our defence. You have heard a lot of evidence so far from people from the Hudson Institute and others about that, and when you are talking about saving 8 million people or 18 million, if you are going to kill 40, 50, 60, or 70 million I really cannot see much point in talking about the relative advantages.

Mr. Groos: To return to this point, since you returned to it yourself, I was arguing it from the other point of view, that whereas you may not be able to do much to enhance your own safety from the point of view of oncoming missiles without diminishing such safety as you are about to have, you could certainly diminish your safety from your own fallout or the fallout of the destruction of the oncoming missile by moving these elsewhere. Would that not appeal to you, not to have the fallout over Toronto or Montreal?

Professor McNaught: We are already going to have it over Toronto from the Bomarcas. You see, it is a question of what one's estimate is of what is going to happen in the event of a nuclear war because there is not going to be any fallout unless there is a nuclear attack, and despite the variations in Herman Kahn's War Games and the rest of it, I do not feel that anybody, in fact, is likely to survive in any populous Canadian centre if there is a nuclear attack and this again, I suppose, is basically where we would differ.

Mr. Groos: Thank you.

The Chairman: Do you have a supplementary, Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Do you not feel that you are attributing complete bad faith to the United States, considering Canadian defence interests as well as their own, in taking that position?

Professor McNaught: No, I am not really. What I am saying is that I do not believe that it is our defence interest that is being considered. I believe that the faith is perfectly good faith with the people who presumably are doing that planning; people who will trust a Canadian deputy commander of NORAD at Colorado are acting in good faith. Certainly it is not a question of good faith; it is a question of the interpretation of the reality of the situation. I just do not believe that gives us defence no matter how good the faith is.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: Professor McNaught, as you know, even though I cannot accept your final conclusion my position is closer to yours than that of other members of the Committee. It seems to me that there are some elements in your argument that ought to be investigated a little more closely.

● 1225

Is it realistic to speak of the Warsaw Pact as the same kind of alliance as the NATO pact? Is the Warsaw Pact, in fact, much more than a piece of window dressing for a military system with headquarters in Moscow which existed before the Warsaw Pact was nominally created and which would exist tomorrow if the Warsaw Pact were officially dismantled?

Is it not also a fact that when you are talking about the Warsaw Pact, because of what I have just said—if it is valid and I think it is—you cannot be talking about any member of the Warsaw Pact withdrawing. The invasion of Czechoslovakia last August is the latest example, but you did not really need any example. Yugoslavia is the one country that succeeded and it succeeded probably because it came so soon after the first rape of Czechoslovakia and before the eastern situation hardened to the extent that it has since.

One knew perfectly well that if any member of the Warsaw Pact tried to withdraw from that military—it is not really an alliance—tie-up aside from any formal alliance they would be invaded, they would be stopped, whereas I think it is still true to say despite the criticisms of American policy which you make in your paper and with which I almost entirely agree, it

is still true to say that if any member of NATO withdrew—Canada, Denmark or any other member—it would be able to withdraw. If NATO were abolished tomorrow you would have a genuine dismantling of an alliance. Therefore, the two cannot be argued about in the same sense at all. Is that not true?

Professor McNaught: I agree with your analysis so far as it suggests that the Warsaw Pact is considerably different in kind from NATO. As you suggest, it is far more a diplomatic window dressing for a military containment system but we have heard it argued, and argued strongly, that one of the two principal reasons for maintaining NATO is to contain Germany, and indeed that is the argument I have heard put most frequently and persuasively when talking, at least in private, to members of the Department of External Affairs. It is an argument in terms of good faith that I think they hold in good faith but with which I think I disagree.

I think what you are presupposing in talking about the permanence of the Warsaw Pact, whether or not NATO disbanded, is no change in the foreseeable future anywhere in Eastern Europe. I think obviously there have been signs of considerable change, considerable liberalization, from time to time and while it is true that just such a change was suppressed militarily by Russia, it does not follow that it always will be. A suppression of the level of insecurity, fear, and the rest of it, the tension in Western Europe, might well lead to a reduction in Russia's feeling of need to maintain a purely military containment.

So far as a NATO member's withdrawing from the pact in Western Europe is concerned, if she just withdrew militarily you are probably right that nothing would happen, but if she withdrew—let us take Italy as a hypothetical example—to become a communist state I for one would not bet that there would be no intervention.

Mr. Lewis: Well, perhaps I agree with you on the latter. I do not read present day history as presenting that kind of likelihood in Italy or France where the Communist parties are the strongest at the moment. And I do not agree with the proposition that NATO is valuable in containing West Germany. I was not in Parliament at the time, but I happen to be one who opposed the rearming of Germany in the first place.

But that is irrelevant, is it not, Professor McNaught, to the present situation, and you have taken me to the second point that I want to discuss with you for a moment.

• 1230

Is not Germany the real problem in Europe at the moment? If one talks about spheres of influence

and ignores Germany and the very explosive situation that that divided country presents to Europe it seems to me that one is not reading modern history adequately.

I am not impressed by the suggestion Mr. MacLean made about Russia gobbling up the Baltic states. I have a memory that we agreed to that gobbling up. I forget whether it was the Potsdam or the Yalta Treaty, but we said: "You go ahead and gobble them up," and we signed a treaty to that effect.

All of that is history, and one can criticize it, but the fact remains that you have (a) a divided Germany, (b) a divided Berlin and (c) a situation in which there is still no peace treaty in Europe.

The fact also remains that you have a determination on the part of the eastern European nations, the Soviet Union and all its allies, or satellites, whichever you like, to keep Germany divided unless it can come under Communist control; and the United States, Britain and France and their allies, or satellites, if you like, determined to keep Germany divided unless it not be a Communist state.

In that constantly boiling situation, with threats and counter-threats about Berlin, stuck in the middle of the Soviet zone, surely it is not unreasonable to expect that the western nations of Europe, aware of that situation and contiguous to the immediate dangers, would feel a pressure on them to have a military alliance, or some kind of alliance, to protect themselves. Any worry about the situation, and I am sharing with you a concern rather than a finished opinion, is that although I think it is true that the Soviet Union is not interested in going west of Czechoslovakia, excluding Germany, it is not at all true, I suggest to you, that the Soviet Union and its allies are not interested in going at some point into the rest of Germany—certainly ejecting the western presence in Berlin, which is a crazy situation, anyhow, and eventually going beyond that.

This is the kind of situation in which it seems to me that to condemn the western European Nations in NATO, whatever Canada's role may be, and to condemn them for taking this NATO step in 1948 and hanging on to it since, does not have very great validity in the present situation.

I am sorry to have taken so long, but I wanted to explain fully what was concerning me.

Professor McNaught: To take your last point first, I have not condemned them for taking the step in 1948 or 1949. It seems to me that the tension of the world was understandable then, even though there was still a monopoly of "the bomb" in American hands.

It seems to me that to defend NATO as a military alliance which offers precarious security to Norway,

Denmark and France—and France does not seem to think that it offers very much—is to skirt around the very subject that concerns you most and lies at the centre of it, and that is the condition of Germany.

I was talking the other night with Professor Smith, who is publishing a book on East Germany and is an American authority on it—regarded of course, by our student radicals as a lackey in the pay of the defense department—who argued, persuasively to me at any rate, that one of the effective things Canada could do if she got out of NATO would be to negotiate for the recognition of East Germany.

I think I would agree entirely with that, that the problem, as in many other areas, is to recognize the realities of the situation. Germany is divided; Germany has not always been united historically; and it is now again clearly, permanently and substantially divided. A realistic foreign policy surely would take account of this and in so doing might well lead other states to a similar position.

• 1235

Mr. Lewis: If I may interrupt you, I think that might make sense to me if it were not for Berlin. How do you solve that? Do you recognize East Germany and retain Berlin as a separate enclave inside East Germany?

Professor McNaught: It seems to me that one of the problems in resolving the Berlin situation, which we should never have had in the first place, is to find some kind of diplomatic leverage by which to force real bargaining on the subject. Such a leverage might well be the question of the recognition of East Germany. But I do not see how we can recognize East Germany and stay in NATO.

Mr. Lewis: No, we cannot do that. That is pretty obvious.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik, and then Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Cafik: Professor McNaught, on page 3 and continuing into page 4 there are a number of comments about which I would like to speak for a moment.

On page 3 you say:

The biggest of the credibility gaps, and there are many, in our foreign-defence policies is that between our generally conceded knowledge that there is no defence in a nuclear war and our support of an alliance system founded on a dominant nuclear power.

Then you go on, and the same theme appears on the following page, where you say:

... we should revoke a policy of military alignment which is defended on the basis of a myth.

I presume the myth you are talking of is the non-defensibility of a country. Then farther on in the same paragraph you say:

... we should say plainly that there is *no* defence. . .

It seems to be quite clear that you are stating that there is no way that we can defend ourselves.

Professor McNaught: Against the only kind of invasion or attack that is foreseeable, yes.

Mr. Cafik: All right. It is one argument to say that there is no way that any nation can adequately defend itself in the event of a nuclear war, but that is surely altogether different from saying that there is nothing that a country can do to prevent the occurrence of a nuclear war?

Professor McNaught: Right.

Mr. Cafik: If a country wanted to avoid the occurrence of a nuclear war, realizing that a nuclear war is one that everyone would lose if anyone went into it—that there is no way of defending it—if a country believed that then surely it would be quite consistent with that belief for that country to feel that it could best prevent a war by military alliance and a position of strength. Would you agree with that?

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: I have the impression upon reading this paper, that you are creating a myth in the sense that saying to the Canadian people, "There is no way you can defend yourself in a nuclear war", you create the impression—or I am afraid many people get it—that there is nothing we can do; that we just have to sit back and accept it—accept this unhealthy reality.

I think quite the contrary is true and that Canada can do something. I, personally, at the moment, from anything I have heard, am inclined to feel that the best way to prevent the awful possibility of a nuclear war is to participate in alliances that would make it impossible, and certainly not worth while, for a nuclear power to begin one. What have you to say about that?

Professor McNaught: Let us take that last point first. The two presidents preceding the present one in the United States are both on record as saying that the gravest danger of nuclear war that we face is that of accident. So also are Mr. Wilson and Mr. Khrushchev on record. If I had the references I am sure I could find the present leaders of Russia agreeing with that position. I find it difficult not to agree with them.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Professor McNaught: Therefore, to build up alliances based upon this kind of incredibly intricate electronic system of devices and controls, in which you say you have a balance of terror—and which is not a balance because the United States says we have to maintain our superiority—is not credible, because within that system all of the leaders of the great powers say that there is a real danger of accident and that that is the way in which nuclear war will come. In fact, Mr. Kennedy went even further and said there could probably be a mathematical formula by which you could predict when it would come.

Mr. Cafik: In view of this, what is the solution? Do you suggest that all countries on this side of the sort of war of nerves, on the west, should unilaterally disarm and disband their associations with one another for mutual defence?

● 1240

Professor McNaught: I agree with you that we find ourselves in a kind of Greek tragedy. As I said previously, I am not questioning the good faith of most of the people who construct and maintain the system, but I am saying that because we can contribute nothing substantial to it, and because all the other methods of containing it and rolling it back as a potential end-of-the-world system have failed within the military-alliance approach, we owe it to the world to strike out on a different line. I am not saying that only the countries in the west should do it. I am talking of the country we can influence.

Mr. Cafik: I find a little inconsistency there. You say we should get out of NATO because we do not contribute anything to it. I would regard your argument as more consistent with your approach if you thought we should get out of it because we did contribute something to it.

Professor McNaught: You are quite right. When I put it that way there is an apparent disconnection there. I agree with you that we should get out of it if we did contribute something to it, yes.

Mr. Cafik: So that is not an argument. The amount of contribution is not germane to your argument.

Professor McNaught: It is in the sense that I reject that as a counter-argument. If it is said to us, as to anyone who supports non-alignment that we have to stay in because we contribute an important element to NATO, I say that is not in fact an argument. We do not, but even if we did we should get out.

Mr. Cafik: Then what is the argument for getting out? Do you feel that these military alliances such as

NATO and NORAD, discounting Canada's participation in them at the moment, have any material effect in eliminating, or decreasing, the possibility of a nuclear war?

Professor McNaught: On the basis of the fact that the alliance system, on our analysis of it and its history, seems to be (a) self-perpetuating and (b) mushrooming in its effect, when you relate very contemporary recent history to the history of the alliance system—say, prior to World War I—and the fact that the alliance system leads, by its own internal generating power and the condition of its armament race,—which still goes on—to increasing the likelihood of war, it seems to me that the argument is that the alliance system will lead us to war and that this is one of the principal reasons for working against its continuance.

Mr. Cafik: Then you think that not only should Canada withdraw from NATO but that NATO should be disbanded?

Professor McNaught: It is probably not up to Canadians to argue that case, but to take their own action and proceed on the assumption that actions do, in fact, speak louder than words. In other words, I think that an image and an initiative are what we should be pursuing and not a cloud of verbiage on what other people should do.

Mr. Cafik: I gather you are a historian. From an historical standpoint, bearing in mind that since World War II roughly 50 wars have been fought in the world and that none of them has really been in Europe, or has affected the real European theatre, would you conclude that that proved that NATO was not a deterrent to war, or perhaps that it was? Or would you not draw any conclusion?

Professor McNaught: I do not think it is necessary to draw definite conclusions from that, no. I think that it is quite clear that the fiftieth, if that is the exact number . . .

Mr. Cafik: I think it is a little more than that.

Professor McNaught: . . . of wars beyond Europe —certainly a number of those wars have been closely related to the competition of the existing alliance systems of Europe and America. The Korean war would certainly be an example. The Vietnamese war is clearly an example. As to whether or not NATO has prevented war in Europe, it seems to me you cannot make that conclusion just because wars so far have happened outside Europe.

● 1245

In other words, if NATO had not existed, there would still have been within the context of nuclear

armaments a reluctance to face a conflict in Europe which, by the very nature of the Continent and its population, could not be contained, whereas the peripheral wars more easily can be contained.

Mr. Cafik: I do not think I agree with your view but I will pursue another line of questioning. Also on page 4 you say:

but an image of concern which reflects the real beliefs of the Canadian people . . .

I gather you have the impression—and this was pursued a little earlier—that the Canadian public are inclined to favour a non-alignment policy. You had stated that one time, and I find later you give arguments as to why they do not really favour it—because we have not given them the facts, as you call them. I do not know how you can have your cake and eat it; that they are in favour of it but we are misleading them and that is why they are not.

Professor McNaught: Historians are notable for having their cake and eating it, I am afraid, and I will agree with you that I am assuming a knowledge about what the Canadian people want there that is not historically verifiable. That is true. It is my assumption, however, that if the case were put on the kind of ground that I consider to be realistic, then one would have a majority of the Canadian public opinion behind it.

Mr. Cafik: It seems to me that in that argument that you put forward, what you would consider the facts would really be begging the question. In other words, you would expect to say to a group of people—Canadians: "NATO serves no useful purpose; I want you to believe this. I want you to believe that it does not help defend us, it does not in any way deter us from entering into a war; therefore what do you think about it?" I think they are obviously going to vote a particular way if they believe the premise you laid down. So I think you would have the same problem if you presented all your facts to the Canadian people as you see them; I think that they would have the same reason to suspect that they may not have made a valid judgment because the factors may not be right as they were presented to them.

Professor McNaught: I agree it is a political problem at that point, and I am assuming that in presenting the case—and you are hearing all kinds of cases presented to this Committee—just as with Mr. Gellner or General Foulkes, who may wish to substantiate and bolster the present line of policy, it is open to us to try to change it.

Mr. Cafik: Right. On page 5 you say here—and I have always been disturbed about this. We have heard people indicating the same thing.

Professor Eayrs has already demonstrated to this committee that a billion dollars could be pared from our defence budget . . .

I have been a member of this Committee since the 28th Parliament began and I have never really seen any proof that there would be any paring of a billion dollars. I gather that our defence budget is roughly \$1.7 billion and I suppose that it could be argued that we could pare the whole \$1.7 billion. I mean it is quite simple to cut everything off. But I have not seen any evidence that you can pare down that much if you believe that we need any kind of defence at all. And that brings up the next question. Do you feel that we would need any defence if we took a neutral role as you outline, or a non-aligned role?

Professor McNaught: The argument, as I recall it from reading sections of the brief presented by Professor Eayrs and also the chapter in his book on contemporary Canada, which is a very good and commendable chapter, is that \$700 million would be enough to maintain the kind of paramilitary security forces that we would need. Yes.

Mr. Cafik: And you think that these military forces would be strictly on this continent, in Canada, to defend our coast lines and our northern frontiers?

Professor McNaught: And to some extent, available no doubt as very highly trained technical people to specialized UN essentially police missions.

Mr. Cafik: You must feel, then, that Sweden and Switzerland, which are not aligned, spend too much on defence, do you?

Professor McNaught: I would argue essentially yes.

Mr. Cafik: They do?

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: You feel, in other words, that we should just pray and hope that all our neighbours, the Americans, the aggressors and this sort of thing will just sort of sit back and leave us alone. You just hope that everything will go well.

• 1250

Professor McNaught: We only have one neighbour unless one takes the polar projection. . .

Mr. Cafik: That is the area apparently in which there is the greatest danger. In the northern section, I understand from evidence we have heard, there is perhaps real reason why we should have sufficient

reconnaissance force to look after that area and ensure that it is not in fact being annexed by other powers.

Professor McNaught: The kind of reconnaissance force that I have heard suggested for the northern reaches and which you would need, based on the argument that the Americans do not accept the sector theory of geography and that the Russians may use floating icefields and the rest of it, is roughly the same kind that you have to police the fisheries, is it not?

In other words, if the Americans decide to move in there they will move in there; and if the Russians decide to move in there they will move in there. And I have yet to hear any persuasive arguments advanced by our Department of National Defence since they abandoned their plans for defence against the United States that there is very much we could do about it.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you. I had a number of other questions but I think I should leave them.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness, then Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Harkness: Professor, would you agree that your paper here really is a statement of the pacifist position and constitutes an argument that Canada should take a pacifist stance in international defence policy?

Professor McNaught: Well, sir, pacifism is a difficult thing to define. Woodrow Wilson has been called a pacifist by his principal biographer, and yet he conducted a fairly substantial military operation abroad and in Mexico. I would not define the position that I am putting forward as a pacifist stand because I think "pacifist" has to have a fairly precise meaning and that means a person who is never willing to fight.

Mr. Harkness: Would you agree then that you are putting forward the position of disarmament or more or less complete disarmament?

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: As a historian looking at the situation between the two great wars, does it not give you some cause for concern that the pacifist feeling that existed during that period, particularly in the United States and Great Britain, and as a result the disarmament of those two countries, was a very strong reason for—in fact perhaps the only basic reason why the Second World War broke out?

Professor McNaught: Yes, I think I would agree that, in other words, Professor Underhill was wrong then

and he is wrong now. That is to say—I say that with great respect; he is my mentor in some ways—that it was wrong to not prepare, to not make an alliance with Russia when we should have made an alliance with Russia to prevent the Nazi explosion and we should have contributed more to that alliance militarily than in fact we did. My argument, however, is that the entire nature of war has changed. We now are involved with a weapons system which has revolutionised the whole concept of the use of power in the world and in such a way that the kind of contribution which we could have made effectively in the twenties and thirties is no longer open to us.

Mr. Harkness: But would you not agree that the basic situation still exists that disarmament on the part of a considerable number of nations invites aggression from those which are armed? In other words, we get back to a large extent to what Mr. Cafik was talking about when he brought up this statement of yours that there is no defence in a nuclear war and therefore you should do nothing about it. Is it not a fact that the real defence against a nuclear war, as Mr. Cafik pointed out, is the deterrent power of both nuclear and conventional armies? This is the greatest guarantee, in fact the only guarantee we have against such a war taking place.

Professor McNaught: Well, of course, I disagree with that proposition. I do not regard it as a guarantee. I believe that it is open, and progressively open, to accident or electronic failure. I do not accept most of the arguments put forward about feeling safe, not in the ultimate sense. I do not see it as a guarantee at all, and I do see a very substantial movement towards disarmament as a far greater guarantee which will certainly have to be undertaken in the context of increasing UN police activity in the minor areas.

● 1255

Mr. Harkness: Do you really believe that if the western countries got rid of their nuclear arms and got rid of their conventional arms we would not almost immediately have the situation where the Communist bloc would use their arms in order to, we will say, take over the entire world?

Professor McNaught: Well, sir, I have not suggested that we should say to the United States, "Destroy all your weapons." What I have said is that the limited area in which Canada can in any circumstances have real influence is not along the line of contributing to an armaments race; it is along the line of saying convincingly to other people, "Do not join it." The problem is limitation and we are not going to solve that problem by supporting an alliance-based arms race.

Mr. Harkness: All I can say on that is that I disagree completely with you. I think your position in this regard is not borne out by actual experience. It is certainly not by my experience and I have had considerable with regard to these matters. I think the exact reverse is the case. The fact that we do belong to these alliances, the fact that we do maintain a certain degree of armament and make a certain contribution to the security of the western world puts us in a very much better position to have some influence on world affairs and have some influence on the general action which is taken by the alliances we belong to on the whole than would be the case if we withdrew from them.

Professor McNaught: I agree that is the point of difference, sir.

Mr. Harkness: Quite a few of the statements that you make throughout here I think are subject—I will put it in this way. Would you agree that they represent your point of view and that there are a large number of other people who are knowledgeable in these matters who would take the directly opposite point of view?

Professor McNaught: I find that almost certainly and always to be the case, yes.

Mr. Harkness: I will just mention one or two of these. You say:

...as we review our role in the International Control Commission in Vietnam it becomes more and more clear that we accepted the job principally because the United States thought we would be the best representative of the West—that we would be a patsy for the Americans.

This is directly contrary to all my knowledge in regard to this matter which, I would humbly submit, is perhaps a little more intimate than yours from a practical point of view. What evidence have you that that statement is correct?

Professor McNaught: The evidence, it seems to me, is that it was the United States that suggested we should join the Commission. The evidence also is in various places in *Hansard*, where Senator Martin, who was then External Affairs Minister said as he was directly countering the argument that we were neutral on the ICC—no, I believe it was in answer to questions put to him by Mr. Lewis a couple of years ago. He said, "No, we are not. We are there as the western member of the ICC." I take that as fairly substantial evidence that that is what we were.

Mr. Harkness: That is a very different thing, though, than saying that we were there principally because the United States thought we should be and that we are a

patsy for the Americans. Actually when the Commission was set up, as you will probably remember, we accepted the job as the result of a request at the Geneva Conference in regard to the matter, and we accepted, as far as I am aware, not with any idea of representing the United States on it but of representing the western world generally on it. Poland was to represent the eastern world generally on it and India was supposed to be there as a non-alliance member of it. In no sense whatever, to my knowledge, were we to be there representing the United States and particularly to be a patsy for the United States. I take the greatest objection to this statement that we would be a patsy for the Americans.

Professor McNaught: The word perhaps is unduly offensive. If you would like me to change it to "agent" or "representative" or something of that sort, I would be perfectly agreeable. It is there for a little extra point, Mr. Chairman, and I think it is a matter of interpretation.

● 1300

Mr. Harkness: I think my point there would be that we were the representative of the western world.

Professor McNaught: In the same way that Poland was of the eastern world?

Mr. Harkness: On the whole. Poland was there representing the Communist bloc, yes.

Professor McNaught: And who lays down policy for the Communist bloc.

Mr. Harkness: This comes back to the very matter that Mr. Lewis was mentioning, that there is an essential and very great difference between the Communist bloc and the western world.

Professor McNaught: But I would argue in this case, sir, that the essential difference is that where the Communist nations may feel themselves compelled to toe the line, Canada, in all too many cases, has self-imposed upon Canadian policy a support of the American position, and the evidence for that I think is clear and spread right across our foreign policy. I agree it is self-imposed.

The Chairman: That is an advantage, Professor.

Professor McNaught: It is an advantage if you recognize that self-imposition can be revoked.

Mr. Harkness: Also, I think it is a matter of each country in the Western World looking first, as it must do, to what its own best interests are. And our best interests, in my view, are served by continuing in the alliance, in these alliances.

On page 6 you say:

Does Canada really believe that West Germany is restrained from military adventures or from acquiring nuclear weapons simply because of the presence of NATO troops in Germany? Certainly West Germany puts no more faith in America's willingness to defend her by nuclear retaliation against Russia than does de Gaulle.

I would suggest that this is a statement which is just contrary to fact. Having had considerable dealings with the Minister of Defence of Germany, and having talked to their External Affairs Minister at considerable length on these subjects, I am personally completely convinced that Germany puts her security almost entirely in the fact that America is going to be willing to defend her. She looks upon the presence on German soil of a large number of American troops armed with nuclear weapons as her more or less complete guarantee, that in the event of a Communist attack on Germany, the Americans will participate in her defence.

Professor McNaught: Sir, that is certainly a point of sharp disagreement. It seems to me that a very strong case could be made that NATO provides, in some ways, a convenient defence for the West German Government to resist right-wing demands in Germany for a much more aggressive foreign policy. I would agree that far. But I do not find it at all convincing that the fact that there are as many thousands of American troops on German soil as there are, in any way adds to the credibility of a policy of the United States of repulsing an attack on West Germany by nuclear weapons.

Mr. Harkness: Then you would assume that in the event of an attack the Americans would just, we will say, abandon their troops that are there? This to me is inconceivable.

Professor McNaught: They are, of course, armed with strategic or tactical nuclear weapons which have a larger explosive blast than the Hiroshima bomb. If there is going to be a nuclear defence, they are going to be destroyed anyway. It seems to me that they are there as a very real kind of hostage, but one which cannot be reclaimed by the use of nuclear weapons.

In other words, it is, in fact, the same kind of mythology that we are led to accept, that there is a defence against that kind of attack. It seems to me that they are buying political influence in the same way that we attempt to buy political influence from the United States by staying in the military alliance.

• 1305

Mr. Harkness: Yes, this is your point of view. But you put forward in your paper here that the Germans

essentially have this point of view, that the Germans do not believe that the presence of these American forces there means that America is going to be willing to defend Germany by nuclear means, which I think is completely wrong, and which I am sure the Germans think is completely wrong.

Professor McNaught: There is a very great debate in Germany on it, and once again one is making hypothetical assumptions about the broad tenor of public opinion, and I do not think it can be tested perfectly on a factual basis. But certainly the unrest in Germany at the moment would suggest that there is a credibility gap there of rather large proportions.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we still have several members who wish to ask questions, and unfortunately Professor McNaught can not be back this afternoon. So if you agree, we will continue until we complete the list of questioners.

Before calling the next questioner, would the Committee agree to print Professor McNaught's advance presentation as an appendix to this day's *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*? Agreed.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Secondly, on February 5th Mr. Forrestall requested there be made available a list of all bilateral defence agreements in force between Canada and other states. Apparently there are 64 in all. A large majority are with the United States. Nine are with other NATO states, and 9 are with non-NATO states. All the agreements are of a highly technical nature. The Clerk has copies of the list available for any member who wants one immediately, but perhaps it would be helpful if we could print the list as an appendix to today's proceedings. Would that be agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, along the same lines, could the letter from which Professor McNaught quoted in his brief be appended too?

Professor McNaught: You mean the whole letter from the Department of Immigration?

Mr. Roberts: Yes.

The Chairman: It is a question of whether there is any objection on your part, Professor.

Professor McNaught: There is no objection on my part. I hope there is not on the part of the Department, since I have a copy of the letter if you would like to use it.

Mr. Roberts: I would like to have a copy of the whole thing.

The Chairman: Would you like to check with the Department before authorizing its printing, or do you feel it is necessary, Professor?

Professor McNaught: It is an official letter, so I cannot see that there would be any objection.

The Chairman: Is it agreed that this should be printed as an appendix?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Professor McNaught, I was going to question you about the very paragraph on page 6 about which Mr. Harkness just finished questioning you. I was objecting to your dogmatic statement, I thought, that:

Certainly West Germany puts no more faith in America's willingness to defend her by nuclear retaliation against Russia than does de Gaulle.

You put this as if it were a fact. I would support Mr. Harkness in what he has to say from my experience on the North Atlantic Assembly, the consultative assembly connected with the NATO Alliance over a period of the last three years. I would say that any West German representative to whom I spoke in the course of that time was extremely nervous about any suggestion of a withdrawal by American or Canadian forces from the continent for the very reason that their presence there and their strength there lent credibility to the willingness of the North American continent to go to war, if need be, in their defence.

That is not a question, that is a statement on my part, Professor, but I thought I should support Mr. Harkness on it.

My first question. Would you not agree that every one of the 15 members of the NATO Alliance has lived, for the last 20 years, in relative peace and security within its own boundaries, and that this is some kind of a world record, particularly for these touchy times?

• 1310

Professor McNaught: Relative peace and security would, of course, perhaps exclude Greece and Turkey and possibly, in terms of peace, Portugal.

Mr. Ryan: No, they have not been invaded. I said within their boundaries.

Professor McNaught: Within their boundaries, yes. But they have had engagements between themselves; certainly Greece and Turkey have.

Mr. Ryan: Do you not think that some of Greece's troubles have been due to Communist infiltration, and also in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola?

Professor McNaught: There is no question at all that unrest and political turbulence have been influenced by Communist feelings, yes.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. On page 5 of your written submission you dealt with Professor Eayrs' suggestion about diverting a billion dollars from our military budget to other aims. At the bottom of the middle paragraph you say, and I quote:

the same billion dollars spent on weaponry and personnel which in no way affect the military power of the alliance

Now this is what I find to be a bit incredible, that our contribution to the alliance in no way affects its military power. Are you aware, Professor, that our air division is one of the top divisions professionally manned?

Professor McNaught: Yes I am.

Mr. Ryan: Are you aware that these are probably tops in their profession, that they have nuclear and conventional weaponry that contributes approximately 10 per cent of the air strength in Europe, that our armoured brigade is one of the finest there is in the world, that we are no longer doing with 100,000 men what we can do with 9,000 or 10,000 men? This is a strong firm commitment from Canada, and I would take issue with you when you say there is no military power contribution from Canada in this respect.

Also we have the NATO naval program in the Atlantic, and I understand that this is a far greater contribution than the public generally know about. It has been run down considerably in the last while, but if the true facts were known, that naval force of ours has much to offer to the military strength of the NATO Alliance. Having said that, what would your reaction be to what I have had to say?

Professor McNaught: I am completely persuaded by the analysis of the relationship of Canadian military potential to the general power of the alliance which has been made not only by Melvin Conant, but also by Professor Eayrs, more recently. Professor Eayrs' point, as I recall it, is that while nobody detracts from the skill and training of the air division and the rest of it in West Germany, it is considerably over and above the strike power required and assessed as required by NATO commanders. And the more general point that Conant insists on, is that in this age we cannot, because of our size, contribute enough to make a significant military difference.

In saying that our contribution in no way affects the military power of the alliance, that does not mean that it contains no power itself. Of course the brigade group and the CF-104s contain power, particularly with their nuclear tactical weapons. But the point is that they do not affect in an essential way the over-all military power of NATO. Certainly they do not affect it to the extent that NATO, as it is conceived, would be crippled by their withdrawal, or seriously affected by their withdrawal.

Mr. Ryan: On page 7 in the third line from the top, you say, quote:

If Canada were to declare for non-alignment, and the results was a virtual disbanding of NATO, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that she would be decreasing rather than increasing tensions in Europe.

• 1315

It is the term "perfectly" that I am getting at. I think I am quarrelling more with your overstatement or overemphasis than anything else. And in this connection I would like to say something about my view of the current situation in Western Europe and in the Atlantic.

The Soviet fleet—now the second in the world in power—is patrolling from Norway through to Iceland and beyond. It has a four-fifth dominance in the Baltic. It has the Island of Bornholm, the Danish Island, as a hostage, with 100,000 people on it. The Soviet army is sitting on the German plain, in East Germany, with about 20 divisions. It is now a spearhead in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet fleet is passing through the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles. It is in great strength, about 50 units. It is based in Syria and in Egypt, and soon apparently it is to be based at the very new modern facility in Algiers. There is some word to the effect that it is even being refueled in Yugoslavia.

There is also the withdrawal of the whole British military influence in the Middle East and the Far East and there will be a big vacuum there which the Russian fleet is also attempting to fill by coming around through Far East waters at the moment because Suez is closed. With all these prongs like a pitchfork into Western Europe, do you think really that now is the time for us to withdraw from NATO, to hit it really between the eyes, as it were, and to permit this large Russian military build-up to be in a position to take on the Western European allies one at a time?

Professor McNaught: Your assumption underlying this, of course, is that there is a Russian conspiracy to attack us, that it is based on a general intention

of aggression and takeover. I do not see that that is any more valid an assumption than it is to say that the American power is aggressive and maintains fleets in all the places you have mentioned and, indeed, intervenes farther from her borders than as yet Russia has done in strength. The real thrust of your argument is that in some way Canada can contribute significantly to what is, I quite agree with you, a power confrontation all around the world. I think Canada cannot effectively contribute to that and that we should work in every possible way with the money that we would save, which otherwise would be uselessly spent on a military contribution, to eliminate points of tension at which this vast confrontation at any point could blow up.

Mr. Ryan: You would break up this successful unity that has endured for all these years in order to accomplish what?

Professor McNaught: Just what I have said. If one says "successful unity for all these years" one has also to understand, of course, the changing environment during those years and the development of world-devastating weapons which it seems to me does, in fact, go well beyond the older concepts of gunboat diplomacy or even vast land armies fighting from trench to trench in Europe. It is a revolutionary new situation and so infinitely expensive that the real power confrontation cannot be affected by us. Our effect has to be on a non-military line.

Mr. Ryan: Of course, I quite agree that the nuclear confrontation is one thing but it is more the conventional confrontation in Western Europe that I fear will cause a blowup.

• 1320

Professor McNaught: Let me put one question by way of illustration. When we had the missile crisis in Cuba in 1962 there was the confrontation of two branches of conventional weaponry by the two super-powers, by Russia trying to get ordinary ships into Cuba and the President of the United States imposing an embargo, but fortunately the confrontation did not move beyond into shooting. But there is mounting evidence, and certainly we all felt it at the time, that the real danger behind that conventional confrontation was nuclear weapons, and I would argue to you that the confrontation of the conventional forces of either of the super powers will always involve that danger of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Ryan: As a historian, Professor, has Russia not had a history of expanding from time to time, retreating somewhat, but always keeping within its maw other tribes, other nationalities, other nations and that this has been a constantly growing process down through the last hundreds of years, so that now there are very few Russians left in Russia, proportionately?

Professor McNaught: Yes, that is quite true. One of the most significant American historians, Frederick Jackson Turner, however, rewrote the entire history of the United States in terms of expansion and I think you really do not want me to take the Committee's time to tick off, one by one, the wars of expansion of the United States. I agree they are both very large continental, militarily expansive powers, yes.

Mr. Ryan: Most of the Americans came in by lawful immigration methods, not by taking.

Professor McNaught: I do not think the Mexicans would agree with you, sir.

Mr. Ryan: Well, in some barren areas this would be true.

Professor McNaught: Nor would the Filipino's.

Mr. Ryan: But in respect of Russia, there is this sort of recognized theory of the pebble in the pond, that she has been rippling out and she needs to be contained.

Professor McNaught: You have invited me to comment on it as a historian. I can only refer you to the now vast literature of American expansionism from the foundation of the Republic. It was Captain Mahan in the eighteen-nineties who spelled out the whole virtually imperial theory on which American power has grown and enveloped a very great deal of the world.

Mr. Ryan: Are you suggesting seriously that there is an analogy to be drawn between the satellites under Moscow and the satellites under Washington?

Professor McNaught: I am suggesting seriously that the Vietnamese people probably think exactly that.

Mr. Ryan: A couple of weeks ago, I was in Saigon for a couple of days and I did not find that to be the case at all. In fact, the Americans are starting to secure that country completely. They are going to have trouble along the border so long as the Russians are in there helping the Combodians and the Laotians and the North Vietnamese.

Professor McNaught: Yes, certainly there is the confrontation, but the Americans are in fact there and doing . . .

Mr. Ryan: The South Vietnamese government and the Americans are starting to win the people over in the south. That is what I found. I was only there for a short few days. I know I am no oracle but it certainly looked to me as if perhaps now is not the time to settle that war.

Professor McNaught: Well, I sincerely hope you are right.

The Chairman: Mr. Gillespie, do you have a question?

Mr. Gillespie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not have the advantage, I am afraid, of hearing Professor McNaught deliver his paper but I have been listening intently and I would like to put a couple of questions to you, Professor McNaught.

A moment ago you referred to the two super powers as being militarily expansive powers, I think probably this is the basic assumption that one has to recognize in thinking about the world order and the kind of balance of power that we might look for in the world. It seems to me that we can only secure the peace of the world based on some appreciation of this idea of balance of power, related to both capability and intention.

You seemed to say at one point—I do not know whether I understood you correctly or not—that you were against all forms of alliances and that you would promote the disbandment of NATO because you felt that this would help to ease tensions throughout the world. Did I read you correctly?

● 1325

Professor McNaught: The essential point I was trying to make is that I think NATO has, in fact, restricted Canadian foreign policy initiatives and that therefore we should withdraw from it. The possible confirmative point that we should then urge the disbandment of NATO is not one that I would make as a formal proposition.

Mr. Gillespie: Did you not make the proposition during the hearings this morning that it would be advantageous if NATO, as one of the military alliances within the world, were to disband?

Professor McNaught: It is my feeling that this would promote a reduction of tension, yes.

Mr. Gillespie: Then are you arguing the case for the withdrawal of Canadian forces from NATO as part of this particular objective; that is, the dissolution of NATO?

Professor McNaught: I am arguing the essential point first that we should have freedom of initiative for our own foreign and defence policy and the subsidiary argument that our best method of influencing other people is to take an action of that sort rather than by simply persuading them verbally.

Mr. Gillespie: Surely you would have to go back to the basic assumption that you are making about the kind of world order within which we have to make our policy. The kind of world order that you seem to be foreseeing is one that would be better preserved if there were no military alliances.

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. Gillespie: You start from that position and then you follow through and say we should get rid of NATO and then you follow through logically and say Canada should withdraw from NATO because this will help to bring NATO down.

Professor McNaught: You are moving. . .

Mr. Gillespie: You can see the argument from one point and I am turning it on you and saying that it has to be related to the kind of goals and the kind of world order within which you foresee Canadian policy being made.

Professor McNaught: I quite agree. I think in return for this kind of policy one should bargain for concessions in Berlin, the settlement of the German question. Certainly it should not be done as a merely naive and isolated unrelated kind of action. But I say that to anticipate the disbanding of NATO as it presently exists is to offer ourselves a flexibility of approach and initiative that we do not have within it.

Mr. Gillespie: But thinking again in terms of the world order argument, is it not more likely that the balance of power, the stability, the predictability of actions of others will be better preserved around an alliance system?

Professor McNaught: That, of course. . .

Mr. Gillespie: I am not now arguing Canada's position. I am arguing the alliance system which you were arguing also earlier, I think.

Professor McNaught: I think the history of alliances is such as to give me no confidence whatsoever in their ability to preserve world order, but precisely the reverse, and the history of Schmidt and Bernstein and others of the alliance structure that led to the first World War, which was very similar in nature to the alliance structure that has grown up today, is such as to persuade me that they lead to arms races, they lead to fear, they lead to militarism and they lead, in fact, to all those things that threaten stability rather than create it.

Mr. Gillespie: So long as there is certainty about the response, they do not need to do the very things that you have been talking about, and surely this is one of the things that NATO has provided—the certainty of response.

Professor McNaught: May I give you one quick historical illustration? In 1911 and 1912 Sir Winston Churchill at the Admiralty had Sir Eyre Crowe draw up a plan of naval action and of rapid deployment of British military forces to France in the event of a breakdown, and he said in the Crowe Memorandum that this was a system of massive and instant and known retaliation which would make certain that there would be no attack upon France. I do not really see the certainty of retaliation; that was, in fact, disbelieved by Germany and I think there is exactly the same kind of credibility gap today between the alliance systems.

● 1330

Mr. Gillespie: I would have thought that might have happened if Cuba had gone the other way. I suggest to you the very fact that the United States were prepared to meet the threat of Cuba and to risk the world holocaust at that time has increased the credibility of NATO and the certainty of response.

Professor McNaught: I take, I am afraid, a different point of view about what happened in Cuba. It seems to be borne out by everything fresh we learn about it, including Robert Kennedy's latest publication, that essentially in the last analysis, since the United States did in fact commit an act of war in imposing an embargo on Cuba, the peace of the world depended upon the good sense of Mr. Khrushchev in not trying to overcome that embargo.

In other words, there was a credibility gap both ways there and I do not think that the fear of instant retaliation was such that it prevented President Kennedy at that time from undertaking an act of war.

Mr. Gillespie: Would you agree that the whole history of these alliances and the reason they have broken down is because there has been uncertainty about the resolve within the alliances to back up the alliance when the crunch comes.

It seems to me, anything we may do inadvertently or as a matter of policy which tends to weaken the idea that NATO will respond, depreciates the value of NATO as a factor in maintaining the balance of power.

Professor McNaught: I disagree. It seems to me the more complex and massive the system of the alliance becomes the more dangerous it becomes. One historical example you will recall is the crisis over the shooting of the Archduke at Sarajevo in 1914 when certain members of the various alliances began to make preparations against the possibility that there would be war. One of the preparations made, of course, was the sending by the Czar of very large numbers of troops to the border. The difficulty was

that by accident and rather bad planning they bunched up at the border and some of them had to go across it because there was a jam at the railhead. It was that event, prominently, amongst other things, which induced the Kaiser to move fast.

In other words, I think that the massive organizations of alliance structures—and the technological changes involved today do not necessarily change the inner psychology of the alliance system—are themselves propellents towards war and accident.

Mr. Gillespie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Professor McNaught, in yesterday's newspaper I believe there was a story to the effect that the Russian government was in favour of Canada withdrawing from NATO. Most of Canada's traditional friends are in NATO. If Canada were to withdraw from NATO, how, in your view, could it do so without causing concern and anguish to its friends, and without giving aid and comfort to the Russian government? One of the arguments used in favour of our continuing in NATO is that, if we were to withdraw, it would give aid and comfort to the Russian government and distress our friends.

Professor McNaught: You may think I have skated on thin ice already; this is going to be really thin, but I believe the case I am going to put. What distresses me about the way in which you have put the question is the assumption that we have friends and we have enemies.

The Chairman: I avoided using the term "enemies".

● 1335

Professor McNaught: However, the counterpart of friend is enemy and while it is true that some of our traditional friends are in NATO, so are some of our traditional enemies. An enemy today is not necessarily an enemy tomorrow and *vice versa*. One of the real problems we face, a problem which all of us who have lived through the cold war should recognize, is that the existence of an alliance system itself tends toward that very cast of mind of dividing the world into friends and enemies, and thus of reducing the flexibility of responses to individuals inside the

other camp. This is precisely one of the areas in which Canada has been most restricted by her military alliance membership.

I am obviously not going to take the step to say we should regard Russia as a friend, but I think we should certainly not take the step and automatically say that Russia is an enemy.

The Chairman: If Canada were to consider entering a state of neutrality, do you think there is any possibility at all that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would recognize Canadian neutrality? In your view do you think there is any possibility that Russia and the United States would recognize Canada as being in a state of neutrality in view of its geographical position?

Professor McNaught: The recognition of neutrality, of course, is a complicated problem in international law. I have not proposed that we should try and get for ourselves a scrap of paper such as the Belgians have relied on since the 1830s with an international guarantee of neutrality, but rather that we should not align ourselves positively and militarily which, as I say, creates the division of the world psychologically, politically and the rest of it. My answer is that probably they would both recognize that neutrality if we wanted them to, although I would not advocate it.

The Chairman: Why would you not advocate it?

Professor McNaught: I cannot see any particular end to be served by advocating it. To advocate a formal neutrality of the Belgian, Swiss or Swedish type, it seems to me, while it would not be a serious restriction on your flexibility of foreign policy, it would be an unnecessary restriction on it. Everybody knows that the Swedes and the Swiss do, in fact, have restrictions on their foreign policy which flow directly from their formal neutrality.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor McNaught. Are there any other questions?

On your behalf, I would like to thank Professor McNaught for being with us this morning. I know we found it very interesting and I hope you found it interesting as well, Professor McNaught.

Professor McNaught: I have indeed. Thank you, very much.

APPENDIX II

Kenneth McNaught

NON-ALIGNMENT FOR CANADA

For a long time many people have argued that our membership in the NATO-NORAD military alliance system has acted as a break against serious Canadian diplomatic initiatives, especially if those initiatives would clearly offend the United States. Amongst the stock illustrations in support of this argument was the case of our non-recognition of China and our pusillanimity on the question of Chinese membership in the United Nations. Now that we have begun to negotiate the matter of recognition directly with the Chinese I do not doubt that the proponents of alliance loyalty will point to the Stockholm talks as proof that the alliance is really broad and tolerant and doesn't inhibit us at all. Because of its plausibility I should deal with this very current argument first.

The point about an initiative is that it is something that comes first, that it is something consciously designed to give a lead. Now, while one can only applaud the decision finally to make "honest women" of our wheat dealers one can hardly argue that with forty embassies established in Peking, including those of France and Sweden, and with substantial evidence that Italy is about to follow suit, we are taking a daring initiative. Indeed, to the skeptical eye of an historian who is painfully aware of the revised interpretations of events required from time to time as archives are belatedly opened to researchers, the whole picture lacks perspective. And even before the archives are open a little reflection can add perspective. For years we have listened to those who have been close to the East Block indicate, both implicitly and explicitly, that the reason we did not recognize China was that to do so would unnecessarily offend the United States. Again, as we review our role in the International Control Commission in Vietnam it becomes more and more clear that we accepted the job principally because the United States thought we would be the best representative of the West—that we would be a patsy for the Americans. In this context of occasions on which we have run interference (or information) for Washington our current approach to Peking—as an initiative—is unconvincing. Through the grisly years of escalating horror in Vietnam we served Washington on the ICC, we steadfastly boycotted Peking at the diplomatic level, and we even endorsed the American theory of intervention in Vietnam. Undoubtedly we practised quiet diplomacy and even intimated publicly that it would be useful to stop the bombing. Like Catherine the Great, during the eighteenth century partitions of Poland, we wept but we kept on keeping on.

What, then, is the context of our decision to negotiate the recognition of China? We do so in the environment created by acute political crisis in the United States. That crisis resulted directly from the insistent need to end the war in Vietnam. And any permanent settlement in Southeast Asia can scarcely be arranged if the United States continues its demand to maintain the faltering diplomatic ostracism of China. Thus, while Mr. McCloskey clucks disapprovingly in Washington, no one in Ottawa takes this as a serious signal to stop the play. Perhaps, but not necessarily, it would be too much to speculate that we had been quietly invited to make our move now. But certainly it would be too much to suggest that the move was a bold assertion of independence and proved that alliance membership does not inhibit us from pursuing policies strongly disapproved by the senior member.

Apart from the China question there remain in full force all the other illustrations of how our military alignment leads to inactivity on many worthwhile fronts and, at the same time, humiliates the Canadian people by associating them closely with some of the most detestable action in the contemporary world. From Greek repression to Portuguese imperialism to American slaughter in Vietnam—we are directly tied by the alliance system. Equally, by that system, we have prevented ourselves from exercising a freedom of action at the United Nations and on other fronts that might well have contributed to a reduction of international tensions. By loyally supporting the American claim that their nuclear superiority must be sustained if there is to be a "balance" of terror we have directly contributed to the continuing "imbalance" and to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By declaring before the world that we believe we are defended by the American nuclear forces (and thus must concede their strategic demands) we have emasculated our support of a non-proliferation treaty. For how can we say to Israel, or India, or Egypt or anyone else that *they* should forswear nuclear weapons when at the same time we claim to bask in the protection of those very weapons—and add that they are absolutely essential to our security?

The biggest of the credibility gaps, and there are many, in our foreign-defence policies is that between our generally conceded knowledge that there *is* no defence in a nuclear war and our support of an alliance system founded on a dominant nuclear power. Since

we know, moreover, that we would be attacked only in the event of war involving the United States and as a result of American policy differences with another nuclear power, the double logic of the situation dictates strict military non-alignment. In a very real sense the nuclear age has recreated for Canada a situation surprisingly similar to that in which our militia bills of the 1860's were debated. At that time everyone agreed that the only danger of attack lay in a breakdown of relations between Britain and the United States—and that the chief burden of defence would therefore be upon Britain. The main difference a hundred years later is that our protector could not protect us. I think it is a safe bet that, had Macdonald and Cartier disbelieved the power of Britain to defend us, Dominion status would have been achieved with more despatch than was in fact the case.

But the real point is, following from the above reflections, that we should revoke a policy of military alignment which is defended on the basis of a myth. In so doing we should not argue that withdrawal from the military alliances system results from our belief that the United States has to defend us willy-nilly; we should say plainly that there is *no* defence, there is only appalling danger that civilization will be annihilated if all states do not come to realize the facts. We should use our non-alignment quite consciously as an international image; not an image of aloof neutralism but an image of concern which reflects the real beliefs of the Canadian people rather than the tired, pre-nuclear age shibboleths of 'power'.

A modern policy of non-alignment might well draw sustenance from the non-military policy bases of our early Confederation years. In that period the governments not only knew that Canada could not afford to contribute anything of significance to the military defence of the empire, they also acted on the knowledge. The principal argument they advanced to London, in reply to *kreigsverein* suggestions was that our best contribution was the development of the country and the peaceful working out of the implications of our multi-national life. While it is true that on occasion someone like Sir Charles Tupper would argue that the building of the CPR was in fact a direct contribution to the military strength of the Empire, few Canadians took that argument seriously—and even fewer Englishmen. Only the rather suspicious Captain Mahan, prefiguring the patterns of American imperialism from the lessons of British sea power, thought that the CPR posed a threat to America. Our military non-alignment in such crises as that which enveloped General Gordon in the Soudan, left us free to develop the ways and sinews of peace. When, quite unnecessarily, we decided to align ourselves militarily with the Empire in 1899 in South Africa, we brought about one of the most serious of our racial crises. And it was a crisis which deepened steadily as our alignment and commitment deepened. Surely the lesson to be learned is that in periods when the military expenditures

which we can afford are insufficient to affect in any significant way the international 'balance of power' we are best advised to put all our effort into proving that a multi-racial state in the modern world can survive without atomizing itself and can develop a cultural life as rich, or richer, than that which can be afforded by nations which devote preposterous proportions of their national incomes to doomsday weapons.

Professor Eayrs has already demonstrated to this committee that a billion dollars could be pared from our defence budget without impairing our ability to provide the kind of para-military forces which we should, as a non-aligned state, have ready for UN police-supervisory actions. If these savings were spent on the alleviation of poverty and the enrichment of culture in Canada, and on extensions of our foreign aid programme it would take a courageous man to argue that they would not do more for the peace of the world, and for even a narrowly-conceived Canadian national interest, than the same billion dollars spent on weaponry and personnel which in no way affect the military power of the alliance.

But the argument for continuing our tight military alignment through NATO and NORAD and the defence production sharing agreement is far more complicated than the relatively superficial one of securing military defence. It is, however, no more convincing than the straight defence argument. That we buy influence at Washington is a part of the further argument for alignment that, again, Professor Eayrs has critically examined. In fact what we buy is inhibitions and defence contracts. An argument advanced less volubly, but of great influence amongst members of the Department of External Affairs, is that a strong NATO is the only sure means of keeping a chain on West Germany's territorial ambitions and any demand she might put forth to acquire her own nuclear weapons. And West German nervousness, it is argued, has justifiably increased because of Russia's intervention in Czechoslovakia. The argument is barely plausible, especially when it includes the proposition that the Soviet intervention renewed the military threat against western Europe. That intervention was a direct response to what Russia considered, rightly or wrongly, a threat emanating from NATO to detach Czechoslovakia from the Communist orbit. It was no different in kind from American intervention in Guatemala or the Dominican Republic or, abortively, in Cuba. That is, it was a reprehensible military action to preserve a sphere of influence. But it was an action of a sort that NATO was never designed to prevent; and it was an action which, in considerable degree, the existence of NATO made likely and possible. NATO, in short, is the principal justification for the Warsaw Pact. And without the Warsaw Pact cover the Russian action would have been diplomatically next to impossible.

Does Canada really believe that West Germany is restrained from military adventures or from acquiring nuclear weapons simply because of the presence of NATO troops in Germany? Certainly West Germany puts no more faith in America's willingness to defend her by nuclear retaliation against Russia than does De Gaulle. And as far as conventional defence against a conventional cross-border aggression is concerned West Germany is certainly capable of assembling sufficient force against any assault that was of less size than that which would invite total (and therefore nuclear) conflagration in Europe. Were Canada to disengage herself from NATO, in the opinion of many observers, including at least one who is high in the present government, some other NATO members would probably follow suit. The fear is that all that would be left would be West Germany and the United States. Yet this is the essential relationship in NATO in any event. If Canada were to declare for non-alignment, and the result was a virtual disbanding of NATO, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that she would be decreasing rather than increasing tensions in Europe. Certainly such a development would rob Russia of much of the rationale for maintaining the Warsaw Pact system. And, beyond doubt, the options open to Canada in her relationship to central and eastern Europe would be sharply increased. She might even lapse into realism by recognizing the permanent division of the Germanies.

The opportunities for constructive and peace-promoting initiatives that non-alignment would open up are, in fact, so numerous that the real question is not "should we get out?" but "why do we stay in?" The question should really be debated on exactly the same grounds as the question "should we join OAS?" If the debate were put on this basis the answer would probably be the same in both cases—the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages. And in both cases the disadvantages (although even stronger in the case of NATO) cluster around the inhibitions imposed by membership. I think the inhibitions imposed by our military alignment are so numerous and, often, so subtle that they deserve further specific illustrations. For, in fact, they constitute a positive argument for non-alignment.

Canada has on many occasions expressed sympathy for the plight of the Vietnamese nation but we have sent aid only to the southern part of that nation. As a result we were listed by General Westmoreland as one of America's supporting allies—and how else but in that light can other states see us? The point is that even in an area where we have no direct treaty obligations to support American aggression we consider that our basic military alignment dictates such support. And when, after more than two full years of massive escalation of the war, Canadian public opinion showed a growing uneasiness, we got a clear statement of why we had to play ball. The statement came in a letter from former Prime Minister Pearson. It was his

reply to 360 professors who had sought Canada's open repudiation of the intervention in Vietnam and a halt to the export of Canadian war material destined for use in Vietnam. Mr. Pearson wrote: (March, 1967)

Confidential and quiet arguments by a responsible government are usually more effective than public ones.... Too many public declarations and disclosures run the risk of complicating matters for those concerned.... The more complex and dangerous the problem, the greater is the need for calm and deliberate diplomacy.

Well, the quiet diplomacy presumably continued through 1967 and 1968 with no noticeable effect—except, perhaps, to weaken the position of Mr. Ronning. What did lead to some progress towards a negotiated peace was the political breakdown in the United States itself. Can anyone deny that Canada's only real avenue of influence in these circumstances would have been along the lines proposed in the professors' letter—a kind of action that certainly would not have delayed the American political crisis and which would probably have hastened it?

While our quiet and ineffectual briefs were being trundled along the corridors of power in Washington a more effective section of our external relations machinery was in top form. The Canadian Commercial Corporation pushed ever higher our share in the profits of the war—up towards \$400,000,000 a year in *direct* contracting. And here we find the really solid reason for not rocking the North American boat. It is a reason which was elaborated in Mr. Pearson's letter. After reviewing the extent to which defence production has been integrated, and the technological and mass production advantages we receive as a result, he argued that because of these developments we could not in fact refuse to contribute to the American war effort in Vietnam:

For a broad range of reasons, therefore, it is clear that the imposition of an embargo on the export of military equipment to the USA, and concomitant termination of the Production Sharing Agreements, would have far-reaching consequences which no Canadian government could contemplate with equanimity. It would be interpreted as a notice of withdrawal on our part from continental defence and even from the collective defence arrangements of the Atlantic Alliance.

Perhaps this is the line of reasoning which has induced the defence minister to propose, during the present policy review, that our arms spending should be increased rather than decreased. No more concise or authoritative statement has yet appeared than that contained in Mr. Pearson's letter. After it, who can maintain that acceptance of continental integration in defence production and planning leaves us free in general foreign policy; and who can deny that our NATO-NORAD membership dictates our foreign

policy? The military alliance is the outward and visible sign of our inward and very material ecstasy.

No doubt the political implications of the situation as stated by Mr. Pearson do not engender equanimity in government circles. Withdrawal from continental defence planning and production would require a good deal of political footwork and even more hard economic planning. But that in itself is not an argument for not pulling out into the open the real reasons (and results) of our military alignment. If the purpose of the present policy review is *really* to consider all the implications of our present alignment then it will have to examine and publicize a very wide range of our domestic policies that are directly affected. In many cases, from foreign investment to immigration, the real meaning of our policies is not only determined by our military alignment but is also almost totally unknown to the public. I propose to mention one area in which the alignment influence is direct and, at the same time, largely obscured from view.

Most Canadians feel that our immigration policy should reflect our basic liberalism. They believe that, not unlike the United States, Canada has been an asylum for millions of people from the British Isles and Europe. They believe, too, that it is a mark both of our independence and our liberalism that we instruct our immigration officials not to enforce foreign laws or to snoop into the political beliefs or military obligations of intending immigrants. Had we acted otherwise a good many of Sir Clifford Sifton's "men in sheepskin coats" would have been sent back to fight in the imperial armies of Russia and Austria-Hungary. Thus, when young American war-protestors began to seek asylum in Canada and many of them experienced difficulty in being admitted there was considerable public concern and the Department of Immigration instructed its border officials to adhere to the regulations by not asking questions about military status. At the same time, however, the Department made a quiet reservation. There was a difference between draft-resisters and deserters. Thus it continues to, in effect, enforce American law by rejecting deserters from the American army. And it does so as policy, although most Canadians undoubtedly assume that if an American refuses to fight in Vietnam and deserts when he is ordered overseas, he will not on that account be denied entry to Canada.

When, in the spring of 1967, I asked the Department on what grounds it pursued this policy I was told, at first, that it was an obligation arising from our NATO commitment. When I objected that the commitment was nowhere spelled out I was informed that it stemmed from the NATO Visiting Forces Act. When I argued further that this did not apply to deserters the

point was conceded and I received an official letter* which cleared up the point. I will quote from the letter because it is the only way of illustrating fully the point I am developing:

It is quite true that the NATO Visiting Forces Act is applicable only to foreign military personnel actually on service in Canada, and that consequently a foreign soldier who comes to Canada after deserting somewhere else is not subject to its provisions. I am sure you will agree, however, that neither Canada nor any other member of NATO would be acting in the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty if it granted immunity within its borders to deserters from the military forces of other members of the Alliance.

Well, I agree that the admission of American deserters to Canada is contrary to the spirit of NATO. That is just the point. Moreover, the further reasoning behind the Departmental position is equally unnerving:

The doctrine of 'asylum' is not recognized in the Canadian Immigration Act, or in any other Canadian statute to the best of my knowledge. In any event, common usage suggests that it really has no application to citizens of friendly countries, particularly those having democratic forms of government similar in principle to our own. The connotation surely is that a person seeking 'asylum' aims to escape from political persecution by a regime having totally different standards from ours. A deserter from the American Forces, or from those of most other NATO members, is certainly not in danger of political persecution, though he may well be faced with prosecution.

I don't think I need to specify those parts of the above passage that should cause deep concern to Canadian liberal opinion, or to underline the relationship of the policy to our military alignment. The letter goes on to suggest very clearly that the avoidance of service in Vietnam is a legitimate concern of our immigration officers, since, to avoid military responsibilities is tantamount to total irresponsibility:

Personal qualities are of major significance in reaching a decision on this point, and motivation is one of the qualities to be taken into account. A person who comes here because he believes it to be a good country to live in, and one that offers him better opportunities, is more likely—other things being equal—to make the transition successfully than is a man whose chief motive is to avoid responsibilities in his own country. Accordingly, there have to be rather special circumstances before we accept an applicant seeking to escape

*Department of Manpower and Immigration, Office of Director and Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration); File No. 555-38; July 31, 1967.

from his creditors, his wife, or some other legal obligation under the laws of his own country. I think you will agree that, under the Immigration Act, we have to look at military deserters in this general category.

It is often argued that, if we really *want* to take an independent line in our foreign relations we could do so, like De Gaulle, without formally rejecting military alignment. I have tried to show that the complexity of our alliance commitments, both known and unknown, is such that independence is unlikely within the alliance system. But what of the further argument that, since we are so timid within the alliance system we would probably be no bolder if we merely withdrew formally from the system? This is a strong argument. One answer is that if, as a result of the present review, we decide upon military non-alignment, that decision will rest upon a political debate that must go far beyond the walls of the West Block. It would be a debate concerning almost every substantive issue in Canadian domestic and foreign policy. And, if it produced a majority for non-alignment, it would also have produced a majority which would demand extensive public planning of investment, resources development, cultural growth and the production of the limited range of conventional armaments that we would still require. In no other way than by closely examining the total implications of our military alignment can we really define the true interests of the country or discover the extent to which Canadians are willing to pursue those interests.

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Degrees:

B.A. (Mod. Hist.) Toronto, 1941; M.A., Toronto, 1947; Ph.D., Toronto, 1950.

Teaching:

United College, Winnipeg—Asst. Prof. 1947; Assoc., 1950; Professor, 1956.

University of Toronto—Asst. Prof., 1959; Assoc., 1962; Professor, 1965.

Summer Sessions—Toronto, Manitoba, Queen's, U.B.C.

Occasional Lectures—L.S.E., Oxford, 1964; University of Minnesota, 1956; Franklin and Marshall College, 1962; Laurentian, Antigonish, 1967.

Books:

(a) Published:

A Prophet in Politics, U. of T. Press, 1959

A Source-Book of Canadian History, Longmans (Canada), 1959; with J. H. S. Reid and H. S. Crowe

Canada and the United States, Clarke, Irwin (Toronto) 1963 (with R. Cook)

Manifest Destiny: A Short History of the United States, Clarke, Irwin, Toronto, 1965

(b) *In Preparation under contract:*

The Nature of Progressivism—for John Wiley, N.Y., problems series.

The Left in Britain and America—for John Wiley, N.Y. (1968)

Pelican History of Canada—for Penguin Books, London (completed)

The Winnipeg General Strike—for Prentice-Hall, problem series (1969)

Papers, articles, chapters:

"J. S. Woodsworth and a Political Party for Labour", *C.H.R.*, June, 1949

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"Debate on Defence", Woodsworth Foundation pamphlet (with A. Brewin) 1961

"Mackenzie King and Foreign Policy", Canadian Historical Assoc. Annual Report, 1957

"Canadian Foreign Policy" in M. Oliver (ed.) *Social Purpose for Canada*, U. of T. Press, 1961

"American Progressives and the Great Society", *Journal of American History*, December 1967

"Socialism and Consensus in the Progressive Era" in A. Young (ed.) *Essays on Dissent*, Univ. of Northern Illinois, 1968

"The English-speaking Canadian Outlook" in P. Russell (ed.) *Nationalism in Canada*, McGraw-Hill, 1966

"From Colony to Satellite" in S. Clarkson (ed.) *Canadian Foreign Policy*. McClelland and Stewart, 1968 (Feb.)

"The Nineteen-thirties" in *The Canadians*, Macmillan, 1967

"Reflections on the Progressive 'Fiasco' of 1924", Paper read at the American Historical Association Meeting, Dec. 1967

"The Impact of Regional and Ethnic Differences on the Culture of English-Speaking Canadians", for Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism—1966

Book Reviews and Review Articles in:

Canadian Historical Review, Annals (U.S.), Political Science Quarterly (U.S.), Journal of Sociology (British), International Journal, Canadian Forum, Saturday Night, Dalhousie Review, Queen's Quarterly, Canadian Journal of History, Monthly Review (U.S.)

Related Activities:

Editor, *Canadian Studies in History and Government* (for Social Science Research Council of Canada and the U. of T. Press) 1959-66

Chairman, CBC Roundtable TV panel, Winnipeg, 1953-57

Contributing Editor, *Saturday Night*, 1959-present; about 45 articles

Member, Editorial Board, *Christian Outlook* (Montreal) 1961-66

Member, Editorial Board, *Canadian Welfare*, 1961-65

Chairman, University League for Social Reform, 1964-5

APPENDIX JJ

February 6, 1969.

List of Bilateral Defence Agreement
Between Canada and Other Countries*Belgium*

1953, March 30—General Agreement between Canada and Belgium concerning the transit through and stationing in Belgium of Canadian forces.

France

1962, May 25—Exchange of notes between Canada and France for the exchange of defence science information.

Federal Republic of Germany

1959, Aug. 3—Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany on the settlement of disputes arising out of direct procurement.

1964, Aug. 28—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the exchange of information relating to defence science (with a memorandum of understanding).

Ghana

1962, Jan. 8—Technical assistance agreement on military training between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Ghana.

Greece

1962, July 18—Exchange of notes between Canada and Greece concerning the exchange of defence science information (together with a Memorandum of Understanding).

India

1953, June 12—Exchange of notes between Canada and India constituting an agreement regarding the inspection of supplies and equipment purchased in Canada by India.

Italy

1961, Dec. 18—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Italy concerning the sale in Italy of waste material and scrap belonging to the command of the RCAF in Italy.

1963, Sept. 18—Supplementary agreement to the agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Italy concerning the sale of waste material and scrap belonging to the RCAF signed in Rome December 18, 1961.

Jamaica

1965, July 16—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Jamaica concerning the training of Jamaican military personnel by the Canadian forces in Canada.

Korea

1958, Dec. 18—Utilities claims settlement agreement between the Government of the U.S.A. as unified command and on its own behalf and on behalf of certain other governments, and the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Malaysia

1966, Apr. 22—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Malaysia concerning the provision of military transport aircraft to Malaysia.

Nigeria

1963, July 3—Agreement between Canada and Nigeria governing the training in Canada of military personnel from Nigeria.

1964, June 25—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria regarding the terms and conditions of service of Canadian Armed Forces personnel on secondment to the Nigerian Armed Forces.

Norway

1960, May 24—Exchange of notes between Canada and Norway concerning the organization of the "Canada-Norway Defence Science Information Exchange Project".

Tanzania

1965, Nov. 4—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania concerning the provision of military training and advisory assistance.

1966, Apr. 30—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania concerning the provision of military transport and liaison aircraft to Tanzania.

United Kingdom

1964, Sept. 11—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom concerning the status of Canadian forces in Bermuda.

United States of America

1940, Aug. 18—Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the U.S.A. regarding the establishment of a permanent joint board on defence (Known as the Ogdensburg Declaration).

1941, Mar. 27—Agreement between U.K. and U.S.A. relating to the bases leased to the U.S.A.

1941, Mar. 27—Protocol between Canada, U.K. and U.S.A. concerning the defence of Newfoundland.

1941, Apr. 20—Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the U.S.A. regarding co-operation for war production made on April 20, 1941 (and related documents).

1944, June 27—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. relating to payment for certain defence installations in Canada and at Goose Bay, Labrador.

1947, Feb. 12—Joint statement by Canada and U.S.A. concerning defence cooperation between the two countries. (Permanent Joint Board of Defence to continue collaboration for security purposes).

1947, Oct. 23—Exchange of notes between U.S.A. and U.K. relating to the delimitation of the area within territorial waters adjacent to the leased naval base at Argentia, Newfoundland. (With Annex).

1949, April 12—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. regarding the establishment of a joint industrial mobilization committee.

1950, Oct. 26—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. giving formal effect to the "Statement of Principles for Economic Cooperation".

1951, Aug. 1—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. regarding the extension and coordination of the Continental Radar Defence System. (Pine Tree).

1952, March 19—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. confirming the recommendation of March 28-30, 1950 made by the permanent Joint Board on Defence concerning leased bases in Newfoundland.

1952, Apr. 30—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. relating to the application of the NATO status of forces agreement of June 19, 1951 to the U.S. Forces in Canada including those at the leased bases in Newfoundland and at Goose Bay, Labrador.

1952, Nov. 8—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. for the establishment of United States global communications facilities in Newfoundland.

1952, Dec. 5—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. regarding the leasing of certain lands situated within RCAF Station Goose Bay (Newfoundland).

1953, June 30—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. regarding the transfer to Canada of the three Loran stations at Port-aux-Basques, Battle Harbour and Bonavista in Newfoundland.

1953, June 30—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. concerning the installation of an oil pipeline from Haines to Fairbanks, Alaska.

1954, May 3—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. concerning the construction and operation of a Loran Station at Cape Christian, Baffin Island (together with annex).

1955, May 5—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. governing the establishment of a distant early warning system in Canadian territory (Dew Line).

1955, June 13—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. governing the establishment and operation by the United States Air Force of Gap Filler Radar stations in the Newfoundland-Labrador area.

1955, June 15(1)—Agreement between the governments of Canada and U.S.A. for cooperation regarding atomic information for mutual defence purposes.

1955, June 15(2)—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. governing the establishment and operation by the United States Air Force of Augmentation Radar stations in British Columbia, Ontario and Nova Scotia (Pine Tree).

1955, Sep. 22—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. concerning the construction and operation of a petroleum products pipeline between the U.S. Air Force dock at St. John's and Pepperrell Air Force Base in Newfoundland.

1956, April 19—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. respecting the construction of housing units of Pepperrell Air Force Base, St. John's, Newfoundland.

1956, Apr. 23—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. extending participation in the Canadian Unemployment Insurance Act to Canadian employees of the United States Armed Forces in Canada.

1957, Jan. 17—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. concerning use of the Haines Cut-Off Road by the United States Army for the winter maintenance of the Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline.

1958, May 12—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. concerning the organization and operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD).

1958, Sept. 2—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. concerning the establishment of a Canada-United States committee on joint defence.

1959, April 13—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. concerning the construction and equipment required for the augmentation of communications facilities at Cape Dyer, Baffin Island (Dew East).

1959, May 1—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. concerning the establishment in Canada of short range tactical air navigation facilities at nine sites (TACAN).

1959, May 22—Agreement between Canada and the U.S.A. to provide for cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for mutual defence purposes.

1959, July 13—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. governing the establishment of an integrated communications system to support the ballistic missiles early warning system.

1960, Aug. 31—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. concerning the loan to Canada for a five year period of the submarine USS Burrfish.

1961, June 12—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. concerning improvement of the Air Defence of the Canada-U.S.A. region of NATO; the Defence Production Sharing Programme of the two governments and the provision of assistance to certain other NATO governments (SWAP).

1961, Sept. 1—Exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S.A. concerning the disposal of excess U.S. property in Canada.

1961, Sept. 23—Exchange of notes between Canada and the United States of America concerning the addition of Cape Dyer to the annex of the agreement of May 1, 1959 relating to short range tactical air navigation (TACAN) facilities in Canada.

1961, Sep. 27—Exchange of notes between Canada and U.S.A. concerning cost-sharing and related arrangements with respect to planned improvements in the continental air defence system (with annex).

1964, May 6—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to amend the agreement of September 27, 1961 relating to the Continental Air Defence System by cancelling the proposed Gap Filler Radar Programme.

1964, May 25—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the phasing out of certain radar stations of the Continental Radar Defence System within Canada.

1965, May 12—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the establishment, operation and maintenance of a torpedo test range in the Strait of Georgia.

1965, Nov. 24—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the establishment, maintenance and operation of a back-up interceptor control system to strengthen the Continental Air Defence System.

1965, Dec. 1—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. concerning the establishment operation and maintenance of improved ground to air military communications facilities in northern Canada.

1966, May 11—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America extending the period of the loan of the submarine U.S.S. Burrfish to Canada.

1966, June 10—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States concerning the use of land at the United States Naval Base, Argentina, for the establishment of a ferry service between North Sydney and Argentina.

1966, June 15—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the continued use by the U.S.A. of land adjacent to Argentina for the operation of a communications site by the U.S.A.

1967, Aug. 8—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. revising the agreement of November 15, 1963 providing for joint cooperation on civil emergency planning.

1968, March 30—Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. to extend for a period of five years the agreement concerning the organization and operation of the North American Air Defence Command signed at Washington, D.C. (NORAD) May 12, 1958.

APPENDIX KK

Ottawa 2, July 31, 1967.

Professor Kenneth McNaught,
Department of History,
University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ontario.

Dear Professor McNaught:

Your letter of July 7 to Mr. Curry on the subject of deserters from the American Forces raises several interesting questions.

It is quite true that the NATO Visiting Forces Act is applicable only to foreign military personnel actually on service in Canada, and that consequently a foreign soldier who comes to Canada after deserting somewhere else is not subject to its provisions. I am sure you will agree, however, that neither Canada nor any other member of NATO would be acting in the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty if it granted immunity within its borders to deserters from the military forces of other members of the Alliance.

The doctrine of "asylum" is not recognized in the Canadian Immigration Act, or in any other Canadian statute to the best of my knowledge. In any event, common usage suggests that it really has no application to citizens of friendly countries, particularly those having democratic forms of government similar in principle to our own. The connotation surely is that a person seeking "asylum" aims to escape from political persecution by a regime having totally different standards from ours. A deserter from the American Forces, or from those of most other NATO members, is certainly not in danger of political persecution, though he may well be faced with prosecution.

People seeking admission to Canada must be examined either as immigrants or non-immigrants as defined in the Immigration Act. Those seeking permanent residence, as most deserters do, must be dealt with as prospective immigrants, and this means among other things that they must be able to meet the requirements set forth in Section 31 of the Immigration Regulations. The possession or non-possession of an immigrant visa or letter of pre-examination, under Section 28 of the Regulations, is primarily indicative that an immigration officer has examined the prospective immigrant and decided that he is or is not admissible under Section 31. Visas or letters of pre-examination are not issued or withheld simply as a means of allowing people in or keeping them out, but

only when the basic decision as to admissibility has been reached. The corollary, of course, is that a person is refused admission, or ordered deported, not simply because he lacks a visa or letter of pre-examination, although this may be the technical reason, but in substance because the lack of the document is indicative of a decision by an immigration officer that the person concerned is not admissible under Immigration law.

In reading Section 31 of the Regulations you will have noted that the admissibility of people who do not have relatives in Canada is made contingent on their likely ability to establish themselves successfully in Canada. Personal qualities are of major significance in reaching a decision on this point, and motivation is one of the qualities to be taken into account. A person who comes here because he believes it to be a good country to live in, and one that offers him better opportunities, is more likely—other things being equal—to make the transition successfully than is a man whose chief motive is to avoid responsibilities in his own country. Accordingly, there have to be rather special circumstances before we accept an applicant seeking to escape from his creditors, his wife, or some other legal obligation under the laws of his own country. I think you will agree that, under the Immigration Act, we have to look at military deserters in this general category.

As you will appreciate from the foregoing, our policy in dealing with deserters from any country, not just from the United States, stems not only from NATO commitments; it is based more broadly on the Immigration Act and Regulations. The policy is not a new one, nor is it aimed specifically at deserters in general or at American deserters in particular. Rather, it is a reflection of general immigration policy on the admission of people to Canada.

If you have further questions on the subject, please feel free to ask. I will be glad to hear from you again in any case.

Yours sincerely,

J.C. Morrison,
Director, Home Branch,
for Assistant Deputy Minister
(Immigration).

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON


**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 29

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1969



Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	MacRae
Anderson	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Marceau
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Nowlan
Brewin	Laniel	Penner
Cafik	Laprise	Prud'homme
Fairweather	Legault	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Forrestall	Lewis	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Gibson	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Groos	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Macquarrie	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
THURSDAY, February 20, 1969.

Ordered,—That Votes 1, 10 and 15 relating to the Department of External Affairs;

Votes 30, 35 and L35 relating to the Canadian International Development Agency;

Vote 40 relating to the International Joint Commission;

Votes 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48 and 50 relating to the Department of National Defence; and

Vote 55 relating to Defence Construction (1951) Limited be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 20, 1969

(43)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (24).

Also present: Messrs. Buchanan, Gillespie, Hymmen, M.P.'s.

Witness: Mr. David Golden, President, Air Industries Association of Canada.

The Chairman made the following report from the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure:

"TUESDAY, February 18, 1969.

(19)

FOURTH REPORT

A meeting of the steering subcommittee was held on Tuesday primarily to plan our proposed trip to Europe. The plan now is that the Committee would leave Sunday, March 9, and it would return to Ottawa Saturday, March 22. Reasonably satisfactory arrangements, I believe, have been made so that those Conservative members who want to attend the annual Conservative meeting can do so and then catch up with the Committee in Europe without too much trouble. Without getting into a lot of detail it is proposed that we go to Cyprus, Germany, England, Switzerland, Sweden, France and Belgium and we will, of course, visit defence installations, but primarily the purpose is to obtain evidence from knowledgeable people that we could not expect to come to Canada to give evidence to the Committee.

In Switzerland and Sweden we will be interested in civil defence and neutrality arrangements. In Belgium, of course, we will visit NATO headquarters. In London and Paris we want to attend briefly some of the institutions of strategic studies. Basically we are attempting to obtain information abroad which is not available to us here in Canada. Originally we had planned to make that trip from March 14 to the end of the month. It has been moved forward five days because the members of the steering subcommittee have come to the conclusion it would be desirable, if possible, to submit a preliminary report to Parliament before the Easter recess. This, of course, would depend upon the wishes of the members of the Committee but certainly almost unanimously the members of the steering subcommittee thought it would be desirable to present a preliminary report and it was felt we should be working on that report,

really we should be thinking about it now, while we are in Europe with a view to actually presenting it to Parliament before Parliament rises for the Easter recess. It was mentioned to us that there is a NATO ministerial meeting in Washington on April 10, I think, and this was another reason why we thought it would be desirable that our preliminary report should be available before the Easter recess.

We are still contacting the people we want to see in Europe and anything we circulate will be tentative indeed. Until we actually get on the plane everything is subject to change. We must, of course, get an order from the House permitting this trip to be made. I believe that will be forthcoming but I think we can circulate something which will be of some assistance to members. Also a memorandum will go out to members indicating what has to be done in the way of vaccinations, passport arrangements, and that sort of thing.

The list of witnesses was reviewed by the steering subcommittee some considerable time ago and a list of possible witnesses was settled and then from that time we have been making arrangements to settle mutually convenient dates when these witnesses could appear before the Committee. It is interesting to know that we have received a very large number of offers of briefs from a number of national organizations and also from many individuals. It is desirable that there should be this public interest and we have taken the position that we welcome all briefs and that all serious briefs will be circulated to members of the Committee if we are provided with a sufficient number of copies. We are anxious to have views, not only from national organizations, but also, of course, from individuals. Unfortunately it was not possible to make arrangements to give all of them who wished to appear the opportunity of presenting their views in person to the Committee. We did our best to settle a list which we thought would be fair and which would be useful to members of the Committee and I say, unfortunately, we are unable to hear all of those who wished to appear. Subject always, of course, to last minute changes the list of witnesses is as follows: Today, of course, we have with us Mr. Golden, then on February 25, Professor John Warnock, February 27, Professor Legault, March 4, Professor Stephen Clarkson and then we have one further sitting before we leave on the trip and we have three or four people on the list that we would like to consider. A decision on our final witness before we make the trip should be made very soon. That briefly brings you up to date with the suggestions made by the steering subcommittee."

On motion of Mr. Winch, the Subcommittee report was adopted.

On motion of Mr. Gibson,

Resolved,—That reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to Professors J. Warnock, A. Legault and S. Clarkson, who have been invited to appear as witnesses before this Committee, in the matter of the Committee's Order of Reference dated Thursday, January 16, 1969.

The Committee agreed to print Mr. David Golden's advance presentation entitled *Canadian Defence Policy And The United States* and his biographical sketch, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (See Appendix 11)

The Chairman introduced Mr. David Golden, who made a brief opening statement. Members of the Committee questioned Mr. Golden on various aspects of defence policy, with particular reference to views expressed in his advance presentation.

The Committee completed its questioning and the Chairman thanked Mr. Golden for his testimony.

At 1:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until Tuesday, February 25, 1969 when the witness will be Professor J. Warnock.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, February 20, 1969

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is after 11 o'clock so perhaps we could get started. Before hearing from the witness who is with us this morning, perhaps I should make a brief report with regard to a meeting of the steering committee (See Minutes of Proceedings).

Mr. Winch: I move the adoption of the report of the steering committee.

The Chairman: Is it agreed that we adopt the report of the steering committee?

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: May I have someone move the following formal resolution that reasonable travelling and living allowances be paid to Professors J. Warnock, A. Legault and S. Clarkson, who have been invited to appear as witnesses before this Committee in the matter of the Committee's order of reference dated Thursday, January 16, 1969.

Mr. Gibson: I so move.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: A summary of Mr. Golden's remarks has, I believe, been circulated to members of the Committee. Is it agreed that this should be printed as an appendix to our proceedings?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, today the Committee begins its specific examination of defence relations with the United States, the third area of investigation, as outlined in our program. Our first witness will be Mr. David Golden whose written statement "Canadian Defence Policy and the United States" has already been circulated.

A lawyer by training, Mr. Golden's past experience has included appointments as Deputy Minister of Defence Production; President of Northern Ontario Pipeline Corporation and Deputy Minister of Industry. He is now President of the Air Industries Association of Canada; Chairman of the

Board of Governors of Carleton University and a Director of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. This experience has given him a broad view of Canadian-U.S. economic relations as well as a comprehensive knowledge of technical details about defence and defence production sharing arrangements with the United States and their ramifications. It is because of this broad and very relevant experience that he has been invited to appear as a witness before the Committee at this particular stage in our deliberations.

Mr. Golden, do you have a few preliminary remarks to make?

Mr. David Golden (President, Air Industries Association of Canada): Yes Mr. Chairman, there are just a very few comments I would like to make. Firstly, although it hardly needs to be said to those of the members of the Committee who know me, I do think it should appear on the record that I am not an expert and I would not like it to be thought that I am posing as an expert.

Secondly, I should like to make it perfectly clear that I am speaking only for myself and expressing personal opinions which I formed over a period of years.

If I had to summarize my views on this subject in a very few words I think it would go something like this. U.S.-Canadian relations in defence and in other areas are of paramount importance to Canada and should receive the attention that they deserve. Defence policy cannot be looked at in isolation but must be related to many other factors as well. If resources permitted everything to be done which was desirable or useful, then no painful priorities would be needed, but since this state of affairs is highly unlikely, then Canada's main interest should receive priority attention.

I do not believe that economic considerations should dictate our defence and foreign policy but I do believe that the economic consequences of the various options which are open to Canada should be well understood.

That is all I want to add to my notes, Mr. Chairman.

• 1115

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Golden. Mr. Brewin, do you have a question?

Mr. Brewin: Yes, I did not expect to be called on so early so I am not ready to go into it right away. Mr. Golden, as I understand the remarks you have just made, the problem in defence matters is a selection of priorities; you cannot have everything, and if you select one thing it may mean that you eliminate another. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Golden: Eliminate or downgrade, depending on possibilities.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, eliminate or downgrade something else. There is one part of your written paper that I find difficult to understand and perhaps you could go into it a little more fully. That is on page 2, paragraph 3:

In other words, Canada should play a role in defensive measures considered important by the United States, even if our assessment of the necessity of such measures should be at variance with that made by the United States.

If I understand that, supposing we came to the conclusion that the Bomarc missile or SAGE system of defence against manned bombers was no longer useful, and that was our view, and if the people in the Pentagon or the American government said, "We think it might have some marginal utility and we have plenty of money to spend on these things and we want to continue it", would you say that in those circumstances Canada should choose as a priority, a system of defence that it thought was obsolete but some American authorities thought should be continued?

Mr. Golden: It is a question of degree, Mr. Brewin. I think that in any black or white case it would be very simple. If Canadians were unanimously of the view that a certain defence system made absolutely no sense at all, then I would expect Canada to fight vigorously to have those views adopted by the United States. But in my limited experience it is seldom that these cases are so clear, and the point I was trying to make is that in those cases where it is not clear, we should always bear in mind the very heavy responsibilities which the United States bears which we do not, and we should seek to accommodate ourselves provided no essential Canadian interest is thereby lost sight of or abrogated.

Mr. Brewin: Does the difficulty with that not arise out of your opening remarks, that we cannot do everything? By assumption, if the Canadian Government takes a certain course that is not essential or required, but by reason of being persuaded by a contrary view of the American authorities it decides that it would like to accommodate the American point of view, by so doing is it not excluding the doing of something which in its conviction is necessary and may also be useful as far as the United States is concerned?

Mr. Golden: Well, this is quite possible. The point that I am making is that within the context of North America, and within the context of Canadian-United States relations, I feel that these matters deserve priority attention and more flexible response than would be the case in any other meaningful defence role that we might choose.

Mr. Brewin: You would not agree, then, that the most essential part of sovereignty is not, perhaps, questions of territory or matters of that sort, but the ability to make up your own mind, according to the best of your own judgment, what actions you are taking for your own security within the limitation of your own means?

Mr. Golden: I do not argue with that. It is the question of the application of that principle that gives me concern. I do not argue with that statement at all. Independence today, unfortunately, in my judgment, is not quite as simple as that categorical and very lucid statement that you just made.

• 1120

Mr. Brewin: But you do say, after all, that Canada should play a role in defensive measures considered important by the United States, even if our assessment, of necessity, should be at variance with that made by the United States. What I am trying to suggest is that in this field we should consult fully with the United States, and if we come to a contrary conclusion, should we not stick to our own conclusions if we want to claim to be a sovereign state?

Mr. Golden: Well, I really cannot add anything to what I said earlier: I agree with your statement and I think it is in the application of it that the difficulties arise, and I believe that within the context of these Canadian-American relations it just becomes that much more difficult.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Golden, I would like to say first of all that after some of the witnesses we have had recently, it is most refreshing to receive you, and I agree with everything you say in your paper. I think the idea of thinking of North American defence in any other context but as of the whole, with both of our countries working together on it, is unthinkable.

You have not spoken about the other phases of our foreign policy and I do not know if you wish to comment on them. You are saying here that: other roles can be added, but not at the expense of the North American one. Would you advocate our leaving the NATO organization and strengthening our NORAD one?

Mr. Golden: I would like to deal with that in a somewhat circuitous way, if I may. This is a very, very difficult question and it is a matter on which I have tried to do some thinking and I am not at all certain that my own view does not change as different factors are fed into the thinking process.

First of all, I believe it is quite proper and appropriate to regard Canadian participation in NORAD as being a contribution to NATO. I am not qualified to get into the very difficult discussions that took place some years ago about whether NORAD is or is not part of NATO, but it seems to me that it would be very difficult to argue that it is not a contribution to NATO. So, I would say that first, that NORAD is a contribution to NATO.

Secondly, I am going on the assumption that we are dealing with finite resources and that those resources within the foreseeable future are likely to be somewhat less in relation to the total resources available to the nation than was the case 12 or 15 years ago. If you were to ask me, what would I think of NATO in relation to a present national defence budget of \$2 billion or \$2.1 billion or \$2.2 billion, I think I would say that I would regard the Canadian contribution to NATO as of very considerable importance. But in relation to a national defence budget of \$1.81 billion, or in those numbers today, then I feel that, of necessity, some downgrading of the Canadian contribution to NATO is going to have to take place. I feel that over the next four or five years, assuming no increase in the defence budget and assuming what has

been going on for so many years escalation in costs and buying less with your dollar year by year—that it would be necessary for Canada to negotiate a substantial reduction of the Canadian forces in NATO.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): And I dare say, this would be even more so if we wanted to cut down our defence budget?

Mr. Golden: Yes, indeed.

• 1125

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I wonder, Mr. Golden, if you would mind commenting on going back to our actual North American defence set up. We have an arrangement with the United States whereby we are pretty well integrated with them, and we have heard from other witnesses—at least it appears to me—that the naval participation by Canada is worthless, that it would require a great deal of money to bring it up to date, and, even then, it is doubtful if its role would be efficient because of the fact that the American Navy has some difficulty with regard to submarine detection and so on. Could you comment on this aspect? It seems to me that either we would have to spend a lot of money or scrap it, and I would rather lean towards the latter suggestion. Would you like to comment on that?

Mr. Golden: My difficulty is that I am not competent to discuss the technical aspect at all. I really have no idea at all about the efficacy of the naval forces which Canada presently disposes. I never did know very much about it, but the little that I do know is some years out of date.

With respect to the other part of the question, here again it is probably a question of degree. These matters, in my judgment, should be decided jointly. Canada is going to devote very limited resources to these things and it seems to me that we must decide jointly which of these tasks that can be assigned are likely to be performed most effectively by Canadian forces using Canadian equipment. There again, it is a matter of fitting what is, in world terms, a relatively modest contribution into a vast number of tasks, many of which, I suppose it can be argued independently, are of tremendous importance. It is only when you relate them to other tasks, in my view, that they then begin to assume relative importance.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): This is exactly what we did with regard to the Air Force, is

it not? Together with the United States it was decided that the bomber force would be looked after by them; this was too big an undertaking for Canada, and so we stuck to the fighter role. In this particular instance do you not think that Canada is too small a nation to take on all of the aspects of defence, including the naval one?

Mr. Golden: Surely, it is true to say that even in this area we by no means cover all aspects of naval warfare; even there we have limited ourselves to a couple of the quite numerous options which are open, whereas, of course, the United States feels it must exercise all options.

Mr. Stewart, my difficulty is that I really do not know too much about the nature of the Canadian contribution on the naval side in relation to what one would expect in the early 1970s to get, dollar for dollar.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Golden. I thought maybe I could get you to agree with me.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Golden, I find paragraph 4 on page 4 to be a very interesting statement. I must confess that I have to agree with the preliminary statement of Mr. Stewart on his reaction to this paper as it might be compared with others we have had recently.

We will be going to Europe with the basic purpose of trying to gain a deeper viewpoint of the NATO responsibility from over there. You say that there is no more important defence role that Canada can play than that in North America. What relationship exists between the defence of North America and the defence of Europe through NATO and our responsibility to that aspect of it, in your opinion?

• 1130

Mr. Golden: I think there are two relationships. First of all, there probably exists a relationship in the Canadian mind which, in my view, is paramount. Secondly, there is a relationship which exists in the minds of the United States, which, I would say, comes second. In Canada we tend to think of our role in North America and our role in NATO in both cases as measures for collective defence; and I believe that is correct. Perhaps when you go down to Washington you will find that there are many people who think

the Canadian role in NATO also has an influence on the attitude which other members of NATO might hold and that consequently in Washington there will be, or there is, among some people, a feeling that the Canadian role is important not only for itself but also for the effect it will have on decisions which other members in NATO might take in the future.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Leaving the attitude of the United States towards what influence we might have on some of the other NATO members, what is your thought in regard to that responsibility as it relates to, shall we say the smaller European members of NATO such as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and even down at the southeast end, Turkey and Greece?

Mr. Golden: I believe in NATO. I believe that it is an alliance which has been absolutely essential. I believe it should continue. I believe Canada should continue to be a member of NATO. My difficulty arises when I try to analyse what forces Canada should put at the disposal of NATO in the context of the kind of budget that we have been talking about.

I also believe that we have not taken sufficient account of the changed character of Europe between 1950 and 1970. At the time that we talked about going into NATO, Europe was almost prostrate after the war. Canada not only had not been touched physically but in fact it had an incredible expansion of its industry and for a short while—a period which I must say I think some people do not seem to realize is now gone—for a short while we were one of the great military powers in the world, and it seems to me it was quite appropriate that we should at that time have shouldered the burden in NATO that we did. I feel that that kind of burden in relation to the other tasks which we now are called upon to perform is no longer appropriate. In my view it is a question of degree rather than of getting out or staying in.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): From your knowledge of the policies and attitudes of some of the smaller countries of Europe that I have just mentioned, do you think the most logical approach, in trying to work out what would be Canada's role in its commitment to NATO, should be in close consultation with the smaller countries of NATO, and that their attitudes are even more important, shall we say, than the attitudes of the United

States and some of the other larger countries such as France and Germany?

Mr. Golden: Yes, I think any renegotiation of the Canadian role in NATO should most certainly be done in closest consultation with the members of the alliance and, although I have no special knowledge in this regard it may be, as you say, that it would be particularly necessary that we should consult with the smaller members; it may very well be.

The reason I keep mentioning consultation with the United States is that it is part of my central theme—that there is nothing more important for the long-term future of this country than that we should understand what the United States hopes to achieve out of these various alliances and they should understand what it is we hope to achieve; that they should understand there are Canadian thoughts and views, as Mr. Brewin said earlier, which in some particulars will be very different from theirs. But I keep coming back to the central core of my theme, which is that Canadian American relations are paramount in all of these areas. But I agree with your comment.

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Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): In regard to the premise that you have just stated, I think it is a fair assumption that Russia probably fears West Germany more than any other aspect of stability in Europe. For that reason and also for other reasons the United States must place very great importance upon the role of West Germany as well. How much do you believe the West German picture vis-à-vis the situation in France affects American thinking that may relate back to us in our relationship with the United States in NATO policy?

Mr. Golden: I have no doubt that all of these things are matters of great importance. I myself have never been able to find convincing an argument which is sometimes put forward—I am not suggesting that you have put it forward—that we really must stay in NATO to make sure that Germany behaves itself. I cannot conceive that this is an appropriate role for Canadian forces in Europe.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My next question, Mr. Chairman, relates to my own interest and experience in Africa and the role that we have to play in the emerging areas such as Africa. How much do you feel that our relationship in NATO, as it reflects to

such countries as Portugal, affects our external policy in other parts of the world such as Africa, and how does it affect our own position as far as the world is concerned?

Mr. Golden: There are anomalies in our foreign policy. There are anomalies in every country's foreign policy. We all remember so well not so many years ago when a very important and very populous country was telling others how wrong they were to worry about Communism and then suddenly a very aggressive neighbour got a little rambunctious on the border and this preaching ceased almost instantly. I feel that what you have said is a difficulty but there are these difficulties in all manifestations of a country's foreign policy, which presumably will represent an amalgam of the best of what is possible and feasible in the pursuit of national interest. And that is why I was careful to say in the introductory paragraph of my brief that I did not think any of the terms that are commonly used—the free world and the Western world—are really all that accurate but that they do have some semblance of truth in them.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, honestly I believe that Mr. Golden is a bit more of an expert than he is leading us to believe. My first question was asked by Mr. Stewart. I would like to ask a couple of questions based on an area in which this Committee is interested and upon which I am certain that Mr. Golden is an expert.

I believe, Mr. Golden, that you were the Deputy Minister of Defence Production for some two years? Approximately.

Mr. Golden: No, it was a lot longer than that.

Mr. Winch: All right. You were the Deputy Minister of Defence Production. Mr. Golden, because you are the first witness that we have had with any knowledge of this most important aspect of our discussion, could you from your experience and knowledge, first of all let us know whether the Department of Defence Production was strictly a contract letting department, working on the basis of the request and specifications supplied you by the Department of National Defence?

And may I put the second question at the same time. Can you give the Committee an understanding as to what was the policy and what were the procedures whereby you tried

to bring into some kind of alignment the expenditures which Canada made, and is still making in the United States, and United States military expenditures made in Canada?

And a third point on the same line of questioning. In view of your vast amount of experience in this sphere as Deputy Minister of Defence Production and the fact that Canada is still in a deficit, a rather heavy deficit position resulting from our military purchases in the United States and their purchases in Canada, is there any advice that you can give us as to how we might bring this more into alignment and adjustment?

Mr. Golden: Well, Mr. Winch, I must say I did not bargain on this one. Let me do the best I can. First of all, as you probably know I have not been Deputy Minister of Defence Production for almost seven years and I must say I do not spend most of my time worrying about what I used to do in Defence Production, so some of these things are...

Mr. Winch: You could not have had those years of experience without coming to some conclusions.

Mr. Golden: Yes, but whether the conclusions are valid or not is another matter. As far as procurement is concerned, you will no doubt recall Mr. Howe telling the House of Commons that National Defence orders a gold piano and Defence Production buys it. I do not think it was like that when he said it; I do not think it was like that before he said it; I do not think it was like that after he said it, but nonetheless there is a real germ of truth, or there was—anytime I say “is” I hope you will understand I am saying “was” because I am not that up to date. There was a real germ of truth in that. The Department of National Defence, when the Department of Defence Production was set up, never surrendered their right to call up products, to decide what their specifications were, either performance specifications or what have you, and I do not think that was changed when the Department of Defence Production was established in 1951. Nonetheless as between reasonable men there is a great deal of difference between saying that Defence Production will buy whatever the Department of National Defence calls up and that Defence Production is going to insist that National Defence buy product A or product B. There is a very, very wide spectrum in between. Certainly in my experience there were many cases when the Department of National Defence would be

reasonably happy with one of several different products and consequently were prepared to allow the economic or industrial connotations of one purchase as against another to prevail; and there were many cases where this was not possible and no industrial or economic consideration obtained because a particular product was required for a particular requirement.

But the number of purchase orders, the number of products involved runs into the tens of thousands in the course of a year and it is very difficult to give principles of general application which one cannot immediately seize upon and say, “That was nonsense” in one particular case or another. But certainly, if I understand your question correctly, the Department of National Defence as the user department had the right to require certain products to be manufactured or purchased, but this was subject to negotiation in many cases.

Mr. Winch: On that position, as we all know Canada seemed to have a policy of buying what was being declared obsolete in the United States and yet we bought; like the *Voodoo*, the *Bomarc*, etc. When you were Deputy Minister of Defence Production was the matter raised when the Defence Department said, “This is it”, or did you have to follow through and make the purchases even if the United States were declaring them obsolete?

Mr. Golden: Mr. Winch, that is a much different question and really, with respect, what you have just said is not so. You said the Defence Department bought the *Voodoo* and the *Bomarc*. The *Voodoo* and the *Bomarc* were acquired by virtue of a very, very complicated inter-governmental transaction involving hundreds of millions of dollars. All documents I assume are available to members of Parliament; anyhow they are not available to me. I know you did not expect me to feed your words in any legalistic way, but nonetheless it is not true to say that the *Voodoo* and the *Bomarc* were bought in the normal sense of the word “bought” and did Defence Production say anything about it. In fact we were in the middle of that transaction; we played a very active role in that transaction; not on the policy side but on the administrative, executive side, and it was a very, very difficult, complicated intergovernmental transaction and the word “bought” does not really describe it at all.

Mr. Winch: Would you now explain to us U.S.-Canadian purchases and offer any advice as to how we can bring our deficit a little more in balance.

Mr. Golden: I am not familiar with the day to day figures. I only see them when they are published, but it was my understanding that on strictly military products, as defined in the various agreements between Canada and the United States, in fact that deficit does not exist. If it does it is a rolling deficit and not of any real consequence. Of course, the overall deficit in trade between Canada and the United States in normal years is very, very great indeed, but it is my understanding, subject to correction, that in recent years the transactions between the two countries on military procurement are not out of balance; however I only see the published figures; I do not have access to anything else.

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Mr. Cafik: Mr. Golden, I would like to refer to the paper that you gave us prior to this meeting. On page 2 you indicate,

...Canada should play a role in defensive measures considered important by the U.S. even if our assessment of the necessity of such measures should be at variance with that made by the U.S.

Surely one would not draw the conclusion from that remark that if we felt our contribution was of no value to North American defence we should proceed in any event.

Mr. Golden: I can see now in retrospect that perhaps I should have worded that differently, although I do not withdraw anything I have said there. I suppose instead of a period I should have had a comma or colon, or something. I really meant that sentence to be read with the next sentence where I said,

I do not mean by this that Canada should surrender her right to make an objective appraisal of each situation as it comes up—what I do mean is that Canada in making such an appraisal should consider the role played and responsibility borne by the U.S.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but I do not really think that answers the question. I had also read further. I agree we should take their interest into consideration, but that does not mean to say that we must act upon those interests against our own, or against our own judgment. If we are going to have the right to

make a judgment, surely we have the right to make the judgment to stay out of or to get into NORAD, for instance.

Mr. Golden: Oh, yes, but you see I differ with you on this point. I think the right to make a judgment does not necessarily mean that you are going to act on that judgment. You might make a judgment that a particular defensive system is less important than the United States considers it to be. You might, nonetheless, decide to go along under whatever appropriate conditions and terms could be negotiated.

I do not believe that making a judgment necessarily means that you then carry through and execute that judgment. There may be many reasons why you would make it and for other good and sufficient reasons modify the judgment that you have made in the execution thereof. That is the point I am trying to make.

Mr. Cafik: Surely there is not much point in making a judgment if you feel compelled not to exercise it.

Mr. Golden: I do not think that at all. I think there are many cases where Canada will, of course, feel impelled to exercise it. I am also saying it is possible that there are cases where, bearing in mind the responsibilities which the United States bears, Canada might decide, weighing in balance all the factors, that it will not exercise it. I quite agree that there are many cases where it would be unthinkable for us to yield what our judgment tells us is the right thing to do.

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Mr. Cafik: All right; thank you on that point. On page 3 you indicate that the United States, in exercising its leadership and responsibility, will ordinarily be prepared to permit its security to be adversely affected by the action or inaction of a close neighbour. In previous testimony before this Committee some witnesses have indicated that the United States might take rather severe action in respect of Canada if we did not behave in just the right way in relationship to her. What is your view of this?

Mr. Golden: I certainly would not put it in that way. That paragraph represents my best judgment of this matter and it is only a private, personal judgment; it is not an exercise in morality. In that paragraph I am not really trying to discuss the morality of the way in which nation states operate; I am trying to

indicate that I do not believe on a major matter of security the United States could consider of no consequence what action Canada might take.

I go on to say I do not suggest for a minute that we are about to be overrun and occupied every time we tell the United States they cannot do something. My whole experience, of course, has been the other way, limited though it is. In most matters of dispute the United States has been very reasonable about considering Canadian points of view. I was never charged with any policy responsibility, but executing some of these policies can also become difficult sometimes.

All I am really saying here is that it is not the same when you are a modest power as it is when you exercise very, very onerous world responsibilities.

Mr. Cafik: If they are very reasonable in their relations with Canada, is that because Canada normally accedes to their wishes? How reasonable would they be if we were not quite so co-operative? I know experience indicates that they have been reasonable, but they have had no reason to be unreasonable.

Mr. Golden: I hoped I was careful to say, "in my experience". It may be that there are some people here who have always had to negotiate with them in other matters where they were always unreasonable. The gamut of Canadian-American relations is very wide indeed, and I was not trying to cover the entire gamut of U.S.-Canadian relations.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik, may I ask a supplementary?

Mr. Cafik: Yes, by all means, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: At that point, Mr. Golden, you indicate there are an infinite number of possible actions that could be taken by the United States. Were you referring to the possibility of economic pressure among other causes of action?

Mr. Golden: Yes, but even before you get to economic pressure it is my understanding that there are subsisting today a number of very special relations between Canada and the United States which are based upon the concept of a commonality of interest in defence measures. In my view that is one step before you get to pressure.

It seems to me it would be quite appropriate for the United States to say, "There are certain agreements that we have: there are

certain understandings that we have which are based on the idea that we do have a common interest in defence. If we do not have that common interest, is it right that Canada should have that special relationship?" I suppose that is not the same as economic pressure, which I would think is: "You behave or else the United States has certain things it can do". I am no better equipped than anybody else to say at what stage this might or might not take place or whether it would.

I think we have to bear in mind this is just elementary, but sometimes we tend to forget that not only does Canada have an interest in good Canadian-U.S. relations, but the United States has a very keen interest in this as well. When I am asked about the Canada-U.S. production sharing arrangement, I sometimes have to remind people this was entered into by the United States freely and willingly because it had advantages to them as well. This is not something that smart Canadian negotiators slipped over on the Americans who did not understand what was happening. There is a commonality of interest in all things.

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Mr. Cafik: In your arguments in respect of national sovereignty you say if we are not going to go through a common effort then we would need forces to do the job ourselves. Further, immediately following, you indicate that if we adopted a neutral or, I presume, a non-aligned stance we would also have to have a defence force to secure that type of establishment. Have you any idea what the cost to the government would be for these two alternatives? Would it cost us less money than our present budget of \$1.8 billion for defence, or would it cost more?

Mr. Golden: I think a lot would depend on how far you want to go, but certainly a Canada capable of keeping the United States and Russia out of its air-space would certainly require, in my view, a budget vastly greater than \$1.8 billion. A Canada prepared to investigate every unknown blip on the radar screen with Canadian aircraft, Canadian warning and control and communications, and so on—I am not enough of an expert to know but there again I should think the costs are likely to be very great. There is not only air; there is sea—air, land and sea forces. I would say that an effective neutrality where we tell everybody to stay off and where we

have the means of keeping them off would be a very expensive undertaking indeed.

Mr. Cafik: This brings up the next question. You talk about the "free ride" concept. I am rather inclined to think that Professor McNaught who was our last witness had this in mind. In any event, you speak of public opinion, you think the public would reject this idea of a free ride. Professor McNaught rather thought that perhaps the public had been misled in its views; that we had begged the question—the government talks about the necessity of NATO and for a number of years we were constantly involved in justifying NORAD—and that we had, in effect, created a condition where the public may have a misinformed judgment. He rather felt that if he had a chance to put forward his propaganda everybody would believe precisely the opposite.

Mr. Golden: I did not realize that Ken McNaught had had any trouble with his propaganda. I tried to come to the hearings to hear Professor McNaught, but you were in a very small room and I could not get in. I read his paper but I did not hear the questioning. I really cannot comment on that.

I am not expert on what 21 million Canadians think or feel. I tried to be honest with the Committee. It is just wrong for Canada to say that we do not have to do something because the United States will do it for us. I just do not think this is the way in which one builds a nation, but other people may have different views and I respect them for it. As far as other aspects of the free ride are concerned, of course, it will not get you very far. As I tried to point out in the first paragraph, you are not only going to get a free ride, you may be taken for a ride.

Mr. Brewin: May I ask a supplementary? I agree with your concept of the free ride, but is it not possible to say that because you are freely getting your main territorial defence supplied by American forces, this releases you to do entirely different things. This does not mean that you do nothing; it means, however, that your role is changed by reason of the existence of the geographical fact that you are part of the North American continent; you are within the American zone of defence whether you do anything or not. Does this not change your role? I think even Professor McNaught would be more in favour of that proposition than a free ride, saying Canadians should do nothing as a result of this.

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Mr. Golden: I agree with that. Of course, it is also true we sometimes forget that we always contemplate allowances, because we have very distorted forces. Looking at the Canadian forces in isolation they make absolute nonsense unless you contemplate that we will be in alliance, and pre-eminently in alliance, with the United States of America.

Mr. Cafik: I have one other line of questioning. I have the impression—I may be wrong—that your primary view is that we should align ourselves very strongly with the United States through NORAD and that our involvement in NATO is of lesser significance. Is that a fair statement of your position?

Mr. Golden: That is a fair statement, except that I believe that NORAD is really contributing to NATO and can properly be considered a part of NATO. But with that amendment, I do not quarrel with what you say.

Mr. Cafik: It has been maintained by many, and I think it is a generally accepted view, that there is no defence in the event of nuclear war. By that I mean, no defence sufficiently adequate to ensure that the lives and property of our people would be safeguarded. Would you take the same view?

Mr. Golden: I would not say "no defence", but that it would not be very effective.

Mr. Cafik: All right. That leads me to this question: The argument put forward in favour of our involvement in NATO directly in Europe is that it is primarily a role to prevent the occurrence of war and that perhaps NORAD is primarily a defence against the event of war.

Mr. Golden: I would not agree with that at all. I would think that is not accurate at all. The main purpose of NORAD is also to provide credibility so that people do not start a war. Once it is started you try to do certain things about it. But they are all designed to avoid this war, and I would not draw any distinction at all. I really find that line of thought very difficult to accept.

Mr. Cafik: Do you consider all the nuclear deterrent resident in the United States—its ballistic missiles and submarines, and so on—all part of NORAD?

Mr. Golden: It is not part of NORAD necessarily, but NORAD is part of it, in the sense that this is what NORAD is all about.

Mr. Cafik: Is not NORAD primarily an organization to prevent anyone launching a successful attack against the United States?

Mr. Golden: My understanding is that these are all designed to convince a would-be aggressor that it is not going to be worthwhile trying it, and, consequently, it is all just as defensive—one or the other. If the unthinkable occurs then, of course, you have got to carry on. But the concept in my view is exactly the same in both NATO and NORAD.

Mr. Cafik: Can we make as significant a contribution to NORAD as we can to NATO?

Mr. Golden: In my view we can make a significant contribution anywhere providing we are prepared to devote the necessary resources. I have gone on the assumption, which might be totally wrong, that we are looking at defence budgets somewhere of the order of magnitude of what we have now. If that assumption is wrong, then I would like to make another appearance before the Committee.

Mr. Cafik: You do not feel that the defence budget should be increased or decreased but that it should mainly stay as it is?

Mr. Golden: I am not making any observations about whether it should or should not. I am trying to give my best judgment, in analyzing these policies, of what I think will be.

Mr. Cafik: You feel that we should cut back our military participation in NATO?

Mr. Golden: I believe that in concert with our allies, not abruptly, not unilaterally, and spread over four or five years, if the defence budget is going to remain in the same ball park as it is now, we should reduce our military contribution to NATO substantially.

Mr. Cafik: But you feel that we should still maintain our alliance with NATO?

Mr. Golden: Indeed I do.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel, and then Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Golden, many of my questions have been asked but perhaps I could ask you for a personal opinion. You must

have been travelling as Deputy Minister of Defence Production. Do you think that any country in the world would consider Canada as a non-aligned country because of our geographic situation even if we did withdraw from NATO and NORAD?

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Mr. Golden: I do not think there is the slightest chance that anybody would think that Canada is non-aligned. I certainly do not think so myself.

Mr. Laniel: This means that in your mind, relative to the promotion of peace and participation with the United Nations in peace-keeping forces, or other objectives of that kind, our image would not be changed in any way whether or not we did withdraw from these alliances?

Mr. Golden: No, I do not.

The Chairman: May I ask a supplementary?

Mr. Laniel: Yes.

The Chairman: Do you regard Mexico as a non-aligned country, Mr. Golden?

Mr. Golden: Yes.

The Chairman: May I just ask why you feel that if we withdrew from NATO and NORAD we could not be considered as non-aligned whereas Mexico to the south is in your view, a non-aligned country?

Mr. Golden: Because I think we are very active in many of these areas and we will continue to be active, whereas Mexico is not, and has not been. These situations can change very radically and I might be wrong about Mexico, but that is the way I look at it.

Mr. Laniel: I have come to the same conclusion. Therefore, if we are to look at our defence policy and participation in our alliances I think we should bear in mind the very important economic factor. Our defence-sharing program is mainly with the United States. What proportion of all our sharing programs with all of our allies would be directly related to the United States in comparison to other NATO countries?

Mr. Golden: Because of geography and because of the very close relationship between Canadian and American industry, not in this field, but in general, the over-

whelming proportion of these transactions is between Canada and the United States. There are some with Great Britain, France and Germany, but they are relatively modest compared to the Canadian-United States one, for obvious reasons.

Mr. Laniel: Can you tell us what proportion of our gross national product these programs would represent. I am trying to discover what would be the influence on the Canadian economy if, tomorrow, we were not to break relations with the United States but at least to isolate ourselves to a point where we would have to establish our own military force and procure for ourselves different things from outside. Because of that isolation would we put ourselves into a position where we would lose advantages that might affect Canadian industry?

Mr. Golden: Indeed, we would lose very considerable advantages, but I could not give any quantitative or qualitative assessment.

As I said earlier, I certainly do not believe that military or foreign policy should be motivated only by these considerations, but I do believe they are considerations which must be taken into account, among many others, in these re-examinations.

Certainly in many industries access to United States technology—access to modern American advances—is very important if you wish to stay competitive world-wide. I suppose there are other ways of doing these things but they are very difficult and very costly and very time-consuming.

Mr. Laniel: You said that Canadian-United States relations are paramount but do you feel that within NORAD our participation is satisfactory, perhaps not militarily—you said you were not a military expert—but in the decision-making process?

Mr. Golden: I think you really should ask somebody else about that. On the face of it,

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we have very senior military officers participating. I have no personal knowledge of how consultation takes place, on the political level, but on the levels of participation I think this must of necessity vary with changing world situations and changing technology. We all know that a whole new round of AWACS and other things are now being talked about which, I assume, would be for intergovernmental discussion on what role, if any,

Canada should play, bearing in mind our very limited resources in comparison to those of the United States.

Mr. Laniel: One last question: Certain people say that because of our geographical situation next to the United States we would retain many of the advantages we now benefit from even though we did isolate ourselves in neutrality. But do you feel that, proportionately, Canada right now is, and for the past 10 years has been, receiving more advantages than has Mexico which is also a neighbour of the United States? And would the reason for this be that we are in different alliances and cooperating closely with the United States either in NATO or in the defence of North America?

Mr. Golden: I suppose that is so. I do not wish to offend the Mexicans, but it seems to me that we are somewhat more advanced as a technological, industrial nation than is Mexico as yet. That, too, not only has an effect on Canadian-American relations but affects what we hope to achieve through Canadian-American relations—what is it they call it?—the revolution of rising expectations. The sort of industrial backup that would have been quite acceptable to Canada before the onset of World War II would be an absolute nonsense in 1969.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. MacDonald, and then Mr. Anderson.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Golden, I think you gave us the key to your presentation some time ago when you suggested that the relations between Canada and the United States really are paramount to your consideration and to the brief you have presented today.

Although, starting from that point, you could end up with a number of different positions, you have ended up in one particular position which accepts that not only should we act extremely closely in defence matters with the United States, but, as has been pointed out this morning, even defer to the United States on occasions when we might disagree on the importance of a certain defence instrument or posture.

If I may go to the basis of your considerations here it seems to me that the essence of your philosophy, if I may call it that, is in

the first paragraph on page 4 where you say, in the third line:

...But on the essential things of life they hardly differ at all...

Do you think that the foreign policy aims of Canada and the United States, perhaps proportionate to the difference in magnitude of the two powers, are in a sense the same?

Mr. Golden: That is a very difficult question. When I talk about the essential things of life I am really talking about the freedom of the individual living in a democratic society, and so on. I assume that the paramount aims of national policy in both the United States and Canada are peace and tranquility.

These, of course, are the paramount aims of all settled communities. Peace and tranquility do not sound so sensible to a nation which feels that the events of the last hundred or two hundred years have dealt with it harshly and that is why, in my view, it is so easy to get a vote for peace and tranquility in North America and so difficult to get a vote for peace and tranquility in some other parts of the world.

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But certainly I would accept that basically we desire a peaceful world order and that is the number one foreign policy objective of Canada and that is the number one foreign policy objective of the United States. I think once you move away from that there are undoubtedly differences between us but I do not regard those differences as going to the quality of life or the essential objectives; they go rather to means and there we come right back to what you said, bearing in mind the difference in size and responsibility. You cannot, in my view, push this to one side.

The pre-occupation with "communism" which one finds in the United States and not quite so much in this country is, I think, because the United States sees its responsibilities globally and also because of certain historical reasons, but I really think that in those areas you are talking with countries which have different missions in the world and that is why they do different things.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Let me stay on this just for a moment. You have indicated that in the United States there is preoccupation or concern with communism, that essentially while Canadians may not share it to the same degree the reason really is because of

magnitude and not because of an essential difference in outlook or in its concept of the danger of communism; we can actually use communism as such because we realize now we are referring to the number of states which within themselves have a different foreign policy view generated out of their own communist ideology.

Mr. Golden: That is right.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Are you, in fact, just saying it is a question of magnitude and not some fundamental difference in view?

Mr. Golden: I would agree with that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Would you say, then, that for a country today one of the essential criteria of national sovereignty is its ability to devise its own foreign policy and also to be ultimately responsible for its own national defence?

Mr. Golden: Yes, but the two really are not the same, unfortunately. Devising a foreign policy is—I was going to say simple, but obviously it is not simple with committees devoting many, many hours to this but it is relatively simple to devise a foreign policy compared with the complexity of making it effective, even what you and I said a minute ago about peace and tranquility.

How do you impose peace and tranquility? Is it going to be a *pax Romana* or a *pax Britannica* and now a *pax Americana*? I guess not—at least, I hope not. The modern world just does not permit that sort of thing. You said, to be responsible for your own defence but who today, what country today, can be responsible for its own defence?

I assume that one of the major considerations motivating the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia was defence. There were others, I have no doubt, so even the USSR thinks it is not capable of looking after its defence itself without having reference to what goes on around it and that, it seems to me, is where the real difficulties come in. You can have a foreign policy or defence policy but how do you make it effective by yourself?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): If I may paraphrase your brief and I think what has been the essence of your testimony here today, there is, in fact, a great deal more that we have in common with the United States than we realize and this must be a first consideration in the development of any kind of

defence policy in this country. I am just wondering whether you foresee the day when, not only for defence purposes but perhaps for reasons of improving the economic outlook and so on, there could be a full-scale economic and political union with the United States?

Mr. Golden: Oh, no; that is why I argue all this so strenuously. I am violently opposed to that. I do not know why I should be, but I am.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not know why you should be either in terms of your presentation.

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Mr. Golden: But I am; I guess I have not got my idea across. It is *because* I want Canada to be independent, it is *because* I believe in a sovereign, independent Canada that I want these things. It is because I do not want American airplanes swarming over the Canadian sky.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But they are today—now.

Mr. Golden: I think having them do it as a result of an agreement freely entered into that we will do some things and they will do some things is one thing, and having them do it as if there were no Canadian agreement at all is quite a different thing.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think you are putting an interpretation on what I said that is not quite correct. I would not see it as Canada's being some kind of cauldron on the United States. I am just simply carrying what seems to be your progression of thought to not only the next step but perhaps the next number of steps by saying that if Canadians are really going to become active and effective in the North American continent rather than just a very small partner, which is what we will be today, we would enter into the full life stream of the United States; we would presumably be 10 more states. An extension of what you are advocating seems to be that we form the next 10 states of the United States and perhaps in that way become even more actively engaged in the development of North American defence policy.

Mr. Golden: I can only make two comments on that. I do not believe that anything I have said leads to the inevitability of such a conclusion or, I believe, in the desirability of

such a conclusion. I do not believe either would be warranted.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, having explored that a bit, let me ask you another question. I forget how you put it—something about we should be aware of the United States and of their interest—but I wonder whether you have any thoughts on whether or not Canada, because of its size and because, as you said earlier, of its technological sophistication, could play any particular role either in its defence posture or foreign policy that would be a particular asset to the United States.

In other words, has the United States discovered, perhaps in the last decade particularly, that there are certain kinds of things it cannot do, simply because of its size and because it is one of the centres in terms of polarity in this period, that the Canadian government might, in fact, do that would be extremely useful and valuable to the American Government?

Mr. Golden: I cannot think of any examples offhand, but I do not see why such a scenario would be inherently improbable at all; I think it is quite possible. There are very few things in the industrial and technological fields that the United States cannot do but there are a lot of things it might not be economic or sensible for it to do. This is the realization that we came to in Canada some years ago in certain fields, and I think joint Canadian-American activities in some of these fields have advantages not only for Canada but for the United States. In my experience if joint enterprises do not do something for both sides most of them do not last very long. They ought to have some meaningful attraction to both members of the partnership.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you think in terms of image or impression that when Canada does something in a part of the world such as the continent of Africa or in parts of Asia it is regarded much differently than the United States is regarded? Do we have a different image for or impression on these people, do you think?

Mr. Golden: The continent that you have chosen is one with which I have no personal experience at all. I have never been to Africa, but in those parts of the world where I do visit frequently I do not find that people have too much difficulty in making up their

minds that Canadians are different from Americans and have different roles.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): On what basis, though?

Mr. Golden: I think they accept the fact that we are a sovereign, independent country and that we have independently come to the conclusion that there are a lot of things the Americans are doing that make sense and we want to be associated with them. I do not believe that because we agree with the United States that necessarily means we are being subservient or not exercising independent judgment.

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Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): May I just ask one final question? The question is short, but perhaps I may be asking for too long an answer, but do you think that the military-political situation has really altered substantially since the late nineteen-fifties?

Mr. Golden: I suppose it has altered; everything changes. I suppose what you are asking me to address myself to is whether it has altered in any meaningful way. Certainly the economic recovery of Europe and its capacity to participate in its own defence has grown with astonishing rapidity in the last 10 years. I would regard that as a meaningful change. I would regard the ability of the nations of Europe and their desire to contribute to their own defence has altered in a meaningful way in the last 10 years.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): If I may just add this as a sort of supplementary, are there areas in which the threat has altered—if I can use that term—the potential military threat, say, to this country? Has it altered or shifted from one area of the world to another?

Mr. Golden: I am not an expert Kremlin-watcher or Sinologist or whatever they call them these days and my views are no more valuable than any average citizen's. Every time I think things are getting better something horrible happens and makes me reconsider. I do not know whether other people have that experience or not.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Anderson, and then Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Golden, I would like to congratulate you on your brief and lucid

statement. It contrasts sharply with some that we have had quite recently, but there is one aspect that I am afraid is not too clear to me and that is in paragraph 4 of page 4 which reads in part:

4. As far as independence is concerned, only a Canada which shares in North American defence and which has forces it can commit to such defence can influence in any important way, American policy.

While I will certainly accept that as a preliminary statement, it seems to me that if we devote a certain amount of our defence expenditure to North American defence in the agreements as you suggested we should do we should also at the same time attempt, perhaps, to play some part in Europe in NATO which would also aid, if you like, in the general defence of the North Atlantic area. In my opinion, a direct attack in Europe or a war in Europe would probably mean war in North America as well. It would quickly become global and I cannot see why you think that our influence is directly dependent upon the amount that we contribute in North America.

I would have thought that our influence would be directly dependent on the amount we contribute not only in North America but also in Europe, and there is not much difference one way or another where we put our troops from this point of view.

Having said that, of course, I come to the next part of my own private thesis which is that perhaps for specifically Canadian interests we should make a fairly large contribution in Europe where we have the opportunity of working with other nations of similar background, nations with which we have ties other than the United States and thus, in concert with those nations, perhaps have more influence on American policy than we might have in a strictly bilateral NORAD-type arrangement, North-South.

I am sorry this is such an involved question but I am really explaining an attitude which I would like you to comment on. You stated on page 3 in paragraph 1 that our contribution in North America need not be 100 per

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cent or even close to that, but it must be a great deal more than zero. I will agree with that, but it seems to me that once you assume that we are only going to carry out something like 30 to 50 per cent of the actual defence of North America, and the Canadian zone, once

having decided that it does not make much difference whether you put in 30 per cent or whether you put in 50 per cent, you are only going to do a small amount anyway. You want to make a substantial contribution, and as far as the Americans are concerned I cannot see how they are particularly concerned whether we put in either 30 or 50 per cent, provided we play a role in Europe which again is in the common North Atlantic interest. This is not a very good question, sir, but I cannot see why you have suggested that our influence on the Americans and our influence on and ability to affect American policy is entirely dependent upon what we do in North America. It seems to me that it would be what we do in both areas.

Mr. Golden: On the contrary, I think it is a very good question. Of course, this is the sort of thing that one runs up against all the time. You have limited resources and you have to try to decide what to do with them. First, when I talk about only a Canada which shares in North American defence, and which has forces which it can commit to such defence, can influence in any important way American policy, I mean American policy in North America. I do not mean American policy locally. That brings me to the difficulty I have in this respect. When you talk about independence and sovereignty you can only relate it to Canada as a physical thing. When you talk about Canadian forces in Europe you are talking about a contribution to an alliance where we may or may not play an appropriate role, depending on one's views. There is no question about it, the United States is most anxious we should play that role and the reasons are well understood.

Perhaps what is not so well understood, in my view, is that there are more compelling Canadian reasons than there are American reasons why we should play an appropriate role in North America. It is not important to their sovereignty what happens in northern Quebec or northern Ontario, it is our sovereignty that is involved, and that is why I am making this distinction. I agree with you that it would pay dividends, in the sense of having an influence on policy, if we had appropriate military forces in Europe, but my assessment of doing that and all the other things that we are talking about doing is that it would require a larger defence budget than we have today. If such is the decision, so be it. I have no objection at all. In fact, I think that is

fine. I think perhaps the Canadian contribution to defence is getting smaller than it should be in relation to the obligations we might properly assume, I do not know. I have no objection to what you have said at all; it is just a question of how you get all this in. When I talk about sovereignty and independence I am quite aware of the fact that many Americans have said—whether they speak for the United States government or not, I do not know—“Do not worry about what goes on in NORAD. You stay in Europe”. I think that is quite a defensible American view. However, I regard it as an indefensible Canadian view. To me it is important for Canada that these things not happen, whether it is important to the United States or not.

Mr. Anderson: So you therefore think that the political advantages that accrue for Canada may be direct advantages by working with European nations and the ability we have to work in concert with those nations on the United States is not perhaps more valuable than for instance, increasing the number of Canadian aircraft in Canada and decreasing the number of American. In other words, we gain more by increasing our contribution from my hypothetical figures of 30 per cent up to 50 per cent than we would lose in Europe?

Mr. Golden: I take it we are definitely speaking in hypothetical figures because I doubt that we would make anything like that contribution to North American defence, or that we are ever likely to.

I cannot quarrel with your assessment. I believe in the importance of an inviolate Europe. I believe that it is important to Canada that Europe not be overrun. I believe that Canada should remain a member of the NATO alliance. Of course, circumstances may change and it might be vital that we make a major military contribution, but I do not see it today in relation to the forces and resources which appear to be at our disposal. It may be there are many aspects of government policy in this regard that I do not understand, and this would not be the first time. However, I do not see much evidence that a major increase in the defence budget is in contemplation, and in relation to what can be done with a somewhat depreciated dollar I put a greater importance, for Canadian reasons, in these fields. I would not downgrade the advantages that can be gained by Canada

disposing of forces in NATO. I just do not see how one does all these things.

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Mr. Anderson: I have a final question. We have been told that the equipment we have in NATO is not usable in North America, it is of a type and nature which is designed for European use only. Do you then feel that we would be involved in a fairly extensive re-equipment program if we decided to bring these troops back and if we decided to bring the air division back?

Mr. Golden: All roles require re-equipment in what, to the people who have to put up the money, seems a lamentably short period of time. When I talk about disengagement in Europe, I am assuming that this would be done in close concert with our allies. It might take four or five years, by which time that equipment would have to be replaced whether you left Europe or not. I do not think these decisions solve the very difficult problems of having to replace equipment. What you then have to concern yourself with is the kinds of equipment. I do not think replacement is a matter that really solves any of these things; all equipment has to be replaced sooner or later.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Golden, like other members of this Committee, I was very gratified when I read your written submission and I compliment you on it. Mr. Anderson has opened an area in which I was interested. With respect to the emphasis you have placed on Canada's defence role in North America, it seems to me that you are placing a little too much emphasis on it. I admit it is our prior interest but at the present time, having regard to the world situation and the circumstances around us, if we are not getting a free ride at least we are—I would submit to you and ask you to agree with me—getting a cheap ride in North America. Would you agree with this?

Mr. Golden: Oh yes.

Mr. Ryan: At the present time?

Mr. Golden: Indeed this is so, and in the very nature of things it is inevitable.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. We do not need 600,000 men under arms as Taiwan does, for instance. We have an army, navy and air force of somewhere around 100,000. We do not need large

conventional forces on land or in the air in Canada. Is this not so?

Mr. Golden: Yes, but "large" could be taken to mean many things. However, if I understand the intent of your statement, I agree with that.

Mr. Ryan: In fact, there is only a certain amount of attention that we need pay to our internal security. We have a friendly neighbour to the south. There is very little chance now or in the foreseeable future of lodgements by conventional forces. In fact, our main fear is a nuclear attack, is it not?

Mr. Golden: As I understand it, yes.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. So with this in mind should we not direct our attention to try to prevent a nuclear war mainly between the U.S.A. and Russia? Is this not our main concern as we live in Canada today?

Mr. Golden: Yes, I believe so.

Mr. Ryan: With this in mind, should we not then turn most of our attention to and put most of our money behind the proposition that we want peace, we want stability, and particularly in the area where war would be most likely to break out, which I suggest to you is along the NATO wall in Europe. I am talking about nuclear war.

Mr. Golden: I hope you do not misunderstand me when I say I really prefer not to go along with that last part. I am not saying it is not correct, but...

Mr. Ryan: I do not mind if you qualify it or disagree.

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Mr. Golden: I do not mind disagreeing either if I know what I am disagreeing about, but I cannot think of anything that I want to substitute for what you said, except that I am not sure but that in my own mind I think of that war as more likely to occur over the Berlin Wall. I suppose the archives may not be opened, if ever, for another 50 or 100 years, but was not the closest we came to a nuclear confrontation that which took place between the two great powers over Cuba, which is a very long way from the Berlin Wall.

Mr. Ryan: Of course, I might disagree with you a bit on that one. I do not think it was as big a confrontation as has been made out. I

think it was in the American ambit of influence and that any reasonable country in Russia's position would pull out of that. I think we would have been in far more trouble if it had been in Yugoslavia or Austria, or some place like that. However, it certainly pointed up to us the grave dangers, of course. You are now limiting my question to the Berlin Wall and I had in mind the whole of the NATO front, like a dike there, and what I am concerned about at the present time is pulling the finger out of that dike. It seems to me that it is our gravest concern.

Mr. Golden: In essence, I will not quarrel with any of the things that you have said.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Golden, if you have thought about it, what would your views be in connection with Canada assisting with an anti-ballistic missile system?

Mr. Golden: Of course, as far as money is concerned, these things come very high and I have no access to this class of information. I have no knowledge about what the Americans may have proposed to Canada, if anything, nor do I know, except from what I read in the newspapers, what requirements there would be for Canadian ground stations or Canadian air space. I would be inclined to lend a sympathetic ear to a suggestion that we co-operate within our resources if, on analysis, it turned out that this was the best or the most effective way of making the American defences what they would hope them to be. I have many ifs and qualifications there because I just do not know enough about it.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Golden.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, there was an article this morning in the *Globe and Mail* written by Mr. Bruce Hutchison which gives rise to a question that I would like to ask. In an interview with some unknown but, I gather, important personage in the United States whom he claims may well become a President of the United States, Mr. Hutchison quotes him as saying in respect to our possible withdrawal from NATO:

If Canada actually thinks of getting out of NATO it is an insult to my country. No, much worse than an insult. It would be a betrayal. Our people would never forgive it. And believe me they would express their hurt by means which would hurt Canada far worse than you can imagine.

I do not know if you subscribe to that view or whether that view is a proper assessment of the reaction of important people in the United States.

Mr. Golden: I do not subscribe to that view at all, and I do not believe Canada should pay any attention to views of that kind.

Mr. Cafik: You do not feel that they would express their disapproval in ways that would hurt us substantially?

Mr. Golden: I read that article this morning and I was outraged by it.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you. My second question—and I hope it is in order, Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of information more than anything else—concerns your background and your office as Deputy Minister. You were the Deputy Minister of Defence Production from 1954 until 1962. Is that correct?

Mr. Golden: That is correct.

Mr. Cafik: You were serving as President of the Northern Ontario Pipeline Corporation simultaneously with that function?

Mr. Golden: In our family that was known as my Sunday morning job.

Mr. Cafik: I see. I presume that means that you were the Deputy Minister at the time of the scrapping of the *Avro Arrow*. Is that correct?

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Mr. Golden: That is so.

Mr. Cafik: I wonder if you care to make any comments in this regard as to the advisability of that move in terms of our defence posture at that time, or even now?

Mr. Anderson: A question of order, Mr. Chairman. I do not think the *Arrow* affair, should be raised at this point. I do not think we should follow this argument.

Mr. Cafik: Why not? It would depend on whether the witness would care to answer. If he would rather not answer, that is fine.

The Chairman: Mr. Golden, if you prefer not to answer, there is no question of you having to.

Mr. Golden: I have no objection to answering. Of course I was Deputy Minister of Defence Production, but one must not overestimate the responsibilities of Deputy Minis-

ters; they do not decide whether *Arrows* should be scrapped or not. I really cannot give you an informed view of whether the scrapping of the *Arrow* made a significant change in the defence of Canada.

But in relation to the resources that we were devoting to defence at the time, I thought then and still think that the decision, though regrettable, was the right one.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Golden, starting with your assumption that the defence budget is going to remain practically where it is at the present time, or in that general range of \$1.5 billion to \$1.8 billion a year, would you consider that from a cost point of view alone, the military contributions which we make at any particular time—we will say at the present time—are determined to quite an extent by the hardware which we already have? In other words, it is far too expensive a business to suddenly decide to change the roles which we are carrying out now and, as a result, be required to completely re-equip our forces. From the straight practical cost point of view, this just cannot be done.

Mr. Golden: I think that is a fair statement, yes.

Mr. Harkness: And therefore the only way in which we can, we will say, change the contributions which we are making is over the course of years as the equipment we presently have becomes obsolescent.

Mr. Golden: Yes, I agree with that. I also would like to repeat what I said earlier, that I am a believer in alliances and in sticking by our pledged word. You know, when I downgrade as I do NATO because of these other factors, I am not suggesting that we ought to get out tomorrow or something like that. This ought to be done properly in consultation with our allies.

Mr. Harkness: Of course, the contributions which we have made to both NATO and NORAD have changed over the years.

Mr. Golden: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: I think it is inevitable that they will continue to change over the years. But I think this is one of the facts that we must bear in mind, that the particular military contributions we are making at the

moment are, to a certain extent, wired on because of the capital costs we have already undertaken and the money that we had invested in the equipment presently on hand.

Mr. Golden: I am sure this is so.

An hon. Member: What about the *Bonaventure*?

Mr. Harkness: It is not only the *Bonaventure*; it is all the military equipment we have. It is the CF-104s in Europe; it is the heavy equipment of the brigade in Europe. If you are going to do away with the heavy brigade in Europe, then that particular role will go on to, we will say, a light brigade which would have to be equipped with a great deal of military transport, air transport, helicopters and so on. It would involve several hundred millions of dollars of new expenditure immediately. And this is a thing which, if our military budget is not going to be very materially increased, we cannot do except over the course of years. It has to be a gradual process.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. MacLean: A supplementary question here just for clarification. I take it that when you say you believe we should reduce our commitment to NATO, you say so on the basis not that our contribution is useless or unwise, but that we cannot afford to continue it as well as other more important commitments?

Mr. Golden: That is right. I do not say anything about it being useless or unwise. I do not have the military background to comment on its efficacy, but everybody who does have this background regards the contribution historically as of top-notch calibre.

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The Chairman: Mr. Golden, I wonder if I could ask you one or two questions, if the other members have no further questions.

In reply to a question from Mr. Ryan, you agreed that a nuclear attack was the main danger to Canada. Would you therefore agree with the views of Mr. Gellner, Dr. Solandt and the two witnesses from the Hudson Institute who were before the Committee to the effect that we should be doing more than we are doing in the way of protection through civil defence, whether or not we retain our alliances? Or do you have any views on that subject?

Mr. Golden: I am ambivalent on this subject. I personally have never done anything in this regard even when I was a civil servant at the time when there was some pressure to do things like that. And yet I read the testimony to which you refer, and I think they do make a good case for some greater activity, but how great I think is very difficult to say.

The Chairman: In your earlier testimony today, Mr. Golden, you referred to the great influence Canada had during the war and immediately after the war, and you indicated that you felt perhaps some Canadians had not become reconciled to playing the lesser role which our present power and position in the world would make appropriate.

Perhaps you may not wish to answer this question or even comment, but in your personal opinion would this apply to officials in the Department of National Defence, for example, or in the Department of External Affairs who have a particular personal interest in maintaining an important position in the world.

Mr. Golden: I did not have officials in mind when I said that. I really could not comment on that.

The Chairman: No. In your view, Mr. Golden, is the degree of independence which Canada can exercise in external affairs or in matters of defence policy—recognizing that no nation can have complete independence—limited by continental arrangements such as the defence production agreement, the automotive agreement, the continental oil policy, and economic arrangements of that nature?

Mr. Golden: Basically, I do not believe so. I do not believe that basically this is so. I believe that Canada, despite the fact that it has all these arrangements, is still quite capable of having an independent foreign policy.

The Chairman: If Canada did wish, in a particular case, to adopt an independent line vis-à-vis the United States, you do not feel that the existence of these continental arrangements would impose undue penalties upon Canada?

Mr. Golden: I think if we denied that we had a commonality of interest with them, then of course these other things would be imperilled, which I find unthinkable. But to differ or disagree on a particular issue—I cannot see why that should in any way inhibit us.

The Chairman: Do you know, Mr. Golden, whether the United States is now doing for Canada on our territory anything in the way of defence which we could do for ourselves if we diverted our efforts from other fields? For example, do you know whether the United States is providing for the air defence of Western Canada? Is this something which, in your view, we could, if necessary, undertake ourselves?

Mr. Golden: You have chosen the most difficult one of all. Because of historical and geographical reasons the Western Canada problem has always existed, even at a time when we disposed of very substantial resources, at a time when we were spending 6 or 7 per cent of the gross national product on defence, rather than the 2.5 per cent or whatever it is that we are doing now.

I am very much out of date, but I would be surprised to find that there were not several things that they are doing that we could do if we were prepared to do it and pay for it.

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The Chairman: Is it possible that with the money saved from a decrease in our NATO expenditures, we could avoid being condemned for taking a free ride by substituting defence of our own territory where we are not now doing so.

Mr. Golden: I think there are considerations like this. And there are also considerations to be borne in mind that the savings soon cease to be savings. All they do is make it possible for you to keep up with the rising cost of everything.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean, I believe you have a supplementary?

Mr. MacLean: I have a question which, I am afraid, is outside the ambit of the brief. I hesitate to ask it, but perhaps I will anyway, and if the witness wants to comment he may.

During your remarks you said that the United States was preoccupied to a greater extent than Canada with the threat of world communism, or words to that effect. Is it not possible that it is we who are in error here and that we are lulling ourselves into a sense of false security, thinking that activities of this sort are not as important as some take them to be. Is it not possible that while we are here deciding how to guard the front door, subversion is coming in the back door in a way which will, in the end, be more destructive than a direct military threat.

Mr. Golden: You may be very right. I find it difficult to quarrel with what you are saying. But I personally, speaking just for myself, sometimes find it a little bit hard to swallow when what I would have regarded as a movement of social reform is immediately tagged by some people as being communist. That is what I meant. Now maybe I am wrong. I am not quite as ready as some other people I know to do that, and I could be very wrong, but that is just the way I am.

Mr. MacLean: On the other hand, to get down to cases, what defence has the average kid straight out of high school against the kind of plausible but, in my judgment, completely erroneous evidence that we were presented with by our last witness?

Mr. Golden: I do not think I should comment on that.

The Chairman: I have one last question, Mr. Golden, if I may. Certain witnesses have indicated that our being part of NATO and NORAD gives us greater influence and prestige than we otherwise would have. In other words, our defence contributions in effect buy influence and prestige, if that is a fair way of putting it. In your view, and I realize it can only be a personal view, is this a strong argument for continuing in these alliances?

Mr. Golden: I think the prestige argument is nonsense, and I would hope that we do not spend a nickel for prestige. Influence, of course, is terribly important depending on what you want to use the influence for. If it is

influence to further Canadian national needs and interests, then I am all in favour of it.

The Chairman: Do you think that our defence dollars to buy that type of influence which does, in fact, further our Canadian national needs?

Mr. Golden: They certainly can. Whether in every case they do is a question of judgment, but I think they certainly can.

The Chairman: Do any members have further questions?

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary. I think Mr. Golden mentioned that he thought that Canada's military commitment in NATO could be reduced over a period, and I believe he added, in full consultation and co-operation with present allies. If there is anything to the so-called domino theory, I presume that this would play a very important part in the consideration.

Mr. Golden: Yes, but I must say that I find great difficulty with the domino theory in Europe. If the European countries themselves are not interested in defence I find it hard to see how we with a few thousand people are going to make that defence effective. That is the difficulty I have with the domino theory in Europe.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, if there are no other questions then, on your behalf, I would like to thank Mr. Golden most sincerely for his evidence this morning. Mr. Golden: thank you very much.

APPENDIX LL

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES

The purpose of this short paper is to make several observations about Canadian defence policy and Canadian/U.S. relations.

Although there are cultural, linguistic, ethical, religious and historical reasons for the close relations which exist between the U.S. and Canada, the two most compelling reasons are geographic and economic. The geographic one can't be changed because of physical laws, and the economic one creates its own physical results as time goes on.

Relations between Canada, or rather the colonies which ultimately came together to form Canada, and the United States, were not always peaceful, and hostile acts occurred on both sides of the border. Although nothing is certain, and prophesy is dangerous, I assume for purposes of my argument that the possibility of similar events occurring in the future are so remote as not to require consideration.

Certain basic facts enter into the formulation of any Canadian/U.S. equation. Some of the most important are:

1. The United States is a large world power, exercising great influence not only on her own behalf, but also is the leader of the "free world", or the "Western" world, or the "democratic alliance". There are objections to all of these words, but they nonetheless represent a considerable body of truth.

2. Canada is a relatively modest power in world terms and does not exercise special or extraordinary influence, or have a leadership role. In any alliance or special relationship between the U.S. and Canada, the different strength and global responsibilities of the two countries are bound to have some effect.

3. Canada shares many basic beliefs with respect to government, relation of state to man, relation of man to man, and rights of the individual, with the United States. These beliefs necessarily condition the way in which Canadians react to certain foreign policy or defence issues.

The United States, in the course of its leadership role, and as a result of its confrontation with the U.S.S.R., takes the view that it must guard against all reasonable defence contingencies. As a consequence of this, certain measures of North American defence are important to her. I suggest that if they are important to her, they should also, unless they are manifestly against our own interests, be of importance to us in Canada. In other words, Canada should play a role in defensive measures considered important by the U.S., even if our assessment of the necessity of such measures should be at variance with that made by the U.S. I do not mean by this that Canada should surrender her right to make an objective appraisal of each situation as it comes up—what I do mean is that Canada in making such an appraisal should consider the role played and responsibility borne by the U.S.

No power the size of the United States and exercising its leadership and responsibility will ordinarily be prepared to permit its security to be adversely affected by the action or inaction of a close neighbour. Does this mean that if Canada doesn't co-operate with the U.S., we will be over-run and occupied? I don't suggest that at all. But there are an infinite number of possible actions that could be taken by the U.S., which would fall between the two extremes of doing nothing at all to counteract Canadian refusal to participate in joint defence undertakings, and military occupation.

Canada should play an appropriate role in North American defence because of reasons of national sovereignty, because of reasons of national interest, because of reasons of self-respect, and because of reasons of independence. I should like to say a few words about each of these.

1. As far as national sovereignty is concerned, there are several courses Canada can follow but each one requires forces sufficient to give effect to the sovereignty we claim. It need not be 100% or even

close to that, but it must be a great deal more than zero. If we join in common efforts with the U.S., we should have some forces to play our part. If we don't want a common effort, then we need forces to do what has to be done alone. If we want to be neutral, we need forces to establish this neutrality.

2. As far as national interests are concerned, Canadian and U.S. views on many subjects differ, and on some subjects differ markedly. But on the essential things of life they differ hardly at all, and Canadian national interests call for a close co-operation with the U.S. in defence of those interests.

3. As far as national respect is concerned, this is a matter about which it is difficult to be exact or quantitative. I feel, but cannot prove, that Canadians do not want, and in fact would reject the idea of a "free ride", so called.

4. As far as independence is concerned, only a Canada which shares in North American defence and which has forces it can commit to such defence can influence in any important way, American policy. An independent Canada which has its own ideas on policy and strategy needs to be a partner or participant, not an onlooker, if it wishes to make its ideas effective.

There are other defence roles which it is proper and appropriate for Canada to perform. It is the contention of this paper that none of them is as important as the defence role which Canada can and should play in North America. If resources permit, or if the international situation so requires, then other

roles can be added, but not at the expense of the North American one.

DAVID A. GOLDEN

Mr. Golden was born in Sinclair, Manitoba, on February 22, 1920. He attended the University of Manitoba and University of Manitoba Law School, and graduated with the degree of LL.B. in 1941. Appointed Rhodes Scholar in 1940.

Mr. Golden enlisted in May 1941 in the 1st Battalion, The Winnipeg Grenadiers, and served in Canada, Jamaica and Hong Kong. He was a prisoner of war in Hong Kong from December 1941 until September 1945. He was discharged from the army in December 1945, with the rank of captain and adjutant.

Mr. Golden was married to the former Molly Berger of Estevan, Saskatchewan, in September 1946, and they have three children; two sons and one daughter.

Mr. Golden was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence Production on September 30, 1954, and became President of the Northern Ontario Pipeline Corporation on June 7, 1956. Resigned from Government service on appointment as President of Air Industries Association of Canada on July 1, 1962. Appointed Deputy Minister of Industry on July 25, 1963. Returned to position as President of Air Industries Association of Canada on July 1, 1964.


Mr. Golden is Chairman of the Board of Governors of Carleton University, Member, Ottawa Advisory Board, Royal Trust Company, Past President of Ottawa Canadian Club, and a Director of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.

January 1967

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968-69



STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 30

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn
Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan
and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	MacRae
Anderson	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Marceau
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Nowlan
Brewin	Laniel	Penner
Cafik	Laprise	Prud'homme
Fairweather	Legault	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Forrestall	Lewis	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Gibson	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Groos	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Macquarrie	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

(Text)

TUESDAY, February 25, 1969.
(44)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:00 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacRae, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(26).

Also present: Messrs. Buchanan and Hymmen, M.P.'s.

Witness: Professor John W. Warnock, Department of Economics and Political Science, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

The Chairman gave a report from the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, concerning the timing of a Report to the House and the itinerary for the trip to Europe. The Committee agreed to defer discussion on these points until an *in camera* meeting of the Committee at 8:00 p.m. this day.

Copies of a revised itinerary for the European trip were distributed. Also distributed were copies of five articles dealing with NATO and foreign policy entitled as follows:

To stick with NATO, or live alone with the U.S. — Woodside (*The Observer*)

New course in foreign policy — Lewis Hertzman

The big gap in the great NATO debate — Thomas A. Hockin, *Globe and Mail*, Friday, February 14, 1969

NATO Is Dangerous, Let's Quit — Anton Vogt, *The Vancouver Sun*: Thursday, January 9, 1969

A New Atlantic Role for Canada — by Roy A. Matthews, *Foreign Affairs*, v. 47, January 1969.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Professor John W. Warnock, who made an opening statement.

Members questioned Professor Warnock about his views on Canadian defence policy.

The Committee agreed to print Professor Warnock's advance presentation entitled *Canada's Role in North American Defence*, and his biography, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix mm*).

Members completed their questioning and the Chairman thanked Professor Warnock for his helpful testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m., until 8:00 p.m. this day when there will be an *in camera* sitting.

EVENING SITTING

(45)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 8:00 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, Macquarrie, MacRae, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(27).

Also present: Messrs. Buchanan and Roberts, M.P.'s.

Members of the Committee met *in camera*, to discuss subjects referred to in the Chairman's report from the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure at this morning's sitting (*See Evidence*).

On motion of Mr. Cafik,

Resolved,—That the report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure be adopted.

The meeting was adjourned at 8:55 p.m., until Thursday, February 27, 1969 at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, February 25, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe we are ready to begin. Your steering subcommittee had a meeting immediately before this meeting to discuss the timing of the trip and the nature of the report. As a result of remarks in the House last Friday, some question arose of whether or not it would be desirable for the Committee to make some sort of report before we returned from the proposed trip.

Inquiries have been made and the subcommittee has been informed that if the Committee could make its report to Parliament by Wednesday, March 26, no statement of government policy would be made before that date. This is the thought. A report presented to Parliament by this Committee by March 26 would give the government time to consider that report before it made up its mind and made its announcement with regard to official government policy on NATO. As members know, there is a meeting in Washington on April 10, so I gather it is desirable that the government makes its decision before that date.

Everything the subcommittee has been able to ascertain indicates that if this Committee could make its report by Wednesday, March 26, this would be a very convenient arrangement for everyone and would avoid the necessity of splitting our report. Therefore, your subcommittee has recommended that we do adopt this procedure. It would require that while we are abroad from March 9 to March 22 members of the Committee should be giving some thought to the nature of the report they wish to make.

Probably the steering subcommittee which prepares the first draft would have to be prepared to work on the Sunday after its return and, possibly the members of the Committee would be asked to work on the Monday and Tuesday after their return in order that we could get a report in French and English to Parliament by March 26.

That is the recommendation of the subcommittee. I do not think we have time this

morning to have any very extended discussion here. If it is acceptable to you, we will proceed on that basis. If you wish to discuss it in detail I suggest that in view of the fact that we have a witness here this morning the discussion be referred to a special meeting which we plan to have on Thursday evening in any event.

Mr. Groos: May I suggest that we proceed with the witness, then, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Anderson: I disagree with Mr. Groos. I think Thursday is too late. My view is that if we put in a report on March 26 and the government considers it, they will have no time to inform the NATO partners in the Alliance of any government decision prior to the meeting in Washington April 10. I think this is far too short a time and I would certainly like to hear the witness, and I think we should discuss the other problem perhaps immediately following his testimony today.

My view is that I do not like the idea of putting in a report on March 26. I just do not see how it can be considered by the government before such time as they make up their own mind about the Canadian position.

The Chairman: If there is to be an extended discussion I do not think we should have it at this time.

Mr. Anderson: Could we have it as soon as possible after the witness has been heard?

The Chairman: That goes without saying; you will have it just as quickly as it can be arranged. Does the Committee feel that it is able to accept the report of the steering subcommittee at this time, or does it wish to discuss the matter in some detail? Mr.

• 1110

Anderson has indicated that he, at any rate, would like to discuss it. What is the wish of the Committee?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I agree with Mr. Anderson; I think this is an important matter for discussion.

The Chairman: In that event perhaps we could defer the detailed discussion to another meeting. There is a problem with committee facilities. We probably could arrange a special meeting tonight, if this is the wish of the members. Subject to your approval we have already scheduled a special meeting Thursday evening from 8 to 10 p.m. to hear a distinguished German commentator, Mr. Theo Sommer, who will be in Ottawa at that time and who can give us some useful information, I think. What is your wish?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, may I just say that the matter of a final decision cannot be delayed because on a trip of this nature, with the contacts to be made, with the important people to meet, we just cannot put external affairs and defence in the position of being left up in the air. If there is to be any change made, then it has to be done today; there is no question about that.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, the point about the date of the report and the time the government would have to consider such a report I think is a valid comment. But are you concerned with the trip itself and the dates surrounding the trip, or are you concerned with the reporting procedures? We might be able to agree to the trip as laid out and settle that problem, and then decide what we are going to do in terms of reporting to the House of Commons, if that is the point you are trying to make.

Mr. Anderson: I do not know what the Committee wishes to decide. I am certainly in favor of going on the trip because I think it would be very valuable, but we have heard a great number of witnesses in the past two months. My own view is that we should at least give the government some guideline to our thinking before we go to Europe, because if we come back here on March 22 and then give our recommendations to the government on March 26, this assumes that every member of the Committee stays in Ottawa and does not go back to his riding after being out of Canada for two weeks.

If we do that and get that report in on March 26, the government has a very short time to consider our report and an even shorter time, perhaps, to inform our NATO partners prior to the meeting in Washington on April 10.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we could get into a very extended discussion. May I suggest, then, that we have a special meeting

this evening from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. to discuss the matter in detail to arrive at a definite decision. Is this satisfactory to everyone? I do not wish to be arbitrary, because of other committee hearings we cannot meet this afternoon. Therefore, we should plan on finishing our interrogation of Professor Warnock this morning by 1.00 p.m. or 1.15 p.m.

A notice will go out, then, from the Clerk to members of the Committee indicating the place of the special meeting this evening from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m.

Gentlemen, our witness today, as I have indicated, is Professor John W. Warnock. His written statement and biographical details have already been circulated to Committee members. Professor Warnock is now Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Saskatchewan. He is well known for his critique of NORAD. It is on this subject that he will present his views today. Professor Warnock, would you like to make a brief introductory statement before the questioning?

Professor John W. Warnock (Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Sask.): Although I was primarily asked to come here to speak on North American Defence Policy, I thought I would make just a few short comments today on foreign policy in general. Particularly because many people, including Mr. Sharp, indicate that nobody, in effect, is providing any alternatives to the present policy, I thought I would like to make some general comments.

I think, first of all, everybody agrees that the long-run goal of Canadian defence policy is to foster world peace, but the question really is, how best can this be achieved?

• 1115

The primary purpose of the current review as I see it is to determine whether the existing policy which was developed in an immediate postwar period is still valid today. Is the greatest threat to world peace the Soviet Union? Is that country poised waiting for a chance to invade Europe? Is it planning to attack the United States? Does the alliance system of the late nineteen-forties in Europe and North America still provide the best approach to world peace for Canada? Are these alliances still effective? Do they require the huge commitment of Canadian resources and efforts? These are the questions that any review of Defence Policy must answer.

In my opinion there have been significant changes in the world situation in the past 20 years which has made the contribution of Canada to NATO and NORAD obsolete. First, the centre of concern now throughout the world is not Europe; it has shifted to the underdeveloped world. Furthermore, China is now considered by most Canadians, according to public opinion polls, to be more of a threat to world peace than the Soviet Union—far more so. Yet, the whole Canadian defence or effort is still oriented towards Europe and the Soviet Union.

Also, I would like to point out, which is a point that has been raised by other witnesses, that all the armed conflicts in the world since the late nineteen-forties have occurred in the underdeveloped countries, not in Europe. As Secretary of Defense McNamara has stated many times, including in his statement to the press in Montreal a couple of years ago, the real concern of the Western countries is the underdeveloped world. He pointed out at that time that there are 40 states in the underdeveloped world today which are now in state of permanent revolution.

The question, then, for Canada is, do we really want a policy which is concerned with promoting peace and how best should this policy be carried out? I would agree with other critics of the present situation that Canada's contribution, militarily and politically to the NATO and NORAD alliances is very small. We have very small political influence which is to be expected in an alliance with a super power. Furthermore, our military commitment is very marginal to both operations. I think everybody would agree with that.

If Canada did withdraw from NATO and NORAD and shifted its interest to other areas in western Europe primarily, the question is, would Canada's military and political influence rise in the cause of peace? In my opinion, it would. It is my opinion that Canada's military and political influence in the alliances system now is very small, and if Canada did withdraw from the alliance systems—the political influence of Canada would probably rise. There is no indication anywhere that Canada's influence would drop.

For example, the main alternative policy, which is being promoted by people like Dalton Camp and Eric Kierans, is based on the premise that Canada does make a very, very small contribution and has very small impact

on NATO and NORAD, but if Canada shifted to another area, Canada could have a much greater impact.

Particularly, Mr. Camp has raised the question of shifting our defence budget to foreign aid. It could be pointed out, I suppose, that our military contribution in terms of the defence budget as far as the NATO alliance is concerned is only about 2 per cent of the total NATO budget. Our military troop commitment is something like one-half of 1 per cent of the total military contribution in NATO. But if Canada shifted this defence expenditure to foreign aid this would amount to a 20 per cent increase in the total Western foreign aid to underdeveloped countries. As many people have pointed out, this seems to be particularly an area of need right now because the other Western countries seem to be cutting back on these underdeveloped countries and great publicity has been given to the growing gap between the rich and the poor. And as Mr. McNamara, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, has pointed out, this was one reason why he was quite happy to move from the defense department to head the World Bank, because he thinks that the real crisis in the world is not in Europe, it is in the underdeveloped countries.

If Canada wants to make this policy change, which I am suggesting as well as others, there seems to be two alternatives in giving aid. One would be to direct it to the United Nations, and I think the way we direct it to the United Nations is important. I would suggest that it be submitted to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization because there is a wide recognition now that

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the plight of the vast majority of the poor countries in the world today will not be improved until they are industrialized, and the present approaches to foreign aid are doing very little to industrialize the underdeveloped countries.

The alternative second policy which is being promoted and was particularly promoted in Stephen Clarkson's book, is that Canada should be selective in its foreign aid. The main political aim of selectivity approach is the growing feeling that Canada is becoming more and more integrated into the United States and this is a rather dangerous policy. For example, in 1968 about 70 per cent of our trade was with the United States and this is approximately the same as Guatemala and

Nicaragua, and leaves many people like the late Ralph Allen of *Maclean's* magazine to comment that Canada is the northernmost banana republic.

The main concept of selectivity is an attempt to reverse the trend towards integration with the United States and move away to try to re-create an independent Canada through a selective aid program, mainly through the Commonwealth countries and mainly through the francophone countries and the underdeveloped countries, as well as to make a real attempt at trade diversification, particularly expansion of trade with Japan and China who are obvious trading partners. This would tend to reverse the trend towards further economic integration with the United States.

Finally, I would say along with others that there is really no reason why Canada should ever want to join the Organization of American States. There is absolutely nothing to be gained from this except more headaches, more problems and more conflicts. Anything that Canada wanted to do in Latin America could be done outside the Organization of American States.

In effect, I think it must be recognized, and I do not think that this recognition is made by many people, and I think it is confused by statements of government officials, that there is a vast difference between a policy of neutralism and a policy of non-alignment. They are two entirely different things and in my opinion as well as most of those who support my position on Canadian foreign policy, Canada could not really ever be a neutral country because we are a Western country. We are a white country in a world which is primarily non-white. We are a Christian country in background. We are a capitalist country. We have this whole long tradition of association with the West which could not really be discarded. It would be impossible for Canada to be a truly neutral country, which means that we would have to be non-partisan and refrain from taking sides.

There is a vast difference between this and being a non-aligned country such as Austria, Sweden or Ireland. These countries are Western in their attitudes but they are non-aligned, and this gives them a great deal of freedom of movement.

In conclusion then, what I am calling for is really a non-aligned policy and a shift in emphasis in Canadian foreign policy. It calls

for a positive approach to Canadian foreign policy, and this may be too much to expect, considering tradition in Canada.

The Chairman: Thank you, Professor Warnock. I might mention that if members have supplementary questions, they would be in order, but I would ask that they exercise a little self-discipline and relate them specifically to the main question. Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Professor Warnock, I wish to deal with two or three things that arise out of the brief we had an opportunity to read before your testimony today. You spent some time in your brief indicating that you believe NORAD is no longer a useful instrument as far as Canada is concerned. Of course, this has been mentioned to us by other witnesses. In the light of that statement and your arguments in support of it, why it is that the Americans, who are obviously putting the largest amount of money into NORAD as compared to the relatively small amount that Canada invests, are continuing the NORAD operation, if it is no longer really militarily justifiable? This is not mentioned in your brief, and I wonder whether you...

Professor Warnock: I do not know exactly what their reasons for it are. As early as 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara, said that NORAD is obsolete. In his statement to Congress on February 1, 1968, he stated that they were going to withdraw from at least the old Pinetree and DEW Line, because they were completely obsolete.

I think we have to recognize—anybody who

● 1125

has been in the government, and I was in it a short while, recognizes—that government becomes committed to existing policies. You have establishments, and Parkinson's Law operates in the military area as well as it does in the area of general bureaucracy. It is difficult to phase out programs overnight when you have a very large body of people who are committed to it. This is in effect asking them to give up what they are doing and saying that what they have been doing in the last few years is obsolete, and that it was unnecessary anyhow. This is a very difficult decision to make.

There is no doubt in my mind that Secretary McNamara's opinions on NORAD were shared widely by the Kennedy administration and the civilian side of the government, but

the military side was totally opposed to withdrawing from NORAD. They had an institution, and a dedication to it. It is a military program.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Are you suggesting then that when the agreement is renewed, or even now when on one year's notice we can change our relationship to NORAD, it might be helpful to the American administration if we said to them we no longer think NORAD is a justifiable expenditure as far as our defence budget is concerned, and we suggest either ending or substantially altering this kind of relationship?

Professor Warnock: I do not know whether the new Nixon administration would share the same views as Secretary McNamara did. But I think, and this is borne out by statements by prominent Americans including Senator Mansfield, that the Americans are in a position now, the government is in a position now, where it expects Canada to do almost anything and is quite willing to accept almost any change. Senator Mansfield fully expects Canada to withdraw from NATO. I think the Americans are ready to accept this right now. They think, because a lot of publicity has been given to defence policy, that Mr. Trudeau is really going to initiate some significant changes in the direction of Canadian foreign policy. And as I have indicated in my paper, I think they might welcome at this time any Canadian initiatives for change in the North American defence area.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Regarding another aspect of your brief. You suggest that Canada should have played the lead or should play a lead even now in building some kind of a detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in particular you suggest that we should be much more open with regard to the use of the Arctic, that we should involve ourselves in some kind of military neutralization of the Arctic region.

You seem to be arguing against yourself here because you also suggest that perhaps there is not a great concern today with the implanting of certain kinds of military hardware in the Arctic. I wonder whether there would be any significance in terms of decelerating the tension that exists between the Soviet Union and the United States simply by taking the kind of action you suggest. I wonder whether you really come to grips in your brief with any way in which Canada

could be some kind of a referee or a negotiator in terms of lowering the tension in that regard.

Professor Warnock: I did not go into very much detail in this paper. Perhaps I should have gone into more detail. What I really meant to say was that the military concept of the warning systems like the DEW Line are not very significant anymore.

Joint Russian, Canadian and American operation of a DEW Line warning system back and forth would not mean very much militarily because the United States is primarily concerned about the whole defence status and is oriented towards watching for a massive attack. They are not concerned about whether one aircraft strays over. They are looking for a massive attack, which can be picked up on other radars they have. Even though in the military sense an experiment such as opening radar systems both ways may not have much significance, nevertheless it would be a step towards a detente. I feel this would be as important as, if not more important than, the test-ban agreement on atmospheric tests.

• 1130

I think that both the United States and the Soviet Union right now are looking for areas of detente. As you know, President Nixon, along with other members of his administration, is saying quite often that they want to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union for reduction in missiles. They are looking right now to open areas of further detente between the Soviet Union and the United States. I think in this case the Canadian initiative might be welcomed as an opening. Also this I feel is an area, because it is not of great military significance to either the United States or the Soviet Union, where a compromise could be worked out, where we could begin working together, where we could establish a precedent for disarmed zones and zones without offensive weapons, and where you could experiment with some kind of inspection and other techniques.

The agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to end atmospheric tests was not a tremendous breakthrough in anything, and yet it has had a tremendous effect. In a specific way it does not indicate a great area of agreement between the two countries, but it had a tremendous effect upon relationships between the two countries. I believe it is in Canada's national interest to

try to minimize conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I will pass, Mr. Chairman, and come back later.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, may I ask Professor Warnock if he is suggesting to this Committee that the NORAD anti-bomber defence system is really non-productive and that there are other more productive things on which we could use our defence dollars?

Professor Warnock: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: I would like to take up your reasons for that. First of all, I think it is conceded that this defence system is useful only against a bomber attack. In your opinion, is it rational under modern technological conditions for the USSR to launch a bomber attack on North America?

Professor Warnock: No. I think this is the position that Secretary McNamara made many times. This is why he was for doing away with the NORAD defence system. He said that obviously if the Soviet Union is going to attack the United States, which in his opinion and mine would be mass suicide and a ridiculous policy, they would start with the missiles. If you start with a bomber attack, you are in effect giving the Americans a two-hour warning. It would take two hours for the bombers to get over here. So you would attack first with the missiles, and in fact the whole strategy of NORAD is based on the expectation that if an attack does come, the missiles will come first. For example, at the NORAD base, when the first warning comes everybody runs and hides, waiting for the bombs to go off. This is the first exercise in the event of a crisis, and then presumably if you are still left, you come up after the missiles have been fired and if there is anything left for the bombers to bomb or if you are left, then I suppose you could do something.

Mr. Brewin: You are taking me a little ahead of my intended questioning, but if there was any intention to use bombers as a second blow after ICBMs had first been used, are not the bases fairly vulnerable? Would it not be possible for the Russians to take out these bases by landing a few of their ICBMs on them? Do you think there would be much effective defence left after a fairly good salvo of ICBMs had been launched at these bases?

Professor Warnock: No. As a matter of fact, it becomes difficult to comprehend, you know when you get into this gamesmanship back and forth, of who is going to drop how many bombs on what, to realize the totality of the destructive possibilities of these two countries.

I do not know exactly how the United States make their estimates, and presumably they are more accurate now that the spy satellites are collecting information, but they estimate this January that the Soviet Union has 900 ICBMs and that they are converting these to multiple warheads. They expect multiple warheads to be in effect in the United States in a year, and I suppose the Russians will be there at the same time.

• 1135

The Russian missiles, however, are capable of carrying much more multiple warheads than are the American, because they are bigger weapons. Even if you just talk about 900 weapons dropping hydrogen bombs of up to 50 megatons all over the United States there is absolutely nothing left of the United States. Apart from what was destroyed in the blast, there would be nothing left because of radiation. In fact, if you have the situation in which the Soviet Union and the United States exchange all their missiles it is very likely that that is the end of the world. The radiation from this would be so great that everybody would be wiped out. Nobody comprehends this, and really, after this happens, to talk about the effectiveness of shooting down a few bombers is rather ridiculous.

Mr. Brewin: If you first of all assume that the Russians do the irrational and launch a bomber attack they would only do so, I take it, as a second blow after the ICBMs had been launched first? Assuming they decide to use this suicidal method of warfare they would first of all use the ICBMs; and you agree with me that these ICBMs could effectively destroy the so-called defensive anti-bomber system?

Professor Warnock: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: I notice that in your paper you use the figure—even as in the good old days of 10 or 15 years ago—that about 50 per cent of the incoming bombers would get through. From where do you get the 50 per cent? We of this Committee, or of its predecessor, have often inquired what was the rate of attrition as I think the word is.

Professor Warnock: It is very difficult, because the airforce does not like to admit that the effective defence is not effective in the traditional sense. They will admit, even today, that the offence, just in terms of bombers, poses a tremendous danger to the defence; and even if only 10 per cent of the Russian bombers got through in this period before the missiles that would be enough to destroy all the meaningful targets in the United States.

I, like you, have asked, and I get various responses—anywhere from 10 to 50 per cent. The most anybody has ever admitted that they would be able to shoot down is 50 per cent. I asked several RCAF people last year, privately, and they say it is roughly about the same now; although they will not state that publicly.

Mr. Brewin: May I come to another point? According to what you tell us—and I must say I agree with it, for other reasons—it is a very strong case against the usefulness of this whole anti-bomber system.

Have you seen any clearcut statements in the literature about these matters—any reasoned statement on why it is thought that this method might have some usefulness? I have not been able to find it, and I wondered if you had run across a statement of the case. I would be very interested, if you know of any such exposition.

Professor Warnock: Not much has been written in this area, really, since the introduction of the anti-ballistic missile. This has attracted all the academic attention and all the military attention. Nobody even thinks about the bombers any more. The only defence really made, even by the military, for maintaining a bomber defence today is the statement, "If you shoot down 50 per cent of the incoming bombers, it is that many fewer bombs dropped on your country". It is hard to imagine what good this would do after a country has already had at least 900 multi-megaton bombs dropped on it—whether it is at all meaningful. President Nixon says it is an aspect of our over-all defence posture, but it is certainly a marginal aspect.

I agree with you. I have seen no significant consensus that has been presented lately, probably because it appears to be such a marginal thing.

Mr. Brewin: It may be marginal, but have you any estimate of how much it actually costs Canada annually to maintain this system?

Professor Warnock: The only estimates I have seen are government estimates—\$139 million, or something like that.

Mr. Brewin: And does that figure include

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the cost of replacing the interceptors, or the system, at all?

Professor Warnock: No. That is just the direct cost, too. From what I have been able to extract from government statements and documents, I do not think includes, for example, the cost of all the back-up behind the system—the training, the equipment, the servicing, and so on. That is just the direct cost.

Mr. Brewin: Your views on this are not based, I take it, on any political objection to co-operating with the United States in North American air defence, but are based upon the obsolescence of the means adopted?

Professor Warnock: Yes. I do not think this serves any purpose. If it really did I would look at it in a different way; but because it cannot possibly do what it is supposed to do it does not seem to warrant attention or the commitment.

Mr. Brewin: I have one final question. I do not want to take too long. It relates to what you say at the foot of page 3:

It is about time the Canadian people admitted that their annual expenditure on the North American defence system is a complete waste of money.

Perhaps this is a rhetorical question, but how do you expect the Canadian people to say that, in a highly technical field, when the Canadian government tells them it is necessary to proceed. Surely the responsibility is not that of people who are hardly likely to be over well-informed about these very technical matters?

Are you not putting the responsibility in the wrong place? Should it not be in the government, or Parliament, or our defence establishment? How can you blame people for accepting something like this?

Professor Warnock: Perhaps the majority of people are not capable of making a decision on that, and perhaps they are not interested in it, but when the government is totally committed to a certain policy you do not really expect it to go around denouncing it. Perhaps Parliament should spend more time criticizing these areas.

I have also found in my own work, particularly last summer in serving news coverage on foreign policy and defence in Canada on which I did a study, which is not yet published, on the news coverage of major developments on the renewal of NORAD and our decision to go ahead with anti-ballistic missiles, that it is very shocking to see how little coverage the press in Canada gives to areas of foreign policy and defence. It is therefore, very difficult for the average man on the street to become really well informed upon these areas because he does not read much about them in the press.

There are many reasons for this not being presented in the press. For example, I took 20 major pronouncements by the United States Government and the Canadian Government on these areas over a 15-month period and looked at 30 daily newspapers in Canada to see just how many covered it in any detail at all. Only 23 per cent of those items were covered in the 30 newspapers. That is looked at 20 times 30, only 23 per cent even bothered to cover these areas.

Also, significantly, primarily because of the Canadian daily press's wide use of the wire services of the *New York Times*, there was better reporting in the Canadian press of American military announcements from Washington than of Canadian announcements or reports of Canadian debates in Parliament.

I suggest it is very difficult for Canadians to become well-informed on foreign policy. They just do not have the opportunity.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman and Professor, on that last point, why might there be some criticism from the population on our defence budget or the use that we make of it? Primarily, I think they are more concerned about the money that is not spent on something else—that is, on welfare, or things of that kind. I am not so sure that the population in general would be more interested in the transferring of part of that budget to external aid.

Professor Warnock: No; I quite agree with you. Given the choice, they would probably prefer to have that money spent in Canada, on Canadian projects.

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Mr. Laniel: You seem to eliminate the deterrent aspect of alliances, be they NATO or NORAD. Perhaps I am completely wrong, but I wonder if some of our alliances are not

really a deterrent that goes further than we think. They go further than preventing a nuclear war, because although the big powers are confronting themselves with the possibility of nuclear war does that not eliminate the danger of conventional war in these same territories?

Professor Warnock: First of all, I would argue that the deterrent in North America is not NORAD but the Strategic Air Command. This is borne out by the action of the American Government during the Cuban missile crisis.

Second, I would say that what has prevented war in Europe is not really NATO. In the early period, it was the weakness of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union had designs about invading Germany, for example, her weakness for a long period of time would have prevented that; and since that time it has been the presence of the bomb which has scared the Russians, even if you presume, first of all, that they are interested in invading Europe—and I do not agree with that.

But if you presume that, what would deter her is not NATO but the fear that if this happens it will result in an all-out war and that nuclear weapons will be used. If a full-scale war breaks out in Europe the Americans are automatically involved in it, because they are on the Rhine, and so on; and it is natural to think that this is going to lead to a direct war of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Laniel: Yes but if we ever come, over will we have settled the problems of war in Europe, or would there be a greater danger of war there?

Professor Warnock: I do not know what kind of danger there is of war in Europe. It seems to me, for example, that Russia's position among the Warsaw Pact countries today is weaker than it has ever been in history, politically, and with so much trouble with Albania, Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and you read of protests even in East Germany on the occupation of Czechoslovakia, you realize how very weak and unstable the Russian position in Europe is. In fact, they use the existence of NATO all the time to justify their occupation of Eastern Europe, and their occupation recently of Czechoslovakia. They are in such a weak position even within their own satellite area that I do not see how they could conceivably think of any kind of a war in the area unless it be one to subjugate one of their supposed allies.

Mr. Laniel: In thinking about our possible withdrawal from NORAD you seem to forget, or you do not say anything about, what our Armed Forces would become, nor do you mention anything about the sovereignty of Canadian territory, although you speak theoretically of a no man's land up north, or land left open to the big powers for observation posts, or things of that nature.

Are you not afraid that a big country such as the United States, which feels that it has a responsibility to defend its people and to protect peace in the world, may, at some stage, if their interest is at stake put some kind of pressure on the Canadian Government to force it to look after our air space? What military force will you have in Canada for a situation such as that?

Professor Warnock: I think we look at these problems differently from the United States. If you examine the Cuban missile crisis you can see exactly how the United States looked at that situation and what role Canada really played in the minds of the Americans in taking that decision because this was a real decision—a real confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. After the United States Government determined that the Russians were installing ground to ground ballistic missiles in Cuba, the first thing they did was to order an alert to the Strategic Air Command to disperse the B-47s to other private civilian bases. They put the B-52s and B-58s on airborne alert, they alerted the missile sites, they alerted their defence forces and they alerted NORAD in the warning system, and it never even occurred to the United States at any time during that crisis that the role of Canada was an all-important one. They did not even think of Canada. They did not think of the defence capabilities. If you read all the inside reports on what happened, the only thing they were concerned about was the deterrent, that is, the Strategic Air Command, protected, and they considered it to be protected, because the American government does not consider the defence forces to be at all significant. They do not consider the territory, or whether or not Canada maintains sovereignty over its territory to be important. They are watching the radar screen to see if the missiles are coming or if there is a massive bomber attack coming. That is the only thing they are concerned about—whether their deterrent is protected. As President Kennedy said and as Robert Kennedy stated in his book about the 13 days, the only thing they were concerned

about was if the deterrent was protected, and the only thing that protects the deterrent is the radar system. This is really outside of Canada right now with the new over the horizon radar and the ballistic missile early warning system.

If you read all the inside stories of what went on, Canada was not even mentioned until the whole thing was over. Then they heard that there was a debate in Canada over whether Mr. Diefenbaker did the right thing, and then they become concerned about it. But it was never mentioned during the whole period. My point is that, from the American point of view, this is not too important.

Mr. Laniel: On another point, you were asked the question that if we withdrew from our alliances would Canada's political influence be increased, and you seemed to say "yes." This is not necessarily the impression that we got from the people who went to the Canadian mission in South America, because they told us that many of the South American countries representatives there must inquire about Europe, about our influence in NATO and what was going on under the blanket and so on. They were concerned. The impression that I got, at any rate, from what was told to me, was that they seemed to think that we have a preferable position being right in the discussions of the important nations that do have influence in the world. They think that our position there is strong enough that we have last minute information and, at the same time, might influence a decision.

Professor Warnock: Yes. I have heard this argument many times and from two points of view I do not agree with this concept that Canada has any influence on the United States. First of all, historically speaking, small powers have never influenced great powers on policy, and great powers have never consulted with small powers before making decisions. Secondly, the Americans are perhaps more nationalistic, strongly and emotionally, than most countries in the world and they do not consult with anyone. The Cuban missile crisis is a good example. When they are going to form a policy, they form one by their own. They do not consult anyone. That is to be expected because they are such a great power, and because they are very nationalistic.

I have looked very closely at this in my own study of decision-making in NATO. I have looked at about 15 major decisions in strategy in NATO and I find consistently in

each case that they are formulated in the United States, by the United States government, to suit American policy as they see it, and then given to the NATO council for approval. This is the way you would expect it to be because of the power position of the United States within the alliance system. I do not see that Canada or even Britain has any

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influence on the United States. Certainly, the Cuban missile crisis was a situation that affected Canada more than any other country in the world. We are caught in the middle. I was in the State Department at that time and I can tell you we were scared. It is over now and everyone thinks Kennedy pulled it off and everyone thinks this was a good thing, but people were even scared in the State Department that this was going to erupt into a nuclear war. Here was a situation that affected Canada more than any other country in the world, because we are caught in the middle and if there is a nuclear exchange, we are going to be destroyed. Yet, it never even occurred to the United States that they should consult with Canada ahead of time. They just do not operate that way.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but if you look at it from the other side, do you not think the fact that Canada and other NATO countries did take some stands that were different from the United States on the question of Viet Nam might have had an influence on the decision of the United States to sit down at the table in Paris?

Professor Warnock: It might have, but in my opinion it was the growing opposition in the United States and the problems, economic and others, that really caused them to change their minds on that. I do not think that the United States, as a great power, operating as great powers have always operated—the United States is a super power, the most powerful country the world has ever known—would, if it makes up its mind to do something, be deterred by public opinion. For example in the Cuban missile crisis, when U Thant of the United Nations tried to step in, if you read Sorensen's or Schlesinger's or Kennedy's report, they looked upon this as an unwarranted intrusion by the United Nations on a matter that was theirs. Schlesinger and others have quoted President Kennedy's statement that this was messing up what the United States was determined to do and they did not like it. I think this is the way great powers operate.

Mr. Laniel: I have other questions, Mr. Chairman, but I will pass.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I have one short supplementary. Do you think that the new administration and particularly President Nixon's comments on his present tour of Europe indicate perhaps at least an opening of the door towards some possible consultation? I agree pretty much with what you have said, but do you see any change at all under the Nixon administration with regard to this question of consultation, or is this mostly window dressing?

Professor Warnock: No, I think periodically they say, when it gets right down to the nitty gritty, they would be quite willing to consult in advance. They could conceivably—and there is no reason why they could not—have consulted in advance, for example, before they decided to install tactical and nuclear weapons in Europe or put Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey. They did not have to go ahead and do that on their own. They could have, but when it comes down to crisis situations, like Cuba, they are not going to consult with anyone; they are going to make their own decisions.

Apparently, it is because of the structure of NATO. NATO was originally established as a traditional military alliance, and if you read the Treaty and the statements by Mr. Pearson and others at the time it was defended in the House of Commons, you will see that he said this did not commit Canada to automatically participate in war in Europe, and that we would do nothing in Europe until we consulted Parliament. It was a traditional military alliance. After the Korean War, however, it was transformed into a highly integrated alliance, presided over by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe who was an American general who owes, under the constitution, his command directly to the President of the United States. He takes orders only from the President of the United States, and he, in effect, controls the American and all the other forces in Europe. This creates a situation in the integrated alliance system which was opposed by France even long before de Gaulle. It created a situation where the United States was bound to dominate and where the decision-making structure of NATO goes from the United States and the President down through the military structure which is integrated in the United States, and this makes the traditional consultation very difficult.

The Chairman: I have eight members who wish to ask questions; perhaps they could try to keep the questions as brief as possible in order to cover them all by 1 o'clock. Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We had some witnesses from the Hudson Institute who disagree with your view about the effect of an all out nuclear war on the continent. You suggested that it would be a complete wipeout as far as North America was concerned, or, in fact, as far as the whole world is concerned. These specialists in civilian defence quoted some pretty horrible figures, but they certainly did not paint any kind of picture such as you paint. They said that there was every possibility that millions would survive.

Professor Warnock: I looked at their testimony too and I think they are primarily concerned about blast effects and fire effects. They did not take into consideration, if I read it correctly, the long run effects of radiation. I would suggest, for example, the briefs and testimony presented by the American Federation of Scientists which includes some of the

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most prominent American nuclear scientists completely contradicted this and believed that if this were an all-out attack it would probably be because of the radiation, maybe not within the next week but within the next month or so, and there would be radiation effects.

You may recall at the Bikini rests in 1954, where they let off one hydrogen bomb of 20 megatons or something like that, several hundred miles downwind there was a little fishing boat and one of the Japanese fishermen died from the exposure to the radiation from this one tiny bomb.

If we speak of 900 missiles exploding over the United States and then the United States exploding 2,000 missiles over the Soviet Union—and with the Soviet Union you cannot tell how large their warheads are, but their rockets are much greater and more powerful than the United States, all indications are that they have adopted the strategy of using a very large nuclear warhead; we know they have tested up to 100 megaton warhead, and if they start blasting off 900 of those over the United States there is not going to be much left.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): We did discuss with those witnesses the matter of

radiation effect and they did refer to this in connection with the figures that they offered. They suggested that with some control measures it was possible to change that picture quite drastically.

Professor Warnock: This has been an area of dispute in the United States for years.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I beg your pardon?

Professor Warnock: This has been an area of dispute in the policy formulated in the United States for years.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes. I want to mention the other main point. It would seem to me that any test of foreign policy or defence policy is whether it succeeds or fails. In the case of NATO, on the general posture of our side, we have been reasonably successful in that we have not had a major war of the kind that we fear particularly. Therefore, the policy, whether it includes NATO or not as a major link, has been successful as far as we are concerned, and if you suggest that we should dismantle it as far as Canada is concerned, I can certainly agree with you that the situation perhaps has changed considerably, but there is nothing to suggest that Russian motives have changed, only their appraisal of any success that they might have under the conditions that exist under the defence situation that there is. There is nothing to suggest that if we changed our defence posture, including NATO, that the Russians would not begin their probes again and decide that they were in a position to take advantage of a situation.

I suggest to you that one of the reasons why there are revolutionary forces working in other parts of the world is because revolutionaries feel a basic security in the world around them as far as the major conflict is concerned. They feel that it is contained until they are free to go about the business of developing their revolutionary forces where they are. This is one of the reasons why we have so many smaller revolutionary forces going on in other parts of the world.

Professor Warnock: First of all, I agree that there has been an absence of war in Europe. I do not know whether or not it is fair to say that it is due to NATO.

If you look at the whole strategy of Soviet defence policy and other Communist defence policy, as well as the ideological commitment of Communism as a movement, it has never advocated and in fact has never practiced the

concept of exporting revolution by force of arms in a direct way; that is, in the way Germany invaded France, or something like that. They have consistently looked upon the army as a defence to the revolution, against counter revolution, and have expected fully that they would be able to export Communism by promoting revolution indirectly. If you look at their whole analysis, they think that internal conditions in a country are what create the atmosphere in which revolution can be successful. It has nothing to do with, for example, the Soviet Union marching into Germany, and I would say this is totally inconsistent with their historic defence policy, with the historic ideology of communism. Certainly this is true with respect to China. China has never marched into its neighbours. And they could, they could run over all of southeast Asia if they wanted to.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): They marched into Hungary and they marched into Czechoslovakia.

Professor Warnock: They were already in Hungary. They were there at the end of the war; they came in during the war. They did not march into Yugoslavia, for example, when Yugoslavia broke away, so they were not there.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): But there have been instances where, let us say, they remarched into Hungary and they remarched into Czechoslovakia. They were there but they used their military forces.

Professor Warnock: They marched back into Czechoslovakia but I do not think that indicates they were ready to march into Germany. They considered that an area of vital interest to them, and I think this indicates even more that they are looking inward rather than outward. They are trying to maintain what they have now. They are not trying to communize Western Europe by sending in tanks. I think what they hoped would happen in Western Europe was that the communist parties in Italy and France, for example, would become strong enough to assume the government directly that way. Certainly that is their whole strategy now and, in any event, Soviet Union strategy throughout the whole world today is not to promote revolutions but to try to achieve office through the electoral process. This is particularly true in Latin America.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you very much.

Mr. Anderson: Professor Warnock, my questions are based almost entirely on your initial statement rather than on your written statement. In the first place, I must say I was in complete agreement with your views on the OAS. I find it very curious that people would suggest that we get involved in an organization which has so little to offer Canada and, indeed, in which there is no role for us to play. However, after agreeing with you there I am afraid I disagree in various other areas.

The basic assumption lying behind many of your remarks seems to be that somehow by increasing our aid we would have a greater impact on the third world. Could you define for me what you mean by this word "impact". Do you mean influence; do you mean...

Professor Warnock: I think this is perhaps the greatest impact that the Kennedy administration had on the whole government structure of the United States; that is, turning the attention of the United States away from Europe and to the underdeveloped world, realizing that the real crisis of our time is the north-south split. It is not the east-west split between the Soviet Union and the United States. My whole premise is that something drastic must be done or the revolutionary expectation, as it is called, will now turn to armed revolution. This was McNamara's and Kennedy's proposal and therefore something really must be done to head this off, and it was for this reason that McNamara went to the World Bank. He said that something must be done to solve the problems of the underdeveloped world. We are going to wake up in 10 or 20 years' time and find that the whole of the underdeveloped world has gone communist and therefore it is in the interests of the Western countries to try to head off the revolution towards Communism in the underdeveloped countries, and this can best be done by positive means. The tragic thing, as McNamara has stated since he became head of the World Bank, is that the Western countries are actually cutting back on their aid to underdeveloped countries and therefore some country, and preferably a Western country, must take a lead in illustrating to the world the magnitude of this problem and that there is a solution but the solution requires more than tokenism, it requires a major commitment and this is something that Canada can do. Therefore Canada could make a big impact in the world by shifting her total defence policy towards foreign aid, recognizing then that this is the real problem in the world today

and it has to be solved. It requires more than tokenism and it requires more than the Viet Nam war, it requires a positive effort and the countries that are marginal in a military sense, such as Canada, can perhaps make a bigger impact toward world peace by direct-

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ing their policy toward this area rather than being a minor client state in the alliance system.

Mr. Anderson: I certainly admire McNamara. However, I do not think he is above criticism. He was responsible for the U.S. Defence Department when the American military forces suffered a series of reversals in Viet Nam which are perhaps unparalleled in American military history. I do not blame McNamara directly for this but he is far from being a man who is beyond making errors.

Professor Warnock: He may have learned something from that, too.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, but on the other hand it does not necessarily follow that exactly what he said in the area of the development of the third world is correct. He has stated, and you have repeated, that other nations are cutting back on external aid, they are cutting back on what they are doing abroad. Presumably you were thinking of such nations as the United States and Western Europe. It seems very curious indeed to me and if this situation is as black and white as you and McNamara see it, presumably is as black and white to nations in Europe, and there seems to be sort of a fundamental illogical failing by these countries in Western Europe to cut back at a time when, as you say, it is so clear they should be increasing their aid commitment. Could you comment on that, perhaps?

Professor Warnock: Some countries are increasing, such as France and Sweden, but others are cutting back, and in particular the United States is cutting back. They are partly cutting back because of budget problems. The military budget, which is now \$80 billion in the United States, has forced them to cut back in some areas and they have cut back in the foreign aid area. Perhaps this is why we should help to pick this up because the Americans cannot maintain their foreign aid program because of military restrictions.

Mr. Anderson: This again brings up a logical difficulty that I am having here. That is, that McNamara, who headed up the defence

establishment, who was responsible for spending these billions upon billions every year, now switches to the World Bank, which is essentially an American financed operation, let us be frank. He evidently carries no weight whatsoever in Washington with respect to getting his views accepted because, as you have just pointed out, the Americans are cutting back on their aid. Is this simply an indication that McNamara has done so badly in the Department of Defense that he has been shunted aside to an area where he perhaps can do less harm to the American interests? The fact that the Americans are not providing more money is an indication that the American government is firmly convinced that what he says is not correct. There is a logical inconsistency in what you are saying, sir, which I find extremely difficult to fathom.

Professor Warnock: I do not think there is any inconsistency between recognition of a problem and the solution, and the ability of the government to do it. The United States is now not only faced with foreign problems, there are fantastic problems inside the United States and if you read the Gallup polls correctly I think they are a rough indication that the public thinks they should get out of Viet Nam and put all money into such things as the cities, some of which are almost unlivable in the United States. There is also great pressure to spend money elsewhere. It is very difficult for the government to go before Congress, which is independent—it is not the parliamentary system—and say that they need so much for foreign aid. In fact, it is significant that in the business community newspapers such as the *Wall Street Journal* are strongly opposed to a cutback in the foreign aid program. There are also all these other pressures on the government, and as long as the American government is maintaining an \$80 billion defence posture—and they are faced with this tremendous crisis at home, and it is a tremendous crisis—they find it very difficult to justify foreign aid programs.

Mr. Anderson: This brings up our problem, and that is that perhaps through luck and the grace of God we are somewhat ahead of the United States as far as domestic problems are concerned.

Professor Warnock: Or behind.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, we may be behind. However, surely we should then anticipate

our own troubles and we can perhaps visualize this by what is going on across the border and not get involved in these massive expenditures abroad in either military or aid fields which might possibly delay consideration of domestic problems in Canada. I feel there is a certain logic to that, too.

Professor Warnock: Yes, I agree with you. There are great demands upon the resources of the country and in our system it is up to the government to decide which priority comes first. It may be that Mr. Trudeau, if he cuts back significantly in the defence establishment and not shift us to foreign aid beyond the 1 per cent level but channel the rest of it into domestic—

Mr. Anderson: Certainly this may be.

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Professor Warnock: In my opinion, I think this is overlooking the fact that we are not isolated in the world. Perhaps we do not realize it as much as the United States because the United States has interests and debts all over the world which Canada does not really have, but in the long run our interests are concerned with the whole world, too. If the whole world blows up, if all of Latin America goes Castro, and so on, if all this happens all over the world, which is conceivable in the next 20 to 50 years, it will also make things bad for Canada.

Mr. Anderson: My personal view is that even if all of Latin America goes Castro, to use your words, the world would not blow up. I think there are still problems involved in what you said. Basically you said we cannot solve the world problems on a global basis by tokenism, simply by gestures, and yet I cannot see, if the United States and the Western European nations are cutting back on their aid programs that Canada, by increasing its tiny amount, can somehow make up for that and furthermore, not only make up for the contributions which the others are not putting forward but turn it from tokenism to a real constructive and meaningful contribution in global terms. It appears to me that faced with the situation which you have described we would be doing nothing more than just giving a token to these countries if we devoted our entire defence budget to external aid. Surely we should perhaps be devoting our efforts to persuading other nations—the United States in particular and Western Europe as well, where we do have

some minor influence, whether it is through NATO or not I do not know—or putting the pressure on them to join with us in such an exercise, unless we should be particularly concerned—

The Chairman: Do you have some specific questions you wish to ask? There are six or seven other people who would like to ask specific questions of the witness. I think we are getting into a discussion rather than into questioning.

Mr. Anderson: I will drop that line then. I was interested in your views on industrialization of the third world. I thought this had gone out ten years ago. It appears to me the development of the third world basically lies in agricultural development. Thailand, for instance, which has a fine agricultural base, is capable of economic expansion while Laos, which does not have a good agricultural base, in my opinion can never develop. Why do you emphasize industry? Do you really feel that this is the only line?

Professor Warnock: No. If you are in a position—and Canada should know something about this because of the huge balance of payments problem every year—of only producing primary goods, agricultural products and extracted industries, and you are importing your manufactured goods, you are going to be permanently badly off. The real reason for the growing gap in the standard of living is because since the end of World War II the Western world has convinced the underdeveloped world that they should only develop primary products in agriculture rather than manufacturing, and as long as they remain hewers of wood and haulers of water they will never break through.

Mr. Anderson: Our prairie farmers remain growers of wheat and yet their Cadillacs descend upon the British Columbian coast every year. I cannot say your logic is very good.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson, there are other members who have questions they wish to ask.

Mr. Anderson: I will ask one final question then, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Then I will perhaps put you down at the bottom of the list for your additional questions.

Mr. Anderson: All right. You have emphasized the fact that aid is the way in which there is going to be development in the third

world. I cannot understand why you say this. In my view the policy of self-reliance which Chairman Mao has written about many times is a far more beneficial and a far more sure way of arriving at economic development in what we call the third world than policies of aid which are generally construed as neo-colonialism, and certainly as far as impact and influence is concerned I tend to agree that aid policies are basically construed in the recipient countries as merely a device whereby we somehow avoid revolution or stave it off at least for a few years. Perhaps you would comment on this. My view is that aid programs are far inferior to genuine policies of development within these countries in the third world and that we should be encouraging only those that have very, very good policies for their own development.

Professor Warnock: Yes, I agree with this. This is the big crisis, you know. I was in the State Department for a short while when the Alliance for Progress was formed and really what the Americans were saying was that if we do not do something significant in the area of helping these countries to develop they will accept Chairman Mao's thesis that that is the best way to develop, and therefore what

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the Alliance for Progress was trying to say was that we can give them a Western alternative, they do not have to turn to the communist type of development. As Walter Lippmann pointed out I think quite correctly, the real threat of Cuba to the United States is that the Cuban revolution will work and that in fact they will become independent, they will become self-reliant and their standard of living will rise. Certainly their standard of living in health, education, and so on, has risen fantastically when you compare it with the rest of Latin America. If this is the concern of the American government I suppose it should be our concern as well.

The Chairman: I am sorry, Mr. Anderson, I know you have other questions and I will put your name on the list and I will try to get back to you, but there are six of seven other members who have questions. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman, there has been some expression of thought, coming back to the U.S., that there has been—perhaps I should not say a reversion to the pre-war isolationism—a definite tendency to say: Look, let us look after our own bailiwick and not be concerned with looking after the

whole world. There has been some suggestion, in spite of your suggestion that the U.S. is aware of the initiatives that Canada is taking in this area and the interest which is being shown in our NATO role, that the Americans are totally unaware of the fact that we are considering withdrawing from NATO, and that by so doing we would, in effect, be giving aid and comfort to this viewpoint in the U.S. Let us follow Canada's example; we should be tending our own fences and remaining within the continental United States.

The suggestion advanced was that the net effect of our withdrawal, and suggesting that we are going to put another \$200 or \$300 or \$400 million into foreign aid might be to give aid and comfort to people in the U.S. who advocated far more substantial cutbacks in their foreign aid, and that the net effect of our pittance in this area would be more than offset by the cutback in the American foreign aid. Is that a valid viewpoint or not?

Professor Warnock: Well, it might be. My real reason for advocating this is not to believe that Canada would, on its own, solve all the problems, but it would set an example and it would dramatize to the other countries. Obviously Canada is not going to be able to solve the problems of very many countries if it shifts its whole budget to foreign aid, but it would serve as an example for the other countries. I do not also associate this with an isolationist policy.

I think it is just a shift away from the alliance approach to an international approach more through United Nations and other nonaligned groupings, and so on. I think, also, that there is a trend in the United States against the American commitment overseas. When you see, for example, people like Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, who has been a strong advocate of military spending with bases everywhere, suddenly becoming almost like Fulbright you will see that there has been a dramatic change, a growing awareness in the United States that the United States is, perhaps, overcommitted and therefore needs to pull back. I think this is growing. We can see this, for example, in the growing popular and Congressional opposition to the antiballistic missile system.

Mr. Buchanan: Do you feel that applies only to the military commitments? You would not put their foreign aid commitments in the same category?

Professor Warnock: No; I think there is a concern in the United States, particularly in Congress, about the cutting back of foreign aid and what this will do, but at the same time recognizing that as long as the military budget is so large this is perhaps inevitable. If you have to set priorities on what you are going to cut back, you have already cut back largely on the poverty programs and other welfare programs in the United States because of the military budget. There is a feeling that you just cannot cut back any farther in those areas so you put foreign aid down at the bottom of the priority and then say: Well, it is unfortunate we had to cut that. We do not like it; we hope to raise it up again when we are able to.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman, I have one other question. An economist friend of mine suggested that he thought a lot of our discussion here was somewhat irrelevant in the sense that we had spent far too little time in trying to weigh the economic implications for Canada of the withdrawal from these alliances; that the net effect of this might be to develop in the United States a feeling, shall I say of antipathy towards Canada; that we are sort of letting the team down and this was certainly brought out by Bruce Hutchison

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in his articles last week, and the result of this would be that when Canada went hat in hand, as we all too often have to do, to Washington to seek certain concessions—for instance in oil, thinking of it in terms of out West or when the U.S. is putting some restrictions on the outflow of capital—instead of getting, as we have in the past, a very warm reception and being accorded our wishes to a large degree the door might be slammed in our face. The economic effect on Canada, if it dampened down our economy somewhat, would be far greater than the savings we would effect by some withdrawal here.

Professor Warnock: I do not know whether you could measure that. I do not feel that the government of the United States would behave in that way towards Canada. To the United States, Canada is important in one respect and this is very obvious. It is important to the United States because it is a source of strategic raw materials and those kinds of things. For instance, 85 per cent of United States nickel comes from Canada, and now Labrador ore is very important, too.

These are the things that are important to the United States, and I do not see how they would cut any of this back. Furthermore, the United States does not control its economy that much in how it operates in Canada, and so on. I do not think that withdrawing from the alliance system would at all interfere with that.

Certainly, for example, if we take Mexico, Mexico over the years has taken a very hostile position towards the United States and even nationalized in the thirties most of its natural resources which were owned by the United States and other Western influences. This has not in any way penalized their economic relationship with the United States. In effect, they put tremendous national controls over their economy, such as no natural resources to be extracted by anyone but Mexicans. All firms in Mexico must have 51 per cent of their stock owned by Mexicans and still, in spite of the fact that they have stood against the United States on Cuba on every question, the United States is knocking at the door trying to invest money in Mexico.

They are having a tough time keeping American money out of Mexico because the money will go where the resources are, where the markets are and, so on. I just cannot see the United States taking any kind of retaliatory measures against Canada.

Mr. Buchanan: I do not know whether “retaliatory” is the word I would use. It is just that our requests would find a much less hospitable climate. It is not that they would actually go out in a malevolent fashion to try to do harm, but if we came seeking increases in our oil import quotas perhaps the voice of the opposition, which is quite vocal, as you know...

Professor Warnock: Yes.

Mr. Buchanan: ... in certain areas of the U.S. would be listened to a little more attentively.

Professor Warnock: Yes, this is one thing I think is a real problem for Canada. It may be an insoluble problem. We are so deeply involved economically with the United States that we may not be able to extract ourselves. I think this is a dangerous situation and as you indicate, and as others like Mr. Pearson have admitted in the past, this fear of retaliation because of the economic integration of the countries has inhibited Canadian political independence.

Therefore, this is one reason why I suggested that we should make a positive effort to move away from this total commitment of integration of economy with the United States and trade investment and so on and move towards the other areas. Certainly this is desired in Western Canada—move toward expansion with Japan and China. These are natural trading allies of Canada and yet our total involvement with the United States restricts, really, our trading with these countries.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, would you allow a short related question?

The Chairman: These are supplementaries? Mr. Prud'homme and then Mr. Hymmen.

Mr. Prud'homme: Do you not think there is a difference in the geographical situation of Mexico and Canada? Surely strategically Canada is much more important to the U.S.A. than Mexico.

Professor Warnock: In the sense it is between us and the Soviet Union, you mean?

Mr. Prud'homme: That is right.

Professor Warnock: Yes, I suppose so.

Mr. Prud'homme: So the retaliation, the kind of retaliation that our colleague Mr. Buchanan was talking about, really could affect Canada while in Mexico it is a completely different subject.

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Professor Warnock: Except that the area which really is of vital concern to the United States is Latin America, and in Latin America the biggest thorn in the side of the United States is Mexico consistently. They have opposed the embargoes on Cuba, opposing breaking diplomatic relations, opposing kicking Cuba out of the OAS, and so on. There was constant concern in the Kennedy administration over Mexico. Mexico gets far greater attention in the State Department than Canada does.

Mr. Prud'homme: Yes, at the moment, because they do not see any military problem with Canada, but if we were to follow your views—mind you, I am just questioning; I am not giving my own opinions—referring to what you have said about how nationalistic the Americans could be, how would they feel

if suddenly they saw a 4,000-mile-long unprotected territory north of them for their security?

Professor Warnock: I think the government looks on these things perhaps in a different way. The government is realistic. They do not see that the Soviet Union is about to launch a ground attack against the United States across Canada. I mean, they are not even concerned about it. They do not even think about that. The only thing they fear coming across the North is the missiles and the planes, and Canada is not really important to that any more now with the ballistic missile early warning system outside of Canada, the over-the-horizon radar.

So Canada is not essential in America's defence as it looks North. I think what might disturb the United States is, for example, if say Quebec separated and a left-wing socialist government took over in Quebec. You know, at the time Project Camelot in the United States was exposed on revolutions in Latin America it was also revealed that Project Revolt was being studied by the army. This was a project on what to do about Quebec if the separatists take over and go socialist.

They even invited Canadian academics to come down to Washington to participate in this to advise the government on what action it could take in removing the separatists and the socialists in Quebec. That, I think, might disturb the United States, but I do not think just withdrawing from NATO and NORAD would disturb them.

The Chairman: I think we had better go on to a supplementary from Mr. Hymmen.

Mr. Hymmen: I have just a short question, Mr. Chairman. I think Professor Warnock answered Mr. Buchanan on possible discrimination from the United States. This is a related question. I think you suggested, sir, that our NATO involvement more or less serves no meaningful purpose. What about possible discrimination from our European allies? There is a military situation; there is the political and economic situations and, of course, Canada has had close ties with our European partners over many, many years. What about this question?

Professor Warnock: I suppose that is speculating. I doubt that it would affect our main trading relations with Britain, for example. Our trading relationship with the Common Market is not that great. I do not think it would be affected, sir.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: Mr. Chairman, something surprises me since we started this consideration of a possible review of our defence policy.

All the professors and the theoreticians have always seemed in favour of the withdrawal of Canada from alliances, whereas the military people, those who are involved in the defence policy, have always been in favour of some sort of a *status quo*, a smaller participation perhaps but an active participation nonetheless in the alliances, rather than a withdrawal. Is this because the military people are too fearful or the professors are lacking in practical sense?

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[English]

Professor Warnock: First, I would say that in Canada a majority of the professors, particularly in political science, would be in favour of maintaining Canada's role in NATO and NORAD. As far as the discrepancy between those of us who disagree and the military is concerned, I think the military naturally in every country are in favour of their military establishment, such as it is. I do not know of any military establishment in history that ever advocated that it be cut back.

Professors, perhaps, can have an opportunity to take a long-range view from a broad perspective and without personal involvement at what they consider to be the long-run national interests of the country; not just narrowly, but on a worldwide basis. They have the ability to devote a great deal of their own time to studying issues, far more so than anybody does who is in the bureaucratic side of the government, and perhaps they come up with different approaches because they are not personally committed.

I think anybody who gets involved in a policy, particularly in the formation of a policy, becomes committed to it. How can you expect people who have devoted their lives to the creation and maintenance of NATO suddenly say that they think it is obsolete? It is very difficult to think people would do that.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: So, following your line of thought, you have just said that you are better placed than others to carry on these studies. Would you tell me what studies you

carried out to come to such a categorical conclusion that we should withdraw from NATO and from NORAD, that Vietnamese war is a useless war and that, indeed, everything that exists should be replaced? What practical studies have you carried out? What comparative studies have you carried out to come to such categorical conclusions before a meeting such as this?

[English]

Mr. Warnock: As I say, the only advantage really is the time. Now I have devoted really the last five years of my life in academic work primarily studying Canadian foreign policy and defence policy since the Second World War. I have spent 15 years in university now studying international relations and foreign policy in general. Simply because I have been able to devote so much time gives me an advantage over other people. I was in the administration of foreign policy for two years and I realize that anybody that is in administration just simply is so occupied with day-by-day chores that they do not ever have the time, even to sit down at night and read books, to take a longer-run objective point of view. At the same time I do not expect that the people who have to make the policy are going to automatically accept the position of professors who are sitting off in their ivory towers studying these things, because they are not responsible. The people who are responsible are the government people and they have to make their decision.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: To sum up your answer, you have expressed an opinion rather than the result of a study?

[English]

Professor Warnock: This is my conclusion after spending 5 years analysing Canadian foreign policy. It is my opinion, yes.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: Now to come to a more specific question. According to you, would the new defence policy which Canada should have be more or less expensive than the one it now has?

[English]

Professor Warnock: Well, in defence per se alone it would cost less, because if you withdraw from NATO and NORAD you no longer have to maintain the defence establishment. If you do what I also suggest, transfer most

of that money to a foreign aid program, then you are just shifting the budget around a little bit. It is not going to result in the reduction in taxation or reduction in budget if this alternative policy is approved.

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[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: Do you not think that this new policy which the country should have ought to bring about expenses, and require new equipment and the possible replacement of the facilities which we now have within these alliances and which could be used, and which will involve necessarily more expenditures for the country? Do you not think that the best solution would be rather a readjustment of our policy, i.e. a lesser contribution to NATO or NORAD along with a role to be played by Canada in keeping and maintaining peace in the world? In other words, do you not think that radical solutions in the field of defence, as elsewhere, are not always the best ones?

[English]

Professor Warnock: Well, first of all, if Canada stays in NATO and NORAD it is in a position right now where most of its equipment is obsolete and will have to be replaced. If it is replaced this will mean a great deal of expense. That is, if we stay in NATO and NORAD now and maintain our policy as it is right now, we will have to buy new aeroplanes and new equipment for Europe. We can stay in and withdraw. For example, we could withdraw our brigade from Germany and bring it back to Canada. But then I think many people have proposed that if we do this and put it in the mobile NATO force this would require spending on more transportation to make it mobile to go to Europe. If we stay in NORAD and want to play a defence role, we are going to have to replace the F101 Voodoos and this will probably mean purchasing new aircraft from the United States, which will cost more money. The foreign aid program would not necessarily increase spending in Canada. One proposal would be to shift it through the United Nations which has the bureaucracy to carry that out.

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[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: Mr. Chairman, with all due respect for the witness, it is not true that we will have to renew our equipment completely,

because Canada has just carried out a campaign, over the past five years, which has renewed all our equipment. I do not think that this renewal has been complete, but I do not think it is true to say that we will have to renew our equipment. It has been renewed for some years, and I think that with a few extra expenditures, it could serve within NATO.

Now, another question, Mr. Chairman. Do you think that in the present state of things, it would be wise to take decisions that are as radical as those that you have proposed? Do you not think that it might be much more advantageous to take an attitude of caution, because the slightest step we may take may bring about a nuclear war?

[English]

Professor Warnock: Well, no. First of all, I do not think the proposals I made are radical. They are made by some very conservative people in both the United States and Canada. I do not think that withdrawal from the Alliance system would provoke any war. I think it is a policy which is not just a possibility, it is feasible, probable alternative. It is something that could be carried out, and could be accepted. I think Mr. Trudeau could do it.

One of the things about this whole review, and I think maybe you do not see it from where I see it sitting on the Prairies, is that so much has been made of the defence policy review in the press over the last year—and whenever the government has to make a statement they say, “Well, we are not going to make a statement until the defence review has been made”—that the people in Canada actually think there are going to be significant changes. I do not think there will be, and I think the attitude and the response of the public will be, “Why, after all this fuss over the past year, have we come out and said that the status quo is the best?”

An hon. Member: That is actually what we are going to say.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Mr. Ryan: Professor, I take it you would agree with me that if your foreign aid program went through we would have a much bigger balance of payments problem than we have with our brigade and our air division in Europe?

Professor Warnock: I do not know. I do not see why that would follow.

Mr. Ryan: Well, if we gave \$1 billion abroad for foreign aid, as against what we are presently doing in Europe in support of

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our brigade and our air division, would there not be a tremendous difference in our shipment of Canadian funds abroad?

Professor Warnock: Yes, if none of this money came back to Canada, but I think over 90 per cent of all the foreign aid money which we spend or give or loan now comes back to Canada in purchases—

Mr. Ryan: That is if it is through export credits.

Professor Warnock: No. I mean, if you give a country money, Canadian dollars, it is quite likely—well, right now we tie most of our aid and we would not have to do that. But I am not so sure about that.

Mr. Ryan: But your plan would be to do it on the basis of getting 90 per cent of the money used in Canada?

Professor Warnock: Well, I do not know whether this would have to be direct, you know—Canadian dollars usually come back to the country in purchases.

Mr. Ryan: I take it that you not only believe that the NATO and NORAD alliances have obsolete hardware but also that the whole concept of the two alliances is obsolete? Is this your position?

Professor Warnock: That is right.

Mr. Ryan: Then I take it that you would be prepared to terminate any overflight arrangements with the United States with respect to Canadian territory?

Professor Warnock: Overflights of what—Strategic Air Command overflights?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, or any that may be decided necessary by the American military.

Professor Warnock: Yes, I do not think the Strategic Air Command's overflights over Canada serve any useful purpose.

Mr. Ryan: Your view is that we should become as independent a country as possible and completely non-aligned. Is that a fair statement?

Professor Warnock: I think that non-alignment could be an immediate policy. And I certainly think that the long-run interests of Canada, once again, are to try to become an independent country in the real sense, you know. As long as the United States owns 60 per cent of our economy and as long as 70 per cent of our trade is with the United States we are not really independent.

Mr. Ryan: But you will agree that we are either second or third in the world in our standard of living.

Professor Warnock: Yes...

Mr. Ryan: I think probably we are the second highest.

Professor Warnock: No. I think we could drop to fourth, but we are right there.

Mr. Ryan: We are right up there, yes.

Professor Warnock: We are in the first three or four.

Mr. Ryan: We are far ahead of Mexico.

Professor Warnock: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: You have pointed out to the Committee that in certain emergencies we have not been consulted as a member of either NORAD or NATO, but would you agree that we are consulted before emergencies pretty thoroughly in most respects?

Professor Warnock: I do not know what you mean by "consulted". In a general overall policy, for example in the establishment of NORAD, obviously this is worked out between the two countries.

Mr. Ryan: But the way it is working out makes it unnecessary to consult us, does it not?

Professor Warnock: Well, maybe. But take for example the decision of the United States to go ahead with the anti-ballistic program. There was no consultation with Canada about that in advance...

Mr. Ryan: But that was within their own territory, of course.

Professor Warnock: But that is part of the NORAD system and it is part of the North American air defence. If it works it will explode bombs on Canada. This is of vital interest to Canada. Why was Canada not consulted in advance? They were not. It did not

even occur to the Americans to consult with Canada. Mr. Pearson says that we were informed a week ahead of time, but the Russians were informed at the same time. Our involvement in NORAD did not give us any special role in this.

Mr. Ryan: You are talking about official information now. But surely Canada and many of her military men knew that this development was going to come.

Professor Warnock: Yes, everybody knew it was in the offing.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, knew it was in the offing. And do you not think that we knew at all pertinent times that we had the option here.

Professor Warnock: Well, I think personally that the decision to go ahead within the United States was due to a domestic political problem. But you will remember that Defence Secretary MacNamara had firmly come down consistently against it all along, so nobody really thought the Americans were going ahead with it. But all of a sudden out of a clear blue sky, so to speak, it was announced that they were going ahead with it. I think Mr. Hellyer a week before had gone to Washington, not for that purpose but for another purpose, and he was informed at that time, about a week in advance, that the Americans had changed their mind and were going ahead to establish it.

Mr. Ryan: How important is it that we feel badly about this in view of what you say, that we would be plastered so hard by incoming missiles that there is really no defence? Why should we get upset about this American contribution.

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Professor Warnock: I am concerned about this because the major argument for our remaining in the Alliance is that we are consulted in advance and that we have a special influence on American foreign policy which other countries do not have. My point of view is that the record does not indicate this is at all true, even when you have a close bilateral relationship like NORAD which demands and specifically states that there shall be consultation ahead of time before policies are introduced.

Mr. Ryan: But you realize that we have our military men throughout bases in the United States being advised of everything that we need to know? You understand that?

Professor Warnock: Yes, I assume that.

Mr. Ryan: And would you not agree that if we become a non-aligned country our position in respect of consultation would become very pathetic indeed?

Professor Warnock: Well, I think the assumption is that you get something out of consultation. I mean, there is no sense in having consultation if you cannot influence policy. This is the position, for example, that de Gaulle took in the Cuban missile crisis when Dean Acheson came to see him. He said, "Are you informing me or are you consulting me?" and Acheson said, "We are informing you." He said, "Well, that is fine because there is a great difference between being informed of a matter and being consulted." As you will recall, at the time the anti-ballistic missile system was first announced and that they were going ahead with it, it was not even known at that time or announced whether Canada would be a part of it or would not be a part of it. In fact, the original maps that were leaked to the press showed one of the missile sites was going to be at North Bay, Ontario. This obviously was the American position—they wanted one there. And it is very logical that one be at North Bay, Ontario. But then the government had to make up its mind quickly whether it was going to be a part of the ABM system or not and whether the ABM system was going to be a part of NORAD or not. The Canadian Government still says it is not a part of NORAD and the Americans say it is part of NORAD. It seems to me the whole atmosphere surrounding this decision indicates that in the real, true sense Canada had not been consulted.

Mr. Ryan: In your written submission, Professor, you say that two countries, the United States and Russia, might conceivably attack Canada. These are the only two that you can conceive at the present time would attack Canada. If we became a non-aligned country at this point, then I take it that it would be necessary, in your opinion, to arm against these conceivable attack threats. Therefore, we should perhaps develop our own nuclear weapons, have our own anti-ballistic missiles, our own missile silos under the sea off our shores, undersea bases and so on and so forth.

Professor Warnock: No, it is quite the opposite, and this is where I disagree strongly with the statements Mr. Sharp has made. In

my opinion Canada cannot defend itself against either, even if it maximized through every cent possible its defence system. It could not in any way create a defence policy, an establishment which could resist an attack by either the Soviet Union or the United States; therefore it would be a complete waste of money. I mean that if you cannot defend against the possible attackers there is no sense in having a defence and that therefore it would be a complete waste of money. And so I would not agree with statements made by Mr. Sharp and others that if we became non-aligned we would have to build up an even greater military system.

Mr. Ryan: Well, now, you say that we might conceivably be attacked by the United States.

Professor Warnock: It is a possibility.

Mr. Ryan: Would this be so, in your opinion, if we continued with our NATO and NORAD arrangements? Would this not knock out the conceivability of a U.S. attack?

Professor Warnock: The only conceivable attack I would think of would be—and of course this is broad speculation and something which may be entirely impossible or inconceivable—in the event that Quebec became independent and became a left-wing government. The United States might consider this a real threat to their security as they did the possibility of left wingers taking over the Dominican Republic and might intervene in Quebec. I do not think it would have anything to do with whether or not Canada was in NATO or NORAD. As far as I can see that would be the only possible case where this might happen, and from the American point of view this is the only possible case which they see also.

Mr. Ryan: Why do you say, Professor, that China is a greater threat to world peace, in your opinion, than Russia?

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Professor Warnock: I think it is because in world politics today the Soviet Union is following a policy of peaceful co-existence. The Communist Party throughout the world, which is still aligned with the Russian foreign policy line, particularly in Latin America, is in effect arguing against wars of liberation, revolution, etc., whereas Chinese policy is to encourage wars in the underdeveloped world, all around everywhere. It is their strategy

and therefore in the minds of Canadians and Americans, the great threat in the world is that China is promoting and encouraging wars of national liberation around the world, whereas the Soviet Union is not—it is opposing these openly. As an American diplomat said, the most counterrevolutionary force in Latin America is the Russian Communist Party, the official Communist Party.

Mr. Ryan: That is not the message I get. The message I get is that it is Russia that instigated the Korean war; it is Russia that is the main backbone of the effort by Ho Chi-Minh against the Americans in South Viet Nam and the South Vietnamese; and that it is Russia that is tying in with Cambodia and that part of Laos which is joins at the border and giving the main problem. Ho Chi-Minh does not work with the Chinese; he will not admit them to the country though he will take aid from them, of course. It is the Russians in the Middle East who are doing the instigating in Syria and Egypt and Algeria. It is Russia's fleet that has been increased to be the second biggest fleet in the world. And it is Russia that is pressing in and filling every vacuum, and not China. China has too much in its own backyard to worry about, with revolution and chaos in every province practically. What do you say to that, Professor?

Professor Warnock: I would say it is certainly right that China in actual policy is limited to Asia. In Latin America the support is mainly a distant ideological commitment. In the Middle East certainly the Soviet Union has given encouragement to the Arab position. They see there is more to be gained from backing Arabs than Israel. But it is significant that in all these countries such as Egypt the Communist parties are outlawed.

No, in effect, they are not increasing Communism in the Middle East; they are just taking a strategic position in the Middle East. They think they have got the Americans backed in a corner because the Americans are in the position of having to back Israel, and there is more to be gained in the long run, they figure, by backing the Egyptians.

Mr. Ryan: And there is a lot for them to be gained, is there, by sending their fleet around to the Far East and Indian Ocean and those parts and in trying to fill in the British retreat—evacuation would be a better term.

Professor Warnock: You mean the Russians?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, the Russians.

Professor Warnock: They have some fishing fleets and spy ships around the world, yes. Most big powers do.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Before calling the next questioner, could I get the agreement of the Committee to print Professor Warnock's advance presentation as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Also, the special meeting this evening to discuss our procedure and agenda will take place in this room at 8 o'clock. I hope it can be brief. I still have Mr. Groos, Mr. Cafik and Mr. Legault. Mr. Groos.

Mr. Groos: A very short question, Doctor. You said that Canada's political influence would increase if we were to withdraw from NATO and NORAD and to devote the funds that have been allocated to those two associations to foreign aid. I think you then went on to say that foreign aid would be channelled, you thought, through the United Nations Industrial Development Organization Assistance Program, the Commonwealth francophone, the OAS, although you did not want us to join the OAS. I should think that Canada's political influence might decrease if we were to withdraw from NATO and NORAD, but I would be interested to hear more specifically where you think it might increase, particularly if our economic funds were to be channelled through the U.N.

Professor Warnock: When I was saying that we should become non-aligned I also associated that with a positive policy of activities through the United Nations in a diplomatic way and through other non-aligned blocs which already exist, and presumed that Canada's influence would increase in areas of the world other than Western Europe. I am not

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saying that it would be increased with the United States or in Western Europe, but in the rest of the world I think Canada's political influence would increase because Canada is somewhat limited now because we are so closely associated with the United States. Again this is presuming that we want to play a positive role in foreign policy—I am not sure we do.

Mr. Groos: You cannot be any more specific than that?

Professor Warnock: Would you want me to cite examples?

Mr. Groos: Yes, I would.

Professor Warnock: For example, in the Middle East we are not even acceptable anymore as part of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez because we are so totally associated with the United States in Israel's policy. We are becoming less and less acceptable as a peacekeeper in the United Nations because we are associated with NATO. The peacekeeping operations in the United Nations automatically exclude the Warsaw Pact nations, and now there is a movement also to exclude the NATO countries.

Another example is that Canadian troops were not acceptable in the Congo, whereas Austria, Ireland and Sweden's troops were because they were non-aligned and we were aligned. The only force we contributed to the Congo was the Communications Unit because it was bilingual and they had a great need for a bilingual communications unit.

For example in the United Nations there was a period of time when Canada, probably before 1955, played a moderating role with other small parts, but this diplomatic initiative has been completely eclipsed by the non-aligned bloc. All the proposals for moderation, change, compromise, etc., come from the non-aligned block and Canada is not in that. The only caucus Canada is in in the United Nations is the Commonwealth caucus when it meets, which is not very often and the NATO caucus. And thus, Canada has ceased to be a leader in compromise in the United Nations and has become more and more associated with NATO projects. It was not asked, for example, to sign the Afro-Asian moderate positions compromising between the East and West. I would say that if we were to become non-aligned there would be a more positive role for Canada to play similar to that of Sweden, Ireland and Austria and this would increase our influence in this agency rather than decrease it.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Professor Warnock, you have made some rather startling observations, I think. I am rather inclined to think that they are a bit naïve. You suggest—at least I have this impression—that Russia really does not have an expansionist policy. You suggested at one time—and I think I quote you correctly—that Russia wants to achieve its victories in other nations through the electoral system; in

other words, to win by election. It seems a rather odd approach when they have never done it before, including in their own country. You have suggested a lot of things along this line and it leads me to conclude that that academic ivory tower that you sit in is extremely well insulated from reality.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, is the witness being questioned or harangued? This is an attack...

The Chairman: Perhaps you could get on with your question.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, if you do not mind, I will ask the question. Now, these are my observations and I wonder if they are accurate—I do not want to misinterpret anything that you have said. Did I express your view rather correctly that you do not really think that Russia has expansionist designs on Europe and other parts of the world?

Professor Warnock: In the military sense?

Mr. Cafik: In the military sense.

Professor Warnock: No.

Mr. Cafik: I agree with you to some extent. I do not think they are trying to achieve them militarily today, but perhaps the reason for that is the military alliance of the allies. In other words, they see that they could not be successful in pursuing these objectives in a military way.

Professor Warnock: Yes, that is an interpretation you could draw. The fact that Russia has not invaded Europe in the last 20 years, or not invaded Germany, could be attributed to NATO's existence. Personally I feel that even if NATO had not been there, they would not have invaded Europe. I just do not think that they ever had that as a policy.

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Mr. Cafik: You suggested earlier, too, when you were talking about a justification for this position, that they were not doing so because they had enough trouble with their own allies, the Warsaw Pact powers.

Professor Warnock: Currently.

Mr. Cafik: That is right, and that this would deter them from trying to expand further because they would only increase the number of headaches they had.

Is this one of the reasons why they would not want to expand?

Professor Warnock: No. If you were thinking, for example, of launching an aggressive policy against Germany, you would naturally want all your allies in Eastern Europe—you have to go through them—to be with you. And if they were not going to be with you, you would certainly have second thoughts about undertaking such a policy.

Mr. Cafik: And you feel that they hesitated because they did not think the Warsaw Pact powers would back them up in that decision?

Professor Warnock: You mean over the years?

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Professor Warnock: Oh, no. I do not think it was ever a policy. First of all you have to look at the situation that Russia was in at the end of the war. I do not know whether it is worthwhile going back that far, but here was Russia, if you read in Kennan's memoirs his description of going from Moscow to the West at the end of the war, totally devastated with not a thing standing. An economic analysis of the situation in Russia at the end of the war reveals that economically it was about what the United States was around 1860. It was just totally destroyed. What the Soviet Union was intent on doing in the immediate period after the war was to build up Russia. It would be the same thing if the United States had been burned to the ground from the Mississippi to the Atlantic Ocean. Would the United States have been as powerful in the circumstances? No. In fact Kennan makes the point in his own memoirs that Russia was extremely weak at this time, and he says that nobody in his right mind would have thought that the Soviet Union was involved in an expansionist military policy at that time when it was so incredibly weak. And similarly it was at a time when the United States had a monopoly on atomic bombs. So to think that under those circumstances the Soviet Union was about to invade Europe was, in Kennan's own words, nonsense.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but I do not think that that means that it did not have the desire to do so, but perhaps not the means to do so, or perhaps it saw sufficient deterrent in the United States that it could not pursue this objective.

Professor Warnock: Well, in a sense, Russia being a closed society, it is a matter of trying

to guess what their policy was, and it is a disagreement among guesses; you and I happen to disagree.

Mr. Cafik: I think this is my last question: one other point you made was that the United States and Russia were the only possible enemies, as it were, or people who could attack Canada, and I presume by that you mean successfully attack Canada, and I am inclined to agree that could well be so. You draw the conclusion, then, that we should thereby cut down our alliances and put ourselves in the position where we would be at the mercy of one or the other, or both. It would seem to me a rational thing to do, under that circumstance, to at least cut your options in half. If there are two possible people who could attack us, by allying ourselves with the United States at least we would cut out one of them, and would only have one who could possibly do it. I think, really, that is our position, that we have thrown our weight in with the United States and that we will stand or fall as they stand or fall in this connection.

Professor Warnock: Yes. I agree that is what has happened and I do not agree that it was the right policy. I think that our policy should have been, right from the beginning, at the end of World War II, to do everything possible within Canada's means to minimize the possibility of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. I feel that by aligning ourselves with the United States, over that period, we did nothing to minimizing this. If anything, we probably increased tensions and if we had been a real buffer zone, if we had done everything diplomatically—I am not saying we could have done this or whether the people would have approved it—if we could have devoted everything in a diplomatic effort to moderate tensions between East and West, it would have been more in the long-term interests of Canada than militarily aligning ourselves very closely with the United States.

Mr. Cafik: Do you not feel that the alliances that we have been involved in have been very successful, at least in the short haul. In the long term I do not really know. But we have not had a nuclear war. We have certainly maintained a free Europe as a result of those alliances. Perhaps you would say that it would have been anyway, but I do not particularly agree. I think we have curtailed the expansionist desires of Russia, in a military sense; we have not seen too much of that in a

direct sense. That, it seems to me, must be the result of something.

Professor Warnock: I say it could be attributed to NATO; I am not convinced of this. Of course, it is just a matter of judgment whether it has been as a result of NATO or not, or whether what really deterred them was the fact that the United States had a nuclear bomb with the capability of blowing up the Soviet Union. That may have been the real deterrent, if you assume that they were intent on a policy of military aggression in Europe. I do not agree with that.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Professor.

Mr. Legault: I have two short questions Mr. Chairman. In your opening remarks, Professor, you did mention, and this has been underlined by Mr. Cafik and I believe by Mr. Ryan, that Russia at the moment was encountering some difficulties, and as far as you were concerned it is getting weaker because of its headaches with the Warsaw Pact countries. I was left with the impression from those remarks that you did not believe that Russia was an aggressor anymore. Mr. Ryan has certainly underlined the fact of all the activities going on throughout the world. But in your paper you suggest that the Arctic area be used internationally in a mutual missile and bomber detection system which would provide information to both sides. This is the plan that you would adopt that we be impartial on both sides and merely be an informer to both sides as to what could possibly happen. You understand that this would break our affiliation with the United States entirely.

Professor Warnock: No, I think the United States is in a position now where it really wants to promote a détente with the Soviet Union and is looking at this. One thing that really inhibits this is the Vietnam War. If it were not for the Vietnam War, I think that you would have seen a great deal more initiatives towards peace and co-operation with the Soviet Union over the last few years. I think this is one area where we could open up an opportunity. It may not be a really great significant thing, but it would be an opportunity to create a new area of compromise.

Mr. Legault: Do you believe, Professor, that the United States are aggressors in any sense, because by this you suggest that the possibility is as much that the United States

would launch a nuclear attack as would Russia.

Professor Warnock: I think it is a feasible policy that you have got to take that into consideration. For example, in Robert Kennedy's book *Thirteen Days*, he mentions that Secretary to the Air Force, at that time, who was Curtis Lemay, suggested at the time of the Cuban crisis that the United States immediately launch a nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union. All during the whole controversy over what to do about Cuba with the missiles there, the military as a unit consistently said that the only solution was an attack and an invasion of Cuba. So, the military are sort of conditioned to think in terms of using the military to solve problems.

Mr. Legault: Using it as a defence.

Professor Warnock: Well, I do not know; they may be.

Mr. Legault: What you are saying necessarily is that the world has to fear the United States as much as it has to fear Russia.

Professor Warnock: I think the world has to fear nuclear war and take precautions, and we should do everything we can to make sure that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ever want to, or are in a position where they feel they ought to, use their nuclear weapons.

Mr. Legault: I have a question which follows this statement that we should pull out of any participation in those: do you believe that Canada should increase substantially its monies in civil defence—I am referring to EMO—because of the description of the devastating dangers and effects of a nuclear attack where Canada would be the victim.

Professor Warnock: Yes, if you are looking at it in a realistic sense about what can Canada really do to defend itself, then you have to take into consideration what are the probabilities of an attack, and the greatest threat to Canada is the possibility of a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is the greatest threat to Canada's existence.

Under those circumstances the most logical thing, if you want to spend money on defence, would be to spend it on survival, in this case. I am not convinced, as I mentioned before, that if we ever got to the point where

nuclear weapons were being used in an all-out attack between the Soviet Union and the United States it would make much difference whether we had fall-out shelters or not, because I think when you get to the magnitude of the number of weapons that are being used, if such a situation ever occurred, that, as Herman Kahn said in his first book, the living will envy the dead.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much, Professor.

The Chairman: I would like to ask one question, Professor Warnock. I understand that the United States does provide through its forces for the defence of Canadian territory to some extent; I believe this is air defence in Western Canada. Are you familiar with the details of the defence that is provided for Canadian territory by United States forces, and can tell us what they are?

Professor Warnock: They have contingency plans. For example, in the Cuban missile crisis they asked to transfer American interceptor planes into Canadian territory, and this was denied by the Government. As far as the specific plans are concerned, I have not seen these as they are available to people only on the basis of need to know. Even when I was in the State Department I did not see those plans. However, they do have all kinds of plans: for example, they even have plans as to what they would do if the Russians invaded Canada. They have plans for every possible situation.

The Chairman: But is not the American Air Force now providing for the defence of Western Canada? Do you know this?

Professor Warnock: I would think so because the Canadian interceptors are stationed in British Columbia and North Bay with nothing in between. If you look at the defence force you can see that the Canadian interceptors do not have the range to cover that area. So that, in case there is a bomber attack, that area, because of the location of the Canadian interceptors, will be defended, if it can be called that, by American interceptors based in North Dakota and Montana and so on.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson, did you have a second line of questioning?

Mr. Anderson: No, not a second line. I would like to follow along with the last line

that I had. Would you say, sir, that the Alliance for Progress has been a success?

Professor Warnock: No.

Mr. Anderson: In your earlier statements you indicated that it was only set up for one thing: to prevent violent revolution and to prevent Latin America adopting Chairman Mao's thesis of revolution followed by . . .

Professor Warnock: Yes.

Mr. Anderson: So you think it has been a failure. Does this mean that you expect a series of Cuba's throughout Latin America?

Professor Warnock: The Americans themselves are now admitting—the government last year admitted that the Alliance for Progress had been a failure. I do not know what will happen in the long run in Latin America. There are about eight countries in Latin America now which have very small revolutions going on. I would predict that in the next twenty years, since the economic conditions and the standard-of-living of people in Latin America is not improving in any way—in fact, it is deteriorating; that is, the food available on a per capita basis in Latin America is declining every year—these guerrilla wars will increase and perhaps become more intense.

Mr. Anderson: I certainly would not disagree with you on that. Do you feel, however, that by a fairly massive increase in aid to that area, through the Alliance for Progress or any other revitalized area development programme, we can prevent such a thing? Or do you feel that because of the social structures existing in many of these countries, and I admit that there are many different types, it is impossible to achieve the development that the Alliance for Progress, for instance, was set up to achieve?

Professor Warnock: I think Latin America is much more difficult than any other area in which to bring about meaningful change. This is one of the great frustrations of the Alliance for Progress in the first two years, particularly, that the original Punta del Este Conference, which established through the OAS the Alliance for Progress programme, called for the Latin American countries to make major reform in land distribution, in tax reform, and to tax the rich. Most of the rich are not taxed in Latin America. Most of the land is

not taxed. In case after case, when put to this test, the governments in Latin America refused to carry out the reforms and it was very frustrating for the Kennedy administration to see that their aims, in effect, were frustrated by the unwillingness of the, I think it is fair to say, particularly in Latin America's case, the entrenched oligarchy's refusing to make any changes at all in the situation.

Mr. Anderson: I certainly agree with you in what you have said. It is my impression, too. However, you did suggest earlier on that we devote as much as we could to external aid in an attempt to avoid revolutions of this type. Yet, you agree with me that revolutions are probably quite inevitable in Latin America. Can you take this one step further, that really and truly should we now re-examine our original premise and see if we should attempt to avoid such things.

Professor Warnock: First of all, if we are going to have a selective policy for example, wherever we give our aid, I would not have stressed Latin America except, for example, the British Commonwealth areas in the Caribbean. I would have stressed the Commonwealth underdeveloped countries, the Francophone underdeveloped countries. I think more can be done there than in Latin America, and particularly, since the United States has this overwhelming interest in Latin America, that you are really meddling in what the Americans consider to be their particular interest. I think Canada could be much more effective, in a positive way by trying to create political, commercial and economic ties with areas other than those which are under the control of the United States.

Mr. Anderson: Do you think there is much possibility of non-communist revolutionary movements developing in Latin America? By this I do not simply mean palace revolutions of generals. I mean revolutions whereby there is a total change of the social structure and yet they do not necessarily follow the Cuban or Chinese pattern?

Professor Warnock: I do not know, really. It is hard to say because of the re-action now. For example, the Cuban revolution was essentially a middle class revolution of college students who were millionaires' and doctors' sons. This is why all during the revolution the communist party in Cuba opposed it and said it was just a bourgeois revolution. After

these bourgeois nationalist revolutionaries got into power they began to nationalize American business and they were pushed more and more to the left and when Castro—and you have to understand Latin American terminology—announced in December, 1961 that he was a Marxist this was, in effect, a way of saying “I am not a communist. I am a revolutionary”. At no time did he or Guevera, or any of these people, associate with the communist party because they think the communist party is sold out, that it is a counter-revolutionary group, and they have consistently held this view from 1954 on. They have strenuously opposed the communist party in Latin America because it was historically aligned with Russia, following Russia's foreign policy line, and therefore would not give any aid. For example, in the Bolivian revolution, the tin miners in Bolivia, are all members of the communist workers union, and on orders from Moscow they gave no support to Guevera. The tin miners are armed, and if they had given full support to Guevera his revolution would have been successful.

Mr. Anderson: This certainly appeared from his diary. You think then that there is quite a possibility in Latin America for what I am describing as the policy of self reliance a sort of internal regeneration which might not be communist.

Professor Warnock: The strongest move, I think, sitting here and reading about it, in Latin America is nationalism and anti-Yankee attitudes and so forth. As you know, many writers and Latin Americans say that all Latin American nationalists believe in nationalization because they believe that the only way you are going to control your economy is to nationalize the American and foreign business.

It does not particularly mean that they are communists. It just means that they believe in national control of the economy.

Mr. Anderson: The Peruvian generals have proved that.

Professor Warnock: Yes, in Peru.

Mr. Anderson: One final question. I am sorry to have taken so much of your time. You stated that we should attempt to expand trade with Japan and China. Having served in that area as Assistant Trade Commissioner for three years, I am extremely curious to have your ideas on where these great oppor-

tunities for trade are. Personally, I think that trade with China, for example, goes entirely to the person who can provide the best deal. The classic example of this is West Germany which has the best possible trade relations with China while other nations fall a bit by the wayside. Do you honestly feel that there is some unexplored area of trade in the Far East which somehow if we look less to the United States we would be able to find. Is it simply a question of Canada not being aggressive enough in that area?

Professor Warnock: You probably know a lot more about this than I do, but I think it is also a problem that most of our trade is already with the United States, and much of this trade is dictated by the branch plant system.

Also, Japan has very strict trade controls. They will not import more than they will export, and then you have got to convince the manufacturers in Canada that they should allow into Canada what they consider to be cheap Japanese goods in order to promote a balanced trade back and forth. The same with China, and until Canada makes a positive effort to increase imports of manufactured

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goods from China and Japan, then the trade will probably remain the same.

Mr. Anderson: I certainly appreciate your comments. I must say I disagree entirely on those last two points. Both Japanese and Chinese businessmen and government officials with whom I have discussed this have been fully aware that you only balance things on over-all terms, and the Chinese no more wish to balance their trade with us than they would want to balance it with Hong Kong where they have a tremendous surplus, just as with Canada they have a serious imbalance against them.

Professor Warnock: You do not think they would want to increase their exports.

Mr. Anderson: Certainly they would, but this would not necessarily give us more opportunity to sell there. It is just an observation. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, if there are no other questions, on your behalf I would like to thank Professor Warnock for a very helpful and a very interesting presentation. Thank you Professor Warnock.

APPENDIX MM

Canada's Role in North American Defence

by John W. Warnock

It is useful for every country to review its foreign and defence policy every few years, for international conditions change rather rapidly. A defence policy must always be based on a realistic assessment of the long term interests of the country. Planning must concentrate on probabilities and not be prejudiced by habit which has developed over the past. Furthermore, all programmes develop vested interests, and defence institutions have not escaped Parkinson's Law. In Canada, as in most countries, resources are scarce and demands are great in many areas. A government formulating its defence programme must recognize the other demands and needs; since defence spending is not as productive as spending in other areas, a government must be certain that the existing and new programmes serve an absolutely essential function.

A military establishment exists to protect and defend the state. There are only two countries which might conceivably attack Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union. Some might speculate that in the distant future China could become a military enemy of Canada, but this stretches the imagination. But what we have feared most in recent years is a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the era of nuclear weapons, delivered by missiles and bombers, Canada would be caught in the middle because of our geographic position and would most probably become a nuclear "no-mans land".

But the central reality for Canada is that we cannot defend against an attack by either the Soviet Union or the United States; we do not have the resources for a defence. Secondly, it is also quite clear that there is nothing that could be done to protect Canada in case of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no defence, in the classical sense, in a nuclear war. Even before the advent of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), both countries had the capacity to rain unacceptable devastation on each other.

Soon after World War II, beginning as early as 1946, the Canadian government decided that our security could best be maintained by a close military alliance with the United States. Our defence was integrated into the American defence system whose primary function was to detect a possible Soviet bomber attack on the United States. This development culminated in the signing of the NORAD agreement in 1958.

However, the North American defence system included acceptance of the belief that the United States could be *defended* against a bomber attack from the Soviet Union. Thus, over the years, tremendous amounts of money have been spent on developing interceptors and missiles. In reality they could never have provided an acceptable defence for North America. The defence system could not have shot down more than 50% of the incoming bombers, and in the 1950's that meant that most of the likely targets would not have escaped devastation. Furthermore, it was never a necessary part of the deterrent system, the U.S. Strategic Air Command: the radar detection system was adequate to give notice of the approach of Soviet bombers.

Significantly, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I the month before the NORAD agreement began; it symbolized the end of the bomber era, and the real beginning of the period of the balance of terror. There is no defence against the ICBM. Even the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system being considered by the United States will not provide any meaningful defence.

As early as May 17, 1965, Robert McNamara, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, proclaimed the NORAD system to be obsolete. In February 1968 he called for the phasing out of the old radar lines and the introduction of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The only real purpose of the NORAD system today is to provide a warning against a Soviet missile attack. Is Canada's continued membership in NORAD necessary for this function? Does Canada's membership make the American deterrent more effective?

First, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) is operated outside Canada: at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and

Fylingdales Moor, England. No Canadian participation or territory is necessary for this operation. The only aerospace contribution that Canada makes is the Baker-Nunn camera sensor at Cold Lake, Alberta, which could easily be moved to the United States. Furthermore, the United States now has in operation the new over-the-horizon radar, operated from stations in the United States, which is far better than the odd anti-bomber and BMEWS system.

According to the latest estimates from the U.S. Department of Defense, released in January 1969, the Soviet Union has approximately 800 ICBMs and is converting these to multiple warheads. They have at least 30 nuclear submarines capable of launching missiles on the United States. In case of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, would there be anything left of the Canadian defence system to shoot down the Soviet Union's 155 bombers? Would there be anything left for the Soviet bombers to bomb? It is about time the Canadian people admitted that their annual expenditure on the North American defence system is a complete waste of money.

However, I would also challenge the current approach to defence on a more fundamental basis: as a basic approach to peace. Is it the best way to protect Canada from a nuclear exchange that would probably mean the total devastation of the populated areas of our country? Nuclear war threatens the very existence of Canada, and our government is charged with the responsibility of minimizing the possibility of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In my opinion, our decision to join in the defence arrangements with the United States has not lessened tension between the two giants but probably has increased it. Permitting nuclear-armed bombers from the United States to fly on "fail-safe" missions over Canada up to the border of the Soviet Union could only be described as dangerous. Canada has not served as a buffer zone in this conflict; we have served as an extension of the United States military system. Therefore, we have brought the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union that much closer to conflict.

Under the present balance of terror, it is important for Canada to make sure that the

deterrence system works *both ways*. We want to be certain that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is able to launch a surprise attack on the other country. Therefore, it would seem to make more sense for Canada to take direct initiatives in this area for the promotion of stability. Canada could suggest that the Arctic area be used internationally in a mutual missile and bomber detection system. This is not a new proposal;¹ it has been suggested in the past but ignored by Canadian officials. Perhaps it would not be military meaningful in present circumstances. But it would be a token move towards peace, similar in impact to the 1963 agreement to ban atmospheric nuclear tests.

Canada could also revive discussion for demilitarization of the Arctic area. In 1958 President Eisenhower proposed one plan for Arctic sky inspection which was presented to the U.N. Security Council by Dag Hammarskjöld.² There were several drawbacks to this proposal; on the whole it seemed to present an advantage to the United States, for there were few U.S. airbases outside Alaska in the area to be covered while it was presumed that the Soviet Union maintained many more airbases in the Arctic circle. However, another proposal was put forth in 1964 by two scientists, Alexander Rich of the United States and Alexandr P. Vinogradov of the Soviet Union.³ This proposal called for a three step plan for possible complete Arctic disarmament, which would involve Norway and Sweden as well as Canada. Canada should be sincerely interested in reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union; an initiative could be made in this general area.

In summary then, it is my belief that the present Canadian contribution to the "defence" of North America is unrealistic, obsolete and wasteful, and could be eliminated without endangering the American deterrent in any way. Furthermore, I do not believe that

¹ For example, see Harry Pope, "Let the Russians Use the DEW Line Too", *Maclean's*, December 1959, pp. 10, 60-61.

² For a summary, see Trevor Lloyd, "Open Skies in the Arctic", *International Journal*, XIV, No. 1, Winter 1958-59, pp. 42-49.

³ Alexander Rich and Alexandr P. Vinogradov, "Arctic Disarmament", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XX, November 1964, pp. 22-23.

military integration with the United States is the best approach to building peace between the Soviet Union and the United States. New policies and initiatives could be undertaken by Canada, and it is quite likely that they would be welcomed by the United States. Certainly the money saved could be spent in more productive programmes, both at home and abroad.

BIOGRAPHY

John W. Warnock. Born December 1, 1933, at Cleveland Ohio. A.B. Duke University. M.A. Ph.D. American University. Archivist, Library of Congress, 1958-1961. U.S. Foreign Service, Department of State, 1961-1963. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, 1963-1969.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 31

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1969



Respecting
Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

THE QUEEN'S PRINTER, OTTAWA, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	MacRae
Anderson	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Marceau
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Nowlan
Brewin	Laniel	Penner
¹ Buchanan	Laprise	Prud'homme
Cafik	Legault	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Fairweather	Lewis	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Forrestall	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Macquarrie	Winch—(30)
	(Quorum 16)	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4)(b):

¹ Mr. Buchanan replaced Mr. Groos on February 26, 1969.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

(Text)

THURSDAY, February 27, 1969
(46)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, Macquarrie, Marcceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Winch (23).

Also present: Messrs. Groos and Hymmen, M.P.'s.

Witness: Professor Albert Legault, Visiting Professor, Chair of Strategic Studies, Queen's University.

On motion of Mr. Winch,

Resolved,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Dr. Theo Sommer and Professor J. Granatstein, who have been invited to appear as witnesses before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, in the matter of its Order of Reference dated Thursday, January 16, 1969.

The Vice-Chairman introduced the witness, Professor Albert Legault. Professor Legault made an opening statement.

Members questioned Professor Legault on various aspects of defence policy.

It was agreed that Professor Legault's advance presentation entitled *NATO: A Vital And Necessary Organization*, copies of which were distributed, in English and French, and his biography, be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix nn*)

At the conclusion of the questioning, the Vice-Chairman thanked Professor Legault for his testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 12:50 p.m., until 8:00 p.m. this day, when the witness will be Dr. Theo Sommer.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, February 27, 1969.

The Vice-Chairman: Please come to order.

• 1110

I would like to inform the Committee that we will be setting aside 15 minutes this evening for a discussion of our plans for the itinerary in Europe and our voyage commencing on March 8 next. We will try to answer any questions at that time.

Mr. Brewin: Is that an in camera session?

The Vice-Chairman: No, this will be a session to hear the presentation of Dr. Sommer.

Mr. Brewin: It does not make much difference because usually the important—

The Vice-Chairman: I do not think we can hear you, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: I was just asking you whether the session this evening to discuss the arrangements was in camera, and then suggesting it does not make much difference at any rate because apparently what we carry in camera is fully reported by members.

The Vice-Chairman: I think this might just as well be carried on in camera. It concerns just the petty details of the voyage.

Mr. Brewin: I am looking at you, yes.

The Vice-Chairman: Let us have a little order. I do not think we want to get into that matter at the moment. I would like to introduce now...

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, I have a question of personal privilege. This has been brought up on two occasions by other members of this Committee and I think if they get the Minutes of the last open meeting we had they will find a statement of my views there which is perfectly public for anyone to read. Not only was it a public statement, it was publicly recorded, so I think perhaps Mr. Brewin's comments are out of order.

Mr. Brewin: If I have done the member any injustice I will withdraw them.

Mr. Anderson: Good.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would like to follow up this comment.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacDonald, on a question of privilege.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): There seems to be some confusion about whether, once an in camera meeting is concluded, members are free to give their individual views of what they either said or what happened in Committee. I am not referring to any particular situation, but it does seem to me that there is some confusion about whether or not there shall be comments by individual members concerning what went on and what was said.

I think there should be some general agreement by the Committee about whether or not there shall be simply a statement of the decisions made by the Chairman or whether it is open to members of the Committee to express views about what went on and what they said, or anything else that was said.

The Vice-President: Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, on this point, I too was a little bit disturbed. This happened in another committee, if I may relate what happened there, and I think we came to a good conclusion. After an in camera meeting of the Public Accounts Committee and interview was given to radio and television, outlining what had happened, and so on. I raised this as a point of personal privilege at that time and we came to the conclusion that we did not think anyone had really made any mistake, but everyone at least should have understood the rules of the game.

We concluded that in subsequent in camera meetings, at their conclusion a decision would be made concerning what the Chairman was allowed to announce in terms of conclusions reached in that in camera meeting. I suggest

that is what we ought to do here. At the conclusion of in camera meetings we should come to a conclusion about what is going to be told to the press otherwise there is no point in having an in camera meeting.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Then I take it that all hon. members would be in favour of postponing this discussion until this evening at which time we will have an in camera meeting and decide.

Mr. Anderson: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I do not think that is the point at all. I think we should discuss it and finish with it now. Both previous speakers have mentioned "once a meeting is concluded," As I said, if he will get the Minutes of the previous public meeting which took place in the morning of the day that we had the in camera meeting in the evening, he will see a perfectly clear statement of my position.

I do not see, if we have an in camera meeting subsequently to discuss something which has already been raised and fully explained, why a personal view which may or may not have been expressed in the in camera meeting but certainly is the view of the member should not be discussed with anyone at all, the press included. This is the particular point here.

• 1115

You stated, Mr. MacDonald, quite rightly that once the meeting is concluded what happened in the meeting is in camera, and I agree. But if a statement has been made prior which has not only been made publicly but has been put on the record and in the Minutes of this Committee, I see no reason why what is publicly published cannot be repeated verbally to the press.

Again, Mr. Cafik, you mentioned that "after the in camera committee meeting," what was said is privileged and I quite agree, but if you made a perfectly clear statement of position prior to an in camera meeting you can certainly repeat it after the in camera meeting. The in camera meeting does not close your mouth to discussion of a certain topic.

Mr. Cafik: Oh, I would agree with that totally. So far as I am concerned the point you make puts the whole matter in its proper context. However, it does raise the over-all problem of what happens in in camera meet-

ings and what our responsibilities are. I do not bring up the point, Mr. Anderson, in respect of what you have done but in respect of the over-all position—and perhaps I should have made that clear—concerning our obligations in in camera meetings. If we agree on that, let us just drop the subject.

The Vice-Chairman: Is that agreed?

Mr. Barrett: We will continue this discussion this evening, in other words.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, we will take the point up again this evening.

Mr. Barrett: Fine.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, today the Committee will be hearing testimony on NATO by Professor Albert Legault. Professor Legault at present holds the Chair of Strategic Studies at Queen's University where he is a visiting professor. Members will find details of Professor Legault's previous experience and publications in the field of international relations in the material that has been circulated, along with his written statement entitled "NATO: A Vital and Necessary Organization".

I would like to point out that as well as other works, Professor Legault is the author of the book "Deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance" published in 1966, which is particularly germane to the Committee's work at this time.

Professor Legault will be making an opening statement in English and an introductory statement on the subject of Canada's involvement in NATO in French. For the Committee's information he is, in fact, fluent in both French and English. As is our practice, members will be able to question him on his views afterwards.

Before asking Professor Legault to make his statement, I would just like to remind you that Dr. Theo Sommer will be appearing as a witness this evening at 8.00 p.m. in this room—253-D—to talk about European security problem from Europeans' point of view. Now Professor Legault, may we commence?

Professor Albert Legault (Visiting Assistant Professor (Queen's University) Department of Political Studies, Kingston; Chair of Strategic Studies): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, it is a pleasure and a privilege for me to testify before your distin-

guished Committee. Before accepting this invitation I had some hesitation about the subject of Canadian participation in NATO, since I can hardly see what can be said that is new or what has not been said that is significant, but since politics seems to consist of repeating over and over again the same things in different ways or with a new dressing, I will venture today for your understanding and your patience.

• 1120

In doing so I realize that there is a certain amount of masochism involved on my part, especially when it comes to the painful process of organizing before you my disorganized cults, but I am sure this will be reciprocated on your side by a certain amount of sadism, at least when the time comes for questions. This having been said I can then proceed to what the French are very proud of in any article; in any book; in any speech—presumably even in the love affair—that is to say, the introductory approach. You will hence allow me to do it in French.

[Interpretation]

Gentlemen, I would like to complete the text you have before you, in two different ways. First of all, I want to point out certain aspects of the evolution of relations between the two Great Powers, on the one hand, and between European countries, on the other hand. And then, later, we will draw the conclusions that may be implied from this with regard to NATO.

From the Cuba crisis till today, the *détente* let us admit—except for the brief interruption due to the occupation of Czechoslovakia and despite Vietnam—has been the dominant feature in relation between the two Great Powers. The main meeting ground was around the great strategic debate. This gave rise to suspension of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the setting up of a hot line, the interdiction of the orbiting of nuclear devices and, finally, the tabling of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

And to all this we have to add the dialogue which has already started on the reduction of offensive and defensive strategic arms, i.e. the anti-missile defence system.

From a general viewpoint, the evolution of the policy of the two Great Powers is no less striking. First of all, the United States after vain efforts to develop the MLF project, the

multi-lateral force, withdrew from European problems to attach an increasing importance to the improvement of their relations with the U.S.S.R.

Then, there was the non-proliferation of nuclear arms plan which coincided, curiously enough, with the progressive engagement of the United States in Vietnam. The Russians, on the other hand, renounced little by little to the universalism of revolutionary communism as soon as the Moscow-Peking rupture took place, and attached increasing importance to Middle East questions and to the problem of European security. Two points are worth mentioning here. First of all, the asymmetry between the evolution of Soviet policy and American policy could not be more total. Little by little, Moscow has drawn in on itself to deal with its own most immediate interests, while Washington has seemed, and I insist on this, has seemed to neglect its allies to suddenly become attached to the need of safeguarding western values—at least, this is what is claimed—in Asia. Secondly, the strategic debate on the stabilization of the nuclear balance strangely resembles that that existed between the wars when the naval powers tried first of all to stabilize the strategic balance on the seas when the continental powers were thinking of the future in terms of European guarantees.

This historical parallel applies pretty well to the European situation today. France certainly was the first country to also look openly for understanding and cooperation with the Eastern countries. But Germany soon followed in the race towards a *détente*, and this made it increasingly harder for the Russians to swallow the pill. The point that we have to remember here, and I already emphasized this in the text that has been distributed to you, is that many European countries, both eastern and western, refuse to recognize the division of Europe as a definitive and final one.

• 1125

Now, the objective of the Moscow policy is obviously, first of all, to consolidate the status quo in Europe which enables it thereby to conserve its military position which it has acquired after such great effort. Secondly, to consolidate its control over the Warsaw Pact countries in such a way as to make them faithful allies. Third, to obtain the disman-

ting of NATO so as to transform Western Europe into a sub-continent which would be, if not converted to its theories, at least would come under its political influence.

The objectives of the European countries, excluding the U.S.S.R., are obviously set in the opposite direction. First of all, they want to bypass and go beyond the status quo; secondly, as far as the eastern countries are concerned, to escape from the soviet control and, as far as the western countries are concerned, to move towards unity by setting up political and economic institutions. Paradoxically, and this is important, NATO meets to a certain extent objectives number one and number two of the U.S.S.R. policy. Since military alliances tend to petrify the status quo on the one hand, and furnish arguments to the Russians to justify the control which they maintain over the Warsaw pact countries, on the other hand.

These ideas are not new, however. They have already been presented to us with much assurance, on many occasions, by a great number of French officials. It is unfortunate however, that one thus comes to consider as the cause, what is but the effects. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are just the result of Europe's division. It is only by attacking the roots of the evil that Europe can find again its lost unity. The questions which to me seem important to ask as conclusion, are as follows: first, in what measure can NATO advance the cause for the re-unification of Europe; secondly, in what measure will the Alliance have to be modified to better achieve these objectives? And here I would like to apologize for leaving the members of the Committee still looking for answers by finishing with questions rather than with answers.

[English]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Brewin has the first question.

Mr. Brewin: You took me by surprise, Mr. Chairman. I was very interested in Professor Legault's paper and I have one problem. As I understand it, he says one of the reasons we should stay within the NATO Alliance is in order to participate in the process of using NATO as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the development of the détente.

I have argued that case many times and entirely agree with it, but I am having trouble with the proposition that it is not used for that purpose and on the face of it seems to be a purely military, monolithic, static, unchanging sort of set-up which is really not used for these admirable purposes that you have set out in your paper.

I am wondering whether you could give to the Committee any reason to be more hopeful that in the future NATO will be more than a purely military alliance. I know it has been referred to in communiqués from time to time, but it is very unconvincing to some people. I wonder if you could help us on that.

Professor Legault: Yes, Mr. Brewin, you certainly went to the heart of the matter. I think it is an extremely difficult question to answer. First of all, for the reasons I mentioned I think that NATO to a certain extent plays into Russian hands in the sense that it does tend, because it is purely a military alliance, to typify the status quo. In other words, the reasons that account for the stability of the status quo are the same reasons that account for the rigidity of the two blocs and you certainly score a point there.

● 1130

However, I think the important point to remember is that you should not take the effects for the cause. I mentioned in my paper that the Russians only ask one thing, which is to say an Eastern Europe, and the Americans, to my mind, would be pretty happy to leave if only Western Europe could take into its own hands the problems of defence.

I have the impression that if you look back at the history of the cold war it has been extremely difficult for France to sell its ideas to either the Eastern European states or to the Soviet Union. I think if France does that unilaterally, you do not see any pay-off on the other side. If you ask me what are the alternatives, I think if you proceed on a bilateral basis the only thing you can do is slowly to diminish the value of NATO which, at the same time, will consolidate the conviction of the U.S.S.R. that they are right in their policy of maintaining tight control over the Eastern European states. To my mind NATO is as important to the Western world today, if you take it as an instrument of peaceful change, as it is to the Eastern European states because these states need NATO in order to have a leverage to negotiate with West.

Just imagine if NATO were dismantled. How are the Eastern European states going to manage to discuss anything with the West when they will have nothing to discuss? It is a way for the Eastern European states at the same time to try to escape from Soviet control, and I think that this is pretty well their policy. The Czechoslovakian affair is a good example of that, to my mind.

If you agree with this general statement, I think we can go deeper into the question and try to see in fact what NATO can do. I am not sure that it will be possible for NATO to achieve détente without trying to deal with various problems at regional levels. I would see the whole problem myself as a network of concentric circles where in fact West Germany would negotiate with East Germany. They have many problems in common, be it only for humanitarian reasons. I would also see a second concentric circle between Western Europe and the Eastern European states, and I would hope that Europe in fact would achieve a certain degree of political unity in the sense that it would be able to negotiate as a common front as well as in a position of strength. I would see the third circle as the United States and the Soviet Union discussing the effects which a European settlement or the effects of the original European security agreement may have on their own relations and especially as regards the maintenance of their own strategic and military equilibrium. Does this answer your question?

Mr. Brewin: Yes. I think so. I have just one other question. I do not want to summarize what you have said unfairly, but I think if I understand it you said that one of the main reasons for Canada remaining in NATO would be that it would enable us to participate in the evolution of a more peaceful system in Europe and in the world. It would strengthen our ties with the continent and so forth.

We have had from General Foulkes—I think I am putting it correctly—the suggestion that we should substantially change our military role within NATO. We should scrap the air division, and change the static brigade group in the forward lines in Germany into a contribution to the ACE mobile force available for the flanks in Europe. I take it that you do not profess to be a military expert, particularly, but are more expert in the political side of this matter. Is there any reason why

the political advantages you see available to us by participation in NATO would not be equally available if we opt for a change of roles along the general lines suggested by General Foulkes?

• 1135

Professor Legault: I must say that I completely agree with General Fouldkes' statement presented before this Committee. For the same military reasons he has explained to you, I think first of all that if you do convert your heavy brigade, or if you get rid of it when its equipment has been worn out, and make a commitment of a light brigade to the mobile armed force under the ACE command, you could use these same forces for peace-keeping. You do not duplicate your equipment, but you try to make it as versatile and flexible as possible in the sense of Canadian needs.

Again I think we should talk about Canadian needs in terms of foreign policy. The kind of participation which we make to NATO is to my mind not very important. I think this is a question which should be left to the military experts and I can only tell you that I agree with General Foulkes. I very much insist that we have a presence of Canadian forces in Europe, because if we do not have a presence there I think we will not be consulted as a full-fledged member of the alliance, as I said in my brief, but rather as an outside expert who in fact may have some ideas, but not much to say.

For example, I mentioned in the conclusions of the brief that Canada could have had quite a role to play in the argument which has divided the alliance as regards the policy of massive retaliation and the policy of flexible response. This is to my mind a purely academic debate, providing that you agree to talk the same language. If you are interested in that, I could go further later on. I think that answers your questions.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: A supplementary question, Mr. Hymmen.

Mr. Hymmen: I have a question in regard to Mr. Brewin's first question, in which he enquired about what NATO has done in the area of détente. Is it not true, Professor Legault, that the events of last August cer-

tainly deterred or negated the optimism which was apparent under the Harmel Plan?

Professor Legault: That is a very interesting comment. I guess we more or less disagree on the interpretation which should be granted to the Czechoslovakian events, at least according to the way you formulate your question.

I think we have to look at history again. In fact the French policy to my mind may not be so divisive, or may not have been so divisive if it had provided or produced positive results in the east. In fact it has provided the opposite results from those which were expected, and in this sense it is a failure.

On the other hand I think that this policy may have come too soon. If it is pursued in 10 or 15 years from now it may yield different results. I think that the Russian system or the Soviet empire is not yet ready to accept any decentralization of its authority because it is not secure enough. In other words, it has not yet digested what it absorbed 20 years ago. As long as this is the situation, I do not see any hopeful sign of a rapid détente in Europe.

The same thing applies, perhaps, to the grand design by President Kennedy. I hope that this will be possible in 20 years from now. But I do not see what could be achieved as far as détente is concerned either if NATO disappeared or if the Western European states cannot build up their own political and defence unity.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch, on a supplementary question.

● 1140

Mr. Winch: I have a supplementary question based on the Professor's reply to Mr. Brewin. You not only mentioned, but I think you rather emphasized the influence Canada can have by remaining inside NATO, even if there is a change of role. Would you mind expanding on that matter of influence a little more by letting the Committee have your impressions as to any change in Canada's influence, if there was a change, and if so in what direction, when France made a change in its relationship with NATO.

Professor Legault: Is this the only specific example you have?

Mr. Winch: I am just using it because I think it is the best example.

Professor Legault: As you know I never had access to the NATO Council proceedings so it is difficult for me to tell you what influence Canada had at the time. There were some press statements at the time that Canada was trying to moderate the reactions of the other NATO members. We heard it also from other people, that Canada has had a certain moderating influence, and this is excellent. As to whether we can have influences in other areas, I think that to go back to this process of détente is important, because perhaps we have tried to tackle the bull by the horn in trying to get through the central problem of Soviet power in Europe. Allow me to use a distinction which is common in strategy namely a difference between the direct and the indirect approach. I have mentioned that the problem of the unification of Europe today is probably more important than the problem of the unification of Germany which, if ever achieved, will happen only at the end of everything else.

First of all it reminds me what President Thiers said of Alsace-Lorraine in the 1880's. He said let us never talk of it but always think of it. The problem of German unification to my mind is, let us always talk of it but never think of it. The terms have been reversed.

Perhaps we have tackled the wrong problems, and we should try to have a policy of détente in the Balkans. After all Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey are all Balkan countries; they have quite a lot of influence, especially after the Czechoslovakian invasion. I think that we have seen some close collaboration or rather rapprochement between Rumania and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria is still very much a difficult problem, but perhaps we should try to stabilize one area and have some withdrawal of troops in this area. Perhaps this is a policy which could be studied, a policy that could be proposed by Canada, a policy in which in fact Canada could even be used as a peacekeeping agent.

This is one example. I think there are other examples of influence. I have mentioned in my paper that in fact if you do want to have influence, first of all you need a policy. I do not know what the policy of the Canadian government is and how many task groups and how many committees are studying these problems. But I have never seen any public statement, in fact, that we were trying to

present new plans or mediate between the East and the West, and so forth. Another area where we could have a certain influence is, as I mentioned before to Mr. Brewin, in the debate on the policies of massive retaliation versus flexible response. This is to my mind very academic, because what in fact is deterring Soviet aggression—if we think in terms of Soviet aggression which is something on which everybody does not agree—is only nuclear weapons through the process of escalation.

You must also take into account the fact that declared policy is one thing in time of peace and another thing in time of crisis. The Cuban crisis to my mind is an excellent example. The United States had already formulated quite extensively its policy of flexible response. Secretary of Defence McNamara had been in office for two years, and General Maxwell Taylor before McNamara had also proposed the policy. He was at the time special military adviser to President Kennedy. Despite the policy, in his famous statement of October 22nd President Kennedy said, "Any attack coming from Cuba will be considered as an attack coming from the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliation upon the Soviet Union".

It was a time of crisis. There was not much difference between this policy and the policy of massive retaliation of John Foster Dulles in 1954. I think that this is important to bear in mind.

• 1145

I think that if Canada had tried to explain that to the United States and perhaps to the NATO members, the split which has happened between France and the United States on this point could have been avoided. As you know, the theory of flexible response was suggested in the NATO Ministerial meeting of 1962, though you had to wait till the last meeting of December 1967 before this policy became the official declaratory policy of NATO, that is to say, until after France had withdrawn from the organization.

If you let me go further into these problems which are important to my mind, if you agree that in fact it is only nuclear weapons which deter through the process of escalation, that is to say, you need a threshold, obviously this is the second point which has raised some difficulties because the European states want-

ed the United States to define the exact level of this threshold. This threshold is a point which cannot be defined and will never be defined, because if you define it you invite the enemy to take some limited actions—anything above this threshold, below this threshold. In other words, if I said to members of this Committee, if anyone is talking to me in Greek today I will walk out of this room. So you may think that you may be allowed to talk French, Spanish and Italian and, in fact, I will not walk out of this room. So you see, when you fix a threshold you deprive yourself of the psychological effects of deterrents.

Now, this point cannot be defined to my mind and this is a point which should be left to the Germans in consultation with the Germans and this should be achieved in the Alliance as such through the process of consultation. The Germans and the British have very much insisted on the fact that you should resort to the use of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. This is an old thing, to my mind, which even goes back to 1960.

I think this is quite true, but if the Germans, in fact, prefer to wage a conventional war this is something you should decide in consultation and adjust your strategy or your declaratory policy in accordance with German needs, you see. You had at one time the Trettner Line which was an atomic demolition line between East and Western Germany and at the time, according to the public press reports that I have seen, if this atomic demolition line had been exploded it would have caused about 10 million German deaths on each side of the border.

As far as I know this policy has been completely abandoned; I do not whether for military or political reasons. Anyway, I think this is an important thing and I think this is a role where, in fact, Canada could have acted a long time ago if it had only thought of these problems.

An hon. Member: May I ask . . .

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch, you seem to be getting some very involved answers.

Mr. Winch: On the second part of my question I said, could you make a brief comment? Was there in your estimation any diminution of the influence of France in NATO because of what I term a rather radical change in policy, which resulted in the American and Canadian forces having to get out of France? I am coming back the influence . . .

Professor Legault: Do you mean the influence of Canada or the diminishing influence of France?

Mr. Winch: No, of France, on account of that.

Professor Legault: There is no doubt about it; you cannot even question that. Good Lord, when France withdrew from NATO all the fourteen other members went very closely together and they started, in fact, to try to see what could be done with the Alliance and they issued the army report, which is quite a landmark in the history of NATO. It has obviously been cut down in its more progressive aspects because, as you know, France is still within the NATO Council and this report had to be approved unanimously, but I think if it had not been for France it would have come out with more progressive results and more progressive policies.

Mr. Winch: Thank you.

Mr. MacLean: First I want to congratulate Professor Legault on his statement. Perhaps I am doing it from prejudice because it coincides very closely with what I believe our policy should be. At the same time, I think there is a psychological disadvantage to the Western world at the present time and perhaps he would comment on it.

We can be painted as having no desire but to maintain the status quo—there is a tendency to do so—and the only thing that is constant in the world is change. Therefore, those who are opposed to the present policy with regard to NATO tend to take the attitude that you can never improve unless you change, which is valid, of course. However, they go from there to the conclusion that any change will be an improvement and this leaves the communist world in a psychologically advantageous state because they are openly, I think, and certainly privately, committed to world domination and therefore change.

• 1150

You have the position where the status quo is being criticized because it naturally never reaches perfection, and you have the advocates of a different world putting forward the proposition that because the Eastern bloc represents change it represents improvement.

I am especially pleased that the professor's presentation comes from his generation

because I think a lot of people as young as he cannot remember from their own experiences World War II, and the beginning of the cold war afterwards, and the situation that Europe was in before NATO was created. A lot of people of that generation are having history rewritten for them by people who I think should be more responsible.

I wonder whether you would make some further comment on what opportunities you think there are for the Western World, and NATO in particular, to take some initiatives towards resolving the confrontation that has existed since World War II.

Professor Legault: Thank you, very much. I must say, perhaps as a counter factor to what I have said before, that Canada should not try to solve the problems of the world in the sense that there are some problems that cannot be solved. You may try to make your influence felt. This is extremely important and this is a point we should bear in mind, but perhaps we should not proclaim that we are trying to solve the problems of the world. If you have small influence it will be all the more felt if you are consistent in your foreign policy; if you will have a wide range of propositions for a limited step but extending to a wide range of areas, perhaps the codification of international law, peacekeeping, some limited influence within NATO, and so forth.

You have mentioned before that the Soviet Union is in a better psychological position. I must say that I thoroughly agree with you, in the sense that the Soviet Union has not budged an iota from its position concerning a European settlement, or even questions of disarmament, since World War II. It is a fact that the West has moved further to meet Soviet points.

This is also very true if you look at the example of France. We have tried consistently to shift away from immobilism—France, the first country. Germany has also very much shifted its policy. It thought that, in fact, it could achieve all its national goals through NATO. I think they cannot be completely achieved through that but can only be supported through NATO if they want to achieve anything at all.

For example, the big powers have also shifted from the four-power negotiation schemes on the reunification of Germany to almost the acceptance of the division of Ger-

many. Germany itself was very close to accepting recognition of Eastern Germany if it had not been for the Czechoslovakian tragedy. So obviously there are some moves everywhere, and I think there are some moves in the Soviet Union, too. Actually, they have tremendous problems. The first one, to my mind, is the increased role played by the Soviet intelligentsia. It is not necessary to recall the history of Czarist Russia to remember the important role the Soviet intelligentsia has played in the emancipation of the Soviet people.

The second thing is that as invasion succeeds invasion—there was obviously Budapest, there was Prague, the second Prague—there is a tendency to have forces that built up and also forces of distrust for the loyalty of the leaders. This is, to my mind, terribly important. There has been one Budapest, a second Prague—I am not sure that the Soviets will be in a position to do a third one.

• 1155

There is also this third factor which is terribly important: this growing disaffection of Soviet citizens for their own ideology. If you read the press reports of people who know Soviet Russia very well you will find out that it is quite a business for them to organize mass demonstrations in favour of their policy. They have to kick the workers out of their own factories. It is quite a problem, and there is no doubt that the Warsaw Pact invasion or occupation of Czechoslovakia has created some deep dissensions within the Soviet Union. There is no doubt about it and this process is certainly still going on. The fact is that it has taken three weeks for the Presidium to be in a position to submit a report to the Central Committee.

Now, you could start from two points. You can say: Well look, policy for the United States is to increase or to facilitate the disintegration of the Soviet empire without provoking them. This is one policy, obviously, which is more or less the actual policy of the European powers and of NATO. On the other hand, you can say that the actual American policy should be to accept or to recognize the status quo, which is obviously going against the will of the Eastern European powers as well as the Western powers. If you accept one hypothesis or the other you have a completely different set of values and a completely different set of policies.

Looking at history and the way nationalism is going in Europe there is no doubt in my mind that the Czechoslovakian nation has simply postponed the realization of what I have called here "an awakened dreaming". I think Canada has a role to play there because I think the future of Europe is fraught with uncertainties in the Balkan regions, in the Eastern European states, and I do not think the situation of immobilism will last forever. Whatever Canada does, I think if something happens to NATO we will be amongst the first countries to send our troops back there as we did in World War I and World War II.

There is no doubt that our security is closely tied with Europe if only because of the international monetary crisis which a war could cause and its effect on the U.S. dollar and, consequently, indirectly on the Canadian economy.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you, very much.

Mr. Cafix: Professor Legault, on page 2 of your report, toward the bottom, you say:

One asks nothing but to be able to stay, and the other wants only to leave; . . .

You are talking about the involvement in Europe, and I presume you mean that Russia wants the right to stay a part of Europe through its satellite countries and that the United States, which is involved in NATO with troops and other commitments, really psychologically would like to get out of Europe but is militarily tied to it.

There are a couple of questions I would like to ask. When you speak of Russia only wanting to stay, do you feel that Russia has lost its expansionist powers in Europe? In other words, is it content to stay within its own boundaries?

Professor Legault: Do you want me to answer that now?

Mr. Cafix: Yes, please.

Professor Legault: I was under the impression that you had a whole list of questions.

Mr. Cafix: I have a number, but perhaps you could take them one at a time.

Professor Legault: I do have the definite impression that in fact Soviet expansionism was abandoned a long time ago. I am not talking about international communism but Soviet interests in Europe.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Professor Legault: Obviously the situation would be quite different if the Eastern European states were occupied by Communist China. Obviously if you look at the pattern today the Soviet Union alone is a European power with the problems that it involves, which explains all of the difficulties of today, and the United States is not as such. It may be in terms of economic and military strength, but in terms of political influence it is obvious that the Soviet Union alone is a European power.

• 1200

I think they have pretty well achieved the objectives pursued by Czarist Russia which are to have a military glacis on the western side, that is to say, to repulse as far as possible their western frontiers, and they are trying to have quite a lot of influence on the *de trop* in the Mediterranean area. I think the Soviet naval increase in the Mediterranean area is also very much a part of Soviet policy. In this sense I think they have achieved more or less the purposes which they have tried to achieve over a number of centuries and that they are no longer expansionist but rather conservative, which is to try to maintain as much as possible what they have acquired.

I think the successive Berlin crises should be viewed in this sense. The number one interest of the Soviet Union is to have the *status quo* recognized by everybody, including the United States. Once this is achieved, you can be sure that this climate of xenophobia, and this climate of insecurity which is existing within the Soviet system, will also disappear. I am rather skeptical that they will, in fact, reach this number one objective over the years.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Do you—

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a supplementary?

The Vice-Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Nowlan?

Mr. Cafik: If I may pursue this point further, I can understand the position you have taken at the present moment, but is this position due to the fact that NATO is there and is a powerful force in Europe? If that were removed, do you feel that they might change

their policy? Is their policy, in other words, one that they cannot do anything about anyway so that they will settle back and accept what they have and hope to get away with it?

Professor Legault: No; as I said in my opening statement, we should not take the cause for the effect, and *vice versa*. In fact, the NATO and Warsaw Pacts are only a reflection of the division of Europe. Obviously, if NATO were dismantled I would be very happy, providing that you have a dismantling of the Warsaw Pact—and complete dismantling; and not a new network of bilateral agreements, or bilateral military relations between Eastern Europe and the United States and the Soviet Union, which is actually what they are doing now, bilateralism being the function of who is the most recalcitrant ally. We agree, I think, on this point.

Mr. Cafik: On the second aspect of that, you talked about the United States being willing to leave, or desiring to leave, but finding it militarily necessary to be there. Is that really true? Do you think the United States would welcome having a Europe strong enough to defend itself totally and without reservation?

Professor Legault: Certainly I think the Grand Design is an example which proves your statement—an example of the American intention. Relative to the Nixon trip to Europe today, obviously, as Kiessinger has said—and as I have read on a number of occasions—Western Europe should take into its own hands the responsibility of its own defence. This is something to which I am very much looking forward, but obviously the Western European states are not in a position today to be able to do so, and I do not think they will be within the next ten years. The Anglo-French role is likely again to have some divisive influence, and everybody is playing their own game and trying to be as cooperative as possible, or to look as being as European as the other one.

The Vice-Chairman: Professor, if I may interrupt you for just a moment, apparently there is trouble with the English interpretation. It is not coming through very well. It is just your voice we are hearing, and there is no interpretation. The French translation is coming through very well.

Professor Legault: Shall I speak a little louder?

The Vice-Chairman: Speak a little louder until the technician arrives and the situation can be corrected.

Professor Legault: I am reminded of a series of lectures which I attended last December, given by a good friend of mine who is, to my mind, one of the most perceptive writers on this question—Alistair Buchan.

• 1205

Professors have a tendency to say that if the middle and small powers do not share some of the responsibilities of maintaining international peace and security it is obvious that the great powers, seeing that, may either return to isolationism or that the world wall will be run by a condominium of powers, that is to say, the Soviet Union and the United States.

What Mr. Alistair Buchan said, in fact was that it is almost impossible for the United States to return to isolation, but that in fact, they may increasingly turn to unilateralism. That is to say, they will care about the possibility of managing their own relations with the Soviet Union, and presumably in the future with China, without paying lip-service to their allies, and without caring too much about what they do. I think this is a great danger. If you look back at the cold war, to 1948, obviously NATO, the United States and the United Nations were almost but one thing—that is, the United States.

Obviously this situation has changed, and I think we should look forward to a world in which, in fact, the middle powers take a share of the responsibilities; and perhaps we should look forward to a third stage where, in fact, you would have an intelligent, political organization, presumably through the United Nations, and some regional organization by which, in fact, you will be in a better position to co-operate, internationally speaking.

Mr. Cafik: I still want to pursue this point about whether the United States really wants Europe to have sufficient power to defend itself.

You pointed out that previously they have shown that they have, but for Europe to be in a position to defend itself in a conventional sense as against a nuclear sense is surely not giving it sufficient power to control itself. The United States surely still insists upon com-

plete and absolute control of the use of nuclear weapons, even those within NATO. I am not saying they are wrong, but does that not mean, in a sense, that they are insisting that Europe remain dependent upon them for military survival?

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I asked for a supplementary, and Mr. Cafik also said he had one. That is an entirely new question. My supplementary—and some of them are not, with respect—was directly related to the Professor's answer to his first question in relation to the expansionist or imperial tendencies of Russia.

Mr. Cafik: By all means; you have permission to go ahead.

Mr. Nowlan: Thank you, Professor, I was most interested in the question and the answer and I would like to ask you if the imperial or expansionist tendencies of Russia have changed, or if, in reality, the situation is changed in that it does not expand into Europe because the situation there is somewhat stabilized militarily, perhaps because of NATO? Otherwise, how can you rationalize the Mediterranean situation, which you touched on very lightly, or the situation in the Middle East? I would like to hear your comment on this soft area in Europe, which is not stable, yet in which there is the Russian presence which seems to be expanding.

Professor Legault: It is a very difficult question to answer and I do not believe anyone can answer it satisfactorily.

Let me say that I think we should dissociate the problems of the trend in Europe from the problems of naval strategy.

We are increasingly going into a new phase relative to naval warfare, and there has not been much strategical thinking on what in fact naval strategy will be. Nobody knows, in fact, whether a limited war at sea is possible, or if it will escalate, or degenerate into total war. Therefore, I propose to leave these problems aside.

Relative to Soviet expansion in the Middle East, it is again difficult to answer. Apparently, if you look back at history, it has progressed in direct relation to the Soviet involvement in Viet Nam, and there are some people today who say, in fact, that if the Soviet Union can help the United States to withdraw from Viet Nam perhaps the United

States will be in position to help the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Middle East.

Perhaps I am not so optimistic about the future. I think the Soviet Union is highly interested in the Middle East. I am not, however, an expert on these matters, so that is about as much as I will say.

To talk about Europe, obviously, as you said previously the question is whether expansionism has stopped because of NATO? I think they have absorbed sufficient states to give them problems enough that they will not think of absorbing other states.

● 1210

I am not thinking of NATO as an organization which will, at all costs, prevent a Soviet invasion, because I consider it very unlikely. That is why, to my mind, the Harmel Report marks a landmark in the history of the alliance, and I hope it will be pursued.

If NATO were completely dismantled, I have the impression that Europe would become a subcontinent to the Soviet system. I do not mean it will turn communist—I do not think that is possible—but it will be very sensitive to the political influence of the Soviet Union. I believe these are all the answers I can give to your question.

Mr. Nowlan: You distinguish very clearly between Europe, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Mr. Cafik: Perhaps you might pursue the answer to the second question I asked in relation to America's position in Europe.

Professor Legault: I had it in mind. I thought it was a very good question and also a difficult one to answer.

I do not think it is possible for Western Europe, or for Europe, to think of its own defence in terms of conventional weapons only. Obviously they will have some need for nuclear weapons. Only France and Britain have them now. I do not think that France yet has tactical nuclear atomic weapons, which makes the concept of escalation possible and makes the adoption of its strategy of flexible response possible.

The United States, if you remember, through Dean Rusk, at the time of the MLF, insisted—and a number of other people under President Johnson have insisted—that if Europe achieves its own political unity they

will be glad to turn over to Europe control of its own nuclear weapons.

I do not think this is any longer possible with the non-proliferation treaty, and this has been quite a concession granted to the Soviets at the expense of the Germans, as well as at the expense of the prospects of a future nuclear European collective enterprise. I would add that this is too bad, because had that option remained open it at least could have been a means of negotiating with the Russians.

To my mind that also explains a lot of the German frustration vis-à-vis the policy of the United States relative to the NPT, which was presented to them a few months after the MLF was abandoned. There was a completely new policy, to my mind.

If you think of the defence of Europe as a single entity they will need to have nuclear weapons, if only to give them some psychological security, and that time, I think, is still ten years ahead; and it certainly justifies the argument that as long as Europe is not constituted NATO is indispensable.

Does this answer your question?

Mr. Cafik: Yes; but to pursue it a little further, I gather you feel that Europe is confined to a second-rate military role; that it will certainly not be able to defend itself for at least a ten-year period; and that past that point they may well have their own nuclear weapons and be capable of defending themselves? Is that what you said?

Professor Legault: This, I think, is the main idea which I have tried to develop; and I think it is the main idea which the Nixon administration also has in mind for the time being.

Mr. Cafik: If that is the ultimate plan I find it extremely difficult to understand why the United States should so often be opposing the position of France in its desire, to develop its own nuclear role and to defend itself. It does not want to have to rely on North America to defend it in the event of war. Why would the United States not encourage the position that France has adopted?

Professor Legault: I think your question has already been answered in the sense that we still have the ten-year period ahead. If you start to dismantle the alliance now you will obviously give quite an advantage to the

Soviet. I simply do not think it is possible; and that is the reason French policy has had such divisive effects.

Mr. Cafik: I think we will drop that immediate question. I just want to ask one other that is related to it.

Do you think that there is any legitimate reason for the argument put forward for the existence of NATO, that it would curtail the military might of Germany? This is often used as one of the arguments in favour of NATO's existence.

• 1215

Professor Legault: I just notice Mr. Theo Sommer walking out of the room. I think that he is much better qualified to answer your question.

The only thing I can say is that obviously the terms of the equations have been reversed, as I said in my brief. The question in the 1950's was to find out what Germany could do for NATO because it was obvious to every military planner that you needed a forward defence. Now in 1969, and indeed in the decade ahead, obviously the problem is what can NATO do for Germany. I think that the German fears about being sold to the Russians or a special bilateral deal between the Russians and the Americans are quite real and in this sense I think that NATO is to them an indispensable forum where in fact they can have some consultations and negotiations with their allies, where in fact they know that somebody is still supporting their policy, that is to say their re-unification, even though they may not think it is possible in the immediate future. At least it has helped to alleviate the sentiments that Germany is the most useful but at the same time the most unwanted ally. As you know, it is very difficult to foresee in history how a nationalism will go on, and in this sense the alliance is a safety or an insurance against something which is unpredictable. You may think that this is a very conservative outlook but I think that one has to put himself into the mind of a German to understand in fact how valuable and how indispensable the alliance is to them.

Mr. Cafik: I will read a statement you made on page 5;

Thirdly, it...

I presume that is NATO,

29853—2

...can direct the aspirations of Western Germany into a broader framework, which will present her with wider political horizons and a chance to realize the most legitimate of her ambitions including, especially, that of reunification with East Germany.

There are a couple of other spots where you talk about the reunification of Europe and the reunification of Germany. I think you indicated that this was not really a possibility unless there was a change, a basic change, in Russia and in its attitude. Now I cannot really see how NATO in any way contributes to the reunification of Europe in that sense of the word. I think it contributes to its stability, to peace and to a lot of other things. Perhaps you would comment on that for a moment.

Professor Legault: I am afraid I will have to repeat what I have already said before. I think that you can only negotiate from a position of strength. If you have read the press reports you have seen in the Nixon visits to Germany that obviously Germany wants the United States to back them on their negotiations with Germany or with the Eastern European states. They are very much looking forward to normalizing, if I could use that word, their relations with Eastern Europe. Just looking at their past policy, they have been pretty successful. Obviously, that stopped with the Czechoslovakian invasion. But I think, as I have said before, that this is only temporary and is likely to come back to the surface again. We must not forget that if forty years ago Bolsheviks had to choose between universal socialism or socialism in one country, they either have to choose today between universal socialism or socialism in one empire and strike a proper balance between the two. I think that if they do not do that they may otherwise be completely overcome either by the left, which is to say Chinese militancy, or by the right, which is trying to develop a more humane socialism of the Togliatti type—and, again, I think that Czechoslovakia is a useful example.

• 1220

I think that we should not think only in terms of force. There is obviously some very powerful political forces which are now at work in Europe and which are working against the civilization of the status quo. I

think that this is likely to go on. You can only do that if you are obviously in a position of strength, otherwise I think it may simply become a subcontinent to the Soviet Union. I think that this is where in fact NATO is still very necessary, if only to reassure the Germans that they will not be left alone.

Mr. Cafik: Do you not feel that the biggest problem to reunification and to perhaps lessening military tensions in Europe is the genuine fear that Russia has of the liberalizing tendencies of its own satellite, such as in Czechoslovakia. I read into that a genuine fear that Russia has, and if one were to try to get a meeting of minds on the two sides I do not think Russia could afford to do it because their own people would get out of the cage, as it were, if they ever let the barriers down.

Professor Legault: Let us take Cuba, for example. If Cuba ever normalized its relations with the United States that does not necessarily mean that they will become an ally of the United States. But at least they can normalize their relation and they can have a certain evolution of their relations. I think that this is what the Eastern European states are looking for. I do not think that if the Soviet Union accepts an independent Romanian foreign policy or an independent Polish or Czechoslovakian foreign policy, it will necessarily mean that these people or these countries will turn democratic and will ally with the West. If this is so, well, this is simply suicide for the West because I think this is completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union. As I have said before, these changes or these potentialities are there and are likely to come to the surface again. But it would rather be the kind of a normalization between the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union, if you allow me the analogy of Cuba and the United States, if there is ever a certain kind of normalization between these two countries.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much, Professor Legault.

Mr. Allmand: Professor Legault, your paper seems to be based on the supposition that Europe is still the principal and perhaps the only meaningful centre of world politics. Some of our witnesses, especially Professor Michael Brecher, have stated that this is not so and have suggested that any policy that is based on that supposition is a policy that

looks back and not forward. And whereas Professor Brecher and others have said that Europe is important, the real danger areas to world stability and to world peace are in the third world—in South America, in Africa and in Asia. These witnesses to our Committee have suggested that Canada can play a much more important role in building bridges to the third world, that what we have to offer can be much more meaningful, that the type of balance of power that you talk about in Europe will be there whether we are with it or not, that we will have the benefits but that we will not be really contributing to the real stability of the world and to political peace and so forth that we could. Are you familiar with Professor Brecher's statement?

Professor Legault: Yes, and to my mind, it is one of the most persuasive which has been presented before this Committee.

I do not see why we have to see politics in terms of black and white. I do not see why if you can have one friend you cannot have a second one, and obviously I do not see why Canada cannot stay in NATO and at the same time try to adopt a progressive policy toward the third world. You cannot read a book today without seeing a comment about the north-south division, the poor country and the industrialized country, and that in fact because of China the industrialized countries may become an ally against the third world.

• 1225

Obviously you cannot see international security in terms of only one area. I think that this situation also applies to Europe. The European powers have had a tendency in the past to be disinterested in what was going on in the United Nations. I think that this is too bad because the more co-operation you have in the U.N. the more co-operation you have abroad, the more co-operation you have with the third world, and the more difficult it becomes presumably for any other system to have a different policy. In other words, you may say that the United Nations international organizations and corporations abroad are all interdependent. I have the feeling myself, though nobody can prove it, that international peace and security is really interdependent and that you cannot have detente in one area without having it in the other. This is a statement which has been made by a lot of French

people in the French press. If you had not had the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam and maybe the Middle East maybe you would not have had the Czechoslovakian tragedy. Well, you see, nobody knows, you cannot prove it, but I think that this is interdependent. I am very much looking forward myself, if for only this reason, to the unity of Europe to the point where in fact they could play a role as far as international peace and security is concerned. I do not see why Canada should be limited in its foreign policy by 1 per cent maybe of its gross national product which could be diverted to the third world and I do not see why we could not spend at the same time so much money within NATO. I do not think it is contradictory, I do not think it is a choice between black and white, I think it is rather a political philosophy of what your foreign relations should be; and if in fact you do believe in international peace and security and the restoration of a durable and peaceful world or world order, I do not see why you should disengage from your military alliances which are trying to achieve through other means the same purposes.

Mr. Allmand: I agree that it is not a black and white issue. But it appears to me and to some of our witnesses that we are now very much committed to one thing, let us say to Europe, and Canada and many other countries are very little committed and underestimate the potential problems resulting from the third world. We are a small country with limited resources. You seem to suggest that we could continue our military commitments in Europe and still do what we should do with respect to the third world. I would like to think that was so perhaps but I feel that with our budget and so forth we cannot do that. We will have to make priorities and perhaps, because of the detente in Europe, we should channel our energies more towards the third world.

Are you suggesting that we can carry our present military commitments in NATO and still do what we have to do with respect to the third world?

Professor Legault: This is what I would do myself if I were Prime Minister. You may disagree with me on that.

Mr. Allmand: Or a taxpayer.

Professor Legault: Even if I were a taxpayer.

Mr. Allmand: Very good.

29853-2½

Professor Legault: It is a question of either believing in political co-operation or not. Obviously everybody has been turning away from this objective which, to my mind, was the objective of the United Nations. So much has evolved that everybody begins to be sceptical about it, about the results, about the pay-offs, about their political influence and so forth, and in so doing they forget that this goes back to the league of nations, this goes back to political co-operation with the institution of the British commonwealth, this goes back to the political mandate of President Wilson. You believe in a cause or you do not believe. You may say that peacekeeping, for example, is something which is secondary, which is useful but not necessary. Well in time of crisis what is useful very often becomes necessary. The same thing applies to your relationship with your own wife. What is useful in time of conflict may become very much a necessity. If you stop believing one day, because everything is moving so slowly and because great powers have such an influence, that you do have influence and that you can achieve anything at all, then you have had it, I am sure.

• 1230

Mr. Allmand: Excuse me, you seem to be confusing my remarks with respect to NATO as being directed towards the United Nations. I have not even questioned the United Nations; I perhaps question NATO.

Professor Legault: I am sorry, I think I am sending back your own questions in the sense that presumably NATO is trying to achieve international peace and security but through different means, and I do not think it is contradictory in that sense.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Legault, you mention here there is a possibility of problems in eastern Europe spilling over into Western Europe. If I keep turning the pages I will eventually find it.

Professor Legault: I remember writing it, anyway.

Mr. Anderson: It states:

Events similar to those of the summer of 1968 could be repeated in Poland, in Hungary, or in Roumania, and could well spill over into western Europe.

This is a commonly-held view but I find it difficult to justify. Is it because the West Germans are so preoccupied with East Germany with respect to unification that they might well take advantage of trouble in Eastern Europe? I cannot see this happening with a relatively stable group of West European countries which have political systems which are now, I would say, stable. I do not know what your views are, and I am not necessarily thinking of Southern Europe but of Central Europe. I cannot see how unrest in Poland could spill across into West Germany. I just cannot see it. Are you suggesting that a certain dissident group might be pushed across the border? Even then, to my mind, this would not create political instability. Would you elaborate on this, sir?

Professor Legault: I must say that this is a strong argument and it is also very difficult to prove. When this kind of argument is made you can only proceed by intuition. I think the European situation is much more unstable than people are inclined to think precisely because the political *status quo* is so stable and precisely because everybody believes in deterrents and the possibility of the Big Two to impose a solution on the other countries. I think perhaps if you had been living in Europe for ten years, and especially if you had been living in Europe at the time of the Czechoslovakian tragedy or at the time of French revolution last May, you would have quite a different feeling than sitting here in the Committee.

I remember at the time talking to a French personality, a general, coming back from Russia in the aftermath of the French revolution in France and the first thing he said was "Look, I think what has happened in France could happen tomorrow in the Soviet system". I think there is quite an element of truth in that, especially if you are aware of the difficulties there are within the Soviet system. Obviously they are better able to control the vast communications process which can make a small event degenerate into the kind of hysterical, psychological, collective reaction that has happened in France. They are obviously in a better position to prevent that. However, if you remember—according to a Chinese press statement which was made in the summer—one of the strongest men within the central committee who will in fact push the central committee to adopt a stronger line

toward Eastern European states is Mr. Chelst, who is the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Republic. According to some Chinese statesman they had a revolution there which was stopped through bloodshed and tanks in Krakow. Whether this is true or not we just do not know, but I am sure if you talk to any Soviet political expert he will tell you that in fact the situation is very dangerous within...

Mr. Anderson: May I follow that up by saying that while I quite agree there is a possibility of instability in Eastern Europe, I do not see how this can somehow be exported across what you might call the East-West line down the centre of Europe. I just cannot see it. I can certainly understand that on the one side there might be instability because of internal backers, such as in France as you have mentioned, or indeed there might be instability on the other, but to me the two systems appear to be sufficiently different and the causes of instability in each area are sufficiently different that I cannot see the causal connection which you suggest in this particular paragraph.

Professor Legault: Perhaps it is a question of personal taste. The only thing I can say is that there is a law of physics to the effect that The violence of the explosion is more or less in direct proportion to the degree of compression. This is about the only thing I can say. Perhaps I see the situation differently. I am not trying to sell you my ideas. This is just intuition on my part and it is about the only thing I can say. You see, I did not justify NATO in this respect at all, I just said it is an insurance policy, adding that the people around this room more or less agree that today the first function of NATO is not to prevent a Soviet roll-off to the Atlantic, because that would be simply inconceivable.

• 1235

Mr. Anderson: I can certainly see with respect to Germany, for instance, that pre-occupation with the other Germany, be it East or West, could lead to such developments. I can see Western Germany perhaps trying to profit by a problem in East Germany, and I can see where the reverse statement could also be true.

Professor Legault: I must say that even the East Germans are not very well liked within the Eastern European states.

Mr. Anderson: Which, of course, would make it more difficult. No comment with respect to Western Europe.

You say in point 4:

This Action:

(4) Allows us to have a voice in the decisions of the Alliance, if not to direct them, particularly regarding the establishment of policies for the use of atomic weapons...

A number of witnesses have come before this Committee and have argued that because our voice within NATO is so small and because we have no real power whatsoever that we should turn away from this obviously Uncle Tom organization, where the Americans pull all the strings, and try to develop friendships elsewhere. Not a single witness to my mind—and this is my personal opinion—has convinced us that we can win friends elsewhere. They have simply mentioned this in rather general and vague terms. However, could you comment on the other aspect of that; namely, how much of a role do we have in NATO and how much voice do we have in deciding where atomic weapons are placed? Could you give some indication of how much the Europeans value our position there. Does it help them vis-à-vis the Americans?

Professor Legault: If you only think in terms of military contribution, I think our contribution is about 10 per cent of the nuclear strike role. I do not think this should be looked at in isolation. After all, this inter-allied force was created in March of 1963. I think it was in March, but in any event it was at the time of the NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa in 1963. There were ten powers associated with that. France has now withdrawn so obviously they no longer have nuclear weapons under the dual system.

I think you should also bear in mind that this was at the very critical time when, in fact, questions of nuclear sharing existed within the alliance, and this was a means of satisfying the German ambitions and German needs for nuclear weapons only because they wanted to have a say in the nuclear strategy of the West or, at least, of the United States. Once the MLF was abandoned there was another solution, which was the McNamara committee which McNamara announced on May 31, 1965, and which drew up the actual nuclear planning committee. I think this is

vital to Germany in the sense that they should know, in fact, where these weapons will be delivered, to which target they are assigned, and so forth. In the mid-1950s nobody knew, in fact, where these weapons would be targeted and nobody knew how to use these weapons. This is quite a change, and I think it is quite a change as far as the German national security is concerned. If they want to adopt a strategy of conventional warfare because they think it is more in their interest, then why not work it out through the alliance, and this is an area where, in fact, Canada could play a role. If you asked me what influence Canada has because of its nuclear strike role, I think it is completely different and presumably you should not look at it in terms of having a nuclear strike role but in terms of being a full-fledged member of the alliance, which in fact has espoused the goals and purposes of the alliance.

Mr. Anderson: This is what I was getting at. I did not mean the particular strike program but the over-all one.

Professor Legault: I think everybody would more or less agree that in fact it is not so much your contribution which is vital as the fact that you have a policy if you want to have some influence.

Mr. Anderson: If I have time, Mr. Chairman, may I ask a final question? I completely agree with you in your interpretation of the influence in NATO. Do you feel that our present role in NORAD will give us some influence on these ABM systems which the Americans are setting up? When I say this I am not suggesting that Canada take part in ABM manufacture, or anything of that nature, I am merely suggesting that through our fairly close relations with the Americans do you feel that we can have some influence in siting these batteries so that in the event of war and the use of these particular weapons fallout would not drop on Canadian centres of population? Do you feel we would have some influence on siting...

• 1240

Professor Legault: I do not think we would have any influence if we do not participate, and I do not think we should participate in an ABM system. This goes back to my previous comment, that if the great powers, and especially the United States, decide to spend

\$50 billion on civil defence and \$50 billion on ABM, that in fact they may turn out to be so schizophrenic about their own security and they may feel so secure—which to my mind is a marginal concept—that in fact they will not care about anyone else except themselves, and I think this is something which Canada should try to avoid. The influence we should perhaps presumably have is to dissuade the Americans from going into this business. I know that Dean Rusk has accepted the construction of a thin system presumably to have some say, some influence and some object of negotiations with the Russians. If this is the only purpose or not I do not know, but I do know that there are a lot of pressures within the Pentagon to move from a thin system to a thick system. I would feel very sorry if this were done because I think it is a tremendous and a scandalous waste of money. No matter what you do, it is less expensive for the enemy to build up its offensive forces and they will always get through.

Mr. Anderson: I could not agree with you more but my point is, though, strictly on the question of siting these particular weapons, do you think we can have any influence with the Americans?

Professor Legault: I cannot answer your question simply because I have no access to what the deployment of these ABM systems will be. If I knew perhaps I could tell you but I just do not know.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Marceau.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: Mr. Chairman, first of all, of all the witnesses who have appeared before this Committee, Professor Legault is the first to have submitted a bilingual report, and I want to congratulate him for it. I hope that this excellent procedure will be followed up by other future witnesses, because this enables us to compare right away the two statements of the witnesses, and I think this is a very precious contribution to the Committee.

On page 3 of your written comments, Mr. Legault, you say—that is 3 of the French text, no doubt—at the beginning of the last paragraph, you say:

“Military security and a policy of *détente* are complementary”.

Maybe we could have more details on this because, the way I see it, military security makes it perhaps easier to maintain peace, but if we have warlike ideas or ideas of rearming, I do not see how this can contribute towards a *détente*.

Professor Legault: Well, it is quite clear, sir, that I am not suggesting a massive increase of military budgets within NATO. I think that the security that the Western countries have within NATO is sufficient, and I do not just want to repeat what I have already said previously, that it is a question of transforming the Alliance into an instrument for the peaceful settling of misunderstandings. I think we must realize that it is precisely this climate of security that has made this constant dialogue possible between the Russians and the Americans. In other words, if you yourself are in a psychological climate of total insecurity, you are neither in a state to negotiate nor to impose your viewpoint on the other party.

And I can only repeat what I have already tried to explain earlier, namely that, in that respect, if you have neither a united Europe nor NATO, I cannot see what results will be achieved concerning precisely this relaxation of the bonds, this *détente* and relaxation of the control maintained by the Soviet Union over its allies.

• 1245

Mr. Marceau: In one of your comments, you seem to give the impression that NATO, in its present state, is possibly not adequate and that it should be altered or, perhaps, reoriented. Could you give me some details in that respect?

Professor Legault: I think the only views I wanted to present were given in the opening of my statement, i.e. that I think of an evolution in terms of committees and study groups that would be constituted in terms of regional problems, in other words, if you wish, in terms of concentric circles, of study groups which could discuss with their opposite number in the other bloc. This is the best way to face the problem, in my opinion. And, I think that Canada could make some suggestions or proposals along this line, either with regard to European security, or, perhaps, improvement of relations between the countries of the Eastern and Western blocs.

Mr. Marceau: Do you think that, eventually, that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are going to disappear or do you think they are going to play a greater role in the future?

Professor Legault: Well, if we come to a point where there is in fact this North-South division between industrialized countries and poor countries, the countries of the Third World, it seems quite obvious to me that these alliances will have to disappear because they will not be necessary. Alliances are solely the result of a fear, of a climate of insecurity. If you manage to establish a climate of cooperation and understanding, I do not see why you have to defend yourself against a fear that does not exist.

Mr. Marceau: But your personally, do you believe that...

Professor Legault: Yes, I do. I think that the goal should be to reach that objective, because this entails expenditures that could be used elsewhere. And, in this case I am giving an argument that was presented to me previously along these lines.

Mr. Marceau: Among the theories you mentioned on page 4 of your report, you did not indicate any possibility for Canada to reduce its contribution or perhaps even to suspend it, let's say, for a period of time. Do you think that this might be possible?

Professor Legault: I do not think that in a time of crisis, particularly, if you withdraw your troops to Canada, that you will be in a position to transfer them to Europe. In fact, in that case, obviously it plays a role with regard to dissuasion, although rather with regard to your psychological will to defend what is in danger.

But, I think that, for economic reasons, that would cost us about the same amount. If you ask me whether we can evolve from this heavy brigade to light brigades or battalions that are part of the mobile line forces within NATO, I fully agree with this. But, as I said at the outset, I think we will have all the more influence providing our contribution, even if only symbolic, exists.

There is something I do not understand. Canada was the first country that pushed probably the United States and even Europe to sign this treaty, which was approved in the House of Commons by 185 to 0, which is quite

extraordinary. In view of this, I do not see why Canada should be the first country to withdraw its troops from Europe.

And tonight, if you discuss this question with Mr. Theo Sommer, he will use more or less the same argument. In other words, if this must really take place, let it be the Belgians or the Dutch or the Greeks who withdraw troops and not Canada.

• 1250

Mr. Marceau: But do you not think that the situation that existed at the time that decision was taken is not different from the present one? In view of the problems of the Third World, do you not think that Canada should gradually orient itself towards providing increased assistance to the Third World rather than towards a contribution to Europe, which might be useful, but which, I think, would be far more useful and more effective if it were directed towards the Third World, which eventually will need this help?

Professor Legault: I think I have already answered that question. I do not see why you should not have a second friend, even if it will cost you a little bit dearer. This is also the case with one's social relations, the more friends you have—if the aim of your external policy is to have no influence, fine, you must say so. But then, let's close shop. I do not think this is contradictory. And I do not believe that the citizens are not able to support further taxes if you have a policy to justify this.

You will not sell a policy to citizens if it is so complicated and obscure; no one would support it. Naturally, in this case, it is also a matter of political imagination and domestic support, with regard to the federal government.

Mr. Marceau: Thank you, Mr. Legault, and again I want to congratulate you for your written comments and your testimony before this Committee.

Mr. Legault: It is I who thank you. May I point out that there is a translation error here in the English text.

[English]

On page 8 of the English text the translation is exactly the opposite of what I have said. In the first paragraph beginning with "In my opinion", the last line of the first paragraph,

...since in the final analysis, it is unlikely that the Canadian Government will be able to choose more than one.

what I said in French is that it is unlikely that the Canadian Government will choose only one of them. In other words, I was talking about the six alternatives on page 6, where we are already participating in (3), (4), (5), (6). That is on page 8 of the English version, yes.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, it is about the seventh or eighth line down from the top.

Mr. Stewart having left us, that concludes the questioning unless there is someone else. All right, there being no one else, would the Committee agree to print Professor Legault's advance presentation as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Agreed as amended. Professor, on behalf of all the members of the

Committee I should like to thank you very much for your thoughtful presentation and the manner in which you have so patiently and thoroughly answered our questions. I regret that we are not as familiar with this room as we are with the room in which we usually meet in the West Block. It has caused a little confusion this morning, but I am sure you will forgive us for that. Thank you very much.

Professor Legault: Mr. Chairman, it certainly has been a pleasure for me and I thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: The meeting this evening will be in this room at 8:00 p.m. There is no brief. The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX NN

Text of a Presentation by

Mr. Albert Legault

before the

External Affairs and National Defence
Committee

February 27th, 1969

NATO: A VITAL AND NECESSARY
ORGANIZATION

In 1969, the application of the adjectives "vital" and "necessary" to an organization such as NATO may well seem questionable or, at the very least, presumptuous. One may well ask whether this "child of the Cold War", as Mr. André Fontaine was recently pleased to refer to it, has not outlived the objectives it was designed to meet, that is, the containment of Soviet expansion in Europe. What is now to be expected of this cumbersome military apparatus, when policy has reached a stage of *détente*, and the theme of our discussions is one of co-operation? What political justification now exists for Canadian participation in NATO?

Admittedly, we are living in a time of *détente*; a study of international political developments over the last few years is sufficient to convince us of this fact. *Détente*, however, is not an end in itself; it is merely an instrument in the service of a broader policy. To repeat a phrase that is destined to become a byword, we must progress "from *détente* to *entente*, (or understanding), and from *entente* to co-operation". The memory of the tragic events of last August 21st are more than enough to make us realize that this expression does not have the same meaning for all.

To understand the reasons for NATO's existence, we must consider the conditions from which it sprang. In 1949, certainly, there was a need to stem the tide of Soviet expansion before it reached the shores of the Atlantic. But there was more to it than that; NATO was a shield against outside intervention, and behind it, Europe was able to rebuild, both economically and politically. All this, it seems to me, constitutes a brief summary of the Organization's history, from its birth to the time of President Kennedy's Grand Design.

It also seems to me, however, that none of this goes to the heart of the matter, which, in

reality, is the confrontation between two opposing and, at that time, unyielding ideologies; it is from this that the division of Europe was born. The two blocs that now confront each other there were brought about by the respective military might of two superpowers, stretching, in one case, from Washington to Berlin, by way of London and Paris, and in the other, from Moscow to Pankov through Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest. One asks nothing but to be able to stay, and the other wants only to leave; and in that statement lies the whole tragedy of today's Europe.

No specialized knowledge of the relations between the countries of the socialist bloc is necessary to a realization that all is not well, that they are in the grip of a critical struggle for control. Events similar to those of the summer of 1968 could be repeated in Poland, in Hungary, or in Roumania, and could well spill over into western Europe. Only a strong and united NATO would be in a position to cope with problems of such a magnitude. In this sense, the Organization constitutes an excellent insurance policy against a fire that could spread from the socialist bloc to engulf all Europe. NATO, then, is irreplaceable, unless Europe takes responsibility for her defence into her own hands. Until that happens, the Alliance will continue to be indispensable.

It would also be a dangerous illusion to think that the reunification of Europe could be achieved unless the Soviet Union's policy evolved in the direction of a greater respect for human diversity, and the abandonment of the repression imposed on her own people and on others. In other words, *the division in Europe will not disappear until the factors that brought it about themselves disappear*. This is the crucial point that we should never

have ceased to recall. Dismantling NATO would only strengthen the Soviet Union's faith in the policy of repression to which she subjects her allies, and would be more or less tantamount to leaving the socialist countries to their fate. Furthermore, it would be—if not an invitation to the Soviet Union to attack—at least a paving of the way to a whole series of political manoeuvres and acts of intimidation, whose effects would not be long in making themselves felt.

The truth is that the Poles, the Hungarians and the Roumanians, to name only a few, are still looking Westward. The French and the Germans, for their part, continue to look to the East. The events in Czechoslovakia have not shattered the hope for a new Europe; they have merely postponed the realization of what is, for the moment, no more than an awakening dream. The reunification of Europe, which is, after all, largely obscured by the problem of German reunification, cannot be left to isolated or—worse—to accidental attempts at a solution. It is only within the framework of NATO that the possibility exists of co-ordinating the efforts of the various countries, of establishing the objectives of a progressive and dynamic policy and of setting up committees and task-forces (who would, let us hope, find opposite numbers within the Warsaw Pact) to appraise the means at NATO's disposal to achieve the ends desired. The Harmel Report represents a first step in this direction, but it will have to be followed by many others if we are to fulfil the promise of what is still no more than a tentative outline.

The authors of this Report were justified, too, in their conclusion that: "Military security and a policy of *détente* are not contradictory, but complementary". Trust and security have always been two sides of the same medal, and history shows this. I find it difficult to question the worth of this principle, particularly at a time when the two Great Powers have long since made it the touchstone of relations between them. Thus, it would be illusory, at the very least, to believe in the possibility of creating an atmosphere of political stability between the two European blocs, conducive to understanding and co-operation, without a balance of power between their respective positions.

NATO, finally, is necessary to Germany's peace of mind, since she is presently unwill-

ing, and unable, to have an independent defence policy outside the Alliance. Soon after the establishment of the Organization, people were quick to wonder what Germany could do for NATO. In 1969, the factors in the equation are reversed: what can NATO do for Germany? In essence, its function seems to me three-fold. Firstly, it must ensure the security of the Federal Republic; this has always been, and still is, the primary task of the Alliance. Secondly, it must provide a defensive screen, in the shelter of which the countries of Europe can become reconciled and reunited with one another. It should be borne in mind that this was the policy of Schumann, of Gasperi and of Konrad Adenauer. Thirdly, it can direct the aspirations of Western Germany into a broader framework, which will present her with wider political horizons and a chance to realize the most legitimate of her ambitions including, especially, that of reunification with East Germany.

Let us now turn to the question of Canadian participation in the Alliance. It seems to me that there are six possibilities to be considered. Canada could:

- 1) withdraw from the Alliance altogether;
- 2) follow the example set by France, and withdraw from the strictly military organization, while remaining a member of the Alliance;
- 3) participate in the Alliance solely on the basis of a contribution to the defence of the North American continent;
- 4) participate in the Alliance by holding armed forces in reserve in Canada;
- 5) make an exclusively naval contribution;
- 6) participate directly by placing troops under the command of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe).

The first possibility, however attractive it may be, is hardly realistic, in my opinion. Any renunciation of the Treaty could only be interpreted as a condemnation of the aims and objectives of the Alliance. I believe I have laid sufficient stress on the need for the Alliance for repetition to be unnecessary. Outright withdrawal on the part of one of its members would not fail to encourage divisive trends within the Alliance. The best way of weakening NATO, obviously, is to sow the

seeds of doubt in men's minds, leaving time to do its work. This is a tactic the Russians have employed with remarkable skill in the past, but without success so far. It would be a pity if Canada were to be the first country taken in by it.

Furthermore, it is essential to realize that an alliance is not an addition or subtraction of national contributions. It is, and must be, an intermingling of national desires seeking a common goal. The dynamism and determination that give it life will constitute its strength or its weakness. If a man is known by his deeds, a country is also judged by the responsibilities it assumes. From this point of view, it seems to me, the second possibility does not stand up to serious examination either. Canada's withdrawal from the military aspects of the Organization would deny all credibility to her political involvement, and her influence within its councils would be reduced in proportion. It is only by making common cause with the Alliance that Canada will be able to carry any weight in its decisions, to say nothing of guiding them. In this respect, it is doubtful whether Belgium could have had such a strong influence had she not participated in the military organization of NATO. The Harmel Report, in any case, attests to the importance that a member country can exercise within an alliance; but this does not alter the fact that a country must have a policy!

As for the third, fourth, fifth and sixth possibilities, let us at once point out that Canada is already involved in a careful way in them. We participate in the defence of the North American continent through NORAD and SACLANT; we keep two infantry brigades in reserve in Canada, to reinforce our brigade stationed in Europe, if necessary; we make a naval contribution to SACLANT, as I have already stated. Finally, we maintain a mobile armoured brigade in Germany. Although our defence policy review embraces NORAD and SACLANT, it is definitely the question of maintaining our forces in Europe that appears to cause the greatest confusion in people's minds.

In my opinion, the best way of illustrating the advantages we derive from the stationing of our troops in Europe is to adopt an opposite approach, and examine, the alternatives, one by one. I must stress that this is a purely theoretical exercise, since in the final analysis, it is unlikely that the Canadian Government will choose only one of them.

Let us note, at the outset, that the third possibility has already been seriously considered, particularly at the time when NORAD was established. The reasoning behind it is very simple: since the geographic area covered by the Treaty Stretches from Europe to America *via* Canada, is it not true that this country is already fulfilling its obligations by taking part in the defence of North America? Would it not be advantageous to withdraw our troops from Europe and attend to our most immediate interests? In other words, if we may pursue the analysis further, to what extent do countries such as Iceland, or, for that matter, West Germany, contribute to the defence of Canada? So stated, the argument obviously has some weight.

However, it is possible to counter these legitimate arguments with political reasons that are no less convincing. In reality, Canada's contribution to NATO is not born of a need for security but a profession of faith: a desire to assume an increasing share of international responsibilities. Secondly, as the objective of European policy today is to elude the growing influence of the two major powers, the number one objective of Canadian policy has always been and remains that of escaping the American political orbit. Canada's European contribution to NATO, in this sense, constitutes an independent political action, which has sprung from an independent national will. It tends to confirm the awareness of a national unity through the prism of international accomplishments, a fact which is far from being negligible at a time when Canada is seeking her own identity.

The same arguments appear to me to be just as valid with regard to the fourth alternative. Apart from the fact that it is difficult to conceive of substantial savings which might result from recalling our troops assigned to NATO (as they will have to return from time to time to participate in Allied military exercises) to change them into reserve troops, it is practically impossible to determine the immediate advantages which Canada might derive. In any case, it would be ironical, to say the least, if the amounts thus saved were to be used for the defence of the North American continent.

The fifth option has this in common with the fourth that the ships assigned to SACLANT could be thus kept in reserve with a view to a possible participation in the mari-

time command recently established in Naples (MARAIRED). The advantages of such a formula are obvious. Of all the member countries of NATO, is not Canada with the United States a maritime nation, at least by geographic location? Would it not be in her interest to provide a purely naval contribution to ensure the protection of her territorial waters, even though, in cases of emergency and at the request of NATO naval authorities, she may transfer some of her ships to the Mediterranean?

History and strategic considerations, I feel, provide the answers to these arguments. In the first place, let us immediately point out that Canada is not a naval power. For obscure reasons, the development of a Canadian merchant fleet has never constituted a primary objective in the policy of the federal government. It would be difficult, therefore, to justify the development of a powerful national navy under the pretext that we must guarantee the safety of our sea lanes when these are in no way vital to us.

If it is a question, on the other hand, of protecting ourselves against the threat of missile-launching submarines, this is an area in which Canada would quickly overreach herself. We have neither the technical nor financial means of setting up such a program. For some ten years, we have been witnessing a progressive militarization of the seas and oceans which are gradually becoming veritable mouse-traps for small and middle powers. It is difficult to find a single reason, be it military in nature, which can justify the launching of a vast antisubmarine warfare program. At the very most, Canada must ensure the protection of her territorial waters. This is tantamount to saying that we must possess adequate means of detection and identification, first to make sure that our territorial waters are not violated without impunity, and, secondly, to be in a position, if need be, to protest through a diplomatic note.

Let us note, finally, that our participation in SACLANT has practically nothing to do with NATO. In fact, in maintaining powerful means of antisubmarine warfare, we are either helping the United States weaken the invulnerability of the strategic reprisal power of the Soviets—which, I feel, is hardly in keeping with the requirements of a sound strategy—or else we are helping to strengthen

the invulnerability of the American reprisal strength—which seems to me to be no more in keeping with Canadian interests. As regards NORAD in which we must participate because, in the final analysis, either we are allied or we are not, it is quite obvious that this commitment concerns only Canadian-American interests and not the Alliance as such, unless it be very indirectly.

Let us take this opportunity to digress a moment. It is probable that, in the years to come, Canada will be exposed to increasing pressures from her neighbour to the south regarding a more active participation in the field of antisubmarine warfare. We shall be in a better position to resist such pressures if we have diversified the nature of our military commitments and if we can reply to Washington that, after all, we are doing more than our share, either in peace-keeping or in NATO, by maintaining troops stationed in Europe.

This leads us to our sixth and final option: maintaining our troops in Europe. One of the major roles of our armies has always been to support and uphold our foreign policy. This situation will not likely change in the future as Canada has no secret or avowed enemy. It goes without saying, therefore, that our armed forces constitute, *ipso facto*, the primary political tool by which we may influence our allies and have a voice in what should be the professed purpose of our foreign policy—the establishment of a lasting and peaceful international order.

Europe, I feel, is the prime concern here. Never has the balance of military forces been so successful as over these past years. And yet, no-one can doubt the importance of the forces of change which are present in Europe today. Some of these seek to alter if not upset the *status quo*, others to maintain or stabilize it. It is possible that within a short period of time they will counterbalance one another. But it would be presumptuous to believe that it will always be like this. Too many psychological, historic, economic and social reasons militate against the division of Europe to permit belief in its perpetuation.

NATO is no longer what it was twenty years ago. It still is a forum and effective centre for exchanges of information and viewpoints; thus, each of the Allies may form its policy in the light of a thorough knowledge of the problems and objectives of all the

others (Harmel Report, subsection 7). But it should be and is already in the process of becoming an effective instrument for the peaceful settlement of disputes, if ever the member countries of the Warsaw Pact should wish to attempt dialogue. Furthermore, if we wish to be consulted, not merely as an expert, but as a full-fledged member of the Alliance, principally concerning the institution of a European defence system or the balanced and progressive reduction of the armed forces on both sides of the two Europes, it is quite obvious that we shall attain this objective only if we maintain troops in Europe and if we willingly assume our responsibilities in ensuring the military stability of the European area of the Alliance.

International politics has always been, for better or for worse, the product of opposite national wills fostered by men of different beliefs or convictions. It is when the one side ceases to believe in a cause that the other side triumphs. It would be a pity for Canada, on her part, to suddenly cease believing in the law of international co-operation and mutual aid.

Allow me to conclude by summarizing the benefits which Canada derives from maintaining troops in Europe. This action:

(1) Is likely to strengthen our feeling of national unity, a fact which is far from being negligible at a time when Canada is seeking her own identity;

(2) Allows us to be consulted not merely as an expert, but as a full-fledged member of the Alliance, particularly regarding the future of European east-west relations or the problem of the progressive and reciprocal reduction of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO;

(3) Marks our determination to espouse the purposes and goals of the Alliance which is a necessary instrument of change and of the peaceful settlement of disputes;

(4) Allows us to have a voice in the decisions of the Alliance, if not to direct them, particularly regarding the establishment of policies for the use of atomic weapons and the selection of military objectives;

(5) Allows us to resist more easily American pressures designed to sway our defence efforts in one direction more than another;

(6) Allows us to have a voice in the matter of peace and international security in Europe which should constitute one of the objectives of our foreign policy;

(7) Enables us to strengthen our ties with the continent and to be fully aware of the evolution of European policy which, at the same time, enables us to determine more surely the development of our own policy.

As to the nature of our contribution, it goes without saying that it should be simple enough to establish, if the principle of maintaining Canadian troops in Europe is accepted *a priori*. This is a problem which military experts can handle more competently and which should be resolved, I feel, in consultation with our allies and in relation to the type of troops it would be desirable for Canada to provide.

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- Le concept de la dissuasion: ses exigences stratégiques et ses incidences sur la politique*. Ambilly, les Presses de Savoie, 1964.
- Deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance*. Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1966.
- Contribution to Schwarz-HADIK (ed.) *Strategic Terminology* ECON-VERLAG, Dusseldorf and Wein, 1966.
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ARTICLES

- «L'évolution de la situation internationale et la politique extérieure française», AAI, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Geneva, September, 1965.
- «Les études stratégiques» *BASTIONS*, University of Geneva, Summer, 1965.
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- «Current Status and Future Needs of Research on Peace-Keeping Operations» *IPKO MONOGRAPH* No. 5, Paris, April 1968, 58p.
- «The Authorization of Peace-Keeping Operations in Terms of the Nature of the Conflict», *IPKO MONOGRAPH* No. 7, Paris, June 1968, 62p.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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B.A.—Montreal, 1959

M.A.—University of Chicago, 1961

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POSITIONS HELD:

1964-66—Successively Assistant and Research
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1966-68—Assistant Director of IPKO (Intern-
ational Information Center on Peace-Keep-
ing Operations), Paris, France.

1968-69—Visiting Assistant Professor (Queen's
University) Department of Political Stu-
dies, Kingston; Chair of Strategic Studies.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 32


THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and External Affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	MacRae
Anderson	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Marceau
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Nowlan
Brewin	Laniel	Penner
Buchanan	Laprise	Prud'homme
Cafik	Legault	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Fairweather	Lewis	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Forrestall	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Macquarrie	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

(Text)

THURSDAY, February 27, 1969.
(47)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, MacLean, Macquarrie, MacRae, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch (24).

Also present: Mr. Hymmen, M.P.

Witness: Dr. Theo Sommer, Deputy Editor and Foreign Editor of *Die Zeit*, Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany.

The Chairman introduced Dr. Theo Sommer, who made an opening statement to the Committee.

Dr. Sommer's biography is printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix oo*)

Members of the Committee questioned Dr. Sommer on various aspects of European defence and external affairs policies.

The Chairman advised the members about certain of the arrangements for the Committee's European tour.

The Chairman thanked Dr. Sommer for having accepted the Committee's invitation to appear as a witness on this occasion.

The Committee adjourned at 10:30 p.m., until Tuesday, March 4, 1969 at 11:00 a.m., when the witness will be Professor J. Granatstein of York University.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, February 27, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is past the hour so perhaps we can begin. The Committee is privileged this evening to have before it as a witness Dr. Theo Sommer. Dr. Sommer is in Canada to lecture at the National Defence College and has agreed to appear before this Committee on very short notice. I am sure the Committee very much appreciates this obvious willingness on his part to contribute to our deliberations on defence policy.

Incidentally, I believe that some of the members wish to discuss a number of administrative matters. Perhaps it would be most convenient to do that after we have heard from Dr. Sommer rather than at this point. It may be necessary to go into an in camera session depending upon the wishes of the members.

Dr. Sommer was born 1930. He is now Deputy Editor and Foreign Editor of the distinguished German weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*, published in Hamburg. This newspaper, incidentally, has a German language edition published in Toronto. He is also a Council Member of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

• 2010

Dr. Sommer has published many articles and several books on German and European security questions as well as writing on the subject for *Die Zeit*. He has also appeared on German radio and television programs as a political commentator.

Due to the short notice given to him, Dr. Sommer has been unable to prepare a written statement for the Committee. However, he has agreed to make an introductory statement on his appreciation of the European security problem, after which members will have the opportunity to question him. I have had the opportunity of a very pleasant short chat with Dr. Sommer and he speaks most frankly, and I know he will welcome questions on almost any subject.

I may also mention that I discussed with him the names of possible people to see while we are travelling on tour and he was most helpful in giving us the names of people of various points of view who will be of some help to us.

Dr. Sommer, would you care to proceed?

Dr. Theo Sommer (Deputy Editor and Foreign Editor of "Die Zeit", Hamburg, Germany): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is indeed a great privilege for me to be able to testify before you. I realize that you have been pondering the momentous matter of your country's alliance commitments for some time now. As the Chairman said, I did receive your summons only at very short notice so I have not been able to submit a written statement to you. I offer my apologies for that, but I will try to make up for this by putting a few introductory remarks on record in what I hope will not be a too disjointed fashion.

I happen to be a German citizen, but I shall try to take a kind of homogenized European view, rather than tackle my subject from a strictly parochial German vantage point. I do not hold any brief, of course, for anyone, and I would not even try to speak for Gaullist France. I should think, however, that outside France the European defence and foreign policy community would not find my presentation too objectionable. By the way, I do beg your indulgence if my handling of the Queen's English is not up to the normal standards of elegance and eloquence that you are used to in these chambers.

Mr. Allmand: It is better than in the Maritimes.

Dr. Sommer: I have proposed, Mr. Chairman, to address myself at the outset to two aspects of the European situation, the defence aspect and the detente aspect, and I will try to explain how in my view Canada fits into this in regard to both defence and detente. Let us take defence first.

The first thing to say here is that since the late forties and the early fifties the nature of the threat to which Western Europe and with it the Western Alliance was exposed has basically changed. A general war, or a central war as it is called in Pentagonese, with its incalculable consequences is not a likely contingency today nor, I think, is a massive attack in Europe a possibility of great reality.

There is still the danger of an armed clash arising from miscalculation or accident and also the danger of swift, limited thrusts across the central European divide, yet neither of these has a very high probability rating. Still, I think it is important to realize that this change in the threat from the East is the direct result of NATO's defence efforts. There is a cause and effect relationship here and if you do away with the cause you are likely to lose that particular effect too.

There is another point we would do well to bear in mind. It is true that Soviet aggression against Western Europe can now be rated exceptional rather than normal or natural, but it is also true that East-west crises could recur and if the instrument which helped to master past crises were dissolved this might conceivably lure the Kremlin leaders back on to the irrational path of adventure, and after Prague I think no one can afford to neglect this possibility.

• 2015

If Prague proved one thing it proved that whenever it can do so without fear of retribution, the Kremlin hits and hits hard.

In the old German army they used to have an offence called in German:

Verfuhrung zum Kameradendiebstahl

seducing your comrades to theft. When you left your locker unlocked, then not only the thief was punished, but also the chap who left his locker unlocked, and if we let our defences run down in Europe today we might really offer a seduction to the Kremlin leadership.

I would like to say a few words about the military effect of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia because I think it has a direct bearing on our topic tonight. I do not share the facile assumption that the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia weakened the Warsaw Pact: I think this view has been put before this Committee. It is true that the 14 Czech

and Slovak divisions cannot be relied upon for the moment, but I am sure if the Czech affair comes to a conclusion at all, in the sense that the Soviets want it to be concluded, then these divisions will be part of the Eastern armed forces again.

I have recently heard that the Czech Air Force is already training again with the other air forces of the Warsaw Pact, and if you look at the historical precedent of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, in 1958 I think it was, the Hungarian army for the first time took a full part in Warsaw Pact manoeuvres again. So this is a passing phase. I would not put too much importance.

On the other hand, I do not share the alarmist view either. Today the Soviets have reduced their garrison in Czechoslovakia to something between 50,000 and 70,000 men. These are deployed inland obviously with police tasks in mind rather than military tasks. Of course, this nucleus is enough to prove to the Czechs and to the rest of the world that the others can always come back, but I do not think that Czechoslovakia, if you look at a map of Europe, is really a very sensible place from which to carry forward an attack against the West. The traditional route of invasion lies through the north German plains and, anyhow, if the Soviets put many troops into Czechoslovakia permanently they would be singularly maldeployed there because they would be facing the strongest units of the NATO defence establishment in Germany, that is, the 7th Army of the United States.

Some changes have to be noted. There are more Soviet divisions deployed west of the Vistula now than there were before August 21 last year. The Soviet Red Army has proved its extreme, surprising mobility. It has conducted manoeuvres and has shown that it can camouflage large-scale operations as manoeuvres which give it a flying start for anything they may have in mind, and our warning time estimates may, indeed, have to be reconsidered. Basically, however, it is my thesis that the threat from the East has not changed, at least the military threat has not. What has changed, however, is the political atmosphere and the political threat.

I submit that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has created new uncertainties about the intentions of the Soviet leadership,

and the Brezhnev doctrine proclaimed last year after the event has further increased

• 2020

these uncertainties for it creates a precedent out of what might have been an aberration. It is ambiguous, ill-defined in its geographical delimitation and it is particularly disquieting to me because it was formulated against the backdrop of a theological debate, again going on in Russia now, between the Russian military and the technocrats, a debate in which the view has been put forward by the military that nuclear war was not, as Khrushchev had reasoned, an unusable instrument of politics and policy in this day and age. These military people now in this debate going on at present in Russia take the view that nuclear war has its political uses.

All this, in my view, adds up to the simple conclusion that the Atlantic Alliance is still necessary; it would be quite foolish to tear down NATO fences before being sure that they are not needed any longer or before a reliable new security system could take their place.

Today, gentlemen, security is provided by the means of deterrents on the one hand, and, in the event that deterrents fail, by the means of defence. This means there must be the ultimate deterrent provided by the United States, but there must also be enough non-nuclear forces to guard against the danger of small-scale incursions across the demarcation line. If such forces are lacking we will, indeed, be confronted with the bitter alternative recently formulated by Dennis Healy, *Suicide or Surrender*, and in my view it is here that Canada's contribution to European defence comes in and weighs more heavily on the scales than is sometimes realized, it seems to me, in this country.

Mind you, it is not only a problem of numbers of troops: it is (a) a question of quality, and everyone in Europe is agreed that you have first-rate units over there and that especially your air division consists of the toughest flyers that can be found within NATO today; and it is (b) a question of principle, the principle being that any aggressor should need, if he attacks, as many Western allies as possible as far forward to the demarcation line as possible. In this expectation on the other side lies the actual deterrent value of even small allied contributions. It is the

presence on the ground of even small units that guarantees the involvement, in the event of war, of as many partners as possible; it is not the actual clauses of the Treaty, such as under the operative clause of the NATO Treaty. The assistance to be extended by any one partner to the attacked party may consist of a letter of "condolation" or of an H-bomb; it is up to each individual government.

Therefore, to make no bones about it, to my mind, if Canada withdraws her contingents from Europe, that may well trigger off a deplorable chain reaction. Your decision is likely to have a catalytic effect in Belgium, in Holland, possibly in Denmark and Norway and possibly even in Germany. There would be such a tremendous thinning-out that we would have to fall back on the old massive retaliation strategy which was implausible when it was formulated by John Foster Dulles in 1964 and which is totally incredible today.

• 2025

I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not mean to say for a moment that there should never be any thinning out. If the evolution from confrontation to collaboration, which was interrupted by the Czech tragedy, is resumed sometime in the future, a thinning-out of the military installations on either side of the Iron Curtain—on the Western side, too—will one day certainly be on the agenda. However, I would like to make three points in this connection.

The first point is, I cannot see why Canada should want to be the one that is pulling the stopper out of the bathtub.

The second point is that whatever we do in the way of troop reductions should not be the result of individual and separate decisions, but the outcome of joint deliberations, and I wish Canada could set and would set an example to the others in how one arrives at joint decisions jointly within the Alliance.

My third point is that in these deliberations Canada has an important role to play. It can help establish sensible criteria for troop withdrawals and see to it that the modalities of any pull-out are such that the forward garrisons can be speedily reinforced in times of crisis.

If you will bear with me for another few minutes, I would like to say a few points about the second aspect of my topic—*détente*.

I say, first, that despite Czechoslovakia, as I see it, *détente* still has a future, not in the very short term, but certainly in the long term, and in the medium term is ready. I do not think that Czechoslovakia has changed for good the basic tendencies that were operating on the European scene before the August 21. These tendencies are submerged at the moment, but they will reassert themselves and I think bridge building between East and West must continue: at least the West must be ready to continue at any time or as soon as the other side is ready for it again. However, we should not delude ourselves as to the speed with which progress can be made; I think after Prague there is no room left for euphoria on this score.

The question is how do you get *détente* or how do you manage it, because what the alliance needs is not only crisis management in the military sense; it is also *détente* management in a political sense.

Let me say, first, that I think the view that Alliance membership and *détente* are mutually exclusive is quite mistaken. Destroying NATO in the way General de Gaulle set about it a few years ago was not a all an instrument of *détente*. I think he rested his case on the assumption that if greater emphasis on national sovereignty were to be laid in Western Europe, then a similar development could be encouraged in Eastern Europe, and that in this way gradually we would arrive at a reunion of the two halves of Europe. It was also his assumption, therefore, that any loosening of the Alliance cohesion on our side could be expected to produce a similar fragmentation on the other side.

• 2030

I think the invasion of Czechoslovakia has proved conclusively that this assumption was wrong. Never was NATO more amorphous, more fragmented, more disunited than before August last year. The Soviets marched into Czechoslovakia at a time when NATO was coming unstuck and when it was quite pacific in its whole outlook. This did not induce the Soviets to permit a kind of mirror image development on their side. They rather took advantage of this loosening up on our side to consolidate their own empire again. I put to you the idea—I am not quite sure whether it makes sense, but I think it makes as much sense as some of the other ideas we have

entertained in recent years—I put to you the suggestion that possibly *détente* can be managed much better on a bloc-to-bloc basis, on a pact-to-pact basis, than by a multitude of bilateral approaches. I am led to think so because only a bloc-to-bloc approach will calm and can calm Russia's fear that *détente* basically is nothing but a means of subversion, a means to break up the Eastern bloc.

Another remark. I had the privilege of listening to part of Professor Legault's testimony this morning and he was talking about the three concentric circles in which *détente* has to be conducted. I would use a different metaphor. I think of *détente* as something going on on three different levels of one and the same building: on the top floor, the super powers, who have to address themselves to some problems which are peculiar to them—strategic arms limitation and so on; on the second floor, the middle floor, Western Europeans and Eastern Europeans; and on the first floor, West Germans and East Germans. That does not mean that the Western Europeans, for instance, should not try to have good relations with Moscow too or that West Germany should not try to have relations with Moscow too. There are staircases in this *détente* structure I have been sketching for you, but on the whole I think that *détente* has to be conducted on these different levels with these different foci, with NATO—and this is my point—with NATO acting as a clearing house, if possible; if not, as an instrument of *détente*.

I do not know whether I should impose on you any longer by inserting a few remarks here about the German question. I would say this: that Germany for several years and especially under the new Grand Coalition Government, which came to office towards the end of 1966, has fully embraced the concept of *détente* and is willing to pursue a policy of reconciliation. These are the three addressees: Soviet Russia, the Eastern European nations and East Germany.

We have tried to initiate conversations with the Russians about a mutual agreement not to use force. We were on the verge of coming to terms with the Czechs when the tragic events of last August intervened. Under the agreement then envisaged, the old quarrel about the validity of the Munich agreement, extant or not, would have been terminated.

● 2035

We have offered talks to Poland and while not publicly renouncing forever any claim to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers, government speakers and prominent figures of the two government parties have made it clear that the Germans do not expect, really, to get these territories back, ever.

We have instituted important changes in our relations with Eastern Germany. We now recognize that there is a kind of state over there, although it is not a kind of state the authorities of which we like or morally approve of. We have said re-unification is not something that is around the corner. It may be a long time off, decades off, possibly. We have to have an interim policy and we have offered talks to the East Germans too. We have said the most important thing is to make partition, if it cannot be ended, at least more tolerable. So far they have refused to talk about this. The point is, however, that we are ready for conversations any time. We do not have any legal reservations anymore. Now we can think ahead into a future in which two Germanies would exist side by side, would co-exist peacefully, and our only condition for this would be that the other side does not insist on the fact that this co-existence is conducted in a very hostile fashion. We want the cold war to be ended between the two Germanies. We are ready to end it on our side, and if East Berlin would oblige, we would be ready to entertain a good many ideas which would have been unthinkable in West Germany 10 years ago. One of these ideas is that perhaps re-unification is not the ultimate national destiny of Germany, must not be the ultimate national destiny. I have said that it must be the policy of the German Government to bring about either re-unification or conditions that make it superfluous, which means that partition must be bearable, must be more humane. This is not a nationalist approach any longer, as you will notice. It is basically a humanitarian approach. We also realize that re-unification, if it ever comes about, must come about within a wider settlement. It must put to rest the fears and doubts our Eastern neighbours have as well as our Western neighbours and friends. I think we have not given up the ultimate aim of re-unification but we are familiarizing ourselves with the idea that it may not be had and we are willing to say

now, "Let us have re-unification if it is possible or let us keep partition if it is tolerable."

In concluding, in this whole *détente* process, even in the thinking about *détente*, how do you go about it, what can you offer, what machinery do you institute? In this whole process the small powers have a role to play. I am not only thinking of the two Belgian statesmen, Paul Henri Spaak formerly, and now his successor Pierre Harmel, but I am thinking of Halvard Lange of Norway; I am thinking of your own Lester Pearson. I think these people have contributed to the political side of NATO and to thinking about *détente* far out of proportion to the weight of their respective countries and I for one would

● 2040

hate to lose the wise counsel of the Canadians on the NATO council when questions of such import are taken up. It is sober minds like those that you have been wont to despatch onto the international scene which we need to keep us from backsliding into the habits and the easy formulae of the cold war. This is, I think, the advantage we get out of your continued presence in NATO, and I think the advantage you would get out of it is that you have a say in the future of a continent for which and on which you have twice, within a generation, spilled your blood and your treasure.

Just one final remark. If you do pull out, one question will come up and it is a very serious question. If you pull out and if that then has a catalytic effect elsewhere, who will fill the vacuum? If the Germans increase their military strength to make up the difference, that will stir old fears all around and it will increase tension in Europe rather than decrease it; and if we thin out, if we follow suit, it will increase the risks in an international situation which is fluid and risky enough as it is. So once more I think it would be a pity to go without your counsel within NATO as it would be a pity for you to leave the business of Europe unfinished. Your continued stay, in my view, helps to minimize the dangers of the present situation and it helps to increase the changes of a hopeful evolution in the future. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Sommer. I have a long list of questioners. The first is Mr. Hymmen.

Mr. Hymmen: Germany is, of course, one of our very important partners in the NATO alliance but there has been concern occasionally and there was a question at our meeting this morning about German militarism. There are many views on this. One view is, of course, the one which has been stated as being the real purpose of the NATO alliance, to prevent a resurgence of German militarism. At the other extreme is the view which I noticed was expressed in the U.S.S.R. press, that by the creation and the operation of NATO over almost 20 years we have provided for this very opportunity. I do not hold to either of those views. You may like to make a comment. I have two other related questions I would like to ask. They will be short. I do not know if you are familiar with a study published in 1964 made by a Professor Eric Waldman who was formerly at Marquette University and is at present on the staff of the University of Alberta. The study was made under a NATO fellowship and the publication was called *The Goose Step is Verboten*. Professor Waldman in his study found that in 1964, which was 18 years after the end of the Second World War, there was a strong anti-militaristic attitude in the general public in West Germany. He also found strong evidence in the Bundeswehr itself of a strong responsibility for a free Europe in the NATO alliance. You have answered part of this question in your previous statement. What is the general view of the German people in regard to the presence of NATO forces, including the presence of Canadian forces whom we are told have no useful purpose in the NATO alliance?

On the third question, I say there has been some concern about German militarism. Canada and Canadians including even our CBC has had some concern about another matter, and while I am not asking you to go into the realm of German politics, there has been some concern about the NDP and whether it is correct or not, there is some suggestion that the very presence of Von Faden and some 20 of his party members in the free City of Berlin may have prompted the recent crisis of a few days ago. I think you have explained the position of your coalition government on the NATO alliance. What is the official view or policy of the extreme right wing faction, the NPD?

• 2045

Mr. Winch: Do not get your initials mixed up, now!

Dr. Sommer: That is a whole range of questions, and I will try to take them one by one. First of all, your question on German militarism: I can only make a profession of faith here. I know that in Western Germany, that the generation of Western Germans now living is no longer militarist. If I may say so, one does not lose two wars disastrously, one of which you started beyond any doubt, without somehow learning a lesson, and I would fully agree with the diagnosis by Professor Waldmann of The University of Alberta.

Secondly, what do the Germans think is the purpose of the presence of foreign—I would say allied troops on German soil? I think we feel they are there as friends. Their purpose is not only to defend the Germans, but Germany simply happens to be their own frontier too, if you look at it in terms of world-wide confrontation. The first purpose of these troops being stationed in Germany is to guarantee the security of Germany along with the security of all the other allies; is to prevent, I would also say, the human, technological, industrial, potential of Western Europe falling into the hands of the Soviet Union. The second purpose is to provide the firm foundation for that time-consuming, protracted process of making Europe whole again.

Your last question related to the NPD. I could lecture you on this no end, but I would like to be brief. First of all, you get cranks in every free society. Secondly, if they are right wing cranks and if the society is the German society, they bear more careful watching than elsewhere. Thirdly, they seem to have a peak and hit a peak about two years ago when they polled as much as I think 13 or 12.8 per cent in some provincial elections. They have now taken a dip again; they are down to between 5 and 6 per cent. I have no way of foretelling what percentage they will poll in the September elections, but I think the mere fact that we have a functioning government again in Bonn that gets things done, that managed the economic recession and that gives the appearance of governing again, has reduced the following of the NPD and I, for one, would not consider them, though I would keep watching them very closely, a danger to the democratic fabric of present day Germany.

Just by way of conclusion, it is so easy to look at the 8 or 10 per cent always they have polled in various elections, but the really important figure is the 90 or 92 per cent of those people who have voted for democratic parties. Thank you.

• 2050

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: I will limit myself to one or two questions, and try to be brief. Dr. Sommer, you spoke about the change in the view of West Germany with regard to the unification of Germany, and that two separate Germanies, as long as the situation was tolerable would serve as an alternative and that unification is perhaps a long way off. Is there any change in public opinion, if there is such a thing, in East Germany with regard to this same problem? I am not thinking of the official view of the government so much as I am of Germans generally who are living in East Germany?

Dr. Sommer: Well, sir, it is very hard to come by reliable data there. My last trip to East Germany was five years ago. At that time I seemed to detect a beginning of, I would not say national consciousness, but a feeling that they were separate from us, and in a way different from us. They are proud of their achievements which they achieved under much harsher conditions than we did in West Germany. We had Marshall aid; they had to ship reparations to Soviet Russia. Also, the younger generation possibly is getting used to it. They do not like their system, but they are not quite convinced that our system is the best one either. So I sensed then, and I hear this confirmed occasionally from recent travellers, that they would want to be together with us, but that they have a sense of distinctness now and they, I think, would also settle for a kind of German—you might call it union, or federation, or confederation—in which the two Germanies were different from each other but not alien to each other.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you very much. I have one other question which is just a confirmation of, or perhaps asking you to expand on, what you have already said in one regard. We have had witnesses before this Committee who, if I understood them correctly, held the view, which I think is very naive, that had NATO not been created, that the expansion

of Russian domination in Eastern Europe had ceased anyway, and that we are contributing to NATO for no valid reason, and to prove this assumption that the thing for us to do is, to prove that rape is not in their minds, to immediately disrobe, from the military point of view, to prove the fact. My view, however, is that the Eastern bloc, Russia in particular, is very pragmatic and if there were any choice crumbs lying around which they thought they could pick off without any great risk, they would be liable to do so, even yet.

• 2055

Dr. Sommer: Well, sir, what you are asking me for is an act of retroactive prophesy. I agree with the feelings that seem to be underlying your statement. I think that at the time, in the early fifties, even if the Soviets perhaps did not have the intention to push to the Atlantic, Western statesmen did well to assume that they might do so. There were enough indications that they might just want to do it, and we had to guard against that. I do not think that by dismantling NATO now you could prove the case, and if that experiment ends the wrong way, we have all had it. As I said before, I would not leave my locker unlocked.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Sommer, I would like to congratulate you on your beautiful English. We have been hearing and studying a great deal too, about NATO in general, and what is uppermost in our minds is not whether or not NATO should in itself continue to exist but what Canada's role should be; whether Canada should withdraw completely, or, if Canada does not withdraw, what its role should be. You mentioned that Canada's withdrawal could trigger a massive withdrawal of other European countries. I find this rather difficult to understand because I do not think that Canada is such a large and important country that we would have that much influence on all of the other countries, in addition to which I wonder if other countries feel that Canada should be solving all of the problems of the world. Certainly, Canada is not large enough to be on every front. At present we are involved in the NORAD aspect. The countries of Europe are not. This is a part of the NATO participation. It seems to me just as reasonable to assume that Canada should not necessarily be taking part in some other

aspect of NATO which the European countries are taking part in. When we consider what our role should be and assess it, we are considering one possibility as the presence in Europe, whether or not that presence should be removed or reduced. We are considering our participation in NORAD which, to my mind, is the most important thing for Canada, and it is a part of the NATO alliance. We are to consider our naval contribution. We are asked to consider also whether Canada should have a peacekeeping force. It has been suggested by one of our witnesses in particular that Canada should have a mobile force. There are others who go along with the idea that the mobile force should be stationed in Canada and ready to be deployed anywhere else. These are all of the considerations which are uppermost in our minds as we are trying to review this NATO problem.

I wonder, Dr. Sommer, if you could give me a little comment on this matter which would convince or help to make me understand why you think that Canada is so important in Europe when we are already committed on this side of the ocean. Would you also comment on my statement that we cannot be solving all of the problems of the world, and we are already involved in Norad, and perhaps we should not be involved so much actively in Europe.

Dr. Sommer: Well, sir, I will try to do some thinking out loud. First of all, I do not think the case is specifically addressed to Canada. I had meant to indicate that when I said I would hate to see Canada be the one that pulls out the stopper. It could be Belgium, or it could be Denmark, but, as it looks, it might be you. Personally, I think that would be deplorable not because I overrate your influence—maybe you underestimate it too—but you would be tipping the scale at a very precarious moment and you would set a precedent of independent action and autonomous decision at a time when the alliance should find its way back to the old ways of concerted action, rather than independent action.

Now, I appreciate your problem about the multitude of tasks which is before you, but I have no way of judging whether you simply have to cast off some of them or whether you simply would like to, whether they are unbearable or whether you would want to drop some burdens in order to pick up other

ones. If the latter were the case, I would ask what other roles you have in mind for Canada and if you have others in mind, what would you get out of that?

• 2100

You are already contributing to the Mobile Force. Mobile forces are a good thing, but if you earmark them in advance that they be used only on the flanks or only on one flank, you reduce that element of flexibility which NATO needs to pose a resistance to any adversary. You are talking about peacekeeping. So far your NATO membership has not encumbered you in your peacekeeping role, has it?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): That is right. It has been a limited role, though.

Dr. Sommer: It has been a limited role. Now the question would be, do you really foresee in the next 20 or 30 years a great many conflicts in which peacekeeping in the old sense would do any good? I notice, for instance, that there is no peacekeeping force whatsoever in Nigeria at the moment, and I sometimes have a feeling that the Nigeria-Biafra affair is the first of many conflicts which we are going to see in the last third of this century, in which the intercession of white troops, whether they wear blue helmets or other helmets, is not desired, and is not at all feasible or effective.

If you will permit me a personal reflection, I do appreciate the moral impulse behind your desire to involve yourselves in the development of the third world, both politically and economically. But with due respect, I think you and everyone else who is trying—and we all are trying to some extent—are in for frustrations. The third world will probably frustrate you more than NATO ever has.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you.

The Chairman: A short supplementary question from Mr. Brewin. You can continue first, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I wonder if you could tell us what the attitude is in Europe towards Canada's participation in NORAD. Do they think it is in effect a participation in NATO, or do they consider it as something completely separate?

Dr. Sommer: I throw the question back to you. Do you consider a German or French participation in NADGE as a contribution to NATO and to your security here, or something separate? I think this is the fence around our individual houses. For you it is NORAD. It must be up to your own discretion whether you think you want a fence or not. For us it is NADGE, which is a similar thing except on a European scale. So I do not see that there is an alternative, being either in NATO or in NORAD.

• 2105

If I may just mention one point, there are all kinds of models, even within NATO. You have the French model which means you pull out of the military organizations but you leave your garrison in Germany. I have heard references in this country to doing a de Gaulle. But doing a de Gaulle means peeving the Americans but staying in Germany. Then you could follow the Scandinavian model which means you are a full member but without a military contribution to the central front. For reasons which I have indicated in my introductory remarks, I think you ought to remain involved on the central front. Then there is the Icelandic example. You are a full member in everything but have no military contribution whatsoever and therefore no influence.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin on a supplementary question.

Mr. Brewin: Dr. Sommer, on the question of the catalytic effect of Canadian withdrawal or reduction, or change of role, I think you have made an extremely lucid case for Canada remaining within NATO, but I find this catalytic theory very unconvincing. Surely the nations in Europe cannot be much concerned about their own security if they are going to follow the example of Canada, and if the withdrawal of a rather insignificant North American Military force is going to set off a sort of domino effect and the whole set-up is going to collapse. If the situation is that weak, we should not be trying to hold it up. If we are the people who can pull the plug out of the bathwater, it must be about time the bathwater was changed. It seems to me you are putting your case there on a very unconvincing basis.

Dr. Sommer: I can see why you would say so and think so. I will try to elaborate my case, and maybe it is a case of changing the bathwater. I think the detrimental effect of your pulling out would not be that we are losing 6,000 Canadian troops and roughly 100 aircraft, but we would suffer a complete change of the psychological climate. There would be less dedication to an alliance, an international organization from which even the normally or formerly internationally-minded Canadians withdrew. I think this would be one effect in Europe. What kind of an organization is that if even the Canadians want to get out of it?

I will go further. If we have to thin out, and we all have our reasons to unburden ourselves, let us do it together. Let us not do it separately and individually, but let us do it together and let us do it in an orderly fashion that will permit us to keep up the defences of Europe on a different basis. I put to you the idea which was bandied about in Europe before the Czech crisis, and which is bound to come up again, that we put our strategy on a new footing, that we shift it from a strategy of presence on the ground to a strategy of mobilization, which for the Europeans would mean installing huge territorial defence systems, using their reserves which they are not doing now, and which for the Americans and the Canadians would mean providing air transport, fast deployment ships, and war material depots in Europe to which you can fly your troops in case of need.

• 2110

If this is what we want to do, what we all feel is cheaper and possibly more effective, then let us do it. But let us do it together and let us do it as a result of a sober exercise of thinking and not as a result of, I would say, a separatist impulse, whoever might give that impulse.

Mr. Brewin: You say that we should do this in consultation, but is it not within the whole concept of the NATO alliance that the role for each country should be one suited to it, and suited within its own thinking, as it were? While we should not unilaterally declare what we are going to, if you say we should consult, surely we have to have a clear idea in our own minds what an appropriate role is, instead of just doing what is sometimes suggested, carrying on what we

have done before because we did it before, as if somebody says, "It will have a disturbing effect if we change"?

Dr. Sommer: I see your point there, but I think in this regard NATO simply is not just any old-fashioned alliance. It is different from former historical alliances, in as much as we have acquired the habit and the custom of making decisions together. At least that is what we ought to be doing from now on, instead of making decisions separately and then springing them on the rest of the alliance. So I think even if you in this Committee and your government in another committee came to the conclusion that Canada ought to remain in NATO but withdraw its contingent, even then, I think, there would be a necessary phase—you should I think subject your vote to the votes of the other allies. There should be a review of the alliance, too. But I see your point. I am also afraid I cannot convince you.

Mr. Brewin: You can never tell.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson and then Mr. Macquarrie.

Mr. Anderson: The statement that you make, sir, that there must be enough non-nuclear forces to handle incursions, is I think probably tied to the idea that you should have as many people forward as possible. Is that right?

Dr. Sommer: It is, but I say not simply as many people forward as possible, but as many different people forward as possible, troops from different nations.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, and then you went on to speak about speedy reinforcements, the idea being the more you had forward the more reinforcements would be likely to arrive. Would that be a logical assumption?

Dr. Sommer: I think that would be logical.

Mr. Anderson: I think the Czechoslovakia crisis did show that the Warsaw Pact is quite capable of putting on an enormous military push very quickly, and that probably our European NATO defence would be inadequate in the strictly non-nuclear sense. I think this is accepted. This is realized and accepted, and I think it is shown by the fact that many of the tactical weapons in Europe are nuclear.

Would you say that we have enough forces to push back a non-nuclear incursion? Would you still say that in view of the fact that probably nuclear or thermonuclear weapons would be used in handling such an incursion? It seems to me that we would so soon get into a nuclear war in Europe that the actual numbers on the ground along the front would not be as important as the American determination to back up nuclear exchanges in Europe with perhaps continental exchanges of missiles.

• 2115

Dr. Sommer: But, sir, I think the principle would be that you use as little force as possible and as much as necessary. If you can cope with an incursion by strictly conventional means, it is perfectly all right—you would never think of using nuclears, not even tactical nuclear weapons then. But if that incursion is larger, or so large that you cannot cope with it by strictly conventional means, you may want or you may have to use tactical nuclear weapons. So the enemy knows that too, and he knows also that the step from tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear weapons is very small. He knows that once you get on that ladder you may get higher up much quicker than you think. So there is a deterrent effect at the lowest rung of the ladder already. And mind you, you are in the tactical nuclear business too.

Mr. Anderson: Exactly, and the step between the conventional and the tactical nuclear is very quickly taken. I can see few occasions where an incursion would not result in very quick, if not immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Dr. Sommer: I do not know, maybe your sources of information are better than mine, but I should have thought that the step from conventional weapons to tactical nuclears is much bigger than the step from tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear weapons. I think the threshold is between conventional and any kind of nuclear.

Mr. Anderson: My information is certainly not as good as yours, but it seems to me that in the light of the tremendous force that can be put against NATO at any one particular point along the NATO line the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be almost immediate in case of a serious incursion by Warsaw Pact forces across that line.

Dr. Sommer: Well, I do not want to get into a semantic squabble about the meaning of the word incursion. I mean by incursion a border violation or getting possession of a city within, let us say, 20 kilometres of the demarcation line, or something like that. If there is more than that behind, if this is just the thin edge of the wedge, then of course the process of escalation will get started very quickly. But the other side knows that very well and it must realize before that this will happen—which again means it is taking nuclear war, central nuclear war in its stride. Now if the Russians, or whoever the potential adversary might be in the 80's, is determined to have a central nuclear war, there is nothing that can stop them. Then the Canadian contingent in Germany will not make much difference, nor will any of the other troops stationed in Germany—except in one role of course, that even in a full-scale nuclear exchange the position of the actual terrain may still make a difference to the outcome.

I would like to make one more point. You referred before to the Russians assembling huge armies for the Czech invasion. Now I think NATO knew all along that this mobilization was not a mobilization that could endanger NATO, that it was geared only for a Czechoslovak operation. If they had really meant to concentrate troops for a large-scale massive attack across the European divide they would have had to back it up with 60 or 100 reserve divisions in an area in which they had nothing. We would have detected that and we would have detected it—to remain in the time scale of last year—in May or June at the latest, and that would have given us the opportunity to reinforce our troops on the European continent.

Mr. Anderson: Could I turn to one other point, sir. You mention that Germany at present fully embraces NATO, you also mentioned the uncertainty that might come if Canada and other nations that you suggested, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and so on, pulled out. Do you think this would lead to an irresistible political force within Germany to acquire German nuclear weapons, if there was such a weakening of NATO?

Dr. Sommer: Frankly, I do not think so—and I have given a lot of thought to this and have written about it several times. There is no body of opinion in Germany that would favour a German national nuclear develop-

ment. Even in the whole field of journalism and the media I know of only one writer who has ever broached the idea, and he significantly is a re-immigrant from the United States.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. But even in the same circumstances that I have suggested.

Dr. Sommer: Let me put it very simply. As long as we have the protection of the American nuclear umbrella we will not need a national nuclear force. If that American protection is withdrawn from us a national nuclear force of our own will not be any good at all, it will not serve the purpose, it cannot substitute for the American protection. And do not be misled by our squabbling about the nonproliferation treaty. We are trying to keep a few options open to us, but the option of a national nuclear force is not amongst them. The option is technological and scientific—and I will conclude on this note, it is European. I think the alternative we would turn to, if NATO came unstuck, would not be a German national nuclear force, because the political disadvantages of such a move would be so grievous, but a European nuclear force, if that is at all possible. In fact, that is one of the options we have fought to keep open in the nonproliferation negotiations.

• 2120

Mr. Anderson: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Macquarrie.

Mr. Macquarrie: The Professor's presentation was both clear and cogent and I have very few questions. I may say that there was one part which surprised me. You rather lightly, I think, but nevertheless did suggest a sort of cause-effect relationship between the loosening of NATO as a result of what has been done by and in France and that taken as an opportunity by the Soviet Union to consolidate its empire in Czechoslovakia. I had thought that Czechoslovakia would be, to use an old-fashioned term, a sphere of influence that would be unchallenged and unchallengeable regardless of NATO's cohesive strength.

Dr. Sommer: I think I said it was the assumption of General de Gaulle that if NATO loosens the Warsaw Pact would too, and I said that he was wrong in this calculation. I think in the long run the Soviets have undermined their influence in Czechoslovakia

much more grievously by invading Czechoslovakia than if they had stayed out or just sat it out. I would grant you that Czechoslovakia lies within the sphere of influence or preponderant power of the Soviet Union, but I would also say that invasion is not the only means of exercising Soviet influence. There are other means thinkable. They were not thinkable to this particular crew of Kremlin leadership, but they may be thinkable to future Kremlin leadership. At least I hope so.

Mr. Macquarrie: I am interested, too, in your references to your own country's contact with some of the countries in the Eastern Bloc, as it is called. As I recall, some months ago and certainly before the August date you mention, there were contacts developed with Roumania, both economic and diplomatic, and with other countries. Is there at the present time any resumption of this particular thrust?

Dr. Sommer: There is a readiness on our side to resume but we realize at the moment we would only embarrass anyone to whom we extend our hand. So we play it rather cool even in our relations with the Roumanians. They have trouble enough as it is. We suffer, tongue in cheek, the Czechs making all kinds of unfriendly noises about West Germany again, which they have not done for a year. We feel that it is the minimum show of solidarity they probably have to make, at the moment, and we do not take any offence. But with Poland it is hopeless at the moment. I do not know about the latest developments in the West Berlin-East Berlin talks about passes for Berliners, but on the whole I should have thought that East Berlin at the moment is not in a mood for serious talks—not in a mood to consider our offer of putting off re-unification and making things work, and making them a little more human in the meantime. We are getting along fine with Yugoslavia. Anyhow, we are ready for anything the other side feels ready for.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Sommer, you stated in analyzing the Kremlin situation that there had been, as you described it, a theological debate going on in the Kremlin between the technocrats and I think you said the theoreticians or the politicians.

Dr. Sommer: I said the military.

Mr. Allmand: The military?

Dr. Sommer: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Do you identify this with what we understand as a debate going on in the Kremlin between the so-called hawks and the doves? If not, do you think there has been a very contested debate between the Soviet hawks and doves in the Kremlin? But after you analyzed and made that statement you went on to say, and I tried to write it down, that there was a new uncertainty in the Kremlin and that there was a new policy that was now acceptable, that nuclear warfare had its political uses.

• 2125

Dr. Sommer: Might have.

Mr. Allmand: In your assessment, would this mean that the Kremlin hawks are on top for the present?

Dr. Sommer: No, sir, but it means that they are speaking out again, or whatever hawks do, which they have not for about five years. I did not use the term "theological debate" for nothing. It is a theological debate revolving around quotes from Lenin and Clausewitz. The decision of some militaries seems to be that the Khrushchev line, that nuclear war is out and for that reason one should not even consider a whole range of political action, was wrong, that it limited the sphere of action of the Kremlin too much, and that possibly nuclear war was an instrument of policy, after all. If you want the details on this, the best analysis of it that I have seen was given by Victor Forza in *The Guardian* about four weeks ago.

Mr. Allmand: I was going to ask you what evidence you had that this theory was now being put forward.

Dr. Sommer: He quotes chapter and verse on this from the official military and ideological publications.

Mr. Allmand: But you do not feel that there has been any conclusion to this particular debate or that any one group is definitely in control of the Kremlin.

• 2130

Dr. Sommer: No, I do not think there has been any conclusion, and frankly I do not know what the West could do to influence the outcome of the debate in a way favourable to the West.

Mr. Allmand: Some people suggest that by reacting to Czechoslovakia by beefing up our defences, and so forth we will only help the so-called hawks in the Kremlin and give them a better position in gaining control and, therefore, lead not to *détente* but to a building up of forces on both sides.

Dr. Sommer: I have seen that argument. I have also seen the obverse argument that if the West gives in now and appears meek this may also strengthen the position of the hawks, because they will be able to point out that as soon as they make some martial noises the West comes around. By the way, with due respect I do not think we are doing anything that could be called beefing up the Western defences. What all the governments are doing now is enacting a few bills which they have had in their desk drawers, some of them for years, and they used Czechoslovakia as a good excuse to finagle the money out of their parliaments.

It is not really a reaction in any way comparable, for instance, to the reaction after the first Prague coup in 1948. That really set off the cold war. Now, this time I could not say that we are conducting a cold war again. In fact, I would say the period of mourning is over already. The Americans are straining for talks with the Russians. General de Gaulle had the "grande commission" in Paris in December. The British would love to do business with the Kremlin, but the Kremlin is particularly beastly to the British at the moment. The Germans have tried to get into the swim by offering a resumption of the talks about the no use of force agreement.

Actually, I think the West has behaved rather reasonably and has done just a minimum to repair the neglect of past years.

Mr. Allmand: I have one last question. You stated that the Czechoslovakian affair was not really an indication that the Warsaw Pact was weakening, and then you gave examples of how even now the Czechoslovakian Air Force is beginning to train, and so forth, and co-operation is being shown between Warsaw Pact countries. However, we have read and heard other statements which say that the Czechoslovakian affair was merely the first of many similar attempts at freedom from the domination of the Soviet Union and that we might see similar things in Poland, East Germany and perhaps again in Czechoslovakia—even, perhaps, in the Soviet Union.

If that point of view is correct the Warsaw Pact would seem to be weaker than you have indicated.

Dr. Sommer: Let me explain myself. I probably was not lucid enough. Mine was a strictly military argument. I was referring to the argument put forward by some people that because 14 Czech divisions cannot now be counted upon the net strength of the Warsaw Pact armies is less than it was before August 21, 1968. This is a very narrow, technical, professional argument. On a political plane I fully agree with you, of course. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was the outward manifestation of a deep insecurity and uncertainty hovering over the whole Soviet system.

• 2135

I think the Russian intervention does not represent a reversal of the decline of Soviet influence over Eastern Europe, but only a temporary postponement. I think it did not defeat, but only delayed, the dominant trends of recent years. There were three trends; first the trend towards greater national independence in Eastern Europe which will continue; second, the trend towards greater internal liberalization, at least in the economic field and third, the trend towards wider contacts with the Western world. I think these tendencies will be resumed inevitably.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Legault?

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Sommer, in your presentation, which I have appreciated very much, you have definitely put the point across that conditions since the origin of NATO some 20 years ago—back in 1948—have changed. Necessarily, perhaps, the conditions have changed to the extent that perhaps France miscalculated and that the *détente* was really so well established that they could pull out of it.

Would you care to give an estimate of how much longer the alliance should continue until we reach the point of this *détente* or this understanding where danger would not exist?

Dr. Sommer: I have given a lot of thought to this but I have not come up with a plausible answer. Looking at the scene in Europe and the Western world as a whole, it would

appear rather implausible that 25 years after the end of the war allied troops would still remain on the main battlefield of that war, but then what choice do we have? So long as the business is not finished I am afraid we will simply have to stay there.

I see an important difference in one thing, however. In the fifties the military structure of the alliance was an end in itself. In the sixties we have come to see that this military instrument must be put to political use. I think we were not doing so badly for some time; then came events in Czechoslovakia which had indigenous roots and were not due to anything NATO did or did not do. Now I think we simply have to sit it out and wait.

As I said, for the long run I am hopeful there will come a time when liberalization and rapport with the West on the part of the eastern European countries will not be prevented by the Russians any more. One of three things must happen. The Russians must take these changes which are afoot in eastern Europe and if you look at recent reports of the Russian intellectuals and Russian scientists, the Russian national minorities act and react and think just the same way the Czech minorities, the Czech intellectuals and the Czech writers acted two or three years ago. All the elements of an upheaval in Russia are there, too. This is the first condition: the Russians conform to the reformist strength themselves.

The second possibility is that the Russians do not conform, but that they tolerate change in their immediate glacis in eastern Europe. The third possibility is that they do not like this kind of change, but they are not strong enough to prevent it any longer and this may happen.

• 2140

Perhaps you Canadians too, but we Europeans certainly, tend to look with a rather transfixed stare at what is going on in the United States and we feel that the fabric of society is weakening there. Sometimes we doubt whether America will be at all a reliable partner in the seventies.

What we neglect is to look at Russia too, and I think in Russia society is under as much strain and stress as it is in the United States. There are some experts who feel that Soviet Russia is much more likely to break up in the seventies, even in its component

minority parts, than the United States, but this is just by way of parenthesis.

Mr. Legault: My first question necessarily was based on the fact that the original understanding was for a 20-year alliance which would be renewed, and I thought perhaps France based its action on that particular stipulation.

In your presentation you also mentioned the surprise and the quick move of the Warsaw Pact troops in invading Czechoslovakia. Yet, I doubt very much whether you or any others—and especially the people in NATO—failed to be aware of this particular move being made. If I recall correctly, for weeks prior to that invasion we could read in the newspapers about the various exercises and the concentration of troops. I have a feeling that NATO could not have done anything even if they had been told a month ahead of time that this invasion would take place, especially in Czechoslovakia. Is that not your feeling?

Dr. Sommer: Yes, sir, it is, because as a matter of fact Czechoslovakia is not a member of NATO. Some people tend to forget that. Some people argue NATO should have done something. If NATO had done anything it would have violated the ground rules in operation since 1945 and it would have let loose the nuclear holocaust.

Mr. Legault: From that do you not deduct that the surprise move was not such a surprise after all?

Dr. Sommer: It was not a tactical surprise. It was surprising only inasmuch as two years ago our military would not have thought that the Soviets could move that quickly, but when they did move that quickly we were, of course, aware of it right away, but we also knew it was not directed against us so there was nothing we could do about it.

To get back to one point you mentioned at the beginning of your second question, that NATO was originally concluded for a 20-year period and that then it had to be renewed and that General de Gaulle—this was your argument—took advantage of this.

Mr. Legault: Not necessarily took advantage; that it had reached a stage where he had miscalculated, that he felt the *détente* was strong enough for him to pull out, that no more danger existed at that particular time. This is the miscalculation that rides.

Dr. Sommer: I was going to remark on that twenty-year period. NATO does not have to be renewed; under Article XIII after twenty years every member can give twelve months' notice. I for one find this a rather unsatisfactory state of affairs. We now have an alliance on twelve months' notice. We now have the nuclear protector in this alliance, the United States, in a legal situation where they can pull out at any time they wish. I do not think this is a permanent enough basis for the alliance. I for one wish to see an extension—and if possible, even ratified by Parliament—for at least five years or so, and then it could always be renewed again. Thank you.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Are you finished, Mr. Legault?

Mr. Legault: Yes, thank you.

Mr. Gibson: Dr. Sommer, I would like to ask you, sir, what the effect of the French withdrawal from NATO was on the NATO countries in Europe. Was NATO taken seriously? Did it have much of an impact in Europe?

• 2145

Dr. Sommer: It did, sir. Of course, this was only one of a number of inequities which France perpetrated on the rest of her allies, so perhaps in the accumulated effect that particular effect was somewhat submerged. However, on the whole the behaviour of France shocked the rest of Western Europe and, frankly, I do not think it did France any good. I have read in some Canadian publications that Canada's withdrawal from NATO would put it in a position where it would have much wider diplomatic leeway and where it would have a much better opportunity to really play a role in the world.

In my view, after France pulled out of NATO's military organizations it did not gain one inch of diplomatic leeway. In fact, I think ever since as a diplomat de Gaulle has been on crutches. Someone said the other day, that he is like a man who is frantically pulling open one drawer after the other and then pushing it shut again to see if there is anything in it. There never is. There was not anything in China; there was not anything in Latin America; there was not anything in the Elysées Treaty with Germany—and I understand there was not much in Quebec—so I do

not think pulling out of NATO's military organizations in any way strengthened France's diplomatic position in the world.

Mr. Gibson: What is the present relationship between the people of France and Germany? That is a hard question to perhaps sum up on, but what is the spirit? We have a good working relationship with the United States, we are friendly. Is the atmosphere anything like as strained as it used to be?

Dr. Sommer: It is not. I do not mean to sound facetious.

Mr. Gibson: Neither do I, and I realize it could be interpreted that way.

Dr. Sommer: But I think that Franco-German reconciliation on a person-to-person and people-to-people basis is an accomplished fact and if anything can endanger it, then it is the activities of our respective statesmen. It is high politics that is jeopardizing it again—if it can be jeopardized at all, and personally I do not think it can. I think this so-called hereditary enmity, where Germans and Frenchmen invaded each other, burned down each other's castles and did all kinds of harm to one another, after 300 years has simply spent itself, and I really think this is the psychological basis for a durable reconciliation. As I said, if anything conjures up difficulties it is the goings-on in the higher ranges of Franco-German relations.

Mr. Gibson: Do you think there is a serious danger of France or Italy suddenly swinging into a communist state?

Dr. Sommer: My first answer would be that I never excluded this thought during the past twenty years. There is always a 25 per cent element of the electorate that votes communist.

My second answer would be that one of the effects of the Czech affair is that the spectre of communism taking over in France or Italy is much less haunting and shocking than it was some years ago. I think one effect of the Czech affair was the emergence of a third kind of communism. I call it white communism. The first communism was the red one, the second communism was the yellow one and this is the third one that is now evolving in the Latin, French and Italian communist parties.

By way of a footnote I would merely like to say that the French communist party is prob-

ably the most conservative force in the country at this time, and that it was the French communist party that saved de Gaulle last year during and after the May revolution.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you for your answers. They were very informative as far as I was concerned.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Sommer, early in your remarks I believe you made some reference to the fact that it was not so much the number of the forces but rather the quality, and I think you made some complimentary remarks about the Canadian flyers. Later on you seemed to draw back from that position and suggested that a thinning out at this particular point in time would be premature, that you felt the *détente* had been arrested and we should not now be considering that course. I do not know if you could elaborate a bit in that area or not.

Dr. Sommer: Yes. Perhaps I did not answer the previous question very clearly. I did not consider a communist take-over in Italy and France a likely contingency at that moment. My answer about the quality of the communist party in these two countries was on a rather theoretical plane.

As to your question, I do not know how to explain myself. I said it is not so much a matter of numbers—noses, bodies—it is a question of the numbers of nations involved. Is that plausible?

Mr. Buchanan: That is right.

Dr. Sommer: At first I said that I was against thinning out...

• 2150

Mr. Buchanan: No, no; initially I got the impression that it was not numbers, it was just to have a certain force there and this was an indication of commitment.

Dr. Sommer: The commitment of Canadian and American forces.

Mr. Buchanan: The numerical quantity was not really so significant as the fact that they were in fact present. Later on, as I say, you seemed to draw back from that position and you suggested that a numerical reduction at this time would possibly not be a wise course of action. There seems to be a little bit of controversy.

Dr. Sommer: There are two things. First of all, there are some contributions by some partners which cannot very well be thinned out much more without "evanescent"—if there is such a word—completely. Second, I really think that at this moment so soon after Czechoslovakia and especially, as I indicated repeatedly, without previously arriving at a concerted allied decision, a thinning out would be wrong.

Mr. Buchanan: You feel that a reduction in our forces this time would have what you call a catalytic effect?

Dr. Sommer: I think so, yes.

Mr. Buchanan: And what effect would it have on the voice with which Canada speaks in NATO councils if we were to reduce our forces?

Dr. Sommer: This would depend upon the kind of status within or without NATO you would fall back on. If you completely leave NATO, of course you would not have a voice in any of these things. If you withdraw to a sort of Icelandic status—and no offence intended to the Icelanders, or to anyone else—I think that would diminish your voice.

Mr. Buchanan: Do I understand that you feel any reduction would bring us to this evanescent point where we are really so close to zero? Is this the implication, that to all intents and purposes any further reduction is zero?

Dr. Sommer: I would say yes as far as ground troops are concerned. I would not want to speculate on what the upper or lower limit of your air force contribution would be, should be or could be.

Mr. Buchanan: Although you complimented our flyers you made no remarks about the aircraft which they fly. I do not know a great deal about them but I understand they are relatively obsolete. Is that a fair statement or not?

Dr. Sommer: Sir, all weapons are relatively obsolete by the time they are put in operation. On the whole I think your Starfighters have a much better record than the German Starfighters. Let me also say that our record has been improving. I think they have either a nuclear role or a ground support role well into the seventies.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan and then Mr. Prud'homme.

Mr. Ryan: Dr. Sommer, speaking about the first floor of your house of *détente*, you indicated that over the past ten years there has been a change of feeling in West Germany and there is now a disposition, which very evidently came to pass last year, to recognize a *de facto* division between East and West Germany in the fact of partition. You indicated further that the idea of reunification is substantially being put out of the minds of the German people but that it is still there as a hope. Is this the situation?

Dr. Sommer: I think that is a fair summary, yes.

Mr. Ryan: What do you think will happen in the foreseeable future in respect to actual recognition of East Germany? In your opinion will this come to pass?

• 2155

Dr. Sommer: Sir, I do not foresee formal, *de jure* recognition of East Germany by West Germany, if that is what you mean.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, that is it exactly.

Dr. Sommer: I do foresee a kind of special relationship between the two Germanies if the East Germans will have it, which comes rather close to recognition but which would still preserve one essential and fulfil one basic condition, and that is the condition that the two Germanies would not be alien to each other. There is a formula which is sometimes used by ministers of the present government; they say that West Germany and East Germany are neither inland nor outland to each other, they are neither foreign nor domestic, and I think the aim of the intellectual effort of the present government was to think up a model that would fulfil this condition but would not for the risk impede East Germany's acting on the international scene. You may be interested in learning that the Commonwealth, with its weird construction, has provided us with a couple of ideas. You do have what the lawyers I think call the *inter se* doctrine. The Commonwealth members, again, are *inter se*; they have a special relationship amongst themselves. They are not alien to each other although they are different.

• 2200

Mr. Ryan: On that point, we of course recognize the different national jurisdictions.

Dr. Sommer: Yes, sir, but you do not call them ambassadors, you call them high commissioners.

Mr. Ryan: And chanceries instead of embassies, that is right.

Dr. Sommer: Yes. This may be, you know, slicing it too finely but, in fact, people in Bonn have been thinking about establishing relations between the two Germanies and have commissioners general or something like that instead of ambassadors. This is not in any one government document but you can piece it together from many utterances by public figures and by ministers.

We have offered them talks, which is new. Formerly we would not talk with them. We would not even open their letters or answer them. Now we answer them. Then we have said we will have ad hoc negotiators whenever there is anything to talk about. Then we said we are also willing to exchange permanent representatives and call them commissioners general. We are ready to do all that as long as that somewhat mystical body, the German nation, is still considered as common to both. There have been several different suggestions on what to call it—the German Commonwealth, German Confederation, German Federation, and German Union. This is a matter for the lawyers to think up. But it presupposes the will of both sides to content themselves with half the loaf. Now we would be ready to do so. The other side is not at the moment ready to do so.

Then, in all honesty, I must say there is of course another problem. East Germany is not foreign to West Germany but it is foreign to Ghana or to Canada. So what do we do about recognition of East Germany by third countries? There is no government policy on this now. I think at the moment the answer would be, let us try to impede that. But I have heard official statements to the effect that we would help East Germany along on the international scene if they contributed to an alleviation of the situation between the two Germans internally. I can only say this: If they are ready to talk seriously there will be a lot more give on our side than public utterances indicate at this juncture.

Mr. Ryan: How would the West Berlin situation fit into this picture, Doctor?

Dr. Sommer: West Berlin, of course, is a sore spot and at the moment it is a crisis

spot, at least a potential crisis spot—through no doing of our own, by the way. We had the presidential assembly in Berlin three times already and the Soviets and the East Germans never kicked up such a fuss. The change has not been on our side but on their side. East Berlin gives the Russians and the East Germans leverage vis-à-vis West Germany. Any time they want to kick up a crisis they have the right there. But if we come to a kind of interim regulation of our affairs, that would of course have to include West Berlin. It would have to safeguard the access routes and it could establish Berlin as a kind of common meeting grounds between the two Germanys. This again, I think, is up to the future and as soon as the other side is willing to call off the cold war which they are now conducting solutions to that problem become thinkable.

Mr. Ryan: Doctor, is there any possibility of an exchange being made of both territory and population—that is, West Berlin—for say a strip along the East-West division line of

● 2205

East Germany or a block or a triangle off the Baltic coast area? Is this talked about or considered? We in Canada, if I may so, regard this—not all of us may be but I think a substantial number—arrangement made at Yalta a very foolish one, in the first place, that it should have been, if made at all, only on a temporary basis and that after a five or ten year period another look should have been taken at it. But now it is 25 years or more. And we read in the paper tonight that—I am sure it is going to disturb a few people back home here—Nixon promises to defend Berlin with U.S. lives. We are in this alliance. This means we are committed too. Does West Germany want this to go on forever?

Dr. Sommer: No, we do not. We would like to come to an agreement with the other side on neutralizing the issue at least. But I do not really see how you could simply pull out now without the whole structure crumbling around your ears. I agree with you that from an ally's point of view this was a very foolish arrangement to enter into in 1944 or 1945.

Mr. Ryan: We would like to hear the German side of it.

Dr. Sommer: In contrast to what you said, that after 25 years it is time to put an end to it, I say that since it has lasted for 25 years now this foolish arrangement, with all the commitments that have been piled on it in the meantime, has become of such tremendous symbolic value, which it does not possess intrinsically but politically, I do not see how the Americans or the British or the French and our other allies, in as much as they are tied in by dint of NATO commitments, could get out now.

In answer to your specific question, you will remember that in 1958 Khrushchev posed the very first Berlin ultimatum. In 1961 we had the crisis when the wall was built. In that period there was some academic consideration in West Germany of the possibility of just taking the whole of West Berlin, not exchanging it for a strip of territory along the border but resettling it in the Lüneberg Heide, which is kind of a big sand spot south of Hamburg, and just rebuilding a completely new city, put the people in there, thereby getting rid of the bone that is stuck in our throat. But I do not see how one could do that today.

Mr. Ryan: Why not in the first floor of this house that they talked about.

Dr. Sommer: I am glad you reminded me of that. The thing is that Berlin is not in the first floor, Berlin is on the super power floor, and I do not see how any of the super powers can divest themselves of their Berlin responsibilities without practically handing victory in the cold war to the other side. I do not see the American administration doing it. Personally, I do not wish to see the American administration doing it. I do not see the Russians doing it either. I think Berlin, simply because it hurts, because it sticks in our throat, because it wrangles, is a sore, but it may also be a spur to finally arriving at some kind of settlement. Maybe that is too optimistic a gloss that I have put on it but that is the only way of looking at it. To put my answer in a nutshell, it is uncomfortable to remain there but it is impossible to get out.

Mr. Ryan: I am sorry to have asked you those rather difficult questions, Dr. Sommer, but you have been most helpful.

● 2210

The Chairman: Dr. Sommer, may I ask you a question please. Some witnesses who have

been before the Committee have suggested that the so-called bipolarization of the world which has resulted from the NATO grouping and the Warsaw Pact grouping leads in the direction of war rather than in the direction of peace, that the increase in the number of non-aligned nations is desirable and that therefore Canada should consider this alternative. Could you comment on that suggestion. In relation to Canada, the position is somewhat different from that of the United States in that she is not a super power and different from nations of West Europe simply because she is geographically further removed from Russia. ?

Dr. Sommer: Sir, taking on your argument on an academic plane, I would say that I do not share the view that bipolarization was bad or has come to an end. I think you could make a very good case that peace during the last 20 years was preserved in all those areas where the two super powers were in immediate contact, in direct confrontation, and that peace was disturbed most often in the grey zones where the two super powers were not directly involved. So I for one feel quite happy, at least relatively happy, as long as the confrontation of the two super powers, the two nuclear powers in Germany continues to exist because I think that guarantees our security and our safety.

On the other half of your argument, I do not think that the multipolarization of the world necessarily increases our security or the chances for peace. Anyhow, as a practical matter now, getting down from the academic plane, I do not see any third powers. Militarily, I think bipolarity is here to stay with us for some time yet. Politically, there are certain multipolar ambitions and psychologically, of course, too. But I think this bipolar model of a world in which the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other will remain with us for some time to come. I do not know whether I answered your question in full.

The Chairman: You answered very well. I have a related question which again arises from some of the evidence which has been presented to this Committee. Remembering that Canada lies between the United States and the U.S.S.R., would there be in your view any point in Canada attempting to negotiate arrangements both with the United States and with the U.S.S.R. which would result in Canadian territory becoming a nuclear free

area, thus interposing a buffer between the two super powers which might make a useful contribution to peace?

Dr. Sommer: I am not really sure that it would change anything one way or the other because, of course, you could make Canada a part of the nuclear-free zone but that would not prevent other nuclear powers from shooting nuclear missiles at you any time they felt like it.

The Chairman: Would it be in the interests of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to enter into such an arrangement with Canada—restricting your comments to those two particular powers? You have given an indication that they both wish to avoid a nuclear exchange.

Dr. Sommer: Yes.

The Chairman: One possible avenue for a nuclear exchange is over Canadian territory. Would it not be in the interests of both powers then to neutralize this particular area?

Dr. Sommer: Yes, but I think your argument presupposes that the weapons they fire at each other are fired from Canadian soil. That is not the case—will not be the case. The weapons they fire at each other will be fired from their respective territories. If you are thinking of denying them the use of your air space or space space...

• 2215

The Chairman: That is what I had in mind—an agreement that they would not use it.

Dr. Sommer: Yes, an agreement not to overfly Canadian territory with their missiles. I think that is technically a rather old-fashioned idea already because they can simply send these missiles the other way around the globe, evading Canadian territory,...

The Chairman: We would be a little bit relieved if they would do that.

Dr. Sommer: ...but still getting at each other.

The Chairman: As I say, we would be relieved if they would do that.

Dr. Sommer: Yes. That would not hit you unless they installed ABM systems so designed as to destroy their respective missiles exactly above your territory. I am not

enough of a missile technician but I think the nuclear devastation, the fall-out, which for Canada is probably the most fearful, will come from an ABM system, from a defensive system, rather than from an offensive missile system.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan, on a supplementary.

Mr. Buchanan: Dr. Sommers, a supplementary on the first part of the Chairman's question. You spoke of the grey zone as being the area where the disturbances and difficulties had arisen over the last 20 years. You suggested that that was really putting it the other way: that the existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in effect, made a saw-off there and therefore the disturbances had arisen elsewhere. It seems to me this tied in very well with Robert McNamara's remarks that to some extent this is the whole area that we have been hitting at; that it is in this grey zone that so many of these conflicts arise; and that they do not arise so much out of the military as out of the economic circumstances. Many of the folks who have been here prior to you were espousing the idea of withdrawal from NATO, the thought being that we would redirect the funds which we were currently spending in the military area into economic aid in this grey area, thereby lessening the cause of disturbances and increasing the likelihood of peace.

Now, is that a valid proposition or not?

Dr. Sommer: Again I would say I appreciate the moral impulse behind this but I doubt the practical effectiveness of such a policy. The third world—we might as well get used to this idea—is a bottomless pit. It has to go through certain stages of development which we had to go through in Europe. It took us 300 years to go through them. It probably has to go through successive stages of economic development and also through successive stages of nationalist outbursts before it settles down as we have.

I hope that by means of the acceleration effect which we notice in many historic developments in this century, it will not take them 300 years. But I have no doubt but that it will take decades and that nothing we do today or do not do today will change that very much. Anyhow one hears it argued very frequently that if we do not do something the

southern half of the world will blow up in our faces. I always ask, how is it going to blow up and how is it to get at our faces? I do not think it will. The north-south confrontation is a myth, as far as we can look ahead. They cannot get at us, to put it in very crude terms. There will be no political catastrophe resulting from the difference in living standards and development. There will be a moral catastrophe, of course, if there are many Biafras or if 50 million Indians die in a famine. That will be a moral catastrophe but it will not be a political catastrophe. And I submit to

• 2220

you the best course the big powers, and possibly the middle powers, can adopt is to look in the other direction when these things happen. If every Biafra becomes a bone of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States, we are going to have a central nuclear war between the super powers one day. They have to learn not to treat this sporadic violence, of which we must expect a great deal to happen in the last third of this century, the way the big powers in 1912, 1913 and 1914 treated the Balkan wars. They must rather treat them as the big powers in the thirties treated the Gran Chaco wars. As long as you ignore them they do not endanger the international system. They are very hurtful to those who are immediately involved in them but I think it is more important that the system as a whole remain intact. I think this is what the super powers have to learn, and possibly some of the middle powers, too.

The Chairman: Dr. Sommer, may I ask one last question. It will be very brief. Assuming for a moment that you are a Canadian, what would you say in answer to this question? Against what and against whom should Canada be defending itself?

Dr. Sommer: First of all the assumption that I might be a Canadian is a very honourable one, as you put it to me, and if ever need arises to emigrate from Europe, I will make Canada my first choice.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Dr. Sommer: I am quite serious about this. Secondly, what should or whom should Canada defend against?

Mr. MacLean: Against ourselves.

Dr. Sommer: We all have to. But apart from that I think the biggest danger to you,

as to all of us, is a direct clash between the two super powers. That clash, the way the world is shaped at this juncture, is most likely to arise out of some incident or some evil design pursued by someone in Central Europe. So I would not know the exact answer to whom you would want to defend yourself against, but I would say you have to guard against another imbroglio in Central Europe and that whatever you have in the way of wisdom or physical capacity to bring to bear on that situation is well spent.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Sommer. Are there any further questions?

Before thanking Dr. Sommer, may I just make a few very routine announcements with regard to the trip. First, the departure time is 5.45 p.m., Saturday, March 8, 1969, from the Centre Block. Now getting into really intimate details, the trip stops will be too short and the laundry service in hotels takes too long to permit laundering en route; so guide yourselves accordingly. Top-coats should be taken, especially of the rain repellent type. For money members should obtain U.S. bills—this sounds almost *infra dig*. You must obtain U.S. bills in small denominations for purchases en route in order not to receive too much foreign currency in any one country before departure. Landing cards for Cyprus—the Clerk will hand these out to be filled in and placed inside passports to be collected before landing in Cyprus. The Clerk is anxious to know just as soon as possible the names of the members who will be coming on the trip, so would the party representatives get those names to him. The Clerk still does not have the final list of names so it is important that we get that information in very quickly. Are there any further questions of a routine nature?

Mr. Forrestall: Yes, one of detail. Perhaps the Clerk could tell me. The flight leaves on Saturday at 5.45 p.m. When does it leave Gibraltar for Cyprus?

The Chairman: Monday morning.

Mr. Forrestall: That has not changed, then?

The Chairman: No. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Gibson: Is there any baggage weight?

The Chairman: We will check on that and let you know.

Mr. MacLean: Will we get a memo on these details?

The Chairman: There are some details on that itinerary that was given to you the other day. On that subject, may I remind the members of the importance of having their passports and their vaccinations. We have not thought of any other memo but we could prepare one if necessary. Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Forrestall said flight time was 5.45. Did you not say 5.45 leaving Centre Block, 7 o'clock flight time?

The Chairman: 5.45 leaving the Centre Block.

Mr. Allmand: And what time is flight time?

The Chairman: The flight time is 7 o'clock but you should be at Uplands by 6.15.

Are there any further questions before bringing this meeting to a close?

Dr. Sommer, as you can see, we in this Committee are all trying to learn and we are most grateful to have had tonight the benefit of your wise and your eloquent instruction. Thank you, ever so much.

APPENDIX OO

February 27, 1969

PUBLICATIONS:

DR. THEO SOMMER

BORN: 1930

BACKGROUND:

Deputy Editor and Foreign Editor of *Die Zeit*; Council Member of the Institute of Strategic Studies, London; German radio and television political commentator; author of several books; lecturer on political science and international relations, University of Hamburg.

in German: *Germany and Japan Between the Powers, 1935-41*

Thinking About Germany (about reunification)

Journey Into a Distant Land (Report on a visit to East Germany)

in English: "Bonn Changes Course" in *Foreign Affairs*, 1967

"For an Atlantic Future" in *Foreign Affairs* 1964

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69


STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 33

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1969



Respecting
Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	¹ Nesbitt,
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
³ Asselin	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Brewin	Laniel	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Buchanan	Laprise	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Cafik	Legault	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
² Carter	Lewis	⁴ Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	Marceau	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹ Mr. Nesbitt replaced Mr. Fairweather on March 3, 1969.

² Mr. Carter replaced Mr. MacDonald (*Egmont*), on March 3, 1969.

³ Mr. Asselin replaced Mr. Macquarrie on March 3, 1969.

⁴ Mr. Stewart (*Marquette*), replaced Mr. MacRae on March 3, 1969.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

House of Commons,
Monday, March 3, 1969.

Ordered,—That the Members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be granted leave to travel outside Canada between March eighth and March twenty-second, 1969, for the purpose of furthering their work; and that the necessary staff accompany them.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, March 4, 1969

(48)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Cafik, Carter, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (23).

Also present: Messrs. Hymmen and Fairweather, M.P.'s.

Witness: Professor J.L. Granatstein, Assistant Professor of History, York University, Downsview, Toronto, Ontario.

On motion of Mr. Gibson,

Resolved,— That the necessary staff, namely: one Committee Clerk, one Assistant Committee Clerk, one Sound Technician, one Assistant Sound Technician, two Interpreters, the Adviser to the Committee, Mr. Peter Dobell, and a baggage man, accompany the members of the Committee during their trip abroad from March 8 to March 22, 1969.

The Chairman introduced Professor Granatstein, the witness for this morning's sitting. It was agreed that Professor Granatstein's advance presentation entitled *Peacekeeping: What Future Role For Canada?* and his curriculum vitae be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix pp*)

The Committee agreed to print the following papers as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Speech by the Honourable Léo Cadieux entitled *Canada's Essential Security Requirements*, delivered January 27, 1969. (*See Appendix qq*)

Speech by the Honourable Mitchell Sharp entitled *The Role of Middle Powers In A Changing World*, delivered February 20, 1969. (*See Appendix rr*)

Speech by the Honourable Sharp entitled *NATO In Canadian Perspective*, delivered March 1, 1969. (*See Appendix ss*)

Members of the Committee questioned Professor Granatstein about his views on various aspects of defence policy, and especially in relation to peacekeeping.

At the end of the questioning, the Chairman thanked the witness for his testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m., until Thursday, March 6, 1969 at 11:00 a.m., when the witness will be Professor Stephen Clarkson.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, March 4, 1969.

● 1111

The Chairman: Gentlemen, perhaps we could begin. As you know, an order was passed by the House yesterday authorizing the Committee to go to Europe. At this time perhaps I could get someone to move and someone to second the necessary motion this Committee has to make in order to authorize the necessary staff to accompany the Committee. Would someone move and someone second the following motion:

That the necessary staff, namely, Mr. Peter Dobell, the Adviser to the Committee; two Committee clerks; one sound technician; one assistant sound technician; two interpreters and a baggage handler accompany the members of the Committee during their travel abroad from March 8 to March 22, 1969.

Mr. Gibson: I so move.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise this point although I do not want to belabour the matter because we want to hear the witness. I understand first of all there was some suggestion that female members of the staff go as translators and clerks during this time and that it was then suggested it was inconvenient for them to go. I do not want to try to change the arrangements now but I do want to give notice that if there is any such rule, and it is applied at any future time, I will challenge it because I do not think it is a proper rule.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Brewin.

The motion as I have read it has been moved and seconded. All in favour?

Is there any further discussion?

Mr. Fairweather: There is the matter that I mentioned. Should we deal with this now?

The Chairman: We could deal with it now or it can be the subject of a separate motion after we have investigated the question of space, Mr. Fairweather, whichever you prefer.

Mr. Fairweather: That is excellent.

The Chairman: This, at any rate, would authorize these people to go ahead and make their arrangements for travel.

Is there any further discussion?

Motion agreed to.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Chairman, could you bring us up to date on the arrangements for the trip? Are we going to receive an advance for expenses, this kind of thing, and when, and are we going to have time to be able to change it into American Express money orders?

The Chairman: A memorandum is being prepared which will go around to members of the Committee giving them the details relating to the trip. With regard to expenses, the requisitions have been prepared and the cheques should be available tomorrow or Thursday morning.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, on another point, will we know in advance the witnesses who are to appear before the Committee all through our trip? The members might have suggestions and might not be satisfied if we just listen to one side of the story.

The Chairman: Yes, every effort is being made to get both sides of any particular question. I believe we will have available for the members a list of the people we hope to see. There may be some changes as we go along, but as soon as we have a list reasonably definite we will make the names known to members of the Committee.

● 1115

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman from the statement you made the other evening did I understand you to suggest that it is better to carry American bills than American Express cheques? You said "bills" when you made the statement the other night.

The Chairman: I think the suggestion was that it was better to have small denominations for conversion over there, but I think either bills or travellers cheques would be all right.

Mr. Gleave: It might be wise to carry the proper booklets of negotiable American travellers cheques. I think the suggestion has been made that small denominations in American bills would be handy over there.

Mr. Winch: I think this is rather important. I checked with the bank I deal with here and they say you cannot get \$5.00 in American Express but you can get \$5.00 bills. If we are only a day or two in each place, as you can get in American bills \$1.00, \$5.00, \$10.00 and up but cannot get anything less than \$10.00 in American Express, and so as not to be left with a lot of foreign currency, it might be better to have American bills. That was my information.

Mr. Gleave: I think you are right.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions?

I think a certain number of these questions will be answered by this memorandum which will be sent around by the Clerk.

The Committee will be hearing the testimony today of Professor Jack Lawrence Granatstein of York University Toronto. Professor Granatstein's written statement: Peacekeeping; What Future Role for Canada, has already been circulated to members with some biographical detail about the author attached.

I would like the Committee to note that although the question of a peacekeeping role for Canada has arisen incidentally on previous occasions, Professor Granatstein is the only witness who has specifically been invited to testify on this subject. Professor Granatstein has attempted in his written statement to provide us with an objective assessment of the prospects of Canada's peacekeeping role.

Before proceeding with Professor Granatstein's evidence, I would like to report that with the agreement of the steering committee, I inquired whether the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence felt it desirable that they appear individually or jointly before this Committee prior to its departure for Europe. In particular, I inquired whether they thought it desirable for them to give their views on some of the criticisms of current defence policy that have been . . .

Mr. Cafik: Louder, Mr. Chairman, you cannot be heard back here.

The Chairman: In particular, I inquired whether they thought it desirable for them to give their views on some of the criticisms of current defence policy that have been put forward by witnesses appearing before this Committee. While expressing their thanks for the inquiry, both Ministers considered that their opinions were already adequately on record in the recent statements they have made.

In these circumstances, will the Committee agree that the speech by Mr. Cadieux at the Ottawa Rotary Club on January 27, and Mr. Sharp's speeches at Carleton University on February 20, and at Calgary on March 1, be attached as appendices to today's Proceedings?

Mr. Winch: Could we add Mr. Kierans' speech in Nanaimo?

The Chairman: Can we deal with these speeches? Can we agree to having these three speeches by Mr. Cadieux and Mr. Sharp appear as appendices? Now, in seriousness, Mr. Winch, is that agreed? Agreed.

Mr. Winch: Now, because Mr. Kierans is a Cabinet Minister and has been, the same as the other two Ministers, publicly making speeches outside of the House, I would like to recommend that the speech of Mr. Kierans at Nanaimo also be printed.

The Chairman: I assume there is no great objection to that. Is that agreed by members of the Committee?

Mr. Cafik: The point raised by Mr. Winch?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: I certainly do not agree with it. I do not think it is a comparable situation at all. The two Ministers have responsibility, one for National Defence and the other for foreign affairs and it puts them in a completely different category.

Mr. Winch: I also believe that a Cabinet minister making a speech has responsibility too.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, now if we were in the Post Office Department, I would agree with you.

The Chairman: We do not want to get into an extended debate with regard to this speech. Do you wish to press the point, or would it be sufficient if we merely distributed copies of that speech to members?

Mr. Winch: We all have it.

Mr. Fairweather: The emperor has no clothes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Now, Professor Granatstein, would you like to make an introductory statement before the members ask you questions on the future prospects of peacekeeping for Canada?

Professor Jack Lawrence Granatstein (Assistant Professor of History, York University): Perhaps I may make a few brief remarks. Gentlemen I do not think there is any need to elaborate on the feeling of disillusionment with peacekeeping that exists in this coun-

● 1120

try today, and that has existed, in fact, since 1967. It has been as if we had put all our prestige eggs in one basket and they were all broken when the basket fell down at Suez. I can understand this, and it is in fact, hard to criticize this.

The United Nations has made precious little progress on the institutionalization of peacekeeping over the past decade and certainly it shows very little inclination to proceed with this task now. The peacemaking capability of the United Nations has never been developed, neither has its peace-enforcing capability. The point I would like to stress however, is that this does not mean we in this country should toss up our hands and say nothing can be done. This does not mean we should abandon peacekeeping, as I perhaps fear we may. We should continue, I believe, to press it forward at the United Nations and retain peacekeeping as a role for the Canadian forces.

I am afraid that if the foreign policy review, as expected—at least as I expect—resoundingly endorses the status quo with respect to NATO and NORAD, there will be a feeling that the government has to find something it can change or else it will run into charges that the review was stacked from the beginning, perhaps, or rigged, or not as sweeping as it might have been. I expect this kind of thinking is responsible for the announcement that recognition of China is going to be proceeded with and the announcement that we will consider recognition of the Vatican, too.

What bothers me is that peacekeeping perhaps might be de-emphasized greatly on the grounds it is something that can safely be sacrificed and to indicate some kind of change. Certainly, the statement made by the Prime Minister before, during and since the last election campaign have given some support to this feeling. I think it would be a mistake for us to de-emphasize peacekeeping. The kind of force structure and the kind of force deployment I think we should have would be ideal for peacekeeping as well as other tasks, ideal for peacekeeping when and if required.

It would be ideal as well for a different type of role for us in NATO. Perhaps I should say that my feelings about NATO are somewhat ambivalent. Ideally, I believe we should be out but practically I think I recognize it is pretty unlikely that we will be. Certainly in view of this morning's paper it seems even more unlikely that we will be.

What we do need is a force that is smaller, a force that is more mobile, a force that is located in the NATO reserve, and possibly in Canada. We need to scrap our expensive and essentially wasteful role and the essentially militarily useless role that we now fill in NATO. There is nothing sacrosanct in the mechanized

brigade, there is nothing sacrosanct in a strike reconnaissance role. What we have to do, I think is develop a force for NATO based at home with a structure compatible with the rest of our forces. By this I mean not having CF104's in Europe and different kinds of aeroplanes here; not having heavy tanks in Europe and different equipment here. This would save on retraining cost, it would save on conversion training, it would save on personnel, and I think it would provide money within the present budget so we could invest in equipment. God knows we need equipment in the Canadian Forces pretty badly. It would be criminal perhaps to send the Canadian brigade in Europe into battle driving their 1940 vintage tanks.

This kind of adaptation of our role would give us more useful part to play in NATO. It would also give us the force able, and I hope willing, to respond to peacekeeping requests in a positive and effective way whenever, and if, they should be raised. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Granatstein. Questions? Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Professor Granatstein, I wonder if you would elaborate on your paper by dealing with actual situations in which you thought peacekeeping forces might be used. In Viet Nam, for example, if the long negotiations there result in any sort of settlement, would you anticipate that the peacekeeping forces

● 1125

would have to be enlarged to police a settlement in that area?

Professor Granatstein: Yes, I think they probably would. It is difficult to foresee just what kind of forces might be required there. They would almost certainly have to be very large. They would almost certainly have to have some kind of mobile capability. In other words, the present ICC would have to be expanded in some fairly large way, and given a pretty broad mandate in order to tackle this kind of job.

Mr. Brewin: I think there was an article in the January issue of Foreign Affairs in which Dr. Kissinger suggested that very thing in discussing the future of negotiations in Viet Nam?

Professor Granatstein: If there were something in Viet Nam it is probably a lead pipe cinch that we will be involved in it simply because we are already on the ICC.

Mr. Brewin: Let us take another situation where there is conflict, the Middle East. True, the withdrawal of UNEF, as you say, had some traumatic effect on the weak-minded, at any rate, and directly lead, perhaps, to the outbreak of hostilities. However, supposing Dr. Jarring is successful, would you think some

renewal of some peacekeeping effort would be required in that area?

Professor Granatstein: I think probably some renewal would be required. However, I think it is probably doubtful that we would be asked to serve on it. I think in some ways we are *persona non grata* at least with the Egyptians at the present moment. I think it rather unlikely that we would be asked to participate in a force there. But, that there is likely to be a force there is, I think, very probable.

Mr. Brewin: I may be wrong but I think this Committee has suggested that in the event of any truce being arrived at by negotiation in Nigeria between the Federal Forces and the Biafrans, almost certainly it would require some sort of peacekeeping force there. Do you agree with that?

Professor Granatstein: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: Although I suggested three cases to you where there might be peacekeeping forces, I suppose the very essence of the problem is that the conflicts spring up suddenly and unexpectedly and some outside intervention may be able to limit the spread of hostilities. Is this not the basic notion of a peacekeeping force?

Professor Granatstein: Yes, I think so. There was no real forewarning in the Congo in 1960 that a peacekeeping force would be required there. Yet, within a month or so of the independence of the Congo there were upwards of 20,000 men serving in the UN peacekeeping force there.

Mr. Brewin: I remember reading the statement that since the end of the last war in 1945 there had been 80 conflicts in the world in which regular forces had been employed. Do you anticipate that there will be a continuation of instability which will lead to these?

Professor Granatstein: Yes, sir.

Mr. Brewin: Is it your view that peacekeeping forces would be perhaps essential to limit conflicts in those areas?

Professor Granatstein: Yes, sir.

Mr. Brewin: That is what you might call a leading question.

Professor Granatstein: Yes, sir.

Mr. Brewin: That is all, thank you.

Mr. Gibson: Sir, on page 6 you have stated that the Commando Regiment, for example, will be capable of operating anywhere on short notice. Would you mind

elaborating on what you mean by a Commando Regiment? Could you amplify this a little bit?

Professor Granatstein: Well, there is a unit of the Canadian Forces that is now officially called Commando. It is based half in the West and half in the East, as I recall, and it is being brought up to strength at the present time. I understand its role is, in fact, to act as a commando force able to operate in various places, over various types of terrain, on short notice.

Mr. Gibson: This concept particularly appeals to me as being a worthwhile type of force for Canada to have, sir. In another place in your brief I think you suggested we should have mobile troops with airlift support. Would you advocate such a force in Europe?

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Professor Granatstein: If we were going to have this kind of force, I would prefer to see it here. However, if for various reasons this is impossible, it would certainly be better to have an air mobile force in Europe than the present force structure we have there.

Mr. Gibson: Some of the witnesses have expressed a view that invasion of Canada is relatively unlikely and that if we were needed to quell some raid or outbreak of violence it would be far more likely to occur in Europe. Would you disagree with that?

Professor Granatstein: I find it very difficult to think in terms of limited war situations in Europe.

Mr. Gibson: Do you not think it is possible, say, if there were a revolt in France—a communist uprising—that there might be cause to send a commando force to some port or some vital area that is under attack?

Professor Granatstein: No, sir, I do not.

Mr. Gibson: Are you thinking in terms of Europe? I am not trying to be little you, sir; I have read your qualifications and anyone who has read them will realize how qualified you are. Do you not think it is more likely that the type of trouble our NATO troops are likely to run into would be in the form of some type of commando raid from the east, or some insurrection or riot of some violent type, a threat on, say government, buildings somewhere or something like that? Is that not the type of situation that might come about?

Professor Granatstein: I cannot conceive of the Canadian government's committing its forces to put down an insurrection within a NATO country. That to my mind is absolutely inconceivable. The prospect of a raid I think, is almost equally inconceivable.

Mr. Gibson: I do not know really why you prefer keeping this commando force in Canada as opposed to

Europe. If there is less likelihood of their use in Canada, why keep them here when they have to be moved around to get to the scene of the outbreak?

Professor Granatstein: In the first place you would save on gold outflow, and so on. It would mean that we would not have this long pipe line that forces us to keep shuttling people back and forth across the Atlantic which is inconvenient, wasteful and advances nothing. We can train just as well in Canada for a NATO reserve role as we can in Europe. I am not ruling out the possibility, as I think General Foulkes suggested to this Committee, of having a sort of six month term for a force operating in Europe. I think that kind of thing is eminently practical.

Mr. Gibson: You touched on the problem—and I think it is a very significant one—of the use of heavy armour and Canada having outdated tanks. Is it your opinion that the German tank is superior to almost any other tank in the world, the type of armour that the German army has?

Professor Granatstein: That is a jointly-developed project with the United States, I think. I really could not comment on that kind of question.

Mr. Gibson: Do you think if we kept out of the tank area that our force would be more flexible, that the peacekeeping aspect would be more practical than if we commit our resources to the tank area?

Professor Granatstein: There is no question that we would be more flexible. Tanks are very heavy and difficult to move around. You would have good tactical mobility, but very poor strategic mobility. I would like to see us increase the strategic mobility.

Mr. Gibson: What say does Canada have in the use of the forces that are committed to NATO? Once they are committed, do they not come under NATO generals jurisdiction and are more or less told to perform whatever role NATO wants them to perform? Can the Canadian government say: "We are going to give you this and you can use it if you want it. If you do not want it, that is all we will give you."

Professor Granatstein: I understand that is a question for negotiation. All I am suggesting is that we, in fact, negotiate ourselves into a different role.

Mr. Gibson: On the question of tanks you should . . .

Professor Granatstein: No, on the question of whether you are in a front line role, or whether you are in a reserve role. If you are in a reserve role in an air mobile position, then I think that kind of deployment does not require tanks. The Canadian government decides whether it is going to have tanks or not. It is

up to us and NATO to decide the kind of role we are going to fill.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you; that is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Granatstein, have you considered the possibility of a UN peacekeeping force recruited directly from the peoples of the world rather than made up of national contingents? The United Nations in all other areas recruits its servants and officials directly and it seems to work very well. Many people have suggested that it should recruit its peacekeeping

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force in the same way, because this would eliminate the criticisms that national contingents are involved with vested interests, and so forth. What analysis have you made of this proposal and what do you think of it as a possibility for Canadian initiative?

Professor Granatstein: I really do not think it is feasible. That kind of thing has been tried. It was talked about in the immediate post-war years and the UN thought in terms of doing this kind of thing and never got anywhere. The closest they came to it was when they set up the UN field observer service—I believe it is called—which, in effect, is a kind of UN communication service made up of nationals directly recruited. I think it would be very difficult to pay for it, recruit it, get permission from the countries involved and decide how to use it. I think there are enormous factors that would come into play there that would probably rule out this kind of thing.

Mr. Allmand: In other words, you feel the national policies of the various states would interfere with the formation of such a force.

Professor Granatstein: I think so, in part.

Mr. Allmand: But do you not feel if we are going to make any real breakthrough in peacekeeping, or in putting the United Nations in a more effective position to deal with international disorders and so forth, that this is the type of thing that will have to be done?

Professor Granatstein: Not really, sir. I think the breakthrough should come in the sense of institutionalizing peacekeeping in a way that we have never managed to do up to now; getting a planning staff at UN headquarters; getting commitments from countries to have standby forces; getting a standard operating procedure worked out that is understood and having people you know you can draw on for certain or countries you know you can draw on for certain contributions. If we get that it would be enough of a breakthrough and that, I think, is more feasible than the case you are suggesting.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

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The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Allmand has touched on one area that I was concerned with and I have a supplementary, just a matter of clarification, Dr. Granatstein. You feel, then, that the reasons why the United Nations would not be likely, in the immediate or foreseeable future, to move in this direction are very much the same reasons that they had to face up to some years ago when they quietly shelved any concept of direct recruitment for such a team. In other words the reasons are the same today as they were 10 years ago.

Professor Granatstein: Yes, it is more like 20 years ago.

Mr. Forrestall: In your written presentation, Dr. Granatstein, you suggested that we should make peacekeeping our *raison d'être*...

Professor Granatstein: In its broadest sense.

Mr. Forrestall: —in the broadest sense and that would effect a reduction of some 15,000 to 20,000 personnel and a huge saving in the contributory costs of maintaining them.

From where would you see these upwards of 20,000 men being cut?

Professor Granatstein: By scrapping the brigade in Europe and not replacing it when you bring it back; by cutting out the CF-104 contribution and not replacing it; in fact, recognizing the fact that if you are going to carry out any kind of role you have to have the money to do it and if the budget is not going to be raised the only place you can get the money to get any equipment is, in fact, by cutting men, because your personnel costs are the most expensive costs.

At the present time, with this country's defence policy, we are going to have to cut 20,000 men in order to buy any equipment at all. What I am suggesting here briefly, I think, would be one way of doing this cut and finding a new role for the forces we have left.

Mr. Forrestall: What would you see the role of the Maritime Command being—and I must be mundane about this—in this broad general concept that you have expressed?

Professor Granatstein: This is a can of worms of sheer interest to Halifax I am sure. I think Maritime Command is a fat cat that could be cut in half or done away with.

Mr. Forrestall: I suppose I asked for that. I do not doubt your sincerity in saying it. However, at another time I must take issue with you about that. I have one other detail question and you may have an equally forceful reply to it. Do you see any continuing value of our new CF-5 in connection with this highly mobile force? Do you think it would play a useful role?

Professor Granatstein: Well, it had better or else we have paid a lot of money for something that is not much good. In the sort of broadest concept of peacekeeping it can play a role in mobile forces. It means you have a force equipped with its own air support, presumably able to operate off more or less rough airfields. I think that is something a mobile force should have.

Mr. Forrestall: Fine; that is all I have to ask.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Granatstein, you make a couple of interesting observations on pages 4 and 5 in your written presentation about Nasser's objecting to Canadian troops because of our at least ceremonial alignment with England in having the same Queen. You speak later on of the unfortunate incident of calling the troops we sent over there the Queen's Own Rifles. This raises a whole basic question in my view. Do you feel that our alignment with England, in the sense that we have the same Queen, is a deterrent to any peacekeeping operations?

Professor Granatstein: Not really, no. I think President Nasser was looking for an excuse to put obstacles in our way in 1956 and the fact that the forces were called the Queen's Own Rifles, in fact, gave him this excuse. But on the other hand, it is a practical consideration. The forces are wearing Queen's Own Rifles on their shoulder patches. The British forces that came in may have been the Queen's Own Cameronians or something like that, some British regiment. The possibilities of a genuine misunderstanding, I think, are evident. But to say this is a deterrent is probably not fair.

Mr. Cafik: As Great Britain was one of the great colonial powers in Asia and Africa and other countries which are now emerging with their independence, and as it appears to me that most of our possible peacekeeping operations will be in those areas in the future, do you not feel that this might be a genuine problem?

Professor Granatstein: I think we have established our bona fides with most of the African and Asian states and I do not see that this is a real problem.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Now, you point out that our being a NATO member in some cases works as an advantage to our getting a peacekeeping role and sometimes to a disadvantage, but in either case we normally end up on the force. This is quite different from what many other witnesses indicated. Many thought that by withdrawing from NATO and NORAD our potential in terms of peacekeeping and working with underdeveloped nations would be greatly increased. You do not really share that view I gather, or do you?

Professor Granatstein: In some ways I do. Most of the people who made that case to this Committee are people who I think would share the same kind of outlook on most of the questions that I do. But in some respects I disagree, just on the basis of experience. Up to now you cannot say that this has interfered in any way. You cannot say that it has helped greatly, that their being there is a factor.

Now, no one knows what future events are going to bring. The point I tried to make is that our military capabilities are the major factor that got us on all these peacekeeping forces. There may be a time when there will be other countries with the same capacities. In that case I would think then a nonaligned nation would be more likely to be a desirable member than Canada.

Mr. Cafik: On page 7 you mention—and this was pursued earlier—our having a mobile peacekeeping force that could be airborne quickly. Do you not think that to create such a force would increase the cost of our defence commitment?

Professor Granatstein: If the present personnel level is maintained, yes, it would. But if, in fact,

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you cut back by about 20,000 to a level of say 80,000 men, then I think a substantial amount of the budget would be free for equipment.

Mr. Cafik: Do you have any idea of the capital cost of making such a change?

Professor Granatstein: Not really, no.

Mr. Cafik: So you think it would be fairly considerable?

Professor Granatstein: Oh, yes, without question. The cost of helicopters, for example, that an air mobile force would have to have run, I understand, for the stripped down version, in the order of \$500,000. If you get C-5 transports, these huge American troop carriers that are now in production, their cost runs at something like \$20 million a plane. There is no question that the expenses are going to be huge. But the point is that if we stay as we are

now, keeping the same role, we are going to have to re-equip the brigade at any rate at huge expense. Tanks are pretty expensive as well.

Mr. Cafik: That is fine. Thank you, very much.

Mr. Laniel: Dr. Granatstein, while many of my points have been put by others, you say there is little likelihood that the United Nations will make arrangements for standby forces, and yet you want Canada to go into that field. If we look back we have to realize that at least the big powers have vetoed most of the forces at the time they were suggested and everyone seems to agree to them as a last resort when nothing else works. How would you really justify a role—a general permanent role for the Canadian Forces in that field of peacekeeping?

Professor Granatstein: I do not think the great powers have vetoed most of the forces and even if they should it would not make any difference because, in fact, under the Uniting for Peace resolution that was passed in 1951, the General Assembly, where there is no veto, can set up a peacekeeping force. In fact, the UNEF was set up by the General Assembly in Suez in 1956 so I do not see that as a problem.

I grant there will be difficulties because it is unlikely that the United Nations will, as I said be able to make real arrangements for standby forces. However I am not suggesting that our only policy should be peacekeeping. I did not say that at all. I am just suggesting that we should keep on pressing for peacekeeping forces, that we should keep pressing the United Nations to make arrangements, that we should be willing and able to serve on peacekeeping forces if the need arises and that this should stay as part of our policy. I am not saying that if the United Nations does not do something tomorrow, therefore, there will be no more peacekeeping. What I would suggest is that crises are going to arise—are almost certain to arise—where the need for a peacekeeping force will come up and then, I think, it would benefit us to be in position to act in such a case.

Mr. Laniel: But you said that Canada would not be too acceptable by the Egyptians in Asia or in Africa and these are the parts of the world where there might be trouble.

Professor Granatstein: I did not say that, sir. I said we might not be too acceptable to the Egyptians, but I have said—I tried to make the point—that we would be acceptable in Asia and Africa as a whole, simply because we are one of the few countries that is capable—militarily capable—of carrying out this kind of role. That is the significant factor. In fact, if we were black, we would be in better shape to do this kind of thing, but we are not. However, we do have the technology, technical skills and so on that

would let us fill this role. I think that is a significant factor.

Mr. Laniel: Apart from the fact that we are a member of certain alliances, it prevents us money-wise from doing more in the field of peacekeeping. Do you not think that there is an advantage—maybe you partly answered that in your reply to Mr. Cafik's question—in being a member of an alliance such as NATO whereby some of the smaller or unsecured nations see our presence there as some kind of security or reassurance?

Professor Granatstein: Which smaller and unsecured nations?

Mr. Laniel: The South American nations.

Professor Granatstein: They are reassured because Canada is in NATO? How?

Mr. Laniel: Because of the fact that our presence in NATO might make the alliance more reasonable and willing to take greater steps in solving a problem and preventing a world massacre.

Professor Granatstein: You would have to convince me that, in fact, our influence has been used successfully in that way and I would be very interested in having you try, sir.

Mr. Laniel: No, these are just thoughts that have come to my mind, too. You have not said too much about NORAD. How do you see Canada in relation to NORAD even if we do give priority to some kind of peacekeeping role?

Professor Granatstein: I think NORAD is an even bigger milch cow than Maritime Command. I do not see why we should be pouring all this stuff into NORAD in an attempt to stop bombers that are, I suspect, a non-existent or virtually a non-existent threat. It certainly would be absolute nonsense for us to put any money in anti-ballistic missiles.

Mr. Laniel: How do you see the role of Canada in its own defence or in the defence of North America?

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Professor Granatstein: I do not see the defence of North America as a real problem. We are, in effect, defended against everybody except the Americans and there is no defence against the Americans, anyhow.

Mr. Laniel: What do you think the reaction of the population of Canada would be if we were to maintain our present defence expenditure just to send our Armed Forces abroad to defend other people, particu-

larly when they are being told by people like you that there is nothing to worry about in Canada?

Professor Granatstein: Who is the enemy in Canada? We have been using all the money in our defence budget to train our forces to send them abroad and the Canadian people have not objected. According to the Gallup poll they seem to be in favour of our continued participation in alliances, so they are not objecting now and I do not see that anything would change.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cafik touched on the topic that I was most interested in and that is this problem of change-over—the problem of cost—if we start into a new role. It has been suggested that a peacekeeping role would be cheaper for Canada and yet all our equipment has been designed for a different type of role. We have geared up to this. Our aircraft carrier, for example, has just been refitted at great expense even though it is considered to be half-way through its life span. This is typical of many of the pieces of equipment we have. They were designed for a role in Europe and the equipment is not necessarily worn out in all cases. Much of the equipment is quite new. Therefore, if we are going to change our role into a peacekeeping one, the equipment that we have will require a complete refurbishing. This is not only a cost problem, but it is also a time problem because we are talking about a matter of years, probably, before we could be effective in such a role. So we are looking at a political situation perhaps five years from now, at the least; we are looking at a period between 1975 and 1985, say. Would you agree then that we are locked into our present position if we agree to stay in NATO at all because of the equipment that we have available at the present time? If we followed your suggested policy that we are really talking about a period starting at least five years from now what is your prognostication of the political situation that we would be dealing with at that time?

Professor Granatstein: I cannot foresee anything in the future, obviously, but I do not think we are locked in. I think you can change gradually and I think you can adapt to a new role. I think it is going to take 10 years to re-equip the forces whether they are operating a mechanized brigade in NATO or whether they are playing an air mobile role. It is going to take 10 years to buy all the equipment because it is going to cost a couple of billion dollars and there is no way we could do this in one lump sum payment; it will have to be spread out perhaps in \$200 million dollops over 10 years. Without question, it is going to take a long time, but the important thing is to renegotiate our role while we can—while the opportunity is with us, this

year, next month—and to change our role, if that is what we want. Let us, for God's sake, know what we are going to do now so we will not find ourselves stuck in the mud in the status quo that was very relevant in 1951, but is, perhaps, not so relevant now.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Are you suggesting that in the meantime we also should be selling the world on the idea that Canada is an independent peacekeeper and not a full-fledged NATO partner?

Professor Granatstein: I did not suggest that; I did not say we should get out of NATO. I said that we should change our role in NATO so that it will be compatible with a different kind of position for us, with greater emphasis on peacekeeping. That is all I suggested. I would like to see, say, our role as one of peacekeeping in NATO and out of NATO as well.

Mr. Laniel: Could I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: Professor, although you did not suggest that we should withdraw from NATO, do you feel if we did withdraw from NATO that it might weaken NATO to the point where other countries might also withdraw?

Professor Granatstein: No sir, because if the other countries withdrew because Canada withdraws then presumably the purpose of the alliance is ended.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): That is all I have; that was my last question.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan and then Mr. MacLean.

Mr. Ryan: Professor Granatstein, you indicated that Canada could save a lot of money by doing away with Air Transport Command.

Professor Granatstein: I did not say that, sir.

Mr. Ryan: Well, that was the impression I got. You would continue it then?

Professor Granatstein: If we are going to play this kind of peacekeeping role, Air Transport Command has to be expanded.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, and you would replace the Yukons with possibly C-5's?

Professor Granatstein: I think we need a couple of C-5's. We need an aircraft that is capable of performing many roles. A C-5, because of its very size, cannot land everywhere, and, therefore we will need other . . .

Mr. Ryan: I am sorry, I misheard you. I was going to point out that the present Air Transport Command is servicing peacekeeping operations pretty thoroughly as well as servicing the brigade and the Air Division in Europe. In fact, we almost have an international airline with regular schedules and sometimes its missions go right around the world.

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Professor Granatstein: There is no question about that. I think Air Transport Command has played an extraordinarily useful role in any number of peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Ryan: So that is one thing you regard as essential to keep?

Professor Granatstein: Oh, absolutely.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: In this whole concept of peacekeeping, their use obviously would be limited to the break out of violence between rather small countries on the whole. I mean there would be no suggestion of sending Canadian peacekeeping force off to Mongolia or somewhere at the present time because the Chinese and Russians are reportedly feuding and it would be limited, I presume, to what is sometimes referred to as the third force in the world, the emerging nations? We had a witness, Dr. Sommer, who expressed the opinion that the attempts of the third world force to solve its problems will probably be the most frustrating and thankless operation that the larger countries of the world will be faced with in the near future or in quite a period of time to come. Taking a perfectly cynical view, why should Canada be so eager, as you suggest it should be, to rush into this kind of a thankless operation?

Professor Granatstein: There is no question that it is going to be thankless; there is no question that our troops are going to get clubbed and beaten and probably shot in some instances, but if you say that the purpose of our forces is, in fact, to preserve peace, to not fight, to not get involved in a general war, then I can think of nothing that is really more truly useful for Canadians and for other countries than to do this kind of thing—to stop small conflicts from blowing up into big ones; to stop brushfire wars from turning to world-wide conflagrations. This is something we really want and, I think, it would be a more useful role for us. It would be something that would make peace more likely than just stationing troops on the East German border as we are doing now. Perhaps the real threat is more likely to come from some smaller conflict than out of the East.

Mr. MacLean: Again from a cynical point of view, could it not be argued that if the larger countries and those associated with them in the east and west blocs, if you want to call them that, were to ignore completely these minor wars in the third world force they would never grow into world conflagrations?

Professor Granatstein: Except that they have not completely ignored them up until now and it is most unlikely that they will completely ignore them in the future. You cannot tell me that the Middle East situation, for example, has been completely ignored by the great powers or the Congo.

Mr. MacLean: I know this has been the case up until the present time, but maybe this is a trend that should be encouraged rather than . . .

Professor Granatstein: I would suggest that the best way of persuading the great powers to keep their paws out would be by having the United Nations presence at these small conflicts.

Mr. MacLean: Is this not going to be an endless task, again from a rather cynical point of view?

Professor Granatstein: Yes, sir.

Mr. MacLean: I do not think you can impose a highly ethical civilization on people who are always at each other's throats. Possibly it is an insoluble problem and unless you impose a kind of a peace by the UN by force which is—especially the peacekeeping forces that are going to be made up chiefly of whites is something fairly close to colonial peace, *pax Britannica*.

Professor Granatstein: Certainly many people have raised the point, in fact, that this will not solve anything. You just will be imposing a new kind of colonialism on the underdeveloped nation and in some ways, I suppose, that is true. You are insisting on applying sort of western concepts of order to a part of the world where perhaps this concept is foreign. This may be one area where, in fact, our western concepts are perhaps rather better than the existing ones and I would certainly say this is one area where we should persist in this kind of role. I think it is a noble role and I think it is a useful role. It is noble; it is idealistic; it is practical. It seems to combine in one package any number of things that make it attractive, at least to me. I grant that it is going to be tiresome, tedious and never ending.

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Mr. MacLean: But human nature is very perverse. In a situation of that sort you would assume that at some time the people who are being kept at peace would become resigned to that sort of situation, but

I have my doubts. This thing may fail in the end in the same way as colonialism failed, in spite of the many advantages it brought to large areas of the world.

Professor Granatstein: I grant that, sir. It may fail in the end, but the trouble is that if it does fail it can kill us all in the process and that is something I am not prepared to risk.

Mr. MacLean: I would not necessarily agree with you there, although it could be a very painful and agonizing process. Maybe the fact of the situation is that the third world areas will have to evolve slowly from their own experience, as Europe did over the last couple of thousand years, to find out that constant warfare among themselves is not a profitable way to live and to . . .

Professor Granatstein: To a condition where we have only big wars?

Mr. MacLean: Yes, exactly.

Professor Granatstein: Real progress.

Mr. MacLean: It is very hard to diagnose but with the nuclear stand-off over the past number of years it would seem that maybe we have reached the point where even we recognize the human . . .

Professor Granatstein: If I follow your logic, sir, then we should give all the small countries nuclear arms so that they will be in the same condition of nuclear stand-off.

Mr. MacLean: No, but they might reach that point eventually.

Professor Granatstein: Then we will be in real trouble.

Mr. MacLean: Then they would evolve much in much the same way as Europe has or if you think that is utterly bad, maybe we should have some peacekeeping forces from older civilizations like China impose their sort of peace on Europe.

Professor Granatstein: I do not know how to comment on that. I am sorry.

The Chairman: Have you finished, Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: I am finished, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Hymmen.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, I noticed that Dr. Granatstein recommends the role of peacekeeping for Canada and I certainly agree with the idea, of course.

We have served an important role in various countries of the world. This was an important recommendation in the White Paper and also was one of the reasons for unification.

I have some questions as other members of the Committee have had in regard to the inference that there could be a large reduction in personnel. So that this will not be taken entirely out of context, I noticed in the sentence following this on the last page of your brief that the saving—the financial saving—in less personnel could be invested in equipment. In other words, you recommend the status quo as far as the defence budget is concerned or do you recommend an increased defence budget? What is your view?

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Professor Granatstein: I would like to see it cut as much as possible, but I do not think that is entirely feasible. The one thing I really think is certain is that if it is raised, if we ever get this 3 per cent GNP, there is going to be an enormous outcry from pretty large segments of public opinion. If you assume that the budget is fixed and if you assume that forces have to have equipment, then there is only one solution and that, in fact is to reduce our present strength by about 20,000 men. We are locked into a financial straitjacket at the moment and there is no way we can get out of it as long as inflation continues and as long as a fixed dollar sum is allotted for defence as it virtually is now.

There is just no way we can have a 100,000 man force filling the same kind of roles we are at present. I just do not think it is possible, at least, if they are going to have any equipment.

Mr. Hymmen: We know and we have been told so many times that in the event of a major conflagration Canada could not hope to defend itself without the help of the United States. You are suggesting that we should have a defense force of 80,000 men in order to provide for any emergencies on our own shores and also to provide peacekeeping forces in other parts of the world. Do you think this is realistic?

Professor Granatstein: Do you think it is realistic to talk of defending Canada with 100,000 man force? Is it any less realistic to do it with an 80,000 man force?

Mr. Hymmen: It has been suggested, as I said earlier, that since we have no way of defending our shores anyway, why have any armed forces? Why not just call on the United States of America to bail us out?

Professor Granatstein: You have armed forces for purposes that I am sure Professor Eayrs talked to you about and put in his brief to this committee. You have them for prestige purposes, for diplomatic purposes, for military purposes, for ceremonial purposes and any number of purposes. He maintains that the role of our forces, in fact, up until now has been largely ceremonial.

I am suggesting that we might be able to find a role that is perhaps a little more practical in which the defence of Canada was not a consideration. In the first place, I do not see an enemy who might attack us and in the second place it would be impossible for us to defend our country anyhow unless we had a massive force. I think this is unarguable. The purpose of our forces then would be to carry out our policies abroad. The question is, what kind of policies? Up to now they have been sort of the NATO, NORAD kind of thing. I am suggesting, perhaps, there should be modifications in that kind of role.

Mr. Hymmen: There is another reason for having an armed force as I think other people have suggested, even the Prime Minister that there could be a spill over of civil disorders from the United States. I am getting back to the question of what is the idealistic amount of forces to have in this country considering its tremendous size and a population of 20 million people and I suggest if you get down to a force of 80,000, 50,000, 25,000 it may be more of a farce then it is now.

Professor Granatstein: I do not think it is a farce now. I did not suggest that. I do not think in the event of a spill over of violence from the United States into Canada it would require heavy tanks and strafing planes. It would require, in effect, people who were trained for precisely the kind of role that peacekeepers are trained for, crowd control and riot control with a mobile capacity.

Mr. Hymmen: I was not talking about equipment. I was talking about personnel and this whole question of what is a realistic force.

Professor Granatstein: Is 80,000 any less realistic than 100,000? If you tell me that you have to have 10,000 in each province, why quibble? Why not get us a role—find us roles—and then start worrying about the number of people?

Mr. Hymmen: I have one other question. You suggested that NORAD was in the same category as the Atlantic command and you used the words, a "milch cow". Is not our role in NORAD essentially one of planning and liaison?

Professor Granatstein: We seem to have put something in the order of \$150 million a year into this thing which is a very high price to pay for planning and liaison.

Mr. Hymmen: If we do not renew the NORAD agreement or cancelled the NORAD agreement what other arrangement could we have with our neighbours to the south?

Professor Granatstein: What is the purpose of the agreement? It is to shoot down bombers. Is there a credible threat and what is this NORAD agreement going to mean with respect to our getting involved in ABM's? These are the questions that should be asked. It is not enough to say when they renew the agreement that we are not going to get involved in

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ABM's. When the Americans put them up in Buffalo and at Plattsburg we are going to get involved because the Canadian people are going to say, do we want these things dropping on our heads? Do we want the fallout dropping on us? They are going to say, no, we do not want this, put them up in North Bay and they will drop on the Eskimos.

Mr. Hymmen: But whether we are in NORAD or out of NORAD, is that going to have any effect on whether the United States installs ABM's in Buffalo or Detroit and is that going to affect our situation?

Professor Granatstein: The United States is going to protect itself as it sees fit. There is no question of that. We have already sort of said, we do not want to get involved in ABM's, but by virtue of being involved in NORAD we are already involved in ABM's. I think Mr. John Gellner who was a witness before this Committee demonstrated this very clearly in a number of columns last year. We are already involved. The purpose of NORAD is to stop the Soviet bomber threat. Is this a credible threat?

Mr. Hymmen: It is still a threat, is it not?

Professor Granatstein: Is it? In the face of ICBM's, when the Soviets have as many ICBM's or almost as many as the Americans are you going to say that 150 bombers constitute a threat that would justify the expenditure of \$150 million by this country?

Mr. Hymmen: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: Might I ask a supplementary. Is it correct to say that NORAD is concerned only with bombers? Surely it has a role—it may be a minor one—in the question of surveillance, identification and maintenance of our sovereignty, jointly with the United States over our air space?

Professor Granatstein: Yes, I would grant that.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Ralph Stewart and then Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a couple of little questions for clarification purposes. Incidentally I would object strongly to anything being placed at North Bay which is going to wipe out my riding.

Professor Granatstein: So would I sir, so would I.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): You said a while ago, Dr. Granatstein, that our relations with Egypt were not good. As a matter of fact, I think you used the words that we were person non grata.

Professor Granatstein: We were in 1967, anyhow.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We are not any longer? I would like you to explain that. I do not understand that.

Professor Granatstein: When UNEF was kicked out, which is not too strong a word for what happened of Egypt in 1967 the Canadians were particularly singled out and in effect told to leave ahead of the rest of the force—given 48 hours notice, in fact, to get out. The reason, I think, was due to certain statements Mr. Pearson had made after his meeting with President Johnson who had come up, I think, to visit Expo at that particular time.

President Nasser, I believe, called Mr. Pearson an idiot at that time, if I recall the phrase, and there was a pretty nasty exchange back and forth. This led a lot of people to say that it was most unlikely that Canada would ever be involved in a peacekeeping force in that particular area again. That is what I meant by the use of those words. That was the reference. I really have not been watching this area particularly closely, but I have not seen any significant changes in the relations between Canada and the United Arab Republic. Certainly we did not break relations with the UAR.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): My impression is that our relations are quite good with them, although I sometimes wonder why when everybody in this country, under the guise of taking a nonpartisan view of things, seems to, at least the media and so on seem to, side invariably with the Israelis in the Middle East war.

I wonder if you could give me an opinion, Dr. Granatstein? A while ago Mr. Cafik raised the point that both England and ourselves have a common Queen and you said that this did not seem to make any difference. Do you think that the international community regards the fact that we have a Queen

nominally as not being really significant that it is with a nominal affair?

Professor Granatstein: It certainly would be my opinion that it bears no importance in our relations with other states. It does not help us; it does not hinder us.

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Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Harkness: Professor Granatstein, I take it that the crux of your presentation is in this sentence on page 7:

What now needs to be done is to make peacekeeping—in its broadest sense—the *raison d'être* of the Canadian forces.

Professor Granatstein: Yes, sir.

Mr. Harkness: Then, I think, we need to examine the validity of that concept.

Professor Granatstein: Yes, sir.

Mr. Harkness: First of all, from the point of view of what the demands on Canada are likely to be as far as peacekeeping are concerned, do you think they will be such that they would require at a maximum more than 3,000 people at any one time?

Professor Granatstein: I said, sir, "its broadest sense". I was not talking only in terms of UNTSO, UNFICYP and UNEF type forces, I was making peacekeeping a phrase broad enough to include our participation in NATO in that sense. In effect I was saying that we should be building and expanding upon this allied command Europe mobile force role that we are operating in—operating as a NATO mobile reserve—if we are going to stay in the alliance.

Mr. Harkness: I think that is a different thing altogether. My personal view is, of course, that NATO has been far more responsible for maintaining peace than has the United Nations in the past 20 years.

Professor Granatstein: That is arguable.

Mr. Harkness: However, the matter of providing peacekeeping forces as they are generally understood for NATO purposes is a much narrower thing altogether, and this is the matter to which I am particularly addressing myself at the moment.

Professor Granatstein: What I did say, sir, was that by making all the forces air mobile, by concentrating

on the control of conflicts, by basing all our forces in Canada, Canada could fill a useful role in the NATO reserve while still keeping itself ready for peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Harkness: To come back to what is generally understood as peacekeeping operations apart from the military alliances which serve that basic purpose, how many people do you think would be required as a maximum at any time as far as Canada is concerned for peacekeeping purposes?

Professor Granatstein: The most we ever had abroad at any one time, I think, was of the order of 3,000 as you say.

Mr. Harkness: I do not think we have ever had anything like that abroad at one time.

Professor Granatstein: When we had people in UNEF, Cyprus, UNIPOM and Kashmir I think we were close to the 3,000 figure.

Mr. Harkness: I think you will find it more of the order of about 2,000. In any event, I put 3,000 as the absolute maximum. Do you think it is a practical proposition, then, if you are going to make this your main role, to maintain forces of anything like the size we have at the present time?

Professor Granatstein: I had better make this clear again. I was not suggesting that UN peacekeeping be our only role. I do not think anybody can credibly maintain that. I am suggesting that peacekeeping in its broader sense, which I take to include a contribution to NATO, of the kind I dealt with here, requires a larger force.

Mr. Harkness: Would you not also include a contribution to NORAD, which purpose is purely defensive?

Professor Granatstein: The question is not whether its purpose is defensive; the question is whether its defensive purpose is a useful one and I do not think it is.

Mr. Harkness: We have a difference of opinion there. However, coming back to United Nations straight peacekeeping operations, you would agree then that the number of forces we need for that purpose is quite limited.

Professor Granatstein: The number of forces that we are liable to commit actively abroad for UN purposes is likely to be quite limited. The number of forces in terms of back-up, in terms of training, and so on, will not be quite so limited. The kind of force structure that I would like to see would, in fact, be able to do that kind of thing as well as other roles.

Mr. Harkness: From that point of view we are not too far apart, because I think the United Nations peacekeeping role which we should have as one of our roles is one that can be carried out by relatively small numbers of people actively taking part in the operation. Second, in order to carry out that role, I think it is essential that we have what you might call a well-balanced force.

The point is that so far as these peacekeeping operations are concerned you never know; we have not known in the past and we are not going to know in the future what we are going to be asked to supply. Actually, on the basis of past experience, the only way we could have met the demands made on us was by having reasonably well-balanced types of forces such as we have.

Professor Granatstein: I do not agree with that at all, sir. When have we ever required artillery in any peacekeeping operation? When did we ever require heavy tanks in any peacekeeping operation?

Mr. Harkness: To date we have not required them, but what we have required in the past so far as the Congo is concerned is signallers which nobody else, as

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it happened, was able to provide and because of the type of forces we maintain we were able to provide these signallers. In the Gaza strip operation we were required to provide medical personnel, vehicle repair people, army service corps types for supply purposes and a reconnaissance squadron. Once more, as I say, we were able to provide these only because we had well-balanced general forces.

Professor Granatstein: The structure I am suggesting, in fact, would be able to meet every one of the cases you have cited and would be able to meet virtually every foreseeable case in the future. There are not likely to be any UN operations that are going to require a mechanized brigade or forces operating with tanks and artillery in an integrated sort of nuclear or heavy conventional role. There is just no way.

Mr. Harkness: It is not probable; it is possible but it is not probable, but the main point I am getting at is that this, in my view, needs to be really a subsidiary role rather than a main role, because the number of people that will be required is always limited and the type of forces that is going to be required you do not know. Therefore, the only way that you can provide them is by a pretty well-balanced type of force.

Professor Granatstein: The difficulty, sir, is that you keep operating on your own definition of peacekeeping and not on mine. If we could agree on the definitions we might be able to discuss it.

Mr. Harkness: I tried to limit it to UN . . .

Professor Granatstein: I try to expand it.

Mr. Harkness: . . . peacekeeping operations so far as the questions I was asking are concerned.

Professor Granatstein: I would agree with you. It is likely to be a relatively small number of men. I agree it is likely to require perhaps infantry, perhaps communications, perhaps transport and service people. I agree, but I maintain that those could come from an air mobile force, a force essentially, if it is going to be based in Europe and in Canada, operating on the same kinds of role with the same kind of equipment. It could come as well from that kind of force as it can from what we have at present. That is all.

Mr. Harkness: I agree that may well be the case.

Professor Granatstein: Then we are in agreement.

Mr. Harkness: I think the basic disagreement so far as we are concerned is that I think one of our main roles should be in NATO and I take it you do not think that is the case.

Professor Granatstein: Ideally, I have said, I do not. What I did say was that it seems very unlikely that the NATO role is going to be dropped as things stand at the moment. If you read the papers this morning, the foreign policy review group and the combined departments that were dealing with it recommended staying in. If that is, in fact, so this probably makes it very likely that we will stay in.

Now, what do you do? Do you do exactly the same thing you are doing now? Is the status quo somehow engraved as part of the Ten Commandments because we have been doing it for 15 or 20 years? Why can we not change our role and get something that is perhaps useful to NATO and also useful to our other role? That is what I am suggesting; I think it is a much more useful role.

The difficulty, sir, with what you are suggesting is that we are going to have to maintain the present size of the force. That means the budget is going to have to be raised and that is something I think is very unlikely, and I suspect the gentlemen on this side of the table think it is very unlikely as well.

The Chairman: Mr. Granatstein, in reply to Mr. Harkness you mentioned that you were not sure that NATO had been a greater force for peace than the United Nations. I think you probably would agree that the United Nations have not been able to achieve the high hopes that we held out for it originally when it was formed.

Professor Granatstein: There is no question about that.

The Chairman: Could you tell us the basic reason for this and whether there is anything that Canada should be doing over the next few years to try to remedy any defects which have resulted in this?

Professor Granatstein: The basic reason that the UN has not been as successful as was hoped?

The Chairman: Yes.

Professor Granatstein: I suppose the basic reason is that when the UN was set up in 1945 and the Charter drawn up it was based on the assumption that the Great Powers would co-operate together and would work together to enforce peace. As it turned out by about late 1945 or early 1946 this was not the way; this was not going to work at all. Once that happened the whole elaborate structure that had been built into the organization became useless. We were forced into a position where, in order to have any kind of intervention capacity, any kind of capacity to intervene in troubled areas in the world, you had to improvise.

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You had to improvise in ways that were perhaps not at variance with the Charter, but certainly involved some radical rethinking concerning the way the Charter of the United Nations could be interpreted. Perhaps what we should be doing now is trying to put as many teeth as we possibly can into the United Nations capacity for operating in a collective security framework.

Certainly this is something this government, the past government and virtually every government, in fact, since the early fifties has been doing, trying to make the collective security role of the UN a more viable one. I think we should continue along this line. That is one of the points I tried to make.

The Chairman: In other words, you feel that there is still some possibility of the UN evolving into the type of organization that can extend collective security and that we are not obligated to rely necessarily for the future upon alliances.

Professor Granatstein: You would have to be pretty visionary to be able to agree to that kind of line. I do not think you can. The United Nations has not demonstrated as yet too much real willingness to go this way. Hopefully it will some time in the future, but you cannot base a policy on a hope. I grant this and I recognize this.

The Chairman: Professor Eayrs seemed to indicate in his testimony that perhaps we should change our role in NATO or even withdraw from NATO, but only if we could negotiate some concessions from the other side. I am not sure just what concessions

he had in mind. Do you feel there would be any possibility, if we were to change our role or reduce our role in NATO, that a similar reduction could be negotiated with the Warsaw Pact countries?

Professor Granatstein: I read Professor Eayrs' testimony on the plane on the way up. I received it only yesterday. My recollection is that during the questioning on that day somebody raised the point that Rumania had evinced some kind of interest in this kind of swap-off, and if something like that could be arranged I think it would be a splendid approach if it could be advanced and worked on.

The Chairman: Do you think it is worth trying to negotiate such a concession?

Professor Granatstein: Yes, absolutely.

The Chairman: You do not think it is completely visionary or way out?

Professor Granatstein: No, I do not think so. I think it is relatively realistic.

The Chairman: In your view is there any possibility at all in the course of these negotiations of getting both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to agree that they would not dispatch missiles through Canadian airspace? Is that the type of concession that could realistically be put into negotiation or is that something which is just too visionary?

Professor Granatstein: I think that is probably too visionary, because it is the shortest missile route. It is most unlikely that either side would agree to anything like that, I would expect.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. Are there any other questions from members of the Committee?

Mr. Nowlan: I have a couple based on one of your last questions. Would the professor be surprised to be informed that perhaps there have been negotiations for swap-offs over the last 10 or 15 years and they have not really produced too much?

Professor Granatstein: Perhaps the international climate may change; that does not mean that you rule it out forever.

Mr. Nowlan: No, that is fine, but the question I really wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, concerns something the professor said earlier in answer to Mr. Forrestall who is no longer here. It is not necessarily a parochial question. He mentioned Maritime Command as being fat cats. I would like him to elaborate on that if he can with this premise: if a Maritime Command, both on the Pacific and the Atlantic with

our coast line, is not going to perform some type of surveillance service, does he envisage leaving this completely to the United States, both in the air and at sea? I am not necessarily talking about four defence destroyers at an extra cost; I am thinking of a Maritime Command service.

Professor Granatstein: I did not say you should sink all the ships. I did not suggest that. I think it is probably fair to say that Maritime Command has been rather well favoured in some ways in terms of equipment—the four destroyer escorts at \$50 million plus each, the lavish refitting of the *Bonaventure*, and so on. I think we probably have to have some kind of surveillance function, but that does not mean you need to base a force entirely on anti-submarine warfare as, in fact, we have done now.

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You can upgrade the coastguard and use it for that kind of purpose.

Mr. Nowlan: This is what I want to clarify. You are not suggesting that because the present function,

in your view, may not be directed correctly a Maritime Command in whatever form should be abandoned.

Professor Granatstein: Oh, no.

Mr. Ryan: Professor, arising out of the Chairman's questioning, I wonder what you would have to say in connection with the apparent concern and upset in West Germany which has come to a head as a result of President Nixon's visit, about the prospect of the Soviet-U.S. talks regarding disarmament. Would you care to comment as to whether or not you feel that this initiative is in the teeth of the Harmel Report?

Professor Granatstein: I think I had better pass on that, if you do not mind.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions to Dr. Granatstein? If not, Dr. Granatstein, on behalf of the members of the Committee I would like to thank you most sincerely for your very helpful testimony.

APPENDIX PP

PEACEKEEPING: WHAT FUTURE ROLE FOR CANADA?

Without question peacekeeping has won Canada more international plaudits since 1945 than any other aspect of our foreign and defence policies. In Kashmir, in Palestine, in Cyprus, Suez, Yemen, and the Lebanon, Canadian servicemen have carried out a wide variety of tasks in a manner that reflected only credit on them and their country. And yet since the debacle at Suez in May, 1967 peacekeeping has been in the eclipse in Canada—and in the United Nations, too. Is the concept of peacekeeping still viable as we prepare to enter the decade of the 1970's? Are there likely to be crisis situations that will require the damping down that a peacekeeping force can provide? Will Canada be asked to participate in any such future forces? This brief essay will attempt to posit possible (and, I hope, plausible) answers to these important queries.

Peacekeeping as it developed and as it has been practised since 1948 was pragmatic in the extreme. The drafters of the United Nations Charter had envisaged nothing like UNMOGIP or UNFICYP when they created the world organization in 1945. Then they had believed that massive forces provided by the Great Powers would enforce peace on any aggressor presumptuous enough to flout the united will of the Big Five. The difficulty was that the Big Five, of course, never had and never developed a united will. The result was a paralysis of the United Nations collective security function. Crises continued, however, and the United Nations was forced to improvise observer forces in Palestine and Kashmir before the end of the 1940's. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, where action had been possible only because the Soviet Union was fortuitously boycotting the Security Council, there was an understandable fear in the West that the Russian veto could paralyze any future attempts to enforce collective security. The solution was the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1951, a clever device that allowed the General Assembly to act in cases where the Council was deadlocked. Ironically the first use of the 1951 resolution came in 1956 when the Assembly agreed to the establishment of UNEF over the vetoes of Britain and France, two of the sponsors of the Uniting for Peace resolution.

Not even the Suez Crisis of 1956 was able to force the United Nations to move to the establishment of a genuine standby force, with plans in readiness and an able staff at New York. In 1957, Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson called for action to this end, as did Prime Minister Diefenbaker in his first appear-

ance before the United Nations in the same year. But when the Congo erupted in 1960, improvisation again was the order of the day. The same was true in the Cyprus crisis of 1964. After the disorganized launching of UNFICYP, the Canadian government again attempted to push the UN toward standby arrangements, and in 1964 it convened a conference in Ottawa that attracted representatives from 23 countries. The Ottawa Peacekeeping Conference was followed by the establishment at the United Nations of a 33-nation Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1965, but this committee unfortunately got bogged down in fruitless haggling about the financing of these operations (a bone of serious contention since the Congo operation) and no major progress was made.

The near-failure of the Special Committee was a serious blow to the peacekeeping ideal and to Canada's plans, but the crushing shock came in 1967 when UNEF collapsed. The resulting third Arab-Israeli war seemed to be the *coup de grâce*. In Canada particularly the shock caused by President Nasser's peremptory expulsion of the Canadian contingent in UNEF was severe.

Even before 1967 criticism was beginning to be heard about Canada's role in peacekeeping. From some on the left came the cry that peacekeeping served only to prop up decadent regimes, that it froze crises and prevented their resolution in revolution. Some academics, some political figures, and some military officers felt that peacekeeping was a waste of time, something that distracted the Canadian forces from preparation for their real role—that of fighting the Russians. Still others attacked the government for being too restrictive in the locales to which it committed Canadian peacekeepers. After the Suez fiasco, this criticism increased in volume, and the Canadian penchant for endless agonizing about national status now seemed to focus in part at least on peacekeeping. Even here, the refrain went, Canada had failed abysmally.

Is peacekeeping in fact a dead duck? I think not. Certainly the idea has taken hard knocks, but it is not yet dead. Crises will continue to arise on every continent, and there will be a need for some international agency—not necessarily the United Nations—to intervene in some of these potential conflicts. There is little likelihood that permanent peacekeeping forces will be created in the foreseeable future, but the improvi-

sation that has so marked the development of peacekeeping is, I suspect, only waiting on an occasion. The possibility of future international peacekeeping—or peace-enforcing—forces cannot be ruled out.

If there are future peace operations, would Canada be invited to participate? As a Caucasian nation, critics say, Canada is not likely to be permitted to participate in operations in Africa and Asia. Even in 1956, they maintain, Nasser objected to Canadian troops because they were white, "soldiers of the Queen", and indistinguishable from the invading British. All this is true enough. Canada is unlikely to be the first choice of many African or Asian states. But I would suggest nonetheless that Canada is almost certain to be involved in any future peacekeeping operation involving forces greater in number than observer groups. The reason is simple, but perhaps not immediately obvious: military necessity. By tradition the Great Powers are barred from participation in United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Where then will the airlift be found for operations within the host country? Where will the communications personnel be located? Canada is one of the very few countries outside the ranks of the Great Powers that has a complete military force in microcosm. We have air transport capability, we have skilled communications personnel, we have a large supply organization. No Asian or African state has this kind of force, trained and ready for operations.

This Canadian capability has in fact been the reason for our employment on at least two United Nations operations. In Suez in 1956, for example, the Canadian government was pressed to provide supply personnel after General E. L. M. Burns, the UNEF Commander, could not secure them elsewhere (and after Colonel Nasser proved unhappy with the unluckily named Queen's Own Rifles). Again in 1960, the United Nations strongly pressed Canada to send a signals unit to the Congo. These urgings, when joined with the strident demands of the press for Canadian participation, were sufficient to virtually force the government's hand, despite the Prime Minister's clear statements in Parliament that Canada's contribution would be strictly limited. The point is that even in the Congo, a black state in the throes of nationalism, colour proved no barrier to the employment of the Canadian signallers. Their bilingualism, in fact, proved a great asset.

Does our participation in NATO and NORAD hinder our participation in peacekeeping? In 1954, Canada was selected to serve on the International Control Commissions in Indochina because she was considered a "western" state. In 1956, Nasser apparently believed that Canada was acting as she did at the United Nations only to get her NATO allies, Britain and France, off the hook. In 1960, the Soviet Union objected to Canadian participation in UNOC on the grounds that "colonialist" Belgium was a NATO ally. Obviously then Canada has been asked to serve on

peacekeeping operations both because of our alliance posture and in spite of it. The key point, however, is that we were asked to serve. It is difficult to argue, therefore, that our ties to NATO or the United States have hampered us in our participation. That we are in NATO and NORAD, in fact, is undoubtedly the reason that we have the military capacity to act for the United Nations. On the other hand, at the time of the Congo crisis, there was severe difficulty in finding enough signallers for UN service, primarily because of our commitment to NATO and to continental defence. In addition, it is probably impossible to argue that we have been wanted for peacekeeping because of our links to NATO and Washington. Canada has participated in all the peacekeeping operations since 1948 because she wanted to and because she has had the capacity to do so. So long as these factors hold true, there is no question in my mind that Canada will be able to participate in any future operations.

The point that must be made, too, is that peacekeeping is relatively cheap. In terms of the prestige we have received and the diplomatic credit we have built up, peacekeeping has been a great bargain. Today Canada is probably in a better position than ever before to participate in peacekeeping (notwithstanding the manpower shortages in the Canadian Forces). The Commando Regiment, for example, will be capable of operating anywhere on short notice. The two battalions committed to the Allied Command Europe mobile force are similarly ready for fast deployment.

What now needs to be done is to make peacekeeping—in its broadest sense—the *raison d'être* of the Canadian Forces. The commitment to a nuclear role in NATO should be liquidated, as should our provision of a mechanized brigade. By making all the forces airborne, by concentrating on the control of conflicts, by basing all our forces in Canada, Canada could fill a useful role in the NATO reserve while still keeping itself ready for peacekeeping operations as they may arise. Such a plan could result in a manpower cut of 15,000-20,000 personnel and a huge saving in personnel costs. The saving could be invested in equipment, something that the Canadian Forces desperately need.

In conclusion then, the prospects for peacekeeping seem to me to be as follows:

- a. There is little likelihood that the United Nations will make arrangements for standby forces;
- b. There is a good chance that peacekeeping operations will be mounted in the future;
- c. Because of Canada's military capabilities, it is likely that Canadian Forces participation will be requested for future peacekeeping operations. Neither colour nor our alliance posture are likely to interfere with this possibility.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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BORN:—May 21, 1939, Toronto.

RESIDENCE:—53 Marlborough Ave., Toronto 5.

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EDUCATION:—

Graduation diploma, Collège Militaire Royal, 1959
B.A., Royal Military College of Canada, 1961
M.A., University of Toronto, 1962
Ph. D., Duke University, 1966.

DISSERTATION:—

"The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-45" (Dr. Theodore Ropp).

AWARDS:—

Governor General's Medal, Collège Militaire Royal, 1959
Lieutenant-Governor's Medal, Royal Military College, 1960
Queen Elizabeth II Ontario Fellowship, 1961
J. B. Duke Fellowship, Duke University, 1963, 1964

Canada Council Pre-Doctoral Awards, 1963, 1964, 1965

Canada Council Research Grant, 1966-7-8-9.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:—

Assistant Professor, York University, 1966 to date.

RELATED EXPERIENCE:—

Historian, Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, Summer, 1964; 1965-6.

MILITARY SERVICE:—

Canadian Army, 1956-66.

AREAS OF RESEARCH INTEREST:—

Conscription; The Conservative Party; Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy.

PUBLICATIONS:—

"How the Tories of Old Switched Leaders," *Globe and Mail*, October 27, 1966.

"The Conservative Party and the Ogdensburg Agreement," *Int J* (Winter, 1966-7). 73-6.

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APPENDIX QQ

SPEECH BY THE HONOURABLE LEO CADIEUX

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

TO

THE ROTARY CLUB OF OTTAWA

27 JANUARY, 1969

"CANADA'S ESSENTIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS"

Over the past few months there has been a heightened, and I might say gratifying, interest in Canadian Defence Policy. Much of this interest has been stimulated by the review of Defence and Foreign Policy. It is notable that statements made by the Prime Minister, by myself, and by other Ministers have encouraged people outside government to contribute to the review process by participating in the public discussion and debate.

In this context I thought it might be useful if I were to go over some of the fundamental considerations which bear on our Defence Review. I am not going to tell you what the policy will be—we have not decided that yet—rather it is with the desire to stimulate discussion on matters of serious national import, that I am speaking to you this afternoon.

Our position on the face of the globe, and the similarities in outlook we share with the United States, have in the past given us a position, from the defence point of view, which few other nations of the world enjoy. Since we became a nation we have prospered over the long run, and we have been unhampered by direct external military threat or interference. We live in a changing world, and we must from time to time reassess the basis of our defence activities. This we are doing now.

The Armed Forces that Canada created in years past have been among the finest in the world. For a traditionally non-militaristic country we can be proud of the quality of the sailors, soldiers, and airmen Canada has sent to all parts of the world in the cause of peace, freedom, and justice. I am sure that there is not one here today who has not at some time been stirred by the battle honours won by Canadian fighting men, who laid the foundation for Canada's present enviable reputation—indeed many of you undoubtedly helped to write these pages of Canada's history. Canada continues today the same traditions in its armed forces.

The modern serviceman is a skilled specialist. He has the split-second reactions and the highly developed sense of team-work demanded by new, complex equipment.

These qualities can only be developed and maintained in a professional force of highly trained, highly motivated, and dedicated men and women. We have such a force today. Such competence takes many years to develop, and we must be sure we know exactly what we are doing before disbanding any part of it.

I know you will agree with what I have said about the quality of Canada's Forces. The questions we are concerning ourselves with today are:—Why do we need them? What are the tasks and missions they are to perform? Why must Canada devote a significant portion of its resources to the support of armed forces? The answers to these questions must be based on Canada's essential security requirements.

I would like to give you some of my thoughts on these requirements. In view of the time available, however, I will have to omit any discussion of the important problem of internal security.

The Basis of Canadian Security

The advent of the nuclear age removed the comfortable invulnerability which geography afforded both Canada and its friendly, but very powerful, neighbour. Although Canada cannot be thought of as being threatened directly, that is in its own right, by the long range bombers, missile-launching submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles of any of the nuclear powers, it is nevertheless a fact that we are uniquely positioned between the two superpowers. Indeed, a glance at a polar projection map will quickly convince you that we are similarly placed with respect to the People's Republic of China—a possible future intercontinental nuclear power.

The bulk of our population and national assets are so close to our border with the United States that we could not hope to escape destruction as a viable society, should an all-out nuclear exchange take place. Even in the unlikely event that our cities are not planned targets, damage and loss of life would be widespread and severe. I believe that the Government of Canada has a dual responsibility to the people of Canada in responding to this threat to our security.

First, we must continue to do whatever can be done to ensure that the nuclear balance is not disturbed, and even more important, to do what is possible to enhance the stability of the balance.

Second, we must not slacken our efforts toward helping to create and maintain the kind of world in which peace can be assured without the necessity of the balance of terror. However, until we come much closer to an ideal world, first priority must be given to those measures which contribute directly to the security of Canada.

Disarmament

I say this with no intention of detracting from the importance of efforts aimed at eventually de-escalating the massive confrontation of nuclear arms. Canada has been an active and effective member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. I might take advantage of this opportunity to mention how fortunate Canada has been to have General E.L.M. Burns as leader of the Canadian delegation to the Committee, during its frustrating and protracted negotiations in Geneva. In a sense, as a distinguished ex-soldier, General Burns symbolizes the close relationship between Canadian defence and disarmament interests.

Canada has given full support to the objectives of international disarmament endeavours, and has contributed significantly to their achievements. Notable among these have been—

- * The treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outerspace and undersea, which has been scrupulously observed by all signatory nations since its agreement in 1963;

- * the treaty banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, which as far as we can know, has also been faithfully observed;

and the most recent major success,

- * the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is aimed at limiting the further spread of devastating power in the hands of individual sovereign states. Earlier this month, Canada was among the first of the nations of the world to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There is no question of the value of Canada continuing its disarmament efforts.

The Strategic System

Now, what about the strategic system, whose stability is so essential to Canada's security? The nuclear balance is an extremely complicated affair. It is much more than a mere counting of the bombs and missiles in the respective nuclear arsenals. The balance involves a large array of separate measures and counter-measures, and is constantly shifting and changing with advances in military technology.

There are three main types of systems for the delivery of offensive weapons: bombers, submarines, and inter-continental ballistic missiles. Although it would contravene the "use of space" treaty, a fourth possibility is the earth satellite. Matched against these are the defensive systems: anti-bomber interceptors and missiles; anti-submarine undersea, surface, and air weapons; and anti-ballistic missile systems. All these components, both offensive and defensive, are closely interrelated in the intricate organism which constitutes the overall strategic system.

The strategic balance depends not only on how many offensive weapons each side has at its disposal, but also on how they are armed and fitted, on the manner in which they are planned to be used, and on the defensive systems deployed against them. The balance is continuously adjusted as both sides take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that the other side does not reach the stage where he can strike first, and strike in such a way that he is confident he can escape devastating retaliatory damage. Neither of the superpowers have such a first strike capability today. Either could suffer a nation-destroying all-out strike, and still have available surviving nuclear forces capable of inflicting comparable damage on the attacker. These survivable forces make up the so-called second strike capability.

Air Defence in the Strategic System

Let us look more closely at the place of the bomber in the strategic system. At the moment, the superpowers find it more economical to concentrate offensive capability in intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles. But why is this so? Simply because effective defence against bombers is feasible and both sides maintain such defences—just enough to discourage the other side from investing in the cheaper and more accurate delivery system that bombers represent.

What would happen if one side abandoned its bomber defences? In all likelihood, the other side would immediately do most of the following things:

- * Refurbish the bombers it still has in service.
- * Modify some of its transport aircraft to carry bombs.
- * Build more bombers.

- * Perhaps use tankers and heavy tactical aircraft as bombers.
- * Remove the jamming equipment from its bombers and replace it with more bomb racks.
- * Forget about using load-limiting stand-off missiles, and finally
- * Target to cities intercontinental missiles which had previously been aimed at air defence facilities.

The balance would be quickly distorted to a much greater degree than that implied by the original "bomber threat".

One side would have available an inexpensive offensive system, which would threaten both the population and the land-based second strike forces of the other. Any movement toward such a situation would be destabilizing and must be discouraged. Thus, air defence will be needed as long as bombers represent either an existing or a potential threat to second strike forces.

Because of our geography, it is doubtful that the United States could, in the foreseeable future, maintain an air defence system adequate to meet the requirements I have just reviewed, unless there is close and active cooperation from Canada. If we made life difficult for the United States in its endeavours to establish adequate air defences, we would only make the nuclear balance less stable. Such behaviour on Canada's part would be acting against Canada's own security interests. Canada's defence cooperation with the United States has developed by a series of carefully negotiated agreements, arising out of the joint pronouncement of Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt at Ogdensburg in 1940. NORAD is an important example of such cooperation, and has served Canada well. In my view, NORAD is still important to Canada's security.

Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Strategic System

Another important aspect of the strategic balance relates to defence against missile-launching submarines. Suppose one side were to abandon its peacetime anti-submarine surveillance efforts or its operational submarine attack capabilities. The other side could then use much less sophisticated and much cheaper submarines, and therefore be able to produce and operate more of them. He could plan on launching the missiles from shorter range and hence larger or more numerous warheads could be carried in each missile. Again, the balance would be disturbed and the world would be less stable.

The most efficient way of one side denying such an advantage to the other is to maintain some anti-submarine capability. Furthermore, it is prudent to support an active program in anti-submarine technol-

ogy development, in order to be alert to breakthroughs which might endanger the invulnerability of submarine-based second strike capabilities. Such a program, to be effective, must be tied in with significant operational anti-submarine activities.

Our cooperation with the United States in anti-submarine operations is another important example of the furtherance of collective security, in the spirit of the Ogdensburg Declaration.

Europe and NATO in the Strategic System

Let me now turn to Europe and NATO. You may recall that last December, in speaking to the Standing Committee of Parliament on External Affairs and Defence, I indicated that, in my view, there is only one major military threat to Canada. This is the threat associated with the catastrophe which would befall us if the superpowers were to become engaged, from whatever source or reason, in an exchange of nuclear weapons.

Where does Europe fit into this proposition? The Soviet Union has stated over and over again that it considers Eastern Europe as vital to its security. Similarly, the United States has taken great pains to convince both sides that it considers Western Europe vital to its security.

The Soviet Union gave ample illustration of its position when it invaded Czechoslovakia last August. If we had any doubts before, we can have none now, that the Soviet Union will not hesitate to use force in the most blatant fashion to preserve what it considers to be its vital interests in Eastern Europe.

The United States lends credence to its position by stationing permanently in Europe large numbers of its armed forces, as well as by contributing extensively to other aspects of West European defence.

We must assume that if any East European aggression towards Western Europe is not successfully contained at a low level of warfare, it can only result in escalation to a general nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. This obviously affects Canada's security. Furthermore, there is no other area in the world where the United States and the Soviet Union are both committed to the ultimate limit. Thus, aside from any considerations of history and tradition, Europe is of unique concern with respect to Canada's security.

Fortunately, machinery exists through which Canada can contribute to deterring aggression and maintaining stability in Europe—indeed this machinery exists in part because of the efforts of the Canadian government and parliament, fully supported by the Canadian people, in the uneasy years immediately following World War II. NATO, including its integrated command structure, provides, I believe, an effective means of ensuring that conflicts of interest or

of ideology in Europe are contained and resolved without resort to cataclysmic violence. NATO represents today the only existing institutional arrangement for furthering Canada's security interests in Europe.

All of us would prefer to see a settlement devised in Europe, which would solve the legacy of division left by War. From Canada's point of view, no settlement can be acceptable unless it satisfies the security needs of the European people in such a way that an enduring peace can be assured. Nothing less would meet Canada's own security needs. In the meantime, it is in our interest to do what we can to ensure a stable situation.

Successive rungs to the escalation ladder are provided in Europe through conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. These contribute to stability by demonstrating to the other side that NATO is prepared to cope with aggression at whatever level the Alliance decides is an appropriate response to the aggressor's acts. NATO's capability for flexible response supports the ultimate strategic guarantee. As Robert McNamara said when he was United States Secretary of Defense, "a credible deterrent cannot depend on an incredible act".

Modern tactical forces represent an area where Canada's advanced technological position and military expertise can be put to very good use as part of our share in contributing to the Alliance objectives, and thereby assuring our own security.

At the same time, NATO gives us an opportunity to take part in the efforts toward détente between the nations of East and West Europe, which hopefully will, in time, create the climate of confidence in which an accommodation on the issues which now unsettle Europe can be reached. Only in the event of a large measure of success in the endeavours toward détente would withdrawal from the military aspects of the European Alliance be in Canada's interest.

How Large Should Canada's Defence Effort Be?

I have not yet said anything about how large Canada's defence effort should be. The same principles apply to both the extent of our continental defence activities and to the size of our NATO force contribution. Both are related to Canada's security in a similar way, since both are elements in the strategic nuclear balance.

Moreover, both are effective in adding to nuclear stability only because they are carried on through collective arrangements. It may be reasonable to act as the unbiased mediator and peacemaker when your own interests are not directly involved—it is quite another thing when the survival of the nation is at stake.

These two factors: the relation to Canada's security, and the alliance or collective nature of our major defence activities, suggest two questions on which we should base judgements concerning the size of our forces:

- * First, with regard to security, what proportion of Canada's national resources should Canadians devote to their own security?
- * Second, with regard to alliances, to what extent does Canada want to participate effectively in the decisions which affect its security?

The answers to the two questions must come ultimately from the people of Canada themselves. We in government can and will do our best to reflect the national will in these matters, but the more thought, the more discussion, and the more communication by individuals and groups within our nation, the better will we be able to understand and act upon the nation's wishes. Canada's security must ultimately rest on the national will to do what is necessary.

The evidence of the success of Canada's security measures in the past is the fact that we, today, are still free, still relatively prosperous, and are now concerning ourselves with what the security measures of the future ought to be. Our attention is continually diverted by other important and far-reaching national and international problems, but these can only be solved in a stable and secure world.

Major Security Considerations

This afternoon I have outlined for you some of the factors which I believe to be important for Canada's security. Let me briefly go over the main points.

- * First, the only significant military threat to Canada's security is the possibility that the delicate balance of nuclear terror may be upset.
- * Second, our defence efforts should be tailored to reduce the chance of this happening.
- * Third, air defence will be needed for an indefinite period in the future.
- * Fourth, anti-submarine operations contribute to Canada's security objectives.
- * Fifth, continued participation in NATO is essential to Canada's security interests at the present time.
- * Sixth, in the trilogy of Canada's security objectives: defence, détente, and disarmament; none can be neglected.

- * Finally, the size of our defence effort must be a reflection of the will of the people of Canada to act on behalf of their own security.

National Defence is a serious business touching the lives and destinies of every Canadian family.

It is important for all Canadians to become informed on the issues concerning Canada's security. We must all be assured that the future will include, for Canada, a realistic national security policy.

APPENDIX RR

TEXT OF AN ADDRESS

BY THE HONOURABLE MITCHEL SHARP,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ENTITLED

"THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN A CHANGING WORLD"

AT CARLETON UNIVERSITY, OTTAWA

FEBRUARY 20, 1969

There is a faintly old-fashioned ring about classifying countries as great, middle or small powers. In the 19th century, and more or less up to the beginning of the second World War, nations were ranked by the size of their naval fleets and there were only five or six "great powers". They were the ones with battleships. Now the battleships have gone and so has the whole order that they symbolized. One of the really striking developments on the world scene in the past 25 years is the advent of vastly greater number of independent states. It is very much more difficult, if not impossible, to classify them as great, middle or small powers.

The concept of degrees of "power" in a sense remains. It is still true that nations have varying capacities to influence the course of events outside their own borders. It is also a fact that nations differ in their freedom and capacity to act within their own borders. None of us, of course, is completely independent. The actions of every nation impinge increasingly on the others and not even the greatest powers can entirely disregard the interplay of national decisions. But some of us have more ability than others to play an active rather than a passive role in the world.

This capacity of a state to pursue policies of its own choosing and to influence other states rests fundamentally on three factors: (a) economic capacity; (b) military strength; (c) diplomatic and political influence.

These functions are obviously inter-related and no nation can be considered a power of any consequence unless it has a measure of capacity in all three. Nevertheless, it is possible for a nation, by deliberate choice, to place great emphasis on one sphere of activity and much less on the others. It is also possible for a country to be compelled by circumstances to rely heavily on one source of national strength.

There are cases of nations which have considerable economic capacity but have chosen not to acquire or

to employ military strength. Post-war Japan is an economic power of major proportions which has decided to maintain only modest military forces and to rely on the United States for its security requirements. Britain, on the other hand, is a nation whose economic and military strength has undergone a relative decline. But British political influence is still very significant in large parts of the world where British military force is no longer dominant. We have other states militarily very strong in relation to their economic capacity and their political influence. Israel is an interesting example. The circumstances of that country's recent history have compelled it to devote an extremely high proportion of its resources to military purposes in order to survive.

In Israel we also have an example of another dimension to the whole question of the "power" of modern states—the geographical dimension. A nation may play an important part in some region of the world because of its capacity in one or more of the three factors I mentioned a moment ago, but its effective influence may not extend much beyond the region. Israel's military capacity relative to its neighbours is obviously very high and for this, as well as for other reasons, Israel is a key country in the Middle East. On the other hand, in terms of its size and population Israel must be considered as a small country, measured on the world scale.

There is one more dimension we must keep in mind if we would place the nations of the world in some order of rank. It is the dimension of time. A country may be apparently strong and vigorous in one decade but mired in political dissension or plagued by economic crises in the next. The international scene is constantly shifting and the relative strengths of nations are rising or falling. We can never take for granted that the present order will remain unchanged for any great length of time.

Looking at the world today in the light of the variables I have referred to, it appears that there are really only two great powers—the United States and the U.S.S.R. They are the only countries which are at the same time immensely strong in economic, military, and political terms and have the capacity to exert their strength not just regionally but all over the world. They have, of course, the supreme ability to exchange intercontinental nuclear annihilation. No other nation is anywhere within reach of that dreadful capacity. It is probably more accurate to refer to the United States and the Soviet Union as “super-powers”.

I doubt that there is much point in attempting to classify those nations which are not super-powers. The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of countries have the capacity to exert *some* influence on the international scene, either in their own geographical area or in the world in general, or in one functional field or another, and therefore they fall into an indeterminate classification. We are nearly all middle powers. Apart from the two giants at the one end and, at the other, a certain number of very small states which are not capable of independent action to any significant degree.

If, then, the world is full of middle powers and their national capacities are of great variety, it is difficult to define a role in international affairs for middle powers as such. It is true of middle powers, as it is of all nations, that their role is largely predetermined by the resources they possess and their historical and geographical circumstances. The effectiveness with which they play that role is another matter. It is dependent upon an accurate and realistic assessment of their capabilities and a sensible choice of policies.

The capacity of the super-powers to affect the destiny of other nations is so enormous that middle powers must clearly be vitally concerned about the policies of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Middle powers have a right and a duty to seek to influence the actions of the super-powers. This influence is likely to be more effective if middle powers act collectively. Indeed, it might be taken as a general rule for middle and small powers that they can be most effective in almost every field of international activity if they act together.

The scale and form of collective action by middle powers depends on the purpose. It may be a functional purpose, as in an economic organization, or a geographical one, as in a regional organization, or it may be a universal objective pursued through the United Nations. The principle is the same. Collective action is likely to be more effective.

Sometimes a middle power may be able to play a special role in a situation where the super-powers, locked in contest for world-wide influence, dare not make a move. Such cases are rare, however, and their importance should not be exaggerated. Canada's initia-

tive over the Suez affair in 1956 is sometimes cited as an example of this role for a middle power, but let us remind ourselves that there were very special circumstances at that time.

I have arrived by this somewhat circuitous route at the acknowledgement that Canada is probably a “middle power”, however we define that term. It is plain that we have become a nation with significant economic weight. We have a population of twenty-one million and a gross national product of more than \$60 billion, and our economy is growing at a steady rate. We offer a market of considerable proportions for the products of other countries. In a number of products we are one of the leading producers and exporters. We have resources that are attractive to capital from outside our own country. We have a sufficiently high standard of living that we can well afford to contribute substantial resources to international activities without in any way weakening our own economy. In short, we are an economic power.

We also have an appreciable military capacity. It is not great in terms of the super-powers, nor is the approximately 100,000 men in our armed forces a very significant number by comparison with many countries whose population is smaller than ours. But our forces are well trained professionals, they are volunteers, not conscripts, equipped with modern weapons and capable of very effective employment in selective situations.

Canada also has a considerable capacity for political and diplomatic influence. We are a respected country in most parts of the world and in the United Nations and other international organizations. This is in part because we have no history of domination over other lands and no historic grievances to trouble our relations with other peoples. We maintain a corps of skilled professional diplomats, competitively selected from the best products of our universities. We have produced some outstanding political figures whose personal abilities have enhanced the influence of our country abroad, notably the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Our people generally have shown a sympathetic understanding of the problems of other countries.

But what about the regional dimension? The peculiar situation of Canada is that we are a nation with adequate capacity to play a very considerable role in a regional setting but, for all practical purposes, our immediate region consists only of ourselves and the United States, which is one of the super-powers. It has been shrewdly observed that we are a regional power without a region. Therefore, we must look further afield.

A realistic assessment of the national capacity of Canada in the various fields I have enumerated, combined with our situation next to the United States,

leads inevitably to the conclusion that, if we are to advance our national interests and exercise real influence on the course of world affairs, we should do so in conjunction with other nations. Every government in recent Canadian history has come to this conclusion. Whatever functional area one examines, it is impossible to envisage Canada making its weight felt with maximum effectiveness unless we get the co-operation of a number of like-minded nations.

In the economic field, Canada has for a long time pursued the so-called "multilateral approach" to world trading problems. We have recognized that, in the face of our overwhelming economic involvement with the United States, it is in our interests, and those of the international community as a whole, to encourage the development of a liberalized multilateral world trading system, rather than an autarkic or bloc trading system. So, we have been strong supporters of GATT and the IMF. When trading blocs like the European Economic Community have developed, we have tried to ensure, by acting in concert with other countries that face similar problems, that the new economic groupings follow the principles of GATT and are not inward-looking and exclusive.

In the military field, a feature of the Canadian answer to the problem of effectively ensuring our own security for the past twenty years has been to work with other middle powers in NATO. Since Europe is the place where a conflict, if not contained, could lead to a nuclear holocaust which would inevitably engulf Canada, we have supported and contributed military forces to the security arrangements in which the countries of Western Europe have joined with the United States under NATO.

NATO, of course, is not just a military organization. Its members have been increasingly preoccupied with such problems as accommodation between East and West and with disarmament. For Canada, the opportunities our NATO membership has presented for close consultation with other middle powers have been of particular value in balancing up our rather unequal North American partnership with the United States. NATO is a unique form of close association with a group of other nations whose collaboration is important to the United States.

We are now reviewing our membership in and commitments to NATO in the light of the situation that has evolved since the alliance was formed in 1949. I have yet to hear any convincing argument that, if Canada wants to play a part in ensuring her own security, in the resolution of the security problems of Europe that directly affect our own fate, and in mitigating the confrontation between the super-powers, we could do so as effectively as within some such collective effort as NATO. We could opt out, of course. That is an alternative. We could decide not to participate with our NATO partners in the search for

collective security and a settlement in Europe. But the problems of a divided Europe will not disappear if we opt out. In or out of NATO, Canada cannot isolate herself from the consequences of failure to establish a stable order in Europe.

There are problems of peacekeeping outside Europe and, here too, Canada has attempted to make sure that our contribution is most effective by combining it with the contributions of other nations. Canada has been among the foremost supporters of peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations. We have participated in every peacekeeping operation undertaken by the U.N. since 1948. Unfortunately, because of the stubborn opposition of some important members of the United Nations, the prospects for permanent peacekeeping arrangements or further United Nations *ad hoc* peacekeeping forces are not good. I see no reason, however, not to go on patiently trying to find a way round the roadblocks that have been thrown up in the United Nations. There are a good many other middle powers in the United Nations that share our views and that are willing to join with us in maintaining pressure for the development of the peacekeeping concept.

There are numerous other instances of Canada fitting itself into groupings of nations organized to achieve some common purpose. One of the most interesting, and perhaps the most peculiar, of such institutions is the Commonwealth. It is, as you know, a very loose association of independent nations, with a modest secretariat. All are graduates of the British Empire school of nationhood.

The Commonwealth has achieved notable success over the past twenty years in easing the transition from colonial dependence to national independence for many members of the world community. It has still a significant role to play in bridging the gulf between the rich and the poor nations and in easing the racial tensions which unfortunately very often coincide with disparities of wealth and poverty. For Canada, the Commonwealth has continuing value as an instrument through which we may exert some influence upon the course of events in a large and important part of the world.

The supreme example of Canada joining with other nations to seek international objectives is our membership in the United Nations. In the U.N. and its associated international agencies we have the opportunity to play a part in every aspect of the struggle to build a stable and just world order—peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, liberalization of international trade, aid to developing countries, codification of international law. In most cases we find it advantageous to work closely in the U.N. with other middle powers, but not exclusively. Sometimes the cause of world order is advanced most effectively by supporting the initiative of a super-power. Sometimes

a very small state puts forward a valuable and important proposal, as Malta did on the exploitation of the resources of the ocean floor. Canada has long supported the principle of universality of membership of the U.N., in the belief that every nation has something to contribute.

I have touched briefly upon some of the things that Canada has been doing in the world and the reasons for some of the policies we have pursued in the past. I would now like to pose some questions about these policies and to suggest some directions which we might take in adapting them to changes in the world scene and in our own country.

As I mentioned earlier, one of the most dramatic changes that has occurred in the world scene in the past 25 years is the proliferation of middle powers. We live in a time of the dissolution of empires. The empires of the Western European powers are largely gone and only a few small remnants remain. The ideological empires seem also to be loosening. They are certainly not nearly so monolithic as they were twenty years ago. Moscow and Peking now vie for ideological leadership of the Communist world. Yugoslavia is communist but non-aligned and Roumania and Czechoslovakia are restless under the Soviet yoke.

The result of a situation in which there are vastly greater numbers of independent states, or states with a greater degree of independence, is that the pattern of political relationships throughout the world is constantly shifting, unstable and unpredictable. It is immensely encouraging that so many peoples have acquired far more personal and national freedom than they ever had before, but this very freedom may lead initially to dangerous tensions or violent outbreaks. In various corners of the world, peoples who have been under the dominance of an imperial power are struggling to establish a new equilibrium. Such is the case in Vietnam, Nigeria and Czechoslovakia.

Another aspect of the world situation which has come increasingly to the fore in the past twenty-five years is the crisis of underdevelopment. The problem has been there for a long time. In its present form it has existed at least since the industrialized nations of the West began their take-off into relative affluence in the 19th century. But the disparity has become vastly more acute in our time and both we and the inhabitants of the underdeveloped countries are far more aware of the problem through the efficiency of worldwide communications. The poverty-burdened majority of the people of the earth are increasingly conscious that we of the rich nations are still outstripping them in economic progress as every year goes by.

As I see it, two of the most important foreign policy questions facing Canada today are what we do about the issues of peace and war in parts of the world with which we formerly hardly concerned ourselves, and

what we do about the enormous disparity between rich and poor all over the world. We have long been closely concerned about events in Europe, and rightly so. We are an offshoot of European civilization; that is where the bulk of our population traces its origins, where we have very large economic interests and where the most immediate threat to our security lies. We cannot turn our backs on Europe but we are compelled to add new dimensions to our thinking about other parts of the world.

Canada has been drawn, partly by the accident of membership in the Commonwealth, into assisting in the struggle for economic viability of first India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and later other Commonwealth nations in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. We have found ourselves grappling at the United Nations with the complexities of such issues as the Korean War, the Congo rebellion, Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. We were called to play a part in the International Control Commissions set up so hopefully in 1954 to supervise the settlement in Vietnam after France's withdrawal. We now have to decide whether we are to continue all or some of these involvements, to broaden out our interests abroad, or to concentrate on certain international functions and certain areas of the world.

Canada's contribution to international development assistance now amounts to more than \$300 million annually and we are pledged to increase it to 1 percent of national income. Our programme is a respectable one in size and effectiveness. But we have a lot of urgent questions to answer about our aid. Should we concentrate more of it in certain countries or in certain sectors of development? What should be the relative emphasis on grants and loans of various kinds and on trade concessions? As a middle power, are there special things Canada can do better than other countries? To what extent should we pool our efforts with those of other contributors? As development assistance becomes an increasingly important part of our international activities, questions like these become much more critical.

One new dimension that has been added to Canadian activities in the world in recent years is that of the active projection abroad of the bilingual and bicultural aspects of our nationhood. French-speaking Canadians now urgently seek to play a role in national and international affairs more in keeping with their weight in the Canadian population. The signing of the France-Canada Cultural Agreement in 1965 marked a major step in a conscious effort to represent the French fact in Canada more adequately in our external relations. As I have mentioned, for historical reasons we found ourselves fairly closely associated with the newly independent members of the Commonwealth in Africa and Asia. We were slower to develop comparable ties with the newly independent francophone countries, but we

are now rapidly expanding these relationships. A proper reflection in foreign policy of our bicultural character is vitally important in strengthening the unity of our Canadian nation. It is also an opportunity for Canada to play a greater role in the world.

An area in which our foreign policy has been unbalanced in the past is in the American hemisphere. Beyond the United States, we have been somewhat tardy in developing an active collaboration with the countries of the Caribbean, and even slower to seek out closer relations with the nations of Latin America. We should frankly admit that there has been a neglect of that part of the world in the thinking of most Canadians and seek to rectify that omission.

So too in our relations with the nations that border the Pacific Ocean. The imbalance in that respect, however, is not exactly a case of neglect. On the contrary, the western part of Canada, and especially British Columbia, has long had active trading and other relationships with Eastern Asia and the South Pacific. In recent years there has been a particularly great increase in our commercial exchanges with Japan. But this has been largely the reflection of a regional interest on the part of those areas of Canada which naturally look outward to the Pacific rather than to the Atlantic. What is now required is that we pay continuous attention to the Pacific as well as to the Atlantic as an area of national interest to all Canadians.

One important step that Canada could take in the Pacific is to exchange diplomatic representatives with the authorities in Peking. We and the rest of the world need to open all possible channels of communication with the government which is in effective control of China. That is why we have recently made the initial contact with representatives of the People's Republic of China to explore the matter of recognition and exchange of embassies.

Going beyond all of Canada's regional or functional interests is our concern to see the United Nations become a more effective instrument for international cooperation and for the achievement of the Charter goals of peace and security, economic and social jus-

tice and individual human rights. The U.N. is an imperfect organization because it reflects an imperfect world. But it is man's most ambitious effort to reconcile differences in the human condition and harmonize the actions of nations. We must look again at our national goals in the United Nations context and identify the changing circumstances of international life as they affect the functioning of the U.N. Then we must decide what changes in Canadian policies or techniques may be required as we make common cause with other countries in the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies.

The task for Canadians, as we review our foreign policies, is first to determine our own capacities, our own strengths and our own weaknesses. As a middle power, what economic, military and political resources do we have at our disposal and how can we best employ them in the interests of our own people and of the world community? We must also examine realistically the world around us and the changes that are taking place in it. In the light of those changes, should we concentrate more on one function and less on others, or more on one region and less on another?

I expect that the answers to these questions will result in some shift of emphasis in our international activities and some alteration in the methods by which we carry out those activities.

Because foreign policy is never static, we have already begun to bring about some changes. But I doubt very much that we will abandon completely any functional or regional activity, and I see no need to do so. We don't need to pull out of Europe in order to develop better relations with Latin America or the Pacific. Participating in collective security arrangements is not incompatible with assistance to developing countries or an active part in disarmament negotiations. We may be only a middle power, but we are a nation with the capacity to undertake a good many varied roles in the world if it is in our national interest to do so. The aim of Canadian foreign policy must be to strike the right balance of effort among those roles that are appropriate to our circumstances as a middle power and to the imperatives of the international situation.

APPENDIX SS

"NATO IN CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE"

A SPEECH

BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

THE HONOURABLE MITCHELL SHARP

TO THE

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CONFERENCE

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, MARCH 1, 1969

Two Canadian Prime Ministers, Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson, were among the founders and chief architects of NATO. Twenty years later, under a new Prime Minister, Canada is reviewing its foreign and defence policies, and one of the key questions is whether or not Canada should stay in NATO. Within the last few weeks the British Prime Minister and the German Chancellor, meeting in Bonn, have re-affirmed their full support of the Alliance, and the President of the United States, at NATO headquarters in Brussels and in other European capitals, has renewed his country's pledge to stay in Europe and to stay in NATO. General de Gaulle, with all his distrust of what he likes to call "the American Hegemony", has kept France in the Alliance, maintains two divisions in Germany and, although he has withdrawn his forces from the unified NATO command, fosters the closest liaison between the French and NATO headquarters.

Why then is Canada, an outward-looking, internationally-minded country, closely tied by history, geography and national interest to the United States and Western Europe, the one country currently conducting a fundamental review of its role in the NATO alliance? First let me make clear that the review has not been undertaken for reasons of narrow domestic self-interest. Canada is very far from being a self-contained economy, our standard of living and our very ability to survive depend on a world-wide pattern of foreign trade. No nation in this position can turn inward upon itself and ignore its international responsibilities. To live and to grow, Canada needs a stable and prosperous world.

Regardless of any review, the whole thrust of Canada's foreign policy is directed toward the twin objectives of world order and world prosperity. This means that, for its own self-interest and its own self-respect, Canada must make its proper contribution to the maintenance of world peace and the raising of the

world standard of living. These are political objectives and are pursued in the United Nations and NATO, by means of other groupings such as the Commonwealth and the newly-founded Francophonie, and bilaterally with the nations of the world.

The pursuit of these political objectives involves military activity, which for Canada is not and cannot be a matter of national ambition but, rather, a contribution to keeping world peace, and foreign aid as a contribution to raising the standard of living in less developed countries.

The purpose of the current review of foreign and defence policy is not to question whether Canada should be engaged in political activity, keeping the peace and foreign aid. And it is not to question the value of NATO as such, for NATO is going for some time to come with the support of its European members and the United States, no matter what we do.

The review of our foreign and defence policies is designed to find out if we are serving our own interests best and making our most effective contribution to world order and world prosperity under our present arrangements. If not, these arrangements will be changed. Coming to NATO, the questions the review asks are the same; is membership in NATO in Canada's national interest? ; does membership in NATO represent an effective Canadian contribution to the maintenance of world peace?

I can't answer these questions for you today, since the Government has not yet arrived at any conclusion. I can, however, discuss with you the background against which the decision will be made and some of the considerations that will bear upon it.

The late forties was a critical period for the Western World. Wartime cooperation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had disappeared. In three

years, the U.S.S.R. had established political domination over five Eastern European countries and part of Germany together making up a population of about 100 million. the final takeover of Czechoslovakia also saw growing Soviet pressure on such countries as Finland, Turkey and Iran, and the blockade of Berlin. Canada, having seen two world wars explode out of European quarrels, saw yet another explosive situation developing.

Western Europe, weakened by war, feared both aggression from the powerful military forces maintained by the Soviet Union and Moscow-directed internal communist subversion.

The democracies of Western Europe had to find a way to protect themselves and the way of life they represented. Hopes that the United Nations might be able to provide such protection through universal collective security had soon been dispelled—in part by the indiscriminate Soviet use of the veto. This was the background against which NATO came into being, a pooling of resources by like-minded nations to protect a common way of life.

While the immediate threat which led to the establishment of NATO was to the Western European democracies, it was seen in Canada and the United States as directly affecting North American security. The lesson of two world wars had been learned, and we accepted that we could hardly remain uninvolved if a third such war should break out. At the same time, however, Canada shared the general feeling that it is possible to benefit by past mistakes; that, by taking the right action at the right time, it should be possible to prevent a war rather than have to fight it. Gradually, it came to be accepted that the effective action which was required could only be achieved on a collective basis. Mr. St. Laurent was the first Western statesman to express this conclusion, when he said on July 11, 1948: "We believe that it must be made clear to the rulers of the totalitarian communist states that if they attempt by direct or indirect aggression to extend their police states beyond their present bounds by subduing any more free nations, they will not succeed unless they can overcome us all."

All this was twenty years ago, and perhaps the most telling answer to the question of whether NATO has been worthwhile is to be found in the simple fact that since its establishment no further European countries have fallen under soviet domination—either through direct military intervention or by subversion. The nations of Western Europe have grown and prospered. In a period marked by violence and conflict in other parts of the world, Europe has enjoyed a unique degree of stability. NATO's success is often taken for granted these days, but this fact should not be allowed to detract from its achievements. Paradoxically, it is the fact of NATO's success that permits the luxury of questioning the need for it. I am often asked how one

can be sure that the twenty years of peace Europe has enjoyed is due to the existence of NATO. I suppose in the end there is no substantive proof, but I can tell you this. The question is one which is easily asked in Calgary, 6,000 miles from the Iron Curtain. But it is a question that simply is not asked by those who like their daily lives in the shadow of massive Soviet forces.

NATO is unique in the sense that it is the only example of a formal alliance that operates effectively in peacetime. Fifteen countries, despite their inevitable conflicts in national interest, have been able to continue to cooperate for two decades. This is a major accomplishment and something to celebrate. It also bears on the contention that the members of NATO have not in fact faced a real threat from the Soviet Union—that the danger they see is imaginary. If fifteen independent states have been prepared to make the effort required to maintain an effective alliance arrangement for twenty years, there must be a commonly perceived danger to which they consider a collective response the best answer. The danger is quite clear. The Soviet Union continues to increase and streamline its enormous military potential; its intentions remain uncertain; and there are unsolved problems in Europe which could ignite a nuclear war because they involve the vital interests of the super-powers. Canada cannot remain indifferent to this danger.

To deal with this situation, NATO has developed features which distinguish it from old-time alliances and make it a uniquely modern instrument of collective security.

First, it provides effective defence on a relatively economical basis. By a pooling of resources under a unified command rather than reliance on individual effort, the members of the Alliance help to ensure that in times of crisis or actual conflict there will be a quick and effective response. In an age of split-second timing and enormously complex and expensive weapons systems, the security which NATO provides to its members could not be attained in any other way.

Secondly, NATO is the instrument whereby the protection afforded by the United States nuclear deterrent is extended to Europe. By cooperating with the United States in continental defence, Canada contributes to the overall deterrent strength of the Alliance.

Thirdly, because the member countries can depend on United States nuclear protection, they do not have to produce or acquire independent control of nuclear weapons. By helping to limit the spread of these weapons, NATO contributes to the idea of "non-proliferation" and at the same time, within the Alliance, helps to reduce the possibility of nuclear war occurring by accident or miscalculation.

Fourthly, NATO enables West Germany to make an effective contribution to the defence of the West. Germany has the largest single military establishment in Western Europe, but all of its forces are integrated into NATO and responsible to NATO commanders. Germany has no General Staff of its own and no forces available to German commanders outside NATO. Because of the nuclear protection which Germany receives through the Alliance, she has been prepared formally to renounce the right to manufacture nuclear weapons on her own territory. This was done in 1954 when Germany entered NATO.

Finally, one of the most important characteristics of the NATO system is its provision of machinery for continuing consultation on military and political issues. This arrangement gives smaller members of the Alliance like Canada a chance to participate in the making of policy on a wide range of major issues of concern to us that we would not have in any other circumstances. But is this participation effective? It is often assumed that when lesser powers sit down with a super-power, all they can do is listen and agree. There are two super-powers in the world today, and they are very different. The U.S.S.R. operates in secrecy and by stealth without much, if any, regard for the wishes and views of its allies. The United States, on the other hand, is an open society with a government that must win elections to achieve and maintain power. While it may be in a position to dominate the Alliance, by its own choice it proceeds by consent and is susceptible to many-faceted influences from within and without its borders.

While NATO brings important advantages to its members, the alliance approach also involves both military and political obligations. On the military side, in addition to the guarantee of mutual assistance under the Treaty, there is an implicit understanding that each member will make an appropriate contribution to the overall military resources of the Alliance. In the political sphere, just as there is an opportunity to advance ideas and influence the actions of others in the Alliance, so there is a requirement to take views and interests of others into account. NATO operates by consensus and there is an expectation that, except in special circumstances, agreement will be reached.

One of the criticisms sometimes directed against NATO is that, besides placing these constraints on the freedom of action of individual members, it is a conservative bureaucracy, tending to perpetuate itself and unable to adjust effectively to changing circumstances.

In an organization made up of fifteen governments, there can at times be some difficulty and delay in coordinating views. At the same time, to the extent that there is a braking influence, it can have a positive value in restraining a member country from taking

precipitate action which could have an adverse effect on the Alliance as a whole. When one is dealing with issues of war and peace—and particularly nuclear war—this could be vital. Secondly, while progress toward political solutions may appear slow when approached in a collective basis, otherwise there might well be no progress at all.

NATO, like any large and complex organization has its imperfections. For each member the question is simple—do the advantages of belonging to NATO outweigh the disadvantages? Unlike the members of the Warsaw Pact, the members of NATO are free to withdraw if they should wish, but the fact that after twenty years none of them has so far chosen to do so suggests clearly where the balance of advantage or disadvantage lies.

Looking at NATO in today's world, we must ask ourselves—What is its role in the immediate future and where does Canada fit in?

It seems to me that a durable solution to the problems which continue to plague Europe and threaten world peace must contain two elements: a lasting settlement, on a generally acceptable basis, of the political issues of Central Europe, including the division of Germany; and the creation of some type of European security arrangement which would adequately meet the needs of all the countries concerned, both East and West.

The issues involved are complex and this goal will not be achieved quickly or easily. If any progress is to be made, there must be some mechanism to keep the peace and at the same time contribute to the creation of a climate in which movement toward a durable solution is possible. Does NATO satisfy these dual requirements?

NATO's main emphasis in the early years was on providing a defensive shield against possible Soviet aggression in Western Europe. This continues to be a fundamental purpose of the Alliance, but the emphasis is shifting as Europe's political and military circumstances change. The Alliance is now devoting its energies and attention to the twin objectives of *deterrence*, which is the prevention of war, and of *détente*, which is concerned with improving relations between the Eastern and Western nations.

The objective of *deterrence* is to prevent war. To do this, the Alliance must try to maintain a situation in which Soviet military adventure is obviously unrewarding and the likelihood of war breaking out in Europe is minimized. At the same time, if a conflict should occur, NATO must have the ability to respond effectively and prevent escalation to all-out nuclear war.

To achieve these objectives, NATO has developed the capacity for "flexible response". This requires NATO to have available enough military forces, both

conventional and nuclear, to convince the Soviet Union that any type of armed attack on its part would be unprofitable. Above all, the strategy of flexible response attempts to avoid a situation in which NATO would be faced with the stark choice of yielding to a conventional attack or resorting to nuclear war. It is also designed to contain an incident started by accident or miscalculation long enough to make a political solution possible without resort to tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. In such a situation, days or even hours could be crucial. This is why NATO is correctly described as a peacekeeping force.

Détente calls for continuing attempts by members of the Alliance—both individually and collectively—to improve relations with the states of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. Obviously this policy depends on some reciprocation from the other side. The aim is to reduce tensions and replace them with an atmosphere of confidence and stability. In such an environment it is hoped that both sides would be able to develop and respond to initiatives designed to produce durable solutions that would make the existence of armed blocs unnecessary. In this sense NATO's avowed objective is to create circumstances in which the Alliance would become redundant.

The pursuit of *détente* will be a slow process, probably bedevilled by setbacks such as that which occurred in Czechoslovakia last year. Its success will be the sum total of the various individual and collective activities of the members of the Alliance. Much of the progress will necessarily have to be made through bilateral relations between individual NATO members and members of the Warsaw Pact. In this process NATO has an important function to perform in providing the machinery for coordinating the activities of its members. What one does could have important implications for the others, and close consultation is therefore essential. There is also scope for collective initiatives and the Alliance is already at work in this area. A specific example of such a collective initiative now being examined in NATO is the proposal for balanced force reductions. This calls for negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, designed to achieve agreement on the progressive lowering of military forces on both sides. The relative balance of military strength in Europe, which now permits a reasonable degree of stability, would be maintained at progressively lower levels. Early last summer, NATO proposed to the Warsaw Pact that discussions on this idea be initiated, and although the events in Czechoslovakia intervened, the matter has not been dropped.

Whatever Canada may decide, the Alliance will continue to be the mechanism through which peace in Europe is maintained and decisions are taken on the issues affecting the evolution of East-West relations and the solution of European political problems. We must decide if these matters are of real concern to us

and, if so, whether we have a better chance of influencing them in a favourable direction through continued membership in the Alliance or by withdrawing.

I appreciate that there are differing points of view as to the importance of developments in Europe for Canada and our ability to influence them. Because of this, I think the open debate we are having is highly desirable. For my part, I cannot escape the conclusion that what happens in Europe matters very much to Canada. Our interests there cover many areas—history, culture, trade and finance, to mention only a few. Perhaps the most fundamental of all, however, relates to the fact that it is in Europe that the vital interests of the super-powers are in starkest confrontation, so that there is the greatest chance of a conflict escalating into a nuclear war. Because of Canada's geographic position between the two super-powers, this was would be fought out above our very heads. This is why Canada has a direct, selfish interest in the prevention of war.

I am not suggesting here that we ignore our interests in other parts of the world, but simply that, in terms of priority, Europe and developments there must continue to have a major claim on our energy and attention for some time to come.

Last summer's events in Czechoslovakia illustrated dramatically the determination of the Soviet Union to maintain its grip on Eastern Europe. It is difficult to accept, however, that the urge for greater freedom and a better way of life now manifesting itself on the other side of the Iron Curtain can be indefinitely suppressed, even through the brutal use of force. With all the uncertainties inherent in this situation, the period ahead seems to call for a combination of vigilance and perception. Vigilance is needed to cope with the consequences for the West of further difficulties such as Czechoslovakia; perception, to discern opportunities that the inevitable process of change in Eastern Europe might provide to make progress on Europe's political problems.

Will Canadian interests in the future best be served through continued Canadian membership in NATO? One of the major concerns in our review of defence policy and related foreign policy considerations has been to establish whether there are in fact any better alternatives to NATO for Canada. We are examining this problem ourselves, we are seeking the views of other informed observers and taking account of the opinions we have received from the public at large. At the same time, a parliamentary committee is conducting its own review of many of the issues.

If we should decide that it is in our interest to remain in NATO, it will be necessary to take account of the responsibilities as well as the benefits that go with such a policy. I mention this because there have been suggestions recently that, by withdrawing from

the Alliance or maintaining only nominal membership, Canada could have most of the benefits the system provides without paying for them. I doubt that this approach would appeal to many Canadians or that the benefits would in fact flow so readily. This is not to say that a decision to stay in NATO would mean that we stay for another twenty years, or that our military contribution will remain the same.

Governments are often accused of losing touch with the wishes and aspirations of the people, and the

Government of Canada has heard such accusations often enough. But there is one issue on which the Government and the people of Canada stand foursquare together: the paramount determination to do our part to prevent war. If Canada decides to stay in NATO, it will be because we are convinced that in NATO we can effectively help to prevent war. If some other course is taken, it will be because we think such a course will better enable us to help to prevent war. No other consideration, however seductive it may appear, will be permitted to deflect Canada from its supreme objective, the prevention of war.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 34

THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1969


Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

THE QUEEN'S PRINTER, OTTAWA, 1969



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand
Anderson
Asselin
Barrett
Brewin
Buchanan
Cafik
Carter
Forrestall
Gibson

Guay (*St. Boniface*)
Harkness
Howard (*Okanagan
Boundary*)
Laniel
Laprise
Legault
Lewis
MacLean
Marceau

Nesbitt
Nowlan
Penner
Prud'homme
Smith (*Northumberland-
Miramichi*)
Stewart (*Cochrane*)
Stewart (*Marquette*)
Thompson (*Red Deer*)
Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Thursday, March 6, 1969.
(49)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch—(23).

Also present: Mr. Roberts, M.P.

Witness: Professor Stephen Clarkson, Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto.

On motion of Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*),

Resolved,—That Professor Stephen Clarkson be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the preparation of his advance presentation to the Committee, as supported by a detailed statement from the firm involved.

The Clerk distributed cheques, documents and travel information to be used on the European tour.

The Vice-Chairman made an opening statement concerning the witness for this morning's sitting, and dealing with the Committee's itinerary in Europe. He noted that the Chairman will issue a press release about the European tour.

The Vice-Chairman introduced the witness and Professor Clarkson made an opening statement.

Members questioned Professor Clarkson about his views on Canada's defence and foreign policy roles.

The Committee agreed to print Professor Clarkson's advance presentation, including the summary and supplementary note, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix tt*)

The Vice-Chairman thanked Professor Clarkson for his testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 1:10 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, March 6, 1969.

● 1110

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Will the meeting kindly come to order.

First of all I would like a motion that Professor Stephen Clarkson be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the preparation of his advance presentation to the Committee which is supported by a detailed statement from the firm involved.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I was going to suggest that we wait until he is through.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay, you can see that there are some supplementary papers on the table that he has had to prepare in an emergency.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I so move.

Mr. Winch: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The Vice-Chairman: This morning the Committee will be hearing testimony from Professor Stephen Clarkson of the University of Toronto.

I would like to point out that Professor Clarkson will be the last witness to appear before the Committee in the present phase of its investigation and prior to its departure for Europe.

I wish to make one announcement about the trip. The Clerk will circulate for the private use of members some information of a practical nature and such details as we now have of the program which the Committee will be following in Europe. We plan to circulate a full itinerary to members of the Committee on the aircraft, by which time we should have more detailed information.

The Chairman proposes to issue tomorrow noon to the Press Gallery a press release indicating the aims of the Committee's visit to Europe in terms already set out in this Committee, giving such details of the itinerary as we have at that time and a list of the members of the Committee.

Professor Clarkson has submitted in advance a very comprehensive written statement entitled *Canada's Role in Long-Term World Perspective: A Proposal for a New Initiative*. He is prepared to give an opening introductory statement on Canada and NATO in the light of the framework he developed in his written statement. I understand that Professor Clarkson is not an advocate of complete withdrawal from NATO but that he believes Canada should develop a new approach and adopt a different policy with respect to participation within the organization.

Professor Clarkson is probably known to you as the Editor of the book *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada*. His biography has been circulated and I shall therefore not give details of his past experience.

Professor Clarkson, would you now like to make your opening statement.

Professor Stephen Clarkson (University of Toronto): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Might I say, to start with that I am delighted to be here for a special reason. Thinking of the Justice Minister's speech on Monday, I speak with some trepidation as someone under fire from both sides: On the one hand the Justice Minister attacking us professors for taking part in public policy discussions and not doing our work in the university of keeping the students off the streets and, on the other hand, the students attacking us for supporting the American empire by taking part in this kind of consultation. I am delighted that this Committee sees fit to still call on independent observers of national policy problems for consultation. More seriously, I am delighted because, in my view, having the House of Commons seriously deliberate in Committee problems of Canadian foreign policy is an extremely important addition to the input of public opinion into the foreign policy-making process which cannot but be a major factor, I would hope, in future foreign policy-making.

I apologize for your not getting the two page summary of my brief. Actually you should have received it with the actual statement itself. But it is there. That is why I thought I would take 10 or 15 minutes and just provide an outline of my paper for those of you who have not had time to read it.

[*Interpretation*]

And I would also like to excuse myself to French speaking members, for having been unable to submit my report in French. I had 5 days' notice only and did not have time enough to do so. I apologize for this, and all the more so as one of the main aspects of our foreign policy review is the bi-national character that our external policy must have. I hope that we will be able to discuss that today.

[*English*]

What I thought I would do then is simply give in rough outline my presentation which is really in three

● 1115

parts. It is, as I see it, the foreign policy problem under review, secondly, the basic analysis within which I think one has to approach a foreign policy review and, thirdly, the policy conclusions and what my proposal is.

First, there is the problem in general. It seems to me that in a total review of Canadian foreign policy what is at stake is Canada's role in international affairs for the next twenty years. There has not been such a fundamental review and one can only assume that the amount of effort that goes into this review now will not be repeated in the near future. So what is at stake is Canada's role in the next at least 10 and probably 20 years. It is rather like the original NATO re-assessment of the creation of NATO 20 years ago. I think this is extremely important because what is therefore at stake is the process of nation building in Canada over that period ahead of us. In my view our foreign policy is intricately linked into the whole network of Canadian national policies and so it cannot but affect our development over the next twenty years, which is why the bi-national character of it I think is so important. It seems to me that this is vital because the foreign policy review has become the focus for testing the practice of participatory democracy. The involvement of this Committee in a very direct way into this review makes it crucial, I think, that its report be a significant factor in the government foreign policy review. It amazes me that you will be able to go to Europe and, as well, write your preliminary report before the 26th. I wish you pleasant writing in Europe, because I find it difficult to write things quickly and I do not know how a Committee of 30 is going to attend to this task. Still it is extremely important and I certainly encourage you in this effort.

In terms of the problem as a whole, I think we can say that there is a real opportunity for Canada to re-assess its foreign policy. This is not an empty exercise because of the international situation which

is at a point where our roles can be re-assessed. I think also it is at a point in political time where a re-assessment makes sense. There is a new leader of the government, Mr. Trudeau, who has announced repeatedly since the day after he was nominated leader of the Liberals party that he wanted to re-assess Canadian foreign policy. This message has got across to our Allies in NATO and to other countries. So there is an expectation of change and I think this is the factor that makes the credibility of a foreign policy change genuine. I think also the fact that Nixon has taken over in Washington and has made clear signs of reappraising certain policies such as aid—even his western alliance policy—makes it still appropriate to think of a significant reappraisal of Canadian foreign policy not being necessarily in conflict with an American policy that is itself under review. I will come back to that a little later.

Another point on the general side is the danger that I think you in this Committee face. That danger is that you have to make a decision on NATO within the next couple weeks or whatever it is before your March 26 deadline, before Mr. Trudeau meets Mr. Nixon and before the April meeting of the NATO powers in Washington. The danger is this. The whole principle of the foreign policy review is to re-assess Canada's role

● 1120

in the world from fundamental principles, and from that fundamental analysis come down to the particular policies and decide what they should be. But this deadline is forcing you to make a decision on a particular policy which turns the whole process on its head. If I have anything to say to you today, it really is to urge, despite this deadline, having to make a decision on NATO quickly, that this should be done within the context of a general analysis of the world situation now and over the next ten years and of Canada's national interest and how it fits into this long-term view of things. The danger is that if one makes a decision on an important but single policy that will implicitly be making assumptions about the long-term prospect, about Canada's national interest. If those are not thought through the decision made on the particular NATO policy will necessarily affect all the other possibilities. You will be locked, with whichever choice it is, into a whole series of logical conclusions from that. So the fact that you are faced with this particular deadline makes your whole analysis of the total situation extremely important, which is why I would like to go on to sketching my analysis of this and make the recommendations that I do in the paper.

Also, there is the basic analysis from which a particular decision on a particular policy would be made. It seems to me clearly that one has to look at the world situation—the world situation as it is now and as we can foresee it developing over the next ten

years—and examine what are the basic threats that face us and what are the basic problems. I think very simply there would be a significant reduction of the communist threat, especially in west Europe as a result of say the success of NATO, a continued and very real threat of nuclear holocaust first of all between the two super powers and then increasingly as proliferation is allowed to take place or does take place between the middle powers, which will be a continuing threat that we have to consider very seriously.

Then there is the problem of instability in the third world, if you like, or, more simply, poverty in the third world and the political and military instability that that implies. I think what we have to envisage is continued local wars in the developing countries, including the near East, Latin America, Africa, Asia, as being the major direct source of instability and threat to world peace, with the nuclear holocaust as an overriding general threat. That then is the international situation over the next ten years, which seems to me to make sense—the communist threat stabilized really because of the split in the communist camps. Even within those two basic blocks there are major splits between Hanoi and Peking between Romania and the Soviet Union, and so on, making the poverty of the third world the major source of instability in the next decade or two.

Now in terms of general analysis, what are Canada's national interests, thinking of the impact of Canadian foreign policy on the national interest? It seems to me that basically it comes down to one problem. Everyone can elaborate on it but it is really the Canadian identity, the survival of the nation of Canada as a country, as a political entity. That, in my view, really means the establishment or the continued establishment or the development of a national identity that has meaning for the French Canadian, the English Canadian, the new Canadian and the original Canadian. The importance of foreign policy in this I think is very real, given the symbolic value that foreign policy has as a kind of international affirmation of the national personality. And if you take the extraordinary degree to which the public now is educated in foreign policy matters by television, the fact that we have hour long specials on Biafra or the Berlin crisis, is just as immediate as a riot in Chicago. The potential importance of Canada's role internationally is very great, I think, in affirming and developing the sense of national

[Interpretation]

In other words, to repeat, let us note the crucial and fundamental importance of external policy as an affirmation of Canadian identity to support the development of a Canadian bi-national state.

[English]

Now what this analysis of the world situation and the national interest implies to me is that one has to think of the review of Canadian foreign policy in terms of proposing a vision of Canada's role in the world for at least ten years. One has to project what we want to do in the world and then work back to a particular policy.

I think—I did not have this in my paper but I have added a couple of pages that I think you also have in front of you—one should start with a conception of what Canada's role in the world can and should be. I would say that in the past twenty years, without making any necessary pejorative judgment, it has been essentially a defensive role—defensive in the obvious and literal sense that the major priority has been NATO and spending on defence. If you look at the amount of money we have spent over the past twenty years, internationally, the bulk of it has of course been on defence military spending and a very relative small part on other foreign activities such as aid. And it has been defensive in the second sense in that we have towards the United States basically a deferential attitude. The US relationship has been rather one way, especially in the first ten years of the postwar period, when we were thoroughly in support of American foreign policy, decreasingly perhaps in the last ten, but always rather worried about the threat of retaliation if we did anything that the Americans did not like.

Without wanting to get into a discussion of the merits or demerits of that, I think what is needed now, and what is possible now, is a conception of Canada's role in the world that is creative, active and positive, one in which Canada, because of its rather unique position—and I say this really because this underlines the importance of Canada's unimportance as a major world power—should think in terms of taking the lead and taking the initiative in foreign policy matters in order to be a kind of experimental country for American foreign policy. I am thinking for instance of China, I am thinking of our role in Cuba, our possible roles in Europe, and especially in terms of aid to the developing countries. Canada can take the initiative and it should think in terms of being much more active and creative in its international role.

Now my ten-year strategy is a very simple one, and it starts really from a budgetary position. If—these are inaccurate but general figures—one takes the current foreign policy expenditures of Canada as

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identity. This means, in terms of national interest, that what is crucial in thinking about our foreign policy review is that it be integrated and coherent with the whole network of national policies that are developed. One cannot think of foreign policy, in other words, separate from our policy towards foreign investment, our policy towards regional development or our policy on biculturalism.

being about 2 per cent of the gross national product on defence and about .5 per cent on aid—it is not quite .5 per cent—project that forward ten years and simply switch those expenditures so that by 1980 we are talking in terms of Canada spending 2 per cent of its gross national product on aid development expenditures and .5 per cent on military expenditures, one can envisage a really significant shift of emphasis of Canada's role in the world. This would mean that Canada would become in ten years one of the great aid powers—on the assumption that the Americans are decreasing their aid, and that the Soviets are decreasing their aid, relatively. Most western powers are decreasing their aid at the moment; perhaps with Canada's example though they might increase. But we should think in terms of Canada doing something extremely significant here because Canada does have a very favored position as an aid-giving power, simply again because of its unimportance, because of it not being a threat to the

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developing countries. This presumably would be in the areas where Canadian aid would be most effective. I am thinking of African countries, I am thinking of Francophonie where, again, if one wanted to develop bi-national foreign policy—si on veut

[*Interpretation*]

If we wish to create an external bi-national policy, the role of Quebec and French Canadians is obviously special, fundamental. A truly increased aid policy to countries of the Third World and especially to member countries of the French-speaking world would give our foreign policy an obviously bi-national character.

[*English*]

So the aid policy would be very significant. I think the military policy would also be significant if it were conceived of as a highly mobile, highly flexible peacekeeping force that relied basically on fairly light equipment, the heaviest equipment being mobile smallish tanks, I suppose. This would not mean that Canada's potential role in Europe would be negligible because peacekeeping would obviously include Europe in times of crisis. They would be basically stationed in Canada and available for peacekeeping activities where needed, and needed really means now where invited by the warring partners or when there is sufficient international agreement that foreign troops can come in. It would have a secondary role, I think, in terms of disaster relief, which is one of the major problems in the third world today. A disaster takes place, the whole development plan simply gets destroyed and instant relief is needed—in other words, a small-cost, relatively small-cost but still significant peacekeeping force with a major effort on foreign aid.

How does one implement this strategy over a 10-year period? You simply work backwards up to current policy. You think in terms of the transitional period in which in Europe, for instance, it would be a result of negotiation with allies, with the European powers taking over an air base when we have vacated it once the atomic strike force became obsolete. A transition in 10 years or 12 years does give a significant amount of time so it is not a question of suddenly pulling out, of abandoning allies, of getting out right away, but one of negotiated gradual shift from the present policy to a clearly expressed future policy which allies know about because it has been made clear.

There is one other point that I will make. It is part of my proposal but was not really spelled out in so many words in my paper. It is that Canada would now not say in statements at the end of March and April, "Yes, we are in NATO", or "No, we are not." It would call for a re-assessment of NATO by the NATO powers. It makes so much sense, if Canada has already spent a year on its foreign policy appraisal and it does not quite yet know what precisely its relationship should be with the current alliance which clearly has certain disadvantages to it, and obvious disadvantages at the moment for certain NATO powers like France, that we should call now for a re-appraisal by NATO itself of the organization. We are, after all, the powers that took the initiative to set it up 20 years ago. It has lived its 20 years as envisaged in the treaty, and it is a logical time to call for a re-assessment of the situation because obviously it has achieved its major goals in containing the Communist push westward and it has stabilized western Europe. Clearly re-assessment now needs to be made. In fact all the individual NATO powers are themselves re-assessing. Britain is reducing its military expenditures. It is an obviously good time to do this. And it might mean that in the withdrawal to Canada of Canadian troops the European security forces were re-organized as a European force with some kind of American nuclear hood-up that would change the name perhaps and the nature of the NATO agreement so that Canada would no longer be burdened with the identity of being part of the Western anti-Communist—this old-fashioned alliance—and would be part of a new one.

I conclude in the paper with certain remarks about whether or not this would be acceptable as a policy to our allies. Two points I think are important. One is our French relationship.

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[*Interpretation*]

It would seem to me that one of the most important aspects of a new Canadian external policy would be a renewal of our relationship with France. And the fact

that Canada is busy re-examining its participation in NATO and that it indicates clearly that it will change its relationship with NATO, will help Canada to renew its links with France and this will also give Quebec, as its role as an intermediary between Canada and France gradually gains importance, the possibility to act and to influence French policy.

[English]

And the second point I would make in terms of acceptance of this proposal is that I think for the United States of America Canada can play an extremely important role as a kind of kiteflyer or bellwether, whatever you want to call it. We are obviously doing this now with China and with problems that have been intractable for the last 10 years such as the Berlin question and divided Germany. Canada's calling for an opening of negotiations on these problems could be an initiative that the Americans cannot take themselves because of their highly involved commitments with the Germans and because of the internal political situation in the States, where as coming from their good friends the Canadians, this could be sold to American public opinion as something that the Canadians want to do as they are there, they are at least honest and they are doing this in good faith, and so negotiations can be started if they are started by an unimportant country, and got going.

So I think we should think of this new 10-year foreign policy of Canada in terms of playing a constructive and creative role, especially in relation to American policy.

Finally, my last point about acceptability is that it seems to me that such a foreign policy approach would be highly acceptable in Canada. It would, for one thing, re-establish Canada's initiative and role of creative policy formation in the world. I do not want to speak as any kind of expert on the opinion of youth in Canada, but my contact with students and those who are highly active, which is an ambiguous word, but those who are highly active in Canadian politics, leads me to think very strongly that such an initiative would be extremely acceptable; or to put it negatively, if we appear locked into NATO old style, this will be a great disappointment to that section of the Canadian population that will be running the country in the seventies and eighties when the results of this policy will become known.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Professor. I have a list of questioners—first Mr. Buchanan, then Messrs. Lewis and Nesbitt. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Professor, you suggest that we should discuss with our colleagues in NATO procedures and processes whereby the role of, not only NATO but Canada's role within NATO, can be altered. I would comment that I hope any

decision which this Committee might make during the next two or three weeks, assuming it is to maintain the connection, which I gather you support, does not in any sense preclude the fact that we could continue very actively to negotiate and discuss the changing role of NATO and our changing role within it. I certainly hope that is the case. The second thing is that President Nixon, during this recent tour of his, made very strong representations that he hopes that this type of negotiation will be done on a consultative basis. Yet there is, I think, a lingering fear amongst the other NATO partners that in the past, while theoretically the Americans may have given lip service to this theory of consultation, in fact the roles and the strategy have pretty well been imposed by the American hierarchy. Do you feel there is really any genuine likelihood that there is going to be a change in this sense, that the Americans are going to relinquish this and be willing to subordinate their own national interests to the over-all interests of NATO?

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Professor Clarkson: Is this a question of whether the Americans would genuinely discuss, or if we called for re-appraisal whether they would?

Mr. Buchanan: Right. How genuine would the consultative process be?

Professor Clarkson: How genuine was it in 1948 and 1949 when it was set up? It seems to me there was major negotiation discussed between those powers that became the NATO alliance.

Mr. Buchanan: Right.

Professor Clarkson: And an explicit call for a re-assessment of NATO?

Mr. Buchanan: Which is what you are advocating we do.

Professor Clarkson: Yes. There would be no alternative but for the Americans to take part in discussions with the French and the British and the Germans and us. They clearly have the predominance of power and that factor would give an extraordinary weight to their opinion. But if the discussion gets on to the floor and it is really a multinational discussion of the future of the alliance members, that makes the opinion of Denmark and Belgium and Holland important because every link of the chain is important.

Mr. Buchanan: Basically what you are saying, then, is that you do feel that as long as we are successful in getting the old role of NATO re-opened and re-assessed there will be genuine consultation. This is what concerns me somewhat.

Professor Clarkson: I do not see that as a problem.

Mr. Buchanan: There is a second matter that concerns me. You mentioned in your paper, I believe, that you feel the threat to world peace in the future is going to become more a problem from the third world. One of our other speakers two or three evenings ago suggested that he did not think the third world would be a threat to our peace in the sense that unfortunately they would not develop the capacity to do harm generally other than within the borders of their own countries.

Professor Clarkson: I did not mean a threat to Canada directly, a territorial threat to Canada. I meant if one were asking what are going to be the major forces of military instability in the world, they are those wars going on in the Near East and in Asia and in Africa at the moment because they involve us; because once a country gets to a certain point the big powers can get involved themselves, so that any war going on anywhere in the world, in my view, is a threat to our security.

Mr. Buchanan: Right. All I would say is that unfortunately I feel that people have a tendency—for instance, the Canadian population's interest at large would be far greater in the area of aid if they felt there was a genuine threat to Canada's own security. It is fortunate in one sense, but unfortunate in another that the third world is not likely going to be able to thrust its problems vigorously upon Canadians and upon the developed world.

Professor Clarkson: Well, I guess that is our role, yours and mine, to make Canadian people aware of this.

Mr. Buchanan: How one does that more effectively, of course, is the problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: Professor Clarkson, I read your paper as well as your additions this morning, and I want to say by way of preface that as you probably can guess my colleagues and I have a great deal of sympathy with probably all, certainly most of what you say. I should also like to congratulate you on a very thorough and profound analysis of the situation. But what concerns me about your paper as well as about your introduction is the question of where you start this long-range redevelopment of Canadian policy—the switch-over from the larger proportion of our income being spent in aid as against the proportion spent on defence; the start of a creative role by this country. Where do you begin? It seems to me that you begin with some of the institutions in which you are now involved. And that takes me to NATO.

My first question is, Professor Clarkson, is there really any very useful element in your suggestion

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that there be another re-appraisal of NATO's role by NATO? We had three wise men about a decade ago, we had Harmel a couple of years ago, and before Canada makes a suggestion that the role of NATO should be re-appraised, we ought to know what we think the role of NATO should be. Therefore I ask you, sir, what should be the role of NATO in the present circumstances and in the foreseeable decade, with the reduction of the Communist threat to Western Europe? What should that role be?

Professor Clarkson: Mr. Lewis, you are right; one does have to start somewhere. I think in the absolutely immediate future it would be very unfortunate if we had to say, "Yes, we will stay in the current NATO", or "No, we are getting out", but my first point was that this would be unfortunate because there are alternatives, and in calling for a re-assessment of NATO, my idea is that this re-assessment would take place in terms of new factors. One new factor would be Canada's having said that our long-range policy is to make a significant shift in the way we spend that same amount of our G.N.P. in international affairs. That already changes the point of view in the situation.

Mr. Lewis: I am sorry. That really is going at it backward; is it not? In the present European situation, with or without Canada, for the moment, what should the role of the organization NATO, which is no longer necessary, if I understand you correctly, to meet a strong Communist threat in Western Europe? And, therefore, consequential upon that answer, what should its military posture be?

Professor Clarkson: Again I am going to answer you slightly indirectly. If one is talking about the European security problem I think Canada's priority, as I said in the paper and as I mentioned in my summary, should be on the economic and political consolidation of Europe; and the military implication of that is that yours, as a third force, would basically look after its own defence, if one is thinking in terms basically of conventional defence; and that the nuclear arrangement, which is still basically as between super powers, would be coordinated with that. Whether that be a new organization, or a revised NATO, is a question of organization to be determined, but conceptually it seems to me that the Europeans should look after their own defence; that Canada has a strong peace-keeping force that can come to their aid if needed; that there is joint military consultation at the planning level; but that NATO, as it is now—and I do not think it would necessarily remain the same—is up for re-appraisal, it seems to me, in terms of Canada spending its major

amount of dollar resources on aid. If you are asking me to be more specific on what kind of consultation there should be, you know, as one gets into the details of that one cannot. Does that answer your question?

Mr. Lewis: Yes; subject to this further question, that if the objective ought to be—and I am inclined to think you are right—that the West European nations organize their own defence in an integrated way, why are you disturbed by the possibility of Canada withdrawing from NATO?

The NATO organization consists of European countries plus the United States, plus Canada, and that is it. If you come to the conclusion that it is time for the European countries to organize their own defence, supported by the nuclear capability of the United States, which is really what you are saying . . .

Professor Clarkson: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: —and which does not need to be stationed in Europe, with the present nuclear type of capability, why are you so disturbed by the forthright conclusion—I may, or may not, share it; I am asking you the question—that in these circumstances Canada should say it is withdrawing from NATO, or at least withdrawing its military contribution to NATO and

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bringing it back home in the form of a mobile force?

Professor Clarkson: I am not disturbed by the prospect. I did not want to give that impression.

Basically, I think I was making a political judgment, that NATO is a highly emotional issue for Canadians, and that to make a very abrupt decision—an announcement—that we are getting out of NATO would upset many Canadians who would not be upset by a policy that would have the same implication seen over a longer period; and that we make the organizational question a technicality in terms of the long-range shift of emphasis. If it meant that NATO would stop in a year, you know, and one could simply re-negotiate the new European defence community, with Canada having a separate role based in North America, that is fine; but that seems to me a problem of detail to be worked out.

Mr. Lewis: It is not detail, with great respect, Professor Clarkson. If I may be frank, I think it is a kind of academic shuffling that does not impress me.

Professor Clarkson: I do not think so.

Mr. Lewis: No one suggests that on a given date, say, April 10 next in Washington, Canada would say, “As

of tomorrow we are out of NATO.” In any kind of contractual arrangement an honourable nation does not act that way. Therefore, what we would do on April 10, in terms of your presentation to this Committee, would be to announce to our allies in NATO that it is our intention to withdraw at least our military commitment to NATO and to bring it back home in a year, or in two years, starting to reduce it now.

That is a declaration of policy. Obviously you do not do that sort of thing overnight with allies; you do it in terms of a year or two. Would you have any objection to this Committee reporting to Parliament the desirability of Canada making that declaration of policy, which I may say seems to me to be the proper declaration of policy at this time?

Professor Clarkson: Yes, that makes perfect sense to me. In a sense, we are agreeing. You are saying we would announce that we were planning to withdraw our troops to Canada, in terms of a re-organization of their potential. By that we would not be denouncing the organization but be changing our policy within it. That does, however, imply a re-assessment of the organization itself, and it is making the technical nature of the organization secondary to the change of policy.

Mr. Lewis: Not quite that, of I may disagree with you again. You can have conceptually—and it is very difficult to put in absolute terms—two alternative roles for an organization such as NATO. You can have an essentially defence role, which has been the posture of NATO until now, or you can have a negotiating role with the Warsaw Pact powers—whether the entity means anything or not—or you can have a combination of the two; but in none of these roles, according to your analysis with which I agree, is Canada’s direct participation necessary.

Therefore, when you say that Canada is withdrawing, assuming that that is our policy, you are not necessarily urging a re-assessment of the NATO role by the European powers; you are merely leaving it to them to make the decision on the extent to which they want a defence role, the extent to which they want a negotiating role and the extent to which they can reconcile the two.

I do not see why Canada’s withdrawal from NATO, in terms of its military contribution, in any way affects the role which the European countries now responsible for their own defence may decide upon. Is that not right?

Professor Clarkson: Yes; and that does imply that the European powers themselves, once they had been reorganized, would re-think their own defence operation.

Mr. Lewis: That leads me to my last question on this point. Is it not a fact, both from history and, I think, from *a priori* logic, that so long as the West European countries can persuade North American countries to be physically with military forces in Europe they will like it, because it gives them a greater sense of security; because it reduces their military commitment; and because they can make political conclusions from that situation. Therefore, ● 1155

if you are ever going to make Western Europe self-reliant in defence terms surely you have to say that it is your decision to get out from the military contribution and not wait for them to ask you to get out, which they never will?

Professor Clarkson: Yes, I think one should be clear and say that we no longer feel that we need subsidize European defence costs in those terms, and that we are going to spend our defence money on basically a kind of a mobile peace-keeping force that would be available in time of need in Europe, as well as elsewhere; that Europe is re-established economically and some countries are almost better off than are we in economic terms; that there is no longer any economic need to subsidize European defence; and that from a basically political point of view we prefer Europe to look after its own immediate defence problems. Surely that could be made clear without being defiant, or aggressive, or unfriendly.

Mr. Lewis: Certainly.

Professor Clarkson: It can simply be in terms of our re-assessment of the world situation and what we plan to do.

Mr. Lewis: I want to ask you two or three questions about the nuclear threat, but Mr. Brewin has a supplementary question, if you will permit it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vice-Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Clarkson, I understand you to suggest that not only should Canada have a changed role in NATO but that NATO itself should be changed in its role. I presume that role would be to negotiate a détente, or a reduction of arms, in Central Europe, and other matters of that sort. What is your opinion of NATO as a credible or suitable instrument for that purpose? I am inclined to think it may be, but I would like to hear your view on it.

Professor Clarkson: I have rather contradictory views on that. I think to some extent there is a credibility in NATO negotiating with the Warsaw Pact if one is wanting to get a *quid pro quo* for a return of Canadian forces from Europe in terms of

some kind of reduction of Warsaw Pact forces. At that level two organizations that are mutually self-supporting really can talk to each other. It is not convincing to me that NATO can play a constructive, long-term negotiating role with the East European countries, because it has in open view such an aggressive image. It is so much linked up with the German threat for East Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union that I do not myself think it is an appropriate instrument for political negotiation.

I can see it relative to military agreements on the withdrawal of troop levels in West Germany, as a whole, compared to East Germany, as a whole. On the military point perhaps it still has a function, or for the re-establishment of some military co-ordinating body in Western Europe with the United States. But I think one can say that without saying that NATO should be the instrument for political negotiations on such a thing as a fundamental German settlement. Does that answer your question?

Mr. Brewin: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: To follow that up, would not the credibility of NATO even as a negotiating instrument be stronger if the North American countries were not members of it and if you had a West European alliance facing an East European alliance?

Professor Clarkson: Credible to whom?

Mr. Lewis: To the East Europeans.

Professor Clarkson: Well, I think we are putting the scenario quite far ahead. It would achieve a reduction of the threat perceived by the East European countries from the West, so long as it did not take place in such a way as to increase the German threat, from their point of view. That, I think, is the major danger. In negotiations the juggling of factors is a very delicate matter, and that is clear; so I do not see focusing on NATO as a sufficient answer to the total European question.

If the military problem is now less important, but the political problem remains the fundamental factor in the instability in Europe, the lack of solution of the German question—which justifies both NATO and the Warsaw Pact—is clearly the root cause of the insecurity.

The Russians are traumatized by Germany, there is no doubt. I was in Moscow this summer. One is still shown examples of German destruction of this palace, or that building, or that city. It is on their minds, and on those of the Poles and the Czechs, also. This is the root cause of the problem in Europe.

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Mr. Lewis: I agree. I was on a parliamentary delegation to Poland about a year and three-quarters

ago. The Poles' fear of Germany is very real. Perhaps I may take just two or three minutes to ask you this question: In view of your, in my opinion, correct analysis that the real threat is the nuclear cloud hanging over the world, where is Canada's position vis-à-vis the United States in that context?

Professor Clarkson: I think it is a most important factor and I think Canada, in terms of an active and creative foreign policy, can really play a role in working towards arms control and the denuclearization of certain zones. For instance, if our atomic capability in Europe ended, that in itself would be a contributing factor. If we could make—and this gets on to the NORAD problem—our participation or our relationship with the United States in North American defence one aimed at arms control and limitation with a view to denuclearizing the Canadian space, in my view, this would also partially contribute to reducing the mutual threat felt from the Soviets and the Americans. I think the major danger that the world now faces is that the United States is on the brink of engaging in another whole round of the arms race; the antiballistic missiles, the multinuclear warhead missiles and the M.I.R.V. This is a new generation that they still seem to be hesitating on but are on the point of engaging in. I could conceive in this 10-year strategy—and Canada's relationship with the United States on this matter is one of strong discouragement of this step being taken—of Canada making certain offers to the United States and also to the Soviet Union that our states would be denuclearized, and while it is only one factor among many others because obviously all the ocean space is still open to nuclear submarines, I can see their making that kind of contribution to a reduction of world tension and I think that is quite compatible with American defence planning, as long as it becomes clear that Canada wants to do this kind of thing.

Mr. Lewis: Does that not lead to the conclusion, in addition to other reasons that have been raised, that Canada should end the NORAD agreement?

Professor Clarkson: I am much more flexible on the actual organizational form of things than you are, perhaps, but I can conceive of Canada still being in a NORAD, or some kind of North American defence agreement, but its contribution would be quite different. Our contribution would be in talking with the Americans on how to reduce the arms level in North America in such a way as not to undermine their security, and also in a balanced way with the Soviet Union, which is obviously their threat, in order to achieve a downgrading of the tension. I am not against being in clubs but I am very much in favour of one's defining one's role in a club, one's membership, in a creative fashion appropriate to the conditions of the time, and I think we should be in some kind of

close communication with the Americans on defence matters but in a way that makes it clear to them that we think our own security is threatened by being an alleyway for nuclear ballistic missiles.

Mr. Lewis: Could you leave your flexibility alone for one minute to answer the simple question as to whether in the present kind of NORAD your analysis does not lead to the conclusion that Canada should withdraw from it, whatever other defence discussions may take place with the United States?

Professor Clarkson: Again I am going to respond the same way. We could be in it or out of it but I think our role in it, if we stayed in, would be quite different and it would be aimed at arms control in North America.

Mr. Lewis: It would not be the present NORAD, though?

Professor Clarkson: No, that is right. We would not have our squadrons, whether nuclearly armed or not, at the service of Colorado.

Mr. Lewis: Of only the United States as aimed against the Soviet Union, because your whole proposition is that it should be an understanding with both powers south and north, as it were, of us.

Professor Clarkson: That is right.

Mr. Lewis: Then that surely means that the present NORAD is not of any purpose. Why is it not possible to say that it does that?

Professor Clarkson: It is quite conceivable that we should end that particular agreement and establish our relations on a different kind of organizational basis. It

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is clear that we still need some communication with the American defense department and planning operations because we have our own armed forces in North America. What I am interested in is the effect of our policy—and the organizational form that it takes could be worked out—but I do not think there is much area of disagreement there.

Mr. Lewis: No, there is not. You are not quite as prepared as I am to say that we should get the hell out of NORAD.

Professor Clarkson: You see, I am also concerned about the effect our action has on the Americans, and in such highly emotional problems as the organization of NATO and NORAD I think Canadian actions can very easily be misinterpreted, and one does not want to generate the feeling in Washington that the Canadians are stabbing them in the back. This really raises the point of how we pursue our foreign policy in the

United States and I think we should conceive of it in a much more educational or, in a sense, public relations fashion so that we will make it clear to the Americans what our policy is and why, so that they will not just read in the *Washington Post* that Canada is getting out of NORAD. It is a question of Canada redefining its role. This is explained and made clear in books that are published in the United States. As you know, Canadian books are generally not published in the United States because of the American tariff laws. However, I would envisage a major increase in the efforts of the Canadian government to explain Canadian policy in the United States so that we are not just the Eskimos of the North. We are a power which has an independent mind and we have certain policies we want to pursue that we also conceive to be in the American interest. Again my answer is given partially in hesitation because I am concerned about the way an act is interpreted, because the way it is interpreted affects the ultimate success of the policy.

Mr. Lewis: Thank you.

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Nesbitt: Professor Clarkson, I have three questions I would like to ask. First of all, I think you will probably agree that the question of NATO must be interrelated with all other aspects of world foreign policy with which we are concerned. Quite a few Canadians, have expressed a view on this, but Mr. Escott Reid is perhaps the original promoter of the idea that the two major problems we will have in the world for the next 25 years—or 50 years perhaps—are assistance to the growth of newly developing countries, an aspect which you of course deal with, and the normalization of relations between China and the Western world.

First with regard to the role that Canada might take in respect to assisting newly developing countries, I do not think there would perhaps be many people in Canada who would disagree with that general principle. So you suggest that as we do this at an increasing rate we should tend to generalize our assistance, perhaps through the United Nations or some other body, or do you think we should do it perhaps in a more bilateral way in certain specific areas, such as Latin America or the West Indies, or something of that nature?

Professor Clarkson: I think basically our aid would remain bilateral. I am not convinced by the argument that bilateral aid is bad. To the extent that the United Nations were capable of channelling more productively Canadian aid, that would be fine and we should certainly work with the United Nations agencies or other international agencies, but that is a technicality that is worked out when there are different kinds of projects. Perhaps technical or

educational aid might go better through certain international agencies when cultural questions are involved, but I think politically one also has to think of aid as an essentially bilateral relationship because for purely economic reasons Canada could only afford a very massive aid policy if it led to Canadian industry being used in the aid. I think the base of my economic proposal is one of shifting a certain amount of economic activity from defence economic operations to an aid industry and I do not think that one could interpret balance of payments and other factors and operate a very vast aid program without thinking of it basically as a bilateral program. There

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are all sorts of other reasons, such as it would provide activity for young people who want to work in the developing countries. We would be able to develop a certain Canadian expertise in areas such as road construction, if that was a major need in Africa, or in certain activities that we knew were in need and could spend the money on. They could be developed as a Canadian operation and a specialised Canadian aid industry.

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes. Presuming that we should do it on a bilateral basis, do you feel that we should tend to concentrate such assistance in certain areas of the world or should we do it in a more general way?

Professor Clarkson: I think the argument on that is in favour of specialization. Obviously there are a number of factors involved. Should you help the poorest countries or the better off? Should you help those with the least potential of the most economic potential?

Mr. Nesbitt: You think it should be done on what our abilities to grant aid are, perhaps?

Professor Clarkson: There are a number of factors. Roughly, I would say that at the moment Africa is the most productive area of aid operations. There are several reasons for this: one, because of the predominance of French-speaking countries in Africa; two, because of the colossal need; three, because the potential for growth is very great simply because the level of economic development is so low; four, we have already developed a special relationship with certain African countries such as Tanzania in a most productive way and there is no language problem, it is either English or French, and there are a number of very good reasons why Africa is very suitable.

I think the Caribbean is also another area, and there is personal contact with the Caribbean world. However, I would put Asia ahead of Latin America for similar kinds of reasons, that the kind of development that takes place in Asia is more hopeful, the needs are very great, whereas in Latin America it

is difficult to make these judgments because we are very rich and they are relatively all very poor, but the development is quite different in Latin America. In my view it is not very helpful to give a great deal of aid to a country that has a political system that will frustrate the development prospects of the country.

Mr. Nesbitt: To get to the second matter and to deal more specifically with NATO and that related body, NORAD, the brief that you presented—a very well arranged brief, if I may say so—as I read it is predicated perhaps on the assumption that a steady decrease now and into the reasonably foreseeable future is intentioned between the United States and the Soviet Union. While this would perhaps appear to be likely at the moment, I think one would agree that it is sometimes a little difficult to foresee the policies that may be pursued by future authoritarian governments in other countries. People in other countries are sometimes motivated slightly differently than ourselves. Do you not feel that it might be rather a risk to put all our eggs in the one basket, so to speak, based on the assumption that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will steadily improve.

Professor Clarkson: I am not assuming steady improvement; I am assuming a kind of balance. In a sense the relations have improved enormously if you look over the past 15 years since the death of Stalin. I do not really foresee any major change in the U.S. - Soviet relationship. The ideological differences are clear and they are decreasing in impact, really.

Mr. Nesbitt: Excuse me, Mr. Clarkson. I grant you that, but in view of the fact that other governments—and the Soviet Union—have authoritarian governments and often the personnel changes rather suddenly, do you not think there is some considerable risk in planning our foreign policy, and related defence policies, on the assumption that there will be no change, let us say, in Soviet policy?

Professor Clarkson: I am not assuming there will be no change in the Soviet system. I think we have to recognize that there has already been a change for the worse since Khrushchev was deposed. There has been a re-Stalinization of the regime in Moscow. It

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has been clear from the trials of the writers and the Czechoslovakian invasion has made that clear in East Europe. I would say that the generation of political leaders who are going to take over in the next 10 years are just as conservative, just as authoritarian as the current Brezhnev-Kosygin team. They are the people who come out through the Komsomol and the trade union movement and we cannot expect

them to be more liberal than the current leaders, so I do not see any reason why they would be more aggressive internationally.

Mr. Nesbitt: I have another question. At the present time we perhaps generally accept the fact that the Soviet Union may be paying a little less attention to her interests, or what she believes to be her interests, in Western Europe and perhaps even North America because of her current problems with China. Do you foresee any possibility of the leaders or future leaders in Peking and Moscow getting together and having a rapprochement?

Professor Clarkson: If you mean is there any immediate prospect, no.

Mr. Nesbitt: No, I would agree but, say, within the next ten years perhaps.

Professor Clarkson: The possibility is certainly there but I think it is very unlikely because of the tensions that exist: we have all read of the border incidents currently taking place. You see, the future trend of the Chinese regime does not seem to be towards liberalization.

Mr. Nesbitt: Let us put it this way. In the unhappy event, from perhaps our point of view or others, that there should be a rapprochement between Moscow and Peking within the next ten years, do you think that might increase the potential threat to the United States?

Professor Clarkson: I think it would decrease it in this sense. Let us assume that the world military policy is basically a conservative one of maintaining the status quo. Now they are very aware, as we know, of the danger of nuclear annihilation, they are obviously engaged in the arms race, so they step up when the Americans step up and vice versa. But I would think that a rapprochement, in other words, between Peking and Moscow would basically have to be on Moscow's world military policy terms. That, after all, was one of the reasons for the split. The Chinese felt that the Soviets were getting into an alliance with American imperialism. I find it hard to think of a rapprochement being the other way around, the Soviets joining up with some kind of wild Chinese foreign policy.

Mr. Nesbitt: I have two other questions. In the event that (a) Soviet policy alone towards the West becomes more aggressive or (b) that there be a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China within the next ten years, that in either of these events the United States authorities might feel from their point of view that the potential threat to them had increased, if in the

meanwhile we had largely withdrawn, from a military point of view, from NATO and NORAD, do you think that the United States would permit a neutralist vacuum in this area to the north, if it felt that their own security was endangered? In other words, do you think if the United States felt there was a serious threat to its own national security they would permit a large military vacuum like Canada to exist immediately to the north and on her borders, with whose economy, even for peaceful means, she is fairly closely integrated?

Professor Clarkson: This would very much depend on how the denuclearization of Canada was arranged. It is obviously conceivable that if the fundamental world balance of military forces were overthrown and changed significantly this would involve a major change in American defence thinking. It would also involve a major change in Canadian defence thinking. In what I would say is the extremely unlikely hypothesis that you are presenting, we ourselves would undoubtedly re-assess and we might no longer feel that the Soviets, in your hypothesis, had lived up to their part of the agreement by which we had established the denuclearization of Canada. So I would think that we ourselves would be re-assessing. Directly on your question whether the Americans would permit it, they would in any case in what I am proposing have their own defence organization geared around the Soviet threat. I do not see it. You are hypothesizing a major shift of the world balance of forces which would impel Canada to re-assess its military situation, but I do not see really, even so, that it would make much difference. Once things get that bad a small power like Canada is not going to make much difference.

Mr. Nesbitt: Sometimes in international affairs life is full of surprises and they are not always pleasant ones.

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In the event of our reducing our military role both in NATO, even if without getting out of it entirely, and in NORAD, would you foresee that perhaps the United States might request, and perhaps very strongly request, the use of certain military and naval bases in Canada for her own protection?

Professor Clarkson: Not if it is done right, no. The whole point of doing this would be to arrange a reduction of armed forces in the northern part of North America in such a way that the United States and the Soviet Union would both be satisfied that there had been a significant decrease in the threat coming from the north. Now you are obviously, raising technological-military problems in your question because it seems less and less important for the American defence machine to have air or naval bases in Canada.

Mr. Nesbitt: Well that is a matter of dealing with the types of hardware involved, which is a technical matter.

Professor Clarkson: Well what I am proposing is not a unilateral "we are getting out" type of thing but a negotiated reduction of superpower tension by Canada playing a creative role in that area that Canada affects, namely the north-south route.

Mr. Nesbitt: Oh yes, I quite understand the thesis. I am just asking if the United States felt—and I think this is not an unlikely assumption—that Canada was not contributing to the kitty, so to speak, for NORAD, or contributing at least in decreasing amounts, would she likely feel, from her own point of view, that she herself had to take over the defence of North America?

Professor Clarkson: Well then we would have failed in what we are trying to do.

Mr. Nesbitt: And this might well entail the use of certain bases in Canada. Do you think then that the posture Canada would put to the rest of the world would be that of a genuine neutral such as Sweden or Switzerland, or do you think we might be regarded as somewhat of a military province of the United States?

Professor Clarkson: Well I myself cannot foresee the Americans imposing military bases on Canada in time of peace when we ourselves are wanting to renegotiate the defence arrangements. That just does not sound credible, unless you have some kind of military takeover in the United States.

Mr. Nesbitt: Peace is a rather relative term in the modern world, is it not? I have just one final question. I think everybody's questions are a bit long this morning.

The Vice-Chairman: Perhaps shorter questions would attract shorter answers. I think this would be the feeling about now, particularly as we are starting to get a little cramped for time. We have five more questioners: Messrs. Allmand, Nowlan, Prud'homme, Gibson and Cafik in that order.

Mr. Nesbitt: Perhaps I might put one more brief question. Do you feel that in the event of a major war between the United States and either the Soviet Union, China, or both, Canada really could become uninvolved in view of the geography of the situation—Detroit, Montreal, the seaway and things like that?

Professor Clarkson: I think in the major war that you are referring to, Mr. Nesbitt, there would not be much time for us to think about it.

Mr. Nesbitt: Good enough.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Nesbitt. Before calling Mr. Almand, would the Committee agree to print Professor Clarkson's advance presentation, including the summary and supplementary notes, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence?

Some Hon. Members: Agreed.

(See appendix attached)

Mr. Allmand: Professor Clarkson, I too want to compliment you on your brief. I find your recommendations the most appealing that we have received so far. Although some of my questions have been asked I want to clarify in my own mind some of the things that you have said.

Are you suggesting that once we decide on what the best role should be for us, and perhaps what the best role should be for NATO as a whole, that we should then go to NATO not with an ultimatum or a dogmatic position but to negotiate what we believe our role to be and what we believe NATO's role to be? Is this a correct interpretation of what you are suggesting?

Professor Clarkson: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Further to that then I would think that if this negotiation is to be meaningful there would have to be a point beyond which we would not go. In other words, whereas we might be willing to compromise in our position to a certain extent, obviously there would be a maximum and a minimum in the compromise situation. Is this also more or less the way you see it?

Professor Clarkson: What kind of maximum-minimum?

Mr. Allmand: You know, you have made certain suggestions in your brief and I am fairly sympathetic to them. You are also suggesting that we go to NATO and say, "Here is what we think Canada's role should be; here is what we think NATO's role should be; let us negotiate; let us consult on this." We may find stiff opposition within NATO to our suggestions. I would think that if we are really

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serious about the negotiation we would be willing to give a little. However, I certainly think that we would have to decide before we go into such negotiations what the area of compromise must be, too, and perhaps draw ultimatums to a certain extent and say, "If you insist on this we do not stay in."

Professor Clarkson: Well, to the extent that we are wanting to reduce our expenditures on armed forces, you know, in a significant way over a ten-year

period and someone said look you should increase them, that kind of thing we would not be talking about very, very seriously. The word "ultimatum" is a very strong word in terms of international negotiations and I would not think that we would be successful in our objective of encouraging the European powers especially to rethink their defence arrangements if we call for a re-appraisal, on the one hand, giving the impression that things should be rethought and at the same time saying we think very precisely on the following five problems and they are not negotiable. It would be a question of working out the details and that is why I am reluctant to say the NATO organization should be disbanded or should be continued. These things will be worked out. The important thing would be the amount of resources we allocated to certain areas—military and aid, our wanting to encourage a European settlement—certain basic objectives that do not have to be put in terms of ultimatums, because we are not giving the Soviet Union an ultimatum that they have to negotiate on West Germany, on Berlin and on the eastern border of Germany. These are the objectives that we want to see achieved in, say, the ten-year period. We consider it unacceptable for the European situation to continue indefinitely with this fundamental source of tension and instability, but that is not the kind of thing you put an ultimatum on.

Mr. Allmand: Maybe I used the wrong word. I meant "dogmatic".

Professor Clarkson: To answer your question, I think we would want to make it clear what our view of the situation roughly is, and that is why we are calling for a re-appraisal—because we think that by their behaviour France certainly, England certainly, have in the past few years re-assessed their situation, and this should be brought together and reformulated.

Mr. Allmand: I understand also from your analysis that you do not feel that there has been sufficient co-ordination or rationalization within NATO of the role that might be played by the member states and that more could be done to make these roles more complementary. For example, you suggested that Canada could play a more experimental role within the Western alliance. As I see it, if we had the proper consultation with our NATO allies we could probably rationalize to a much greater extent than is now being done. The total use of the NATO countries with respect to foreign policy goals for NATO as a whole was directed towards détente and peace in Europe. Is that not correct? Do you feel there is enough rationalization now and co-ordination of the various NATO states within NATO?

Professor Clarkson: Well you are talking on two different levels now: rationalization, militarily, and

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co-operation, politically.

Mr. Allmand: Yes, but I see one tied to the other.

Professor Clarkson: Well at the moment they are not. That is one of the problems.

Mr. Allmand: Yes, that is it.

Professor Clarkson: France has its own communist policies on its bilateral approach to Soviet relations, with Czech relations, Polish relations and it is carrying on quite an independent communist policy. Even, in a sense, probably its military policy is more integrated because the troops are there and they are potentially in the NATO organization, or would be there in case of a conflict. But my response would be roughly the same as my response to Mr. Brewin, that one should think of the military problems in Europe and one should think of the political ones. In terms of a ten-year prospective our concern should be with the political development of Europe, and the military really should start to look after itself if one gets discussion and negotiation going on the political problem. We have a great obsession with the military—primarily, I think, because we do not face the fundamental political problems. I remember Escott Reid said at a C.I.I.A. conference a couple of years ago that when he was the ambassador in Bonn from about 1959 to 1961 or 1962 there was no fundamental discussion of the German situation among the allied powers. I found that very shocking. There was a crisis over Berlin and there were problems in Germany. There was no attempt to raise the German question in terms of achieving a basic settlement, and that is the kind of thing I do not think we should allow to continue. I am not saying that just by raising the question we are going to get a solution, but I would think, considering the next 10 years, that it is not unreasonable. After all, East Germany has been stabilized by the Berlin wall; it now has an economic viability that it did not previously have. According to Western observers, there is political support for the regime. One of these particular observers is Professor Jean Smith of the University of Toronto. This gives East Germany a greater stability vis-à-vis West Germany, and there is a potential for negotiation that is not simply the one strong West German power against the tottering East German. There is now a basis for negotiation and discussion, and what is partially needed is for questions to be asked, and if this is the Trudeau style I think it should be applied internationally.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I have fewer questions now than I had before in view of the other questions. I would first like to ask Professor Clarkson some questions that Mr. Lewis touched on. He mentioned

a couple of my points, although he perhaps worked from a different angle. He mentioned the Harmel plan. I think your paper was most stimulating and even in the presentation of your thesis, but I am surprised you are asking for another review in view of the Harmel plan which was done shortly ago and, as I understand it, at our initiative. I wonder if you could briefly reconcile the review of the Harmel plan of less than a year and a half ago with your thought of Canada again requesting another review of NATO?

Professor Clarkson: Mr. Nowlan, the reappraisal would be in terms of the declaration of intent by Canada to shift its foreign policy resource allocations over the next 10 year period, and I would therefore think that declaration assumes a revised view towards NATO, so it makes a different kind of reassessment necessary.

Mr. Nowlan: In effect, the new factors that you indicated earlier today, and also mentioned in your paper, of a new government as well as Canada's declaration would thereby stimulate a review.

Professor Clarkson: Plus the change of regime in Washington. There is one factor that is quite different from a couple of years ago; that is the American intent to withdraw from Viet Nam.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes.

Professor Clarkson: This may take another couple of years. It is obviously not an easy question. You have generally a withdrawal of active military American commitment in Asia. You have probably a similar kind of withdrawal of American overextension of military commitment around the world, and I would think it would be very much in the United States' interests if they could see fit to have a renegotiation of the

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European situation.

Mr. Nowlan: I will not pursue that at the moment. I will not pursue that, period, because I will not have another moment. I now come to the other thing that disturbs me, although many of your objectives—as Mr. Allmand said—most constructive and challenging. Perhaps in some ways I am like Mr. Lewis. I am not suggesting academic shuffling but perhaps theoretical, and I wonder how practical this would be. For instance, with respect to Germany you suggest that the emphasis should be on the economic, political and then military, and as soon as you raise the question of Germany—which you set out in your paper as perhaps being the thorn in the flesh of some of these problems—you get the other side of the coin, do you not, in the sense that in theory the West Europeans should look after own defence, but has it not been because of the very fact there is a NATO that countries other than West Europeans have sort of

diluted the German threat as far as the East Europeans—and especially Russia—are concerned?

Professor Clarkson: No. My analysis would be the opposite. Unfortunately NATO has increased the East European perception of threat from Germany because it has led to the rearmament of West Germany. I disagree on your last point.

Mr. Nowlan: Do not hesitate to disagree. I am just trying to rationalize the conflict in my mind. You mention the ideal of West Germans defending West Germans, and I agree with that . . .

Professor Clarkson: Why do you say that?

Mr. Nowlan: I thought you said earlier that the West Europeans were balanced off against the East Europeans. You mentioned the German problem and our withdrawal, and when you speak about our withdrawal as a North American country I presume you are also talking about the American withdrawal from NATO, are you not?

Professor Clarkson: Oh, no. One would have to consider what the Americans would do.

Mr. Nowlan: Certainly on your thesis that the West Europeans balanced against the East Europeans would thus open up the way for exploration of the German question—Berlin, and some of these other issues—then surely if we had the power to do that our withdrawal must be followed by an American withdrawal from Europe, or what is your view on that?

Professor Clarkson: My view on that would be that you would be very unlikely to get a complete withdrawal of American troops from Europe until the Berlin and German question had been resolved.

Mr. Nowlan: Then that leaves the . . .

Professor Clarkson: The one obvious reason for this is that the whole Berlin situation is still a four-power situation and, as archaic and anachronistic as it may be, that is very central to the problem and you could not expect the Americans to withdraw before a solution; it would be part of a solution.

Mr. Nowlan: Then does this not sort of aerate some of your thoughts about the admitted insignificant contribution of Canada in terms of manpower, although psychologically there may be a contribution, and that our withdrawal from a NATO situation is not really going to open up this area of West Europeans versus East Europeans until you resolve the American problem. I just do not quite see how you rationalize that.

Professor Clarkson: Could you repeat that? Until we resolve the American problem, or do you mean the German problem?

Mr. Nowlan: You say our withdrawing will tend to shift the emphasis to West Europeans versus East Europeans. I suggest you are forgetting about the United States because by our withdrawal you are not really going to be able to open up Berlin, as you already mentioned, or the reunification of Germany, and others before you have suggested that the German problem is really going to be at the last stage; you will have the United States and Russia, the West Europeans and the East Europeans and then finally down at the bottom, or in the concentric circles, the Berlin problem or the German problem.

Professor Clarkson: No, I am not forgetting the United States. It is really central to my analysis that by acting ourselves we would provide initiative to get the Americans negotiating: in other words, starting the process of change going, and that we are not insignificant. I did not say that our main role is insignificant.

Mr. Nowlan: No, you did not.

Professor Clarkson: You might have interpreted it in terms of unimportance, but the importance of our

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relatively small role in NATO, although still being part of the NATO Alliance, is such that if we declare we want to reorient our total foreign policy, and specifically towards Europe, in doing certain things, this combined with a call for a reassessment of NATO and also I think the specific objective of resolving the German question as the central question in East and West European tension would be part of a package and we would continue our efforts to ensure that it did continue a process of renegotiation between East and West Europe. So, the role of the United States is obviously fundamental and the role of Canada in this is as a kind of catalyst.

Mr. Nowlan: I see. You do not think that we could play a catalyst role even within the alliance on some of the very necessary problems that have to be resolved.

Professor Clarkson: But this would be within the alliance in the sense that we are starting off now.

Mr. Nowlan: But to use, for what it is worth, the fact of our withdrawal and pull-out as one of the bargaining points, if it was a factor, rather than throwing the poker hand on the table before this and saying that we are getting out and we hope you do this, that and the other thing. I am wondering if

we do not have the cart before the horse and why we are precluded from stimulating discussion in our present situation.

Professor Clarkson: We have not done it very successfully . . .

Mr. Nowlan: No, I appreciate . . .

Professor Clarkson: . . . and I do not accept the poker analogy. It is not a question of the Soviets not knowing what our cards are. They know the debate is going on. The Canadian people will know pretty soon what the result of the foreign policy review is, and . . .

Mr. Nowlan: No, the poker analogy . . .

Professor Clarkson: . . . I think we should think in terms of mutual reduction of forces, but whether we have to keep our Canadian troops there until the Soviets in some way withdraw one or two divisions from Poland I think is beyond our control. I think one should assume more realistically that if we reduce our commitment to Europe in terms of troops actively involved on that soil, that over time there would be a certain pressure on the Soviets and the East Europeans to reduce their arms.

Mr. Nowlan: I would like to explore that further but time is running on. I would like to ask one more question on a matter which has not been opened up here, and it may not be, although you certainly raised it in your brief as well as referring to it this morning. I am referring to the national flavour of our external affairs policy obviously reflecting the component parts of the country. This leads me to the question of a nation in foreign affairs. You certainly have Quebec, which is also interested in external relations, and I wonder how you reconcile the two, or are you going to curtail one in order to have the national flavour develop to the full?

Professor Clarkson: I do not see any . . .

Mr. Nowlan: Or do you see any conflict?

Professor Clarkson: . . . fundamental difficulty, given goodwill on both sides, both the Ottawa and the Quebec sides. It seems to me that the creative and constructive contribution that the Government of Quebec can make to Canadian foreign policy is untapped and that specifically in relations with France or specifically in relations with francophone countries it obviously would be French Canadians who would be applying our aid to the francophone countries.

Mr. Nowlan: No, but as the Government of Quebec or as part of the Government of Canada?

Professor Clarkson: Both. Ontario has a foreign policy in the sense that we send trade missions to Europe. That is part of Canadian international economic policy. These again are details.

Mr. Nowlan: I see. My last question—and someone else may be going to touch on it—is about the peacekeeping force in Canada. We keep talking about reduction of forces but you still intend . . .

The Vice-Chairman: You have tacked a supplementary on your prior question. Would you hold it for a minute, Mr. Nowlan. Mr. Marceau on a supplementary.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Marceau: Mr. Chairman, I would like to give more details about what my honourable friend just said. I do not believe that Quebec has expressed the intention of having an external policy. I believe one

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forgets the distinction made by Quebec. What Quebec wants is an extension of its various exclusive jurisdictions. In the field of education for example, what Quebec wants, is that its jurisdiction be extended outside Canada, without however entering into conflict with the external policy of Canada, as the latter is accepted by Quebec as pertaining to federal jurisdiction. To be fair, one should say there is a problem. But one must admit that Quebec seems to be prepared to compromise and that the attitude ascribed to Quebec does not enter into conflict with Canadian external policy to the point that one was led to believe. There is a problem, but I think that with negotiations, we could reach an agreement. This is my opinion.

Professor Clarkson: Could I consider that statement as a question and answer it?

Mr. Marceau: Yes.

[English]

Mr. Nowlan: I may agree with part of what my colleague said but I really do not think that was a question. It was an explanation of my question. I am not going to disagree with it or agree with it in part, because I believe there are perhaps several areas of potential conflict here and I do not want to pursue the point. I was just going to ask something that is separate and apart from this. Professor Clarkson really answered my problem there. My question has to do with this peacekeeping force. I gather from your thesis that you assume regardless of what we do we are still going to have to have some type of peacekeeping force in Canada with transport capability and mobility. Is that correct?

Professor Clarkson: Right.

Mr. Nowlan: You do not want to get down to the technical terms as to how big a component that is. You have related it to gross national product but are you thinking in terms of 100,000 or 50,000, or just a nominal force of 10,000?

Professor Clarkson: In terms of numbers of troops?

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, to see how you can relate the gross national product to the peacekeeping force you are talking about.

Professor Clarkson: I think this Committee should exploit the expertise of its witnesses, and I do not claim to be a military expert. You obviously get what you pay for, and it would be a smaller specialized force. You would have economies of specialization. You would probably get what you wanted for less expense, in my view.

Mr. Nowlan: I will pass because of the time.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme?

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Prud'homme: Professor, I agree entirely with you when you say the question is not a simple one and that it cannot be settled by yes or no.

However, the question I would like to ask was asked by some of my colleagues, in a slightly different way though. According to you, what would be the reaction of our allies if Canada informed them of its intention to play a new role as a participating member of NATO while operating in close cooperation with its allies. Would this not be opening up a new avenue to our allies rather than telling them: we are leaving the Alliance.

My opinion on this subject is—and I would like to have your comments—that it would be difficult to say that from the 10th of April: Out we go. I believe this possibility does not fit within present realities. However, as I said earlier, maybe we could voice our intention to play a new role which could be a combination of what you have suggested in your brief and of many other suggestions voiced here quite clearly by other witnesses.

Do you believe that Canada could immediately inform its allies that in the future it wishes to play a different role but that it wishes to do this in close cooperation with them? Do you believe that at the present time NATO members are prepared to receive such manifestation of intention from Canada?

Professor Clarkson: Mr. Prud'homme, you are asking two questions in fact. The second one being

whether our allies are ready to accept such a re-evaluation of our role. I believe that they do. We already know that France has re-evaluated its political and military role within NATO. We know that the English believe that the communist threat is much less important than it used to be and that they are in fact reducing their military expenditures. We know that the Belgians, for instance, do not have a very large military commitment.

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As you can see, it is not simply Canada which wants to change its external policy. I believe that the Germans, like Mr. Nowlan said, are facing serious problems and that the German government would be the least prepared to accept without protest such a reorientation of our external policy. This is the problem, and I think that we have to face it. Thus the problem is the reaction of the Germans. We must take it into account with patience and consideration, but that is indeed the problem. That takes care of your second question.

Now, let us deal with your first question. It would seem to me that it is possible, to a certain extent, to stay within NATO while changing our policy. However, if it is really important for us to change the orientation of our external policy, I think it would then become important to change the name of the Alliance, for symbolic reasons, if not for other reasons. NATO has an image.

Mr. Prud'homme: A military image.

Professor Clarkson: We, Canadians, are members of NATO. This sometimes hinders our freedom to give assistance to a non-allied country. I think that if an important change is made in the role of Canada and Europe and if the character of the Atlantic Alliance of the Western Countries changes, it would be normal for the organization to change also. To get back to Mr. Lewis' questions, this, essentially, is my proposition. There would be changes but, in so far as I am concerned, what is important is not whether or not to have NATO as a name, but what role Canada will play and how we are going to play it. Does this answer your question?

Mr. Prud'homme: Yes.

Professor Clarkson: One cannot stay within an organization and change one's role completely without influencing the organization itself.

[*English*]

Mr. Prud'homme: To return your courtesy, I will ask my next question in English. One of my concerns is this question that you have raised yourself. How will this be received in Germany? To

me, it is Germany that is the nerve centre of the NATO alliance at the moment.

I suppose we will hear a great deal about that in Europe, and if we could find a new way acceptable to the German people I suppose that would be helpful. I do not like to call it Canada withdrawing from NATO, because that always sounds negative. I would rather call it a new role for Canada in NATO; that is more positive.

Professor Clarkson: I would rather call it a new role for Canada in Europe, because if you centre everything on NATO you are assuming that it should continue forever, which obviously we do not want to assume. No organization is eternal. We should have a European policy and whether that should always include NATO...

Mr. Prud'homme: May I interrupt, sir? When you say, "which we do not want to assume", who is the we? Do you mean Canadians?

Professor Clarkson: I do not think anyone would want to assume that the NATO organization would be a permanent feature of Europe, either the West Germans themselves who officially want a unification of their country, or the Americans who want to achieve a stabilization of Europe. It is a stop-gap organization that was set up in 1949 with specific defensive aims, intended explicitly to run for a certain length of time. It was part of the treaty that the countries could renounce it under article 15 and leave within a year. It was set up with a certain time horizon in its founding statutes.

Mr. Prud'homme: I do not know if my next question, which is my last, would be well received higher up somewhere in Parliament, but do you not think that at the moment Canada should start thinking positively of a kind of new rapprochement with the Government of France under President de Gaulle?

Professor Clarkson: What was your question? Do I think that Canada should now...

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Mr. Prud'homme: Start making positive gestures of rapprochement with de Gaulle in order to be able to play a new role in NATO. For instance, if we could establish close contact with the Government of France, perhaps this could be a second step. President de Gaulle was the first to leave NATO, and now Canada wants to play a new role in NATO. Without being influenced by France, perhaps we could form a new Canada-France alliance, in a new role in NATO.

Professor Clarkson: I think those are two rather different problems, and very difficult to link. I

would be in favour of Canada improving its relations with France, but I would not think that the best way to go about it is to suggest that our common purpose would be a reorganization of NATO, in the sense of bringing France back in when it is so clearly de Gaulist policy...

Mr. Prud'homme: Could we not profit from their experience?

Professor Clarkson: Now your implications are different. If new France-Canada relationship were based on trying to reassess NATO...

Mr. Prud'homme: We could profit from France's experience.

[Interpretation]

We could use France's experience in our development of a new policy within NATO.

Professor Clarkson: I agree, but I believe that in order to use it, we would have to study the consequences of the French attitude.

Mr. Prud'homme: That's right.

Professor Clarkson: I would say that the French action was a manifestation, within an Alliance, of a fairly strong independence, to try and influence American policy. I think that the results of these 10 years of Gaullist policy show that this is a failure and that the Americans have pursued their foreign policy without taking French policy into account. So, Canada should draw the conclusion from this that, yes indeed, it should try and influence American policy but not as though it were the policy of some kind of enemy within an alliance, but, on the contrary, as that of a friend who is of the same opinion. NATO must be re-evaluated, but in a manner that is more likely to be understood by the United States.

[English]

Mr. Prud'homme: That is exactly what I meant. I am glad you came to the same conclusion about profiting from their experience of leaving NATO. I do not think it was a good experience. Like you I would call it a very bad experience. But by profiting from that experience, maybe Canada, a small country, could arrive at a positive reassessment of its role in NATO.

[Interpretation]

By using France's mistakes. I fully agree with you; to turn up on April 10, for instance, and say: "Now, out we go," is no way to deal with one's allies. I do

not believe that this is not an acceptable way of proceeding on the international level.

Professor Clarkson: There is another aspect of the French experiment which one tends to ignore when discussing NATO namely, that France is not that keen on NATO. And if you want to reevaluate the role of NATO in Europe, it must be borne in mind that NATO is actually an alliance without France. It is all good and well to say that France is there, that its armed forces are always there in case of aggression, but in fact, France has an independent military force that is not integrated in NATO. It is a member of the Alliance, but not in its most important aspect.

Mr. Prud'homme: The military aspect.

Professor Clarkson: Yes, the military aspect. So, the reorganization of the military links between Atlantic Alliance countries, especially in Europe, and which would take into account French policy, should be carried out on the level of a far greater national independence for the European countries. This is a factor that plays against the thesis that the effectiveness of NATO can go on for ever and ever. In my opinion, if you consider seriously what France has done, we cannot maintain vast illusions about the cohesion or the military integration of Europe because this no longer exists. This is a factor one tends to ignore or which is not taken seriously.

Mr. Prud'homme: I would like to ask a last question now. Do you believe that if Canada decided to play a new role that is entirely different from the present one, that this change could have an enormous influence on its allies, other than Germany and the United States?

Do you believe that this change would influence Belgium and Holland, for instance, to the point that this could really mean the end of NATO in its present form?

Professor Clarkson: You are asking me if a change in Canadian policy would mean the end of NATO?

Mr. Prud'homme: That's right.

Professor Clarkson: If after this negotiation that would be unavoidable, it were accepted that Canada

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should play a different military role, it appears probable that countries like Belgium and the United Kingdom would also want to change their role in order to reduce their military expenditures. Hence, the sum total of the military policies of these countries would be different and therefore NATO, whether or not it were to keep the same title, would be different. But this does not mean there would no longer be any defence of Western Europe. We should

not draw conclusions from this that are too pessimistic in so far as the capacity of Western Europe to defend itself is concerned. Yes, there would necessarily be changes.

Mr. Prud'homme: Especially in West Germany?

Professor Clarkson: Yes.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, we have two more questioners. It is now after 1 o'clock and it looks as if it will be difficult to continue the meeting this afternoon because there are a number of other meetings. Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Our questions will be very brief and it should not take any longer than five minutes.

The Vice-Chairman: If it is the wish of the Committee to continue, I will call Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: I will be very brief, Professor Clarkson. I am interested in the development of the set-up in Europe as a result of Mr. Nixon's visit. I would like to ask you, sir, if you do not think it would be foolish for Canada to make a drastic change in foreign policy prior to a big four conference or confrontation which is likely to take place within the next two or three years on the world scene.

Professor Clarkson: Why do you say it is likely to take place?

Mr. Gibson: I think it is extremely probable that the President of the United States and the head of the Russian state will sit down and try to hammer this out. Let us pray they do. Do you think this is an unlikely forecast of what will happen on the world scene within the next two or three years?

Professor Clarkson: Did you say a big four conference or a big power conference?

Mr. Gibson: A big power conference.

Professor Clarkson: And by that you mean the United States meeting with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Gibson: Yes, at least that.

Professor Clarkson: And that this is going to take place within the next two or three years?

Mr. Gibson: Yes. Do you think this is a probable forecast?

Professor Clarkson: The Americans and the Soviets are going to be talking to each other sooner than—you know, within . . .

Mr. Gibson: Yes, but do you think there will be a real large-scale show down?

Professor Clarkson: You mean a summit conference?

Mr. Gibson: Yes.

Professor Clarkson: Or simply a conversation?

Mr. Gibson: No, a real summit conference.

Professor Clarkson: Well, that is different. A summit means . . .

Mr. Gibson: Perhaps it is different, but . . .

The Vice-Chairman: There is a disarmament proposal conference now.

Mr. Gibson: Yes. We have the Paris talks going on on nuclear disarmament and we have a bad situation in Europe and I am putting this to you. Do you not consider it very likely that President Nixon and the heads of the Soviet Union will have a conference of some sort at a very high level within the next two or three years?

Professor Clarkson: Yes.

Mr. Gibson: Well, then, would it not be foolish for Canada to go off on a different tack, a drastically different tack, prior to that event taking place?

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Professor Clarkson: Why?

Mr. Gibson: Because if the whole climate is improved—and let us pray that it will be—by a high-power conference, we would be in a better position to look at it then more realistically.

Professor Clarkson: Well, I myself would not hold my breath until the Soviets and the Americans by themselves solved the European problem.

Mr. Gibson: No, but we are looking to 1980.

Professor Clarkson: Yes, I am thinking in terms of that time . . .

Mr. Gibson: I know you are.

Professor Clarkson: . . .and that is why I think one has to envisage what we want to do. We are already starting to take a creative part in getting talks going. Now surely these talks will take place at the Soviet-American level. They should also, though, be taking place within Western Europe. It is not

simply a question of having to wait for one kind of negotiation to take place before any other negotiation can. Negotiations are taking place daily in diplomatic communication among all the countries. What one has to do is to get the processes of fundamental rethinking going as much as we are capable. There is a slight implication in your question, perhaps, that it is presumptuous for Canada, as a smallish power, to get involved in a bigger ball game between the two super powers.

Mr. Gibson: That was not the purpose of my question. No, I do not personally believe in unilateral pulling out.

Professor Clarkson: I want to make it clear that I am not recommending that Canada burn all bridges. I am recommending that Canada make it clear that it is wanting to reorient its foreign policies, its international role, and that one object is to get its allies to rethink and to adapt to the current realities of the international situation.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Professor Clarkson, I want to join others in thanking you today for your presentation. It is very clear and I think it has been the strongest case for the position that you hold that I have heard since I have been here.

You have maintained in your presentation here today that Europe is now sort of economically of age after the Second World War and can look after its own defence. I think that is a fair statement of what you have said. I too think that is true and this has led me in the past to believe that we should not be involved in NATO. A new factor has been presented to me that kind of sways me to think otherwise. Although they can defend themselves in a normal, conventional fashion, they certainly cannot defend themselves in the nuclear sense and it does not look as if they are going to have the nuclear capacity. I do not think the United States wants them to have it and I do not think it is in the interests of peace that Europe have its own capacity. Then, in view of this, how can they really be expected to defend themselves when they do not have the resources to do it? Our presence is a sort of guarantee to the European powers, especially on the part of the United States, that the United States will back them with their nuclear deterrent in the event something breaks out. If all the North American commitment were removed, that of Canada and the United States, they would not feel quite so secure in that regard.

Professor Clarkson: I am saying first of all that Canada should redirect its military policy, and that does mean certainly withdrawing our nuclear strike force and our troops from Europe. That does not say that the Americans withdraw. There are two things; either their conventional forces, necessarily, or their nuclear umbrella. I think on the conventional forces level for the Americans, that would depend largely on the successful resolution of the German question, because the American forces are integrally involved in the Berlin situation. If you could get to the point where the Americans withdrew their conventional forces you would still have, given the assumption of the balance of nuclear terror being basically a Soviet-American one, the American

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nuclear deterrent providing that umbrella of protection that it does now for west Europe. Whether the nuclear bombers are stationed in Europe or whether there are nuclear armed submarines in the Atlantic or whether there are missiles in the United States, it is a technical question. The basic point is that the American nuclear deterrent would presumably still be providing the ultimate umbrella of defence for west Europe.

Mr. Cafik: But of course the question in the minds of Europeans under those circumstances would be: would the United States, in fact, guarantee their security when they were not directly and personally involved in Europe themselves?

Professor Clarkson: That is a very real question and that is what de Gaulle has been asking.

Mr. Cafik: That is correct. And do you think it might not lead the Russians then to begin to suspect whether they would really use it? In other words, that they might be encouraged to take a few chances in Europe?

Professor Clarkson: No, I think that conclusion is not justified. Take Western reaction to the Czech invasion in July. There was no question that the West would get involved. NATO had been worrying about the Czech situation since the spring and all

through the summer and there was no hint that because the Soviet tanks were going down the Czech roads the Americans were going to intervene. The risks are just too great and I do not see why the same logic would not be applied by the Russians. The balance of terror is a very real one and the fact that there are American troops in Europe is a significant factor. It is a symbolic guarantee to the Europeans that the Americans will intervene. That is why, as I said to Mr. Nowlan, I do not think you would get a complete withdrawal of American troops until there had been a resolution of the German question.

Mr. Cafik: I would like to pursue this further but I do not think I should in view of the time.

Professor Clarkson: I think one can dissociate the Canadian withdrawal from the American.

What we would be doing by this is rather different from what the Americans would be doing.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, that concludes our questioning. On your behalf, gentlemen, I would like to thank Professor Clarkson for his very well thought out and very well received presentation. Thank you very much, sir.

Professor Clarkson: May I say in conclusion that in a sense I would much rather have your trip abroad take you to countries like Tanzania or Algeria if you want to assess the NATO problem.

Mr. Allmand: Next fall.

Professor Clarkson: If you are going to NATO countries you should also look at NATO as seen from the third world.

The Vice-Chairman: We will consider that another time.

The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX TT

CANADA'S ROLE IN LONG-TERM WORLD PERSPECTIVE:
A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INITIATIVE

Notes prepared for presentation, March 6, 1969 by Stephen Clarkson, Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto.

Preliminary Considerations: What is at Stake in the Foreign Policy Review.

When approached to testify before this important Committee undertaking its historic review of the whys and wherefores of Canadian foreign policy, I was asked to address my remarks to the question of NATO and, more specifically, to give the "anti" arguments on this particular issue. While I do not shy away from taking a clear position—as I hope the latter part of this paper will indicate—I have some misgivings about launching into the fray with fists swinging on the left of this most battered of foreign policy issues.

Frankly I felt it would be doing some injustice to this Committee to provide a pre-packaged argument on what in my view is only a secondary aspect of the foreign policy review. It became very clear on reading the long record of this Committee's hearings in January and February that, regardless of the official subject of my predecessors' remarks, you have already spent two months discussing NATO in all its many dimensions. I wondered whether another re-capitulation of the major arguments at this level of detail would be particularly helpful. Furthermore what struck me in reading the record through is the confusion resulting from the interrogation of the experts. Speakers with roughly similar approaches have differed wildly on particular issues (e.g. European response to a change of Canadian policy) while speakers with quite opposite political approaches have often agreed on particular issues (Canadian security is guaranteed). With some notable exceptions, the analysis has been less centred on the overall international situation on the eve of the 1970's than preoccupied with such short-term considerations as U.S. intentions, our allies' current concerns, or budgetary problems. This preoccupation with the specific as meant that considerations of policy changes has been concentrated on immediate short-term adjustments (troop shifts, possible immediate American or Communist responses) at the expense of the long-term trends in the international situation. The focus on current problems of military organization seems to have precluded consideration of their implications for Canadian foreign planning in the decades ahead.

This concern for the detail of policy at the expense of the rationale for policy was difficult to understand, especially as problems of principle are raised in the terms of reference and in the papers prepared for prior circulation. The reason for this incongruity is to be found, I realized, in the ambivalent position in which this Committee finds itself placed. Having been set up to carry on a thorough review of Canadian foreign policy from first principles, the Committee has now been told to come to a quick conclusion on perhaps the most controversial of all the present policies that are up for review, Canada's role in NATO. Like the Government, this Committee has been placed before a self-defeating ultimatum by the deadline of the April meeting in Washington of the NATO members. The problem is not just that the issue is highly complex with ramifications and implications making clear-cut analysis very difficult. A greater problem is that the immediate "NATO: Yes or No" answer will be decisive in determining the nature of the remaining foreign policy review. Rather than flowing from an overall analysis of Canada's role in the world for the next two decades, considerations of consistency will dictate that Canadian foreign policies be made consistent with the decision on Canada's NATO role. For a decision on NATO will make assumptions, whether implicitly or explicitly, about the nature and future of the international situation, the priorities of Canada's international role, and the definition of Canada's national interests. The limits of discussion on all other policy areas, from aid in the third world to continental economic policy, will be set in broad outline by this single prior NATO decision.

The artificially imposed deadline for an early decision on NATO is requiring you to lock the country into a foreign policy stand for the 1970's without giving you sufficient freedom of mind to consider seriously the long-term considerations from which this foreign policy should be derived.

Importance of Review for Canada.

My alarm that your foreign policy review is being turned upside down is reinforced in my mind by a concern for the immediate impact of the foreign policy review in the Canadian political system. This

is not just a fear that the expectations for change aroused by Mr. Trudeau's announcement of a reappraisal could be disappointed by a reaffirmation of the main lines of the old policy. This Committee is also significant in another political dimension, the effort to make participatory democracy meaningful even in the traditionally secretive area of foreign policy. The activation of this Committee as a forum for consultation with public opinion is an important step forward in bringing in the independent experts and for bringing the parliamentarians (and thus the electors) into the process of formulating foreign policy.

It is especially for this reason that I am worried about the impact of your review on the youth of the country. The Government cannot afford to make a fundamental reappraisal of its foreign policy every year. This review will without doubt lock the country into a foreign policy for the duration of the Trudeau era. This foreign policy will, in other words, define Canada's role for the formative political years of the generation now in its early twenties. I am uneasy that there has been no provision for the articulation of their views. This is all the more disquieting since the decisive decision will be made on that particular policy—NATO—which, for the young generation, is a symbol of the largely irrelevant foreign policy of the past decade.

A final indication of what is at stake is the effect that the redefinition of Canadian foreign policy will have on Canada's nation-building process. Since general dissatisfaction over Government foreign policy has grown—the nuclear strike role, the involvement in Vietnam, Paris-Ottawa relations—foreign policy has not been a source of unity in this country. It has not been realizing its potential as an instrument of promoting national cohesion. As politicians, you are as aware as I of the tremendous symbolic importance that national policy can have for the people. With Canada still grappling with its fundamental political identity crisis, a creative and imaginative foreign policy can be a major constructive force in resolving this tension in the decade ahead. To do this, our foreign policy must be one with which the major elements of our population, English-Canadian, French-Canadian and new-Canadian, can identify.

Having made a case for what is at stake in the foreign policy review which you have undertaken, let me add what seem to me to be two extraordinarily opportune factors facilitating your successful achievement of this goal.

1. Canada has a unique chance not just to dream up in theory but to realize in practice a fundamentally new foreign policy. Consider the following factors:

— a new Prime Minister with a quite different style having announced his intention to make a basic reappraisal of Canadian foreign policy has received a majority mandate both in English and in French Canada. The diplomatic world is thus prepared for Canada to express a revised policy.

— in the capital which is most important to us, Washington, D.C., there is also an unusually flexible situation: the transfer of power in the White House is leading to reviews of such major components of American foreign policy as aid and the anti-ballistic missile system. As long as our foreign policy review can be completed without excessive delay, the revised Canadian international stance can be integrated into the American review as one of the factors in the world situation that Nixon's policy must take into account.

2. for all the disadvantages of having to deal first of all with NATO, the simple fact that the whole NATO agreement is coming to the end of its twenty year mandate makes it possible to reassess NATO in quite a different spirit. It is not a question of unilaterally breaking ranks. The question of its future is not being raised by a dissident member as did de Gaulle several years ago. The organization has lived its twenty years' projected life. The question of the future military co-operation of the current members of NATO is thus a proper subject of debate. This means that Canada need fear no opprobrium for opening the discussion. Quite the contrary, it can offer the Atlantic community the benefit of the considerable energies that have been devoted here to Canada's foreign policy review. What the Prime Minister said of the Canadian constitution is also true of NATO: it is "up for grabs". We will be doing no service to our closest international friends if we do not have the imagination and daring to think ahead for the next ten if not twenty years rather than asking the petty questions about regrouping some troops to Bavaria or redeploying our repainted aircraft carrier.

It is for these reasons that I would beg the Committee's indulgence if, in my paper, I step in where previous—or at least more expert—angels have feared to tread. Rather than becoming entangled in the underbrush of the NATO: Yes/No, In/Out or For/Against debate, I would like to propose an overall analysis both of the international situation and of Canada's role in it. If agreement can be reached on this analysis, you would have a framework for the consideration of the particular foreign policy areas whether military or economic, American or African. For foreign policies ultimately are indivisible. Keeping in mind that the concrete policy issue before the Committee is NATO, I will sketch my analysis of the general principles from which our foreign policy should be derived with special reference to military policy.

The General Framework for a Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1970's.

Two major factors must be considered in defining a total foreign policy: 1) the international situation as it is and appears likely to develop; 2) the country's national interests, both external and internal.

1. The International Situation.

In an age of insecurity, the most important question a country must ask about the world situation is what are the major threats. The answer at any particular moment is crucial since it has already been remarked to this Committee that a major danger in foreign policy making is preparing to deal with the problems of the past. This must always be a problem since leaderships in their forties, fifties or sixties carry into their policy making views of the world determined by their experience gained in their twenties and thirties. The challenge for this foreign policy review, in other words is to try to grasp the problems of man in his world, 1969-1979, not re-live the story of Canada in its world, 1949-1969. A summary sketch of the changing threat in the last decades will illustrate the point:

—late 1930's: Hitler's expansionist Nazism contained by no collective security capacity. Remedial action: none.

—late 1940's: Stalin's military, political consolidation of the Soviet East European sphere of influence threatened politically unstable, economically weak West Europe. Remedial strategy: collective security by NATO plus economic development by Marshall Plan.

—late 1950's: East-West confrontation in Europe with growing tension throughout the developing world, all in the perspective of a nuclear balance of terror. Strategy: East-West status quo defended by U.S. world policing function and some aid effort.

There need be no great difficulty in making a general assessment of the world scene at the close of the 1960's. The stabilization of Soviet and European communism has reduced the former communist military threat to the West turning the Cold War into a less uneasy Cold Peace. One can no longer talk about the "communist bloc" now split fundamentally between the Chinese and the Soviets. Even within Moscow's and Peking's respective spheres of influence, the forces of nationalism, whether in Rumania or Hanoi, no longer make it possible even to talk about the Soviet bloc or Chinese bloc. Where communist regimes have established themselves, they have not shown irresistible practical—as opposed to verbal—external aggressiveness. The China and Cuban revolutions have been less a threat to Western and neighbouring interests than was first thought. The

break up of the communist bloc, its loss of expansionist momentum and the stabilization of the individual communist regimes thus spells the decline of communism as our major world threat. (The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia should be seen as a defensive operation by a conservative Kremlin and not a threat of new expansion.) This does not mean the end of either political or military instability in the third world. But it is clear that Western-dominated military alliances like SEATO cannot be relied on to impose stability since the developing countries don't see communism as a major threat but work out their foreign policies in terms of their own national interests, as can be seen from Pakistan's rapid shift from major American base in Asia to principal Chinese ally. As for indigenous revolutionary movements and liberation wars, the prolonged and grizzly record of the Vietnam conflict has rubbed in the lesson that internally generated social and political revolutions cannot be contained or defeated by military interventions of the super-powers.

The major threat overshadowing the whole global situation is the nuclear holocaust. The uneasy balance of terror that was tested in Cuba in 1962 is again threatened by the prospect of the two super nuclear powers entering a new stage of their self-perpetuated arms race, despite the increasingly compatible character of their national interests and the considerable progress it has been made in achieving a working collaboration between them (hot line, anti-proliferation treaty).

What can one project from this apparent situation for the decade ahead? In Europe we can anticipate a general continuation of economic progress with continental integration making progress after de Gaulle loses or leaves power. In the Soviet Union one can hope for little more than a perpetuation of an authoritarian, decreasingly dynamic, but nevertheless militarily advanced system. In the third world efforts to accomplish serious economic and social development will required first of all strong and enlightened national leadership but secondly major supplies of aid from the developed countries. But the growing economic gap will worsen making poverty the world's major menace. We should expect continuing instability, both military (border wars, civil wars) and political coups (army coups, radical political movements). The least predictable factor in our projected scenario is the role of the United States. Whether it will push on with the military technological race; whether it will try to maintain its largely unsuccessful world police role in all areas where it has an economic and ideological interest; whether it draws in its horns, reducing aid and military commitments in order to concentrate on its

own enormous internal social and economic problems: it is impossible to foretell. I would anticipate the U.S. pursuing all three directions. These imponderables must be seriously considered in our policy making. Our policy will have to adapt to whatever the American reality becomes. More important, we must be concerned with helping affect the course of the American debate on these policies that will affect global developments.

The scenario for the 'seventies as I see it is thus one in which the over-riding communist menace that dominated our thinking in the late 'forties and 'fifties is no longer the major concern. Rather the threat to our future is on three levels:

1. *The threat of nuclear holocaust* resulting either from a mishandled super-power confrontation, from their engaging in another stage of their self-generated arms race or from the nuclear capacity proliferating among the middle powers.

The implication for Canadian military forward planning is the highest priority being put on dissuading the super-powers, particularly our American friends, from this hazardous venture and working to achieve disarmament and denuclearization agreements that will keep the nuclear threat within some acceptable limits of instability.

2. *The threat of sporadic local wars* in the third world of the Nigeria-Biafra, Arab-Israel or India-Pakistan types. The military role of the industrialized countries in the third world will not be that of world policemen acting by arbitrary intervention on the model of the unfortunate Dominican Republic episode. Rather it will be one of co-operative peace-keeping and peace-making, small-scale policing operations set up by request of the disputing countries themselves or, where a conflict is beyond such settlement, by international agreement.

The implication for Canadian military policy is that a continued peace-keeping role by a country with an increasingly independent international stance will continue to be in considerable need.

3. To the extent that *the European security situation* can be distinguished from the American-Soviet nuclear stand off, the major source of military tension is less the alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact than the political cause of the Tensions these Pacts have grown up to reflect, namely the unresolved split of Germany and Berlin into two ideological opposed sections.

The military implication of this for Canada is that in an economically, politically and militarily restored West Europe, our role can either be to re-inforce the status quo and so help postpone the settlement of

this fundamental source of tension or to press for its resolution. Since the 'fifties and 'sixties have shown that the former strategy and the passage of time have not led to a tackling of the underlying problem, this would suggest that Canada should encourage the re-opening of the dossier of the German settlement.

The military implications of this projection of the current international situation into the 1970's is a declining need for a forward military commitment in Europe but a maintenance of a peace-keeping capability able to act with vigor and effectiveness in several parts of the world—Europe included—as needed and requested on very short notice.

The National Interests: External.

While everyone agrees that foreign policy must serve the national interests, how these interests are defined is as much subject to interpretation as any part of the public policy. To say we want to further the objective of world peace and prosperity is not good enough. Are we going to mean the peace of the status quo that maintains the world imbalance in favour of the rich nations whose prosperity will continue to increase at the expense of the poor? Or do we mean a peace that makes room for the new nations and a prosperity that considers their poverty to be as inadmissible as the slums in our own back streets? In thinking of the long term, our national self-interest must be compatible with the best interests of the world as a whole and we must surely recognize that continued poverty in the revolution of rising expectations is a potent force of internal instability and so military insecurity. If the satisfactory social, economic and political development of other countries becomes a Canadian national interest, then productive relations with all foreign governments in the Soviet as in the third world, takes on a higher priority than regional military alliances. If, as I feel, a major Canadian interest is a weakening of the vicious circle of the nuclear arms race between the two super-powers, it should be a Canadian objective to encourage the consolidation of balancing power centres independent of either Soviet or American control.

The military implication of such an objective would be the containment of the super-powers' defence perimeters, the reduction of the threat perceived by each super-power from the other. This would imply arms control and denuclearized zones.

If the long-term international objectives of Canada are defined by where the needs are greatest, Europe now fully recovered from World War II must cede priority to the third world whose economic development is a moral as well as economic and political necessity. Since we must expect much tension to accompany the pangs of forced development of the ex-colonial people, a maximum international effort

centred on aid would need to be complemented by a significant military capacity of a peace-keeping type.

The National Interests: Internal.

While we must bear the needs of the world community continually in mind, we must also remember that foreign policy is simply one aspect of our Government's total activity. As such it must serve internal as well as external interests. Canada's most pressing national interest is its political survival of a federal state. As the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism is trying to tell us, Canada is undergoing a major identity crisis. Anglo-Saxon Canadians are searching to identify themselves as Canadians in a way that is distinct from the citizens of the United States; immigrants to English-speaking Canada have to adapt themselves to a culture that does not offer them a clear substitute identity; French-Canadians are struggling to determine whether it is not Quebec rather than Canada as a whole that can best give political expression to their collective existence. Since one of the continuing functions of foreign policy is to affirm a nation's personality to the world, it is essential that our own foreign relations be designed to give Canadians a sense of their separate bi-national identity by showing them how they act on and are perceived by the world outside. If it is the highest national priority to build a bi-national, confident and progressive political community, then our foreign policy should be consciously used to reinforce Canadians' sense of identity as a separate country with its own goals and policies. This implies that our foreign policy should bear a clear "made in Canada" label and should not continue its image of being a pale carbon copy of American policy objectives. This is not to advocate in anyway an anti-American approach. Rather the establishment of the distinctively Canadian foreign policy as a complement to the nation-building process implies that Canada should seek ways of being effective in the world arena that are identifiable. This does not mean rejecting all relationships of inter-dependence. It does mean that the worth of alliances and supra-national organizations should be measured in terms of the degree of effectiveness that Canada can have within them.

The military implications of this would be to play down membership in military clubs whose purpose is simply their own self-perpetuation and to play up participation in activities such as disarmament negotiations where Canadian initiative can contribute to the achievement of collective agreements.

If a major national interest that our foreign policy should be achieving is an assertion of the country's bi-national character, relations with French-speaking countries take on a new priority. Aid to French-speaking ex-colonies and efforts to develop a *Franco-*

phonie are two dimensions that can be pursued. It can be argued that, as long as de Gaulle is in power, nothing can be done about Canadian-French relations. This is not certain. Continued Canadian identification with American-led military regional alliances can only reinforce the French image of Canada as American satellite. Other things being equal the implication of a high priority being placed on French relations would be that Canada should strive to reduce its dependence on the United States, both militarily and economically.

There is a third dimension in which a consideration of the internal significance of our foreign policy should affect its design. Isolated external policies, however spectacular in themselves, will have far less an impact on developing the Canadian identity than would a coherent foreign policy that is explicitly integrated with an overall National Policy. Such a National Policy would specify not just Canada's role in the world but the meaning for Canada of biculturalism, regional economic equality and social justice. Our "special" relationship with the U.S.A. would be defined as being able to control our own socio-economic environment was the essential condition for the healthy development of the country.

But the Canadian-American relationship should not solely be defined negatively, as independence from U.S. control. Part of the Canadian National Policy, in my view, should include a conception of how Canada should itself influence American policy making. The question of an anti-ballistic missile system, for instance, should be a legitimate concern among the Canadian people who will be directly affected. The expression of Canadian concerns to the American politicians and American public opinion should be considered a basic national objective. We are the Americans' closest friends; we should act as such: independent, co-operating, frank, and when necessary, critical.

What this means in military-organizational terms could be decided pragmatically. It might mean retaining membership in the NORAD Agreement but shifting our participation from the supply of supplementary forces to participation in policy planning with a view to denuclearizing Canada and having the Pentagon abandon the ABM and MIRV missile systems with Soviet agreement to do the same. The home military role would not need to be very great: enough to patrol the coasts and the Arctic and be ready in time of national disaster.

A Canadian Foreign Policy for 'Seventies.

An examination of the international situation and its projection of how it is likely to evolve, combined with a consideration of Canadian external and internal national interests, establishes the general

framework within which we can shape a long-term conception of how Canada's foreign policy can be developed with a reasonable time span for implementation and realization. The purpose of this section is first to sketch a policy responding to the international situation and expressing Canadian national interests over the next ten year period and second to explore in somewhat greater detail the means of implementing such a foreign policy design.

1. *A Canadian Foreign Policy for 1980.*

Accepting the reality of the declining communist threat, the increasing third world need for economic development resources and the probability of continuing sporadic wars, a reasonable ten year target for Canadian foreign policy would be to reverse the budgetary allocations for military and aid spending. Assuming that foreign and military expenditures stay at a constant 2.5 per cent of the Gross National Product, this means that military and aid allocations would in ten years be switched from 2 per cent and .5 per cent to .5 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively, by 1980. From ranking as fourth or fifth world military power in the late 1940's Canada would have made the transition by 1980 to being a leading world aid power. While maintaining the same per cent of Gross National Product spent for foreign relations, Canada's international role would have shifted from its present one of marginal defence support for the Western anti-communist alliances to a dramatic anti-poverty international development strategy.

Militarily Canada would have perfected a relatively small, highly flexible and extremely mobile peace-keeping force whose range of operation could extend from Europe to Asia, from Africa to Latin America. Its light military equipment would serve both a peace-keeping and a disaster relief role: a strong engineering corps for emergency civil construction, a technological base for mobile communications, and an air transport capability for instant relief operations.

Canada would thus by the end of the 1970's have established a considerable specialization in its international activity, the third world now having number one priority. In its aid operations, Canada would be concentrating on countries and areas where its aid capacities and linguistic abilities gave it the greatest potential for successful impact: French- and English-speaking African countries, the Caribbean, the democratic Asian countries, and those Latin American countries that had proven their ability to make the necessary political and social progress which is a prerequisite for economic development in that continent.

In Europe with which normal international intercourse would be continuing to develop, it would be first economic, then political, and thirdly, military considerations that predominated. By that time, Canada could have worked out a fruitful associate status with the European Economic Community supplying both raw materials and technologically sophisticated products of specialized Canadian industries; in return the European industries would have developed outlets in Canada (on the Volvo model) as jumping off points for their penetration of the North American economy. Politically our contribution would be essentially to encourage the development of a supranational European "third force" and would hopefully have achieved a significant breakthrough in the resolution of the German problem. The contributing factor to such a political resolution of the German question would be the negotiated and mutual reduction in the force sizes of the Warsaw and NATO alliances within which the Canadian forces would have been repatriated. By phasing out its obsolete nuclear strike capacity and working out with its former NATO allies its new military role, Canada would have established its land mass as a nuclear free zone and have pressed its allies to transform NATO from a North Atlantic alliance of a collective security type to a West European military group in whose defence planning Canada and the U.S.A. would play a consultative role. Thus European security would still be guaranteed in two levels, by the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and on the ground by conventional forces organized by the European community itself as a viable third force.

Apart from contributing to reduce the threat that East European countries feel from West Germany, Canada would have been pursuing its constant policy of developing economic relations with the individual communist countries, doing what it could to establish contacts and increase understanding. While its impact in the Soviet Union would not have been enormous, its encouragement of relations with the East European countries could be expected by 1980 to have yielded considerably greater fruits, complementing the Gaullist policy of bilateral economic, cultural and scientific co-operation with these countries.

With the United States, Canada by 1980 should have established its position as a distinctive and friendly neighbouring power, working clearheadedly and dramatically in the developing countries and acting as a creative, but not subservient, friend in the whole field of East-West relations. Canada might still co-operate with the United States in its military and strategic planning, but in such a way as to reduce American-Soviet nuclear tensions. NORAD would, in

other words, have become an agency of arms control in one of the areas of continuing nuclear tension. A greatly increased Canadian effort to communicate its world policy views to the American political arena and to American public opinion would have made it clear—and perhaps even had some impact on American policy—that Canada wanted to promote world security by spurring social and economic development in the third world, not repress all signs of Left Wing political developments. In the economic dimension of its relationship, whether by bilateral or, preferably by international action, Canada would have hopefully achieved the establishment of rules of procedure governing the operation of multi-national firms, in a way compatible with the national interests of host countries.

2. Implementation

To sketch a ten year programme outlining a significant shift in Canada's international role can set the targets and outline some major avenues of operation. What is next needed is some idea about the practicality of achieving such goals and implementing the particular policy alliance suggested. Implementation would require first of all policy planning on a similar scale by those with whom Canada is most intimately involved, our current NATO partners. By making it clear to them that there was no intention arbitrarily to withdraw troops and support, by showing that Canada's ultimate foreign policy objectives were being redefined with world interests very much in mind, by being willing to carry on discussions with our allies on the best means and timetable of implementation, the transition to a different international role should provide no major diplomatic difficulties for Canada or its allies. The willingness to take great pains with the transitional measures, scheduled over a number of years, would be even more crucial for our own military establishment. Personnel retraining would be but one aspect of a major and long term plan to redirect the national military capability as part of the global planning process.

3. International Acceptance

The success of a bold long-term revised policy such as this would largely depend on the acceptance that it generated in foreign capitals. I mean this not just in the sense that the implementation of this programme would require co-operation from other countries but also in the sense that the new policy would be designed to affect the behaviour of other countries. Whether it successfully affected their behaviour would depend on how credibly the new policy was presented.

Acceptance in the U.S.A. would principally depend upon maintaining or reaffirming Canada's image as an independent, friendly neighbour with his own role to play. It would be important, for example, to keep pointing out to the Americans the usefulness of Canada's non-dependence: its ability to carry out operations which the United States, for various reasons, unable to perform such as Cyprus peace-keeping, aid to Tanzania, trial relationships with China, open-door for Cuba on the West. It would furthermore be essential that the United States understood that differences in policy were due not to antagonisms but to different assessments of the international situation and the way to deal with it. Such a clear, positive, unemotional handling of the American relationship should make talk of "retaliation" or the U.S. imposing its policies on Canada of trivial consequence. If Canada's objective is clearly to adapt its own international role to the needs of the 1970's, then the American politician or diplomat or general would not need to cry alarm. Rather American officials should be encouraged to observe Canada's policy changing process and take part in working out the transitional measures in such a way as to meet their own short term adjustment needs. Considerable attention would thus have to be paid to educating American political and public opinion. There is no reason to suppose that, if moderately executed, the Americans would not find Canadian policy both intelligent and helpful in their own reassessment and adaptation to the needs of the coming decade.

In Europe there would be little difficulty with such small or neutral countries as Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Norway. With France it could be expected that such a policy once started along the path of implementation should enhance the chances of re-establishing fruitful diplomatic and economic relations. With most NATO members in Europe, there should be no great difficulty in working out an acceptable timetable of withdrawal—preferably on the basis of some equivalent Warsaw Pact arms reduction. Rather than creating a domino effect, creative long-term policy discussions could help these countries rework their own military arrangements. Canada would make it clear that her conception of her mobile peace-keeping military role would embrace Europe in any time of need. Military consultation and continued collaboration in joint defence production, arms standardization and other co-operative military arrangements would be encouraged. The only country likely to take exception to the overall Canadian strategy would be West Germany, always sensitive to any weakening of its bargaining potential with the Eastern bloc. Since one of the political aims of this type of strategic withdrawal from Europe would be precisely the encouragement of a rethinking of the whole German situ-

ation—opening negotiations on the status of Berlin, the boundaries of East and West Germany and some form of East-West German co-operation—Canada should be willing to take the lead in restoring this long-repressed problem to the top of the international negotiating agenda. As in our American relations, there is no need for such a declaration of intention to lead to violent reactions in Germany. Rather this should be conceived as an effort to have a significant impact on those elements of progressive opinion in Germany that could be encouraged to move in the necessary direction towards a European settlement.

The impact on the *communist world* should not be exaggerated. While it would obviously be acceptable to the Soviet Union to have Canada de-nuclearized the Soviets would still be primarily preoccupied with West Germany that, for them, would still be the dominant fact of European life. It could, however, be expected that a significant reduction of NATO conventional forces and such technical nuclear threats as the Canadian bomber capability would have some reassuring affect on East European public and elite opinion reducing their own feeling of need for a countervailing Warsaw Pact. While the impact of such perceptions would be very hard to measure, its potential force as a liberalizing element has been seen only last year in Czechoslovakia. In the short term at least, one could not expect very favourable official reaction from the East European capitals. The pronouncements by the military would be extremely sceptical since the very *raison d'être* of the Warsaw Pact and the Generals in command of it would be threatened by the reduced NATO aggressiveness.

Similarly one should expect that spokesmen of NATO's military organization would themselves be highly skeptical, if not openly antagonistic to the proposed revision of Canadian long term policy. Since these two organizations require their mutual threat to justify their continued existence, their spokesmen would thus not likely be overly enthusiastic. Once again, however, the need for clear, patient and persuasive explanation of the new foreign policy by government leaders and diplomatic representatives would be of prime importance. Once again, too, the style of reasonable negotiation in designing transitional measures should be enough to overcome foreign military opposition.

Summary

I have been arguing from an analysis of the current international situation and a projection of the world relationships over the next decade to a Canadian international role that by 1980 would establish Canada as a Great Aid Power. Working back from

the way Canada would by that time be acting in the major areas of policy, we come to a programme of action centred round the revision of NATO that will by then have lived its twenty year term to an end. Canada would serve notice to its fellow members that its ten year policy was to proceed with a phased restructuring of its international role in collaboration with its NATO partner with the above-mentioned long-term aims in mind. One would anticipate spending a year in discussions with the NATO powers on the many range of long-term planning issues that such a ten year proposal would generate in the other political systems. As joint policies worked out, withdrawals could proceed. As progress was made in adapting to the Canadian phasing out, European forces could introduce their next generation of conventional military equipment. While the necessary steps and stages could be spelled out in greater detail, enough has been said to indicate that the choice before Canada in the immediate short term need not be phrased in the high confrontation style of immediate withdrawal from NATO. A profoundly rethought long term policy can, in other words be implemented in a manner that does not rouse antagonisms or retaliation from those whom it will ultimately affect—and, in my view, benefit.

Political Acceptability

Having asked how such a long term foreign policy adjustment would be implemented and how acceptable it would be to the major powers and allies, one still has to evaluate this proposal in terms of the Canadian political situation. Is such a programme acceptable? I can best answer this by dealing with the obvious questions that come to mind:

— Would this be considered by the older and more conservative segments of the population as too radical a break with previous foreign policy? The answer in practice would as we have seen in other cases above depend largely on the way that such a policy was presented to the Canadian public. It seems to me that it is entirely consistent with the Canadian international tradition. It does not try to cut off Canada from the North American continent and float it out to sea; it does not claim that Canada should be a non-aligned country in the Yugoslav or Indian pattern. It explicitly accepts the maintenance of a very considerable international responsibility vastly increasing the productive elements in our foreign relations—economic aid—which informed and articulate public opinion universally approves. It would in no way be stabbing our allies in the back since no commitment relating to NATO would be broken. Indeed it should be considered as highly responsible Canadian statesmanship to raise the question of the future of NATO in terms of the long-term perspective. It would not leave any currently defended sector of the NATO shield un-

defended since it would allow ample time for re-grouping to take place. It would in other words be in the best tradition of Canadian diplomacy: a proposal aimed at creative change and implemented by multilateral negotiation.

— Would it be seen as too anti-American? There is no reason why it should, except by those who blindly accept as God-given everything that is at the moment American policy. It has after all been characteristic of our relationship for our two countries to have significant differences in our strategic analysis and in our view of our respective national interests. Twice since 1914, when the United States was defending an isolationist policy and did not perceive the major international threat before her, Canada went to war notwithstanding her neighbour's isolationism. Twice since 1959, when the United States over-reacted to a perceived threat, Canada stood its ground (Cuba and the Dominican Republic). There is no reason it should be thought that such a constructive initiative should endanger the American relationship.

— Would this policy programme be acceptable to French Canada? There is every reason to believe so. Anti-communism is no longer a dominant concern there, NATO has long been considered an essentially Anglo-American operation particularly as Canadian forces' symbolism is so strongly bound up with the monarchy. For those who look to substantial French relations for inspiration and support in Quebec's development, the de-nationalization of Canadian foreign policy should be an especially positive feature. Apart from the separatists who might want to nourish Paris-Ottawa hostilities, improved relations between these capitals should be seen by the French Canadian as a significant proof of the desire to make Canadian foreign policy express the bi-national character of Confederation. As for the other side of the coin—vastly expanded aid operations—these would clearly be directed in large measure to social, economic and political support of Francophone countries, with the employment opportunities for French Canadians that such aid would provide.

— What of Canadian youth? As someone who is professionally involved with the most articulate members of the new generation, I have no hesitation in affirming that such a foreign policy adequately explained would be over-whelmingly supported by Canadian youth for whom NATO has lost almost all credibility as symbol for all that is out of date and irrelevant in Canadian foreign policy. The expansion of the Canadian aid industry would furthermore offer them prospects of creative employment in fields that could harness their idealism expressed at

the moment in the expanding interest in university courses on the third world.

— But what of the military? Many would feel their jobs threatened. Many would be discouraged that, so soon after the tri-service unification had shaken up the military establishment, yet another policy change was to be implemented. This calls for every understanding and consideration in the re-training and re-employing of those whose jobs might be displaced. But if we are to believe the testimony of the previous military experts, the extremely high ratio of non-fighting to fighting men that characterizes our forces might indicate that the phased reduction of Canada's military activity would affect more people in civilian type activities than actual fighting troops. Re-training for new equipment and defence roles is in any case so much a continuing characteristic of military life that there should be little difficulty in adapting to a full-scale peace-keeping capability.

If this proposal is, then, politically acceptable, as well as internationally acceptable are there any further objections that might be raised? The only serious one that I can envisage is the economic query: what would this do to our military-industrial complex? Joint defense production agreements account, after all, for some 400 million dollars of business, the rough equivalent of our imports of military equipment from the U.S.A. In the long term, defense production might be expected to diminish as a significant element in the economy, since buying less American arms might reduce U.S. willingness to allow Canadian firms (or American subsidiaries) to place bids on U.S. defence contracts. By the same token, however, government investment in aid operations would have the equivalent impact on the economy—on the reasonable political assumption that Canadian aid would continue to be tied. The implication of this on the economy is that the shift in Government spending priorities would stimulate research and development in areas of much greater social importance (new dietary products, mass birth control, agricultural techniques, maritime food production) than rocket launchers, or green berets.

Conclusions

Twenty years ago Canada took the lead in inventing and negotiating the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to meet what was felt to be a major international need: a regional collective security arrangement. Now that this organization has fulfilled its purpose, Canada has a similar chance to take the lead in attacking the major economic, political and moral problem that now confronts the

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world: the growing gap separating the rich nations from the poor. long-range plan as I have outlined above.

I would strongly recommend to this Committee that it urge the Government to take the initiative once again by adopting such a clear and constructive

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen Clarkson,
University of Toronto,
February 28th, 1969.

APPENDIX TT

CANADA'S ROLE IN LONG-TERM WORLD PERSPECTIVE:
A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INITIATIVE

by Stephen Clarkson,
Dept. of Political Economy,
University of Toronto.
March 6th, 1969.

Summary

The foreign policy review is being turned on its head by having to make a decision on NATO *before* the basic reappraisal is made of Canada's role in the world. Rather than the reformulation of a general foreign policy approach for the years ahead determining our attitude to North Atlantic security, a decision on NATO will beg the important questions of the foreign policy review.

The political stakes of the foreign policy review are high: the credibility of participatory democracy, the locking of Canadian foreign policy into what will be its mould for the Trudeau era. Thus the effectiveness of Canadian foreign policy as a nation-building instrument will be determined by whether French, English, new and young Canadians will find in it an expression of their national identity.

Canada has a great opportunity to change its foreign policy:

— our allies are prepared for the new Government to make changes;

— NATO is in any case ending its first twenty years and so must be reassessed.

This paper urges the Committee to decide its military policy only after:

1. appraising the *major international threats* as they are today and evaluating the probable shape of the world's problems by 1980 (declining communist threat, continuing nuclear menace, growing economic disparity between industrialized and under-developed countries, continuing sporadic local and civil wars in the third world);

2. identifying the nature of *Canada's national interests*, both its external long-term interests (peace which allows progressive change in the third world, prosperity which reduces the gap between rich and poor nations and a limit to the escalation of the nuclear arms race) and its internal needs (a distinct Canadian identity to be promoted by a coherent

National Policy integrating social and economic policies with a clear view of Canada's role in the world and relationship with the United States).

In the light of this analysis of the projected international situation and Canada's continuing national interests, a ten-year foreign policy programme for the seventies is proposed.

Keeping its expenditures for foreign relations (defence and foreign aid) a constant proportion of the gross national product, we should simply switch the military and aid allocations so that by 1980 Canada would be spending 2% of GNP on aid and .5% on defence. Canada was a leading military power in the late '40's. This programme would re-establish Canada's role as a major contributor to world stability by making her a leading world aid power by 1980.

Canada's military role would be specialized as a peace-keeping and disaster relief force highly flexible and mobile, able to move anywhere on the globe—Europe included—when requested and needed.

Canada's aid activity would concentrate on those countries in the developing areas where aid would have the greatest potential impact: particularly Francophone and English-speaking African countries and the Caribbean.

The long-term foreign policy target would be implemented by as long a transitional process as required by the defence needs of our allies with whom the transition would be negotiated.

The paper concludes by demonstrating the high degree of acceptance such a programme would receive within the North Atlantic community and within the Canadian political system, on condition that it is presented as what it is: consistent with Canada's best tradition of responsible international leadership at a watershed in the world's political development. What Canada did in 1948/9 for European security, we can do again for world economic stability.

APPENDIX TT

CANADA'S ROLE IN LONG-TERM WORLD PERSPECTIVE:

A SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

Stephen Clarkson
Dept. of Political Economy
University of Toronto

*A General Conception of
Canada's International Role*

For twenty years Canada's foreign policy has been defensive, both in the literal sense that it has been centred round defence—as can readily be seen by the size of our defence budget relative to national expenditures on other foreign policy activities—and in the figurative sense that our international role has been largely deferential to American policy. "Quiet diplomacy" has been the slogan for the Canadian foreign policy doctrine conceived as a basic support for and reflection of the policies of the Western alliance. Particularly in the latter years U.S. relations have been thought of as a one-way street, in which retaliation has been the major obsession and hence foreign policy was conceived as a reaction within the limits imposed by the direction of U.S. policy.

However such a conception may have been justified in the past by the pressures of the Cold War and inherent Canadian feelings of inferiority and dependence in an insecure world, the conditions in which Canada must redefine its general conception of its world role have changed:—There is less automatic faith in the wisdom of American foreign policy.—There is a greater self-confidence by Canadians in their own abilities to tackle and resolve their own policy problems.

The time has now come for us to conceive Canada's world role as an *active and creative foreign policy* by which Canada takes initiatives and leadership in confronting world problems. In particular this means we should realize that Canada can play its most important roles in influencing American foreign policy by taking leads that the American president cannot himself initiate because of internal political pressures or external formal commitments. Rather than playing an obstructionist Gaullism from outside the circle of Western friends, Canada can play an independent and so more influential role by staying within the Western alliance but initiating new efforts to resolve fundamental and persisting problems.

Canada should, in other words, exploit the importance of its unimportance and use its lack of international commitments round the world to provide

international leadership which the Americans can then follow.

Biographical Sketch

Stephen Clarkson was born in London in October 1937 and educated in Toronto. He graduated from the University of Toronto in history and languages in 1959, went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar where he studied politics and economics and did his doctorate in political science at the University of Paris' Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

From 1964 he has been teaching comparative politics at the Department of Political Economy of the University of Toronto where he is now associate professor.

His main field of academic research is the Soviet theory of under-development. He has published articles on this subject in the journals *Problems of Communism*, *International Journal*, the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* and the *Economic and Political Weekly*. His book, *L'analyse soviétique des problèmes indiens du sous-développement*, will be published this year. He spent 1967-68 at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University and two months last summer in the Soviet Union continuing this research.


His publications on Canadian problems include:

"A Programme for Bi-national Development", in Peter Russell, ed., *Nationalism in Canada*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966. "Charting a Course for Canadian Foreign Policy", *Globe and Mail*, July 12, 1967. "The Politics of Economic Dependence", a Study for *Watkins Report*.

He was programme chairman on Canadian foreign policy for the University League for Social Reform for whom he edited *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968.

He is on the Board of Editors of the *Canadian Forum* to which he has contributed regularly.

He is fully bilingual.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE


ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

PROCEEDINGS

No. 35



MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1969

TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

INCLUDING
FIFTH REPORT TO THE HOUSE

THE QUEEN'S PRINTER, OTTAWA, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Buchanan	Laniel	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Cafik	Laprise	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Carter	Legault	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
¹ Fairweather	Lewis	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	Marceau	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹Mr. Fairweather replaced Mr. Asselin on March 24, 1969.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
THURSDAY, January 16, 1969

Ordered,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be instructed, to hear evidence on and to consider Canada's policy with reference to defence and external affairs.

MONDAY, March 3, 1969.

Ordered,—That the Members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be granted leave to travel outside Canada between March eighth and March twenty-second, 1969, for the purpose of furthering their work; and that the necessary staff accompany them.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.



REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, March 26, 1969.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

FIFTH REPORT

Pursuant to its Order of Reference of Thursday, January 16, 1969, your Committee has heard evidence on and has considered Canada's policy with reference to defence and external affairs.

Your Committee held 24 meetings in Canada from January 21, 1969 to March 25, 1969, and heard the following witnesses (listed in order of appearance before the Committee):

1. Mr. John Gellner, Editor, the *Commentator*, Toronto.
2. Dr. O. M. Solandt, Chairman, Science Council of Canada.
3. Dr. Raymond D. Gastil, from the Hudson Institute, Inc., Croton-on-Hudson, New York.
4. Mr. Robert A. Krupka, from the Hudson Institute, Inc., Croton-on-Hudson, New York.
5. Major General M. R. Dare, Deputy Chief Operations and Reserves, Canadian Forces Headquarters.
6. Professor Adam Yarmolinsky, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
7. Professor James Eayrs, Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto.
8. Professor Charles Foulkes, Visiting Professor, School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.
9. Professor Michael Brecher, Department of Economics and Political Science, McGill University, Montreal.
10. Professor Kenneth McNaught, Department of History, University of Toronto.
11. Mr. David Golden, President, Air Industries Association of Canada.
12. Professor John W. Warnock, Department of Economics and Political Science, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.
13. Professor Albert Legault, Visiting Professor, Chair of Strategic Studies, Queen's University, Kingston.
14. Dr. Theo Sommer, Deputy Editor and Foreign Editor of *Die Zeit*, Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany.
15. Professor J. L. Granatstein, Assistant Professor of History, York University, Downsview, Toronto.
16. Professor Stephen Clarkson, Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto.

The Order of Reference of March 3, 1969 granted leave to the Members of the Committee to travel outside Canada between March 8 and 22, 1969, for the purpose of furthering their work. Accordingly, the Members visited Europe as an integral part of the Committee's consideration of Canada's defence policy and concluded the first phase of the overall review of defence policy that began in January. The Members of the Committee visited Cyprus, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden, France and Belgium.

Members met and held discussions with many prominent persons. These included the President of Cyprus, the Secretary General of NATO, Defence and Foreign Ministers of a number of countries visited, NATO civilian and military officials including the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, political leaders and representatives of all parties in countries visited, officials of foreign and defence ministries, Canadian and foreign military officers, Canadian representatives in Europe, representatives of important research institutions such as the Institute for Strategic Studies and prominent journalists and political commentators.

The following documents were printed as Appendices to the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

- Z —Proposed Programme for Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence and Programme: Phase I.
- AA—Text prepared by Mr. John Gellner and his biographical sketch.
- BB—Biography of Dr. O. M. Solandt.
- CC—The Effectiveness of Civil Defence—by Raymond D. Gastil and Robert A. Krupka and biographical sketches on Dr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka.
- DD—Biography of Major General M. R. Dare.
- EE—Text prepared by Professor Adam Yarmolinsky and his biographical sketch.
- FF—Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada—notes prepared by Professor James Eayrs and Professor Eayrs' biographical sketch.
- GG—A Canadian Response To Collective Security—by Professor Charles Foulkes, and Professor Foulkes' biography.
- HH—Neutrality: An Analysis—by Professor Michael Brecher, and Professor Brecher's curriculum vitae.
- II—Non-Alignment For Canada—by Professor Kenneth McNaught, and Professor McNaught's curriculum vitae.
- JJ—List of Bilateral Defence Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries.
- KK—Letter to Professor McNaught dated July 31, 1967, from the Director, Home Branch, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Ottawa.
- LL—Canadian Defence Policy and the United States—by Mr. David Golden, and Mr. Golden's biographical sketch.
- MM—Text prepared by Professor John Warnock, and his biography.

NN—Text prepared by Professor Albert Legault, his biography, and list of publications.

OO—Biography of Dr. Theo. Sommer.

PP—Text prepared by Professor J. L. Granatstein, and his curriculum vitae.

QQ—Speech by the Hon. Léo Cadieux, delivered January 27, 1969.

RR—Speech by the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, delivered February 20, 1969.

SS—Speech by the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, delivered March 1, 1969.

TT—Text prepared by Professor Stephen Clarkson, and his biography.

In addition, a number of submissions were received from interested citizens and organizations. Only those submissions which were supported by a direct appearance before the Committee have been included in the formal records of the Committee.

PART I

Scope of Preliminary Report

The Committee's Order of Reference of January 16, 1969 authorizes a thorough review of Canada's policy with reference to defence and external affairs. The Committee intends to continue its present review of defence policy after the Easter recess.

Although its work is not complete, the Committee thinks it desirable to make this report, including recommendations with regard to Canadian participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), before the Government announces its policy with reference to NATO on or before April 10, 1969 when the North Atlantic Council meets in Washington.

Canada and the United Nations

Canada's territory is not directly menaced by threat of invasion by any other nation. Nevertheless Canada would be seriously affected in any world conflict and shares with all other nations a vital interest in the maintenance of peace, world order and stability. Canadians therefore need a peaceful world order—one which is not static but rather one that will permit and encourage change, so that peoples of the world can live peacefully and the largest possible measure of freedom and equality of opportunity.

The achievement of such objectives through collective security was one of the purposes for which the United Nations was founded after the Second World War. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, hopes for world peace through the United Nations have not yet been realized.

Canadians are enthusiastic supporters of the United Nations as one of the best possible ways to achieve the type of world order which they desire. The Committee believes that all United Nations members should apply even more leadership, ingenuity and effort to assist the evolution and development of the United Nations so that it can effectively achieve collective security through the establishment and enforcement of the rule of law in international affairs.

Canada's Existing Alliances

Canada's defence policy since the Second World War has been based upon alliances—notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and defence arrangements with the United States including the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). Such alliances are contemplated by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949 and the organization now consists of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The organization resulted largely from a reaction of its members to the rapid expansion of Russian territory and influence after the Second World War and from fears of further Russian aggression and subversion of Western Europe.

The Treaty did not itself impose specific military commitments upon any of its members. Article 5 of the Treaty recognized that assistance might be military or non-military the nature of any military forces to be maintained by each of the members was left to the discretion of such member and the Treaty itself made no provision for the pooling of military forces or any integrated or joint command. Very soon, however, procedures and institutions were developed under the Treaty pursuant to which member countries undertook to provide military forces and to integrate these forces under a unified command.

The Treaty provides that after it has been in force for twenty years, any party may give written notice of withdrawal. Withdrawal becomes effective one year after such notice has been given. The treaty came into force when it was ratified by a majority of the original signatories on August 24, 1949. Accordingly, at any time after August 24, 1969 any member can withdraw on one year's notice.

NORAD

The agreement between Canada and the United States for formal establishment of the North American Air Defence Command was signed May 12, 1958. Originally it was effective for a ten-year period. It was renewed on March 30, 1968 for a further five-year period. However, it can be reviewed at any time and following such review it may be terminated by either Canada or the United States on one year's notice.

Basically the NORAD agreement sets up an integrated command for the planning operation of the air defences of Canada and the Continental United States. The Commander-in-Chief is an American. The Deputy Commander is a Canadian. They are responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff who in turn are responsible to their respective governments.

The NORAD Agreement does not impose any specific obligation on either country to allocate military forces to the NORAD Command. The NORAD Command includes only such individuals and combat units as the two governments from time to time choose to allocate to it.

Because the Committee intends to continue its review of NORAD in later hearings it decided not to include in this report any recommendations with regard to NORAD.

Canada's Present Military Contributions to NATO

Canada is providing a fully mechanized brigade group which now has a peacetime strength of approximately 6,000 men. The brigade is equipped with a variety of modern mechanized equipment, most of which is of recent origin and includes two Honest John launchers armed with short-range nuclear warheads. However, the Centurion tanks have seen heavy service and the Committee was informed that for this reason they would require replacements in the early 1970's. The 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, with its headquarters in Soest, Germany, forms a part of the British Army on the Rhine, which in turn constitutes a part of the Northern Army Group, which is responsible for defending the North German plains.

Canada has also committed an Air Division in Europe. The 1st Air Division is at present organized in 6 squadrons of Canadian-built F-104 aircraft. These are divided into 4 squadrons of strike-attack aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional weapons, and 2 squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft, which also have a limited conventional attack capability. The Committee was informed that these aircraft will probably remain serviceable until the mid 1970's. The complement of the Air Division, once the squadrons are concentrated on two bases, will be approximately 3,800 men. Its headquarters is in Lahr in Southern Germany and it forms part of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force in Central and Southern Germany.

Canada also makes available to NATO for service in Europe a brigade of air-transportable troops which are based in Canada.

Canada's East Coast maritime forces are earmarked to NATO and would be assigned to Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) in an emergency. These forces include 1 aircraft carrier, 15 destroyer escorts, 3 submarines and 26 long-range Argus aircraft. Forces on the West Coast can also be assigned to NATO. They comprise 5 destroyer escorts, 1 submarine and 4 Argus aircraft.

The Committee visited the headquarters of the 1st Air Division and the mobile headquarters of the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. All members of the Committee were impressed by the dedication and professional competence of the Canadian officers and men wherever they were serving. These Canadian forces are all highly regarded by the other forces with whom they are associated and are establishing a very favourable reputation for Canada.

PART II

Is Neutrality a Possible Policy for Canada?

While most witnesses believed that Canada should continue to participate in defensive alliances, a few have advocated Canada's withdrawal from alliances and the adoption of neutrality or a policy of non-alignment. These witnesses stated Canada was not menaced from abroad; they felt that the prime danger arose from involvement in any conflict between the alliances; and they argued that Canada could play a more independent and influential international role as a neutral or non-aligned nation.

The Committee had an opportunity to assess the validity of this argument in Sweden. They were impressed by the Swedish conviction that their defence forces must be capable of providing a balanced defence of the whole country

with forces sufficient to make any attack by an aggressor unprofitable. The Swedish analysis assumes that their territory is of only marginal interest to the Great Powers and they depend on NATO to offset the power of the Warsaw Pact. Finally, they believe their defence system must be sufficiently effective to convince the Great Powers on both sides that Sweden will and can fulfill the obligations of a neutral state. This policy involves compulsory military service and much higher defence costs than Canada is now incurring.

The Committee concludes that neutrality would not be possible for Canada because of our proximity to the United States and the fact that we live directly between the United States and the Soviet Union. Swedish experience, moreover, indicates that to have Canada's neutrality respected by both Great Powers would require prohibitively costly defence expenditures.

Should Canada Rely Solely Upon United States Protection?

It has been argued before the committee that Canadian defence expenditures can be substantially reduced because of the fact that Canada's geographical proximity to the United States makes it necessary for the United States to defend Canada in order to defend itself. This has been referred to as the "free ride" theory.

The Committee does not accept this theory. On the contrary, it is convinced that Canada must be prepared to incur reasonable expenditures for its own defence in order to maintain its independence and freedom of action as a nation, and to ensure that Canadian interests are taken into account when continental defence measures are being considered. The committee recognizes that Canada's geographical position as the neighbour of a super-power, the United States, does indeed confer certain advantages. One of these is that it frees Canada from the need to maintain a complete range of defensive equipment and thereby enables Canada to make a contribution to world security which in the broadest sense is also a contribution to her own security in other fields.

Can Foreign Aid be a Substitute for Defence Expenditures?

A few witnesses urged that Canada should reduce very substantially its defence expenditures and use the defence dollars so saved to increase aid to developing countries. The Committee is not satisfied that defence and aid expenditures should be interdependent. Expenditures to assist developing countries are desirable and Canada should be generous, but such expenditures do not, at any rate in the short term, provide security for Canada and therefore are no substitute for defence expenditures. This is, however, a topic which the Committee hopes to examine in the future.

Should Canada Concentrate on United Nations Peacekeeping?

Evidence presented to the Committee indicated that, in the future, United Nations peacekeeping operations would not be likely where the intervention of a peacekeeping force would be adverse to the interests of any of the Great Powers, whose approval in the Security Council would not otherwise be forthcoming. They would be required, however, when such interests were not involved, where the Great Powers had an interest in seeing stability in the area maintained, and when the host state was ready to extend the necessary invitation.

The Committee had the opportunity to visit the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. It was impressed by the spirit of co-operation among the national units making up the United Nations force and particularly by the efficiency and morale of the Canadian contingent (3rd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment) and by the respect for it which prevails not only among United Nations officials, but also among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Committee is satisfied that, in Cyprus, the Canadian peacekeeping forces are fulfilling a most useful and worthwhile role and making a valuable contribution to Canada's reputation abroad.

While some witnesses suggested that Canada's attractiveness as a state able to provide peacekeeping forces might be marginally increased if Canada were not a member of NATO, the more persuasive testimony suggested that any disadvantages were compensated for by certain advantages as a peacekeeper which NATO membership conferred on Canada. The record also indicates that NATO membership has not led to Canada's exclusion from any peacekeeping operation. The Committee accordingly concludes that NATO membership does not inhibit Canada from playing a useful peacekeeping role through the United Nations. Moreover, certain forces earmarked for NATO are also earmarked for United Nations service, so that no extra costs are involved in filling these two tasks.

What is the Effect of Alliance Membership on Canada's Influence?

A number of witnesses urged that Canada should withdraw entirely from its alliances on the ground that our continued membership makes us suspect with the non-aligned or developing countries of the world. As a member of alliances, it was asserted that Canada's influence with the nations of the "third world" is much less than it would be if we withdrew from them completely, our credibility as an independent nation at the United Nations is undermined and our acceptability in peacekeeping operations is seriously impaired.

Other witnesses who appeared before the Committee adopted an argument opposite to that outlined above. They advocated continued active participation by Canada in NATO on the ground that NATO provides the principal forum within which to exercise an influence on the trend of events in the area of the world where there is the greatest risk that local conflict could escalate into a nuclear exchange. Some of the witnesses further maintained that Canada's close association with the United States and other NATO countries was favourably regarded by some non-aligned states who believe that Canada can serve as an intermediary with these countries.

The Committee concludes that Canada's influence with other nations of the world, including the non-aligned and developing nations, its influence at the United Nations and its acceptability in United Nations peacekeeping operations will be determined more by the degree of independence, objectivity and fairness which Canada exhibits in its relations with other countries than by its alliance associations.

The Committee further notes that a neutral state such as Sweden does not appear to derive for that reason more influence with other nations than does a comparable state in NATO such as Canada. While the Committee finds it difficult to assess intangibles such as influence, it concludes that Canada derives advantage from being able to put its views forward in the NATO forum where issues affecting European and world security are discussed and decided.

Is NATO Necessary?

Conflicting arguments were presented to the Committee with regard to the continuing importance of NATO. Some argued that Russia remains aggressive and expansionist, e.g., Czechoslovakia. NATO provides more effective and economical protection than could be provided by any of the NATO countries acting individually.

Some argued that NATO makes unnecessary the proliferation under national control of nuclear weapons among the nations of Western Europe which do not now have them, so long as the United States' nuclear deterrent is available to protect all countries of the Alliance. Witnesses in France argued otherwise.

It was also argued that NATO's continued existence was particularly important because it provided security within a collective framework to West Germany. This makes it unnecessary for West Germany to seek her own security by bilateral military alliances or by building up military strength or a national nuclear capability—a process which would alarm her neighbours and create instability in Central Europe.

It was further suggested that NATO was necessary as an instrument to co-ordinate plans for the mutual reduction of the arms confrontation in Europe and negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries on other measures of détente.

Others argued that the urgent need for a defensive military alliance in Europe had disappeared as the threat of an all-out invasion of Western Europe had become more and more unlikely with the emergence of the nuclear stalemate. Such a stalemate, it was said, would effectively deter military adventures in Europe. Indeed some even maintained that the continued existence of NATO was provocative, perpetuating the Warsaw Pact and militating against the development of liberal tendencies within Eastern Europe.

Having considered these arguments, the Committee concludes that the military strength of the Warsaw Pact is greater to-day than ever before and that NATO continues to offer the most effective means of providing for the security of Western Europe. The Committee is also impressed by the extent to which the NATO Council has become a focus of political consultation and they believe NATO can and should be a useful instrument for promoting détente with the Soviet bloc.

Is Canadian security involved in Europe?

Many witnesses maintained that, by making forces available for the defence of Europe, Canada is contributing directly to its own security. They argued that, in the words of one witness, the "fault line of confrontation" between the Soviet bloc and the NATO alliance crosses through the middle of Europe. In this situation spontaneous outbreaks or accidental conflicts unless they are quickly and effectively controlled, could speedily escalate into a destructive nuclear exchange, in which Canada and her territory would inevitably be affected. The presence and availability for immediate use of adequate conventional NATO forces in Europe is important to provide a credible deterrent and time for negotiation in the event of limited hostilities. In the view of these witnesses, a pre-meditated all-out nuclear attack on North America was unlikely and the principal risk of nuclear war—which was the only kind of war in which Canadian territory would suffer directly—lay in escalation of conflict in Europe.

The Committee accepts this argument.

Is Canada Over-Spending on Defence?

Several witnesses have argued that Canada is spending too much on defence. Others have reached the same conclusion by pointing to the fact that Canada is the only Alliance member other than the United States to provide forces in three theatres: in Europe, at sea and for the defence of North America. Some witnesses limited their comments to recommending a reduction, on the ground that Canada is not directly menaced. Others advocate transferring the savings to foreign aid, and still others to domestic development.

The Committee found this to be a difficult question to assess objectively. The yardstick used most widely is a calculation which involves relating defence expenditure to per capita gross national product. By this standard of comparison, Canada's total defence expenditure in all theatres, and including peacekeeping, is now one of the lowest in NATO, whereas when Canada first sent forces to Europe in the early 1950's its contribution was one of the highest. But the Committee found this standard imprecise because it includes expenditure for large internal security forces maintained in some countries; for military activity carried on by others outside the NATO area; and does not distinguish among differing requirements for development funds.

The Committee believes that by comparison with other nations both inside and outside of NATO, Canada's defence expenditures are not disproportionately high. And while Canadian forces are spread over three theatres within NATO, the forces maintained in each are not excessive. The Committee considers that further conclusions regarding the nature and location of Canadian defence activities must be based on political and security considerations. The foregoing does not mean that the Committee has reached the conclusion that savings in defence expenditures cannot or should not be effected.

Does NATO provide An Effective Forum?

The Committee had an opportunity to learn from experienced witnesses in Europe that the NATO Council provides an effective forum for political consultation. In this process, which is being steadily expanded, the views of the smaller nations, especially when they act in combination, can be much more persuasive than if they are advocated bilaterally.

Would Canada's Withdrawal Seriously Damage NATO?

Repeatedly arguments were made to the Committee that, if Canada withdrew its forces from Europe or substantially reduced them, the United States or the Western European states might follow suit and NATO might be seriously weakened as a result of such a Canadian initiative—that Canadian action might have a "domino" or "catalytic" effect.

Advocates of this argument who were concerned about a United States withdrawal from Europe placed special importance on the continued physical presence of substantial numbers of American forces in Europe. These forces were needed in part to assure Europeans that the United States, which was no longer invulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, was determined to deter a Soviet move against Western Europe by whatever means might be necessary. In the view of several witnesses, Western Europe without United States support, would be obliged by its geographic location to accept a degree of political subordination to Russia. These advocates feared that, should Canada withdraw its forces from Europe, this example could be used by those political groups in the United States who are pressing for similar action by the United States.

Those who feared a "catalytic" effect in Europe suggested two possibilities: certain European countries with budgetary problems might follow Canada's example; and Germany might feel the need to replace any forces which were withdrawn, thereby further increasing its now relatively large military contribution to the Alliance. Several witnesses spoke of the shock which would follow such a move by Canada; since Canada had a high reputation for responsibility and good judgment, its example would influence others.

Some witnesses in Europe spoke of the psychological effect of such action by Canada on Russia. It was asserted that even if forces withdrawn by Canada were replaced by equivalent forces provided by another country, so that NATO's military power was unchanged, the deterrent effect of NATO on the Russians would be reduced.

The Committee recognizes that this is a difficult question on which to make a categorical judgement. However, the Committee considers that the withdrawal of Canadian forces—depending on how or when this were to be accomplished—might have some or all of the adverse effects suggested above.

Would Basing of Existing Forces in Canada for Service in Europe Be Feasible?

The question was raised as to whether Canada should withdraw its forces from Europe, but maintain them in their present form in Canada for dispatch to Europe in an emergency.

The Committee had ample opportunity to examine this suggestion. They ascertained that this approach would diminish the effectiveness of the training programme; that it would require the stockpiling of heavy equipment in Europe; that it would require considerable additional costly air transport; that it would not achieve any significant economies in operating costs; that the military utility of such forces in time of crisis was uncertain and their return to Europe might be provocative; and that accordingly the other members of NATO would attach considerably less importance to such a contribution from Canada. The Committee accordingly concludes that there is no advantage to be gained from transferring Canada's existing forces in Europe to Canada, while maintaining them in Canada for service in Europe in an emergency.

What Should Be the Role of Canadian Forces in Europe?

This is one of the most important questions faced by the Committee. However, it does not have sufficient evidence upon which to form a judgment. The only definite suggestion made for a change in role was to replace our present forces in Europe with a light conventionally-armed air-transportable force. The Committee did not have sufficient evidence as to what the use and value of this force would be, nor did it have expert evidence in regard to what other roles might be open to Canada. The Committee will pursue its inquiries into this whole question with a view to making definite recommendations in a future report.

PART III

Having assessed the arguments presented to it, the Committee submits the following recommendations which flow from its assessment of the various arguments examined in Part II.

1. Canada should continue to play an effective role in the preservation of peace through membership in NATO.

2. Canada should continue to maintain forces in Europe as a contribution to the collective defence arrangements of NATO.
3. Canada should continue its present roles in Europe until such time as the main items of equipment for its Air Division and Mechanized Brigade require replacement.
4. The future long-term military roles of Canadian forces assigned to NATO must be reviewed promptly, and kept under periodic review in the future by the Government and by this Committee, bearing in mind
 - (a) the desirability that our NATO forces should be as compatible as possible with our other forces.
 - (b) that decisions on roles must be arrived at in sufficient time to negotiate with our allies and, if necessary, to acquire new equipment and to retrain forces.
5. Through NATO, Canada should use its influence to seek détente in Europe and, while maintaining security, negotiate balanced force reductions as recommended by the Harmel Report.

Up to the present time, the Committee has not obtained sufficient evidence with regard to Canada's Maritime forces, which are earmarked to NATO, to permit it to include recommendations with respect to them in this report. This subject will be investigated in the course of the Committee's continuing defence review.

The Committee has taken evidence in Canada and obtained information in Europe with regard to United Nations peacekeeping, Civil Defence and Disarmament. The Committee has decided however, to defer recommendations on these subjects to a later report.

A copy of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence relating to the Order of Reference dated January 16, 1969, (*Issues Nos. 19 to 35*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
FOR THE YEAR 1900

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1901

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, March 24, 1969.

(50)

(Text)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (28).

Also present: Mr. Groos, M.P.

Members of the Committee thanked the Chairman for his part in the European tour and he in turn thanked the members for their co-operation.

The Committee also expressed thanks to Mr. Peter Dobell, the Clerk of the Committee and members of the supporting staff. The Chairman was instructed to forward a letter of thanks through the Minister of National Defence, mentioning all DND personnel who accompanied the members on their tour.

The Members began their consideration of a working paper, to be used as the basis for a Report to the House.

The discussion continuing, the Committee adjourned at 1:00 p.m. until 2:00 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(51)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera*, at 2:10 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (29).

Also present: Mr. Groos, M.P.

The Committee continued its consideration of the working paper.

At 6:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING

(52)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera*, at 8:15 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Marquette*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (26).

Also present: Mr. Groos, M.P.

Members of the Committee continued their consideration of the defence review working paper.

At 10:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, March 25, 1969.

TUESDAY, March 25, 1969

(53)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 9:40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (30).

Also present: Mr. Groos, M.P.

The Committee resumed its consideration of the working paper, to be used as the basis for its Report to the House.

At 12:30 p.m., with the discussion continuing, the Committee adjourned until 2:00 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(54)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 2:05 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay, (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (30).

Also present: Mr. Groos, M.P.

During the afternoon sitting, the Committee completed its consideration of the working paper. It was agreed that the Chairman should present the document, as amended, as the Fifth Report to the House.

The Committee adjourned at 5:40 p.m., to the call of the Chair.


Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968-69



STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 36

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1969

Respecting

Estimates, 1969-70, Department of National Defence.

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Buchanan	Laniel	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Cafik	Laprise	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Carter	Legault	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Fairweather	Lewis	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	Marceau	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS
THURSDAY, February 20, 1969.

Ordered,—That Votes 1, 10 and 15 relating to the Department of External Affairs;

Votes 30, 35 and L35 relating to the Canadian International Development Agency;

Vote 40 relating to the International Joint Commission;

Votes 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48 and 50 relating to the Department of National Defence; and

Vote 55 relating to Defence Construction (1951) Limited be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF

CHARLES THE FIRST

BY

JOHN BURNET

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

IN TWO VOLUMES

[Text]

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, April 17, 1969.

(55)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8.10 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Cafik, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Laniel, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Nowlan, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch (16).

Also present: Mr. Roberts, M.P.

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance; Brigadier General A. McCaig, Director General Budget and Finance.

The Chairman read the Committee's Order of Reference dated Thursday, February 20, 1969.

The Chairman called Item 1 *Departmental Administration etc.* \$7,299,250 of the Estimates, 1969-70, Department of National Defence.

The Chairman introduced Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance. Dr. Arnell made a short opening statement and was questioned by the Members; Dr. Arnell was assisted by Brigadier General A. McCaig, Director General Budget and Finance.

The Committee agreed to print the advance statement on the Estimates, including the list of Selected Major Equipment Items, prepared by the Department, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix UU*).

Item 1 of the Estimates was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called Item 5 *Grants as detailed in the Estimates* \$546,375.

The Chairman reported the recommendations of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure which met on Tuesday, April 15, 1969. He outlined the schedule of meetings which is planned for a review of the National Defence and External Affairs Estimates, and a program for the next phase of the Defence Review. Members made additional suggestions which will be considered by the Subcommittee.

Members questioned Dr. Arnell, under *Item 5* of the Estimates. Mr. Allmand requested a written report containing additional information on the grants to *Canadian Universities—Military Studies*. Dr. Arnell will send the report to the Clerk, for distribution to the Members.

At 10.10 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year.

2. The second part contains a detailed account of the various projects and the results obtained.

3. The third part discusses the financial position and the resources available for the work.

4. The fourth part deals with the personnel and the organization of the work.

5. The fifth part contains a summary of the work and the conclusions reached.

6. The sixth part discusses the future prospects and the plans for the coming year.

7. The seventh part contains a list of the publications and the reports of the year.

8. The eighth part contains a list of the names of the persons who have contributed to the work.

9. The ninth part contains a list of the names of the persons who have been employed during the year.

10. The tenth part contains a list of the names of the persons who have been consulted during the year.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, April 17, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, perhaps we could begin. This evening we will be examining the estimates of the Department of National Defence and we have in attendance as a witness, Dr. J. C. Arnell, the Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence, who has particular interest in matters of finance and the estimates. Members will recall that Dr. Arnell appeared before this Committee with the Deputy Minister when we considered the 1968-69 revised main estimates of the Department last November.

For your information we are proceeding upon the basis of a reference which was passed by the House and which reads as follows:

Ordered that Votes 1, 10 and 15 relating to the Department of External Affairs; Votes 30, 35 and L35 relating to the Canadian International Development Agency; Vote 40 relating to the International Joint Commission; Votes 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48 and 50 relating to the Department of National Defence; and Vote 55 relating to Defence Construction (1951) Limited be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

Tonight, as I have indicated, we propose to deal with the Defence Department's estimates. Next Tuesday evening we will be dealing with the estimates of the Department of External Affairs. You have the Blue Book in

• 2015

the usual form listing the votes and, in addition, you have the estimates in the new form prepared by the Department.

I propose, first, to call upon Dr. Arnell. I believe he has distributed a written statement with regard to the estimates and he has a few introductory remarks to make. Dr. Arnell.

Mr. Allmand: I do not know if this is the proper place, but would you inform us at

some time or other what our program will be now that we have returned from the Easter recess. I believe you had a meeting of your steering committee. I do not know what you have planned, but I wondered whether we would have a chance in the Committee to discuss the program from now until the summer recess?

The Chairman: Yes, we could do it now or we could do it when other members have come in. I thought possibly toward the end of our hearing this evening might be an appropriate time to do it when more members are present.

Mr. Allmand: Very good.

Dr. J. C. Arnell (Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance Division, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, and members of the Standing Committee, as a result of my appearance last November when, in fact, you were looking at the 1968-69 estimates and you found the list of major equipment items and a few of the highlights of the estimates which we put forward at that time of use, I thought I would try to do the same thing this year except it had been suggested that rather than keep the hand-out until we appeared before the Committee that it might be helpful to you to have it sent around ahead of time. I believe all of you did receive the statement and the attached list of selected major equipment items which, I think, you will find are essentially the same list of items that we distributed last year and, in fact, are the major items of equipment that were put into the five-year program which was announced by Mr. Hellyer and Mr. Cadieux back in December 1964.

As I indicated in the circulated statement, this year's estimates reflect or relate to the fifth year of that five-year program and really it represents the rundown of that program as, in fact, many of the individual projects have either just been completed or are in the process of being completed.

As a result of the government's decision to embark on a defence policy review we were

directed to prepare a minimum budget for the fiscal year 1969-70 and, in fact, to plan on holding the line, as it were. You will, I think, have noted from the estimates, for example, that we have provided for 98,000 military man-years which, in fact, was the target figure for March 31, 1969 which, as I recall, we indicated to you last November. This represents a reduction in terms of military man-years of 2,000 from the 1968-69 budget. Similarly, the civilian man-years, you will find, are down some 2,400.

There are no new equipment projects as such, I think, for the reason I have already indicated, namely the government's decision to maintain a hold-the-line budget until the defence policy review was settled. As a result and as I have already indicated, you have essentially a clean-up type of thing on the equipment.

● 2020

As has already been indicated by the Chairman, the Blue Book contains the estimates in the vote structure which was the budget as formally presented to Parliament. I believe, when the new form of estimates was tabled it was pointed out that this was, in effect, for illustrative purposes and from our point of view they are not precise in the sense of the Blue Book. Our detailed supporting data in many areas is by the old objects of expenditure and as I indicated in the statement that was distributed to you we had to allocate some of the force components, in particular, on a rather broad pro rata allocation. I can explain to you how we did it, but there will be places as I think it is explained in the text where, because of two or three tasks that a single force was responsible for, we would put the estimated cost of that force entirely in one of the activities in the new form. I am quite happy to discuss the contents of the estimates in the new form, but as I have already indicated, there are certain areas where, if you want real detail, I will have to go back to the Blue Book formation, because this was the way, in fact, that the budget was compiled. If the Committee would like to start by looking at the new form, I am quite happy to do this and perhaps I can lead you through or do it any way you like.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, in order to get things under way, I will call Item 1 of the Blue Book which in this instance corresponds with Item 1 of the new form of estimates.

Department of National Defence

Administration

- 1 Departmental Administration, Operation and Maintenance including authority, notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act, and subject to allotment by the Treasury Board, for total commitments of \$2,-695,674,125 for the purposes of Votes 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 and 45 of this Department regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that \$961,166,000 will come due for payment in future years) and authority to make recoverable advances under any of the said votes and, notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act, to spend revenue received during the year, subject to the direction of the Treasury Board, in respect of assistance rendered to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or any member thereof, any member of the British Commonwealth or any provincial or municipal government and in respect of charges for supplies and services as authorized by Treasury Board and made pursuant to regulations under the National Defence Act—\$7,299,250

The Chairman: Are there any questions on this? Mr. MacLean?

● 2025

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, in an endeavour to clarify the situation even more for the Committee, and perhaps the witness will be patient if my questions seem very elementary with regard to Item 1, I would like Dr. Arnell, if he would, to help us correlate the information in the Blue Book and in the new form, together with the statement he has just given. Now with regard to Item 1, especially, to make sure that we understand the item, I think it appears in the same form in both, but this wording, I think, has been used in Item 1 for the last five years or so and there is a reference to Section 30 of the Financial Administration Act; notwithstanding this section and so on. I believe that is the section of the Financial Administration Act which deals with the entering into of contracts with regard to items in the estimates for that current year to the effect that a contract cannot be entered into unless there is supply to pay the payments which would fall due as

a result of that contract in that financial year. Then it goes on to mention the total commitments of over \$2 billion in each case.

I am afraid I do not understand entirely or I am not sure that I understand fully the meaning of this total commitment figure. I note that for the last five years it has been \$2.5 billion, \$2.6 billion, \$2.8 billion, \$2.7 billion and \$2.6 billion this year. There is another figure for commitment to be paid in future years and this is dropping. Now what does this commitment for future years cover in addition to large equipment procurement?

Dr. Arnell: Well part of the commitment for future years, is, in effect, really as you put it in your question. Whenever a contract is entered into that is going to have the cash payments spread over a number of years, it is necessary to have enough commitment authority voted by Parliament to allow us to really commit ourselves to that program. The reason for this larger amount of \$2.7 billion, of which only part is carried over in future years, is to provide a sort of bookkeeping authority in the sense of being able to meet salary payments and things where in effect money has to be committed ahead of the actual date on which it is paid. So, within this \$2.695 of total commitment the bulk, some 60 or 70 per cent, is to allow ordinary financial transactions to be carried on during the year. Then the future commitment, of which, as the estimates say this year, there is \$961 million, is really to allow us to enter into contracts that carry over. I could have one of the experts on the subject add to this, if you would like, to explain just exactly how the commitment authority is used.

Mr. MacLean: In this summary of selected major equipment items, there is a column which lists the balance to be paid in future years.

Dr. Arnell: That is right.

Mr. MacLean: Now I totalled that up roughly and I think it is only about \$200 million, but the total commitment shown in Item 1 is \$961 million.

Dr. Arnell: Well with your permission, could I ask General McCaig just to comment a little further on what I have said?

Mr. MacLean: Yes.

Dr. Arnell: Could you comment on this?

The Chairman: Could you please speak into the microphone.

Mr. Winch: Would he especially speak on the salaries. I thought salaries were in the normal budget and not in the future commitments.

Brig. Gen. A. McCaig (Director General, Budget and Finance, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa): As Dr. Arnell mentioned, when approval is granted for a particular program—for instance the CF-5 program totalling something like \$215 millions—it is necessary at that time to enter into contracts with the various contractual agencies for the total amount of that program. To do that we need this commitment authority for the full program, even though there may be only a few dollars spent in the first year and it is phased over a number of years. For example in the CF-5 program we would have asked, in the year it was first introduced, for some \$215 million of commitment authority. In that particular year we may have only asked for, shall we say, about 10 per cent in cash, that being what would come for payment in that year. In subsequent years then we would ask for the commitment authority for the unexpended balance of the program and the amount of cash that was coming due for payment in that particular year.

Mr. MacLean: This I understand, but the problem in my mind is the fact that I thought this continuing commitment would be chiefly for major equipment contracts. We have them listed here, or at least most of them; for example, the CF-5 in future years has \$18 million and so on, but when you add all of those balances to be paid in future years for all of these equipment contracts, they add up roughly to something of the order of \$200 million. Yet in Item 1 there is \$961 million committed. What does that \$700 million plus as a future commitment relate to other than equipment?

Brig. Gen. McCaig: A very large portion of it, of course, is commitment. These are only selected major items of equipment. There are other items as well within the total commitment package, both for equipment and construction and development. There are some O and M—operations and maintenance—types of contracts which are placed which cover more than a one-year period because of the nature of the buy and it is when you add the total of all of those items that you get the grand total. You cannot take it just from this list which is simply a list of selected major items.

• 2030

Mr. MacLean: Yes, I realize all of that, but I am surprised that even this partial list of major items makes up roughly only a quarter of the total future commitment. I would have thought this list would represent something like three-quarters of the total future commitment, perhaps, with the other items such as pay and so on that are on a yearly basis making up the rest.

Brig. Gen. McCaig: We certainly could provide additional information on this point if this is required. I do not have all of the items that make that up at my fingertips at the moment.

Mr. Winch: Would Mr. MacLean mind if I asked a supplementary in order to clarify this, Mr. Chairman? Under Item 1, Administration, you have listed close to \$1 billion for future commitments, but if I turn to the estimates for this year, for example, on page 27 of your White Paper there is \$74,411,000 for ships; there is \$1,930,000 for fighting vehicles and there is another \$2,878,000. Are these three amounts separate and apart from this \$1 billion or is this the total amount required this year? You understand, sir, what I am trying to get clear now?

Dr. Arnell: The total commitment authority for every use within the Department—the Defence Research Board on any major procurement upon which they may embark as well as the Defence services—is included in Item 1.

Mr. Winch: Well, then what does page 27 mean? Is that part of this?

Dr. Arnell: There is no commitment authority shown on page 27. There is a future year's requirement there which is—I suppose one would say, yes, this really...

Mr. Winch: Also the proposed estimate for 1969-70.

Dr. Arnell: Well, that is cash. That is the cash for...

Mr. Winch: Is that included in this?

Dr. Arnell: No, sir. The cash that is here is the cash that is included in the object of expenditure on Item 15 for the Construction and Acquisition of Machinery, Equipment and Furnishings. If you turn to page 242 in the Blue Book about two-thirds of the way-down the page where it says, "Construction and Acquisition of Land, Buildings and Equip-

ment", there are two items there; Construction and Acquisition of Buildings, Works and Land at \$19.6 million and below, it, Construction and Acquisition of Machinery, Equipment and Furnishings at \$210.4 million. Those are the totals of construction and capital for the military and you will find that the \$210 million figure will, in fact, be the same total that you will get as you go through all the individual items on pages 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, but I am talking about the ships, the fighting vehicles, the aircraft and the engines, not the acquisition of land or equipment.

Dr. Arnell: No, but these are the acquisitions. This is capital program. If you look at the heading at the top of page 27, it reads, "Detail of Major Construction and Acquisition Projects", this is, in fact, an information break-out of everything that is included in those two-line items on page 242 of the Blue Book.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman? What are the details of the particular construction and acquisition of various buildings as indicated on page 242? Could you give us the details as to what you intend for these amounts, \$19 million and \$210 million?

• 2035

Dr. Arnell: Yes, there is a very large list and it was in an attempt to indicate the major items that I had put together this other list which was in parallel with the list that we laid before the Committee last year. These are really the big items that are included in that \$210 million.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Then could I ask, Mr. Chairman, as my supplementary question, if the gentleman could tell us in detail tonight, over and above the supplementary list that he has made available to us, what this item on the construction and acquisition of buildings consists of and, particularly, those which he thinks are on their priority list? Could he give us this specific information this evening?

Dr. Arnell: I could go through the entire list, but the sort of thing that is in here...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Your priorities.

Dr. Arnell: In terms of priorities, the ones that are included are those that have a suffi-

ciently high priority to be in the current program. There are many others for which no cash is being asked and to give you an example of the sort of thing that is embodied in the \$19 million or \$20 million for construction, let us take a single base, Cold Lake, for which there is a \$305,000 item for sewage treatment facilities which are in need of repair. There are improvements to the ...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Is there an amount on that sewage treatment?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, the amount is \$305,000. There is an improvement to the test range there where the CF-104 operational training is carried out in the amount of \$215,000. There is a ten-classroom school at \$600,000 and so on. There are several pages of these individual items, but this is getting away actually from the ...

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I wonder if I might be allowed to return to my original line of questioning. I will soon be finished and then, perhaps, we can get down to the more widespread details. Again, referring to the wording of Item 1 which says:

...notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act, to spend revenue received during the year, subject to the direction of the Treasury Board, in respect of assistance rendered to...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization...

This means, I take it, that the total figure shown in the estimates is the net cost of defence and recoverable items are, in effect, over and above this. For example, if ... reimbursed during this year for assistance to the United Nations, say, to the extent of \$10 million for the sake of argument, that would be added to the total. Is my reasoning correct?

Dr. Arnell: If you look on page 242 starting at the top of the page under Administration, Operation and Maintenance, there are a number of things, Military Pay, Transportation and so on. Then there is a gap followed by a line item, "Less: Amounts recoverable". You will notice that the amounts recoverable are estimated to have gone up from \$94,962,000 in 1968-69 to \$99,158,000.

• 2040

Mr. MacLean: Oh, yes, for this year.

Dr. Arnell: Now, in effect, we are required to tell you how much we think we are going

to get in all the different ways that we are authorized to collect money and re-use it. The fact that you accept this figure say, of, \$99 million as moneys that we will recover, is the amount that we can recover and use from all these purposes. If, in fact, we recover more we cannot use it because, in effect, Parliament authorizes us to use \$99 million against the authority they have given us in the first place.

Mr. MacLean: Ordinarily though, under the Financial Administration Act this recoverable amount would go straight into general revenue and would have to be voted again?

Dr. Arnell: That is right.

Mr. MacLean: So you have this special privilege, if I might call it that, in Defence?

Dr. Arnell: I believe this does occur in other departments as well.

Mr. MacLean: Yes.

Dr. Arnell: The parliamentary control is, in effect, in the amount that we can explain how we arrived at the amount. Once that number is there, that is the number and the only way that number can be changed is by a supplementary.

Mr. MacLean: I do not want to take up any more time except to ask one further brief explanation of this list of major equipment items. Although there is no item here for a specific piece of equipment—I am thinking chiefly of refueling tankers for the CF-5 and perhaps some additional CF-5's themselves if it were determined that we should equip more than Mobile Command with them and possibly forward thinking towards the replacement of the Argus—is there any evaluation being done of possible suitable aircraft for upcoming replacements and that sort of thing on a tentative basis, if you wish, even though nothing appears in this for such a particular purpose.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, sir, in the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff Branch of Canadian Forces Headquarters there is a Deputy Chief of Force Development and within his organization there is a Director General of Force Objectives. It is the responsibility of this staff to anticipate the future and to investigate possible new systems, getting analysis done of operational research types and so on, and at all times having some knowledge of potential equipment systems or weapon systems for the future.

This is also one of the reasons why within this commitment authority there will in fact be at least some of it that is not immediately identifiable against anything in the estimates at all. It may well be during the year that a change in government policy or a change in something may in fact start a new program. Before a new program can be started you have got to have the commitment authority in order to even consider seeking Treasury Board approval to move ahead. This is sort of the one bit of flexibility to move ahead even though there is no cash available.

• 2045

As I mentioned in the statement, this really was one of the problems in the moving ahead on the major equipment program of 1964. There is a time lag where really all you can use is commitment authority. You cannot spend money because tenders have to be called or contracts have to be met and there is no money involved for perhaps six months and in some cases up to a year. So it is quite possible to start a new program even though there is no cash in the estimates.

Mr. MacLean: Yes, well I am pleased to know this. I would like to think—and I think I am right in assuming—that a great deal of thinking and planning is going into possible replacements for equipment that is on the verge of becoming obsolescent at the present time so that immediately a decision is made the tap can be turned on, as it were.

Dr. Arnell: Often the future studies will take three, four or five years before you get to a point where you can really spend money.

Mr. MacLean: I would like to pass at this time.

Mr. Nowlan: Could I ask a supplementary to that statement?

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan on a supplementary.

Mr. Nowlan: Will there be someone from the Department to discuss some of those long-term plans and/or replacement of present equipment and/or, in particular, this sum of money that Mr. MacLean was talking about and the leeway that Dr. Arnell says is there. I am thinking precisely of the Argus and/or the Orion. I do not want to ask any further questions on that if somebody later is going to be talking further and in more detail of some of the departmental thinking on replacement of equipment, not necessarily

with the authority that you are going to go ahead and get it depending on what the Minister decides and what the policy review decides and/or what the state of maritime transport is.

Dr. Arnell: Well this is really what I would have to answer at this time, that the direction in which the new policy is going to take us becomes a bit academic as to what is being thought about is many areas. However, I can assure you that for example the question of whether the Orion would fit in as a replacement for the Argus has been under consideration for several years. While they were looking at the Orion they were also looking at the Nimrod which is the new British maritime control aircraft which is based on the Comet. This is the thing every time they are looking at competing systems, competitive systems.

Mr. Nowlan: Well I appreciate that, and I know they have been looking at different systems but my question, arising from Mr. MacLean's question, is based directly on your statement about the time lag that necessarily evolves between a decision and procurement and/or some detailed discussion here from this department within headquarters as to what the status is. As far as some of my information is concerned we are almost beyond the point of mid-life of the Argus and even if a decision was made tomorrow it might be very doubtful if there was going to be any plane to replace it by the time you train pilots, have the conversion program and so on.

Dr. Arnell: My recollection is that the Argus is good until at least 1975. I believe that perhaps with some structural reinforcement and so on, it can run until 1978.

Mr. Winch: May I ask a brief supplementary? How do you do your forward thinking on equipment? You mentioned the Argus, but I want to mention the Centurion tank which we are told is about two years. How do you do your forward thinking without knowing what the defence policy is going to be?

Dr. Arnell: I think the only way I can answer that Mr. Winch is to say that five years ago the government approved a five-year equipment program.

Mr. Winch: The five years is up this year, is it not?

Dr. Arnell: This is the end of the time. As you are aware this re-examination of defence

policy has in fact been under way for at least a year in one form or another. Within the department, I would say the question of where we should be going has been under consideration in, perhaps, a partially academic sense all the way along. If I might go back to eight or ten years ago when I was Scientific Advisor to the Chief of the Air Staff and very much involved in the future look, within the air force every time a new aircraft system was put into the program and procurement started, because of the long lead time, the beginnings of systems analysis would be started of what sort of things were on the horizon for the next generation around and, of course, this was during a period when the speed of aircraft was going up 100 miles an hour a year. You know, what you were ordering then was going to be pretty slow by the time you got delivery of it. There was one period about 10 years ago when one wondered if the generation of aircraft—in the high performance type—would really last more than about five years. The system carriers, such as the Argus and the things in which the speed was not the critical factor, had a long life, but for a fighter aircraft type of thing, you began to think what you were going to replace it with before you got the one. This was just a continuous process. There was one group of people who were conscious of this fact and who were trying to guess what would be coming next.

• 2050

Going back to that period, this was the time when you really could not tell what was likely to happen and at that time we did one study in the air force that, in fact, examined the probable aircraft needs for every kind of conflict that anybody could imagine from a World War II type of exercise in the desert with absolutely no ground support or anything else where an airplane was just on its own to the type of sophisticated environment that was being envisaged as the most elaborate of the systems. We had a whole series of studies so that when somebody asked for something we could, at least, give them a line on where they were likely to go.

Mr. Winch: What you are saying now is that no matter what comes down from the government as defence policy, because of your forward looking you have in mind what you are required to meet?

Dr. Arnell: There will be some ideas, but once you know which way the government

wants to go in defence, then you obviously have to pause and go into detailed studies before you can come forward and explain, say, to this Committee that this is the type of equipment that will meet that particular thing. All we can tell you the first time around is that this is the sort of thing you might do, but we cannot tell you what it will cost and so on until we get...

Mr. Forrestall: May I ask a supplementary?

The Chairman: I wonder if we could pick up the supplementaries in order, Mr. Forrestall? Have you finished your questioning, Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I was not satisfied with the answer, but I will let the discussion go on for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I think Mr. Allmand had a question, followed by Mr. Nowlan and then Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Mine is a supplementary and as long as the others are supplementary, I will wait my turn.

The Chairman: That is fine. Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, my question is a supplementary. In the list that was distributed to us before the meeting entitled "Selected Major Equipment Items—1969-70 Estimates", the amount that has been spent for each item is shown plus the amount outstanding. I wonder, Dr. Arnell, if there is a list showing how many of these items have been received and how many you expect to receive with the dates?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. My question is directly supplementary...

The Chairman: Excuse me for one second. Is this on Item 1 or is it on Item 15, Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: I think it is on Item 1, but I may be wrong.

Mr. Forrestall: My question, Mr. Chairman, is supplementary to questions that have been asked and it is in public pursuit of a position that has been enunciated in the last couple of days about a question that is under discussion right now.

The Chairman: I think your question, perhaps, relates more specifically to Item 15, Mr. Allmand, and with your permission we could

take the question raised by Mr. Forrestall, which I gather relates directly to the inquiry which we are now pursuing.

Mr. Forrestall: My question relates, but again, Mr. Chairman, I must open myself to the position of contradiction in this sense. Dr. Arnell, in the last issue of the publication *Sentinel* which has just come to the attention of the members of Parliament in the last day or two, the Orion program has been referred to as the best bet as a follow-on aircraft for the Argus and I agree with that technically. My supplementary question is, do you agree with this or have you had any reason in your capacity to believe that the government has decided, in fact, to follow on with the Argus?

Dr. Arnell: No, as far as I know, this is part of what is to be looked at.

Mr. Forrestall: You have had absolutely no direct indication...

Dr. Arnell: No.

Mr. Forrestall: .. and the *Sentinel* is wrong and is misleading...

Dr. Arnell: I am afraid I have not seen the *Sentinel*, but I would say it is definitely incorrect to imply that there has been any action taken. People may have looked at it and said, "If we go ahead, this is where we go." However, nothing has come forward officially on that.

Mr. Forrestall: Some of us took false hope then from the article in the *Sentinel*. Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan, do you have a question on Item 1?

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, but I thought Mr. Allmand had a question.

Mr. Allmand: Mine is on Item 15, it seems.

Mr. Nowlan: I already have asked part of my question. Basically it was with direct reference to the Argus, but more generally it deals with what Dr. Arnell said about the different studies for equipment systems and the forward look. It really comes right down to what the Minister of the day decides the policy is going to be, does it not? Or to put the question precisely as past history, whatever happened to all the studies and reports on the CF-5? Did they ever get to the Minister's desk or did they ever get to a Parliamentary desk? Certainly I appreciate this is perhaps controversial and I am not asking to be

controversial. I am trying to explore how to avoid some of these problems in the future. If this task force or this Department of headquarters and the men who are making these studies decide as a result of the studies that a certain piece of equipment is negative and the Minister with his discretion says that it is going to be positive, how can a Parliamentary committee explore this if we do not have some of these reports?

I appreciate you are not the one to make the decision, but in order for a Parliamentary committee to cross-examine the Minister on why he is going to go ahead on a piece of equipment—in the case of the CF-5 I would suggest, the majority, if not all, of the inter-departmental reports were negative for a multitude of reasons and on which we are still trying to work out the kinks—we need these reports. I am not trying to ask you to re-hash necessarily the CF-5, but how is a Parliamentary Committee—I listen to you and I like to agree with you, but we are the elected people and the Minister does have the responsibility to decide—going to perform its duties—we are starting to specialize in committees—if it cannot in some way get at some of these reports in order to cross-examine the Minister and to carry some of the load and the frustrations that you carry when you see your equipment shot down?

Dr. Arnell: I would agree with you and I think that what is going to be one of the real advances in Parliamentary understanding of things is, in fact, the conversion from what has been a one-year control budget-type philosophy that has been prevalent for years and years and years all over the world in the old Blue Book sense with standard objects of expenditure which, when they came in, I understand, were quite an advance over what had been in existence prior to that in terms of people understanding what the money was being voted for, to this new idea of being able to talk ahead five years in programs. People can become interested in knowing what the program is rather than just saying, "Why do you have \$50,000 for postage". I think it is a mutual educational process and it is moving in this direction. I think the studies that are being done right now because of the Prime Minister's recent statement on defence policy are going to lead to what one might call a new direction for the program. When this is decided, this will be the time when I think this Committee can call for an explanation from the Minister, or he can direct offi-

cials to describe the conclusions that came out of this, and this is the time to probe and see how the things were arrived at.

• 2100

I would suggest that one of the reasons it has never been done is there has never been the opportunity to do it, there has never been the interest to do it and the material has not been available to do it.

To my mind, we are living in a new era. This is one of the reasons why last November, when I first appeared before you, I talked about our management philosophy, and about how some of these things are arrived at. I do not believe anybody had ever come forward before and talked about the process by which these things are arrived at, and the questions tonight indicate an interest in this which three, four or five years ago probably would not have existed.

I think you will find as this system develops you are going to be almost forced to look into it, rather than its being the other way around.

Mr. Nowlan: Just one short comment, Mr. Chairman. I certainly agree with the philosophy expressed by Dr. Arnell, and would like to believe it is going to bear fruit. Being on the political side, I am a little cynical. For instance, as you explained to Mr. MacLean, you can think ahead and project ahead without its ever appearing. I can understand if it gets within the framework now, and there is a change within the five-year planning, obviously it sticks out like a sore thumb and members can ask questions.

However, in the precise example of, say, a replacement for an Argus, first you have to have a decision as to whether or not there is going to be any Maritime command, and I appreciate these are policy decisions. But assuming there is going to be a Maritime command and a plane to replace the Argus, how is this Committee, even under the philosophy that you describe since this has not appeared before under a five-year plan, going to know whether it is the Orion or some of these other planes that you mentioned which will replace it, where in fact all these task forces within the Department may have said no to the plane the Minister picks, and we will not know.

Dr. Arnell: This Committee in the last three or four months has devoted an awful lot of time to probing into areas that I do not believe it has ever really looked into before.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Hear, hear! Wait until we start on the budget.

Dr. Arnell: When you get to the question of a change in the direction of defence policy, if the pattern of Committee members' thinking is to be continued, you are going to be interested in things in which, I would suggest, committees in the past were not interested.

On the question of all the documents and everything, undoubtedly a Minister is going to decide he wants to retain some of it but he is still going to have to explain in general terms what his confidential papers contain to satisfy you in terms of getting a . .

• 2105

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, my last question is more precise and I think the doctor has answered it in a general way.

It is your opinion and judgment then, that with the studies that have already been carried out, and admitting the lead time necessary for a change to a new piece of equipment, that we have not gone beyond the point of no return as far as the Argus is concerned?

Dr. Arnell: This was one of the fundamental points that allowed the Department to really accept the hold-the-line budget for the year that the major equipment, when examined, did have enough life in them, that none of them, in fact, had to have a new program this year or suffer any irreparable damage.

Mr. Nowlan: Could you tell me, doctor, what is the critical time for a decision to be made on . .

Dr. Arnell: The bulk of these major equipments, the Argus is one—as I say, it was 1975 to 1978. I would say with another, 1970 or 1971 would probably be the year for the beginning of the new program.

Mr. Nowlan: How long did it take to change from the Neptune to the Argus?

Dr. Arnell: They were in parallel, of course. The two of them were bought almost at the same time—I forget the actual dates—and they were, in effect, flying together.

Mr. Nowlan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Doctor, just to follow along the questioning of Mr. Nowlan it would be appropriate to ask whether or not the old

concept of five or six years lead time is now something of the past and that because of what is on the shelf we are able to accomplish in two or three years what perhaps earlier took five or six years. Is that a fair estimate?

Dr. Arnell: This is a debatable point that really hinges on at what stage you pick up something along the way. The lead time of many of the sophisticated equipments, if you start from the research and development stage, is just as long a lead time now as it might have been ten years ago. On the other hand, and perhaps your questions about the Orion are a case in point, there is an airplane that, in effect, you buy into a production line, and if you buy into an on-going production line you obviously have a shorter lead time than if there is a decision to support a Canadian industry and tool up in Canada to produce something that may be produced somewhere else. This is not a departmental decision. This may be a government policy to aid Canadian industry.

Mr. Forrestall: That is right, but of course, it is one that is influenced by departmental thinking because you are the professionals.

Doctor, that had nothing to do with the question I wanted to ask under the particular item. I wanted to go back to the DDH program.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall, I am advised by Dr. Arnell that we are now getting into a matter which could better be discussed under Vote 15, and I believe Mr. Allmand has some questions there as well. Could we pass on?

Are there any other questions on Item 1? Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I could ask a question if you will allow me, doctor. It is with regard to municipal governments. I will use Item 12 as an example, where it says "for details, see page 241". I certainly do not consider the item to be detailed in any way, shape or form on page 241. However, I must go back to Item 1 because this is the point of discussion. What is the participation of municipal governments in this regard? I have a little experience with municipal government and I do not recall, for instance, "Operation and maintenance including authority", and also with regard to Item 1 you specify provincial and municipal governments. What are they? I would like to be enlightened on that.

• 2110

Dr. Arnell: Perhaps we can turn up one for you, but the purpose of the wording here is that essentially this item, as was raised earlier, is what allows us to spend revenue that is received for rendering assistance at really any level of government. The most common one in Canada, where there is in fact revenue received by the Department, is where a provincial government asks us to undertake a specific thing which, it has been agreed earlier, is the kind of service that the Department of National Defence provides on a recoverable basis. One that comes to mind was where cattle were isolated in a blizzard out in Alberta several years ago and the provincial government asked us if we would assist in the feeding of these cattle. When they asked us if we would assist they stated that they would pay us for our services, but when the whole operation was over we rendered in effect the straight out-of-pocket expense cost. I cannot think of one at the moment on a municipal basis but it could conceivably happen where a large city asks us to do something.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I appreciate your answer. However, I feel that the statement is relatively broad and that this applies only in unique circumstances. I presume that you must make a certain allowance under this particular part of your budget in case of certain things happening. This particular item may certainly represent a substantial amount of money but yet it is really never spent for that particular purpose.

Dr. Arnell: We do not budget specifically for these. I now can give you an example of our undertaking something for a municipality. I think in connection with the Pan-American Games in Winnipeg we actually did undertake something with the city which was on a straight recoverable basis. If we cannot do it within our normal operations, as it were, we just say we are sorry. It is not something that we actually budget specifically to be able to do. If there is a forest fire and we are asked to help, or if there are problems like the ones in Saskatchewan now with the floods, any local forces that are available there can give up their local training and go and help. This is what always happens. As has been the case a number of times in the past with forest fires, if there is not a major search on you invariably use your search and rescue helicopters. However, if a search has to be undertaken the forest fire may suffer a little

in support. This really is our only authority parliament gives us to recover our out-of-pocket expenses. In fact, we do in our recoveries include a bit of money which is really based on historical figures because you cannot really predict with any precision what you are going to do next year to help people. So there is a bit of historical fact in our recoveries, and of course if we do not get the money that we have estimated we are going to get we are just as short as if we did not get it in our budget to start with.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Cafik: May I ask a supplementary on this giving of money to municipalities. I understand from what we have been told in the Public Accounts Committee that a lot of this money that is being given the provinces is not really recovered by the federal government. Is this correct?

Mr. Lewis: They do not get money. You are not talking about money, are you?

Mr. Cafik: No. But we supply services for which a charge is made to the province and in many cases this money is not paid. I believe it has not been written off but many have suggested that we may as well write it off because we will not get it. I understand that Newfoundland is one that owes the federal government a reasonable amount of money for this purpose and has refused to pay it. Is that correct?

Mr. Nowlan: British Columbia too.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, that is correct.

An hon. Member: They can pay it. Newfoundland cannot.

The Chairman: Have you any comments on that, Dr. Arnell?

Mr. Cafik: I would really like to know if the Department has any plans to recover this, or is it just going to leave it sit?

Dr. Arnell: This is reviewed periodically within the Department. We take follow-up action directly in many cases. Of course, it is like anybody else who has money owed to them; if in effect somebody says, "Will you do something for us and we will pay you" and you do it in good faith and then you send them a bill and they ignore your bill, you follow it up a number of times and you really have not any defence when somebody says,

"Why did you not get the money?" We have on occasion sought authority to write off bad debts of this type. I could in fact give you more information on this, if you were interested, although I think it has probably been dealt with and I am sure the information will be provided through the Public Accounts Committee.

Mr. Cafik: It would seem to me that there is a very simple way of recovering through perhaps the Treasury Board. A lot of money flows from the federal government to the provinces and an offsetting procedure could be used. It is not as if it was a one-way street.

• 2115

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, I have one quick supplementary.

In a case where a program falls behind schedule, through no fault of the department—perhaps procurement or something of this sort—and you are not able to spend the amount of money that has been approved in the Estimates of the current year for that project, does the item lapse or do you have a special right to carry it over to the next year?

Dr. Arnell: The actual cash provided lapses. The only money in the entire Estimates that does not lapse is Vote 48.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Would it not be possible, Doctor, that in future it would be shown where help was requested. I am thinking of, say, the Pan-American Games in Winnipeg and the amount of help you have given them—whether it be cattle in Alberta or something in Charlottetown or Vancouver—so that we would have detailed account of what was spent the previous year. When I speak of details of, say, the help we have given section 241 because there are no details there. In fact, that is very confusing, particularly to the new members. I am thinking in terms of details of, say, the help we have given Manitoba, Winnipeg, St. Boniface or St. James, then the details on the Pan-American Games or the cattle situation in Alberta. This would be a more sensible way of presenting a budget, particularly to newcomers. In this way we could make a sound assessment on what you spent last year and what might be needed this year. If I presented this type of a budget at the municipal level I would be thrown out in no time flat—I am sure you

would also be in the same boat—because we would not buy these broad terms.

So would it not be possible to show the details? And when I say "details" I do not want someone telling me to look at page 241—because there are no details there. The details should show those you have helped, and only in this way can we make an appropriate assessment.

Now if by chance I am shooting my mouth off here and I should have looked in certain books or certain reports which I have not available to me then I would suggest, Mr. Chairman and Doctor, that these be made available, particularly to the newcomers who are not aware of them, so they will be in a better position to make the appropriate assessment I mentioned.

• 2120

Dr. Arnell: I think perhaps there is a slight misunderstanding here. In looking at the blue book, with all the description under Vote 1, the dollars that are shown beside it, the \$7.316 million does not include any money that is directed at aiding any provincial or municipal or any other kind of activity. That money, the \$7.316 million, is almost entirely to provide—or at least \$6.482 million of it is, as you will see in the new form of Estimates, 1969-70, for National Defence on page 8—to provide for the salaries of the Deputy Minister's staff. The remainder of the money is to pay for the information services. But it is almost entirely a salary Vote, because this is in fact is where the Deputy Minister's staff, who are responsible for what is now called Civilian Control and Policy Management, draw their funds. This is where the money is provided for that staff.

All the rest of the text in here is really to provide the necessary commitment authority to allow contracts to be made which are going to have a requirement for cash later, so that people can let a contract even for three months from now without having to put cash on the line, and also to provide authority for us to bill the various people listed here, United Nations, NATO, any members of the Commonwealth, provincial, or anything, for any services that we give out of our normal operational forces or out of our normal stocks of stuff. I do not know for sure at the moment—I could find out if you are interested—whether in fact we bill, and I presume we do, for the sandbags that we have provided for

floods, and so on. These are in our stocks, and we cannot replace our stocks if we ship out 100,000 sandbags unless we collect money to buy some more. This is really the kind of thing, and this is merely giving us authority to bill somebody for something of ours they may have used. There is no actual money in Vote 1 that goes for that.

The Chairman: If there are no further questions on Vote 1, in accordance with the suggestion made by the steering committee, if you agree, we will stand Vote 1 in case other questions do occur to members which might possibly require the attendance of the Minister or other witnesses. And we will proceed then to Vote 5.

Before calling Vote 5, would the Committee agree to print the advance statement submitted by Dr. Arnell, including the attached selected major equipment items, as an Appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence? Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Perhaps I might also take this opportunity to answer the question raised by Mr. Allmand as to the agenda of the Committee for the rest of the month and for the next few weeks after that. We had a meeting of the steering committee, and it was decided that we should try to complete all the estimates which were referred to the Committee by the end of this month if we could, and then proceed at the beginning of May with our general review of defence policy.

Mr. Forrestall: Would that include Maritime Command?

The Chairman: That was one of the items which was suggested. Dealing specifically with next week, on Tuesday evening at 8:00 p.m. we hope to deal with the estimates of the Department of External Affairs. We have no other meeting scheduled for next week, but we could possibly arrange one if we do not proceed as rapidly as we anticipate. We may need it to finish up the estimates of the Department of National Defence if we do not finish them off this evening. Then on Tuesday, April 29, we have two meetings scheduled, one at 11:00 a.m. and one at 3:30 p.m., to deal with the estimates of the Canadian International Development Agency. So we would hope to finish all our estimates by the end of the month if we could, and then proceed with our general defence review.

• 2125

As members know, when we filed our interim report with the House before the Easter recess, we reserved a number of items in that report, and I might just remind you of them. First we reserved on NORAD, and that presumably would include consideration of ABMS and possibly AWACS. We reserved the question of the Maritime Command, future roles in NATO, peacekeeping, civil defence, and disarmament. The steering committee discussed these various items and thought that possibly the most urgent were NORAD and the Maritime Command.

We also discussed in the steering committee the possibility of setting up sub-committees to deal with these various items. There are some practical difficulties due to lack of facilities, and we will have to give that suggestion some further thought, whether or not we could save time by the setting up of sub-committees on these various items, and how they would function. But in the meantime we do have those two major items which seem to be of prime importance, namely NORAD and Maritime Command. If any of you have a preference as to which item should be dealt with first, we can either discuss it now or you could perhaps notify your party representative so that a decision could be made as to which one should be proceeded with first. Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, because of the very obvious urgency of the review that we have yet to complete, of its importance in terms of what the government now must do, particularly in light of the indications given by our Prime Minister of the necessity for this, I would like very much, whether or not it becomes a matter of discussion right now, to at least suggest to the Committee that before we look at anything else we must look at what would be a primary specialized role. And in that sense I would ask you and the steering committee to consider Maritime Command in some priority over NORAD.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, first of all, do I understand that if we deal with NORAD we will deal with the problem of the ABMs?

The Chairman: That would be logical, if we can get sufficient information at this stage on that subject.

Mr. Allmand: In that case, I would urge—maybe we will have to have another meeting to decide this. Maybe we will have to see our party representatives, but I think that we should as quickly as possible try and get some information about the ABMs. The Government is supposed to be studying it from their point of view, and obviously the American government has to make some decisions. Their committee is working on it. I feel that Maritime Command could wait two or three weeks while we try to get as much information as we can on the ABMs. I realize we have to have the estimates done, but as soon as possible after that I feel we should have some kind of meeting to make some kind of recommendations with respect to ABMs and NORAD.

The Chairman: Probably there is no possibility of deciding definitely this evening when we have the Defence estimates to proceed with. But would members give some thought to this question? I gather that we all agree that these are the two major items, at any rate, that we should proceed with first. The only question is which one we take up first and which one comes second. Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: It seems to me that the over-all problem we face is that the government is going to be making decisions in terms of its reduced forces in NATO, and of course on this ABM system.

With these things in mind, I think that it is very important that we proceed as much as possible on all these levels so that we can come down with recommendations prior to the making of those decisions, which will be made certainly by August anyway, and probably prior to that time.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: What Mr. Cafik raised in a general way is just what I wanted to raise. We all ran into the problem with NATO, to which Mr. Lewis referred, of three months of hearings, a tour of Europe, and then we had to hurry up and get out a report. And there is still a question in many of our minds whether decisions were made before the report.

• 2130

Mr. Chairman, my question was, have you any idea, either from the House Leader or from the Prime Minister or from Mr. Cadieux, and whether you read the Press or

listen to the House—there may be some difference of opinion between Mr. Cadieux and The Prime Minister as to the time limits. You say the estimates first. My first question is, why, if we are going to study ABM, Maritime Command and all these for the very point that Mr. Cafik mentioned? One of the ministers, I think, says that our allies are going to be told in May or in August and then someone else says December, but in any event we are not going to be here in the summer. My first question is why do the Estimates have to come first and separate aside from some of these general policy discussions, when perhaps we should be breaking into subcommittees so that we can formulate a report if the report is to be worth the paper it is written on?

The Chairman: To answer your question specifically, Mr. Nowlan, I have had no information concerning any time limits imposed upon any specific reports the Committee might wish to file with the House. I think the answer to your second question about why we are proceeding with the Estimates is simply that we feel we probably can dispose of them within a reasonably short period of time, whereas it is very difficult to anticipate how long an inquiry on these other two major items that I have mentioned would take.

Mr. Nowlan: Before it was NATO and as I remember it you did make an approach to, or discuss it with, the Prime Minister and as a result of that and perhaps a couple of other things there was no stated policy on NATO before they had our report. Has the steering committee considered whether the same procedure might be followed so that all this motion and effort is not perhaps superfluous and redundant?

The Chairman: We can give that some consideration, Mr. Nowlan. The steering committee has not considered that particular question yet.

Mr. Nowlan: Certainly the Prime Minister's statement involved the Maritime Command potentially. He has already mentioned it as an area of study, and it involves NORAD. I would not want to see us go through the charade of meetings and hearings, and perhaps investigating on the site some of these other problems and find out that the report comes after the decision.

The Chairman: I think that is a good point, Mr. Nowlan, and we will bear that in mind.

Perhaps you would indicate to your party representatives any ideas you may have with regard to the relative priority of these two major items and also any suggestions you have with regard to methods of breaking up into subcommittees if you think this is feasible, bearing in mind the facilities available. Perhaps now I could call Vote 5 on page 239.

5 Grants as detailed in the Estimates—
\$546,375

Mr. Cafik: On Vote 5 I have just a couple of short questions. We have a fair amount of money, although rather modest compared with the other items in the Estimates, for rifle associations, military service associations and so on. Can you explain what these grants are really for? I think I am talking about the right vote.

The Chairman: Yes, that is right.

Mr. Cafik: I do not know anything about these details. I am particularly interested in the United Services Institutes. What is this money used for?

Dr. Arnell: In the case of the United Services Institutes, because it is only in the order of a couple of hundred dollars, I suggest that essentially it is really just a small amount of administrative money for postage and probably for sending out notices.

Mr. Cafik: No, I think we do not understand each other. For instance, under Military, United Services Institutes and Others as shown on page 13 of the new form of estimates, there is \$50,000 for the Air Cadet League of Canada. What do they do with that?

Dr. Arnell: This is the money . . .

Mr. Laniel: Is that not really under Item 1?

Mr. Cafik: No; I believe it is Item 5 in the old form. It is Vote 1 in the new form.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but it is Vote 5 in the old one.

• 2135

Dr. Arnell: With respect to the Air Cadet League of Canada—in fact, the three leagues—these are largely voluntary organizations that run the cadet corps all across the country. For some years the Air Cadet League of Canada, which is a very active league and runs the air cadets all across the

country, has been helped. This goes back to the days of the air force itself. They helped the Air Cadet League to the extent of \$50,000. I do not think I can dig out the figures now of what we estimate it actually costs to run the cadet movement in Canada, but it is a very sizeable sum, as I recall, compared to the \$50,000 that the Department gives.

The Navy League of Canada, which is the sea cadets, operated as a purely voluntary organization that collected all its own money for the sea cadets until it finally reached the point where it just simply could not keep the sea cadets going on a purely voluntary basis and sought help from the Department.

The reason the air force was always so interested in supporting the air cadets is that there was, in fact, a record of many air cadets going on to join the service. Those that did proved to be very good airmen and it has always been felt that for the very small amount of money that goes into the cadet movement across the country, this is really money that has been well invested for what we get in the way of boys who join up as a result of it, and so on.

This is one reason why you will notice that no item is shown for the Navy League of Canada for 1968-69. The Navy League of Canada has, as I say, finally found that it just could not keep operating on its own and it was the Departmental view that like the air cadets it is really too good a movement to see waste away.

Mr. Cafik: What about the Canadian Universities—Military Studies? What is involved in the program there at the university level?

Mr. Laniel: Is that Sir George Williams University?

Mr. Cafik: Is this to teach them how to wreck a computer in 10 minutes, type of thing?

Dr. Arnell: No, this is really the five Chairs of military studies that have been endowed, if you like, at five of the universities.

Mr. Cafik: Is this for post graduate work?

Dr. Arnell: It is essentially for post graduate work. One of the Chairs is here at Carleton University which is included in the School of International Affairs. Alistair Buchan was the first incumbent of the Chair. They plan to keep it as a way of bringing in senior people. This, in fact, replaced the university reserve training programs—the Can-

adian Officer Training Corps of the Army, the university reserve training of the air force and the UNTD of the navy.

It was felt that in the long haul probably more value in getting an understanding of military history strategy, military studies, would be a result of establishing these Chairs at senior graduate and post graduate levels than the other system. It is estimated at \$50,000 a Chair. Authority was given for six but at the moment only five have been established. Those are the two new items that are in the old list.

You will notice a \$300,000 change from last year to this year. Fifty thousand dollars is for the Navy League of Canada and \$250,000 for the Canadian Universities—Military Studies.

Mr. Cafik: These Chairs were just established last year?

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much, Dr. Arnell.

Mr. Allmand: I have a supplementary question on that point.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: At what universities are these Chairs?

Dr. Arnell: As I recall, subject to correction, I believe they are at Acadia University in Nova Scotia; Université Laval; McGill University, I believe; Carleton University and University of Victoria in Victoria, British Columbia.

• 2140

Mr. Allmand: Are these specifically Chairs for military studies or are they all approximately the same as the one you described at Carleton University?

Dr. Arnell: They are called military studies, but really in the broad sense they are everything from strategy to military history. The individual institutes have, I would suggest, some freedom of action as to just who they fit in there because having Alistair Buchan come to Carleton for three months was really quite a stimulus in the broadest sense of strategic thinking.

The actual decisions on how or where this money is placed were worked out with the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, so it was really the universities

themselves that decided how this program would be developed.

Mr. Allmand: Are these courses that are provided through these chairs open to the general student bodies at those universities?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, in fact, in the case of Carleton University when Alistair Buchan was here, they made one of his courses available to part-time students on the payment of the fee.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart and then Mr. Forrestall. Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I just have a supplementary to this as my other question was asked. I wonder what led to the establishment of this \$250,000 for these five chairs. I wonder what the need is behind it since we have staff colleges and so on. I wonder why we are doing this in universities and having an additional grant going out from the government?

Dr. Arnell: I think the staff college and the chair in the university are really two quite different things. This is to broaden the type of teaching or research—whatever you like to call it—in universities in what has been developing in some of the schools that have been seeking to develop institutes of international affairs. I think, as one might say, the Department has been very conscious in recent years of the fact that there was really nobody in any of the universities who was thinking in terms of the strategic side of the picture in international affairs. Most international studies tended to be economic studies or trade or something else. There was nothing with the military flavour. This was introduced to provide a little incentive to broaden the scope of the schools. As I said, it really is, I think, quite flexible as to just how...

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Dr. Arnell, you may be able to answer this very briefly. In terms of the government reaching into the private or non-military sector for one reason or another, whatever it may be, might I ask you if to your knowledge, the Boy Scouts of Canada, for example, either in its national contacts or in any of its regional or provincial contracts have ever approached the federal authorities for the type of grant of financial assistance in a much more definitive way that is made

available to the Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, the Royal Canadian Air Cadets and The Royal Canadian Army Cadets for such programs as rifle practice?

Dr. Arnell: Not to my knowledge, but I can only speak from the point of view of National Defence. Whether they have approached another part of the federal government, I could not answer.

• 2145

Mr. Forrestall: Would it be a matter of policy or could I ask you what the reaction of your Department would be if the Boy Scouts of Canada were to approach you in terms of utilization, for example, if rifle ranges that are available in communities right across Canada and in terms of the supply to them of ammunition, not rifles, but just ammunition?

Dr. Arnell: I think I would have to say my answer is a purely personal one because with respect to your specific question of rifle training and so on, probably my first reaction would be why do they not join the cadets and get a little of the military side. I have just been told that within the broader business of help, that along with many other organizations, upon occasion, the Boy Scouts have been helped in the local sense by perhaps setting up a camp or something where there is a local military unit or a local reserve unit, but it only would be help in the sense of having something available. There has never been, to my knowledge, any question of providing them with money.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay and then Mr. Lewis. Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Could I just ask—

The Chairman: I think perhaps we had better hold that supplementary. I will put your name down, Mr. Allmand. Mr. Guay is next and then Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Forrestall: If I could refer back to one question, Mr. Chairman I would like to ask just one clarifying question. Could I ask the Doctor whether or not the attitude of the Department is one of charity because from what I can gather and from what he has said there has been a lot of local goodwill towards the Boy Scouts Association.

Dr. Arnell: I would not say there has been a lot.

Mr. Forrestall: Or some.

Dr. Arnell: All I tried to imply was that many people have been helped. To keep the

records perfectly straight, there have been many exhibitions that have been lent a tent type of thing just to keep flowers in. In this way we have helped them, but it was not something that really could be called a lot of help or anything else. In the sense that we talk about aiding other people, I would say we do not.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I am asking my question, Mr. Chairman, of the Doctor with a lot of respect; I am not skylarking. With the vast amount of experience Doctor, that you have obtained over the years, if, by chance, you were in private enterprise and would be eligible for a bonus for any amount of money which you might save out of the budget, would you be prepared to tell us where you could cut this budget, taking into consideration that you would be on the bonus system? Do you feel in looking at the budget as it is that with your experience you could tell us where you could substantially chop it?

I have had experience, Mr. Chairman, and I am aware that a budget is presented to a board, a commission or a committee with the hope and anticipation that it will be approved by the committee or whatever it is. I think sometimes you certainly could draw the conclusion that we are relatively stupid by the type of question that we ask and, too often, we do not ask that particular question. Let us say—I ask this very humbly—we really need to cut the budget and yet at the same time you are on the bonus system—you must bear that in mind also—where would you cut it, sir?

Mr. Winch: Where would you cut it? You would throw it back to the Minister and let him answer that question.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): That was not my question.

Mr. Forrestall: It is a good question.

Dr. Arnell: We are actually discussing Item 5 which is half a million dollars of grants.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Maybe my question was too broad, but I meant it in a broad sense.

• 2150

Dr. Arnell: As far as this area is concerned, we actually took a hard look at this. Many of these associations are of very long standing and have, in fact, provided the nucleus of

reserve organizations and this type of thing. The United Services Institutes have provided the forum where people can get together and often have invited speakers and so on, so it has been the considered opinion that this level of grant to keep military organizations aimed towards keeping the reserves going and so on is, in fact, justified. To attempt to reduce this grant which, apart from the military studies, amounted to about a quarter of a million dollars, was felt unwise. It was felt that this was not an area to cut. Under the circumstances of a short haul the only way you can cut a budget is by getting rid of people, or stopping operating, and it becomes a question of how fast you can get rid of people.

The capital side of this has no new program in it of any consequence. Therefore, you cannot save money by new capital. Most of the programs, as you will see from looking at the big programs and the list, would probably cost you almost as much for cancellation charges as to get the equipment. And you really come back, as I said at the beginning, to the fact that this is strictly a hold-the-line budget. The only way you can save money is by getting rid of people, because as long as you have people you have to feed and cloth them and keep them occupied.

As you will see, a very large percentage of this budget goes to pay, allowances, personnel costs and pension charges, because \$200 million in this budget goes to straight statutory military pension charges of actuarial concurrent contributions.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary on this point, if Mr. Guay would allow it. Just taking the budget of \$1.6 billion, that is here, either as a dollar figure or as a percentage, and amplifying more or less what Dr. Arnell was saying, what leeway is there, without cuts of personnel, to diminish this budget this year?

Dr. Arnell: There is really virtually none, unless you just want to keep people sitting in their barracks instead of driving trucks.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, if you are going to discuss that phase I want to go to Vote 15. I want to discuss that very important point on Vote 15.

The Chairman: Members have been gradually getting away from Vote 5. I wonder if we could come back to it.

Have you finished on Vote 5, Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: Dr. Arnell, I am interested in knowing about these Canadian university grants. How did they come about? Did the universities ask you, or was this a notion of the Department?

Dr. Arnell: It really was associated with the fact that for many years there used to be the university reserves, or whatever they were called—the Canadian officer training corps of the Army, the university naval training division of the Navy and the university reserve training program of the Air Force—which ran, if you like, the higher level cadet officer programs within the universities. This program was in nearly all the universities and it normally had a professor directly involved as a reserve officer, who acted as a local commanding officer, and several professors with an interest in military matters. It was by this means that some knowledge of the military and of military thinking, and so on, were in fact introduced into the universities so that there was some connection with the academic community rather than just a complete gap.

• 2155

Because of what came out of the program in terms of future officers, and so on, the military themselves a few years back began to wonder whether it had rather outlived its usefulness in the modern age. It was no longer possible to expose the university cadet to as much as he should know of the actual military way of life in the sophisticated age. With the thought that perhaps the day had come to cut this off, the Canadian forces felt they had to retain some sort of connection with the universities to have an exchange of views.

Mr. Lewis: You are giving the answer at some length. The point is that you initiated this.

Dr. Arnell: And, as a result, it was discussed with the associated universities of Canada, because the universities themselves were very interested in continuing to have this cadet officer scheme. Therefore, this other one was really worked out with the Association of Canadian Universities and Colleges.

Mr. Lewis: Why should the Department of National Defence be interested in subsidizing

a particular kind of program which you call military studies?

Dr. Arnell: Why does the federal government support research in universities? It is, in fact, really a type of research.

Mr. Lewis: Come, come, now; you are not doing any research on a \$50,000 a year chair at a university. You do what you say you do. You are going to have military studies at universities. I appreciate that the amount is not very large. I am not quarrelling about the amount. I am quarrelling about the principle.

Why should you not be just as interested in making a grant to the universities to set up a chair for a study of the avoidance of war, or a study of the causes of war?

Dr. Arnell: These could be done within this.

Mr. Lewis: Why should you be interested in the universities having a chair for military studies?

Dr. Arnell: General Davis has just passed me a note to the effect that he said he took the course at Carleton University this year. He says that the studies are not military but strategic, and that the subjects examined in the course included peacekeeping and arms control, which were just as much emphasized in the course as the broad military strategy type of thing. It is really in the broadest sense a strategic study, if you call it that.

Mr. Lewis: If it have value, and it may well have—and I appreciate that the course is no doubt left to the universities, although you may give some advice but do not control it, I hope...

Dr. Arnell: No we do not.

Mr. Lewis: I would be pretty darned mad at the universities if they let you control it—but if there is value in this kind of course at universities why should it be the Department of National Defence? That is what I cannot understand. Let the Department of the Secretary of State make a grant, or let the Canada Council make a grant—let all sorts of groups do so. Why should you people be so darned interested in making sure that there is a military contact with the people at the universities? Why should you be interested in that?

Dr. Arnell: I do not think this leads to there necessarily being a military contact.

Mr. Lewis: You just said so, Dr. Arnell, three minutes ago. You were explaining how this program came into effect. You said you had the officer training course at the universities, and that there came a time when you decided that there was doubtful value in it from the point of view of getting anything out of it for your forces, and, therefore, there was going to be a gap. This military connection with the universities was—God forbid—going to disappear. Why in heaven's name is it your business to have any military connection with the universities?

Dr. Arnell: It is really up to the university how much of a military connection there really is.

Mr. Lewis: Why should I vote for \$250,000 to go to the universities to promote the military mind? Tell me that.

Mr. Winch: I would be very interested to know if those who took the strategic studies were the leaders of rebellion in the universities.

Mr. Lewis: I do not care whether they were or not, Mr. Winch.

The Chairman: I am not sure that Dr. Arnell can really be expected to answer that last question, Mr. Lewis.

• 2200

Mr. Lewis: I think so. He is here defending this budget. I do not see why I, as one member of this Committee, should vote for any amount of money the purpose of which is to keep this so-called military contact at the universities. I happen to be a person who is not particularly interested—and I was not when I was a student—in having the military mind on the campuses of Canada. Why should you be interested in having that?

Dr. Arnell: I led into my explanation of the Chairs of military and strategic studies by saying that when the time had come to withdraw from the officer cadet programs the Canadian forces wanted to maintain a connection, and they in fact looked at many ways in which it might be done. I would suggest that this solution does not necessarily mean that there is any direct connection at all, because what has been established are five chairs that the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada have decided to place in certain universities, generally within the institutes of international affairs, in order to have a

professor who will lead the teaching and studies in the strategic area in the broadest sense. And peacekeeping and arms control are viewed as military studies in exactly the same way as the history of war in the fifteenth century.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions on that, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: They are answered.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand and then Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Allmand: The question I had was answered.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, the question I have is a supplementary about this university grant. The \$250,000 being, new this year, strikes me as being a bit odd when we are having a hold-the-line budget and a kind of austerity approach to things, and when it did not exist before. But this leads me to ask—and this may already be answered—whether these chairs have in fact been established. I gather that one has been established at Carleton University. I do not know about the other four. And if they have been established—perhaps I am a little naive as a new parliamentarian—how was this done when Parliament has not approved of this particular \$250,000 grant for this purpose? Was it approved last year? I presume this is the first time it is before the House of Commons and its Committee.

Dr. Arnell: It was approved last year, and in fact authority was given to spend the ROTP money when the cadet corps in the universities terminated. There was money that was in fact put towards the military chairs on the authority of the Treasury Board.

Mr. Cafik: But not through the direct authority of Parliament?

Dr. Arnell: No.

Mr. Cafik: Are all the chairs now established, or are you considering establishing them?

Dr. Arnell: I think they were all established together by, in effect, the Association of Universities. I think they all went into effect. I stand to be corrected. Perhaps I should say that we could provide a written answer to this, and be absolutely certain. But I think they all went into effect last fall.

Mr. Cafik: Are you saying that although there is a new item of \$250,000 here, in fact it is replacing an item of a similar amount in the previous budget?

Dr. Arnell: There would have been money in the other one for what was the URTP.

Mr. Cafik: Would that have been under this same item, Vote 5?

Dr. Arnell: No, it would have been under the reserve item.

Mr. Cafik: So if we were to look there, we would find a \$250,000 decrease?

Dr. Arnell: I think there was more money than that. Yes, there was more money than that. To my recollection this was only a part of what was going into the URTP program.

• 2205

Mr. Cafik: So the result of pursuing this particular program was a reduction in overall expenditures by the Department. Thank you.

Mr. Allmand: A supplementary question on that. You suggested you might provide us with a written answer on this. I would be interested in having a written answer, briefly describing the five chairs and the kind of subjects, if that is possible.

Dr. Arnell: I do not know if we can get the actual subjects that are being taught. We might have to go to the universities. But we can certainly give you the details of the chairs, and where they are and when they were set up.

Mr. Allmand: I would appreciate that.

Mr. Winch: And who the professors are.

The Chairman: We will get that and file it with the Clerk of the Committee, and make it available to all the members.

Mr. Nowlan: It is beyond 10.00 p.m. I do not know what the Chair is going to do, but certainly, unless there was a great unanimity, I do not care to sit much longer than 10.00 p.m. This day we started at 9.30 a.m. in some of these committees.

The Chairman: I think we all agree that we should not attempt to continue later this evening.

Mr. Winch: I have at least five questions on Vote 15, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cafik: What are we going to do? Are we going to have another meeting on this subject?

Mr. Nowlan: We are not going to pass the defence estimates in one meeting. Anyone who thought we were, including the Chairman, is rather . . .

Mr. Cafik: I am not suggesting that anybody did.

Mr. Nowlan: I think he did.

Mr. Cafik: Knowing that you are on the Committee, I certainly would not presume such things.

Mr. Nowlan: I hate to say this, Mr. Cafik, but the Chairman might have been off his rocker if he thought we were going to get through this in one meeting.

The Chairman: I am sure everyone is delighted, including Dr. Arnell, in the intense interest which members are showing in the estimates of the Department of National Defence. It is quite apparent that we are not going to finish this evening. I think therefore, if you agree, we will stand Vote 5 that we are now on, and perhaps you could leave it to me to try to work out with officials an appropriate time to re-convene.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Could we not vote on item 5 and get it over with?

The Chairman: I think in any case we have lost our quorum momentarily, so perhaps we could stand that item. There may be some difficulty, because next Wednesday and Thursday, as members know, there is the debate on external affairs and national defence. The following Friday Dr. Arnell may be out of the city, but we will do our best to arrange an appropriate time.

Mr. Nowlan: Since time is of the essence, and since we have all had an Easter holiday of sorts, is there any possibility of a Saturday-long meeting on the budget?

The Chairman: That might be rather difficult, but what about tomorrow morning—Friday morning at 9.30 a.m.?

Mr. Nowlan: No.

Mr. Cafik: I am not too sure about it. There are many people with other commitments then.

The Chairman: Perhaps you could leave it to me to do my best to work out some appro-

priate time. If you are interested in obtaining NATO ties or the SHAPE medallion, you can fill out the form which Mr. Grant has circulated to members and return it to him. The meeting is adjourned until further notice.

Thank you very much, Dr. Arnell. We will be seeing more of you.

APPENDIX UU

14 april 1969

STATEMENT ON THE 1969-70
ESTIMATES FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE PREPARED
FOR THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL DEFENCE

The 1969-70 Estimates for the Department of National Defence relate to the fifth year of the five-year equipment program for the Canadian Armed Forces which was announced by the Minister and Associate Minister of National Defence in December 1964. This program was the direct result of the Government White Paper on Defence which had been issued earlier that year and was designed to re-equip and improve the mobility of the army; to provide the adequate air and sea lift for immediate deployment in an emergency; to acquire tactical aircraft; and to maintain a relatively constant improvement of maritime anti-submarine capability.

The total planned capital expenditure over the five year period was to be approximately \$1,500 million. Including the capital monies provided in the 1969-70 Estimates, the total funds expended on the Defence Services capital program during this period will be approximately \$1,300 million. This shortfall in expenditure was due in large measure to the inability to spend all the funds which were provided for capital during the first two years of this period. There is always a time lag in achieving a cash flow after a decision is taken to procure a major equipment or weapons system. The drafting of detailed specifications, the invitations to industry to tender, the contract negotiations, and the successful bidder's tooling up-time can result in a period of a year or more before any significant funds are expended on a major project amounting to \$100 million or more in total.

It will be noted that the funds provided for capital in the current Estimates are less than that provided in previous years. This is the direct result of a Government decision to limit defence expenditures in this area to continuing projects until such time as the defence policy review should be completed. As a result, several new equipment projects which might have been considered for inclu-

sion in this year's program were postponed and funds have only been included to meet the anticipated expenditures arising out of the previous approved capital equipment projects.

In the attached annex is a table of selected major equipment items which are currently under procurement showing the estimated expenditures to 31 March 1969, the anticipated expenditures during the current fiscal year and the remaining funds committed to each. This table includes those items listed in the five-year program for which the orders have not been completed. By the end of the current fiscal year, about 75 per cent of the estimated total expenditure will have been made.

Turning to the Estimates themselves, it is to be noted that the total is approximately \$102 million above the revised 1968-69 Estimates which was considered by the Standing Committee on 21 November 1968, after deducting \$5 million representing the value in 1968-69 of the Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment transfer to the Department of Communications after the revised Estimates were printed. This difference is entirely attributable to the result of military and civilian pay increases granted during 1968-69 and to the Government contribution to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Account. These two items together total approximately \$104 million which is slightly larger than the increase in the total Estimates. There have been some adjustments between votes in the Estimates to meet increased costs of supplies, etc., and the changes in the capital program already referred to.

The 1969/70 Estimates, in common with those of other departments, have also been prepared in the new program/activity form and the pamphlet displaying this new approach to Estimates' presentation was distributed to all Members of Parliament after it was tabled on 24 February 1969. It is important to note that this year's Estimates were originally prepared in the traditional form and were tabled in the Blue Book on 4 February 1969. It is understood this will be the form in which they will be enacted in the Appropriation Act. As a result, the main explanations and justifications are therefore in terms of the Blue Book.

When the 1968/69 Estimates were being considered by the Standing Committee last year, a brief was presented on 21 November 1968 which outlined the approach to program budgeting being developed within the Department of National Defence. The program/activity structure used for this year's Estimates is essentially the same as that presented in November, with only such modifications as were necessary for clarification, and is in conformity with the outline proposed to the Public Accounts Committee by the President of the Treasury Board and the staff of the Secretariat for future years' Estimates.

In this new format, the Defence Estimates are presented in terms of Programs, which are in turn subdivided into Activities related to the objectives of the programs. In the case of the Defence Services Program, there are seven activities. The various components of the Canadian Forces are grouped with their

costs under one or other of these activities. However, many of these forces perform more than one role, or are required to meet more than one commitment, which is explained in the accompanying narrative. Because of this, the financial resources associated with these force components have been distributed to the appropriate activities by means of broad pro-rata allocations of the Estimates as originally prepared. As a result, only the general magnitude of the costs attributable to each activity are presented in the new form of Estimates, which can only be considered to be supplementary illustrative information and not accurate cost estimates of each activity. Nevertheless, the Committee members may find it useful to study this new form of Estimates along with the Blue Book, as the two displays of the same budgetary data taken together give a much clearer picture of the intended uses of the requested funds.

NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
1969-70 ESTIMATES
SELECTED MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS

\$ Thousands

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	CASH PHASING		
		Estimated Expenditure to 31 March 69	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1969-70	Balance To be paid in Future Years
	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)
DDH CLASS CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.....	220,692	57,800	57,000	105,892
Continuation of an approved program to construct four modern helicopter carrying destroyer escorts to improve the Fleet's ASW capabilities. These ships will carry the Canadian SEA SPARROW Close Range Missile system, the Variable Depth and Hull Mounted Sonar AN/SQS-505 system, the Italian Oto Malarà 5"/54 Mk. 45 gun, the OOS280 Action Information system and the latest types of electronic warfare and communications equipment.				
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SHIPS.....	63,308	42,014	17,000	4,294
Continuation of an approved program to construct two ships similar to HMCS PROVIDER to replenish the fleet at sea and provide a limited sealift capability.				
RESTIGOUCHE CONVERSION PROGRAM.....	49,700	10,296	14,200	25,204
Continuation of an approved program to improve ASW capabilities of four ships, installing modern Variable Depth and Hull mounted Sonar (AN/SQS-505/AN/SQA-502) systems and ASROC (anti-submarine rocket) weapon systems.				
OBERON SUBMARINES.....	49,200	45,477	1,400	2, 23
Completion of an approved program to construct three conventional submarines to improve the fleet's ASW capabilities and to provide realistic training for anti-submarine forces (both surface and air).				
BONAVENTURE REFIT AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.....	12,570	12,056	295	219
Completion of an approved program to improve the operational capability and habitability of this ship.				
NAVAL RESEARCH SHIP.....	11,919	9,734	1,985	200
Continuation of an approved program to construct a ship to carry out hydrographic and oceanographic research for the Defence Research Establishment (Atlantic).				
TECHNICAL ENGINEERING SERVICES.....	Recurring Item	Recurring Item	1,290	1,000/annum
A continuing program to hire civilian consultants and design services to determine the most suitable systems and equipments required to meet ships' operational characteristics and the optimum installation arrangements.				

NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
1969-70 ESTIMATES
SELECTED MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS

\$ Thousands

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	CASH PHASING		
		Estimated Expenditure to 31 March 69	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1969-70	Balance To be paid in Future Years
	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)
ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER M113A1, COMMAND Post M577A1, CARGO CARRIER M548.....	46,049	45,546	503	0
A continuing program to provide increased cross-country mobility, and protection against blast, heat and radiation from nuclear explosion. 461 APC's in first buy, 500 in second.				
ARMoured RECOVERY VEHICLE M578.....	702	531	171	0
Eight vehicles (tracked) to provide essential recovery facilities for armoured fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery.				
HOWITZER MEDIUM SELF-PROPELLED 155mm, M109.....	8,997	8,831	166	0
Fifty howitzers to equip the artillery regiments in mechanized brigade groups.				
155mm AMMUNITION.....	15,679	12,527	2,152	1,000
Various types are being procured for use with the M109 SP Howitzer.				
TOTALS.....	24,676	21,358	2,318	1,000
105mm PACK HOWITZER.....	2,597	893	207	1,497
This is a lightweight, air-transportable, direct support artillery weapon which can be rapidly disassembled for mule or pack transport. The howitzer fires the current 105mm M1 ammunition.				
MEDIUM MORTAR, 81mm.....	545	340	205	0
AMMUNITION.....	7,953	4,797	1,946	1,210
This is an indirect fire weapon system providing infantry battalions with integral fire support.				
TOTAL.....	8,498	5,137	2,151	1,210
CARRIER, COMMAND AND RECONNAISSANCE (LYNX).....	11,00	10,820	180	0
This tracked vehicle, of the M113A1 family, is a small, air-droppable, amphibious vehicle which will replace the Ferret Scout Car now in service.				
TRUCK, UTILITY, 1/4 TON M38A1 (JEEP).....	7,663	3,028	3,236	1,399
This personnel and light cargo carrier will replace similar vehicles now in service as they reach the end of life.				
C130E HERCULES AIRCRAFT.....	12,500	11,069	50	1,381
This is a long range prop-jet transport which has replaced C119 Flying Box Car and North Star Aircraft.				
Completion of an approved program for exchanging three C130B aircraft for four C130E aircraft. Two aircraft were received in July 68 and two aircraft were received in August 68.				

NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
1969-70 ESTIMATES
SELECTED MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS

\$ Thousands

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	CASH PHASING		
		Estimated Expenditure to 31 March 69	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1969-70	Balance To be paid in Future Years
	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)
CS2F TRACKER MID-LIFE MODERNIZATION.....	10,470	9,392	800	278
A program to up-date ASW capability of 45 CS2F aircraft.				
CC115 BUFFALO AIRCRAFT.....	46,900	38,731	2,000	6,169
A continuing programme to procure 15 tactical transport aircraft for support of the field forces.				
CHSS 2 SEA KING HELICOPTER.....	87,257	83,571	2,000	1,686
A programme for an amphibious anti-submarine warfare helicopter. It will be flown off destroyer escort ships with which it forms an ASW weapons system. 41 helicopters are on contract.				
CF5—LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT				
A continuing program for 115 light attack aircraft.				
AIRCRAFT AND ENGINES.....	215,000	173,330	23,000	18,670
ARMAMENT EQUIPMENT.....	9,148	6,007	3,141	0
AMMUNITION AND BOMBS.....	5,367	968	1,283	3,116
TOTAL.....	229,515	180,305	27,424	21,786
CL89 SURVEILLANCE DRONE AN/USD-501.....	7,765	3,936	2,417	1,412
A photo-reconnaissance pilotless airborne vehicle which will be launched by artillery units. It is being developed jointly by Canada, US and the Federal Republic of Germany.				
CC117 FALCON AIRCRAFT UTILITY JET TRANSPORT.....	13,200	12,199	700	301
Completion of an approved program for 7 Fan Jet Falcon aircraft for Command communication operations. Aircraft delivery completed June 68.				
CUH-1H UTILITY TACTICAL TRANSPORT HELICOPTER.....	7,000	5,034	1,200	766
A program to procure 10 Bell UH-1 helicopters and support materiel, to train air crews and technicians for the UTT helicopter role in Mobile Command.				
ARGUS IMPROVEMENTS.....	16,488	11,170	3,800	1,518
Navigation and flight control systems improvements for 32 Argus aircraft.				
COMPUTER DRIVEN ALTIMETER SYSTEM.....	4,485	100	2,130	2,255
A program to improve altitude accuracy of CAF aircraft.				

NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
1969-70 ESTIMATES
SELECTED MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS

\$ Thousands

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	CASH PHASING		
		Estimated Expenditure to 31 March 69	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1969-70	Balance To be paid in Future Years
	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)	(\$000)
CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT.....	10,743	8,708	344	1,691
On line cryptographic equipment to provide long haul strategic communication networks with simultaneous encryption and decryption.				
RADIO SET, 50 MILE—304 SETS.....	19,000	12,540	2,237	4,223
RADIO SET, 15 MILE—1078 SETS				
RADIO SET, 5 MILE—2069 SETS				
A program to re-equip the Land Forces with up-to-date tactical radios for manpack and vehicular use. These sets are all standard in the US Army.				
ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT.....	5,721	1,443	380	3,898
Major component parts of a comprehensive program to equip one aircraft carrier and 20 ST LAURENT, RESTIGOUCHE and ANNAPOLIS Class DDE's with an effective Electronic Counter Measure System (Noise and Deception Break-lock Jammers for RESTIGOUCHE Class only). In addition, provision is made for Fleet Schools and peacetime attrition.				
NON DIRECTIONAL SONOBUOYS.....	Recurring Item	—	3,400	Recurring Item
An expendable underwater listening device used in ASW operations and exercises. New procurement is required annually to replenish depleted stock.				
Three Transportable Radio Communication Stations required to provide Mobile Command, Air Transport Command and Maritime Command with rear link and air-ground-air communications in support of UN and NATO operations or in the defence of Canada. The stations are scheduled for delivery in September, 1969.	2,250	400	1,100	750

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

LIBRARY

JUN 11 1969

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 37

MONDAY, APRIL 21, 1969

Respecting

Estimates, 1969-70, Department of National Defence.

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan
and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Cafik	Laniel	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Carter	Laprise	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Fairweather	Legault	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Forrestall	Lewis	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
¹ Groos	Marceau	Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4)(b):

¹ Mr. Groos replaced Mr. Buchanan on April 21, 1969.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

MONDAY, April 21, 1969.
(56)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3.35 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan-Boundary*), Legault, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch (17).

Witnesses: Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance, Department of National Defence and Mr. C. R. Patterson, Director General, Canada Emergency Measures Organization.

The Committee resumed its consideration of the 1969-70 *Estimates of the Department of National Defence*.

Continuing the discussion of *Item 5*, Members were provided with information by Dr. Arnell concerning the grants to *Canadian Universities—Military Studies*, as requested at the previous meeting. Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*) requested additional information about universities in the Prairie region, which Dr. Arnell will provide.

On completion of the questioning, *Item 5* was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called the Items pertaining to the Emergency Measures Organization, namely *Item 7 Administration and Operation \$1,778,600*; *Item 10 Construction or Acquisition etc. \$220,900*; and *Item 12 Contributions to Provinces and Municipalities etc.; \$3,000,000*.

Dr. Arnell and Mr. Patterson were questioned by the Members on each of these Items. Mr. Harkness requested information on field hospitals, Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*) requested information on grants to municipalities in Manitoba and Mr. Allmand requested information on the EMO Digest. Mr. Patterson will send reports on these items to the Clerk, for the information of the Members.

The Committee agreed to print a statement on the *plausible attack study*, to be forwarded by Mr. Patterson, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix VV*).

Items 7, 10, and 12 were allowed to stand.

The Committee adjourned at 5.45 p.m., until 8.00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(57)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8.05 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Cafik, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*) Wahn, Winch (16).

Also present: Mr. Groos, M.P.

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance; Commodore F. D. Elcock, Director General Organization, Manpower and Management; and Brigadier General G. R. Truemner, Director General Personnel Plans and Requirements.

The Chairman called the Items of the 1969-70 *Estimates* relating to Defence Services, namely Item 15 *Administration, Operation etc.* \$1,541,006,000; and Item 20 *Transitional Grant etc.* \$700,000.

Members of the Committee questioned Dr. Arnell on these items, with particular reference to personnel matters. Mr. Howard (*Okanagan-Boundary*) and Mr. Legault requested additional information concerning reductions in the number of Officers. Mr. Cafik requested information on pay fields. Dr. Arnell will provide this information. Commodore Elcock and Brigadier General Truemner assisted Dr. Arnell during the questioning.

Items 15 and 20 were allowed to stand.

The Chairman re-called Items 5, 7, 10 and 12 which were severally carried.

The Chairman re-called Items 15 and 20.

Members continued their questioning under these Items. Dr. Arnell will provide a statement dealing with medical personnel, as requested by Mr. Ryan.

With the questioning continuing, at 10.05 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until Tuesday, April 22, 1969 at 8.00 p.m. when the Committee will consider the *Estimates* of the Department of External Affairs.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Monday April 21, 1969

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have Dr. Arnell from the Department with us again.

Last week we dealt with Vote 1 in some detail and stood it, and then we dealt in some detail with Vote 5 and I believe we completed most of the questioning. However, questions were raised with regard to grants to universities for military studies, and in accordance with suggestions made in the Committee, Dr. Arnell has further information on that subject. After he has given that information to the Committee, unless members have other questions on Vote 5, we will proceed with the votes relating to the Emergency Measures Organization. Dr. Arnell.

Dr. J. C. Arnell (Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance Division, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, I thought that the best way of answering the Committee's questions on the university program and the chairs of military studies would be to refer to two press releases. If it is the wish of the Committee, these could be included as appendices.

The first of the two was an announcement on October 2, 1967, in which information was given out for the planned discontinuance of the reserve officers training plans at the universities. They are the three to which I referred last Thursday night—the University Naval Training Divisions, the Army's Canadian Officers Training Corps and the Air Force's University Reserve Training Program.

That announcement went on to say:

The Department of National Defence, to foster the development of military studies at the university level, will propose the establishment of courses in military studies at some Canadian universities, together with post-graduate fellowships and research grants.

Some statistics were given of the number of officer cadets in training, and so on.

The second press release was on the 3rd of July 1968, in which it was announced that:

Professorships of military and strategic studies will be established at five Canadian universities this fall.

meaning the fall of 1968

under a new program developed by the Department of National Defence and the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada.

And here I must correct an implication I made last time about which universities are taking part. The press release reads:

Taking part in the new program will be Acadia University, Wolfville, N.S.; Laval University, Quebec City; Carleton University, Ottawa; Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario; and the University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C.

The professorships will enable both graduate and under-graduate students to study problems of international and national security in a Canadian context.

The remainder of the announcement relates to the financial support of \$250,000 that we were discussing last week. This support

will include salaries, university overhead, and reference material. Graduate scholarships, fellowships and individual programs of research may be included.

It speaks of the recruitment of staff and development of course content as the sole responsibility of each university. And it goes on as follows:

It is expected that the establishment of these professorships will encourage and contribute to objective and informed study of all aspects of Canadian defence problems in the broad content of international security.

And it concludes with the statement:

The Universities receiving professorships were selected by a Committee headed by A. D. P. Heeney, Chairman of the

International Joint Commission, with representatives from the A.U.C.C. and D.N.D.

The question was raised as to how this was funded last year, and the Committee might be interested in the figures. At the time the 1968-69 estimates were put together, just over \$1.5 million was provided for the total of the university officer training plans, all three of them. With the decision to phase out any new officer cadets and to run down these training plans, only \$287,000 of that money will be spent, when the accounts are finalized for last year, on what is now spoken of as the Reserve Officers University Training Plan. And out of that \$1.5 million, \$141,000 was used for the beginning of the establishment of the chairs in the universities.

In this year's estimates, as we were discussing last Thursday night, there is \$250,000 in Vote 1 for the military studies, and in Vote 15, the Defence Services vote, there is \$294,000 for the continuation of this Reserve Officers University Training Plan, to finish it off. I think that covers the point that was raised on Thursday night, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Arnell. Are there any further questions on Vote 5?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Could I go back for a moment, Mr. Chairman? I am particularly interested in Western Canada. I think we have often been overlooked, and possibly there is a reason why we are being overlooked again. I took note of the universities Dr. Arnell mentioned, and I also took note that no university in the Prairie Provinces, namely Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, was named as one in which these studies will be made. Could he explain to the Committee why the Prairie Provinces are left out entirely in this program?

Dr. Arnell: The choice of the universities was made in two stages. First, universities were invited to apply if they were interested,

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and quite a number of universities did so. As I mentioned in the course of going over this, the actual selection was done by a committee made up largely of representatives from the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. So that in large measure the choice was made by the university representatives themselves.

Without digging into the details, I cannot tell you offhand which universities in the Prairie Provinces applied for grants. But the selection was put in the hands of a committee, so that would be largely the decision of the universities themselves as to which universities got chairs. I believe that provision was also made for other universities to associate themselves with the program by local co-operative arrangements. To date I have not heard of any doing this, although they may have.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I have a further question. Is this committee which made the final choice situated in Ottawa?

Dr. Arnell: No; I think the representatives, in fact, came from the universities. I do not know that we have a list of the actual people, but my understanding is that they were representative of universities right across the country. If you really want the information I am sure could dig it out.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I would like to have it, Dr. Arnell. I want to find out, first of all, whether universities in the Prairie Provinces applied, and, if so, the reason for their not being given any consideration.

I understand it could very well be that they did not apply, but if they were interested and did apply then I think we should also know the reason for the three provinces being bypassed.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, would you like to know the members of the committee which made the selection?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes, I would, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Arnell: I think we might have to go to the committee, because it really was not something done within the Department. It was really so that it would not be a choice made by the Department of National Defence that this was really put to the universities to sort out. I think if the information is desired I could try to get it and provide it as an appendix to the minutes.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman and Dr. Arnell, I appreciate that greatly. But the fact remains that it is the committee that is spending the money, and that being the case I am concerned.

The Chairman: The information we would like to get, Dr. Arnell, however it is obtained, is first of all, whether any prairie universities did apply; second, who were the members of the committee that made the decision; and, third, what were the reasons, if they did apply, for no prairie university being given the opportunity to participate.

Dr. Arnell: The only information I have is that 14 universities originally applied.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions on Vote 5?

Mr. Forrestall: I have one brief question, Dr. Arnell. On page 239 of the estimates there is an item in the amount of \$50,000 for the Navy League of Canada. I am curious about why it does not appear as a recurring item.

Dr. Arnell: I think I mentioned it in passing on Thursday night. The three cadet organizations of the navy, the army and the air force are in large measure voluntary organizations run by interested citizens for the cadets.

For many years the air force supported the Air Cadet League with some money. It was a very large and active group and the money helped them with their summer camps and other training. The other two cadet organizations preferred to operate entirely on voluntary donations which they themselves collected.

During the past years the Navy League of Canada, which handles the naval cadets, found that with increasing costs they simply could not continue on a voluntary basis, and they applied for support from the Department. The Department has always viewed the cadet movement as a very valuable asset, because it has been found over the years, in the air force in particular, that among the recruits there are a very surprisingly high proportion who in fact have been air cadets. The same has really also been true of the other two cadet organizations.

As a result, because the air cadets had in fact been supported for some years, when the Navy League also applied for help, it was considered both desirable and reasonable to include them.

This is really the beginning of what presumably will be a continuing grant to the Navy League and one might anticipate, with the continuing increase in costs, that perhaps the same thing may take place with the army cadets in the course of time.

Mr. Forrestall: Thank you, Dr. Arnell.

The Chairman: Have you finished, Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: I surely wish to ask your direction on something I cannot find anywhere in the estimates. I wanted to ask questions about the financial position of the Department in relation to the construction of headquarters for *HMCS Scotian* in Halifax.

Dr. Arnell: That will be in Vote 15.

The Chairman: We will be coming to that a little later.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, while we are on this subject of cadet organizations, I have been a little surprised to find that although the cadet organizations are officially recognized by the military forces they seem to be rather like stepchildren of the organization.

I have received complaints from officers working with these organizations about what happens when they try to obtain used military equipment required by the organizations. As an example I will cite band instruments. They have attempted to obtain these used pieces of equipment that the other military forces have declared surplus and are getting rid of. They find that they cannot even buy them out of their own pockets from the military forces that they have to go through a Crown Assets Disposal proposition; and that they are unable to do this because Crown War Assets Disposal Corporation handles these items on a very large quantity basis.

It does not seem to me to be a very good use of funds to give these organizations the money to operate and then have them go and buy back, through civilian organizations, equipment which has previously belonged to military forces and which has been sold at a fraction of its original cost. May I have an explanation of that?

Dr. Arnell: I do not have any detail on this particular aspect of the situation. In fact, I do not think I have ever heard of this particular problem before.

Generally speaking, I think, if it is known that there is such a situation as you have just outlined something could be done in the course of disposal. Quite often it is not until after a declaration has already been made to Crown Assets that the needs of such an organization as the Cadet League will become known and then efforts are made to give

them an opportunity to bid on the equipment. Undoubtedly there will be cases in which somebody will hear after instruments have been declared surplus that such is the case and will find perhaps that there are too many involved.

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Mr. Winch: May I just add some information here, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, is this a supplementary question?

Mr. Winch: I wish to inform the hon. member that I also have had applications in Vancouver and have never had any difficulties whatsoever over the years. The procedure is that when you receive the application—whether it be from a cadet league or a legion band, I have even had them from legion bands, you send the letter to the Department of National Defence, knowing the equipment is going to be declared to Crown Assets Disposal, and in my experience it has worked out wonderfully well—is that the Department of National Defence in turn notifies Crown Assets Disposal Corporation so that the Cadet League or the Legion or the Navy League who are after this send a letter to the Department of National Defence and a letter to Crown Assets. I have yet to find one solitary instance when they have not been able to obtain the equipment at a price which is so low that I have not had one complaint. That is the procedure that is followed in Vancouver, if it is of any use to you, sir.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): I appreciate that information very much because I know of cadet organizations who have not been able to do that and I will be very happy to follow that advice.

Mr. Winch: We have not failed once in Vancouver in that respect.

Dr. Arnell: In general that is the way I would have expected it worked. It is a case of knowing ahead of time, you cannot really do much after the event sometimes.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): I know. You can assure me it is a policy that where equipment of that kind is available other military organizations in Canada can buy it before it is sold publicly? I can be assured of that?

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Barrett: I might say, Mr. Chairman, it is the first time I have heard of anything being of benefit to Vancouver from that same source.

Mr. Winch: Well we have no little that I am happy to say we have had some results in this regard.

Mr. Barrett: Very good.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, sometimes we do hear a lot of complaints and when we investigate we find out that they really did not ask for these things. I think it might be very interesting to find out in the case of Mr. Howard, and I am not suggesting that he did or did not, but I think it might be interesting to know if they really asked the Department of National Defence for this particular help. Did they do it in writing, and if so, when, and is it possible to follow it up? If one can do it and get it, the other one does not, then I think we should know about it.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Well I, of course, found this on a file which indicates they have been unable to get through the red tape and obtain these pieces of equipment.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions on Item 5?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I was going to ask one more question, sir, pertaining to this. Over and above the increase in cost, could Dr. Arnell explain the increase of well over \$1 million, is it a million or billion; from \$6 million last year to \$7 million this year?

The Chairman: Are you back on Item 1?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I am speaking of Item 5 on page 234. The total there is \$7 million and last year it was \$6 million which is over \$1 million increase.

Dr. Arnell: This is a combination of Item 1 and Item 5, the total figures there. You will find the Item 5 figures are the \$546,375 and the \$246,375 in the two columns. Of that \$300,000 increase, \$250,000 relates to the university support, and the other \$50,000 is the Navy League of Canada grant. The increase above that relates essentially to the departmental salaries of the Deputy Minister's staff and so on. The actual details of the increases are on pages 238 and 239.

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The Chairman: Are there any further questions on Item 5? If not, perhaps we can stand that item and we will pass these items in a group later on.

Item 5 stood.

The Chairman: We will pass on to the next item which is Item 7. Members will notice that Items 7, 10 and 12 all relate to the Emergency Measures Organization. I think I have to call each item separately but perhaps if members agree we could discuss the items as a group because they all relate to the same general matter. Indeed, they are dealt with I think as Item 5 in the new form of estimates. Is that satisfactory to members?

All right, I call Item 7, Item 10, and Item 12; I will accept questions from members on any or all of these votes. Mr. Harkness?

Department of National Defence

Emergency Measures Organization

- 7 Administration and Operation—\$1,778,600.
- 10 Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment, including authority to make recoverable advances not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of the Governments of the Provinces of the costs of joint programs—\$220,900.
- 12 Contributions to Provinces and Municipalities for Civil Defence purposes—\$3,000,000.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I have been concerned that the Emergency Measures Organization activities seem to have been constantly melting away. Even the figures we have here show quite a decline from the year 1966-67 to the present. And 1966-67 was a decline from four, five and six years earlier. It has always seemed to me that one of the most important things that could be done in the way of defence was civil defence. In the event of the worst happening, through an effective civil defence organization, probably many millions of lives could be saved which otherwise would be lost. As a result, I think it is a disturbing development that the amount of activity as far as Emergency Measures is concerned has been declining so steadily and so rapidly. I do not know who is the official now in the position of Director General, Canada Emergency Measures Organization, but I wonder if we might have an

outline of just what activities have been dispensed with, and which ones are being carried on at the present time.

Dr. Arnell: Well, Mr. C. R. Patterson who is the Director General of the Emergency Measures Organization is here with me, but before asking him to say anything I would like to point out that in Item 7 you will note that quite a sizable amount of the decrease is related to salaries and wages.

As part of the transfer of the Emergency Measures Organization from the Department of Industry last year into the Department of National Defence there was an amalgamation of a number of staff functions with the result that the headquarters of the Emergency Measures Organization was reduced in size and this has resulted in a decrease in the requirements for salaries.

Perhaps the largest decrease shown there is the decrease for professional and special services. I understand this is due in large part to the completion of a large consultant study that had been under way last year and the continuing moneys are the moneys available, some \$292,000, for whatever consultant they may feel they need to call in. The other sizable decrease is the one shown in Item 12 where the contributions to the provinces and municipalities have, in fact, been cut further. Perhaps as you have asked for it Mr. Harkness, I might ask Mr. Patterson to join me here for a few minutes and answer some questions for you.

• 1600

The Chairman: Mr. Patterson would you like to comment upon the question raised by Mr. Harkness?

Mr. C. R. Patterson (Director General, Canada Emergency Measures Organization): The reductions that took place in Emergency Measures Organization began basically in the fall of 1967, or at least for the budget 1967-68. At that time, when the government was cutting expenses I went to see the Minister. The Minister at that time asked where we could actually reduce expenses and still carry on with a program? In common with many other departments the biggest items cut at that particular time were capital construction and the capital purchase items. When we talk about capital construction, capital construction is generally involved with matters such as the development of regional emergency government headquarters, of which you are well

aware and for which we have an on-going program. We had at that time planned to rebuild the school in Arnprior and, of course, as far as capital purchase was concerned, there was a fair amount involved in emergency communications equipment and in radiological defence equipment, and basically this was it. At that particular time, too, we were spending in the neighbourhood of \$600,000 or \$700,000 a year in the fall-out shelter survey. There was also a big reduction in the 1968-69 budget with respect to provincial participation in civil emergency measures. The big change in direction at this particular time was this. The attempt was made, along with the reduction in expenses, to continue a viable and on-going program using existing resources. This really meant that the expenses involved in recruiting and training large numbers of volunteer workers were reduced. Also, the number of people and the amount of money available for local co-ordinators, et cetera, were reduced. This was in line with the modern thought which applies to more than Canada—it applies to the western nations as a whole—that civil emergency measures really exist as a development of plans and preparations for the utilization of those resources that are available at all levels of government. It was the intention of the government of that time to ensure that every federal government which has a responsibility that it carries out in peacetime that would have a comparable job in wartime would take as part of its regular, every-day efforts the job of planning for wartime as well.

The same thing applies to the provinces. The provinces, as a matter of fact, in some cases have bills and in some cases actually have orders in council in which they have done the same thing. As a result of the reduction to \$3,750,000 in the 1968-69 period and \$3 million in the 1969-70 period, there has been quite a change in the form of provincial management and provincial organization but every province is still involved in the Civil Emergency Measures Program.

As Dr. Arnell said, there have been changes in the headquarters program of the Canada Emergency Measures Organization.

• 1605

We had 150 personnel all together in the year 1968-69, which was our establishment, and this has actually been reduced to 92 for the year 1969-70. However, 30 positions, as Dr. Arnell has already said, were originally

allocated to our administrative problem and these 30 positions are substantially replaced by the work that the Deputy Minister's office carries out. At the Canadian Emergency Measures College at Arnprior we had 48 positions. For a long time it had been considered that we should actually, from the point of view of economy, go to a different system of messing there; and as a result of reductions which we have been able to make this year, we are going to a system of messing and our complement at the Canadian Emergency Measures College has dropped from 48 to 22. Mind you, we have exercised every possible economy in every aspect of the Civil Emergency Measures Program to fit within this \$5 million budget which we have in Canada EMO.

We have in each province a regional office of the Emergency Measures Organization which we have reduced in all the provinces to one co-ordinator and one secretary, and this gives us 20 people across Canada. Those are where the reductions have taken place generally. Would you like to be more specific on it?

Mr. Harkness: I might just say that as far as this reduction in administrative expenses is concerned as well as the cutting out of a number of positions as a result of putting the Emergency Measures Organization into the Department of National Defence, I think it is all to the good. I am fully in favour of that as I can quite see how having this Organization in the Department does make possible the savings of a considerable number of administrative positions. I have no comment on that. But when we come to your equipment and building program, what is the situation now as far as these regional headquarters are concerned? How many of them have actually been completed and how many are in operation?

Mr. Patterson: There are six across Canada that are totally completed. That is Nanaimo, Penhold, Shilo, Camp Borden, Valcartier and Debart. As you know, their plans are for a regional emergency government headquarters at every provincial centre and there are interim headquarters with communications at the other centres.

Mr. Harkness: Are these headquarters manned and in operation?

Mr. Patterson: Yes. At the time that the reductions were announced there was no major system in existence that was dropped.

In other words, the emergency communications system across Canada is still fully manned. The regional emergency government headquarters are manned. The warning system is manned on a 24-hour watch basis. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation maintains the emergency broadcasting system. So all these systems are still being maintained, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Harkness: Are there any plans to complete these headquarters in the provincial regions which have not got them up to date?

Mr. Patterson: At the time that the announcement was made, the government made a statement to the effect that capital construction and capital purchases were being deferred. That was their term; not cancelled but deferred.

Mr. Harkness: They are more or less deferred indefinitely, I take it?

Mr. Patterson: No, I could not really say that, Mr. Harkness. We still talk in terms of a total program. In fact, when we talk about the program of Emergency Measures in Canada we talk about all the associated departments, all the provinces, a system of emergency government headquarters, a communications system, a provincial-municipal radiological defence system. We are still thinking in terms of the total amount.

• 1610

Mr. Harkness: As far as equipment is concerned, was the program for provision of radiological detection equipments completed? Is that one of the reasons why the amount allocated for acquisition of equipment has steadily fallen in the three years that are shown in the book 1966-67 to the present year 1969-70 from \$743,000 to \$220,000 a year?

Mr. Patterson: The radiological defence equipment purchases are about two-thirds completed. Last year we had stock on the shelves. The provinces actually bought a large amount of equipment from us last year and depleted our shelves. We have enough money in this year's budget for another thousand low-range meters which I think will meet our requirement for this year. Mind you, when you talk about a program of this nature, what you are doing is talking about the capacity of the province to deploy it. We have been able to maintain the number of instruments necessary to meet the provinces' demands up to this point.

Mr. Harkness: What about other equipment? Has there been any provision made in recent years for other equipment such as fire-fighting equipment and so forth?

Mr. Patterson: Fire-fighting equipment is not considered at this particular point in time to be an item that we normally purchase under the Canada Emergency Measures program.

Mr. Harkness: There was a program of adapters so that any type of equipment could be used.

Mr. Patterson: The adapter program has been completed. It is a matter of interest that when they had the riots in Detroit the fact that we have these adapters in Windsor enabled the Windsor Fire Department to go across the bridge and connect to many fire hydrants that other fire departments in the United States could not do because they did not have the adapters that we have.

Mr. Harkness: But in any event that adapter program is completed?

Mr. Patterson: That is right.

Mr. Harkness: And it is in operation throughout Canada?

Mr. Patterson: That is right.

Mr. Harkness: What about the emergency hospital equipment, a considerable amount of which was shipped off to Viet Nam, as I recall?

Mr. Patterson: I think there were four hospitals shipped to Viet Nam. I cannot tell you the exact number of hospitals that were purchased. I think it was in the neighbourhood of \$18 million to \$20 million worth of equipment that was purchased for these hospitals. These have been, in part, deployed. Some are in storage at Plouffe Park and some are in storage at central storage in the Province of Quebec. As I say, some have been deployed.

Mr. Harkness: What do you mean by "deployed" in this case?

Mr. Patterson: When I say "deployed" in deploying an emergency hospital, which is a hospital that has 200 beds and so on, a contract has to be arranged to send the hospital to a point where there will be a secondary school or a large building that can actually be set up as wards, and then arrangements are made with the provincial government for the

secure storage of this equipment, the replenishment of drugs, and things like this. Some of this equipment has to be refrigerated, some kept warm, some kept dry, and so on and so forth. This is the basis of deployment.

Mr. Harkness: How many of them have already been deployed?

Mr. Patterson: This I cannot answer. I would have to ask Dr. Crawford about that. As a matter of fact, I expected to see Dr. Crawford either tonight or tomorrow night because they have one of these hospitals set up right here in Ottawa at the present time for demonstration in the pavilion at Brewer Park.

Mr. Harkness: Well, what about those that were deployed to Viet Nam—and I think there was one sent somewhere else?

Mr. Patterson: There was one sent to Yellowknife.

Mr. Harkness: To Yellowknife?

Mr. Patterson: That is right. Part of the hospital was sent to Yellowknife and recovered.

Mr. Harkness: Were there four sent to Viet Nam?

Mr. Patterson: That is right.

Mr. Harkness: Have they been replaced in central storage?

Mr. Patterson: I could not answer that question.

The Chairman: If the two items that Mr. Harkness has asked about could be furnished to the Clerk, perhaps we could include them in our records. The first one, Mr. Harkness, the information as to whether or not the four emergency hospitals have been replaced?

• 1615

Mr. Harkness: —the deployment—how many of these hospitals have actually been put out in various areas in Canada and are available on the spot?

Mr. Patterson: Yes.

The Chairman: And also what has happened to those that were deployed.

Mr. Harkness: And also if the ones that have been sent out of the country have been replaced?

Are there any plans to increase the number of these mobile hospitals?

Mr. Patterson: What we are dealing with right at the present time is that while the Canada Emergency Measures Organization is a co-ordinating group, it does not have control, although it discusses the plans with the various departments. During the years 1969-70 there are no plans for the enlargement of this.

Mr. Harkness: The Emergency Measures Organization provided the funds to purchase these hospitals to begin with.

Mr. Patterson: No. The Department of National Health and Welfare actually provided the funds.

Mr. Harkness: That may be so, but my memory was that the funds were provided out of the Emergency Measures Vote to the Department of National Health and Welfare which then purchased the hospitals, but that the actual financing of them came through the Emergency Measures Organization.

Mr. Patterson: I would have to check on that, Mr. Harkness. I have been with the Organization for four years and during that four year period we have not had any involvement in the expenditure of health moneys, with the exception of the money that goes through the financial assistance program to the provinces for the hiring of health planners with the provincial departments of health. As far as the Department of National Health and Welfare is concerned, they have actually provided the doctors and the pharmacists in the field in the various provinces for the maintenance of these deployed hospitals where they exist.

Mr. Harkness: When you come to the matter of contributions to provinces and municipalities, which have dropped to about half of what they were three years ago—and that was a drop then considerably from what they had been previously—what is the explanation for that?

Mr. Patterson: As I was saying beforehand, one of the requests of the government in the fall of 1967 was to reduce planning expenditures as much as possible. Each province took to its own devices as far as reducing planning

expenditures was concerned. On the whole, what has happened is this: they have reduced, as the Canada Emergency Measures Organization has reduced their central corps, to get a major job done, to the number of people required on the basis of one man per job.

Mr. Harkness: That is not actually so in the Province of Alberta, is it?

Mr. Patterson: They have quite done so considerably.

Mr. Harkness: They send me their monthly pamphlet all the time, and I gather from it that is the one province which really has not reduced its expenditures and activities.

Mr. Patterson: They have actually reduced their headquarters expenditures. I might say that the Province of Alberta and the Province of British Columbia are two provinces—and other provinces from time to time—that have almost annually supplemented the amount of money that is given to them by the federal government. They are both very interested in the peacetime disaster planning as well in the wartime disaster planning, especially in the Province of British Columbia where you have more possibility of peacetime disaster situations. Rather than having a basis of what you might call 75-25 or 3 to 1, they are working on about a 50-50 basis with the provincial support of the program.

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Alberta has reduced its headquarters program to a certain extent and I know that because I was talking to Arnold Lavoie when I was up there recently. As I say they have supplemented this as well, themselves. If you want to go back to how some other provinces have dealt with it, in the Provinces of Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and New Brunswick, to take three examples, they have taken what you might call a provincial-regional approach toward developing civil emergency measures. So, naturally, you do not have a co-ordinator in each small community; you have a co-ordinator in an area or a region. The Province of Quebec, for example, has done away, as result of the expenditures, with quite a large number of what you might call part-time co-ordinators who have been employed locally. They have established co-ordinators who have several municipalities under their control, and this sort of central co-ordinator

or area co-ordinator deals with the municipal clerks in the various centres and the mayors of these towns can actually charge the town or municipal clerk with the responsibility of establishing a plan. I was in Quebec two weeks ago and looked at their program at that time. They had at that particular point 239 communities of 2,000 population or better in which the mayors have named a town clerk as an unpaid coordinator and the 13 service supervisors. When I talk about a service supervisor that is the chap from the police, the chap from the fire department, the chap from health, from welfare, from public works and so on. Each one of these is charged with the responsibility of establishing a plan. This is what I mean by, say, getting back to planning for use of the potential in any government organization be it municipal, provincial or federal, rather than what you might call developing a fourth arm that it is supposed to rise up and defend the country from the civil point of view.

Mr. Harkness: What in effect has been the result of the 50 per cent reduction in grants to provinces and municipalities in the last three to four years? In other words what is not now being done which was being done, or how has it been possible to reduce these grants?

Mr. Patterson: The provinces are up against the same thing that they are federally at the present time as far as capital construction and purchasing equipment is concerned. While they are maintaining their emergency communications systems at their present level they are not able to expand the communication systems unless they cut personnel costs drastically in some areas. It is pretty hard to cut it drastically at the level it is at the present time.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Pertaining to municipalities and provinces but particularly to municipalities of which Mr. Patterson is speaking, could you show us what they were getting and where the reduction took place, also which provinces were receiving it and which are not receiving it now. The reason I ask this question, Mr. Chairman, is that I have yet to know of, at least in the municipalities in which I am interested,

a province in receipt of actual grants. Possibly I come from a province that is not too active in civil defence—at least I feel that way—and sometimes I question the amount of money we spend on civil defence in relation to the benefits which we receive. May we have a statement of the grants given to municipalities, for example, in 1967, 1968 and 1969 so that we can see how much we will be losing under this year's new policy.

Mr. Patterson: Mr. Chairman, this is a matter of provincial preference. What happens at the present time is that you take the amount of money that the federal government provides for the subsidization of the civil emergency measures programs in the provinces and divide it among the provinces on a per capita basis. Then, when it goes to the provinces on a per capita basis,

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they have the complete say as to how this is being used, within a certain number of guidelines of course that we provide. In other words they have certain lines of equipment they can purchase and they can also employ planners, coordinators and so on in accordance with what they consider is a suitable organization for their particular province. That does vary from province to province. So we do not actually have the allocation to the municipalities.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): So, the province must spend this money on civil defence, and there is a federal provision that if they do not use it they have to return it. Is that not correct?

Mr. Patterson: Towards the end of the year we get an indication from the various provinces of what they are going to use. If there is going to be some money left over in province A and province B in its project at the beginning of the year—they put up a project each year—indicates that it wants to actually spend a certain amount of money for the purchase of communications equipment then we can actually consider allocating the overage from one province to another. I believe my accountant told me that this year we are going to have unspent about \$3,000 out of the \$3,750,000 for the provinces.

The Chairman: Mr. Patterson, following that up, would you not get a report from each province on how they spent their money?

Mr. Patterson: Yes.

The Chairman: If so, would you not have a list of the municipalities in which there had been assistance? I am merely wondering whether, somewhere in your files you would have the information that Mr. Guay has requested.

Mr. Patterson: I have a massive amount of information. Each province at the beginning of the year submits a project saying what it wants to do, that is approved by their minister and submitted to the Minister of National Defence who, in turn, approves it. This indicates what they are going to spend provincially and how they are going to break this down into municipal projects. Do you want total information, a sample, or some specific area?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, possibly the other members are not too interested but I would like it for the province of Manitoba.

The Chairman: Yes. You spoke of estimates at the beginning of each year, but we are interested in actual expenditures which presumably would be set out in the report which you get at the end of the year.

Mr. Patterson: Well, the auditor works on the basis of the project. In other words they cannot reallocate from one aspect of the project to another without the authorization.

Dr. J. E. Arnell (Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance Division, Department of National Defence): I understand that Mr. Guay would like, say the 1968-69 report as it looks at this time of year before it is finalized. That would be very close to a full report.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Perhaps you could show me one from a previous term, which might be easier to produce than the latest one.

Mr. Patterson: I would be glad to produce it.

The Chairman: That is for the province of Manitoba.

Mr. Harkness: I have one other question. What exercises has the Emergency Measures Organization carried on during the past two years?

Mr. Patterson: At the present time they are getting ready for a NATO exercise, Civil Logistics 1969, which is the civil emergency measures activities of Canada with respect to

NATO. In 1966—and this happened while I was in Quebec City for ten months—they carried out the Tocsin exercise. I think that you actually were involved in the Tocsin exercise some time before. Then they were involved in Fallex along with the Canadian Forces headquarters. Then in 1965 they were again involved in Civlong 1965, which again was a NATO civil logistics exercise.

Apart from that we provide what you might call an exercise situation for the provinces and the provinces actually can exercise any municipality or group of municipalities as they see fit. For instance, back in your own city in the spring of 1966 they had an Evacuate the Nation exercise up to Didsbury from Calgary.

Mr. Harkness: I take it there has been no full-scale exercise making use of central, provincial and regional headquarters, Signals and so on since 1966 then?

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Mr. Patterson: That is right.

Mr. Harkness: Is there another full-scale exercise...

Mr. Patterson: I am sorry; I was talking about a civil emergency measures exercise.

Mr. Harkness: Is any full-scale Emergency Measures Organization exercise planned for this coming year?

Mr. Patterson: Not for this coming year, no.

Mr. Harkness: So by the time there is another one there will be a gap of four or five years.

Mr. Patterson: As far as a straight civil emergency measures exercise is concerned, that is right. As far as participation with Canadian Forces is concerned, that is not correct because we have an input as far as they are concerned, merely as observers. We had headquarters and field people deal with some of the exercises in the United States to see how they were carrying on their civil emergency measures program as well.

Mr. Harkness: I would just like to observe, Mr. Chairman, that when we come to consider our report I think we should examine the matter of whether we should put in a recommendation on the necessity for or value of having more frequent full-scale emergency measures exercises. I think there is no question that because of the rapid change of per-

sonnel that takes place in all government departments, if you do not have an exercise more than once every five years the system is just not going to work when it may be called upon to do so.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Harkness. Mr. Penner?

Mr. Penner: Mr. Chairman, I would like to pursue just a little further a matter that Mr. Harkness referred to in his questioning. This has to do with the program whereby grants were available for municipalities for fire-fighting equipment. It is my understanding that municipalities could purchase fire-pumpers, and you mentioned the adapters which were used in Detroit. Perhaps you could just explain to the Committee what these adapters did.

Mr. Patterson: This was what you might call a hose connector standardization program that took place across Canada. This program was started by Major-General Worthington, first of all, because he felt that if you were going to do anything in the area of mutual help and especially in the area of fire, you could not do it with the large variety of equipment that exists across Canada. This is why an adapter program or standardization program was developed across Canada.

Second, as far as pumpers are concerned, it was really a fire-pumper trainer that was provided in the first place. The attitude today, because of the many claims on money set aside for the Emergency Measures program, is that there are more essential things in the provinces and the municipalities than the fire-pumper program. In other words, nobody says that in a fire-pumper program a fire-pumper is not of benefit in connection with any fire situation, whether it is in an attack or otherwise, but we are saying that there are other things of more immediate necessity. After all, fire-pumper programs do go on in the municipalities irrespective of the Civil Emergency Measures program. If the Civil Emergency Measures program stopped today there would still be fire-pumpers, fire-fighting equipment all the way across Canada.

One of the guidelines given by government back in January 1968 was that money allocated to capital construction in the field of civil emergency measures should be for the purchase or construction of equipment or buildings that would not be immediately available

from the economy or from the area surrounding or from its normal resources. This is why the fire-pumper program has gone down the drain.

Mr. Penner: I believe you said, Mr. Patterson, that this program was completed; actually it would be more correct to say that it was terminated.

Mr. Patterson: The standardization program.

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Mr. Penner: No, the fire equipment program.

Mr. Patterson: No, I was talking about the adapter program.

Mr. Penner: It was just the adaptor program that was not completed?

Mr. Patterson: That is right, the standardization program.

Mr. Penner: I am not so sure I could agree with the policy you outlined, particularly in certain sections of Canada such as northwestern Ontario where a number of communities are located squarely in the bush. Their economy cannot, in fact, support this special sophisticated equipment and every year they are faced with the threat of extinction from fires that get out of control. Of any program that the Emergency Measures organization had, this one was the most welcome because it meant that many of these communities could look forward to getting this equipment and having a measure of safety that otherwise they could never hope to acquire from their own revenue.

In many cases in northwestern Ontario communities applied year after year and, were told to apply again next year; that eventually their community would be eligible. Then the program terminated automatically and these communities were left in a very desperate situation. I question the wisdom of the termination of that particular program. In my mind it fits very adequately the definition of Civil Defence. Civilian communities are threatened and we often think in our part of the country that there is even a foreign force involved because we have that influx of American tourists who allegedly are often responsible for the misuse of our forests. We think this is real Civil Defence and we regret, we lament, the discontinuance of that particular program whereby our communities could get pumpers.

Mr. Patterson: May I make an observation here, Mr. Chairman? I think your observation is perfectly correct from the point of view of the protection of a northern community against fire under normal circumstances. I would like to say that the Civil Emergency Measures program is dedicated to building a capacity to deal with a war situation, an attack on North America. It has always been agreed that the capacity you build up for a war situation is a capacity that should be used in a peacetime situation if it is available. Nevertheless, when you are talking in terms of developing a capacity for a wartime situation this is where actually you have to take a look at the priorities. Once you start looking at a wartime situation you really have an entirely different type of what you might call "threat" to Canada as a whole and various areas of Canada, et cetera.

Mr. Penner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I would like to ask a supplementary pertaining to those pumpers. Is it the province that dictates the policies pertaining to these pumpers? First of all, I know that they purchase them, probably on your behalf, and then send them out more or less on loan to various area municipalities but they are designed to be used only for training. These pumpers are of no use whatsoever to the municipalities. It is wishful thinking really in some areas, particularly in metropolitan areas, to say that these trucks are benefitting the area municipalities as far as use other than training purposes for Civil Defence is concerned because the area municipalities that have the pumpers will be only more or less storing them for that particular program. Am I correct in making that statement?

Mr. Patterson: This was the purpose in mind when they were purchased, that they were actually training pumpers and not operational pumpers. They were not supposed to be put into a community with the idea of augmenting the capacity of the community to deal with a fire situation. This was not supposed to be the extra pumper they needed to make a good fire-fighting force; this was supposed to be a pumper that could be used by the province or the municipality for the training of fire-fighting volunteers.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): My other suggestion certainly will not affect this year's budget but I think possibly consideration should be given to Civil Defence working jointly with

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area municipalities, especially the metropolitan areas, in a co-operative effort to purchase the pumpers, which are very costly at the moment, through the federal government. You cannot buy a decent pumper for less than \$40,000-odd and you even have to pay both federal and provincial taxes on the purchase price. I know that where I come from people would be very happy to work jointly with Civil Defence and this co-operation would benefit Civil Defence in many, many phases, particularly the maintaining of your machine which otherwise is let in somebody's fire-hall and probably remains there. I have had experience in this, and I feel that such a joint program certainly would result in federal, provincial and municipal savings.

I have had quite a bit of experience since 1956 on civil defence, and I sometimes think that it is a lost cause. It is very difficult to rally people together, even some of those who have taken your training program in Arnprior. They come back to our own areas and you never hear any more about them. They do not even make a report of what they learned. If you ask them how did it go, they will say it was lovely, it was a really fruitful training program. But I have really never seen anything come out of it. And when I say that, it is because I have seen many municipal officials who attended it, and I for one would not attend because I did not think I could do any better than the others. So I did not attend myself. If the others are an example, I felt it was very poor and I wonder sometimes if the money spent was worth it.

This leads me to the other two questions that in part I have already started. Could we get the figures of the money that is given to each of the provinces annually, and also the contributions to municipalities? I am sorry if I am going to Vote 10 for a moment, but it is relevant, Mr. Chairman. The reason I say that is that in these estimates, as in any other part of the budget, we have the heads of Departments sitting here and it is a matter of the members of the Committee making an assessment as to who is the smartest, who can really hit at the right spot to find out where these people might have made a mistake or where they could reduce. Otherwise we are

like a teacher with a class trying to give the kids an exam and saying who is the smartest and who is going to ask the best question. And I think that this is a very, very poor budget, particularly for newcomers to really question these people as to whether the money is well spent, and whether they really need the amount which is indicated in these estimates, even though the amounts may be less than the previous year.

So my question will be to you: Is there any part of this Civil Defence budget, that with your experience and your knowledge, if you were in a private enterprise and we gave you a bonus for reducing the budget, could you in all sincerity say to me that you could find a spot somewhere where you could reduce this budget?

Mr. Patterson: I think you would have to take that right around and you would have to task me, and when you had tasked me then I could actually tell you what the proposition was.

Mr. Forrestall: What do you mean, task you?

Mr. Patterson: In other words, what do you want a civil emergency measures program to do. You have many variations and themes on what you may want a civil emergency measures program to do, and to carry out some schemes would require very large amounts of money. I might say this, that the civil emergency measures budget itself has been reduced from \$12 million in 1966-67 roughly, in 1965-66—I am talking off the top of my head now—to \$10 million to \$7.6 million. We were \$6.5 million last year, and we are \$5

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million this year. We have been working very hard to ensure that the dollars we had left are put in the most significant areas.

Mr. Guay (St.-Boniface): That I appreciate, Mr. Chairman. I was going to come up with that question, because I felt that the answers were not satisfactory. The first question would be, is there any possibility or a hope that possibly in another year, in any of these votes, particularly the one that we are dealing with, we could have more details instead of the very broad sense of it? We do not really know what we are looking at, whereby we can study it intelligently and come up with intelligent questions. I feel that if the budget was made more comprehensible and

more understandable, particularly to newcomers, possibly we could have a better discussion which would make more sense in benefiting the citizens of Canada.

My next question, Mr. Chairman, to the witness is do you really believe that we are getting worth for the money that we are spending on civil defence?

Mr. Winch: If you say no, you are fired.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I do not know, I think probably I would take my hat off to him.

Mr. Patterson: There is no such thing as a perfect organization, I do not think, because you have many individuals and many programs that are in various stages. But I would like to say one thing that I think would be rather interesting. When I talk to you about civil emergency measures in the Province of Quebec—I just came back from there—you may ask if the program there is worth the money. There are 6 million people in Quebec and last year they got a little better than one-quarter of our money, which would be about \$900,000, say \$1 million. Apart from running a first-class central organization—and when I say first class, I mean that—in those 229 municipalities that were involved, you multiply 229 municipalities by 13 and when you add the department heads, you would have somewhere in the neighbourhood of 26,000 people right there that you do not pay a cent for who actually all have a plan and are all responsible for carrying out a responsible job in an emergency situation. That exists right across Canada, and you are doing it, as far as the Emergency Measures Program itself is concerned, for \$5 million a year.

Do you mind if I change to another subject for a minute? You raised something a short time ago that I think is rather significant. You were referring to the civil emergency measures school, what we now call the Canadian Emergency Measures College at Arnprior.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I did not question it, Mr. Chairman. I have no doubt about your program there, but I question those who have attended.

Mr. Patterson: I was wondering over what period you have seen this, because the program at the College has changed quite significantly.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I know.

Mr. Patterson: At one time it was what you might call a basic rescue school. It developed individuals or teachers to do what you might call an individual rescue job, including first aid, and so on. At the present time it is a staff college. There are doctors, nurses, welfare people, mayors, reeves, counsellors, municipal co-ordinators, provincial co-ordinators, people who actually have responsibilities in every-day life who go there to find out what their role is, and what the total large plan is for civil emergency measures. These people go there and really I would say 90 per cent of the people who arrive there have no support as far as civil emergency measures are concerned outside of the fact that we pay their transportation to the place, feed them for the two to five days that they are there and send them home again. And they go back to assume a responsibility in an emergency situation in a community. I think things are changing, as we have gotten away from what you might call a school to a staff college.

Dr. Arnell: Mr. Guay, this brings us back to something we talked about Thursday night and that is the question of the new form of Estimates. I think, although again it is only the first try at it, that the description given of the Civil Emergency Measures program in fact breaks it down and shows what the five supporting services are. This tends to focus

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attention on what in fact is incorporated within the program, and I would hope that in another year this new form of estimates will, if anything, present even more information, but this is the trend the estimates are taking in which they will be described on a program basis rather than just sums of money.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, doctor.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Howard on my list and then Mr. Barrett.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, when we heard the testimony from the Hudson Institute during our NATO review there was some discussion about the business of fallout and various levels of protection that were available to a country if proper preparations were made. We even heard estimates of the number of casualties based on the level of protection that was obtained.

Could you tell us, Mr. Patterson, what level of protection we have in Canada today against fallout threats?

Mr. Patterson: If you are talking about what level of planned protection we have, we do not really have what you might call a planned protection program apart from the fact—I think this is extremely important—that in Canada when we completed the fallout shelter survey, working on the basis that for shelter capacity you should have 12 square feet with the protection factor of 10 or better, we have basically 55 million shelter spaces in Canada. Of course, this is what you might call a large term in a way, because this involves all large buildings and it involves all the background material we have done on mines and caves, and so on. Some of these places are not available to you because they are full of coal; some of these places are not available to you because they are big storage equipment depots, and so on. This actually supplies us with the material or it supplies the provinces with the materials by which they can, in each individual community, go out and determine what the fallout shelter capacity is within the community with the idea of developing what you might call a crash action shelter program.

As far as a shelter program as such is concerned—I am talking now, of course, about fallout shelters, I am not talking about protection from fire and I am not talking about protection from the blast, I am talking about fallout shelters only—in Canada in every home that has a full basement with, say, two feet of concrete above the ground and maybe 20 per cent of the wall space for windows, you probably would be about 30 times as well off inside that basement without any other shelter as you would be outside, as long as your house did not catch fire, and so on.

The idea of the fallout shelter program was to do two things. It was, first of all, to give the communities the information concerning the large buildings in their community so that they could start working on a program and could say that in the 10 blocks we have set up for our community the significant buildings are such and such and if we were in a position of tension then we would direct people towards them.

The second thing, of course, is to develop towards this with the idea of providing government with an indication of what the shelter situation is in Canada generally and, after we have analyzed it completely, what steps would be necessary to carry a program to a further stage if it were considered necessary.

To ensure that this program does not get out of date, we actually have funds in this year's estimates for its updating so that any municipal planner who is planning for the crash action shelter program in his community has up to date information on the information of five years ago which in Canada as it is developing today would be probably worse than useless in many places. We deal both with buildings that are going up and buildings that are being torn down so that we have a feeling for the total at all times. Can you make your question more specific?

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Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Am I to assume from what you have said that we actually do not have any shelter program at all at the present time, other than a survey of the fact that we do not have any?

Mr. Patterson: No, there is a municipal guide which has been used by the provinces and the municipalities for some years. There is a chapter in the municipal guide on exactly how to use the information with respect to the results of a fallout shelter survey. All the provinces have had print-outs from this fallout shelter survey so that every municipality can have a print-out indicating exactly what buildings have what amount of shelter space, potential shelter space and square footage sort of thing as well as what degree of protection.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I realize you could have a print-out, but do we actually have any space in Canada that is fallout shelter space and is so designated?

Mr. Patterson: That is so marked, no. I should not say that because we do have space for the emergency government headquarters that have been established at the regional level, at the zone level and at the community level. These actually are designated as protected spaces for the carrying out of the government and for the people who—

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): This would amount to 0.001 per cent of the population that you are protecting.

Mr. Patterson: The Department of Public Works has in the past actually dealt with the situation with respect to the capacity of large buildings being developed by Canada to determine whether or not the position of the building required that there be shelter space in it. I know when I first came on to the

program it was considered that if there were a requirement and if the building were in an area that was threatened, they could make an expenditure to enhance the building in such a way as to increase the fallout shelter space.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Am I to assume, then, from what you have told me that as of today the country is naked and unprotected from the possibility of fallout?

Mr. Patterson: No, I do not think it is fair to say that for another reason entirely that I have not mentioned. One of the most important things in any fallout shelter program or any other emergency preparedness program is an informed public. There are radio tapes and T.V. films available at the present time which are so designed that if we were in a position where things were beginning to heat up and the government felt it was desirable to do so, they actually could inform the public at large of what the impact of a nuclear attack on Canada could be and what the individual should do to protect himself. This information is available not only as radio tapes and as T.V. films, but it also appears in the new edition—of course, it appeared in the old edition, too—of *Eleven Steps to Survival* which we are turning out at the present time. We have not put out this edition in general distribution, but we actually are making available 6 million copies so there will be one copy for every household in Canada.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Patterson, you have told me all about pieces of paper, you have told me all about radio tapes and films, but you have not told me a thing about a single shelter we have, except for a few at provincial capitals to house government officials. Actually we do not have a single shelter for the civilian population at the present time.

Dr. Arnell: Mr. Howard, this emergency measures program that is included in the Department of National Defence estimates is precisely that, co-ordinating function to try to assist people at all levels of government and particularly out in the provinces and the municipalities to do things for themselves. I do not believe it has ever been conceived that this \$5 million or \$6 million here would provide any of these things. The money is intended to educate people and provide them

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with information to enable them to do it themselves. I think, going back to World War

II, the concept of civil defence in very large measure was to educate people to help them to protect themselves rather than, in effect, have the view that somebody does everything for them. This was something that General Worthington always used to stress so much in the early days when he was in charge of this.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): May I ask supplementary question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Mr. Guay on a supplementary.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): If the reason for this is to educate them—and I use the word “them” as meaning the area of municipalities—how can we think we will achieve the appropriate education of the area municipalities if we who are dealing with a budget are not sufficiently educated by you people who come before us and do not even know the details of it. It is not because we are short of thinking; it is because we get very little detail. I hope you will give us more details at that particular level.

I would say to you, however, in all sincerity, that if the idea is to educate the area municipalities I think you are failing very badly, because I know—and certainly I was at school when this was going on in the last 10 years or so—that the program of education to that end and to let area municipalities know what is involved, and all the privileges that may be made available to them, is certainly not communicated properly at that particular level.

I am suggesting that, and I would like to hear your comments on it.

Mr. Chairman, if I am taking the wrong attitude I will just pull right out.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, I think it is a very important question.

By way of explanation, in the course of our NATO hearings before Easter we received evidence, not from one witness but from several, of the extreme importance of emergency measures organizations. We went to Switzerland and Sweden and got some insight into what they were doing. For example, in both those countries they have requirements that new buildings in certain vital areas be so constructed as to provide appropriate shelter. This can be done at very little additional expense.

All of us in Canada know that our urban areas are growing very rapidly. In Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Winnipeg huge new

multi-million dollar buildings are going up and not a cent is apparently being spent on or no thought is being given to, adapting the basements of those buildings for emergency measures.

You have justified this, Mr. Patterson and Dr. Arnell, by saying that you see your program as an educational program, or a helping people to help themselves type of program. I know Mr. Guay has had a great deal of experience at the municipal level and I think it is fair.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I do not claim that it is only my impression, sir. I may have some experience and perhaps I lacked the proper qualification to adapt myself to what their program was, but I feel that we see very little of it at that level. And if it is not the fault of the federal government could it then be because you are leaving this to the provinces. Could it be the province that is failing to communicate? I do not know. I am asking you.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, correct me if I am wrong, but I think the point you are trying to make is that if this is very basically an educational program directed towards the municipalities then in your experience it is not working. If this is true it is a comment which should be considered very carefully by your organization, Mr. Patterson.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I am not criticizing. I am just asking the question to see what you think.

The Chairman: Mr. Patterson, would you like to comment?

Mr. Patterson: Thank you very much. I know what you are referring to. I might say that the fall-out shelter survey has just been completed and the basic individual material has just gone to the provinces and the municipalities.

We are collating this with several points of view in mind: your shelter situation against the day time population; your shelter situation against the night time population; and the locations of your shelters relative to the threatened areas in Canada.

As a result of all this collation and actual examination and separation into this basic material, we will be in a position, Mr. Chairman, to make an observation about the actual situation of fall-out shelters in Canada. If you ask have we gone beyond this point, the answer is no.

• 1705

In the United States of America they have actually gone beyond this to the point where they have done two or three things. First of all, in many places they have marked the shelter space that has been identified. The shelter space was identified in just exactly the same way as we have been identifying the space here. The marking was done as a result of contracts with various hotel-owners and owners of big department stores, and so on, that had areas that could be used for shelter. They have got to the point of stocking, with water containers, emergency sanitary facilities, first aid kits and basic rations, 92 million shelter spaces in the United States of America. At the present time the program is not being further funded but they have reached that stage.

One of the important things they are doing—and this is one that I have just been talking about—is developing community plans in which they actually say to the people in the community, “You are in area X and the buildings to which you can report for shelter are so and so.”

At the first major conference I attended on civil emergency measures I listened to the mayor of a western United States city who had just finished completing this shelter program. They asked him: “Do you have complete shelter facilities for the population of the city of X?” He said, “No, we have not. All we have done is identify them. But as a result of the number of shelter spaces, we have accommodation for at least 65 per cent of the population, and I feel that the total population should be advised where this accommodation is.” Some of the people would be away, some of them would decide to go some place else, some would be on duty, and some people always stay at home. Therefore, he felt that actually, despite the fact that he had only arrived at identifying his space, he should have a community plan that told them, for their protection, to go to these points.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, with your permission, my next question is a supplementary. I have to leave. I have another meeting to attend. My question again relates to communication. First of all, you know your program and you seem to be able to put it across to me, but in my thinking, if you at the federal level are spending the money and handing it out to the provincial government to work out a program on your behalf, are you following it up to see that it

is properly communicated to the areas? Do you go to the municipalities and from them to the citizens themselves, or do you just give the money to the provincial government and that is the end of it?

Mr. Patterson: No; we have spent a good deal of time actually with the provincial people and with the municipal people, whenever possible in company with the provincial people, to see what is happening in the field of civil emergency measures.

In relation to the fall-out shelter program that we are talking about, however, we are just at the stage where follow-up is possible. We have TV tapes that have been prepared...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I just wanted to ask the Doctor whether his Department was following up the money for civil defence that it has allocated to each province, to find out if it is properly spent and whether the program is properly communicated to the municipalities and their citizens. This is what I want to know. I do not want to go into video tapes, or anything else.

In other words, if you are in private business and you are allocating money to several branches surely to goodness you would want to know where the money is and whether or not it is being properly spent.

• 1710

Dr. Arnell: You have your assurance from Mr. Patterson that they follow it up in the field. Also, in answer to the earlier question, some information is being provided for you about the Province of Manitoba relative to just what sort of projects the money goes, and I hope that that will, in fact, tend to answer your question.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes, you are right, Doctor.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard, did you finish your question?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): No.

The Chairman: Perhaps we can come back to you then.

Mr. Gibson: I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I think we had better get back to Mr. Howard. I have your name down on the list, Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): We have heard estimates from the Hudson Institute as to the number of casualties that would occur in the United States in the event of a nuclear attack. Could you give us those figures as they apply to Canada?

Mr. Patterson: Let us go back to the question of North America being attacked: is the United States attacked only, or is Canada and the United States attacked? If they are attacked, what centres are attacked?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Mr. Chairman, surely Mr. Patterson knows the comparable basis on which we are talking. We are talking of the Hudson Institute study on an all-out nuclear attack on the United States, and they gave us estimates of the number of casualties. Surely we have some comparable figure available to CEMO in Canada.

Dr. Arnell: I think the real problem that Mr. Patterson has in answering this question is that with the exception of relatively few either major population centres or military establishments there are not the equivalent sort of targets in Canada.

One of the major target areas in the United States today for a missile attack is, of course, their underground missile silos. These are in remote areas in the United States and an attack on that particular area could have absolutely no effect on Canada if, in fact, the weather conditions are such-and-such. On the other hand, if the weather conditions were quite different and the wind was blowing in the opposite direction, it could, in fact, have a major effect on an area which you would say under normal circumstances would not be likely to have fallout.

So that, in attempting to do the kind of study that the Hudson Institute has done with respect to the United States, there are so many postulates that must be put in as to whether the wind would be a certain way if a certain American target was attacked, that one tends, I think, to limit considerations to such areas as the major metropolis or megalopolis, or whatever you like to call it, along the southern Ontario area through to Montreal as being an area that would get any direct downwind effect from some major American targets or might, in fact, be itself a target.

Really, one of the great difficulties is to relate Canada to a separate target from that of the United States or whether in fact there

are specific Canadian targets where we are really only downwind from an attack against the United States.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Having made all these suppositions, do you have a...

Mr. Harkness: May I say a word there which I think might help?

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness on a supplementary.

Mr. Harkness: Eight to nine years ago there were extremely detailed charts, which you must still have in your Organization, showing what the effect would be, of a bomb of a certain megatonnage, outside of Toronto, inside of Toronto, outside of Montreal, various distances from it, in the middle of Montreal and the various other larger centres in the country, what the area of destruction would be, and what the fallout effect would be depending on the direction of the wind. There were very detailed and extremely complicated charts which showed all this information that you are talking about, that the Hudson Institute was talking about, as far as Canada is concerned. Do you still have these charts?

• 1715

Dr. Arnell: I think one of the problems here, Mr. Harkness, is that those charts of 10 years ago were essentially in respect of fission bombs where almost the total energy, in fact, produced radioactive fallout, so that it made no difference whether they were exploded at altitude or on the ground.

Mr. Harkness: Oh, yes.

Dr. Arnell: You could depend on that. In fact, as you yourself said, they were bombs. Moving into the missile with the thermonuclear warhead, the amount of actual fission product produced is very much reduced, and it depends in large measure on the altitude at which the thing is burst as to whether it comes in contact with the ground as to whether in fact you...

Mr. Harkness: I think Dr. Arnell will confirm that these charts show the effect of a ground burst, an air burst at a certain distance, another air burst higher up, and so forth. In other words, this material is available to a large extent.

Dr. Arnell: I would suggest the targets have changed. I agree there are such charts, but there is no simple answer. That is all I was trying to say.

Mr. Patterson: If North America were attacked, it is very difficult to say X number of people would die. What I was trying to say was, are they going to attack population centres or are they not? Are they going to attack Canadian population or are they not?

We did a study recently and we got what was called a plausible attack. A plausible attack is just one of many attacks. I cannot quote the exact figures this plausible attack today because I was not expecting it, but I would like to give each member a copy of this plausible attack.

The Chairman: Could we agree that this be supplied and made an appendix to the minutes of our hearing today?

Mr. Patterson: All I was going to say was that this is a plausible attack, and only under one situation with a certain amount of megatonnage on certain targets.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): But you do not have any actual figures for the whole of Canada?

Mr. Patterson: Yes. This is a plausible attack on the whole of Canada using population centres as...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What are those figures?

Mr. Patterson: As I said, I cannot give you the exact figures. I wish I could quote it exactly here, but I do not want to make an inaccurate quote.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Following on what Mr. Wahn mentioned about shelters in buildings being constructed, you have no program of this kind in Canada at the present time?

Mr. Patterson: No.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the whole program we have had outlined to us today is a pretty Mickey Mouse operation in terms of what we as a committee have learned is valuable as a nuclear deterrent and that if our nuclear deterrent is to have any effect we will have to follow it through with a civil defence organization that has some teeth in it. It would

seem to me, from the kind of answers that we have had today that we do not have that kind of deterrent in Canada.

The Chairman: Mr. Barrett.

Mr. Barrett: Mr. Chairman I would like to go back for a moment to the hospitals mentioned by Mr. Harkness. Mr. Patterson, you indicated that they were deployed—or the word used was “deployed”—to various provinces or areas on request. Who would request a hospital for Viet Nam? I understood from the answers that there is one out of the country.

Mr. Harkness: The Department of External Affairs really supplied these as part of our external aid program.

Mr. Patterson: That is right.

Mr. Barrett: In other words, assuming we had 18 available, X number were not here because we did not have an emergency problem, so we allowed a few to go out of the country.

Along similar lines, when we are talking about this reduction in the amount of money to be spent by the federal government, and I would assume a smaller amount by the provinces, and I would assume also because of lack of interest in municipalities, do I take it that there is less interest in civil defence or that they are so extremely efficient they do not need this participation any more? Which of the two would you suggest?

Mr. Patterson: As I said earlier, if you are going to carry out any program somebody has to determine what the program is going to be, what it is going to cost, and so on.

• 1720

Mr. Barrett: For this program covered by these estimates, you projected something in your mind after contact with the people of the provinces, or you gathered in a little group amongst yourselves and decided that this amount of money was sufficient. You also indicated, if I am not mistaken, that less people were needed in the regions. In fact, in the area that I am acquainted with there was an emergency measures man in charge and he had a second-in-command. When he retired they just left the second-in-command in charge; therefore, they reduced it. For what reason, lack of interest or lack of need?

Mr. Patterson: This was in Northern Ontario. It was lack of resources.

Mr. Barrett: No, this particular situation was in Southern Ontario.

Mr. Patterson: There have been several people that were co-ordinators that have been replaced as they retired by their deputies or by other people and there has been a reduction in the number of people involved in civilian emergency measures. This is a budgetary problem.

Mr. Barrett: Because of the lack of need? Because they are so efficient?

Mr. Patterson: No, because of the lack of money available at the present time.

Dr. Arnell: I think Mr. Patterson is really just raising the point that in the plans of provinces and municipalities this has to take lower priority than other things for their available funds.

Mr. Barrett: I will accept that situation, but I think the point that was made is that there is a vast country and we are just taking an attitude that if a bomb drops in Ottawa, for instance, Vancouver will carry on for Canada. If they happen to hit Vancouver and Ottawa, then the people in Saskatchewan will inherit the earth. Possibly they would like it; I do not know—I am assuming this. Is that the philosophy?

Mr. Patterson: Mr. Chairman, could I recap for a minute?

The Chairman: Yes, please, Mr. Patterson.

Mr. Patterson: I would like to go back to recapitulate for a minute. There are other people besides ourselves in the emergency measures field. There are 17 other associated departments; National Health and Welfare, Public Works, Justice and so on. The total expenditure in civil emergency measures is probably about \$14 million federally—I say probably. It is hard to estimate when you consider the number of people that are working half time that are not budgeted against it, you know, but it is around \$14 million.

This means, as I said before, that the federal government has not backed down on its emergency communications across Canada. It has continued to maintain its warning system across Canada; it has continued to maintain its emergency government headquarters, both the permanent emergency government headquarters and the interim headquarters, and it continues to maintain planning staffs in every one of the departments I am referring to.

You asked the question, is this program adequate? With \$5 million at the present time we can do this: We can carry out the necessary planning and preparation from the plan point of view at the federal level, and we can do certain studies and up-date fallout shelter surveys, and things like this. We can also subsidize provinces and municipalities to do the same thing; in other words, there are alterations and maintenance that have to be done at various government headquarters across Canada. But if you say, can we go ahead and complete the regional zone municipal communications program across Canada, can we carry out an emergency government headquarters system with the \$5 million and other capital construction and capital purchase items, we cannot on \$5 million and this is the situation.

As I say we can plan, we can make all these preparations concerning information, we can get studies done, and so on, but this is where we stop.

Mr. Barrett: I would like to make one comment and I may be in error, but I am looking forward to seeing the new facts and figures that you are presenting in relation to your philosophy concerning the new type bomb that will have less radioactive effect on people regardless of where it explodes in the air, or dissipates and that sort of thing. If I am not mistaken, Mr. Patterson, you made the comment that if I had a basement and there was not too much window space in the basement room and I had X number feet of concrete around me I would be 30 per cent better in that than out of it.

• 1725

Mr. Patterson: I did not say 30 per cent; I said 30 times, probably. This is a rough term. In some basements you could be 40 times as safe. I am talking about the protection factor here and the protection factor really means that you are protecting yourself at this point from radiation. Now, if you have 40 units of radiation coming to the outside of your basement and you have a protection factor of 40, there is one unit of radiation that actually reaches the inside of the basement.

Mr. Barrett: Thank you.

The Chairman: For the information of the Committee, a number of members who are interested in Vote 15 have had to leave for other meetings, so we plan to finish, if we can, before 6 o'clock the votes relating to the

Emergency Measures Organization which we are now on, and then continue the Vote 15 after the dinner break—in other words, at 8 o'clock tonight. I have Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: Sir, in connection with Mr. Guay's question about whether you follow up the spending of money by provinces and municipalities I believe your answer was that there is a follow-up in the field. Well, that phrase does not satisfy me, sir, and I would like to know the nature of the follow-up plan; how many employees are employed in the follow-up plan; whether they are specialists in following up or whether they are doing it in relation to other work; whether they cross the country simultaneously, that is, one task group in each province going out and doing follow-up, or whether one man or two or three men cross Canada over a period; what is the period and when the last follow-up was made.

Mr. Patterson: May I start at the beginning? Each province at the beginning of each year submits a project, as I said, and this project is based on what the municipalities and the province intend to do. They submit this to the federal government and the federal government says, we can support this to such and such an extent.

The follow-ups are three-fold. First, of all, there is an audit. In other words, is the money actually being spent for the purpose for which it was allocated in the first place, and it is quite specific as to how it is allocated.

Second, there is what you might call an almost constant follow-up in this respect. We have a conference once a year of federal and provincial people from the field—these are the co-ordinators and our regional directors—with the idea of talking about what has been done, what should be done, where we should be going, trying to get some picture of what is going on, and where we are going.

Beyond that, I and my senior directors endeavour to cover as many provinces as possible at least once a year and in some places more often, if possible, actually to see the situation in the field and to discuss the situation personally.

Last, and I think this is the most important, in 1968 when the government authorized these changes in funding they also authorized the Canada Emergency Measures Organization to do two things: to consult with departments and provinces on priorities, and they

required them to do this, and second, to set up an evaluation program.

We actually have two groups now, one called a program planning and budget group that will make a sweep across Canada every year starting this year with the specific idea of going to every province and saying, "These are the priorities that have been established generally federally, this is the situation today; what are you actually going to do in the province this year?" and coming to some common conclusion about what that province will do that year. The project will be submitted on the basis of this discussion, and this is this business of getting the priorities and allocation of funds.

Then we have an evaluation group whose responsibility first of all is to determine where we are at the present time...

• 1730

Mr. Gibson: I am sorry to interrupt you. Is this something new?

Mr. Patterson: Yes.

Mr. Gibson: Is this evaluation group a new one, too?

Mr. Patterson: Yes, the evaluation group is a new one, too. We carried out a study starting in January of 1968 and this study actually took a look at the program, found out how many activities are involved in the program and what activities actually had to be carried out to give us an effective capacity across Canada to do the things that a civil emergency measures program should do. As I say, to go back to what the government said, we are now using this as a plan of evaluation. We know what we are trying to do and we know what we want to do. We will know from these program planning and budgeting people what they intend to do during the year; then we can determine at the end of the year whether or not that situation has been met and if there is a shortfall, what has to be done to push it up.

Mr. Gibson: I will not name any particular place because this is on record, but supposing you went to a town in Ontario and found they were using the funds that the province had given them for this purpose for recreational sports. What would happen within the Department in that event? Would it go to the Minister? How would that be dealt with?

Mr. Patterson: Would I myself find...

Mr. Gibson: For instance you are investigating and you find that, say, \$30,000 has been misappropriated and used on welfare or sports or something like that instead of on defence. What would you do?

Mr. Patterson: First of all I would telephone my counterpart in the Province of Ontario and tell him what I had observed and then let him look at the situation. He might at that point just say that somebody had to refund the \$30,000; but it is his responsibility in the first place. This is a municipal activity and is not the responsibility on the federal government. If, however, the situation continued as such...

Mr. Gibson: This is a real problem, I think.

Mr. Patterson: Yes. Then what you would do is to inform the auditor of what you saw at such and such a point and ask him to investigate the situation when he is looking at the expenditures on the project.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions? Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: I just have a few short ones. If they were asked before I came in, Mr. Chairman, let me know and I will withdraw them. I would like to know under what vote the EMO magazine falls.

Mr. Patterson: It is under Information.

Dr. Arnell: It is the Information line at the bottom of page 240, the fourth one down under Vote 7.

Mr. Allmand: Yes I see—\$68,000. I would like to know to whom you send that magazine free of charge—or is it completely free of charge?

Mr. Patterson: It is a gratis magazine.

Mr. Allmand: To whom do you send it?

Mr. Patterson: To all the provincial coordinators and all paid staff of the provinces and the municipalities. It is sent to all the federal government departments and all the people involved in civil emergency planning. There are other people, of course, who are unpaid but who still have emergency planning responsibilities. This is what you might call our method of keeping them abreast of what is going on, basically, not only on a

Canadian but also on a North American and world-wide basis in civil emergency measures.

Mr. Allmand: It is distributed down to the municipal level?

Mr. Patterson: That is right.

Mr. Allmand: Therefore, the municipalities that Mr. Guay has been with would receive that magazine?

Mr. Patterson: That is right.

Mr. Allmand: I presume that it is distributed to all civil protection employees in municipalities as well as in the provincial field. How many copies are there in all?

Mr. Patterson: I would have to enquire, Mr. Chairman. I will get the number of copies.

Dr. Arnell: Could we give it to the Clerk to have it included in the minutes?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Is it printed in French as well as in English and distributed to the French-speaking areas of Canada?

Mr. Patterson: Yes. That is right.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions? Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Patterson, could you tell us your background and training prior to taking on the job as head of the Canada Emergency Measures Organization?

• 1735

Mr. Patterson: Certainly.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): And your subsequent training in the subject of emergency measures?

Mr. Patterson: How far back do you want me to go? I am a graduate from the University of Alberta originally. I was teaching high school before the Second World War and then I was in the Canadian Armed Forces for a period of about two and a half years. I came back and served with the Department of Veterans Affairs as an occupational counsellor in connection with university education for a period of a year, after which I went to the Civil Service Commission of Canada where I

was the Regional Director for the Civil Service Commission of Canada in the province of Alberta, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon, working out of Edmonton. I came from there to Ottawa in 1952 as a senior selection officer—they called them in those days—and then became the Assistant Director of Personnel Selection. Shortly afterwards, because of the illness of my immediate chief, I became the Acting Director of Personnel Selection. The Civil Service Commission had a change at that time in which they grouped both the personnel selection function and the classification function into one group and I was then responsible for operations. I was called the Director of Operations, with the responsibility for the recruiting and staffing of the Civil Service of Canada as well as the classification of positions. At that point I was transferred to the Canada Emergency Measures Organization basically on the basis of the fact that I had, as a result of my experience with the Civil Service Commission, a very broad background of total departmental activity, as the Civil Service Commission deals with all government departments and appreciates their intricacies and so on. Because of my appreciation of the governmental situation I was transferred to the Canada Emergency Measures Organization. Since I have been on the Canada Emergency Measures Organization, what you do, of course, once you are on this job is that you more or less eat, live and sleep it almost from the time you begin.

As you probably know, we are associated in arrangements with the United States—I should not say arrangements—the development of plans that are what you might call mutually desirable. In other words, we do not want one system of warning on one side of the river at Windsor and another system of warning on the other. I also deal with the problems of Canada with respect to its NATO association in the civil emergency planning field. Again as you may know, Canada is involved in five of the eight wartime agencies of NATO and I am the Canadian representative on a senior committee on emergency plans. Basically, that is it.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Have you had staff training at a military staff college, for instance, or any specific military training other than...

Mr. Patterson: No. I have never been to a staff college.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Were you a commissioned officer?

Mr. Patterson: Yes.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What type of work did you do in the military forces?

Mr. Patterson: I was an armoured corps officer. As I had been a school teacher before I went in, whenever I got through a course I would end up either as an administrative officer again or as a training officer. And so I went through OTC into the instructional field, into the admin. field, in the driving and maintenance training, went overseas, finished my training over there and then was picked up and put in the Selection of Personnel Unit of No. 3 C.A.C.R.U. at that time.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Your work has been mostly administrative rather than technical?

Mr. Patterson: That is hardly fair because actually I have a very keen appreciation of science and its implications. In fact I had a background of biology and chemistry at university and I have never dropped my interest in these fields ever since I left the university. So actually, if you talk about the field of twentieth century warfare and its implications for the individual as far as Canada is concerned, from the scientific point of view there is not a great deal that I cannot talk to you about.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions by members? If not, may I direct three short questions either to you, Dr. Arnell, or to Mr. Patterson? Have you any reason to believe that any Canadian areas or cities are, in fact, targeted by the...

Dr. Arnell: No, I do not think there is any reason to believe that at all, other than this speculation of the total target of North America.

The Chairman: Have you in fact considered the desirability of requiring that new construction make provision for shelters and, if so, what decision was made?

Mr. Patterson: This situation has never been put to the government by myself since I

came to the Canada Emergency Measures Organization. I might say what the American experience has been.

Dr. Arnell: I think the real question here is that the Chairman asked what has happened in the Canadian one. I guess it has never really come up from the co-ordination point of view, has it?

Mr. Patterson: No, outside the implications with respect to public buildings. Mind you, it was agreed, when the fall-out shelter survey started that no action would be taken until such a time as we knew what the situation was.

The Chairman: That was my third question. I think you mentioned that you are now in the course of carrying out this shelter survey. When will that be completed?

Mr. Patterson: That should be completed, from the point of view of collation, within the next few months.

The Chairman: I see. Do any members have any other questions? We are dealing with Emergency Measures Organization Votes 7, 10 and 12. If there are no further questions on those we will stand the actual passage of those votes until later. We will adjourn until 8 o'clock this evening in the same room, when we will go on to Votes 15 and 20.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

EVENING SITTING

Monday, April 21, 1969

• 2006

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe this afternoon we completed the votes under the Emergency Measures Organization, Votes 7, 10 and 12. We stood the actual passage of them. Possibly now we could go on to the votes under the heading Defence Services which are votes 15 and 20. I will call them individually, but again if you agree, we will perhaps discuss both of them together as they do relate to the same general subject. Accordingly I will now call votes 15 and 20.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Defence Services

- 15 Administration, Operation and Maintenance and Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Major

Equipment and Development for the Canadian Forces including payments to Provinces or Municipalities as contributions towards construction done by those bodies \$1,541,006,000

Defence Services

- 20 Transitional Grant to the Province of New Brunswick in respect of the Town of Oromocto \$700,000

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, I believe you have questions on vote 15.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I hope that both you and all members of the Committee have noted that in the last two meetings of this Committee I have been very quiet. I was quiet, sir, because I hoped and anticipated that under Item 15 I might be allowed to ask four questions and hear comments on them by the members who are appearing to assist us.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to deal with what is obviously the largest amount in the estimates of the Department; I refer to the pay of the military personnel. It will be noted, Mr. Chairman, that it is anticipated in this fiscal year that the total military personnel of the regular force will be 98,238. The military pay allocated is \$701,589,000. There is also the federal contribution to superannuation and the Canada Pension Plan in the amount of \$195,720,764, making a total of \$897,309,764.

Mr. Chairman, I found it somewhat difficult, although I am a strong believer in good pay for our armed forces, to relate \$897-odd million to the number of our armed forces; namely, 98,238, and to relate almost \$900 million to our total defence expenditure. I have tried, sir, to find the reason for this and it is because of my study that I have certain comments.

In the information given us in the white section we find that with 98,238 military personnel for this year there are 106 with the

• 2010

rank Brigadier General and over, for a total armed forces establishment of all three forces of less than 100,000. I believe, sir, that some comment should be made on this and I think it would be interesting to our Committee to know how many of the rank of Brigadier General and higher are stationed at CFHQ here in Ottawa. May I follow through with a

breakdown? I also find, according to the information supplied to us, that there are 16,297 commissioned officers. This works out to one commissioned officer in our armed forces to five other ranks from private to chief warrant officer. It is interesting to note that we have 58,076 non-commissioned officers; that is, from the rank of corporal to chief warrant officer. This works out that we have in our armed forces 74,373 non-commissioned and commissioned officers for 23,865 privates.

Relating the costs of salaries and soon of 98,238, we have 106 brigadier generals and higher, we have one officer to five all other ranks, we have 58,076 commissioned and non-commissioned officers to 23,865 privates.

I think you will understand, sir, why I am asking for a comment on what I maintain is an extraordinary balance situation.

Dr. Arnell: First of all, Mr. Winch, I would like to start at the bottom, if I might, and comment on the corporals. As part of the restructuring of the military establishment and the development of the new pay fields for tradesmen corporal really became the rank of the trained serviceman with a minimum term of between four and five years service. So that, in effect, the serving man in the old sense is a combination of the corporal and the private.

Mr. Winch: The corporals are 35,215.

Dr. Arnell: So that you end up with approximately 60,000 who are trained and men on their way to becoming the trained service man. Within the corporals there are a limited number of what are called master corporals who are at the first stage of command, if you like, in the old sense of the corporal, in the sections in a platoon. So that accepting that the corporal represents the mark of the trained serviceman, your figure on the total of corporals and above as being the NCO's tends to be misleading in the sense of the junior command. It should, in fact, be the warrant officers and the sergeants and the few master corporals who become the non commissioned command levels...

Mr. Winch: You mean a corporal is no longer an NCO?

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Dr. Arnell: No. A master corporal is an NCO and there are only relatively few of those.

Mr. Gibson: Is a corporal like a private first class in the American Army.

Dr. Arnell: It is the trained service man today and he has to have between four and five years of training and service before he gets his corporal stripes but...

Mr. Winch: I understand that. Will you explain, then, one officer to five other ranks up to the chief warrant officer?

Dr. Arnell: One of the difficulties of explaining this particular rank structure is that included in it are a number of ranks which we call Part II Establishment. These are, in fact, military personnel at least 50 per cent of whom are officers seconded to other departments and, in fact, are not paid for out of our own estimates. These people fill a number of needs in a wide variety of things. You will find one such officer working in the Privy Council office and a number in External Affairs and this type of thing, in addition to a number of officers who are with the Defence Research Board and carried as members of their staff and paid for them. Such rank is not, in fact, part of the military rank but we have shown it—at least a paid military rank for purposes of this Vote 15. This group of officers for the most part are included.

Mr. Winch: But they are part of your establishment of the military personnel regular force?

Dr. Arnell: But they are not in fact part of the, if you like, authorized military establishment for military purposes. They are paid for outside this vote, and when they are not required for whatever job they are doing outside the military organization, that position ceases to exist.

Mr. Winch: Can you, then, explain to the Committee, if they carry a rank in the armed forces and are shown under your regular force personnel, what they are doing under your estimates?

Dr. Arnell: Now that you come back at me, Mr. Winch, I think I have misled you. I realize now the seconded 207 are the ones I am talking about, and you are quite right...

Mr. Winch: I am going on those that which are straight military service.

Dr. Arnell: You are right.

Mr. Winch: And that is 16,297, which is one to five.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, sir. This rank structure is in the process of being "run down"—and that is probably the best word—from the rank structure which was authorized in 1964 as being the target at which the military establishment was to aim when the military establishment was at the level of 110,000. With the run down over the years we have been gradually running down, but included in this rank structure are, in fact, the officers on retirement leave, because the 98,000 includes the terminal leave people. You will see the footnote: "(a) Included in figures showing distribution by Rank".

The difference between the two columns, which you see under 1969-70, of the Total man-years Authorized and the Allowable Continuing Employees does give you a mea-

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sure of the number of people in the different ranks who are estimated to be on retirement leave during the year.

Mr. Winch: Is that included in the second column?

Dr. Arnell: No. The second column is the Active Force.

Mr. Winch: That is exactly what I quoted from.

Dr. Arnell: Is that the column you are using? I thought you were using the first column.

Mr. Winch: No, I am using the second column which is your employees until 1970. All my figures are based on the second column.

Dr. Arnell: I thought you were speaking to the first column because there was no...

Mr. Winch: No, I am sorry, sir.

Dr. Arnell: Very well.

Mr. Winch: I am speaking only of the second column.

Dr. Arnell: We are dealing with the numbers 1, 7, 24, and 74 in the second column.

Mr. Winch: That is right.

Dr. Arnell: Of those figures 1, 7, 24 and 74, to answer your one question, in CFHQ there is one general, four lieutenant generals, ten major generals and 32 brigadier generals.

Mr. Winch: That adds up to what?

Dr. Arnell: Forty-seven.

Mr. Winch: Out of 106 there are 47 at NDHQ. Is that correct?

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry to labour this, but can you comment on 106 people of this rank for an active force of 98,000. Can you also comment—I am sorry if I do not have it right—on one commissioned officer to every five other ranks?

Dr. Arnell: Included in this are quite a number of what I think in a civilian sense one would call the professionals, rather than the operational servicemen. For example, within this rank structure there are over 500 doctors, 233 chaplains and 155 dentists, to give you some figures. Also included in the rank structure are the information services people. They are not paid out of Vote 15 but the total rank structure is carried here.

Mr. Winch: May I ask, sir, what military staff you have at NDHQ?

Dr. Arnell: The total military staff?

Mr. Winch: The total military staff at NDHQ?

Dr. Arnell: I can get it for you in just a second.

Mr. Winch: And the total civilian staff at NDHQ. You will notice, Dr. Arnell, I have only been using the straight military figures in the second column. It sounds to me like the Mexican Army, which used to have one general for every 27 men. We are getting pretty close to that here, are we not?

Dr. Arnell: One of the reasons, of course, is that you tend. . .

Mr. Winch: And also because of this very heavy officer staff—one to five—we have a military payroll of \$701 million for 98,000 men.

Mr. Harkness: Will you permit a supplementary, Mr. Winch?

The Chairman: I think we had better wait until Dr. Arnell answers the question which

has been asked and then perhaps Mr. Winch would permit a supplementary.

Mr. Winch: Yes, I would be pleased to, because I want to go on from that to the others.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, while this is being looked up—I came in late, for which I apologize—in what manner are we attacking this very large estimate of \$1.5 billion, which is the largest of all the estimates?

Mr. Winch: I have four questions.

The Chairman: We started on Votes 15 and 20. I called them individually but we are dealing with them together under the heading of Defence Services in the Blue Book. It is Vote 10 in the new form of estimates. Mr. Winch led the meeting off with some questions with regard to the pay scale.

Mr. Harkness: I was referring to Vote 15, which is in an amount better than \$1.5 billion. I was just asking for clarification on how we are attacking this or dealing with it.

The Chairman: I believe Mr. Winch gave some prior thought to questions under this heading and he started off, so we will just take the members as they indicate their wish to ask questions.

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Mr. Harkness: In other words, we are going to jump from personnel to equipment, and so on and so forth.

Mr. Winch: I was hoping, sir, that I could ask the four questions I had in mind, and there will be supplementaries on them, because I have not said a word for two meetings.

Mr. Harkness: I came in late and I am just asking for information on how we are going to deal with this really extraordinarily large item.

The Chairman: Perhaps there is a better way of dealing with it. If it is the wish of the Committee, we could split it up between personnel and equipment. I called the items and I was just going to take the members as they came along on either personnel or equipment. If it is considered that it would be easier to handle it in some other way, this would be . . .

Mr. Harkness: I would suggest that perhaps it would be better to deal with personnel first

and equipment afterwards, or the reverse. I do not care.

The Chairman: As we started with personnel, would it be satisfactory if the questions were directed to personnel first and then to equipment?

Mr. Winch: My first question, sir, was on personnel. My next three questions are on equipment and maintenance and perhaps I could start that afterwards.

The Chairman: Yes, when we finish with personnel. In other words, permit supplementaries on personnel first.

Mr. Winch: And then my other three questions have to do with equipment and maintenance.

Mr. Harkness: I would like to make it clear, Mr. Winch, that I am not trying to interfere with your form of questioning at all. I just wanted to find out how we were going to deal with this in a reasonable manner because it is an enormous item, as everybody realizes, and I think we should have some definite means of procedure.

The Chairman: It appears to me that it would make good sense if we exhausted the questions on personnel first and then went on to equipment, if that is agreeable to everyone. Dr. Arnell?

Dr. Arnell: To answer your question regarding CFHQ, Mr. Winch, there are approximately 3,100 military personnel at CFHQ, of which 1,800 are officers.

Mr. Winch: Of which 1,800 are officers?

Dr. Arnell: And there are about 3,400 civilians. I should point out that within the last year, as I mentioned when I appeared before you in November, as a field command Materiel Command was in fact brought into CFHQ in order to do some double tasking of personnel, and if I...

Mr. Winch: You say there are 1,800 officers at CFHQ?

Dr. Arnell: And this includes what used to be called Materiel Command, which had its headquarters at Rockcliffe.

Mr. Winch: Of these 1,800 officers how many are on Materiel Command?

Dr. Arnell: I am not sure we could give you that information tonight because it has been completely integrated.

Mr. Harkness: Could you tell us how many were on Materiel Command last year?

Dr. Arnell: I am told it is in the order of about 400.

Mr. Winch: That still leaves 1,400 other officers out of the 3,100 military personnel at command, and in addition you have 3,400 civilians.

Dr. Arnell: Of course, a lot of those civilians are also in Materiel Command.

Mr. Winch: When you said 400, that was not just the officers?

Dr. Arnell: Those were the military officers that had been in Materiel Command that are now part of the 1,800 officers shown as being part of CFHQ.

Mr. Winch: On other words,—I just want to get this clear—that means you now have 6,500 military and civilian personnel at NDHQ.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, sir.

Mr. Winch: That means that 3,100 of the 98,000 military personnel are at NDHQ.

Dr. Arnell: And in effect it handles the major logistics job within the whole military function. The Materiel Command headquarters organization, which was at Rockcliffe, did all the procurement of re-supply and this sort of thing, and it has now been brought into Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. Winch: And of the 1,800 officers at NDHQ, 47 hold the rank of brigadier general or higher?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson and Mr. Guay on supplementaries.

Mr. Gibson: Is it not true that because it is a peacetime force you are well advised to have a large cadre of officers and NCOs which can expand in case of trouble? Is that

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not one of the main reasons for having a relatively larger number of senior officers and NCOs than...

Dr. Arnell: With reference to the headquarters organizational structure, which was in fact the original headquarters structure that was set up following the establishment of the integrated headquarters at the time the total

force was over 110,000, it has only been in the last year or so that it was recognized that the decrease in the entire manpower of the Department was going to be a continuing thing, that in fact steps are now in hand to reduce the officer strength. About a year ago, a planned reduction in officer strength was undertaken; a reduction planned in the way that promotional opportunities would be left within the officer establishment, but, in fact, the promotion policy would be that only one vacancy out of every two would have a promotion into it. As a result, there has been a reduction in officer strength of about 1,200 in the last twelve months.

Mr. Harkness: You mean these are people who actually left the service?

Dr. Arnell: As people retired for any reason from voluntary to compulsory retirement, there has been a policy that only one out of every two vacancies in the ranks up to Colonel were in fact filled. Related to Mr. Gibson's remarks are the top four ranks, largely the headquarters establishment, all the command positions in the field, and quite a number of officers who serve at NATO and in the NORAD headquarters and so on. These upper ranks have been, in fact, left more or less the way they were for about the last four years.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay on a supplementary? This would relate to the high proportion of officers, would it Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay: Yes. My question is somewhat similar to that of Mr. Gibson. Is it not the case that you probably have certain initiatives whereby an officer will pass certain examinations and qualify for promotions to a higher rank? As Mr. Gibson also mentioned, could it be that, in view of the fact this is a peacetime force, you are keeping on hand the most qualified personnel you can retain; so, in case an emergency occurs, you will then have experienced men along with the appropriate ranks to facilitate carrying out your task. Is this the case?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, in a certain measure it is. I might cite an example of the sort of thing that results in this large number of officers in CFHQ. Within the Technical Services Branch of CFHQ are found all the engineering specialists who, in fact, have responsibility for the capital equipment program. Essentially in the way they were programmed, these programs have been continuing during a period when

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there has been a reduction of forces elsewhere; so the requirement for technical officers in certain areas over the last two or three years has really been going up rather than down, even though the establishment has tended to be held constant. In defence of these 1,400-odd officers within CFHQ, I must point out that I identified what had been the Materiel Command headquarters structure which included a lot of specialists both technical and on the logistic side; however, the largest of our headquarters branches before Materiel Command was incorporated with headquarters, was, in fact, the Technical Services Branch. It now reflects collectively both the old Materiel Command function, all the technical service staff for new capital equipment as well as a large measure of the research and development activity. This technical services headquarters establishment is close to 1,000 and is being manned at the present time with about 860 officers. The 1,400 would include the Materiel Command; so roughly half of all the officers shown, who I said were in CFHQ, are, in fact, technical experts or logistics experts of one type or another. If you add to that...are the doctors all carried in CFHQ?

A witness: No.

Dr. Arnell: No. I was going to say, "If you add a lot of the specialists". We do, in fact, have within this group the Judge Advocate General's staff, all fairly senior officers who are legal experts. All our legal experts are in uniform. Also included is the Surgeon General's headquarters staff and he is a Major General. Then there is the dental headquarters and the Chaplains; the Chaplains have a Major General and the dentists have a Brigadier General. Quite a number of these higher ranks are assigned to the professional in the civilian sense. I am just reminded there is another one which I meant to mention earlier. The military attachés scattered around the world are carried as part of the headquarters staff, too.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): What is the percentage of commissioned officers to soldiers both in Cyprus and in Germany? In Germany, I believe you have somewhere close to 36,000 men. What is the percentage of officers there?

Dr. Arnell: In the two forces in Germany, the ratios will be quite different. One of the

big differences between the operational groups is that the bulk of our air crew, certainly our pilots, are all officers. This gives us some 4,000-odd officers who are, in fact, air crew. On the other hand in an army, or a battalion, as you know, the ratios are...

Mr. Winch: It must be that in the field there is a vast difference in the ratio of officers to men. In headquarters, you have one officer to less than two other ranks.

Dr. Arnell: On a quick check, the Air Division ratio is one officer to six other ranks; the brigade is one to about eleven.

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Mr. Winch: Whereas at headquarters it is 18 officers to 31 other ranks.

Dr. Arnell: Of course the fact is that CFHQ is not really a place where you tend to have other ranks. You will find in Air Division that there is a total of five civilians all told out of 4,000. On the other hand at CFHQ, as I noted earlier, there are 3,400 civilians. In fact, a very large measure of the supporting staff at CFHQ, the file clerks, stenographers and so on tend to be civilians. There are, of course, a limited number of senior NCOs around headquarters, but generally speaking there are not many other ranks proportionately in CFHQ compared to what you would have in a field command.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, did you indicate to me or to us that the other section of civilian personnel was to be discussed later?

The Chairman: We are on supplementaries dealing with officers at the moment, Mr. Guay. We are dealing with the more general questions of personnel, so I will put your name down to raise questions later about civilian personnel. Mr. Howard, did your question relate to the higher percentage of officer strength?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes.

The Chairman: All right, Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, when we had our review of the NATO situation, we also reviewed the fact that we have a permanent force that is a professional body and we compared it with our military forces before World War II where we had a small number of people involved, many of whom were officers, with

the idea that in the event of hostilities this trained cadre would be in the position of being able to expand quickly and to train other people to develop a civilian army. However, we were told in our NATO studies that this was no longer practical and that military events being what we expect them to be, there would be no time to train an army. We would have to depend upon the military forces we have on hand at the time that war started and this was the justification for a very expensive highly trained professional force.

Tonight you have told us that we have a lot of officers in our military forces because we need a trained cadre so that in the event of hostilities we could go out and train many more people to form a civilian army.

Now, one of these stories is not right. You cannot have it both ways. Was the story we heard in NATO wrong or is the story we heard here tonight wrong?

Dr. Arnell: I think, in fact, that perhaps what was said earlier gave a slightly wrong impression. The thing that I really was referring to—I think it was in an answer to Mr. Gibson a little while ago—was that until quite recently our officer strength essentially had been held at what was judged to be about the right officer demand mix at the time the total force was of the order of 110,000, that during the period of tight budgets when it was necessary to hold down the manpower a little it was continued to be viewed that we were not, in fact, changing what was essentially our force structure and that in certain areas, such as the training schools and this type of thing, some positions were being left unfilled, as it were. In fact, as part of the hold-back, there has been a reduction in the number of trainees in the last year which has now gone back up again. There is a certain amount of expansion inherent in the fact that we have reserves—this, I think, has been discussed before—and at the present time there are of the order of 28,000 in the reserve forces.

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These reserve forces in fact, are available to flesh out a regular force in the event of an emergency so that there is an inherent expansion of that amount, but not in the sense of the pre-war concept of a very small regular force of the order of 5,000 or 6,000 with a very, very large reserve organization behind it. What I really was referring to was the fact

that here we had a force structure which was based on a ratio of about one officer to seven men...

Mr. Winch: And now it is 1 to 50.

Dr. Arnell: ...which now is approaching 1 to 50. However, as I pointed out we are in the process of reducing the officer strength to bring it more in line with the earlier ratios. The fact is that with modern equipment and particularly where you are manning equipment rather than equipping men you tend to have higher officer demand ratios and you will find in the case, say, of a typical infantry battalion of the old sense, as I mentioned earlier, that one air division, which is a straight operational force, has an officer demand ratio of about 1 to 6. On the other hand, the brigade is about 1 to 11, but even that, I think you will find, is high in proportion to what used to be considered was an officer demand ratio of a typical land force.

Mr. Winch: When I was in the army it was 1 to 33. I was the only officer in a platoon.

The Chairman: If we could continue with your questions, Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What would be the approximate ratio of officers to other ranks in the reserve force that you have been talking about? Would not your reserve force be mostly officers?

Dr. Arnell: No, a very large number of the reserve force tends to be I think—although I am afraid we do not have the figures here—land force units.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Are you talking about the Militia or are you talking about...

Dr. Arnell: Yes, this is the Militia.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): They already have a full complement of officers in the Militia, do they not?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, but they are only, in effect, organized up to sort of the regiment battalion level so that they would become part of a larger formation if they...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You would need many more officers then to put them...

Dr. Arnell: In fact, this would be the fleshing out type...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): A great many brigadier generals would be needed, would they not?

Mr. Harkness: As a matter of actual fact I think you will find that the proportion of officers to NCO's in the Militia is very, very high, indeed. It is higher than in the regular forces.

The Chairman: I would think so, particularly from the experience I have had.

Dr. Arnell: I had not checked it before and I must say I...

Mr. Harkness: I think it is just the reverse of what you said.

Dr. Arnell: ...stand corrected, Mr. Harkness. I do not think I had seen the figures before so I was wrong on this. There are 3,600 officers out of 28,000 reserves, so that really is about the same ratio as everything else.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Then the over-all picture is that you are pretty heavily officered all the way through. How does this compare with the military forces of other countries in the world, say, the United States or the United Kingdom?

Dr. Arnell: I have attempted this comparison on a number of occasions, but there is no common line. The last time I saw some figures the British tended to have a higher officer ratio than we did, particularly in the higher ranks. They tend to run to higher ranks on the grounds that it really does not cost that much more to have a three-star general than a two-star general. At the other extreme, and one that is often thrown up at us as a comparison are the United States Marines which are very lean, but the reason...

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Mr. Winch: The sergeants have command there.

Dr. Arnell: ...for this is that they draw the bulk of their logistic support, which is one of the areas where you get a lot of rank—from the technical and logistic side—from the United States Navy and in some areas they depend entirely on the U.S. Navy for this support. Therefore, the United States Marine Corps tends to show only part of the officer strength that, in fact, is necessary for them.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): How does this ratio compare with the over-all United States forces?

Dr. Arnell: We would be higher, but one of the reasons for this is the fact that they, at the moment, are very much involved in a war with a large number of people in the field who are one-year conscripts or whatever their period of force service is, the bulk of whom never, in fact, are given any real rank at all. They have a very massive turnover of their large number of fighting troops and when you are actually engaged in active combat you tend to have many more privates and corporals than you do in peacetime as we are effectively now.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Would you say then that Canadian forces are very heavily officered and that as we spend \$701.5 million on military pay, theoretically a reduction in the number of officers might save quite a bit of money on our military budget?

Dr. Arnell: Well, as I say, we are in the process of reducing the ratio now but one of the real difficulties connected therewith is the fact that large numbers of officers are specialists—the medical doctors, chaplains and so on. In fact, there are 1,000-odd in the group of doctors, chaplains and dentists and one could argue that unless you reduce the total forces you could not reduce this number because it makes no difference what the rank is, you still need the doctor.

Mr. Winch: If you take out that 1,000 you still have 15,297. You said 1,000.

Dr. Arnell: Yes. Of course also included in that figure are the 1,900 officer cadets in the military colleges and universities.

Mr. Winch: They are not going to be sergeants, they are going to be officers.

Dr. Arnell: But they are going to replace somebody who in fact really will have retired at the front end by the time they come in. The active part of this rank structure should at least have the officer cadets removed from it.

Mr. Winch: You are still defending the one-to-five ratio of officers.

Dr. Arnell: I am not defending it because, as I said, we are in the process of pushing back towards what is viewed as the ratio that

one might expect in a highly equipment-oriented force and that is a ratio of somewhere between one-to-six and one-to-seven.

Mr. Winch: One-to-six to one-to-seven is peacetime but in the field it is one-to-eleven. I am speaking now of armed brigades, I am not speaking of the air force.

Dr. Arnell: Well the brigade would be . . .

Mr. Winch: One-to-eleven.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, but by the time you add in the whole Maritime side I think you will find that it is somewhere in between and comes out at one-to-eight.

Mr. Winch: Well this is one spot where we could save money.

The Chairman: I wonder, Mr. Winch, if we could let Mr. Howard continue with his supplementary.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): You say that you reduced the number of officers by 1200 people in the last year and there has been no noticeable effect on the efficiency of the force?

Dr. Arnell: I think one of the areas that can be debated at length is whether or not in fact it has had an effect on the efficiency of the force. Many military units are organized for their ability to keep operating in a period of an emergency for a period of time and when you are short certain people in the establishment it does not necessarily affect the efficiency of operating, but what it may in fact affect is your staying power if you have to continue operating. For example, one of the areas often debated in this regard—and I only give it as an example—is that if in fact you have to put an air squadron on a 24-hour operation day in and day out the question arises how long you can keep the airplanes flying and it is often debatable whether, in fact the air crew or the ground crew gives out first. In other words, the problem is whether you have to cut down on your planned flying rates because your pilots are too tired to take the aircraft off or, in fact, the ground crew cannot keep up with the maintenance to keep the aircraft flying. If you are short of a certain trade you may have absolutely no efficiency at all within

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the unit and it may be just as hard to recruit trade. On the other hand you might be able to run at 80 per cent of establishment

and really be efficient for any foreseeable operation. This is the type of thing that we envisage we might be exposed to in the next little while.

This is one reason that the brigade and the air division have always been kept as close as possible to the approved establishment of all the trades that they need. The shortfalls have tended to be back in the training centres rather than in an operational unit which, if used, has to be efficient.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Do you have any plans to try for another 1,200 men? Do you need another 1,200 this year?

Dr. Arnell: I am not sure what the actual number is but there is a projected decrease in officers that will be going on throughout the year. There is in fact a target for March 1970, which I do not happen to have with me, that they will be trying to achieve.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Could we get the figure on the reduction that you plan?

Dr. Arnell: I think we could give you a short statement on this subject, yes.

The Chairman: And that will show the extent to which the officers strength will be reduced by March 1970.

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): That is all, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Dr. Arnell, in previous years we had spoken about having reached the point where many were taking their retirement. Are these 1,200 men that you are speaking of men who have reached the retirement stage?

Dr. Arnell: This reduction that I mentioned occurring in the last year or so have all been people who left the force either voluntarily or because they reached retirement age. There has been no force attrition in the last year.

Mr. Legault: And the anticipated number is 1,200 men.

Dr. Arnell: No, that is what we have reduced in the last little while. I would have to check for sure what the actual position is right now.

Mr. Legault: It is an estimate.

Dr. Arnell: Yes. I think I can produce a short paragraph, which the secretary could include, which would answer Mr. Howard's question and also yours.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much, Doctor.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan on a supplementary and then Mr. Harkness on a supplementary.

Mr. Ryan: In respect of our military missions abroad, is it your practice to increase the rank of an officer in special situations, such as in Indo-China, so that at least, temporarily, he will have added status while he is there, and is there an understanding with such officer that he will revert, say, from a brigadier to a colonel when he is no longer in that position with that military mission?

Dr. Arnell: It is not our practice, although upon occasion it is done. Generally speaking, on military missions abroad officers of the right rank are selected, or officers who are due for promotion and are promoted into the position; but it is only in the exceptional case that in fact a man will be given an acting rank for such a position.

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I think we have only really had one or two. The only one that I am sure of is that Major General Milroy, when he was sent to the Nigerian area, was in fact made an acting major general because he was the Commandant at the Armed Forces Staff College at the brigadier level; and although he was given an acting rank for that, by the time he returned there had in fact been a retirement at the major general rank and he was really in line for promotion anyway and was confirmed.

Mr. Winch: Why did you send a colonel to replace him?

Dr. Arnell: To Nigeria? I think it was in fact a change in situation in the observer team.

The Chairman: We are getting away from the supplementary.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask if an acting brigadier would be paid the full salary of a brigadier, or whatever the rank might be?

Dr. Arnell: Yes; we pay them when they are given the rank.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

Mr. Harkness: Dr. Arnell, these figures are what you might call theoretical, or paper, figures. In other words, you have the total man-years authorized and you allow for the continuing employees, which together come to approximately 98,200 people, but I have a return which you will probably remember, of about five or six weeks ago, showing the present strength, leaving out those on terminal leave, as something between 95,000 and 96,000 rather than 98,000.

Have you the number of officers and NCOs who are presently in the service rather than these paper figures that we are looking at?

Dr. Arnell: I think I can get you the figures. But I would like to explain, relative to these two columns, which are in fact the same...

Mr. Harkness: They are the total man-years authorized.

Dr. Arnell: The situation was that during 1968-69, because of a high figure at the beginning of the year and the fact that only sufficient funds were provided for 100,000 military man-years during the year, it was necessary to decrease the total military manpower quite appreciably. As a result, recruiting was held down for quite a large part of the year and the net result was that the number of train-

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ees in the stream was about 3,000 less over the year than we would expect to have in order to maintain a constant strength during the year.

In the course of guessing at the turnaround point, the judgment was that we would run below the 98,000 which was the target for March 31, 1969. If, to the figure you have just quoted, you add in the people on terminal leave, my recollection is that it comes to 97,000 and something. We have in effect, under-shot the 98,000 figures, and money is provided in the estimates, in fact, to pay 98,000 apart from the seconded officers; and if you add in the seconded people, for whom somebody else pays, you come out with the total.

Mr. Harkness: The point I am trying to make is that to get at the proportion of officer

and NCO strength we need the actual figures, not the authorized figures, which may be very different indeed.

Dr. Arnell: We do have the latest return here. We can check this for you.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, if that is all on the personnel question...

The Chairman: No; there are further questions on personnel. Mr. Harkness, have you finished?

Mr. Harkness: No; I have a number of questions on personnel. But as I said, I think that to some extent we have been talking in a vacuum. We are talking about authorized strengths whereas, in my view, we should be talking about the actual strengths.

The Chairman: I have a number of names here. Mr. Cafik, is your question on personnel or equipment?

Mr. Cafik: I have some questions on a number of areas, but I did have some supplementaries on personnel.

The Chairman: Have you a supplementary, as well, Mr. Harkness, on personnel?

Mr. Harkness: Yes, on personnel.

The Chairman: Perhaps we could let Mr. Harkness continue and then call on you, Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Harkness: Relative to the first two groups, general and lieutenant general, for some 20 odd years, and with about 25 per cent more people than we have at the present time in the armed forces, we got along with one full general, or equivalent, and three lieutenant generals. Why is it necessary now to have double that number with 25 per cent fewer people?

Dr. Arnell: I believe it has been quite a number of years since we had as small a number of lieutenant generals as you suggest.

Mr. Harkness: It is exactly five years.

Dr. Arnell: We used to have a lieutenant general at NORAD and a lieutenant general at SHAPE, in addition to the three at Headquarters. I had an idea there was another one somewhere, but we always had a couple of extra lieutenant generals who in fact were on international posting, rather than just the three of the chiefs of staff.

In relation to the present lieutenant general rank, as part of the Canadian Forces Headquarters when it was first set up it had four branches, each of which was headed by a lieutenant general; and, in fact, I guess there were four at the beginning.

Mr. Winch: Now you have seven.

Dr. Arnell: At that time there was still a lieutenant general in Paris and another at NORAD. The one at SHAPE has since been withdrawn, and there still is the Deputy Commander at NORAD; so that the seven that are listed now are in fact the four in Headquarters, the Mobile Commander, the Maritime Commander and the Deputy Chief of Staff at NORAD.

Mr. Harkness: In actual fact, the authorization is for nine, and the two extra that you are talking about are those that you have just mentioned, who were on international assignments; so that the actual general strength—lieutenant general and above—in

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Canada has been doubled, although the forces have been reduced by 25 per cent. This, to me, just does not make sense, and it never did.

Dr. Arnell: I think the nine that are shown as the total man-years authorized in 1968-69 included at least one lieutenant general on retirement leave. I would have to check that to be certain. The terminal leave rank structure is included in this list.

Mr. Harkness: Let me come back to my basic question. With a 25 per cent decrease in the total forces why is it necessary to have this increase in the number of lieutenant generals?

Dr. Arnell: I would not phrase it quite that way.

Mr. Harkness: I know; but that is the brutal fact.

Dr. Arnell: The reason I say I would not phrase it quite that way is that the rank structure of the lieutenant generals has not in fact gone up as the strength came down. The number of lieutenant-generals was, in fact, set up in 1964 and the senior officer establishment has been essentially unchanged.

Mr. Harkness: The fact that it was set up in 1964 does not make it sacrosanct.

Dr. Arnell: No, sir, I agree with you.

Mr. Harkness: I think it was a mistake to increase it in 1964 and I think it is a worse mistake to have it increased again now.

Dr. Arnell: When I say I would phrase it a little different, it is a case not so much of saying to have it increased now as to continue to have it the way it is, I think.

Mr. Harkness: It has increased with nine now authorized rather than seven.

Dr. Arnell: If you look at 1969-70, the nine is the 1968-69 figure which included, I think...

Mr. Allmand: May I ask a supplementary?

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand on a supplementary.

Mr. Allmand: This may have been said, but do not these rank structures include the integrated forces, the air force and the navy?

Dr. Arnell: Oh, yes.

Mr. Allmand: I see.

Mr. Winch: An admiral is now a general.

Mr. Allmand: So some of these people that were formerly classified under naval and air force positions are all classified together here.

Dr. Arnell: This is the total rank structure.

Mr. Winch: There are still 47 Brigadier-Generals and Generals at Headquarters, and 106 for our entire forces.

The Chairman: I wonder if we could take these one at a time. Mr. Harkness, are you still on this line of questioning?

Mr. Harkness: I am still trying to get an answer to what reason there is for having this—I would say 50 per cent, Dr. Arnell would probably argue 30 or 40 per cent—increase in the number of Lieutenant-General and General positions with a 25 per cent decrease in the total force. This is my simple question, just what justification is there for this?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Imagine if we had a Field Marshal.

Mr. Harkness: It would be just that much worse.

Dr. Arnell: I think all I can say, Mr. Harkness, is that the rank structure was based on a force with a 10 per cent decrease

and, in fact, the senior officer component of it has stayed constant while the rest of the force has been. . .

Mr. Harkness: It has not stayed constant, though; it has increased.

Dr. Arnell: That nine which you refer to is, in fact, a total man-years authorized in 1968 and 1969, and that did include one or two Lieutenant-Generals on retirement leave. This year the total number of man-years authorized and the allowables is seven because it is not anticipated, as I understand it, that there will be any Lieutenant-Generals retiring this year.

Mr. Harkness: All right; if you take that figure one of those seven Lieutenant-Generals is on international service in NORAD and that leaves six who are presumably on service in Canada, in comparison with three five years ago with 25 per cent fewer people to command.

Mr. Winch: Double the number.

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Mr. Harkness: Double the number. That is what I say; it is a 50 per cent increase no matter how you look at it; or 100 per cent—if you take it from the basic figure it is 100 per cent increase.

Dr. Arnell: I think you will find, although this may be no defence of the figure, that in the same way that a trained serviceman is now called a Corporal, that in fact. . .

Mr. Harkness: I was going to come to this a little later.

Dr. Arnell: I had gone over this earlier with Mr. Winch.

Mr. Harkness: I do not think that is any defence.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Yes; the basic point—and I think this is perhaps what Mr. Winch was on before I came in—is that it would appear that we have a terribly inflated rank structure which results again in an inordinate cost as far as our defence services are concerned in comparison with other countries. If you look at the whole rank structure, coming to what you have just mentioned about corporals, out of the 98,000-odd authorized personnel in 1969-70 we have just about 20 per cent who

are privates. In other words, nearly 80 per cent of our defence forces are either officers or NCO's.

I do not think there is any other defence force in the world that has a proportion anything like that—nothing like it—and I would put to you that the sole reason for the fact that these 38,500 corporals, of whom probably 35,000 or at least 30,000 should be privates and the 11,730 sergeants, at least half of whom should be corporals and would be in any other army, are holding those ranks simply and solely because this was an indirect means of increasing their pay.

An hon. Member: Be careful; they will not vote for you next time.

Mr. Harkness: I do not worry about that. I think this is solely an indirect means of increasing the pay of most of the personnel in the armed forces by putting them into false ranks. I am quite surprised by looking at this to see the number of lieutenants, because I have not been able to find any lieutenants in the various units I have gone around to look at; they are all captains. Practically all the people that are doing lieutenant's jobs are captains, and where these lieutenants are I do not know, because certainly I have not found them in the various units I have been to.

Dr. Arnell: I think that while I accept your criticism of the rank structure I would like to make one point in defence of the NCO ranks particularly. In a number of comparative studies that have been made of the serviceman tradesman and his counterpart in civilian life, it is the judgment of independent assessors that in many cases the serviceman-tradesman, for all that he may be a sergeant or even a warrant officer, in fact does not get as high pay as his supervisory counterpart would in industry or in the maintenance shop of a place like Air Canada, or this type of thing.

This, in fact, is what was aimed at when the reorganization of the pay scheme was put through in 1966, to attempt to provide the equivalent of the civil salary for the military man rather than a smaller pay and a number of allowances that was added to it if he happened to be married, or if he happened to be living in a rented house. I think one can criticize us for the ranks, but perhaps what we should be looking at in this case is the rank and the pay fields against which these people actually draw their salary based on their particular specialty. This is a large

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schedule because of the large number of trades and skills that exists within the services.

Mr. Harkness: I would think it is far better to have a reasonable rank structure rather than one which is really, I believe, complete nonsense and to pay whatever the necessary rates of pay are for the people employed including trades pay, rather than to have a rank structure of this kind. Looking at any past military organization we have had, and any military organization that I know of in any other country, this is nonsense—this rank structure is really nonsense. When 20 per cent of your personnel are privates or the equivalent and 80 per cent are NCO's and officers, the thing just does not make sense—it just does not make sense.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Cafik, on a supplementary, and then Mr. Allmand will take the floor. Have you further questions, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: I have, but I will stop at the moment.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik and then Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Cafik: The majority of the questions I had in mind in this area have either been asked or I have come to the conclusion that there is not much point in asking them.

I have one, however. At some future date could you give us a schedule of the rates of pay for these basic categories from, general and lieutenant general, right down the line? I would like to have a look at that, in due course. I presume that such things as trades pay are paid over and above their basic figure for that...

Mr. Winch: No, not now; that is the reason for their getting the increased rank.

Mr. Cafik: Therefore, there are no trades pay categories?

An hon. Member: Not now.

Dr. Arnell: There are pay fields within a rank. A highly skilled trade will be in a high pay field and a lower skilled trade will be in a lower pay field. In fact, if you so desire, we could provide some of this detail to be appended to the record, because this is a straight...

Mr. Cafik: I would like to see it appended. And could you give the range? For example, a captain might be from so many thousands a year to so many thousands a year. Their rate would depend on their qualifications, I presume?

Dr. Arnell: The pay fields and the trades pay idea are in the other ranks—the NCOS.

Mr. Cafik: Would you, in what you are going to...

The Chairman: Before we go further, is it agreed that Dr. Arnell will furnish the Clerk with this schedule of information, which will become part of our record?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Cafik: Also, in that schedule could you include any other pay benefits or allowances they would get? Does this vary from rank to rank, or...

Dr. Arnell: There are only a few special allowances. There are no allowances in the old sense at all. The allowances are now relatively few and include such things as divers and parachutists, where there is, in fact, a type of inherent risk that has traditionally been recognized with some additional allowance. There are a limited number of these which, again, I think, could be made available if, in fact, it was desirable. But we have the straight tables of pay here in the orders and they can be reproduced as appendices.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): And the doctors are included there?

Dr. Arnell: We can give you the total. We have legal, dental, and so on. It is just a case of extracting the necessary information. Unless, of course, you wish to have a copy of the entire chapter of Queen's Regulations and Orders?

Mr. Cafik: I do not think that is necessary, from my standpoint.

Did you indicate that there were a thousand doctors and dentists in the military service?

Dr. Arnell: The figures I was given show that in the established positions—and whether or not they are filled at the moment. I could not tell you—there were just over 500 doctors, 155 dentists and 233 chaplains.

Mr. Cafik: Chaplains?

Dr. Arnell: Yes. I am not sure what the legal...

Mr. Cafik: I gather that in the military the physical wellbeing is more in need of looking after than their spiritual but this seems to be a phenomenal number of personnel. If a

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city of 98,000 people had that many doctors in it I presume they would all starve to death.

Mr. Barrett: They are not all in one place.

Mr. Cafik: No; I know they are spread around, of course, but I do not know how many areas they would cover.

Dr. Arnell: They cover everything from field ambulance units, which are ready to go anywhere a battalion goes, to hospitals. We have a number of major military hospitals, and we also have 40-odd bases all of which have at least one doctor associated with them.

Mr. Cafik: These would be the doctors in military hospitals, such as the one here?

Dr. Arnell: And in units; and on bases.

Mr. Cafik: I have one last question. You referred to the strength on the officer level being a little higher than it should be and to reducing it by replacing only half of the vacancies that occur. Do you have any schedule of what you consider to be the advisable strength of each one of these categories that you are working towards; that is, how many lieutenant generals you think you should have, or how many major generals, or how many brigadier generals, and so on? Have you determined this? Are you working towards reducing them to a certain level?

Dr. Arnell: There is one area in which, I think one might say, subjective judgment is required. The rest, I think can be handled in a straight engineered fashion. Operational units are obviously very easy to structure; and operational commands with the command headquarters I do not think require too much subjective judgment on what is needed in the headquarters to support the field units.

Once you get past these you move into the support area, where you have a number of bases with base commanders. In recent years—and I do not really know how far back this goes but certainly it has been so for quite a long period of time—it has been our practice to have a colonel, or his equivalent in rank, in the days before integration, in

charge of a base; and to have more or less the same type of base organization, of a colonel in command, a chief of staff, chief engineer and a chief administrator, and so on. We have tended to maintain a sort of basic rank structure within a base.

It could be argued that below a certain level you should change the structure of a base. They practically all have commanders. There will be slight variations, but, basically speaking we have run a base with a rank structure of a colonel, two or three lieutenant colonels and around eight or nine or 10 majors supporting them. I suppose one could argue that a lieutenant colonel could run a base just as well as a colonel and that in fact, one could lighten the structure all the way. The same is true of—in fact, the earlier discussion in large measure revolved around—the rank structure there should be in a headquarters. One could argue that you could drop the rank of every officer in a headquarters and, in fact, have it that much lighter.

I do not think there is any real way of measuring this. There is an area of subjectivity here that is quite different from when you are talking about rank structure in a ship, or in a squadron of aircraft, and so on.

Another point is, of course, that certainly on the air force side we have traditionally

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viewed air crew as being officers. It has been argued that senior NCOs can fly airplanes just as well as officers. As I say, there is a certain subjectivity in this that you cannot measure.

The present rank structure is arrived at against a set of principles and the only areas that I think could be debated are CFHQ, perhaps some of the command headquarters, and the technical side; that is do you have to have rank to persuade engineers, and so on, in the same way as doctors and dentists?

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Dr. Arnell.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand, on a supplementary, and then Mr. Guay.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Arnell, this is a related question. I do not know if what is happening in the armed forces relative to rank structure is the same as what is happening in business, but if it is there would be a good explanation for the greater ratio of higher ranks to lower ranks. For example, in industry and business today—and it is for you to tell me if this is happening in the military—compared to five

years ago we see a greater ratio of trained labourers to untrained; a greater ratio of white collars to blue collars; and a greater ratio of administration to staff. The reason for this of course is the greater use of technology and the greater complexity of technology. Is this happening in the military?

Dr. Arnell: This is what I really referred to a bit earlier in defense of the high officer to man ratio—that we are really manning equipment now rather than equipping men and you are really very much technologically oriented in that most equipments now have to have really skilled tradesmen.

Mr. Winch: Why do the other armies of the world not have to do the same thing?

The Chairman: I wonder, Mr. Winch, if we could let Mr. Allmand finish his supplementary.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Harkness made an allegation that we, compared to other defence forces, are top heavy and I wonder if that allegation is supported in fact. I do not know where we can get some information on this but I would really like to get to the bottom of this. It seems to me that what is happening here is happening in private industry, and I would feel that if that is the case then the greater degree of technology and greater mechanization is justified, but I would like to see if this is also happening in other military forces.

Dr. Arnell: We do have some data. The last time I looked at it it was not as complete as I would like. But I will make a note to bring anything along that I can find the next time I appear before you—as I am sure I am going to have to.

Mr. Allmand: I would be particularly interested in our NATO allies, the United States and Britain.

Dr. Arnell: I can tell you one that is very much the other direction and that is Turkey, because I had occasion to check it a while back.

Mr. Allmand: But that would be reasonable because they would be a force presumably based more on untrained, but unskilled soldiers.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I wonder if I could interrupt just for a moment. It is rather likely that we are not going to finish Votes 15 and 20 of the Blue Book tonight. We have

stood a number of votes which we have discussed in some detail. Would it be agreeable now if we passed the votes that we have discussed and then continue with Votes 15 and 20.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Harkness: What about the questions that Mr. Guay wanted to have answered on Votes 7, 10 and 12?

The Chairman: I think we have made arrangements in that connection.

Dr. Arnell: This will appear in the Minutes. We agreed to provide the material to the Clerk and he will have it included in the record.

The Chairman: I believe we have agreed to that effect.

Mr. Winch: I do not know what your plans are but as far as I am concerned, I still have four questions when we get to equipment and maintenance.

Dr. Arnell: This is on the Emergency Measures Organization, I think.

Mr. Winch: Just what are your plans?

The Chairman: We are not going to pass Votes 15 and 20 now; we will be able to continue with them later. I merely wish, if it is agreeable, to pass the votes which we have discussed in detail. They would be Votes 5, 7, 10 and 12. Then we will revert to the equipment and personnel items under Votes 15 and 20.

Mr. Harkness: I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that as far as Votes 7, 10 and 12

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are concerned, when we get the answers to the questions I wanted to have answered and the ones Mr. Guay wanted to have answered, we might have quite a number of other questions. Therefore I would doubt whether it is advisable to pass those votes. As far as Votes 1 and 5 are concerned, I am quite agreeable.

The Chairman: I believe we have agreed, Mr. Harkness, to hold Vote 1 open so that we can raise any further questions—Vote 1 being a general vote.

Mr. Harkness: As long as we are able to ask further questions after we get this further information that we have requested, I am

quite agreeable; I just do not want to be precluded from asking other questions.

The Chairman: No, that is understood. We have agreed to hold Vote 1, which is a general vote, open until the very end so I would think any incidental questions that come up could be asked under that vote. Under those circumstances, shall Vote 5 pass?

Vote 5 agreed to.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): I have a point of order on Vote 7. In view of what seemed to me to be unsatisfactory answers that we got this afternoon, is it possible for us to have a rider attached to this Vote that we have a further investigation of the Emergency Measures Organization—say, a reference to this Committee that it be studied in greater detail?

Mr. Winch: I was going to say, that part of our terms of reference was discussion on civil defence. Am I not correct, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes, when we filed our interim report with Parliament we specifically reserved the question of civil defence. We will have an adequate opportunity at an appropriate time to go into it, and I think our record indicates the necessity of going into that at some considerable length.

Mr. Harkness: This is the very point I had in mind when I was doubtful about passing Votes 7, 10 and 12.

The Chairman: Then in those circumstances is it agreed that those votes shall carry?

Votes 7, 10 and 12 agreed to.

The Chairman: Perhaps now we can continue on the general heading "Defence Services" Votes 15 and 20. We are still on personnel and I believe Mr. Allmand, was raising a supplementary question.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Arnell said he would try and provide us with some comparative data relating to the ratio of higher ranks to lower ranks in other NATO forces and I would like to see that. I have finished my questioning.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Dr. Arnell, have you formulated a policy or planned programs regarding reducing the number of armed forces and, if so, does such a policy take into consideration (a) keeping the proper ratio of officers and men (b) spell out how you will keep in the army fairly young and active

personnel? In other words—If you were not taking such people in at the other end of the line would it not be possible that eventually we would end up with a preponderance of old grey haired high ranking officers in the forces?

Dr. Arnell: This is part of the current study being undertaken for the government as a result of the Prime Minister's announcement a couple of weeks ago of the planned restructuring—I guess that is the best word for it—of Canadian defence and until such time as this study is completed one does not know quite what the shape will be. However, I can assure you from discussions I have had with people who are undertaking this study that they are looking at the entire situation. In fact they are looking into areas which we have mentioned tonight, ranging all the way from the foreign liaison type of activity right through to the military participation in civil defence. They are looking right across the entire board because the new policy as defined in broad terms is quite a new approach to defence forces in peacetime. I

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really cannot give you any idea just what the outcome is going to be because the studies are just getting going now, but they are going to look at every aspect of the rank structure which does reflect the organizational concept.

Mr. Barrett: A supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Barrett on a supplementary.

Mr. Barrett: Is there a possibility then that instead of declining it might increase with such a policy?

Dr. Arnell: As far as this is concerned, one has only some of the statements of the Prime Minister that suggest how he, himself, sees this going. I would say at the moment that we are examining the effect of withdrawing from the present role in Europe and what might be done in the way of restructuring forces to give more meaning to the concept of having what I believe, as the phrase goes, "completely compatible forces".

Mr. Barrett: You mentioned about civil defence, therefore if they are going to put troops in civil defence I would assume that it automatically would have to increase.

Dr. Arnell: Well, again—and I feel that this afternoon's discussion revolved in large measure around it—under the BNA Act you get into the federal-provincial areas of responsibility and really the federal people have much more a co-ordinating role than stepping into areas that in large measure are provincial. As to just what will come out of all this I really have no idea at all. I only use this as one experience, with the foreign liaison type of thing being the other extreme of looking at what the military is going to do in the future.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay have you finished?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): This was a question that I wanted to bring out and the doctor is assuring us, as you know Mr. Chairman, that they look into every aspect. That being the case there is no use my going any further with this question.

The Chairman: Mr. Ralph Stewart and then Mr. Cafik. Do you have a question Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I was going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, perhaps the mood of the Committee is that we pass all of these estimates.

Mr. Winch: I have been waiting through two meetings to ask questions and I intend to ask them.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik do you have further questions on personnel?

Mr. Cafik: No, I want to ask questions on equipment, please.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions on personnel before we move on to equipment?

Mr. Harkness: I would like to make an observation or two with regard to personnel. First of all, I doubt very much that what Dr. Arnell has just been saying about a change in roles will have much effect on rank structure. I, personally, find it very difficult to see why, if you change the role you are going to change the rank structure very materially. It seems to me that one of the most useful things this Committee could do would be to exert some pressure in order to get a more realistic rank structure.

I do not think there is any question, when we have reached a situation where we have one chief or sub-chief for every one-fifth

Indian, that the situation is ridiculous. I hope this Committee will be able to make a recommendation for a complete revision of the rank structure to bring it into what I think most people would look upon as a more realistic type of rank structure.

The Chairman: Following along on that comment, Dr. Arnell, you have given a number of reasons why the officer strength bears a high proportion to the total; nevertheless, on balance, there did seem to be an indication that the basic reason is simply that we have been reducing our total strength probably faster than our officer strength. Would that be a fair statement of the basic reason for the high percentage of officers at this time?

Dr. Arnell: No change in the commitment pattern.

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The Chairman: The way you have been rectifying that is to adopt a policy of just filling every second vacancy in officer rank as these vacancies occur. That seems rather an arbitrary, not completely rational, way of releasing a force.

Dr. Arnell: We had agreed on a target at the far end of this; it was not to go on indefinitely. I think the point now is that for the next year the current studies are under way on what is going to be the result of the restructuring coming out of this defence review. I do not think there is any doubt that there is going to be a re-organization of rank structure from the top down. I think it is recognized by all that there is—

Mr. Cafik: I have a supplementary on that, Mr. Chairman and I think it is rather a good point. If we are overextended in terms of officers why would you fill half of them? If you have too many, why do you not do it right and not replace any of these people until such time as you are down to the strength level that you want? You are taking twice as long to do it, I think.

Dr. Arnell: It came out from the point of view of morale. If, in fact, all promotion were stopped for a period of time morale would be affected. Particularly in a time when things were a little touchy anyway, it was viewed as being too drastic. After looking at the over-all picture it was judged that it could be done within a reasonable period of time, and a target for a new rank structure was set to be met over a period of a year or eighteen months.

The Chairman: I think it is quite clear that this system though tends to result in the higher ranking officers remaining simply because they are more highly paid and they are not likely to retire voluntarily.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, but you also find that the higher ranking officers tend to be the older ones who come up for retirement reasonably regularly. As I pointed out, the general ranks were, in fact, excluded from the purpose of this straight run-down because the general ranks were tied to command structure organizations and CFHQ, and had a lot of the NORAD and SHAPE and this type of structure in them.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, with regard to personnel and then Mr. Winch, with regard to personnel. Perhaps we could decide now, as it is 9.50 p.m., to defer equipment to our next sitting and just finish the question of personnel this evening, if we can. Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: I have two questions in respect of personnel, Mr. Chairman. First of all, for the year 1969-70 in the Estimates this projection of paying 3,334 lieutenants and almost as many majors, 3,258; there is only a difference of 76 between these two categories. I wonder what the explanation would be for so many majors. In fact, back around September, 1968 there were a few more majors than there were lieutenants on pay.

Dr. Arnell: Well major is a rank that many pilots achieve automatically because of outside competition. The rank structure on the flying side was, in fact, increased by adding majors a while back to meet really straight competition. The other part of it is, as Mr. Harkness noted earlier, that the time spent as a lieutenant has become, in many cases, sort of the training period of a man's life. By the time he is fully trained as an officer he is practically ready to be promoted to captain.

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So in many areas the captain is the first serving rank. It tends to be a case of grouping captain and lieutenant as either one filling most of the operational vacancies, in the same way that the corporal-private tends to get grouped together. I think when you have a chance to study the pay rates you will find that the corresponding salaries are quite comparable to civilian salaries. One, in fact, finds essentially the same thing on the public service side. In some categories there is no use being made at all of the first two officer posi-

tions. And I think that in the public service there is a rank structure very similar to what is being discussed on the military side tonight.

Mr. Ryan: I take it that this follows when you have a professional permanent force such as we have, this situation that you have just described. And it is true for other countries as well, with their armed forces.

Dr. Arnell: And when you have to compete in a fairly sophisticated environment in civil life.

Mr. Ryan: I have another question in mind in respect to your statement that there are 500 doctors and I believe you said 150 dentists in the armed forces. I was wondering what pay doctors and dentists start at? What is their rank to begin with? What can they attain? And why is it that we need 500 when the force is under 100,000? That is one doctor for less than 200 personnel, though it may include the families of many of the personnel.

Dr. Arnell: All the families overseas come under the doctors who are with the Brigade and I Air Division, and also in outlying posts.

Mr. Ryan: Would you be able to give us the figure, the ratio of doctors per persons served?

Dr. Arnell: First of all, to answer your question on pay, this is in the pay tables that we were going to have added to the Minutes. We were going to give you the whole cross section. I think we could probably produce a table showing the distribution of medical positions and those that are filled across the whole organization, in bases and hospitals and so on.

The Chairman: I think that would be useful. We should know how many are in Canada, for example, because it is a little difficult to see why we need doctors on staff in Toronto or in Ottawa. It might be cheaper to use civilian doctors rather than military doctors, or it might not be. I do not know.

Mr. Ryan: We would need them on board ship, for instance, one or two, or three.

The Chairman: And at isolated posts. Did you have any further questions, Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: No. If we can get that information, I will be very pleased.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman. I was most interested in one word that was used by the Doctor a few moments ago. It is the first time it has come up, and is very important. It is the question of morale, which is a most important matter in the armed services. The Doctor happened to mention what would happen to the morale if all ranks were frozen. I have a great many friends in the armed forces, and on speaking to them I find that one of the reasons why they are contemplating resigning from the armed forces is because of what they say is the lack of any possibility of promotion. One reason perhaps is that some are held in the higher echelon beyond the normal period of retirement. Not being personal at all, but for example our one general who is now two years beyond the

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usual retirement age.

I do not want to see any drop in experience, but I personally know of lieutenants who over a year ago passed their captaincy. I know many captains who over a year ago passed their exams for majority. So if people went out, you would still have the experience, but with the younger people coming up.

You brought morale into the question. Now I know you are going to lose many officers this year who passed for higher ranks a long time ago, and just the way things are going now in the higher echelon they cannot see any possibility of promotion. Would you perhaps make a comment? I think this morale is a most important question in the armed forces.

Dr. Arnell: I do not know just how to answer your comment Mr. Winch, because I would need to know if you are speaking of a man with a specialty which is limited in its prospects in relation to another one, or whether you are speaking of opportunities in general.

Mr. Winch: No, I am not. As I say, a number of officers across Canada have told me that they are going to get out. There are two reasons. First, they cannot see the possibility of promotion; and second, they are tripping over each other now, not knowing what to do. They are just tripping over each other. And that is affecting morale.

Mr. Penner: I hope some of those who want to get out are doctors and dentists. We have a tremendous need in my area of the country for a few of those. Are there any, do you know, Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: No.

The Chairman: I do not know whether Dr. Arnell has any comment or not.

Dr. Arnell: Rather than try to answer it myself I might ask the personnel man who is here if he would like to add anything specifically to this.

General Truemner, who is from the personnel side, might comment on this, particularly on Mr. Winch's question of lieutenants who feel that they have no future to get promoted to captains.

Brig. Gen. G. R. Truemner (Director General of Personnel, Plans and Requirements, Department of National Defence): I cannot add much to what you have said except to say that it seems to me the mood of the meeting is to reduce the rank structure, and of course this is one of the things that would make the condition that you allege even worse.

Mr. Winch: No, because I am talking on your basis of the upper echelon going out and bringing up the others. But also I am very glad that you are where you are at the moment. As a personnel man, has hit been drawn to your attention that many officers are getting low in morale because they say there are so many officers that they are tripping over each other?

Brig Gen. Truemner: Sir, I have been in the service for 29 years and I have heard that for 29 years.

Mr. Winch: Has it increased in tempo this last two or three years?

Brig. Gen. Truemner: I do not think so.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, did you have a question to direct to the General?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): First of all, concerning what Mr. Winch has said, I would like to compliment the young man for reaching the rank of general. I think it shows certainly his efficiency to have reached that status.

My question pertains to personnel. If you cannot answer it tonight, we can deal with it another time. If an immigrant comes to this country, we will say for example from

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France, and joins the army and intimates to you that he wants to make a career of it, do you waive the waiting period that is usually

called for, I think it is five years, to make it possible for him to be able to get up in the ranks of the army?

Brig. Gen. Truemner: No, sir. The requirement now to join the Canadian Armed Forces is that you be a Canadian citizen, and that takes five years. Therefore, the answer is "no" sir. We have provisions within the regulations to make exceptions if a trade or a skill that we have no other way of getting is involved, and if the security of the country in accepting the man is not at stake.

An hon. Member: I have a supplementary on this.

The Chairman: There are three supplementaries. Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: There is a case where a new immigrant who has been in the Canadian army for approximately two years, he enlisted immediately upon obtaining his landed immigrant status and obtained his citizenship immediately.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: You are talking about a special case and I would want to look up the details of it before enlarging on it. There is an avenue for waiving this under a certain age and in certain cases, as I said, at the pleasure of the Chief of the Defence Staff; and the Regulations are so written.

Mr. Legault: I think we should be able to provide you with the information that you request.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): This is the only question I wanted to ask the General and I told him if he could not answer it today he could answer it later on. We had a specific case in mind and that is why I mentioned it.

The Chairman: There are three supplementaries. Mr. Legault, have you finished your supplementary?

Mr. Legault: Yes.

The Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme did you have a supplementary on this?

Mr. Prud'homme: No, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand, you may proceed.

Mr. Allmand: Along this same line, once you have Canadian citizens and are advancing them and giving them promotions, do you differentiate at all as to whether they are native born or non-native born but naturalized? I have had complaints made to me that servicemen were not given special jobs and special promotions because,—although they were Canadian citizens, they were naturalized Canadian citizens.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: The answer clearly is "no". If you look carefully at the spelling of my name I think that would be a satisfactory answer.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, the time being what it is, may I ask whether at our meeting tomorrow night we go on to External Affairs estimates or do you intend to follow through and complete defence estimates.

The Chairman: Tomorrow night we will be in Room 308, West Block at 8 p.m. and we will be on External Affairs estimates. A week tomorrow we will be on the CIDA estimates. It is quite apparent we cannot finish the defence estimates this evening and we probably will not be able to get back to them until sometime next week. I will try to arrange an appropriate time.

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Mr. Prud'homme: Could we not complete the questioning tonight?

Mr. Winch: A number of questions still have to be asked on equipment, maintenance and so on.

The Chairman: It is quite apparent that we are not going to be able to finish Vote 15 tonight Mr. Prud'homme. I am quite prepared to continue if members wish to, but it is after 10 o'clock. We have had a long session since 3.30 this afternoon. Perhaps I should now thank Dr. Arnell and his staff, and say that we will be seeing them again before too long, if not this week.

APPENDIX VV

POTENTIAL CASUALTIES

The estimation of casualties which might occur from an attack depend upon a great many variable factors and it is, therefore, desirable to postulate these before making casualty predictions. In a study which was carried out by Canada EMO recently, there was a requirement for potential casualty figures, resulting from an attack which represented neither the heaviest possible attack nor the lightest, but was nevertheless, a completely plausible one.

Of the various attack studies available, that which suited the above purpose best was taken from a study prepared by the Defence Research Board. This attack had 300 aim points in North America, including Canada, and represented a likely attack upon which planning could be based up to and including 1975. A synopsis of this attack is set out below:

*Details of Plausible Attack for 1975
Population Distribution—Day*

Population distribution in cities has been based on a day-time distribution.

Warning

Assumptions regarding warning are as follows:

- (a) Warning of the actual attack is insufficient to allow protective measures to be taken against direct effects.
- (b) Population outside the area of direct effects will be aware that the attack has occurred in sufficient time to utilize available shelter against fallout radiation.

Protection

Under the assumptions made regarding warning, the only protection utilized will be fallout shelter. The level of protection assumed is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. If no warning was assumed, the natural distribution of population between indoors and

indoors might be such as to provide an average protection factor of around 3. With warning, but no detailed knowledge of effects and protection measures, it may still be expected that a considerable fraction of the population will use basements for protection, at least part of the time, and that there will be few outdoors. It is assumed that this will increase the average protection factor to 6, and this figure has been used.

Single Attack Pattern

In order to provide a definite reference base as standard, a single attack pattern has been assumed. The number of targets (300) chosen is considered a likely one taking into consideration the magnitude of the Soviet Threat in 1975, the probable effectiveness of active defences and the level of damage the attacker may wish to achieve. The total number may be varied considerably without appreciably affecting the number of Canadian targets attacked.

Weight of Attack

300 Aim Point Attack for North America including Canada;

3 cities, 50 MT each; 8 cities, 10 MT each; 3 cities, 2 MT each; 3 cities, (US-Canada 102 MT Total): 17 cities, 236 MT in all (plus part of 102 MT Total)

Ground Bursts

All bursts in Canada have been assumed to be ground bursts. This maximizes fallout effects, and with the yields assumed in relation to city size, involves only a minor decrease in direct casualties.

Accuracy

For the purpose of the calculations in this study, it has been assumed that all aim points are hit.

Casualties

Casualties (Millions)					
Classification	Direct		Fallout	Total	Casualties
	Urban	Rural	Mainly Rural	Urban & Rural	Percentage of Total Population
Killed	8.0	0.333	0.500	8.53	38.8
Seriously Injured	0.4	0.036	0.356	0.79	3.6
Lightly Injured	0.10	0.026	0.642	0.77	3.5
Uninjured Surviving	4.5	7.41		11.91	54.1
TOTALS	13.00	9.00		22.00	100.0

Radiation Recovery

The radiation casualties have been estimated on the basis of an acute dosage and do not, therefore, take into account any radiation recovery.

Summer-Winter Variation

Differences between winter and summer conditions have been ignored. Casualties quoted are the initial distribution following the burst and are not modified according to mortality in the days following. In these circumstances, allowance for the difference in survivability in winter and summer can be avoided.

Population Growth

Allowance for population growth to 1975 has been made on a fairly conservative basis. The growth has been limited to urban population and is accompanied by some decrease in the rural population. Projected totals are:

Weather Variation

No allowance has been made for weather degradation of nuclear effects. The assumption of ground bursts minimizes errors due to this omission.

Urban	13 millions
Rural	9 millions
TOTAL:	22 millions

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Government
Publication

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

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JUN 11 1969
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 38

TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 1969

Respecting
Estimates, 1969-70, Department of External Affairs.

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,	Groos,	Marceau,
Anderson,	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>),	Nesbitt,
Barrett,	Harkness,	Nowlan,
Brewin,	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner,
¹ Buchanan,	<i>Boundary</i>),	Prud'homme,
Cafik,	Laniel,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
Carter,	Laprise,	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>),
Fairweather,	Legault,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
Forrestall,	Lewis,	Winch—(30).
Gibson,	MacLean,	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,

Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹ Mr. Buchanan replaced Mr. Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*) on April 22, 1969.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

TUESDAY, April 22, 1969.

(58)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:15 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Marceau, Penner, Ryan, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (21).

Also present: Mr. Roberts, M.P.

Witnesses: From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. T. H. Bennett, Director General Finance and Administration; Mr. G. G. Riddell, Head, African and Middle Eastern Division.

The Chairman called Item 1 *Administration, Operation and Maintenance, etc.* \$49,133,800 of the Estimates, 1969-70, Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman introduced Mr. M. Cadieux, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Cadieux answered questions under Item 1, assisted by Mr. Bennett.

The Chairman called Item 10 *Construction etc.* \$7,000,000 and Item 15 *Grants, etc.* \$18,957,800. Members questioned Mr. Cadieux under all three of the Items as called. Mr. Cadieux was assisted by Mr. Bennett and Mr. Riddell.

The Division bells rang at approximately 9:10 p.m., to summon Members for votes in the House.

With the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned at 9:15 p.m., until Tuesday, April 29, 1969, at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, April 22, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe we are ready to start.

This evening we have before us estimates of the Department of External Affairs. To give you some idea of the timing, the estimates are rather short, as you will notice, and we hope we will be able to dispose of them this evening. However, if this proves to be impossible, we can always schedule another hearing.

I should point out to you that the items dealing with CIDA, or the aid agency, will not be dealt with tonight. We have another meeting scheduled next Tuesday to deal with Votes 30, 35 and L35. So basically tonight we will be dealing with Votes 1, 10 and 15 of the Department of External Affairs. Vote 40 relates to the International Joint Commission. We do not have anyone here this evening who could deal specifically with that Vote. If you have any questions, we will have to postpone passing that Vote until our next meeting. If you have questions with regard to the foreign policy aspects of it, then it could be answered

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by Mr. Cadieux or others present.

Accordingly I will now call Vote 1.

Department of External Affairs

- 1 Administration, Operation and Maintenance, including the payment of remuneration subject to the approval of the Governor in Council in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses; authority for the appointment and notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act the fixing of salaries by the Governor in Council of High Commissioners, Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Consuls, Commissioners (International

Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries, and staff of such officials; and assistance in repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; cultural relations and academic exchange programs with other countries—\$49,133,800

We have in attendance tonight the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Marcel Cadieux. He appeared before our Committee last December and I am sure he needs no further introduction. Do you have an introductory statement to make, Mr. Cadieux?

Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Q.C. (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs): No, I do not.

The Chairman: Mr. Cadieux is now available to answer any questions which any member may have with regard to the estimates.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, before we start questioning, could I ask whether or not the Minister will be made available to us at all this year in connection with the estimates?

The Chairman: We had not intended to ask him to appear for the estimates. As you know, we have a general policy reference and he certainly will be available when we get on to policy questions. If any policy questions do come up which require the Minister's attendance, we could simply stand the item involved until the Minister does appear. We did not anticipate, though, that there would be any lengthy questioning with regard to basic questions of policy. These would be deferred until our general policy review. Mr. Laniel.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Cadieux, I have a few questions. In the definition of Vote 1, you talk about:

the authorization to make recoverable loans not exceeding the overall sum of the parts of those costs payable by these organizations.

Is there a provision in the overall amount of the Estimates, for \$75 million for this year, and is there a reserve or do these recoverable amounts come back to you during the year, or even those of the preceding years? Because I see on page 8 of the new Estimates, that you deduct a recoverable amount of \$99,000. Does this amount have a bearing on amounts recoverable in past years or current years?

Mr. Cadieux: I think I'll ask my colleague, who is an expert on financial questions, to answer.

[English]

Mr. T. H. Bennett (Director General, Finance and Administration Branch, Department of External Affairs): The amounts shown as recoverable in the pamphlet on page 8 are amounts that are estimated to be recoverable in the year that is shown.

Mr. Laniel: From previous advances?

Mr. Bennett: No.

Mr. Laniel: From the current year.

Mr. Bennett: That is right. There are amounts that we recover from other departments for expenditures we incur on their behalf.

Mr. Laniel: And they are included in the different items of the estimates, not identified as such necessarily?

Mr. Bennett: That is right.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): May I ask a supplementary question? Could you give us an indication, sir, of where this money which is recoverable comes from? Could you give us an example of what it is and how you recover it?

Mr. Bennett: For example, when there is an item in the estimates for payments in aid of distressed Canadians, these payments are advanced by the Department to Canadians who become distressed in foreign countries through no fault of their own. They are, in effect, loans, and as such they are recoverable from individuals by the Department. In addition, there are amounts which we pay on behalf of other government departments which we recover from them. For instance in our chanceries where we rent the chancery property, the gross amount of the rent is distributed on a square foot basis among other departments who occupy the chancery and we recover at a rate from them.

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Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Laniel: My second question, Mr. Cadieux. For Vote 1, there is a difference of \$5 million in the increase of the vote for general services of the Department. This is almost 8 per cent in comparison to last year, and perhaps twice as much as the difference with the year 1967-1968. Is this increase due mainly to salary increases?

Mr. Cadieux: There is an increase in salaries, but also in general overhead costs. Rental costs abroad have increased, and communication with missions abroad, travelling expenses and slight increases in staff may contribute to the increase of expenditures. I believe it is this sort of items that have contributed to this.

Then we have contributions to organizations, but this is not taken into account. I think it is mostly salaries, allowances, and operating costs: rent, and so forth.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, because as far as embassies are concerned, I notice that all those costs are grouped under Vote 10.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, indeed.

Mr. Laniel: These would be rents in Ottawa?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes . . .

Mr. Laniel: . . . but not necessarily in connection with foreign missions?

Mr. Cadieux: It's mostly salaries and maintenance costs such as electricity, and so forth.

Mr. Laniel: On page 8 you talk about cultural relation and university exchange programs with other countries.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: And on page 89 of the previous Estimates, we see that a figure of \$1,910,000 is mentioned.

Could you explain how this amount of \$1,910,000 is spent? Page 89 of the previous estimates. There are no details, although—

Mr. Cadieux: Yes . . .

Mr. Laniel: . . . the new presentation gives us no idea what this means.

Mr. Cadieux: Well, in the first place, you have academic exchanges scholarships to Belgium, France, Switzerland. And, for these three countries, this is a total of \$750,000.

In addition, there are cultural activities such as tours by Les Grands Ballets Canadiens, by the Canadian Opera Company which is going to perform the opera *Louis Riel*; the Théâtre du Nouveau Monde which is also going to participate in the Festival du Marais, and then, there is also an exhibition of Canadian Eskimo Art that was opened recently in Paris. This gives you an idea of the type of cultural activities concerned.

Then, there are cultural activities with other countries, such as England, for instance. There are also academic exchanges similar to those with the French-speaking countries I just mentioned, with Germany, scholarships, Italy, The Netherlands, and activities...

Mr. Laniel: I'm not asking you for a detailed enumeration.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: The reason why I put this question, is because I have tried to establish a relationship between this amount and an amount of \$250,000 listed this year under the Department of National Defence Estimates, that was provided last year for the setting up of five university professorships, and I was wondering whether the Department of External Affairs has something similar?

Mr. Cadieux: No. We have no similar amount in connection with the direct creation of professorships. What we are considering is establishing closer relations with the university world in Canada, for the purpose of the Department's activities. And, this would be somewhat similar to the activities you mentioned, as we are considering the appointment of certain officers from the Department to take courses in the universities. At the outset we might have at least 2 or 3 who would go to some universities to participate in university activities.

Mr. Laniel: Do you use university people to carry out studies for your Department?

Mr. Cadieux: We invite university people to come and train with us, and one of them, for instance works in the Historical Section for the publication of certain documents. And, during the summer, we have a number of young students who come for a certain period to become familiar with the work of

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the Department. There are about a dozen students who have been working for us for a number of years and who are recruited by the Public Service to do this work.

Mr. Laniel: Are you able to recruit several of these students later on?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. If they sit for the exam, and it depends on how they manage in their exams.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but they are graduates, aren't they?

Mr. Cadieux: They usually are in their last year of university or they are doing post-graduate work.

Now, the Department also contributes \$50,000 per year to the *Association des universités de langue française*. This is part of our budget; these are universities throughout the world.

Mr. Laniel: Is the amount shown in vote 10, on page 11, for the purchase of a cultural centre in Paris in line with an exchange policy, or is this for Canadians in Europe?

Mr. Cadieux: This is for Canadians living in Paris. The policy has yet to be drawn up, but a building has been bought by the Canadian government. This building is being renovated and will be used by both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians. The exact formula still remains to be drawn up by the government.

Mr. Laniel: One last question, Mr. Chairman. I am changing the subject somewhat. Do you have, in your Estimates, an approximate amount for setting up a diplomatic mission or embassy in Peking?

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Laniel: This would be an additional vote?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, we have taken into account that we might have a diplomatic mission in Peking, but only for the purpose of planning. But, for the time being, we don't have anything specified in the Estimates.

Mr. Laniel: Real estate or other?

Mr. Cadieux: No. Because as long as the agreement has not been signed we do not know what the importance of the mission

would be, and, we don't know how much it would cost. We do not know exactly.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question on Vote 15 but I had better wait.

The Chairman: Yes, we will take that up when we come to Vote 15. Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, my first question relates to the item "New Missions" on page 8. I wonder if we might be told what new missions are contemplated this year that would be allowed for in the proposed estimates 1969-70?

Mr. Cadieux: We are hoping that it will be possible in the course of this year to open additional missions in Francophone countries. Just which countries has not been determined yet. This is a matter for government consideration and the matter is before the government now. There is my difficulty in answering.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is China included in that figure?

Mr. Cadieux: China? No. There is no provision for China in this budget.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Then this figure of \$715,000 is an estimate?

Mr. Cadieux: It is an estimate. Usually missions cost about \$300,000 each I think. Therefore, you have here an estimate that we would need for about three missions.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Might we also be informed of missions that have actually been opened in this current 1968-69 year?

Mr. Cadieux: There have been no others.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): None opened at all during this year?

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Allmand: May I ask a supplementary on that?

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand, on a supplementary.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Cadieux, I notice that last year there was no item for "new missions" and this year you have an item of \$715,000 but you have no specific plans for the missions.

Mr. Cadieux: The plans are before the government.

Mr. Allmand: I see. But you do not know what countries they have in mind?

Mr. Cadieux: I know but I am not at liberty to say. This is going to be determined by the government and it is not up to me, an official, to state this.

Mr. Allmand: I see. But they have particular places in mind.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, I am sure that they have some proposals but there are alternatives. There are various considerations that enter into it and until they have made their decision it is not possible for me to say.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, in respect of the various expenditures for the different missions abroad, there are some that have decreased. Others show a very substantial increase. For example, France has gone

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up a quarter of a million dollars approximately. There is also an increase of \$152,000 in capital expenditure under Ghana—\$237,000 versus \$85,000. I wonder if we might have a brief report on these major increases without asking specific questions on each one that we might dig out? Is that too difficult?

Mr. Cadieux: I think without doing research in the particular case of France and if I may answer generally, this could increase according to the general cost in France. If the index goes up there because the cost of living has gone up, then your general cost as far as France is concerned would have to be increased. This would be the first factor. The second factor that you would have to take into account would be any increase in the number of staff which would be reflected immediately in the estimates. These are the two major ones, I think, that occur to me, the cost of living locally plus the staff.

Mr. Forrestall: May I ask a supplementary? The items that Mr. Thompson referred to are capital items and perhaps, for example, we might look at the one for India which has gone from \$671,000 to \$1,049,000. It was this type of item, not the operational cost, to which, I believe, Mr. Thompson was referring.

Mr. Cadieux: In India we have had the site for a number of years and now, I think, we have started to develop it by building accommodation for the staff and for offices.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Does this represent a complete new building? • 2035

Mr. Cadieux: This is the beginning. I think there are various stages that are foreseen and the expenditure shown there for India is for that purpose.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Does this also apply to, say, Ghana?

Mr. Cadieux: In the case of Ghana, certainly.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Could we have some idea of where we are erecting new buildings? We have just completed a new establishment in Bonn.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, in the case of Ghana, for instance, the plans for this year call for an expenditure of \$200,000 with the total cost of the project for the chancery being \$400,000. That is in Ghana. In the case of Canberra we are anticipating an expenditure this year of about \$200,000 out of a total cost of \$270,000 for a residence. The same thing applies for a residence in Dakar where we expect to spend about \$100,000 this year out of a total cost of about \$265,000. At Islamabad there is a program for developing something a little more ambitious. This year the foreseeable expenditure is \$700,000 for a project the total cost of which eventually will be \$2 million. This involves the building of a chancery, a residence, and staff quarters. In New Delhi, as we mentioned a minute ago, this year there is an estimated expenditure of \$1 million on a total project of \$2.75 million. This will involve the building of a chancery and includes the site development. In Warsaw there is an expenditure of \$220,000 for this year out of a total of \$650,000 for the construction of a chancery. There are several other projects of various kinds in a number of other countries totalling \$300,000 and the estimated total capital expenditure for construction this year is \$2.7 million.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have another question that relates to capital costs under the item OECD. I notice that the capital costs remain fairly constant in the main item and yet under OECD in France we find an operational expense, again, of some \$64,000.

Mr. Cadieux: On what page is that?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It is on pages 88 and 91 of the main estimates—page 88 for the

operational item under A, and page 91 a difference of some \$64,000 in this year's estimates.

Mr. Bennett: If I might explain, sir, the items shown on page 88 are the costs of Canadians seconded to the organization. We pay their salaries and we recover from the organization, as such. They would be on the staff of the organization. The items shown on page 91 are the operational costs of our delegation to the OECD. These are Canadians employed by the Department.

Mr. Forrestall: Are we paying them twice?

Mr. Bennett: No, they are different people. They are quite different people. The increase in the cost for OECD from \$190,000 to \$254,000 as shown on page 9, is a reflection of the increased cost of salaries and allowances that have been awarded by the Board.

Mr. Forrestall: This does not necessarily reflect an increase in staff.

Mr. Bennett: No, sir.

Mr. Forrestall: I wish they would give us raises like that.

Mr. Bennett: On the lefthand side of page 91 you will find a reduction in the numbers at OECD.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have just one more question. Now that our foreign service officers are being unionized and collective bargaining is being extended to these professional people, how does the Department contemplate this as it might relate to salary levels?

Mr. Cadieux: We have to adjust to the conclusions of the negotiations. Treasury Board has partaken in the negotiations which resulted in a contract covering a certain period. In this case it covers the period up to the fall of next year, 1970, so that some estimate will have to be made of what the costs and the increases are likely to be. Certainly the results of the last negotiations have been very satisfying as far as we can judge from the point of view of the officers in the Department and we expect that the impact on morale will be very good. The officers feel that the negotiations have been worthwhile and have resulted in an agreement that, as far as they are concerned, is satisfactory. I saw the Chairman and the Co-Chairman of

the Association after that meeting and they are naturally now giving thought to the other types of problems that they will raise in the course of the next round, but as far as they are concerned they feel that this has been a successful experience. They look back at the negotiations and the creation of the Association as something that has been indicated in their opinion.

The Chairman: I have called Vote 1. Some of the questions have related to Vote 1 and some to Vote 10. This indicates, perhaps, that it might be convenient to deal with both these votes at the same time and, indeed, we could deal with all three at the same time if this were the most convenient way of doing it.

Mr. Allmand: On a point of order. Since some of us only have this booklet and the votes are not divided up perhaps it would be better. There is only one vote in these books and it is hard to tell under what vote they come in your book.

The Chairman: Presumably Votes 1, 10 and 15 are all under the single vote.

Mr. Allmand: They are, but when asking questions we do not know under what vote they would come.

The Chairman: Under those circumstances would it be agreeable if I called all three votes? Questions then can be directed to any of these three votes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have one short question that would be on another section if we are going to do that.

The Chairman: Could I just call the three votes and then we will proceed with you, Mr. Thompson. I will call Votes 10 and 15.

Department of External Affairs

10 Construction, acquisition or improvement of buildings, Works, Land, Equipment and Furnishings \$7,000,000

15 Grants as detailed in the Estimates and contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the sub-vote titles listed in the details of the Estimates, including authority to pay assessments in the amounts and in the currencies in which they are levied, and authority to pay other amounts specified in the currencies of the countries indicated, notwithstanding that

the total of such payments may exceed the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1969, which is \$18,957,800

(S) Payments under the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act and Pensions \$50,000

(S) Credits to the Government of India under a financial agreement entered into between the Government of Canada and the Government of India to finance the purchase in Canada of aircraft and associated spare parts and equipment—not required for 1969-70

We will deal with questions on all three votes at the same time. These three constitute Vote No. 1 in the new form of estimates, do they not, Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Yes they all are under Vote 1.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My question relates to the United Nations, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cadieux, we have been aware during the last few days that a number of the major countries including the United States, the United Kingdom and, I believe, Russia as well, have been calling for a holdfast on all expenditures at the U.N. with the exception of the percentage increase which has been agreed upon which, I think, is 3 per cent or something like that. I notice that our expenditure in the proposed estimates is up nearly 10

• 2040

per cent when compared with last year's. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. Bennett: The provision we make in the estimates is based on an estimate of the ultimate size of the UN budget allocated according to our scale of contributions—the scale that is set by the UN itself for the contribution that will be made by Canada. It is necessarily made long in advance of the final decisions by the UN on the size of the budget. Therefore, it is subject to change when the final budget is set by the United Nations. This accounts for the special wording in the vote which allows us to pay the actual amount when it is paid, and these funds are not available to us for any other purpose. In other words, if the United Nations budget is set at a lower or higher level, we pay the precise amount according to our scale of assessment. This was our best estimate at the time it was made.

Mr. Cadieux: This is the view of the larger powers on the desirable ceiling of the United Nations budget. This is bound to be discussed in the course of the next General Assembly in the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Financial) where the views of many other countries will be brought to bear on this.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Really what they are talking about now is 1970-71?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, but as you will see, this will be a highly political question and the Canadian government will have to make a decision in relation to the vote there and the views it holds on the importance of the United Nations and the kind of line it wants to take in relation to what these big powers take and what other middle size countries, like Canada, or smaller countries, may want to take. How this will develop, I think, will be a factor that no doubt the Canadian government will take into account when making its decision.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Thank you.

Mr. Cadieux: If the three powers say, "This is the figure"; that is not binding on Canada and how the other countries take it, I think, very much remains to be seen.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, on page 12 of the new form Estimates under "Contributions" there is an item of \$500,000 for "Defence support assistance to Greece and Turkey", which is an increase from \$100,000 to \$500,000. What is that for; how much is divided between Greece and Turkey and why was it increased by that amount?

Mr. Cadieux: This is a forecast expenditure for the telecommunications link that I mentioned, I think, the last time I appeared before the Committee in December.

Mr. Allmand: For telecommunications?

Mr. Cadieux: A telecommunications link unless I am wrong. This was discussed, but I do not think there has been approval yet. It is still under consideration between the Canadian government and the governments of Greece and Turkey. There has been no decision yet on this; so unless there is an agreement, this sum may not be expended. It is there in case it is needed and in case there is an agreement. If it is spent, it is very likely going to be spent for that purpose.

Mr. Allmand: It has just been brought to my attention that in the Blue Book the figures

are different from those in the white book. In the Blue Book the figure for 1968-69 is \$1 million and 1969-70 is \$500,000; whereas, in the white book, the new form, it is \$100,000 for 1968-69 and \$500,000 for 1969-70. Which is correct?

Mr. Bennett: May I draw your attention to the fact that the heading in the white book is "Forecast Expenditure" in the past fiscal year. We have forecast that we would actually spend approximately \$100,000 on this project.

• 2045

Mr. Allmand: Yes.

Mr. Bennett: At the time the Blue Book was prepared, which was an estimate for 1968-69, provision was made for expenditure of \$1 million that, in effect, was not spent.

Mr. Allmand: Was spent?

Mr. Bennett: Was not.

Mr. Allmand: Was not.

Mr. Bennett: We actually expect to spend \$100,000 of the million that was provided in 1968-69.

Mr. Allmand: All right, very good. My next question relates to the item for the grant to the John F. Kennedy Centre for the Performing Arts. Is that a capital grant or is it a grant towards some particular function that took place there? There is an item of \$61,000.

Mr. Cadieux: It is a gift; I think it is a piece of equipment.

Mr. Allmand: A piece of equipment.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: The last question I have relates to the item for "Information", which I see has increased from \$580,000 last year to \$1,552,000. Is this due to an expanded information program or is it due to merely increased costs on the same program?

Mr. Bennett: If I may answer that, sir, in the recent Re-Organization Bill that was, I believe, approved by the House, responsibility for the Canadian Government Exhibition Commission, which was previously carried in the Estimates of the Department of Public Works, was shifted to the user departments, if I can describe them that way. We have now been asked to make provision for the cost of the exhibits that will be prepared by the

Canadian Government Exhibition Commission on our behalf. This has added approximately \$800,000 to our information program which was previously carried in the estimates of the Department of Public Works for the Exhibition Commission. We now pay the Exhibition Commission for the work they do for us, previously we did not.

Mr. Allmand: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, could you read out the names that you have?

The Chairman: I have your name and I have Mr. Laniel, Mr. Forrestall and Mr. Roberts. I was calling on one from each party to start with. I am calling Mr. Brewin now.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I wondered if we could have an explanation of the item which is right next door to the item discussed by Mr. Allmand on page 12 of the white paper: "Defence support assistance to cover direct expenditures on behalf of countries not members of NATO...\$3,700,000", compared with a figure of \$3,100,000. I wonder if we could have an explanation of those items? Why the increase? My understanding was that at least one country, I think it was Uganda, had indicated they were not going to seek Canadian defence assistance. I take it this is a contribution to the defence forces of certain countries and I wonder if we could have an explanation of those items?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, this covers a number of programs. I think the country you have in mind, Mr. Brewin, is Tanzania.

Mr. Brewin: Tanzania.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, but I think they announced that after these Estimates were printed. The various programs covered are the Ghanaian program at \$228,000 and the estimate for the Tanzanian program was for \$3.2 million, but as I say, this was budgeted before they announced their decision.

Mr. Brewin: Three million dollars?

Mr. Cadieux: It was \$3.2 million for 1969-70.

Mr. Brewin: If they do not want the money, then we can save \$3.2 million?

Mr. Cadieux: The total estimate for the year was \$3.7 million for the military assis-

tance program. There is an *ad hoc* program that covers a number of countries: Jamaica, Kenya, Zambia and Malaysia. I think that these four countries receive *in toto* not more than \$300,000.

Mr. Brewin: What was the reason for Tanzania declining our support for their defence policy. I understand at one time we were competing with the Chinese to supply them with defence assistance; is that still the case?

• 2050

Mr. Cadieux: I prefer that you ask that question of my Minister because I think we get into a consideration of the motives of other governments and the reaction of the Canadian government.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, could I ask a supplementary. It is on another item that comes under this support for defence.

[*Interpretation*]

I also notice an increase under the item "assistance to defence support services granted to Greece and Turkey". It is a fairly important increase of \$100,000 to \$500,000. Is this an individual engagement by Canada or is this part of a general program. Do the NATO countries contribute individually, according to agreements with Greece and Turkey, or is this decided at the NATO ministerial level?

Mr. Cadieux: A few years ago, NATO had recommended that its members give help to Greece and Turkey which had, and still have important military responsibilities. At that time, in keeping with this recommendation, Canada had proposed to Greece and Turkey a form of aid that would consist of liaison in the field of communications. Thus, a project was drawn up and it is expected that it may cost up to \$3 million. But the project has not yet been definitely approved by the Turkish and the Greek governments, and the amounts that are listed in the Estimates are sums that could be spent if the program were approved.

Mr. Laniel: They are directly connected to this communications program?

Mr. Cadieux: That's right.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

[*English*]

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin, had you finished with your line of questioning?

Mr. Brewin: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: I have a supplementary to Mr. Brewin's line of questioning.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand on a supplementary.

Mr. Allmand: I recall reading an article in recent weeks which stated that Tanzania had made a request to the Canadian government for military aircraft. Do you know if that is correct?

Mr. Cadieux: I understand that this program between Canada and Tanzania is going to be terminated in January of 1970. There will be some expenditure this year but the program is not going to be continued. I think the reasons for this and the considerations that enter into it get us into a more sensitive political area, and that is why it is difficult for me to comment. The relationships between the Tanzanian government and other government is again a matter that I think it would be more appropriate for my Minister to comment on.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Cadieux, I have found the clipping I was thinking about. It is a clipping dated April 11, 1969, and it is under the by-line of Mr. Patrick Best. It reads:

Tanzania is awaiting a firm reply from the Canadian government to a request for jet aircraft to help the young nation to defend its borders against incursions from Portuguese Mozambique.

Do you know about this request for military aircraft?

Mr. Cadieux: All I can say is that the present position is the decision of the Tanzanian government to terminate this five-year program. It is coming to an end in 1970 in any case, and it will not be extended. So, if there is any question of military aircraft, I do not think, unless there is a new request—

Mr. Allmand: It would appear to be a new one. This is dated April 11.

Mr. Cadieux: I am not aware of this. The latest information I have is a decision of the Tanzanian government not to extend the five-year program. It was commenced in August of 1965 for a period of five years, and it was to consist of an army component and an air wing component. Some people were going to be trained here and a school was going to be built in Tanzania, but this—

Mr. Allmand: Excuse me. This clipping goes on to say, and it may be completely false:

A top level exchange has taken place between the two governments on this question and the matter is now believed to be before Canadian External Affairs Minister Sharp.

This refers to the request for additional military aircraft.

Mr. Cadieux: I can only say that if there is a new request I am not aware of it.

● 2055

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cadieux, someone mentioned a while ago the gift to the John F. Kennedy Arts Centre. I would like to have more information about this. Is it a gift or...

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, if I understand correctly, the Canadian Government has decided to make a gift to the John F. Kennedy Centre.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Is there any special reason? Is it as a memorial on the part of Canada? Are there any maple leaves on it, or what?

Mr. Cadieux: I think quite a few countries have made contributions. I think I have a note about what different countries have given. On the other hand, we also have a National Arts Centre here, and I believe that other countries have offered contributions to Canada. It is an exchange of friendly services between countries. It is a sort of international compensation, if you wish.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): When you make gifts to an arts centre, do you first consult the Secretary of State?

[English]

Mr. Bennett: Yes, sir. The gift is in the form of a curtain for the stage. There was close cooperation with the National Arts Centre and I understand the design for the curtain came about as a result of a competition between Canadian artists. I am not absolutely certain of this. The curtain is being made for the Centre as a memorial.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Cadieux: The countries that have made gifts to the Centre are Denmark, West Ger-

many, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Italy in addition to Canada.

As far as the procedure that was followed in the choice of the Canadian gift, I unfortunately do not have that information here. I cannot tell you how one proceeds.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): By the way, it is interesting to note that the curtain cost \$61,000, since ours here in Ottawa, will be costing \$93,000.

You mentioned a while ago the scholarships that are included in the amount of approximately \$2 million.

Mr. Cadieux: For cultural relations.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): You have mentioned scholarships given to Belgium and to other countries. Are these scholarships given to students of these countries, to Belgium, for instance?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Not to Canadians who are in those countries...

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): ...but to Belgians.

Mr. Cadieux: To Belgians, Frenchmen, Swiss. But it must be kept in mind that the governments of these countries often offer scholarships in return to Canadians. I believe that this scholarship system is administered for the Department of External Affairs by the Canada Council.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Do we give more than we receive, or—

Mr. Cadieux: I think what we give and what we receive is about the same.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): There is also another topic I wish to deal with. A little while ago, we gave a special form of aid to Biafra. Would it be under the Canadian International Development Agency, or does that concern us here, this evening?

Mr. Cadieux: I will ask my colleague, Mr. Riddell, who is an expert on Biafra, to answer this question.

• 2100

The Honourable Member asked whether the help we gave to the Red Cross comes under the budget of our Department?

Mr. Riddell (Chief, Central Eastern African Division): No, Mr. Chairman, assistance to Biafra and Nigeria comes under the CIDA.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you. I think I would like to have more information about one certain topic about which there are certain rumours that are not true and which may be detrimental to your external relations. For instance, I have been told that when you expect a surplus of money as far as travelling appropriations are concerned, a few months before the end of the fiscal year, you find means of spending that surplus by sending people around the world. Could you make any comments about this?

Mr. Cadieux: It is certainly not the case.

These trips have to be justified. The agents who carry out these trips have to do so in terms of appropriations earmarked for certain departmental services. Therefore, a service that has already or almost used up its funds, could not carry out another trip of this nature. Before undertaking a costly trip, each service has to ask for authorization from the financial services. In some cases, Senior Officers in the Department exercise a certain amount of control. And the concern of Departmental Officers is similar to that of the various financial administrations and of the government, i.e. to carry out their functions in the most economical way possible. There is no point in having Officers travel just for the pleasure of it. Furthermore, the Departments which would do such a thing would be the first ones to be penalized, because Officers are always limited in number, and when they are absent, those who are left have to do the work with less staff. Therefore, it is not in their interest to let them go, or if they have to let them go, they do so for the shortest possible time.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): It's a good thing to clear this up, because we hear about that in the Public Service.

Mr. Cadieux: Moreover, I think during the last year we did not have enough money available in the appropriations for travelling. And we have had to transfer additional money from other items to cover all our expenses in that field.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Another thing which is perhaps not well understood by MPs in general and by the public at large, is the question of the building of residences and

legations abroad. I have had the opportunity of seeing what the situation is in a number of countries, and I know that it is to our advantage, and that it is even more economical to build these residences. Could you explain that?

Mr. Cadieux: Certainly. I shall tell you about some of the things to be considered in this matter. The advantage of having your own residence is the same as that enjoyed by a private citizen has when he buys a house instead of renting it. When you rent you have to pay rent but after doing so for years and years, you have nothing. Whereas, if you can make the necessary investment, you have your own house and of course you benefit from such a situation, because otherwise you have nothing left after a given number of years.

Another advantage is that if you buy or if you build a house, you have a building that corresponds to your needs, so that you can carry out your work more efficiently. A third advantage of residences and legations built according to your needs, is that you can project an image of Canada abroad. You are promoting Canada. It is not always very easy to give an idea of Canada simply through architecture or the furniture but I can assure you that the architects used by the government try by all means to give the best possible image of Canada through the buildings they construct. This is not something that you can do if you move into an empty building that is large enough to house your services. So, for various reasons, i.e. finances in the first place, then efficiency, and giving a good

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impression of Canada in foreign countries, to the extent that we have means to do so, we have an advantage in having our own buildings. Another thing, when you install people in charge of missions and your staff in temporary quarters, you must keep in mind that in a good many countries it is not always that easy for them to find what suits them and to move from one place to the other. In the end, you must also ask yourself whether it is economical for the government to have a head of mission and his senior officers looking about anxiously every two or three years for other buildings then correspond with Ottawa

to obtain the necessary authorization, have officers' time taken up with this, briefly, spending a good deal of their time moving from one place to another without ever living decently. Moreover, while they are doing that, they cannot pursue the main objectives the government has set for them in the foreign countries. It does not seem very reasonable to me to spend three or four hundred thousand dollars to send a team to a given country and have them looking for buildings and houses every two or three years. It is much better, if we can afford to do so, to have them settled in a good legation, in a good residence. And once that is done, they can concentrate their energy towards achieving the actual goals set for them abroad, and not waste their time on matters that are really of minor importance.

[English]

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I only have one more question which I would like to ask and it has to do with bilingualism within the service. As one of our aims is to project Canada's dual culture abroad, I assume your program of bilingualism is one that will ensure within a reasonable time that all foreign service officers are bilingual. In this correct?

Mr. Cadieux: We are doing the very best we can to pursue this. As a Department we have an interest in doing this, not only because I think it is the wish of the country but there is a professional advantage in doing it. French and English are two of the great international languages, so professionally there is an incentive to do what we can to get our people to learn these two languages.

I have some figures here concerning officers which I think are interesting, but there are other figures as well. These figures relate to people who join the service at the officer level. In 1966 out of 54 new foreign service officers 23 were bilingual, so that is a good start. If half of your officers are already bilingual when they join the task of teaching the other official language is made relatively easier. In 1967, when 57 foreign service officers joined us, 36 were bilingual. In 1968 there were 14 out of 22 who were bilingual. I think there were some tests made a few years ago. Unfortunately the testing technique is perhaps not as perfect as we would like it to be

but, such as it was a few years ago and such as it is today, this is what it reveals. In 1963 a survey showed that the percentage of bilingual officers in our Department was 29 per cent. This test was applied to the people in Ottawa—which is about 58 per cent of the officers, and the reason we only applied it to the people in Ottawa is because it is only in Ottawa that we have the facilities to apply the test—and the present figure is 48 per cent. So, it shows a fairly substantial advance from 1963 to 1969. Perhaps it was not as low as 29 per cent in 1963 and it perhaps may not now be as high as 48 per cent, but I think there has been a good increase. As you can see from the figures relating to those who joined the service and the indications that we have as a result of the test, at the moment it is around 50 per cent so far as officers are concerned.

On top of that, we are really making a very serious effort to first send the young officers to learn the other language and then we deal with the senior officers as soon as we can and as often as we can. We send them on these immersion courses for a year to learn the other language. The difficulty here is the operational requirement. There is a point at which it is not possible to release an officer because the Department or a section thereof would really break down if the officer went away, but compatible with the operational requirements of the Department we are making every effort to release them.

● 2110

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): With regard to these new recruits, they have two years of training in Ottawa?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Do you insist they become bilingual within those two years?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, sir.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): For example, do you say, "You do not go abroad until you are bilingual"?

Mr. Cadieux: The first thing they do is learn the other language. This is the first requirement. Then we train them in the procedures of the Department. We teach them the job and then we prepare them for their

assignment, but first they must learn the other language if they do not know it.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): There is a little criticism that I would like to level, if you do not mind, Mr. Cadieux. It seems to me that the first of our foreign posts that should have bilingual officers are the ones that deal with French-speaking countries and I have noticed that there are some foreign posts where the ambassador, or the other people who visit other French-speaking countries, are not in fact bilingual.

Mr. Cadieux: I know.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Can this not be corrected?

Mr. Cadieux: We are doing our best to correct this.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): In Africa, for example.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. At the moment we do not have enough to go around. This is the difficulty. We are trying to spread them out and as we open new missions it puts a terrific strain on our resources. We do not have enough. We need a type of worker for certain divisions at headquarters who is particularly concerned with la francophonie and liaison with the provinces. These are divisions where a knowledge of the two languages is almost essential. You have to keep those people here and you must deduct the ones who are in the process of learning French and there are also some anglophone posts where you want to assert your principle of bilingualism. Take a country like Australia or the City of London; if you send a good bilingual person to London or to Australia it is not possible to say whether he will speak French very often, but I think it is important for the country to send a young man like Mr. Hardy to a place like London or to send people such as Mr. Charpentier to a place like Australia. They go there and among other things, if they are French Canadian learn a great deal about the Commonwealth and just by being there they advertise the fact that Canada has French Canadians. What does that mean? It means that if you have a post in Tunisia you may have great difficulty in finding a French Canadian for your number two or your num-

ber three. Why? Because he is in London or in Australia. We have these conflicting requirements and that is why the more we have the more we can train and the easier it will be, but it takes a little time to do this.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I am afraid I will have to adjourn this hearing because of the votes. We will have to make arrangements for Mr. Cadieux and his assistants to return at some future date because I do not

think we will be back in time to complete our work this evening. I still have a fair number of questioners and I assume it would take too long. Mr. Cadieux. So, on behalf of the members of the Committee I would like to thank you. I am sorry we have had to break it off, otherwise we could have perhaps finished this evening. We will be in touch with you to arrange another time.


Mr. Cadieux: Fine. Thank you.

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 39

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1969

Respecting

Estimates, 1969-70, Canadian International Development Agency.

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan
and Messrs.

Allmand	Groos	Marceau
Anderson	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Barrett	Harkness	Nowlan
Brewin	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Buchanan	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Cafik	Laniel	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Carter	Laprise	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Fairweather	Legault	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Forrestall	Lewis	Winch—(30)
Gibson	MacLean	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, April 29, 1969
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The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(20).

Witness: Mr. M. F. Strong, President, Canadian International Development Agency.

In attendance: The Honourable Senators Aird (Chairman), Grosart, Laird and Quart, Members of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs; Mrs. Ruth Masika, Uganda, training under the C.I.D.A. program; Mr. Kasem Gulek, Member of the Turkish National Assembly and President, North Atlantic Assembly.

The Chairman welcomed members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and introduced Mrs. Masika and Mr. Gulek.

The Committee resumed its consideration of the Estimates 1969-70 of the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman introduced Mr. M. F. Strong, President of the Canadian International Development Agency. Mr. Strong made a short opening statement introducing his audio-visual presentation on Canadian external aid policies and programmes.

Items 1, 10 and 15 of the Estimates were allowed to stand.

The Chairman called the Items pertaining to the Canadian International Development Agency, namely Item 30, *Salaries and Expenses*, \$5,765,400, Item 35, *Grants etc.*, \$171,404,000 and Item L35, *Special loan assistance etc.*, \$137,000,000.

Members of the Committee questioned Mr. Strong. Mr. Thompson requested a statement of external aid allocations and expenditures for the past ten years and Mr. Nowlan requested a statement showing the relative performance of other D.A.C. countries. The Committee agreed to print this information, to be provided by Mr. Strong, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix WW*)

At 12:55 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
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The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Lewis, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(18).

Witness: Mr. M. F. Strong, President of C.I.D.A.

Mr. Strong introduced the officials of C.I.D.A. who were present and Members resumed their questioning.

Members received copies of the transcript of the audio-visual presentation made during the morning sitting, binders containing information about Canadian External Assistance Programs (April 1969) and copies of the C.I.D.A. Annual Review 1967-1968.

At 5:15 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Chairman thanked Mr. Strong and the Committee adjourned until Thursday, May 1, 1969 at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday April 29 1969.

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, could we come to order, please. It is particularly pleasant today to have with us the members of the Senate Committee on External Relations and its Chairman, the Hon. John B. Aird. The Senate Committee is currently investigating all facets of Canada's relations with the Caribbean area. It is particularly interested in Canada's external aid policies and programs relating to that area.

Hon. Senators, we are very happy indeed that you could be here this morning. I would also particularly like to mention that we are happy to have with us this morning, Mrs. Ruth Masika from Uganda, who is training under this aid program. Perhaps you would stand up, Mrs. Masika, so that they can see just where you are.

I would also like to draw the Committee's attention to the presence at these hearings of Mr. Kasem Gulek. Mr. Gulek is a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and is this year's President of the North Atlantic Assembly. Mr. Gulek is visiting Canada for several days in his capacity as President of the North Atlantic Assembly at which the Canadian Parliament is represented annually by a delegation. Mr. Gulek is here today as a guest of Mr. Perry Ryan, our Vice-Chairman who was former Chairman of the Canadian delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly. Mr. Gulek, we are honoured to have you here and hope that our proceedings will be of interest to you.

Today the Committee has as a witness Mr. Maurice Strong, President of the Canadian International Development Agency. He has appeared before the Committee on previous occasions and I am sure no further introduction is necessary.

Mr. Strong has arranged for an audio-visual presentation on Canadian external aid policies and programs to be made for the Committee and for the members of the Senate Committee. I understand there will be four 15 minute projections, perhaps with a short

break between each. Each completes in itself particular aspects of external aid. That will take about an hour in all.

Afterwards, Mr. Strong, will be happy to answer general questions from anyone here. Possibly by the time those general questions are over it will almost be time to break for lunch. In that event, the members of the House of Commons Committee will meet again this afternoon to go over the details of the estimates.

With that I think, Mr. Strong, I will turn the meeting over to you.

Mr. M. F. Strong (President, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, hon. members, hon. senators. I will waste very few words and very little of your time this morning in introducing this subject. I would like to give you a word of explanation as to what we are doing here this morning.

We had a problem of trying to relate to you in a very meaningful way the story of external aid and the story of the activities of the Canadian International Development agency which are the subjects of the estimates you will be reviewing. To do this within a very short period of time, and to make the best use of that time, we decided to spend a lot of our own time in putting together that story using the latest audio and visual techniques. In this way we will try, in one hour, to give you more information on our program than would be possible to present in the same amount of time by, your simply listening to me relate it to you from this forum.

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The voices you will hear will be my own voice—so that I am in effect making this report—and, on occasion, you will hear another voice. I was advised by my technical advisers that to hear my voice continuously for an hour would create a certain monotony. I agreed with that after I heard it. Therefore, you do hear another very rich voice, that of Father Harold Oxley, who is also the man in charge of the technical presentation itself.

It involves a great deal of time, effort, and work by our staff. This is an experiment and we hope it is an experiment which will have the kind of results that we intend it to have; namely, to give you a great deal more information and a great deal more insight into our program than would otherwise be possible. With that, gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, I would turn this meeting over to Father Oxley and our technical people who will take it from here.

(Audio presentation follows)

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, in presenting this report on Canada's Development Assistance Program, I would first like to refer to some of the factors which provide the broad background for our concern and our activities.

We will be speaking today on what are called the world's less developed countries.

First, let us look at what we mean by that term.

From an economic point of view, we mean countries with an annual per capita incomes of less than \$500.

Of 115 countries listed by the World Bank as having populations of one million or more, 77 are less developed.

But two-thirds of the world's population live there.

Twenty-nine countries have per capita incomes of \$100 or less. Some are as low as \$40.

The poorest continent in the world is Asia; it is also the most populated. One billion, seven hundred and forty million people with a per capita income of about \$100 per year.

The average per capita income in the less developed nations, as a whole, is about \$145 per year. In the past two years alone, the average per capita income of Canadians has increased by more than \$180.

And so the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen. In the field of trade, 70 per cent of the world's exports now come from the developed countries, leaving only 30 per cent to be shared by the less developed majority.

The developed countries are increasing their trade with each other more rapidly than with the less developed countries.

Even their sales to less developed countries are increasing more rapidly than their purchases.

And the terms of trade continually worsen for less developed countries.

The prices they receive for their exports, principally commodities, have declined, while the prices they must pay for the manufactured products they import, have arisen.

Undoubtedly, improved trade conditions are imperative, and some progress is being made—albeit slowly—towards international agreements for granting preferences to imports from less developed nations and to commodity agreements covering some of their principal exports. But there are limits to the assistance the less developed nations can expect to derive from these measures.

In the meantime, they continue to need other types of aid too; economic, educational, and technical. They need the help of people, as well as of capital assistance. Mr. Paul Hoffman, Administrator of the UN Development Program, has said that within the last 18 months, no more than 25 low-income countries of the world have reported achieving the 5 per cent increase in their gross national products, established as a minimum development goal.

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He adds: "Growth in production, particularly food production, barely kept pace with population growth. Industrial output, export earnings, employment opportunities, school enrolments and many other key indicies of progress generally failed to show adequate upward trends."

And U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the spring of 1968, highlighted this crisis when he said: "The most urgent conflict confronting the world today is not between nations or ideologies, but between the pace of growth of the human race and the insufficient increase in resources needed to support mankind in peace, prosperity and dignity..."

"With the current unsatisfactory growth of resources, the world will become more hungry, more crowded, more pressed in every sense. Half of those now living and two-thirds of those still to be born in this century face the prospect of malnutrition, poverty, and despair."

In 1960, the world population was about 2,998 million by the year 2000 it will have risen to about 6,130 million.

The population of the less developed countries is increasing at annual rates almost

twice as high as those of the developed world. Today, 2 out of 3 of the world's population live in the less developed regions; by the year 2000, it will have risen to 4 out of 5.

Despite substantial growth in food production and education, there are more hungry people, more illiterate people, in the world today than ever before in history.

The scale of the needs is too vast and the crisis that looms is too grave and far-reaching to enable solutions to be worked out in a purely local or even a national context. It is an international problem and must be tackled internationally. Canadians will be deeply affected by the consequences and must be involved in the solutions.

There is no doubt that the less developed countries need assistance. But can the assistance really benefit them? To what extent can it really help?

We cannot hope to close the economic gap between the rich and the poor countries. At least, not in our lifetime. But we can eliminate that dire poverty which condemns so many millions of people to live under conditions that are an affront to humanity.

And we can do a good deal to help improve generally the quality of life for the world's less fortunate people.

We can work towards the establishment of a world society where all people have a more equitable share of the benefits which modern science and technology now make feasible.

Aid programs really represent the first primitive steps in this direction.

Canada's aid program cannot, in itself, provide a total response to this problem. But it can make a vitally important contribution to the collective effort of the wealthy industrialized nations to help the less developed nations achieve their aspirations for better standards of life.

Ninety per cent of the world's development assistance comes from 16 countries linked in The Development Assistance Committee, which we call (DAC) for short, of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which we refer to as OECD. Canada is one of these countries.

The total flow of DAC assistance has increased slowly but steadily since 1962. But it still represents only about \$11.50 per person per year for the people of the DAC member

countries. And that must be spread over some 2,400 million people in the less developed countries.

As a percentage of gross national income, the flow from DAC countries has declined since 1962. In 1961 the average was 1.2 per cent of their combined national income; today it is 0.9 per cent.

In relation to national income, the net flow of official aid to less developed countries has been slightly declining for most of the major developed donor countries, while the flow from smaller countries has been increasing.

The average unofficial aid flow from all of the DAC countries is 0.57 of 1 per cent of their combined national product.

Present evidence points to a levelling off in the amount of international development assistance. Its value in real terms has been subject to continued erosion while its contribution to development is frequently impaired or offset by other factors:

First, the debt-service burden incurred through previous loans now amounts to over \$3.5 billion a year and is growing.

Second, the drop in prices for some of the primary products on which they depend for a major portion of their export earnings.

Third, the tying of aid which sometimes increases the price of goods purchased under aid programs by 10 to 40 per cent.

But the facts are not all discouraging. The economies of the newly independent developing nations, as a whole, have grown at a rate more than double their pre-independence per-

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formance. The world bank estimates that 15 of the world's less-developed countries could become economically independent of external assistance within the next 10 or 15 years. A number of other are showing economic growth rates exceeding the average of industrialized nations.

Science and technology has made available promising new tools and techniques for dealing with some of the most difficult development problems, including the production of food.

In this context, let me now refer to what Canada is doing. I will first outline the present scope and dimensions of our aid program.

Significantly, during the past year the name of our office was changed from the External

Aid Office to The Canadian International Development Agency, and we will refer to it as CIDA throughout the remainder of this presentation. As you know, the Agency reports to the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, who is the Minister responsible for the Canadian development assistance program.

The new name reflects more clearly our basic objective, to help the less developed nations with their own efforts to develop their economic and social potential for the benefit of their people.

Our business is development, and international development is a cooperative process, not a giveaway program.

Our aid program began in 1950, when Canada became one of the founding members of the Colombo Plan for the development of the newly independent Commonwealth nations of South and Southeast Asia.

Since then, about \$1 billion of Canada's bilateral assistance has been channelled through the Colombo Plan, \$126.3 million of it during the last fiscal year.

In 1958, a program of Canadian assistance to the Commonwealth Caribbean was introduced.

In the past 10 years, about \$81.5 million has been allocated for that program, over \$22 million of it last year.

The Commonwealth Caribbean, in fact, today receives more Canadian aid on a per capita basis than any other area of the world.

In 1959, Commonwealth Africa was included in Canada's aid program for the first time, and in 1961, a special program was initiated for Francophone Africa.

The total allocation for Commonwealth Africa has amounted to over \$95 million so far, \$25.7 million of it last year.

In Francophone Africa the total since 1961 has amounted to nearly \$57 million, \$23.8 million of it during the 1968-69 fiscal year.

This today is our fastest growing program.

Since 1964, Canada's aid program has included assistance to Latin America.

\$10 million were allocated in each of the past five years for projects administered on our behalf by the Inter-American Development Bank.

Canada's allocations for external aid in the 1968-69 fiscal year amounted to \$298,908,000.

Of this, \$234.9 million was for bilateral assistance and \$61.8 million was provided through multilateral agencies; principally, the United Nations Agencies, the World Bank Group, and Regional Development Banks.

In calculating the overall amount of external aid provided, we also include loans made to the less developed nations under the Export Credits Insurance Act, less the amounts repaid on loans previously made, as these amounts are included in the figures used by the Development Assistance Committee in reporting comparative aid flows on an international basis.

Estimated commitments 1968-69, by the Export Credits Insurance Corporation for the fiscal year 1968-69 are almost \$13 million, which would make the total aid budget some \$301,630,000.

Apart from export credits, Canada's bilateral aid to developing countries is encompassed under two programs: the International Development Assistance Program, covered by External Affairs Vote 35, and the Special Loan Assistance Program, covered by External Affairs Vote L35.

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The administration of these programs is covered by External Affairs Vote 30.

External Affairs Vote 35 includes grants for economic, technical, educational, and other assistance detailed in the Estimates. In fiscal year 1968-69 Vote 35 amounted to \$153,747,000.

This includes \$69 million allocated for the international food aid program, \$200,000 for International Emergency Relief, and \$5 million in CIDA grants allocated for non-governmental organizations.

Vote L35, the Special Loan Assistance Program, last year amounted to \$106 million and the Administration Vote, External Affairs Vote 30, totalled \$4,003,000.

For the fiscal year 1969-70, Parliament has been asked to appropriate additional amounts. Details can be found on pages 101-103 and page 462 of the Estimates for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1970. The International Development Assistance Programme, which is covered by External Affairs Vote 35 and which consists entirely of grants, includes \$70.6 million for economic, technical, educational and other assistance, \$70 million for food aid, \$24 million for contributions to international organizations, \$300,000 for inter-

national emergency relief, and \$6.5 million for contributions to non-governmental organizations. The total amount of the vote is \$171 million, an increase of \$18 million compared to last year.

The Special Development Assistance Loans Program is covered by vote L35. It amounts to \$137 million, compared to \$106 million last year.

In addition, Parliament has authorized the Government to make advances to the International Development Association and to the Asian Development Bank. They will total \$29.7 million during the course of the current fiscal year.

In summary, apart from Export Credits which the DAC includes in its calculation of aid flows, total Canadian assistance to developing countries in 1969-70 would amount to \$338.14 million.

Canada endorsed the 1961 resolution to the United Nations calling for the supply of government and private aid flows to total 1 per cent of the gross national income of donor countries.

Canada has also agreed to work towards the target, as revised in 1968 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (which we call UNCTAD), of 1 per cent of gross national product at market prices which is more than 33 per cent higher than the previous target. In the last comparative figures released by the development assistance committee, which calculates aid on the basis of actual disbursements as distinct from allocations, Canadian official aid amounted to \$213 million in 1967 or 0.50 per cent of 1 per cent of national income.

In *absolute* terms we ranked sixth among the DAC countries, and *relative* to national income, eighth.

We compare somewhat less favourably if private flows are included—seventh in *absolute* terms and thirteenth in relative terms.

Canadian bilateral aid is heavily concentrated in 10 countries or areas which account for about 75 per cent of our total bilateral aid allocations.

These are:

In the Colombo Plan Region of Asia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaysia.

In Commonwealth Africa, Nigeria and Ghana.

In Francophone Africa, Tunisia, Cameroon and Senegal.

And the Commonwealth Caribbean area taken as a whole.

In total, some seventy-two countries or territories received some aid from Canada in the last fiscal year, but in most of these countries it was confined to small contributions in the field of education and technical assistance.

There are several important characteristics of our bilateral aid program which should be borne in mind. As you are aware, our aid program is concentrated in those areas in which we feel that Canada has special interests and where Canadian resources can best contribute to development.

Our aid is basically responsive in nature. But this does not mean that we wait passively for requests to be made. The best projects arise out of a continuing process of consultation and communication between CIDA and the developing countries concerned. This policy of creative cooperation increases the likelihood that our aid will be as effective and well directed as possible.

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Also, our bilateral aid is used primarily to provide Canadian goods and services to the developing countries. In the past, we required that goods supplied under the aid program have a Canadian content no less than 80 per cent. This percentage was recently reduced to 66⅔, which permits a much wider range of Canadian goods to be supplied under our program. Also, under certain circumstances, up to 25 per cent of our contribution to a development project may be used to cover local costs normally borne by the recipient country.

Let me now review the program itself in greater detail beginning with the provision of education and training in Canada to people from the less developed countries.

There are now about 2,073 students and trainees from less developed countries studying in Canada, in educational institutions and with industrial firms and other private and governmental organizations.

We offer several types of scholarships: University undergraduate, graduate, and post doctorate courses, one and two year trade and sub-professional programs at the post-secondary school level; and special courses of shorter duration in such important areas as public administration.

CIDA arranges too for the training of students whose visits to this country are

sponsored by the United Nations and its agencies, or other international groups or donor countries.

Sixty-six such students arrived in Canada this year.

We are presently taking a hard look at our training program. It is often less costly and more useful to provide education and training in the developing country itself, or in another country in the region where conditions are similar to those in the home country of the student or trainee.

Recently we initiated a program of third country training in which students from developing countries are sponsored by Canada to study in other less developed countries which offer courses unavailable in their home lands.

For example, 35 students from the Caribbean islands are now studying at the University of the West Indies under CIDA sponsorship.

Post graduate scholarships are also offered through the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan, which provides for an exchange of students within Commonwealth.

Canada had 250 such students last year.

The counterpart to receiving students and trainees into Canada is to send Canadian teachers and professors to less developed countries to assist in their educational programmes.

There are now over 700 Canadian teachers or professors serving overseas under our program.

It is generally understood between Canada and the recipient country that these teachers or professors should, as soon as possible, be replaced by properly trained local educators. And this of course is one of the principal objectives of our Program.

This explains our growing need for teacher trainers rather than line teachers.

The educational assistance that less developed countries have been receiving has increased the number of their secondary school graduates and created a corresponding need for help at the university level. And this in turn has led to experiments in teaming Canadian universities with those in less developed countries in the development of particular courses and facilities.

The University of British Columbia teamed with those of Malaya and Singapore in 1961

to establish courses in accounting and business practice. Since then, several other similar programs have been initiated.

CIDA's Technical Assistance Program also sends Canadian experts to developing countries to carry out specific assignments of a professional and technical nature.

There are now some 250 such people in the field under CIDA auspices.

Recently, we have been shifting towards a team approach to advisory assistance, and a greater involvement of Canadian institutions in comprehensive projects designed to provide the country concerned with a capability of its own to meet a specific high priority development need.

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For example, a team of experts from the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission was supplied to the Niger Dam Authority in Nigeria to train personnel for the Kainji Dam, 300 miles north of Lagos.

The team will help to set up the power plant there and to run it with 100 Nigerians until an additional 200 Nigerians complete a three year training program to qualify them for senior line positions.

In our advisory program, we co-operate closely with the multilateral organizations, particularly the United Nations and its Agencies.

In any given year, there are at least 250 Canadians serving with multilateral agencies, many of them recruited through our Advisors Division.

Educational and Technical assistance represent a considerable portion of our total aid program in every area of Canada's concentration.

In the Colombo Plan area, it amounts to about 10 per cent of our total allocations.

In Commonwealth and Francophone Africa, it accounts for about 50 per cent of current allocations.

In the Commonwealth Caribbean, Educational and Technical assistance represents about 25 per cent of total allocations.

In Latin America, we have not yet introduced a specific program of Educational and Technical assistance, but we expect to introduce such a program shortly.

Let me now discuss what is referred to in the estimates as our economic assistance program beginning with food and commodity aid.

The combination of a rapidly increasing world population, and an inadequate supply of essential resources, has made this an important aspect of our aid program.

Food aid can only be a temporary palliative, but an essential one, when people are starving, as they were in India and Pakistan last year.

The provision of food aid also contributes to long-term development, as it frees scarce foreign exchange to enable recipient countries to direct their resources to programs and projects designed to deal with the underlying causes of under development.

The supply of other basic commodities has a similar impact and enables the capacity of existing industries in the country to be more fully utilized.

Food aid will continue to be a necessary ingredient in the Canadian aid program, but the need for it is likely to diminish in the next few years.

The countries to which Canada regularly gives food aid are India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.

Last year, the food aid allocations to India amounted to \$40 million, to Pakistan, \$5 million, and to Ceylon, \$2 million.

In the past five years, besides the three countries just mentioned, Canada has also given food aid to approximately twenty others.

The Food Aid Convention, which forms part of the International Wheat Agreement, provides for annual shipments of 4.5 million tons of food grains as aid to less developed countries.

Canada's share in this will amount to approximately 1.5 million tons of grain over a 3 year period.

Also, through the World Food Program and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, Canada gave \$9,365,300 in food aid last year.

Canada's commodity aid since its inception in 1951, amounted to \$243,810,000.

Last year the total was \$56.5 million, about 15 per cent of that year's total allocation.

Among the principal commodities shipped by Canada are: fertilizer, sulphur, copper, nickel, aluminum, and newsprint.

Almost a quarter—some 22 per cent in fact—of Canada's bilateral aid is provided in the form of capital assistance.

In total, during 1968-69, Canada undertook to help finance 243 new capital projects estimated to cost \$157.275 million. We continued our assistance to 276 projects carried over from the previous fiscal year, and valued at \$344.4 million. We completed 240 projects, the total cost of which was \$137.36 million.

Now entering fiscal year 1969-70, we are continuing our financial assistance to 279 capital assistance projects carried over from last year, and estimated to cost in total \$364.315 million.

These projects were designed to meet needs in such fields as agricultural developments, provision of educational facilities, electric power generation and transmission facilities, health and social services, communications, transportation, and resource development.

In India for example, Canada has allocated over \$44 million dollars to two large power projects, one at Kundah in Madras state, the other at Idikki in Kerala state.

We are also financing a significant long term agricultural program in India which resulted from the work of a special agricultural task force sent out to India about a year and a half ago.

One of the highlights of our program in Pakistan last year was the inauguration of a Thermal Generating Plant at Sukkur designed by Canadian engineers, built and equipped at a Canadian cost of \$13 million dollars.

Road construction, housing, airport development, lumber processing, and hospital and school constructions have all been among the projects financed through Canadian aid to the Colombo Plan area.

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In Vietnam, Canada has agreed to construct, equip and staff a rehabilitation centre at Qui Nhon at a cost of 1.2 million to care for 50 in-patients and 100 out-patients.

In the Commonwealth Caribbean, much of our capital assistance is going for the improvement of airport facilities in the Eastern Caribbean region, essential to the development of the tourist industry in that area.

Over four million dollars has been allocated for this purpose.

Still in the Caribbean area, CIDA has allocated \$950,000 for the construction of prefabricated schools in Jamaica, \$400,000 for the development of a dairy industry in Trinidad, and \$400,000 to the University of Guyana.

We are also helping to provide low-cost housing projects, rural electrification, aerial surveys, facilities for the improvement of harbours, and the undertaking several feasibility studies.

In Commonwealth Africa, CIDA, with the help of the Department of Education in Alberta, is contributing to the design, construction, equipping, and staffing of the Benin City Technical High School in Nigeria.

Canadian teachers and advisers will be provided over a five-year period, while Nigerians will be trained in Canada to take over from them eventually.

Canada is to contribute \$1.5 million to the construction of the school, while Nigeria will contribute \$800,000.

Additional equipment was provided last year to the Accra Training School in Ghana. Since 1962, Canada has provided \$1,305,000 to this technical institute, which was built and staffed by Canadians.

The aerial photography and mapping project continued last year in the coastal region of Tanzania. We have so far provided \$1,350,000 to this project. Last year a further \$1 million loan was approved for an aerial photography and mapping study, which will be used as the basis for planning the development of 30,000 square miles in South-West Tanzania.

In Francophone Africa, Canada has assisted the University of Butare, in Rwanda, since 1963. In January 1967, a 5-year financial plan of support was established whereby Canada is contributing \$750,000 annually to the University of which approximately 60 per cent covers the cost of Canadian professors and administrators and 40 per cent represents our contribution to the operating expenses of the University. In addition, scholarships are provided for the post-graduate training in Canada of Rwandese students who are being groomed to teach at the University.

In Tunisia, Canada is constructing a 42 mile, 90 Kilovolt transmission line from Tunis to Korba, a circuit terminal at Tunis, and a receiver sub-station at Korba. These facilities are required in order to satisfy the growing

demand for power in the Cap Bon area, originating largely from the agricultural sector and the fast-expanding tourist industry.

In Ivory Coast, we are undertaking a pilot rural electrification project, whereby the existing electrical system will be extended to supply power to some 50 villages in an area 30 miles north-west of Abidjan. This is the first attempt at rural electrification in Ivory Coast and it will launch a long-range programme to supply power to all of the country's rural areas.

In Morocco, Canada will finance a cadastral survey of 2,700 sq. miles of farmland in 5 selected regions. This survey will produce an inventory of land and basic information on land tenure, agricultural soil types, types of cultivation and forestation, and types of housing, roads and public utilities required. The Government of Morocco needs this data to develop and modernize the agricultural sector of the economy.

In Cameroun, work is underway on an airborne magnetic survey of 6 areas representing 35 per cent of the total area of the country and a photogeological study of the entire country. This is required to identify the most promising areas for conducting mineral exploration.

Our aid program to Francophone Africa entered a phase of rapid expansion with the Chevrier Mission, established by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in January, 1968. In conducting an on-the-spot examination of the Canadian aid program there, the mission had authority to commit up to \$40 million of Canadian Government funds to assist projects submitted by the host governments.

All of that amount was committed to 49 projects to be implemented over the next 5 years, 39 of them capital assistance projects in the areas of education, agriculture, public health, the development of natural resources, tourism, and fisheries. 29 projects will be financed on a grant basis, the other 20 through soft loans.

One of the most interesting requests presented recently to CIDA for financing has been the Ghana-Togo-Dahomey Transmission Project. The governments of these countries requested Canadian financing for the construction of a transmission line from Ghana through Togo and Dahomey to provide hydroelectric power to the coastal regions of the two French-speaking countries.

Canada's involvement includes the design and construction of the transmission line and the cost of four additional generators. The total estimated cost of the project is \$13,826,000 of which \$446,660 will be in grants and the rest in loans.

In Latin America, our program began in 1967. Since then, Canada has allocated \$50 million in development loans through the Inter-American Development Bank.

Among the loans signed under this program are: first, one for \$16,740,000 to Colombia to help finance the upper Anchicaya River electric power plant. The largest power plant in Colombia's history.

Second, \$9,320,000 to Brazil to expand electric power generation transmission and distribution facilities in 10 Brazilian states.

Third, \$1,260,000 for a comprehensive study of the Guayas River basin in Ecuador.

Fourth, \$3,240,000 for construction of a new port at Acajutla, in El Salvador, Central America.

As part of the review of Canada's foreign policy now underway, the Government has said that it is considering ways of extending the scale and broadening the scope of our development aid to Latin America. In many

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of the kinds of projects that I have been referring to, Capital Assistance is combined with Technical Assistance to assure that local personnel receive the training necessary to enable them to make use of the facilities provided.

Approximately one sixth of Canada's total aid program is channelled through multilateral organizations, grouped in three principal categories:

The United Nations, The World Bank Group, and The Regional Development Banks. Last year, Canada's total contribution to these organizations amounted to \$61 million.

Among the UN agencies, the UN Development Program receives the largest continuing share of Canadian Development Funds. Last year we increased our annual contribution to the UNDP to \$10,750,000.

Canada also supported the programs of UNRRA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program of the Food and Agricultural

Organization, the United Nations Childrens Fund, and The International Atomic Energy Agency.

The total amount of Canadian contributions provided through these and other international organizations amounted in the 1968-69 fiscal year to \$25,760,000.

The World Bank Group includes the bank itself, the full name of which is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Then it also includes the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation.

Canada's total contributions to these organizations collectively amounted to \$27 million last year.

An important event in the history of the World Bank Group was the agreement reached to replenish the soft loan fund of the International Development Association to the extent of \$1.2 billion over a 3 year period.

Canada played a leading part in this important exercise and was one of the first nations to provide its share of the replenishment.

Canada also belongs to consortia established by the World Bank, the OECD, or the Inter American Development Bank, to coordinate assistance to India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Greece, and to consultative groups for Ecuador, Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Thailand, and Tunisia.

We are also actively involved in supporting the establishment and operation of regional development banks through which resources of the region concerned, and those made available by donors outside the region, are mobilized and channelled by collective action to meet the development requirements of the region.

Last year we provided \$8.2 million through the Asian Development Bank and together with the United Kingdom, joined with the countries and territories of the Caribbean area to work out plans for establishment of a development bank to serve that region.

We have also provided a limited amount of technical assistance to the African Development Bank and are considering additional assistance to this important new institution.

Another program of a multilateral character is the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program administered by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

This relatively new program will help the developing countries of the Commonwealth in the fields of development planning, project preparation, statistics, finance, public administration, and trade promotion.

Each of the Commonwealth donor countries including Canada will provide finances through the Program for the transfer of technical skills between Commonwealth developing countries as well as from the more developed countries to the developing countries.

In Francophone Africa, CIDA has agreed to contribute \$500,000 over the next 5 years, to the International Association of French-language Universities in support of university projects in French-speaking Africa and the Far East.

• 1150

Also, at the Niamey Conference held in Niger last February, Canada agreed to support an agency to be formed for the provision of Technical Assistance to Francophone Africa and the Far Eastern French-speaking territories.

In April 1968, CIDA initiated an important new program designed to assist Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations to increase the scale and the scope of their participation in international development. These agencies are already making an important contribution.

It is estimated that in total, they provide some \$35 million annually for overseas programs of a development nature. Indeed, they have done much of the pioneering on which Government aid programs are based.

Increased private programs are vitally important as a complement and a supplement to the official aid program, particularly in areas where their private character enables them to operate more effectively than government.

During the fiscal year 1968-69, \$5 million were allocated to support specific projects and programs of Canadian private agencies, and the estimate for 1969-70 includes provision for \$6.5 million for this purpose.

Our assistance is extended to the voluntary agencies in the form of grants or contracts under conditions designed to stimulate higher levels of private financing and new program initiatives.

The largest single grant went to the Canadian University Service Overseas, which

we know as CUSO, which received \$2,374,360. This enabled about one thousand Canadians to work in 42 developing countries under CUSO auspices. CUSO is a unique Canadian organization which is making a highly significant contribution to Canada's total development effort. It is also an outstanding example of co-operation between the private sector and government.

One of CUSO's notable contributions was its initiative in helping to establish a companion organization—Canadian Executive Service Overseas or CESO, as we call it for short.

This new organization recruits experienced Canadian business and professional people, many of them retired, for specialized short-term assignments in which their skills and experience are made available to the less-developed nations. Last year, CESO received a CIDA grant of \$311,000.

Other CIDA grants to non-governmental organizations during the past fiscal year included \$64,642 to the Canadian Teachers' Federation to provide an in-service teacher program to certain developing countries; \$75,000 to The Dominican Sisters for the construction of a nursing school in Rwanda; \$26,970 went to the Canadian Red Cross Society to help finance school gardens, well digging, orchard planting, and poultry raising by village children in Sudan; \$100,000 was granted to The United Church Missions of Canada for manufacturing small portable drill rigs and for training Indian well diggers and \$100,000 went to The Canadian Hunger Foundation to help finance a training centre offering instruction in food technology and in the preservation and processing of indigenous foods.

Each year Canada also allocates certain funds for international emergency relief and these funds are administered by CIDA.

The amount of funds allocated under this program depends, of course, on the number and extent of the emergencies which arise during the year and to which we must respond.

By definition, emergencies cannot be foreseen and it is not possible to determine accurately in advance what funds will be required.

Last year a total of \$200,000 dollars was provided under this program.

The most extensive emergency situation in the past year was undoubtedly that which arose in Nigeria as a result of the civil war in

that country. Canada has so far contributed \$2.6 million in relief to that area.

However, this amount was not taken from our limited International Emergency Relief Fund but was drawn from our normal bilateral aid allocations.

● 1155

International emergency relief funds for the past fiscal year were spent on a total of eight separate emergencies, including the following: \$121,000 for relief in Nigeria and Viet Nam; \$1,158 to cover the residual costs of an aircraft made available to UNRA for relief of refugees at the time of the Israeli-Arab war; \$7,500 to the Iraqi flood relief fund; \$10,000 to Burma for cyclone relief; \$30,000 divided equally between India and Pakistan for flood relief; \$2,500 in cash for the relief of Costa Rican earthquake victims; \$25,000 for the relief of Iranian earthquake victims.

The program we have described in summary form represents Canada's response to the economic and social needs of less developed countries.

Requests for assistance under this program are normally received from those countries through Canada's missions abroad. Then begins the process of selection of projects requested and the planning and execution of those which are approved. These are the responsibilities of CIDA's administration.

In the 1968-69 fiscal year CIDA's administrative costs amounted to approximately \$4,003,000 which represents about 1.7 per cent of total costs of our program.

It does not include the administrative costs of operating our diplomatic missions in the developing countries; one of whose main tasks is to administer the aid program in the field on behalf of CIDA. Nevertheless, by any standard, our administrative costs are lower than those of most aid agencies.

But operating a really effective development aid program is no easy task. I know of no other field of activity which is as complex and demanding in its administrative requirement.

CIDA's basic function is to bring Canadian resources to bear on the needs of the less developed countries.

Within Canada, this means that we must have direct relationships with the sources of resources; The universities, the school system, business and industry, the co-operatives,

the labour movement, professional organizations, hospitals; indeed, the entire range of the institutions of Canadian society, as well as thousands of individuals.

In the developing countries, we must work directly with the governments of these countries and the organizations directly involved in each individual project.

We must operate under conditions vastly different from those in Canada, involving a wide variety of different languages, cultures, traditions, attitudes, and sensitivities.

All of these activities must be co-ordinated with the programs of other donors by a process of continuous consultation with them directly and through the international mechanism that have been set up for this purpose.

● 1200

During the past two years, we have been reconstructing our organization to enable it to deal more effectively in this context with the program which is continuing to grow both in size and in quality.

The divisions responsible for sending Canadian advisors and teachers overseas and for bringing overseas students to Canada, were drawn together with the division responsible for the Capital Assistance Program in the new operations branch.

A new Planning and Economics Branch was set up, incorporating a division responsible for planning our programs, another with responsibilities for multi-lateral programs, one with responsibility for the private agencies program, and a liaison and evaluation group containing senior experts in various of the principal sectors in which our program operates.

Many of the support services within the agency were also refined and strengthened. For example, computer and data processing services were introduced to improve our personnel inventory and to collate field project information.

A management services group was added to the administrative and financial unit.

A separate personnel division was established and our information services expanded.

The new organization has enabled us to establish a more comprehensive system of planning and evaluating our program.

This begins with a thorough analysis of the development programs of each of the princi-

pal countries in which our aid is concentrated to identify the particular sectors in which Canadian aid can make the best contribution to the country's development.

A strategy is then worked out in agreement with the cooperating government for the Canadian aid program in the country for the next five-year period.

Requests for assistance from Canada for individual projects are then made by the country within this framework. Each year we send a high level team out to the country to review the results of the previous year's program and plans for the ensuing year.

These procedures have now been adopted in respect of a number of our countries of concentration and are being extended to cover the remainder of these countries.

In addition to the general country reviews, there is a need for intensive evaluation of specific sectors and projects. To meet this need, we send out special task forces consisting of our own personnel together with outside experts with the specialized knowledge and experience required.

Last year, task forces were sent, among other places, to India to do an agricultural study, to East Africa to study technical needs, to Vietnam for a study of medical projects, and to Francophone Africa for a review of our overall development program in that area.

One of the most important of our new review and evaluation procedures is the application of cost benefit analysis to the process of project appraisal and selection. Of course, cost benefit analysis has its limitations. It is not a substitute for the exercise of human judgment in evaluating all of the complex factors which bear on the value of a particular project. But it does provide a tool which is extremely useful as an aid in making these judgments by permitting common standards of evaluation to be applied to the economics of a wide variety of projects under consideration.

CIDA officers are now being assigned to our diplomatic missions in countries in which we have a significant aid program to assist with the administration of that program in the field.

In addition, certain contract personnel are being sent out to provide specialized and supplementary services required for the implementation of projects and programs at the field level.

Our headquarters staff has also been strengthened by the addition of a number of people with specialized skills who come to us under contracts for periods ranging from a few months to two years. This enables us to benefit from the experience of many skilled people from outside government who could not be attracted to the public service on a full-time career basis.

Many aspects of our program are now under intensive study. For example, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada is just completing a study of the role of Canadian universities in international development. The University of Ottawa carried out a study of procedures for briefing Canadian teaching personnel and experts being sent to the developing countries. Special studies are being made in the field of private investment in the developing nations.

A major series of studies has been undertaken as to the application of science and technology to the fundamental problems of economic and social underdevelopment in the less developed regions of the world. You will recall that the government has indicated that it intends to seek approval of Parliament for the establishment in Canada of an International Development Centre to help meet this most strategic need.

Of special significance, of course, is the major study now being carried out of Canada's basic policies in the field of international development. This is an important part of the government's overall review of its foreign policy.

● 1205

In summary, our development assistance program is in a period of significant change. We are endeavouring to translate the experience of the past into an organization and a program that will meet the demands of the future. We know that the development process is complex and often frustrating. We also know that it is an imperative process and a continuing one—that it will make increasing demands on our resources, on our ingenuity and perhaps most of all on our political will.

Important decisions must soon be made concerning the future direction of Canada's international development assistance program. Those of us to whom you have entrusted the administration of this program are dedicated to carrying out these decisions in a manner which will assure that Canada's con-

tribution to the less developed world will be in keeping with our highest traditions and expectations.

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, I know you would want me, on your behalf, to thank Mr. Strong and CIDA for this film presentation. I believe it is the first time a film presentation of this type has been given in connection with the review of Estimates and I know that all of us have found it most interesting and impressive.

Mr. Strong has very kindly said that he would be prepared to answer any questions which anyone may have with regard to the film presentation.

The members of our House of Commons Committee will have the opportunity later to ask specific questions with regard to the items in the Estimates. So, if there is a large number of questions perhaps it would be fair to give those who are not members of our House of Commons Committee a little bit of priority. However, we will see how things go along. Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: Before you start questions, Mr. Chairman, I was wondering whether the audio part of the presentation is available in some transcript form. Mr. Strong and his associates threw a lot of figures at us and you darkened the room so that we could not write; all of which was undoubtedly a deliberate plot. Can we break through that plot and not to have to wait for the minutes and have a transcript of what was said?

An hon. Member: Was it recorded also, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Lewis: I presumed it was recorded for the minutes.

The Chairman: It was recorded, but you wish to have a transcript available before the minutes. Is that the problem, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: In fact, personally I would have liked an opportunity to study it before questioning begins, but I suppose that would be impossible.

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, we do have the transcript. We had not come prepared to provide the number of copies that would be required, but I am sure that by this afternoon we can have these available. We have a number of them here for our own use and we can certainly provide them to this Committee.

The Chairman: Could I get some idea of how many copies Mr. Strong would need for that purpose? How many of you would like to have copies?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Each member of the Committee should have a copy, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: That would be 30, but are there others as well? I would think that 40 should cover it, Mr. Strong. Mr. Allmand did you have a question?

Mr. Allmand: I had the same question.

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The Chairman: Then we are open for general questions from anyone with regard to the film presentation or of CIDA generally. Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson: This is in the same general area, Mr. Chairman. Somewhere in the presentation it was mentioned that 15 of these 77-odd nations are at what you might call a take-off point. They are in a position whereby, in the foreseeable future, they can be developed to the point where they become developed rather than developing nations. Then later on in the presentation we heard of 10 nations of concentration and I wonder how these correspond. I wonder if you could tell us which nations were emphasizing this point and whether or not these are the nations we can expect in perhaps 4 years, 10 years, or 20 years, to stop receiving aid and, perhaps, contribute it.

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, the first figure mentioned was in the more general part of the presentation and referred to the World Bank's estimate that within the next 10 to 15 years about 15 countries should be in a position to free themselves entirely from the necessity of receiving foreign aid. This is, of course, relative to the total world picture and not just to those countries Canada is supporting. I cannot remember all of the countries but some of them are Taiwan, Iran, Jordan, Korea, Singapore, countries of this calibre.

The 10 countries or areas in which Canada concentrates its aid do not necessarily bear any relationship to these. In Asia they include: India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaysia and none of these countries are on the list that I earlier referred to. Malaysia might be; I am not sure whether Malaysia is on the World Bank list of 15 that might make it. It would be quite close to being in that category

if it were not in that category. They include Ghana and Nigeria in Commonwealth Africa; Tunisia, Senegal and Cameroon in Francophone Africa and then the Commonwealth Caribbean which we, for these purposes, consider to be one area.

Mr. Anderson: Is it an area which you think would be possible of fairly rapid development? Is it one of the 15?

Mr. Strong: No, it is not. Jamaica and Trinidad would be included, I am sure, in that 15. Trinidad is almost at the point now where the amount of external assistance it requires is relatively limited. We look at the Caribbean in terms of our program as an area of concentration. There is quite a lot of variety within the area as to the stage of development that these countries are at. For example, the island territory of Dominica is at a very low stage of development and Trinidad, as I have mentioned, is at a fairly advanced stage.

Mr. Anderson: Could I conclude then that there is no real effort on your part to direct aid to countries which, perhaps in the relatively near future, could reach a developed level, a level at which they no longer need aid?

Mr. Strong: This is really one of the fundamental policy issues confronting those who make aid and development policy. Should we concentrate our efforts on those who are relatively better off, who are likely to be in a position to become self-supporting very shortly, or, do we concentrate our efforts on those who are really at the bottom of the ladder, who are experiencing that dire form of poverty that requires them to live at less than human levels? This is an important policy decision. Looking at the distribution of our program, I do not think the decisions have been made based solely on that point; in fact, a good deal of our aid is directed to countries that have a fairly low level of development as measured by their average per capita GNP. India, Pakistan and Ceylon together represent the largest portion of the so-called less-developed world and those that have the lowest average per capita income.

Mr. Anderson: Would you say this basic policy question has more or less been decided, generally speaking, in favour of the lower level of developing countries rather than those who are capable of rapid expansion in the near future?

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Mr. Strong: That is not the entire answer. I think you cannot really rationalize the distribution of Canadian aid based on application of any one factor. I think there is a historical process through which Canada got into the aid business. The first countries that became independent in Asia, which were the object originally of forming the Colombo Plan, were India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and Canada's coming into the aid business dates back to 1950 when the Colombo Plan was formed primarily for the purpose of assisting those nations. They also happen to be amongst the poorest nations but I do not think you can say that we are directing our aid to them because they are poor. They also happen to fall into that category.

In Francophone Africa, for example, where we are really increasing our program at a very rapid rate, and in the Caribbean area taken as a whole, the standard is relatively high. Some of the countries of Francophone Africa are receiving very substantial amounts of aid from other sources that are at fairly advanced stages of development in terms of per capita GNP. The same is true of many of the Caribbean countries. So we do have a number of countries in which we are concentrating and where there is also a relatively high level of development as represented by average GNP.

Mr. Anderson: I have one final question.

The Chairman: Yes. May I ask first, though, can those at the back of the room here the questions which are being asked here at the table? Can you hear the answers? Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: I am sorry to take up so much time, Mr. Chairman; it is a very interesting subject. I have one final question. It appears to me, sir—or at least to the press—I have read, that your Department, your office, is concentrating its aid efforts and this, I think, is a very good thing, although from the previous questions I have asked, I think, perhaps, we have a difference as to what criteria should be used for concentration. However, it appears from your presentation that we have expanded enormously in other parts of the world such as Latin America, for example, where we did not give aid before. I wonder why this is taking place sort of contemporaneously with a concentration on 10 countries you are nevertheless still expanding the total number of countries that

are receiving aid. What is the rationale behind that?

Mr. Strong: We administer the program. Government policy determines the selection of the countries. I would point out that Latin America has been receiving aid at the rate of \$10 million as development loans per year for the last five years. In other words, it has not just started to receive aid in the last year or two; it has been receiving aid for five years. Ten million dollars out of roughly a \$300 million aid program is a relatively small percentage of the whole. The government has said that it is part of the Latin American policy review. Mr. Sharp has indicated that the Canadian government is considering increasing assistance to Latin America but no specific decisions in that respect have yet been made.

The Chairman: Do any of our colleagues from the Senate have any questions to ask Mr. Strong? In the meantime, while you are thinking of them, I will call Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Strong, I first wish to congratulate you for this presentation. I am wondering if it is planned by CIDA to do some public presentation of this. Actually, as politicians, we do have to convince our electors that external aid should be expanded and this is a means by which our job would be much easier because there is also a need in the country. Is there a program planned that such a presentation could be made available to institutions, at least schools or universities?

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, we have expanded, and are expanding, our general program of information. The particular presentation you have seen will be useful to us when we extract from it those portions that relate specifically to the votes, and matters that this Committee has been equally concerned with. This presentation itself will

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assist us in our job of informing the Canadian public about our aid program.

We also have a series of other things. We are helping to conduct seminars across the country in response to requests that are made to us from communities. A number of communities across the country, either through their community organizations or, in some cases, through their universities, have asked us to undertake to help them provide public seminars which would increase the knowledge

in those communities of the development process. A lot of this, incidentally, has come as a result of the interest generated by such things as Marches for Millions. So we are responding to that and we are increasing our total information effort.

Mr. Laniel: At the end of your presentation you spoke of the project of an international development centre. Could you expand on that? Will this be a research centre or will this be a place where students from underdeveloped countries would be welcome and will it be a private or a governmental institution?

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, the centre that I spoke of was the centre referred to by the government in the Speech from the Throne where it indicated that it did intend to bring legislation before Parliament to set up an international development centre. The purpose of this would be to focus the application of science and technology to special problems of development. It would, I presume, be a governmental centre in that it would be sponsored and financed out of Canadian government aid funds, but inasmuch as the government has not yet brought the matter before Parliament—it has not outlined in detail what its proposal in respect to the centre would be—I do not believe that it would be appropriate for me to...

Mr. Laniel: Has the Agency been asked to look into the matter?

Mr. Strong: Indeed, Mr. Chairman, we have been the agency responsible for doing all of the basic work which formed the basis for the decision of the government in this area. A very great deal of work has been done during the last two years on this subject.

Mr. Laniel: I do not know if it was said that CIDA was planning to reduce the Canadian content of aid or if it is already down to 66-2/3 per cent. What is the reason for this and what is the reaction of the actual countries involved? I imagine they would appreciate more help. In such a case would this mean that the other 33-1/3 per cent comes from the country concerned?

Mr. Strong: No, Mr. Chairman, the Canadian content applies to the portion of any piece of equipment or any materials provided under our aid program that is originally made in Canada and does not constitute imported materials. Even though the article itself in

total may be manufactured in Canada, we require that 66-2/3 of it actually be originated in Canada. The 80 per cent figure limited very severely the number of Canadian industries that could participate in our program because in order to manufacture equipment materials competitively, it is very often necessary to include imported materials to get the total cost of the product down. So, in fact, I think I could say that the reduction from 80 per cent to 66-2/3 per cent in content has been welcomed both by the developing countries and by Canadian industry. It has given us a far greater degree of flexibility and has made it possible for us to provide under our aid program a much wider range of Canadian products than was previously possible.

Mr. Laniel: Oh, I did not know that. I have one last question, Mr. Chairman. Concerning your food aid, how is this distributed in underdeveloped countries? Is it done through a governmental agency or is it through welfare...

Mr. Strong: Principally, the food goes to the government of the country concerned and is distributed by the agencies set up by that government for this purpose. Some of it is distributed through such international bodies as the World Food Program. Other parts of it—this is relatively a smaller amount in total—which is being provided in response to emergency relief, are very often provided through such organizations as, principally, the International Red Cross.

Within the countries themselves, a number of private agencies very often are designated by the government. For example, in India and Pakistan during the time of the Bihar famine when I visited those areas I found that Canadian milk powder actually was being handed out through feeding stations operated by CARE and UNICEF. They were doing this as the agents of the Indian Government. So the governments concerned very

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often do utilize a great many of the private agencies to help them with their distribution, but as far as we are concerned, our gift is to the government of the country concerned and it is that government which takes the basic responsibility for its distribution.

Mr. Laniel: I asked this question because sometimes we hear complaints—I do not mean official complaints—that some of the food does not go to the people who need it

the most and things like that. I imagine this is very difficult to control, from this end anyway.

Mr. Strong: We, of course, are very concerned with any complaints of that kind. We do hear these complaints periodically and I am sure periodically there is a basis for this. As far as our Canadian program is concerned, I am satisfied that we have set up as rigorous a control over this as it is feasible, but even with the most rigorous control you do get incidents that are reported to us from time to time. For example, the problem of the burst bags that was referred to a year or so ago where the packing was inadequate. There are individual incidents, but I am satisfied that there is no widespread abuse of food provided under the Canadian aid program.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): May I ask a supplementary?

The Chairman: Mr. Guay on a supplementary.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Do the governments to whom you have made a contribution indicate to you the manner in which they have allocated and spent the money?

Mr. Strong: In respect of everything except food aid we provide the funds only to support specific projects or specific programs that have been worked out and agreed to in advance between us and the country concerned and which are the subject of a specific agreement between us in which we required that they perform their part of the agreement just as we are required, of course, to perform our part. Generally speaking, they provide the local cost—the local support, the costs of local labour and local materials—and we provide the foreign exchange component of a project. This really involves us in a co-operative relationship and one in which we provide them with goods and services, not really cash money, and those goods and services are provided on a progressive basis as the project develops.

In the case of food or commodity aid, of course, these foods and commodities are delivered to the governments, but we have to be satisfied generally with the purposes for which they are intended and having satisfied ourselves in that way, it really is not feasible to trace each bag of wheat or each piece of copper down into its end use. Really all we have to do is satisfy ourselves, generally, that

they have a need for this, that their system of distributing and allocating it is adequate and then rely on that system.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, perhaps this would be an appropriate time to call the votes on the estimates and then we can continue with our general enquiries. I will call Vote 30 and, also, if you agree, Vote 35. Votes 30 and 35 are on pages 101 and 102 of the Blue Book. I will also call Vote L35 which is one page 462 of the Blue Book. These are also dealt with in the new form of estimates which you may have. Is that agreeable? Mr. Thompson?

Votes 30, 35 and L35 agreed to.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman and Mr. Strong, we all are conscious of the agreed objective that it is desirable for us to aim at 1 per cent of our gross national product for international development, but I am concerned that our percentage in relation to our gross national product is going down. According to the statistics you showed to us today in this very tremendous presentation, the percentage of our national income is only .5 per cent which means that the percentage of our gross national product is down to approximately .4 per cent. This is a decrease from the ratio of expenditure of these two figures from previous years. Would you comment on that?

• 1230

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, we have been conscious of the fact that in the past year the increase in our expenditures has not paralleled the increase in our allocations. This was a rather deliberate move on our part. We have been in the process of making very major changes in our organization, in our administration and in our procedures for evaluating and implementing projects. When you are doing this it is necessary to slow down the process to some extent. You cannot change it really without slowing it down to some extent. We felt if we were gearing up to be able to handle effectively a much higher level of expenditures we had to be prepared to slow up the process somewhat and this is really what has happened. The impact of this has primarily fallen in the 1st year. We feel as a result of this we have today much better procedures for evaluating projects and that from here on in we have a much increased ability to respond intelligently to the needs of these developing countries.

I think this is going to lead to a much greater capacity on the part of our organization to spend effectively the larger sums of money that are being allocated to us. I would have been concerned to have to spend, and to feel that we were spending effectively with the same procedure that had been built up since the program began in the early fifties, the very much higher amounts of money that are envisaged for the future. I just do not think that the former kind of organization would have been able to do this effectively and I really feel that we have run a justifiable risk, if it is a risk, in slowing down our rate of expenditures in the last year or so.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What you are saying then is that you are not extending the allocations that are available to you, or you have not in this last year?

Mr. Strong: We have not in the past year, but I am saying that I am confident we are going to be able to do this on a rising scale in the future and with a great deal more effectiveness than otherwise would have been possible.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Could we have the percentage statistics provided to the Committee for the last ten years in relation to the actual expenditure on aid relating to GNP, and to gross national earnings? Would it be possible for us to have those statistics?

Mr. Strong: Yes, indeed, we have here a group of statistics presenting this information in various forms. I am not so sure it gives you precisely what you have asked for, but we can certainly get that. It does give the allocations and expenditures by various categories from the conception of the program up through the end of the 1969 fiscal year.

The Chairman: Do the members wish that to be attached as an appendix to our proceedings when it is prepared and filed with the clerk?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You mentioned that one of the increasing difficulties with recipient countries was the repayment of interest and loans that have been made under capital development loans.

Mr. Nowlan: May I have a supplementary on the previous question if you are going to change the topic?

The Chairman: Would it be satisfactory Mr. Thompson, to permit a supplementary from Mr. Nowlan before we go on to your new question?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): All right.

Mr. Nowlan: I think this is related to Mr. Thompson's other question. Mr. Strong, you mentioned in your presentation there were 16 countries in this DAC which set 1 per cent as a commendable target. I wonder if, now or later when you give us the figures Mr. Thompson asked for, you could let us know also which countries have hit that target, or how they fared with that target of 1 per cent over some period of time.

Mr. Strong: I would be quite happy to provide the relevant figures from the DAC statistics indicating the performance of other countries as well. We are quite happy to file that record with the Committee.

Mr. Allmand: I have the figures. I might point out all those figures are in the CIDA Annual Report 1967-68. They have all the figures for all the DAC countries and also the total figures plus percentage of GNP up to 1967. They have it from 1962 on to 1967.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I think it is important, though, that we get this last year because of the significant change.

Mr. Allmand: Right, I am just pointing out they are all there.

• 1235

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Relating to this problem of repayment of capital assistance in the form of both payments and interest, there is an increasing proportion of our expenditure, as you outlined, that is going into capital assistance projects. Am I correct in saying that?

Mr. Strong: That is true in one way, but it is inevitable in the large expenditures. Large expenditures are primarily related to capital projects, but our technical assistance and educational programs are receiving major emphasis in terms of the actual expansion of those programs. They are being expanded at a rate about as fast as is feasible to expand them. Finance is not the principal constraint on expansion of these programs; it is the availability of human resources.

The programs requiring large expenditures of funds are, in fact, capital programs, but we are no longer making quite the same dis-

inction between these two. We are more and more undertaking what we call integrated projects where we combine a capital project with the program of developing technical assistance related to that project. I think you saw in the presentation for example, the Niger dam, where we are providing training. The Niger dam is actually financed primarily from multilateral sources, but under our bilateral program we are providing systematic training for the staff that is going to be running that project. This is now built into almost every one of our capital projects; programs designed to train people to run the project, as well as the capital resources to construct the project, in the first place.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Are you saying that the increase of capital assistance does not really represent the emphasis of CIDA as it relates to the total aid program?

Mr. Strong: Yes, I would say that you cannot look at the dollar comparison in terms of the program emphasis because inevitably there will be more dollars involved on the capital side than there will be on the educational and technical assistance side.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have just one last question, Mr. Chairman, in relation to capital assistance including soft loans. Do you really regard these as loans in the strict technical sense or is this merely a technique of getting aid out that is more satisfactory than it would be if it were given directly as a gift. Do you expect repayment in other words?

Mr. Strong: The basic philosophy behind development loans is really an assumption that development will be successful to the point that these countries inevitably will reach the stage where they will be capable of making repayment, but that is not likely to happen in the near future. In the meantime, we have to be concerned not to overburden them in the short term with repayments of principal and high interest charges.

Taking those separate factors into account, the Canadian development loans, I think, really serve both purposes rather well. First of all, they are for a period of 50 years, payment of ultimate principal is not required for 50 years, which certainly allows a rather long time for the development process to take effect. It does, however, call for ultimate repayment if the country presumably is in a position to pay at that point. In the meantime, because they are interest free and because there is a grace period of 10 years on

any form of repayment of principal at all. They have a maximum period during which the development loan does not impose a strain on their current development resources. It has to be admitted that if you take the actual present value of these loans at current interest rates, they have, what we would call in our development jargon, a very high grant component. In other words a development loan for 50 years at 0 per cent is very close in present value to a grant.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Yet the problem, as indicated is that the very gifts are becoming a chain around the neck of some of the countries that drags their foreign exchange and makes it impossible for them to divert as they might in their own effort.

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Mr. Strong: Right, that primarily is a result of high interest payments and relatively short-term loans requiring substantial annual repayments of principal.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Strong, what was the exact amount you said was given to Nigeria in emergency relief in 1968?

Mr. Strong: The figure shown on the chart, the principal amount, was \$2.6 million. In fact, that was the portion that was charged against our normal Nigerian allocation. There was another amount of approximately \$400,000 that appeared elsewhere as part of the Emergency Relief allocations, and I think one or two other places in the estimates. However, the total is \$3 million. The principal figure referred to in the presentation was \$2.6 million.

Mr. Allmand: Is this what was given in 1968 or up to the present time?

Mr. Strong: Up until March 31, 1969, the end of the 1969 fiscal year.

Mr. Allmand: Until March 31, 1969?

Mr. Strong: Yes, until the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. Allmand: Are we still responding to requests to give money to Nigeria to help them in their civil war? Is there anything budgeted for this fiscal year?

Mr. Strong: Well, as we mentioned in the presentation, it is extremely difficult to budget funds for emergencies. However, the extent of the Nigerian emergency is such that it relates to their entire development effort

and, therefore, we felt it appropriate to use funds that were designated for the normal Nigerian program to help out with the emergency. The budget for the normal program for Nigeria has not yet been agreed by the government, but it is very likely that it will be no less, and perhaps more, than the 1968-69 budget.

Based on the total allocations determined by Parliament, the Cabinet has to make a decision as to the allocation of these funds to individual countries, and while it has not yet made that decision on how it is going to allocate these funds amongst the various countries, our recommendation as an agency is that the Nigerian allocations be certainly no less than they were last year. That is a long way of saying that the chances are that there will be funds available at least equal to those provided last year.

Mr. Allmand: Does that figure that you mentioned include amounts of money that were given to the Red Cross and churches and found its way to Nigeria?

Mr. Strong: That includes only the government support for those activities. The \$3 million figure includes only actual government expenditures. Part of those expenditures were used to provide transportation costs, for example, for food and other materials that were provided by private agencies. Of course, the value of that food and the value of contributions in toto by private agencies is considerable. It is not included in these figures.

Mr. Allmand: In any case you would expect our emergency relief to Nigeria to continue this fiscal year?

Mr. Strong: Yes, indeed.

Mr. Allmand: How many persons were involved in the CESO program and do you have any plans for expanding that program?

Mr. Strong: The CESO program is a new program. Every new program takes time to get off the ground. The CESO program has made a good start when you compare it with its U.S. counterpart and its Japanese counterpart. It has actually put in the field more people at an earlier stage of development than each of those counterpart organizations. In fact, they had in the field at the end of the year some 28 people, as I recall, and since that time the number has built up considerably. There is a fair time lapse between the time a need is identified in a developing

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country and a man recruited from Canada and that man getting out into the field. I believe the figure was 28 at the end of the last fiscal year.

Mr. Allmand: I might say that I personally feel that this is a great source of manpower for overseas countries because we are having more and more early retirements resulting in a lot of men, whose talents I feel are being wasted, sitting around in Canada. I am sure that they would like to do this, so I am quite pleased that you are assisting this program.

Do you give any money to the assistance of the Coady International Institute at Antigonish?

Mr. Strong: We do not support the institute as such, but we support its programs. As a matter of fact, we have had a long and very happy relationship with the Coady Institute. We support many of the students who come from the developing countries to receive their training at the Coady Institute. I do not know the precise percentage but I think more than 50 per cent of the students in some of their programs are supported, in fact, through CIDA programs.

Mr. Allmand: In the same way that you support students at other Canadian universities?

Mr. Strong: Yes, indeed, but because of the specialized nature of the training provided at the Coady Institute, and the fact that it has had a relatively unique relationship with many of the developing countries, the percentage of the students financed under our program at that particular institute is probably higher than it is at most.

Mr. Allmand: In looking at the comparative DAC figures I notice that France has an exceptionally high percentage of its GNP dedicated to external aid and it out-paces all the others by quite an amount. Is this due to special aid programs to their former colonies or is France just giving that much more than all the other countries? When the DAC countries give aid it would have to be to underdeveloped or developing countries, would it not—not their language programs in developing countries?

Mr. Strong: No. The principal competition with the French are the Portuguese in terms of their performance under the DAC tables. I think Canada has always taken the position

that the DAC statistical tables, while useful in some degree, really do not provide an adequate measure of the total quality of a country's contribution to the aid process, and this is partly reflected by the fact that France and Portugal are at the top of the list.

The Portuguese program is relatively unique. It is related almost entirely to its overseas territories.

The French program is much more a conventional aid program in the sense that a good deal of what they spend is, in fact, spent on economic and social development, but it is very largely concentrated in those countries in French Africa and elsewhere which were formerly part of the French colonial empire, and a very large amount of the cost is related to the supporting of substantial numbers of French officials and French teaching personnel who previously served in those same countries under the colonial regime. That is not to say of course, that this does not represent a reasonable contribution to development, but it does mean that their program does benefit by inclusion of items which would not likely be included in a normal aid program.

Mr. Allmand: Do these figures include military assistance?

Mr. Strong: No, they do not.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we just have time for questions from Mr. Nowlan. We will be meeting again—in this same room at 3:30 p.m. and perhaps then we could pick up the questions from Mr. Howard and Mr. Cafik, Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, the hour is getting late, Mr. Chairman, and I have several questions, but first I would like to ask two and then in coming around the second time this afternoon get more details on something else that interests me.

Firstly, on a digression of Mr. Laniel's question about this Miles for Millions and the educational value of the type of thing we saw today for Members, something like that, or even less sophisticated and more graphic, for

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schools, including the Miles for Millions showing what a mile will do when they walk the mile, I feel, as the father of two daughters who walked more miles than I have ever walked, would be not only educational but productive in dollars in the future. Coming

down to the present, I would be interested, Mr. Strong, in the budget. As I understood the presentation, you said \$1 billion, as I remember it, has been contributed or paid out or allocated since 1950, and if that is correct, or whatever the total figure is in the program, I would like to know what part has been grants, loans or export credits, as a start?

Mr. Strong: Yes, the \$1 billion figure referred to was a figure for the total amount of contribution to the Columbo Plan area. The Columbo Plan has received the largest single amount of Canadian aid on a cumulative basis.

As to the division between loans and grants, my staff has copies of these and we had actually geared ourselves to provide them before the afternoon session when we thought we were going to get to the more detailed questions.

Mr. Nowlan: That is fine. I would like to pursue the outlay and the difference between the grants, the loans and/or export credits. Do you include an export credit as a loan or is it in a separate category?

Mr. Strong: The export credits are always a source of some confusion because they are not administered by our agency, we do not consider them aid, but we have to refer to them in reporting on total aid figures. That is why they figure in our presentation, otherwise there would be a gap between the figures that we are using and the figures quoted by DAC because under DAC's official figures long term assistance provided to developing countries, even if it is under export credit arrangements, if it exceeds five years in term, is counted as aid, and therefore, to be comparative with the performance of other nations, we have to include it. But it is not really a part of the Canadian Aid Program.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, if I could come back to that element this afternoon, either at first or when I get my turn next, I would like to pursue it.

I would like to ask a general question which perhaps relates to policy, and it struck me as we watched the pictures today, of the 77 countries, as I remember the figure, with less than \$500 per capita, how many of those countries have a birth control program or disseminate education in the schools or to the public on birth control? Is this an element in

policy as to how we contribute to an individual country? There are several questions there.

Firstly, I would like to know of the 77 countries—and it was pretty graphic, obviously, from some of the pictures you showed—with less than this \$500 per capita income, how many of them have any type of birth control program or centres or even allow information to be disseminated? Surely, there must be some study on this or some knowledge of this.

My second question is, as far as I am concerned, without getting too provocative, if a country is not going to help itself in some areas, is this an element in the contribution that Canada is going to make to that country? Or is this another area of policy that is under review? Is there any policy on it?

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, is this to be answered this afternoon?

The Chairman: Would this be more conveniently answered by you this afternoon, Mr. Strong?

Mr. Strong: It is going to open a rather wide area.

The Chairman: Would it be satisfactory, Mr. Nowlan, to hold that answer over until this afternoon when we have more time? Perhaps to...

Mr. Nowlan: That is fine. I could perhaps start in again then?

The Chairman: Yes, we will have you first on the list.

AFTERNOON SITTING

Tuesday, April 29, 1969.

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The Chairman: We are now in a position to proceed. In front of you there has been placed the annual report of CIDA and also a black binder containing a great deal of information with regard to the assistance programs of CIDA. Mr. Strong has told me that all the figures which were mentioned this morning in the visual presentation are in that black binder and a great deal of additional information as well.

I believe Mr. Nowlan has a question for Mr. Strong.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Just before noon I asked a couple of questions, one with regard to policy and two with regard to the budget, the amount of aid and the difference between grants, loans and, perhaps, export credit, all of which are represented in the total figure. I would like to mention, first, this question on policy and the choice of 77 countries, as mentioned in the presentation, of the total 115 that were again shown in the presentation this morning with a per capita income under \$500. Firstly, how many of those 77 countries have specific birth control program? Secondly, where there might not be a government birth control program is there the possibility or the availability of birth control information, and, thirdly, what the position of the Agency would be if there were a request for either information or actual birth control devices from a particular country?

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, with your leave before replying to this specific question, I wonder if I may introduce to you and to the Committee those of my colleagues who are with me and who may be called upon to explain and answer some of the questions. Would that be all right?

The Chairman: That would be fine.

Mr. Strong: On my immediate right, Mr. Denis Hudon, Vice President, Planning and Economics; on his right Mr. George Kidd, Vice President, Operations; sitting behind me here, Mr. Ross McLellan, Deputy Director General for Administration and Finance; at the end Mr. James Miller, Director General, Operations; Mr. Lionel Bonnell, Director General, Administration and Finance; Mr. Noble Power who looks after our Commonwealth Africa programs; Mr. Fergus Chambers, Director of the Planning and Economics Division; Mr. Jean Guerin my Executive Assistant and Dr. Henri Gaudefroy, Director General for Evaluation and Liaison.

If I may, I will now direct my remarks to reply to the hon. member's question. In the first instance, I really could not reply accurately in terms of the 77 countries. I could not tell you exactly how many of the 77 countries that receive some form of Canadian assistance actually have family planning programs. I can tell you that of the 10 countries or area in which our program is concentrated, each one of these countries has an official program of family planning. You will recall I mentioned that we consider the Commonwealth Carib-

bean as a single entity. Within that entity the two principal countries, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have official programs of family planning. Some of the smaller countries and territories also do, but I actually cannot give you a figure on which those do or do not. However, generally speaking, throughout the Caribbean area there is an official approach toward family planning.

Secondly—

Mr. Nowlan: Pardon me, Mr. Strong. Did I understand—someone was whispering in my ear about something else—you to say that in the 10 main countries there is some type of program?

Mr. Strong: Yes, in every one of the 10 countries or areas of concentration there is an official government family planning program. Your second question dealt with the extent to which we are influenced by—

Mr. Nowlan: You answered the first and second parts, I think, in your general answer. I asked about official or government programs and if there were not even a government program, if information and/or devices were available.

Mr. Strong: In each of these countries it is true that there is a program. There are varying degrees of commitment by the respective governments to the programs with varying degrees of effectiveness. This whole matter of effectiveness is a difficult one on which to make a judgment.

Mr. Nowlan: The last part of my question was what would be the reaction if there were a request from a country for either information or actual material help in regard to some type of birth control program. Have there been such requests and if so, what has been the reaction or what would be the reaction?

Mr. Strong: We have not had any official requests for assistance in the family planning area. However, this quite possibly may arise from the fact that it is very widely known in international communities that we are, at the moment, precluded from providing direct assistance in the area of family planning because of the interpretation applied to the existing Criminal Code legislation and its application within Canada. It has not been government policy to to outside of Canada what is not feasible to do in Canada. Howev-

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er, in our own planning of our programs it is obviously necessary to relate the total development assistance program to the economic effects of population increases and this kind of thing. Therefore, it is obvious that we are mindful of this and its importance in total economic terms in the allocation and implementation of aid, but we are not in a position to respond directly—

Mr. Nowlan: Officially.

Mr. Strong: —to request for specific assistance in this area.

Mr. Nowlan: I have one last question on this field in view of your last answer. Pardon me, I should say, in view of your last answer I have only one last question on this field. From your experience—I appreciate there has been a transition and you have been there, perhaps, a relatively short time—taking 1950 as the beginning, have you found in your period and/or the advice you are getting from your officials, more of an awareness in the emerging countries—in these under-developed countries—for this type of assistance, help or information?

Mr. Strong: Quite clearly, I think there is a general awareness amongst the professionals, if I may use that word to describe those people who are directly involved in aid and development programs, an awareness, in fact, that we just cannot ignore the whole field of population growth and family planning if you are to be seriously interested in the development field.

Mr. Nowlan: Could I ask a supplementary to my last question? Has the United Nations and some of its agencies actually officially moved beyond the position that we find ourselves in because of the interpretation of our Criminal Code?

Mr. Strong: Canada has taken the positive position in recent times in its attitude towards the involvement of the United Nations and its agencies in family planning areas. We have been willing to see them do this and, as a matter of fact, we have taken the attitude that the most effective instrumentalities for providing assistance in this field are, in fact, the multilateral ones.

Mr. Nowlan: Then a country interested in this could, perhaps, find help and assistance through a United Nations agency which at the

present time they could not find through the Corporation?

Mr. Strong: That is correct.

Mr. Nowlan: Turning now to another area, I would like to ask you about the amount of aid you mentioned earlier this morning. I was in error when I referred to a billion dollars. You told me that figure applied to the Colombo Plan. Is there a figure for external aid from the inception of the program which, I gather, started with the Colombo Plan?

Mr. Strong: Up until the end of the fiscal year 1969, the figure on the aid program as such, excluding export credits, would be \$1.8 billion or more precisely, \$1,803 million. You will find that figure on Table 2 of the figures that have been provided to you. Now, if you wish to add export credits granted under the Export Credits Insurance Act, less the payments during the period, that would add another \$407.6 million and the total after allowing for repayments would be \$2,125.3 million.

Mr. Nowlan: I see, thank you. Leaving that general total figure and referring to the figure on page 24 of your report where it states that Canada's contribution in the last fiscal year was .6 of national income, does that figure comprise grants, loans and export credits?

Mr. Strong: Yes, it does.

Mr. Nowlan: We already heard this morning that there is no interest on the loans for the first 10 years. Is that correct?

Mr. Strong: There is no interest during the entire fifty-year period of our fifty-year loans. We do have a thirty-year loan, but we have not made many of those. Most of our loans are on a fifty-year basis, no interest throughout the entire period, no repayment during the first 10 years and thereafter—after the first 10 years—repayment commences.

Mr. Nowlan: Still staying, Mr. Strong, with that .6 figure of . . .

Mr. Lewis: I have a supplementary on that. Are there no loans on which interest is charged?

Mr. Strong: The only loans on which interest is charged are those made by the Export Credits Insurance Corporation. We do not consider them aid, although they are considered aid in the international account and they are not administered by our Agency.

Mr. Lewis: Are they included in your figures?

Mr. Strong: They are included in the gross figures.

Mr. Lewis: Yes.

Mr. Strong: The reason for this is that they are included in the figures reported by the Development Assistance Committee. It is, admittedly, confusing, but when we are talking about gross aid figures we do include these.

There was a period when we charged a service charge of three quarters of 1 per cent on our loans as distinct from interest. About two years ago that service charge was removed, so now our loans are granted completely free of either interest or service charges.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, do you have a supplementary?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, Mr. Chairman. The gross loans to export credits anticipated for the next fiscal year is \$318 million. If this is so, would this not throw out considerably this gross figure?

Mr. Strong: This is a non-controllable factor as far as we are concerned. Export credit loans are not allocated as are our funds on an annual basis. They come out of a total pool of funds and it is difficult to predict in advance the amount of these that are going to be loaned to individual countries in the developing world. The repayments are more predictable, but the actual loans are in response to specific projects that arise and from our point of view and the point of view of the Corpora-

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tion that administers them, they are rather difficult to predict. In fact, from the point of view of this Committee, I would think it would be more realistic to look at the figures that actually are controllable by our Agency or controllable through these estimates.

Mr. Nowlan: I appreciate that Mr. Strong, but, again, referring to your gross figure of .6—I have a theme that I want to follow through and I do not know whether or not you will agree with my premise or my theme—in that figure there are these loans and export credits, but also in that figure there are moneys payable to Canadians either by buying a million dollars worth of tractors in Canada for Nigeria and/or salaries to the

people in Nigeria or in any other part of the world whereby the government recoups some of this in tax, does it not? In other words, you have given us a gross figure and it happens to be .6, but really you can subtract from that figure loans which are going to be repaid. Even as you were giving your presentation this morning there may have been some members who thought we were paying too much—I do not believe that even though the taxpayer wants value for his money and in this area it takes a little time to see a return perhaps—but if .6 per cent is your figure for the last fiscal year, you actually can deduct from that figure loans, the amount of export credits and/or the income tax that is recouped by government. In other words, as a result of these deductions you get a figure that is less than .6 per cent.

Mr. Strong: We do not have any figures that would be broken down that way, although, I think, when we quoted the figures—I think I referred to earlier the actual loan repayments under export credits—we had not yet taken into account any loan repayments under our normal development loans because actually this is so small that it is not really applicable. I think that by any other standard our aid is real aid. It could be argued, I think, that the effective cost to Canada of the aid we provide is reduced to the extent that it is used to buy Canadian goods and services and to the extent that because of our policies, the recipient country is receiving those goods and services at a slightly higher cost than might prevail if they were purchased competitively on the international market.

Mr. Nowlan: But of the total figure, can you tell us today how much of that is a loan factor?

Mr. Strong: No, I cannot. I can tell you how much was loaned, there is no question about that. If you will look at Table 2, it breaks it down between grants and loans or in the case of multilateral programs, advances. We certainly can give you that breakdown and you will notice that for the entire period until the end of the fiscal year 1969 under our bilateral program, \$69.1 million was for grants and \$375.5 was in the form of loans. Under the multilateral program, \$214 million was in the form of grants and \$145.2 million in the form of loans or advances in the nature of loans.

Mr. Nowlan: To follow that through, again, with my reference point of the fiscal year 1967-68, is the .6 to which you referred based on \$90 million under loans in the bilateral program and the \$17 million under the advances in the multilateral program?

Mr. Strong: Taking what year?

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Mr. Nowlan: How can you correlate the two?

Mr. Strong: If you use this Table 2, you will see that using 1968—what year would you prefer to use?

Mr. Nowlan: I am using the fiscal year 1967-68 when it was .6 per cent.

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: I am trying to figure out in that figure of .6 per cent how much of it is actually loans?

Mr. Strong: Well the total figure would be \$90 million under the bilateral program; \$17.7 million under multilateral to designated advances, plus \$63.6 million under export credits less \$19.7 million being repayments under export credits. Therefore, the net figure that you get down to at the end, on which the percentage is based, does take into account loan repayments under the Export Credits Insurance Corporation.

Mr. Nowlan: I do not want to belabour this, but it takes into account the loan repayments which is, in effect, \$20 million?

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: But the other remaining figures total over \$100 million. In other words your .6 figure really is almost one-third. One-third would come off, would it not?

Mr. Strong: I do not quite understand.

Mr. Nowlan: There is \$90 million and \$17 million for over \$100 million, plus \$63 million. There is \$171 million minus your \$19 million odd for a difference of \$151 million, which is part of your program and is part of the total figure and represents a pretty sizeable portion of your total figure. All I am trying to get at is that it could be argued your .6 per cent could be reduced accordingly, because in theory you are going to get the loans back.

Mr. Strong: If you consider that loans do not represent real outlay of resources, then

that would be true, but I think, as far as developing countries are concerned, they are receiving real resources up to 100 per cent value per dollar. If you look at it in terms of the cost to Canada and the fact that the loans are interest free and for such long periods—I forget the present worth factor now—and apply a present worth factor to reduce the value of those loans to their present value, if they were the equivalent of grants, the grant equivalent is about 90 per cent. In other words, a dollar given out as a loan for zero per cent interest for 50 years is equivalent to 90 cents roughly, perhaps a bit more than 90 as a grant. Therefore, the grant component—if I may use that jargon—of our development loans is over 90 per cent.

The Chairman: Mr. Strong, would it be fair to say that with these figures you are proceeding on a cash basis rather than an accrual basis? In other words, these figures represent your cash outlays for aid less your repayments. You do not treat a loan which is eventually repayable as a deduction from the grant of a particular year?

Mr. Strong: Oh, no, it is an actual commitment.

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Mr. Hudon has just pointed out that on an expenditure basis for the year 1967—and it may be the figures I was talking about are the actual appropriations for the year—if you get it down to the expenditure level, \$213 million was actually spent in 1967 of which \$35.3 million was in the form of loans. That, of course, highlights the difference between the way the development assistance committee presents its figures and the way the appropriations appear here. The development assistance committee is dealing with actual disbursements of aid, some of which arise from previous years' appropriations, whereas what I referred to in table 2 referred to our actual approved appropriations.

Mr. Nowlan: I will leave the floor after this last question, but I have other areas I would like to examine. Just on this point—and you may have answered it in a general way, Mr. Strong, before—but of the moneys, whether it is loans or grant, either by policy, equation factor, or percentage factor, or just an administrative percentage factor, how much of that money is spent in Canada, or in effect is spent by Canadians?

Mr. Strong: The basic policy in respect of Canadian bilateral aid is that we provide not dollars, but Canadian goods and services. That is based on the requirement that our funds be used normally to supply goods and services which have a Canadian content of 66 2/3 per cent or higher. This is the figure that has recently been reduced from 80 per cent and which we referred to earlier.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes. How about the multilateral?

Mr. Strong: The multilateral contributions are normally given as outright contributions, either loans or grants, to the multilateral agency and are not tied to Canadian goods and services.

Mr. Nowlan: As far as this .6 is concerned in the fiscal year 1967-68, and from your other answers, would it be fair to say that that is the absolutely gross figure and that if anything, because of Canadian purchase content, and/or this loan question and/or the export credit arrangements, it most likely in all probability would be less than .6 per cent to the Canadian taxpayer? How would you put it?

Mr. Strong: I would put it this way. These amounts of resources were in fact transferred to the developing countries. So, as far as they were concerned, they received resources equivalent. The effective cost to the Canadian taxpayer would have been somewhat reduced by some of the factors that you referred to.

Mr. Nowlan: I reluctantly pass.

The Chairman: I will put your name down for the second round. I now have Mr. Howard, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Legault and Mr. Thompson. Mr. Howard, you may proceed.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to Mr. Strong that I am very impressed by the work that CIDA does, but a number of years ago I read a book called "The Ugly American" and I wonder to what extent we might, as a nation, fall into the kind of situation in which the Americans have found themselves in various areas of the world?

Mr. Strong: I think that is a very real danger for all of us who are involved in aid and development programs. I do not think that there is any question that there is an adverse psychology set up in our relationships with

these countries by the very nature of the donor-recipient relationship. We prefer to refer to it as a co-operative relationship; it is in fact, and can only be a co-operative relationship. While we have our problems from time to time with individual Canadians in the field, by and large I think the kind of people we send out under our development programs are very aware of this and I think our record has been fairly good. In many instances the best ambassadors that Canada has are people who are sent out as experts under our program.

However, this is an ever present difficulty and it is a hazard inherent in aid programs and one that we try to overcome. Certainly, we have not learned all the answers to overcoming them, but we find that a good, well-intentioned capable Canadian can usually meet this problem head on and learn to win the confidence of the people he is working with and to tear down the barriers that exist.

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These barriers do exist at the very beginning: there are these preconceptions on both sides of the relationship. Therefore, you really have to start from a downhill position in a relationship of this kind. These things do work against you right from the beginning.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): At what level do we pay our people who are representatives overseas with CIDA in relation to the salaries they would be getting in Canada?

Mr. Strong: The policy is to pay people at a rate equivalent to what they were getting in Canada with suitable allowances for overseas service, for lack of continuity, and for the actual cost to them of relocating overseas.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In effect, then, they would be quite wealthy people in many of these countries where they live.

Mr. Strong: Yes. By the local standards our people are obviously more highly paid because Canadians receive more normally for an equivalent kind of work in Canada than their counterparts would in developing countries. This unquestionably also poses a problem.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Do they live then at that standard of wealth in those countries, comparatively speaking?

Mr. Strong: It varies very much with the local circumstances. In some cases the allowances and the salary that an expert would get even though equated to Canadian conditions would permit them to live at a very high level by the standards of the country concerned. In other cases, and it depends very much on the country, people experience real hardship. I have seen some of our experts who are living under conditions that were rather enviable, and others who were at the other end of the spectrum. By and large though, they are encouraged, and their salaries permit them, to live at a middle-class standard in the countries concerned, which would equate to their level in Canadian society.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In poorer countries would this not create a real barrier between the Canadians and the people whom they are serving?

Mr. Strong: It depends very much on what they are doing. They are not usually living under conditions that are much different from those of their local counterparts in terms of housing and that kind of thing. Their total salaries would be greater, but the housing is normally provided by the local government and it would be normally provided at the standard they would provide for a person equivalent in their own government service. By and large, the housing standard would not be, but the standard of reimbursement, the standard of salaries that they would receive, is unquestionably higher.

It is a two-edged sword really because in the one instance by the cultural standards of many of these countries a person who consciously lives at a lower level than his station in that country would normally entitle him to very often erodes his capacity to make a contribution, it undermines respect for him and this kind of thing. This is not true everywhere but it is sometimes a factor. It does not always work the way we think it would. Very often we had people who have chosen to live at a very sacrificial standard, one that was really below the standards normally acceptable even in the developing country for a person on his level, and it has not always had the effect it was intended to have. It is very hard to generalize about developing countries. Their cultures and their standards vary very considerably.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I understand that CUSO workers work at local

salary levels; is that correct? They live at local living conditions; is that right?

Mr. Strong: CUSO people are volunteers basically although we do not really use that word, that word does not fully describe all

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CUSO activities anymore. However, they are volunteers at least in the sense that they work at a local salary. Very often the nature of their activities, too, is such that they are involved on very much of a grass roots level, say, as a teacher in a village, this kind of thing, where conditions are a good deal more difficult for living, but, where they nevertheless can live at a reasonable standard. Again, it varies a good deal. I have seen some CUSO people who were living by the standards of their local environment very well, and some who were living under very sacrificial conditions. It is true that CUSO people, because they are contributing their salaries, because in many instances, they are working at lower salaries than they would be able to get if they were doing an equivalent job in Canada, are living at a level closer to the level of the people around them.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Would you say that this would erode their position and make it more difficult for them to do their jobs than if they were paid at higher levels as CIDA people are? You suggested earlier that it is necessary to maintain a position for the CIDA people. You feel they work better and are more respected if they are paid at Canadian salaries.

Mr. Strong: There are two sides to this, too. I do not want to be waffling on this but it is very hard to generalize. If you are talking, for example, about a CIDA expert, an economist who is a senior adviser to the planning commission in Tanzania—I am talking of a rather specific situation—I think the chances are that although in total salary a man like that would be getting a good deal more than his Tanzanian counterpart his every day level of life would roughly correspond with that of his Tanzanian counterpart. If he were to choose to live at a very much lower level than those people with whom he was working in the Tanzanian government, as distinct from the general mass of the people in Tanzania, then I am not at all sure that his effectiveness would be increased.

On the other hand, if a man is out in a community development project in a village

and he goes back every day to the big hotel, if there is such a thing in the area, and lives at a very much higher standard than all of the people with whom he is associating, that obviously would have a rather negative effect. I think it is really a matter of what is appropriate in a given instance.

We have to apply policy on something of consistent basis. We cannot force people to adapt to a certain standard of living. We have to do it on the basis of what is fair in terms of payment for Canadians who are prepared to undertake these assignments, on the one hand, and what is an appropriate level for them to live, on the other. We cannot be rigid in our interpretation of how they should live, but we govern it; we do it through the allowance system. We pay them what they would be getting in Canada, and we provide allowances that are designed to enable them to live at roughly the level appropriate to the job they are doing in the developing country.

Mr. Ryan: On this point I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. Are there not many capitals in the world today that designate areas specifically as residential areas for political, military, trade and foreign aid missions?

Mr. Strong: There are, yes.

Mr. Ryan: You have to pretty well fit into that picture?

Mr. Strong: I think it is important to distinguish permanent personnel who are assigned to our diplomatic missions for the purpose of helping to administer our official aid programs. These are accorded the normal diplomatic privileges and are, in fact, a part of the diplomatic establishment in the country. These are a relatively small number of people.

The people I assume the honourable member was referring to, and to which my replies have been directed, are the people we send out as teachers, professors, or experts. They go out under contract; they are not public servants. We contract for their services for specific periods of time, and they fill specific

have to live at a level appropriate to the particular post they are occupying.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You mentioned teachers. If we pay teachers at Canadian salaries, you are talking perhaps \$12,000 a year or somewhere in that neighbourhood. What is the equivalent for a teacher in the West Indies? What are they getting, \$40 a month?

Mr. Strong: Mr. Kidd may wish to reply to that.

Mr. G. P. Kidd (Deputy Director General (Operations), Canadian International Development Agency): This again would vary, but it would be higher than that, I think more in the order of \$150 probably.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): We will say \$150 as against about \$1,000 a month. Do you really feel this is not a serious barrier in our people trying to work at that level. I am concerned about it; I think it could be.

Mr. Strong: There is no question that these things are barriers and problems, but this whole process of international development is not an easy one. On the one hand you want to provide them with good people, and, to be fair to Canadians, we are quite happy to have as many Canadians as are prepared to come forward and volunteer their services at a very low price: we have volunteer programs designed to take advantage of that. But you cannot meet the needs of the developing countries for the kind of really skilled people that they require on a purely volunteer basis. What we are really trying to do is build up their own capabilities. The type of people that we are requiring more and more in our aid programs are people that are pretty highly skilled, and characteristically are at a stage in their life when they have family responsibilities, where they have to make a break with their professional careers, and however they may be interested in this, they really cannot normally be expected to take these assignments unless they can get a salary that is comparable to what they are accustomed to getting.

There is no question that it does set up difficulties, and that is one of the reasons why our main emphasis is on developing their own capabilities. We are going, as we mentioned in our presentation earlier, to what we call "third country training", which means taking people from one developing country and training them in another developing country,

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posts. There is a great variety of posts, everything from wild game management to advising presidents and prime ministers. This is why you cannot have a canned answer for how each of these people should live. They

because it is true that the things you point to do constitute problems.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Working, as you are, as a government department, do you feel that this is a satisfactory arrangement for something which is quite different from most government departments? I presume that you are required to hire through the Public Service Commission and follow all the necessary procedures of government service? Would you not be in a better position, for instance, as a Crown Corporation?

Mr. Strong: Let me say only that there is no question that there are a lot of special difficulties related to the operation of a program that extends beyond Canada into a number of other countries. It involves cultural barriers, language barriers, intergovernmental relationships, and these do require special administrative flexibilities and we have been successful in getting a bit of relief here and there from some of the rigidities that necessarily prevail in the operation of domestic programs. I would have to say that I think our program would be improved if we had more flexibility. I think there is a general understanding of this within the government and there are obvious problems related to accomplishing this about which I have to be patient and understanding too.

Mr. Nesbitt: Mr. Chairman, on a supplementary.

The Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt, on a supplementary.

Mr. Nesbitt: Does not the government of the United Kingdom get around this problem by excluding all of their foreign service from the regular requirements of the public service commission?

Mr. Strong: I do not know that the foreign service as a whole is excluded. They have their own rules and regulations.

Mr. Nesbitt: I meant excluded from the general rules of the British public service.

Mr. Strong: Yes, I think they do have, but I do not think this applies to the actual operation of their aid program any more than it applies to the operation of their diplomatic missions.

Mr. Nesbitt: No, but it applies generally to that whole field?

Mr. Strong: Yes, I think that is correct.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik? On a supplementary, Mr. Prud'homme.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Prud'homme: A supplementary question. You would be happier if you had more latitude as far as this problem is concerned. Is this what I should deduce? It is very interesting and very important for us to know this, because we would have the same fears that you have, i.e. the lack of flexibility of the public Service.

[English]

Mr. Strong: I am not sure the extent to which I should allow my personal feelings on the subject to influence my answer, but in all honesty I would have to say that I think we are making progress but that it is not really feasible to run a good aid program when subject to all the conventional rigidities that apply to domestic public service operations.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Prud'homme: I agree with you.

[English]

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Mr. Cafik: Mr. Strong, my questions are related to some extent to those raised by Mr. Howard and by some other members. I want to compliment you on the presentation that was made today. I agree with Mr. Laniel that it would be important to get this kind of message across to the Canadian people, particularly, the younger people of Canada. I am proud, frankly, of the efforts made by your Department in helping underdeveloped countries. I would like to see, however, a little more effort, perhaps, being taken in encouraging the individual members of our society—business, individual people, particularly young people—in involving themselves more directly in this work in a voluntary way, and this has been alluded to. I wonder what you think in terms of, for instance, industry itself. I do not see any reason why some of our larger corporations, who have many skilled people who I am sure would be very useful in the work that you are doing, should not be encouraged to donate such personnel for a one, or two, or three year period. Is this being done, or is any encouragement being given in this direction?

Mr. Strong: Yes, I very much agree that this is an important program emphasis. We have made what I think are some pretty significant beginnings in this area. In the last year we initiated what we call our private agencies program. We have set up a special

division for this purpose and this has succeeded, I believe, inducing a great deal more of the kind of activity to which you refer involving participation by individuals through their own private voluntary organizations in a much wider range of international development activities.

We have also recently set up a business and industry division, the purpose of which is to enlist the co-operation and support of Canadian business and industry and, also, to bring to their attention opportunities which exist for them in developing countries.

I think the Canadian Executive Service Overseas, which was founded with the assistance of our office, and with the assistance of its predecessor CUSO, is a good example. Here we have a board of about 70 of the leading businessmen in Canada. It is staffed entirely by retired businessmen or businessmen who were prepared to take early retirement in order to work at this activity and there is a growing stream of business people who are going out to developing countries under this program. We have also in our office a number of people who have come forward from the business world and who have volunteered either at no salary or at a very much reduced salary.

We have got the vice-president of one of the leading advertising firms in Canada, who is undertaking a seminar at a very nominal remuneration to him; it is just a fraction of what he would command in private life. He is undertaking to put on seminars across the country in response to the requests we have been receiving from communities for a greater amount of information on aid and development.

We also have a number of senior advisers who have come to us under special contracts at salaries considerably less than what they command in private life.

So, I would agree that this is an important area and we have certainly been attempting to illustrate the importance we attach to it by the programs we have initiated in this area.

Mr. Cafik: Have any specific requests or approaches been made to specific businesses, for instance, where they may have specialized personnel who are capable of doing this work and who you might think could well afford to donate such persons? Is this type of approach being made to individual firms?

Mr. Strong: Indeed. As a matter of fact, business firms are one of our principal sources of expertise. Let me just mention, for

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example, the food industry: the food industry in Canada has done something that is relatively unique. It raised money from amongst its own members and promoted a program of providing assistance to developing countries in the field of food technology. One of our leading grocery chains, whose chairman has taken a real lead in this area, has also been willing to free up some of his own senior personnel to undertake specialized assignments for us in developing countries. I think that the food industry as a whole, because of its involvement in this Mysore project, first of all, and what they now call the Canada Plus One project, has really opened itself up to the whole field of international development. As a result, its interest has grown and its willingness to help us with skilled people has grown considerably.

Mr. Cafik: Now a question in respect to the soft loans that you referred to. I gather they are interest-free for the entire 50-year period; is that correct?

Mr. Strong: That is correct.

Mr. Cafik: I wonder, following this same theme of involvement of the private sector in the work that you are doing, has any thought ever been given to perhaps issuing interest-free development bonds, as it were, that people might invest in this? They would get their capital back in due course, but there would be no interest; thereby the charge to this government would be less and perhaps the availability of funds more. Has any thought been given to this type of approach?

Mr. Strong: It is a very interesting suggestion. I am not so sure that it is appropriate for me to comment in the sense that we are responsible for the spending of the money and not for the raising of it. However, it is certainly a very interesting suggestion.

Mr. Cafik: I have one last question along this same line again. At one time, a little while ago, a particular Minister talked in terms, perhaps, of a youth corps of some kind or a youth draft that might be used in this area. I wonder what your thoughts are in that regard, or, if failing a type of draft, at least to take advantage of the thousands of highly motivated young people in our country today who really have something to offer and do not seem to have an adequate vehicle through which to offer it?

Mr. Strong: We do not have a direct program in our own agency for this purpose. The reason we do not is that there is a much more effective program being operated by a private agency, CUSO. We feel this agency is able to deal very effectively with the provision of opportunities for young people to do meaningful, useful things in the developing countries. Because of that, we have supported to a very sizeable extent the CUSO budget and its expansion. It has been expanding at a rate that is, I think, pretty consistent with its capabilities administratively of handling that expansion.

There have been ideas for a much broader youth program, but many of the ideas that I have seen put forward in this area have been more addressed to the problem of involving Canadian youth for the value of the experience to them rather than for the value of their contribution to developing countries. I think it has to be appreciated that there is quite a difference here.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I think it could not help but have both effects nonetheless. On this thing with CUSO, as a matter of information, is it a necessary prerequisite that the volunteers in CUSO be university students, or is this open to any citizen, any young person in Canada?

Mr. Strong: I understand it is open to any person and it is not confined to young persons. CUSO started off, of course, principally as a university enterprise. It has, in fact, grown because of the tremendous support it has received from the universities and it continues to receive that support. However, it has broadened its activities to make it possible now for people of really all ages—I am not sure what their minimum age is, 18, 19 or something like that—but there is no upper range. I think there are CUSO volunteers who are over 60, in fact one or two who have been over 70.

Mr. Cafik: Fine, thank you very much.

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The Chairman: Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Strong, I want to pursue with you a different line, if I may. I have not looked through the material that was just given us so I will have to refer to a return which was tabled on April 2 in reply to some questions I put on the Order Paper. The answers were, no doubt, prepared by your division.

I noticed with some concern the gap between the appropriations and the expenditures, year by year. Beginning with 1964-65, Parliament voted \$226 million; it is given as \$224 million, I think, on your Table II. The expenditures, according to the return in that year, were \$152.5 million, and in 1965-66 it was an expenditure of \$143.7 million as against an appropriation of \$214.7 million and so on down the line every year. My arithmetic for the years 1964 to 1968, the four years inclusive, shows that over that period of four years you spent only just under 71 per cent of the amounts voted by Parliament. I appreciate that some would be carried over from one year to the other, that is why I took for my guidance the four-year period rather than year-by-year. It seems to indicate to me a failure somewhere of planning in your division or something. Our total appropriations are not so large that it is a matter of satisfaction to see that even the amounts we do vote in Parliament are not used up. What is the explanation for that?

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, this is a very important question. I think it should be understood that there are really two main explanations here. One is inherent in the lag that necessarily always exists between appropriations and expenditures, which I will come back to, and the second is the peculiar conditions surrounding the program the last couple of years while we have been experiencing a major re-organization.

On the first question, when Parliament votes funds—except for food and commodity aid, which are quickly dispersed in the sense that you simply buy the food or the commodities and ship them—a good deal of our aid is given in the form of projects, some of them capital projects or some of them technical assistance projects. These projects require a good deal of time to develop and to implement.

When you start to build a school, you first of all have to do the planning. You do a feasibility study and then you do a plan and you have to get agreement of each stage with the government concerned and then you have to start implementing it. These projects may take five or six or even seven years in some cases to complete. The expenditures in the first year may be very, very minor. The total expenditure is made over a period of a number of years. So when you have an increasing program you inherently are bound to have a considerable lag between the level of each

year's appropriations and the level of that year's expenditures.

Secondarily, and peculiar really to the last couple of years, we have been going through a period of rigid evaluation of the experience that we have had in the aid field since 1950 when we began. We were not at all satisfied with our own planning procedures, with our own procedures for evaluating projects and with our own procedures for implementing them. That is not to say we are in any way trying to criticize what has gone on in the past because we were dealing to some extent in the dark in the past. All aid agencies have had this problem. Our experience has been relatively limited.

We have had enough experience now to be able to apply its lessons to trying to produce a better program.

As the person responsible administratively, I was just not prepared to see us spend money on things that I did not feel were well-planned or well-conceived or where the money could not be effectively spent. So we have concentrated the last couple of years on trying to give ourselves the kind of organizational machinery that will permit us to spend this money effectively. It is inevitable that during this period the normal lag between appropriations and expenditures has become somewhat exaggerated. I am satisfied that it is a very temporary thing. I feel it is justified. I feel we will have a better program because of it and I think we will have a better capability of reporting increased expenditures to you in the future.

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Mr. Lewis: With great respect, Mr. Strong, I want to tell you frankly that what you have said does not satisfy me. I was almost going to say it does not impress me at all. First, you are doing yourself an injustice. The actual percentage of expenditure to appropriation in the two years that you have been director has not gone down. When did you start, if I may ask?

Mr. Strong: About three years ago.

Mr. Lewis: About three years ago. In 1966-67 it was 78.9 per cent, and in 1967-68 it was 68 per cent as compared to two-thirds in 1965-66 and two-thirds in 1964-65. So that the factual basis of your answer is not supported by the figures. Since you have taken over the percentage, the proportion, of appropriations actually spent has not decreased.

This is what I could not understand when this was first drawn to my attention and I ask these questions; surely when Parliament is asked to vote a certain amount of money I assume that it is asked to do so because of some representations made by your predecessor, or by yourself, to the government. I assume those representations are related to plans that you have already investigated. You do not pull figures out of the air. I hope that when you ask the government for a certain appropriation for a year it is because you have forecast the likely expenditures you will have based on the studies made and on the plans that you have for that year. If that is not the case, I would like to know how you do arrive at the figures and why there is this lack of planning in the appropriations requested. There must be a lack of planning or this result would not be there.

Mr. Strong: Well let me answer your two questions basically. First, to explain what I meant when I said that the lag has been greater during the last two years, that does not necessarily tie directly into the figures simply because as I mentioned earlier, the expenditures are a product of a pattern which takes place over a period of years. The expenditures were actually less. Our program was slowed up during this period; I assure you I am accurately reporting this. It slowed up beyond what it would have been had we not been going through this reorganization. I did not say that it had been reduced either absolutely or as a percentage of total. In fact the expenditures, and more particularly the rate of new commitment, has been slowed up. That will have an effect over a period of the next several years but it will be a lessening effect as the period lengthens out.

Second, on your over-all question, the aid program in all countries is peculiar in the sense that there is for all practical purposes an almost unlimited need for aid; certainly, in terms of anything that is now being done. So the constraint is on the speed with which governments are prepared to move up their aid budgets.

A budget is not put together really, like budgets of other departments, on the basis of taking planned projects and determining what they are going to cost and then petitioning the government for financing on that basis; it is based on the fact that there are very large needs. We must be in a position to know what the government is going to spend before we can commit on programs. We have

known for some time the government's policy of moving its budget up and we have assumed in our planning that there would be an increase. We would have been able to increase our expenditures in the last couple of years quite a lot had we not taken the attitude that I was referring to earlier; that we wanted to take a complete new look at our standard of planning and evaluation. It

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would have been possible to increase our expenditures considerably over this last couple of years.

Mr. Lewis: But is your study complete?

Mr. Strong: Oh, yes.

Mr. Lewis: Or is there going to be a longer delay; two years seems to me to be a fairly good time.

Mr. Strong: No, I think that is true. It is not just a matter of thinking it through. We did not have, for example, any economists on our staff two years ago. We had one or two people with economics training, but they were not practising economists. It is pretty difficult to make a really good evaluation of a country's development plan and its progress in the development field without having some economic expertise. So we have had to get these people and we have had to put them together in team that can be evaluating.

Mr. Lewis: Do you mean that from 1951 to 1967 there was not an economist in the External Aid division?

Mr. Strong: That is right.

Mr. Lewis: That is a revelation worth having, Mr. Strong. What other expertise did the division lack that you acquired in the last two years in your restudy?

Mr. Strong: I think it should be explained that the lack of these people does not necessarily mean that you could not have a good program; our program was not big enough at that stage to justify a lot of these things. However, when we are going into a larger program, and we are concentrating that program, we really do have to have a fair amount of professional expertise, not only economists but expertise in some of the particular sectors we deal in.

We found, for example, that agriculture is a very major element in our program and we really had nobody on our staff who was able

to assess our agricultural programs as agricultural programs. We now have a senior advisor who is able to help us evaluate the requests we receive in the agricultural fields by using professional criteria related to his own profession in the field of agriculture.

Mr. Lewis: Where did you get him?

Mr. Strong: He is Dean Bentley, Dean of Agriculture for the University of Alberta.

Mr. Lewis: When did you get him?

Mr. Strong: About a year ago. We also have a man in forestry, because forestry programs are important. We have a special adviser who helps us evaluate the professional aspects of our forestry programs. We have a man in the fisheries field who helps us evaluate the professional aspects of our fisheries programs.

Mr. Lewis: All of these people have been retained in the last year or so?

Mr. Strong: Yes. It takes a while to actually integrate, to get competent people, to make them a real ongoing part of your organization.

Mr. Lewis: I think, Mr. Strong, you and your colleagues have justified your appointment as far as I am concerned. I am just surprised beyond words that these things have happened only in the past year. May I ask you this. Sometime ago, I have not got the date, a Mr. Chambers in your organization...

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: ...made a statement, I think to this Committee, that 1 per cent of national income target or 1 per cent of GNP target—I forget which one he was dealing with at the time, I think it was GNP—was not likely to be reached by 1975, if I represent what he said correctly and I think I do. Is that still the thinking of the agency?

Mr. Strong: We have had discussions on this and I think Mr. Chambers who is here would say that what he intended to relate at that point was that if you took mathematically the present rates of increase and extrapolated them you would not reach it by that point.

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Mr. Lewis: I agree with that, although I did not work out the exact year. I wanted to ask whether it is still the thinking of your agency that the most recent UNCTAD target

of 1 per cent of GNP will not be reached in Canada before 1975?

Mr. Strong: This is not really for me to say, I can only report to you what has been done. I would refer you to the fact that the government has said on several occasions that it intends to reach the international target; that is, the original UN target.

Mr. Lewis: Yes.

Mr. Strong: Based on gross national product at market prices, or at factor cost, I guess.

Mr. Lewis: National income was the original one.

Mr. Strong: By the early 1970s. The government is on record as saying that. The government also voted affirmatively on the redefinition by the last UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi of the target to put it on the basis of gross national product, but it established no date by which Canada intended to reach that.

Mr. Chairman: Would you permit a supplementary by Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Lewis: Yes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My question is supplementary, Mr. Chairman. I do not say this criticizing the fact that we are spending too much; we are not spending enough, but on the basis of the statistics that you have given in your annual report, we will never reach 1 per cent because we are going downhill. We reached a peak in 1966 of 67 per cent of gross national income, we went down the next year to 59 and this year we are down to 50 per cent. When you compare that with the various countries that are listed here, we are the lowest of all the countries that are participating as "have nations" under UNCTAD and this concerns me.

Mr. Strong: I think you have to realize that the figures for a given year do include some distortions. For instance, there are substantial amounts of food aid in some of the years in response to emergencies or substantial amounts of uncontrollable, on our part, Export Credit loans. Actually if you look back a little bit beyond the years that you mentioned . .

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Then we were on the upward incline until 1967. Since then we have been on the downward trend.

Mr. Strong: Yes, but in terms of absolute values we have been increasing. One of the

problems—it is a good problem, I guess, for Canada—is that our GNP during these periods has increased at a faster rate than that on which the original estimates had been based.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I would like to see this related to GNP. This is related to gross national income. If it were related to GNP it would be much worse.

Mr. Lewis: The national income, of course, goes up with your GNP.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I know, but the percentage is much worse.

Mr. Lewis: The percentage would be worse. Having seen these figures, having seen the not very edifying performance of Canada as a proportion of national income over the years and having read the criticisms of DAC—the Development Assistance Committee—of OECD about Canada's performance, I would like to ask you—if you can answer and if you feel free to answer—whether your Agency has been asked by the government to prepare a program of expenditures which over two, three or four years would reach the UNCTAD target?

Mr. Strong: I think I could say that we now take this into account because the latest UNCTAD target, as I explained, is not a commitment by the government to any particular period of time, but we certainly have all of the planning necessary to permit us to increase our aid program to reach the announced government intention of achieving 1 per cent by the early 1970's.

Mr. Lewis: Can we talk simple figures? I am not an economic expert or a statistician. We now spend, including the Export Credits things which are really loans at a rate of interest—if you took them out, you would have much less—between five-tenths and six-tenths of 1 per cent of the gross national income or somewhere in there. In order to make that gross national product as distinct from gross national income, you would immediately have to increase by some 20 per cent. Is that not right? Is that not about the difference?

Mr. Strong: Right now, Canada's gross national product is, I believe, something in the order of \$67 billion?

Mr. Lewis: Yes.

Mr. Strong: On that basis today, 1 per cent would be \$670 million and if you assume .2 of

1 per cent to cover private flows, the official program would have to be about .8 which would be roughly \$500 million or something in the order of...

Mr. Lewis: As of today.

Mr. Strong: As of today...

Mr. Lewis: Assuming a modest increase in gross national product of 4 to 5 per cent a

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year—whether it is constant dollars or current dollars, let us not get into that—but assuming that kind of increase, you would have to increase your present program of about \$300 million by an average of at least 20 per cent per year to arrive at the 1 per cent in 1974, would you not?

Mr. Strong: I think that is a pretty fair statement.

Mr. Lewis: So Mr. Chambers was not far out because the likelihood of an increase of more than 20 per cent per year is not very great unless the government really is prepared to give it a serious boost.

Mr. Strong: There is no question that increases in the GNP each year obviously extend the amount by which you have to increase your aid program.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): So they should.

Mr. Strong: Certainly, but if Canada's GNP grows at 6 per cent, that is \$5 million a year...

An hon. Member: Roughly.

Mr. Strong: About \$4.5 million a year, it would take just 1 per cent of that increase to make...

Mr. Lewis: About \$40 million.

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: May I ask one other set of questions? I have some more on this score, but perhaps others will pursue it. For the past three years you have been making a study of reorganization, a study of programs and so on. Could you tell this Committee, to the extent that it is not classified or secret which I hope much of it is not, exactly what were the points that were concerning you? What kind of programs did you find in your study was not entirely sensible and what kind of improvement did you find was necessary to

make more sensible programs? I know this is a very broad question, but I, as one member, and I am sure other members of the Committee would like to know what you came up against in your study and what improvement you thought ought to be made in the programs?

Mr. Strong: I cannot give you too long an answer to that question.

Mr. Lewis: Quite objectively.

Mr. Strong: First of all, let me say that when talking about change—and about improvements and changes—I do not want in any way to imply any reflection on the previous administration because aid programs are very new and anybody responsible for our program at this stage would obviously look at and apply the lessons of the past. It is not a matter of looking critically at the past, but of looking constructively at the future.

Mr. Lewis: You can take for granted we understand that.

Mr. Strong: One of the important areas, of course was this very one that you have been highlighting the realization that our program was going to expand to a very large program and the processes and the procedures that were appropriate to a much smaller program really were not going to permit us to spend effectively the much larger amounts of money that would be involved in the government's commitment to 1 per cent. This was one thing. We realized we had to be more professional; we had to realize this was a long-range commitment and that it was not just a year by year ad hoc response to emergencies, but a long-range process of Canadian involvement in development. This meant that we had to bring in people who had professional expertise in the various areas that I referred to, so one of the jobs was an organizational job.

Then, in looking at our actual programs, we have had to review—some of this has been done and some of this is in the process of being done—such things as the role of Canadian institutions outside of government, knowing that really our agency cannot be a resource in itself. The purpose of our agency is to relate Canadian resources to the needs of developing countries. Inherently, that means we must have a knowledge of the needs in the developing countries, we must have a knowledge of Canadian resources and we must have the kind of expertise that will

permit us to reach into Canadian society to tap the resources and create a program that relates them to the needs. Obviously we have to involve many of these institutions as institutions, so we have to know what kind of resources there are in these institutions. The universities are very good examples.

Mr. Lewis: Excuse me for interrupting, but the answer you have given deals with Canada...

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: ... with the same kind of thing you have to do in Canada.

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: Are your studies not concerned with the kind of program we enter into from

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the point of view of the needs of the recipient country and have you found that some of the programs we undertook earlier may not have been the wisest from the point of view of the recipient country? I am sure you are as anxious as I am to think from their point of view as well as from the administrative, bureaucratic Canadian point of view.

Mr. Strong: I was coming to that because on the one hand we have been looking at our resources, realizing we are going to need more of them and, therefore, we have to have a better understanding of where they are and under what conditions they can be made available to us in Canada. So we have had a number of studies including, for example, a study by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada of the resources available throughout the Canadian universities. Then looking, quite rightly, as you said, at the developing countries, we have been doing a number of studies of their own needs, on the one hand, and the special ways in which we could meet those needs. A good example is in the agricultural field. I think we have referred in our presentation to an agricultural task force. India is the biggest single recipient of Canadian aid. One of India's principal problems is an agricultural problem.

Mr. Lewis: Famine.

Mr. Strong: Rather than just sit back and wait to receive requests from the Indians, we decided to get together a group of leading Canadian experts in various aspects of the food and agricultural field, send them out to

India after quite a long period of preparation here, and have them do an in-depth study of the needs of Indian agriculture related to those things in which we can help the Indians. Out of that we have developed, through a process of dialogue with them, an understanding on both our part and theirs, of the particular ways in which we can help them most. Out of this process, they are making requests to us for help.

Mr. Lewis: Are they participating in this study?

Mr. Strong: Oh yes, the team was Canadian, but it went out to India and worked very closely with the Indians. After receiving their report, we worked out a program with the Indians which is based on that report. As a result, they now know the areas in which we can help them best, and we know the areas in which they have the greatest needs. Therefore, the projects that they are now requesting from us are made within the framework of this understanding. They are not just made in the dark. We have a set of guidelines for the next five years or more which will help us to rationalize our program and to do those things that we are most capable of doing.

Mr. Lewis: Have you done this in other fields, in other countries?

Mr. Strong: Yes, Ceylon is another area of concentration. We employed a very high-grade, knowledgeable expert in the field of development who spent several months in Ceylon making a detailed review of our entire program; taking the World Bank and other reports on Ceylon's development, reviewing the things needed for the next five years, and working out with the Ceylonese a strategy for Canadian aid in Ceylon for the next five-year period, identifying a number of particular sectors in which we should specialize.

Mr. Lewis: Excuse me for interrupting. To what extent do you make these studies in your agency in consultation and co-operation with the multilateral agencies such as the UN Technical Assistance Board, other UN agencies, the World Bank and so on? To what extent are we carrying on studies on a purely bilateral basis? This makes me very unhappy. One of the things that I think is wrong, if I may say so without being too presumptuous, is that the total aid field in the world is far too bilateral in the case of our country and the United States and not sufficiently multilateral through international agencies so that

the "ugly American" problem would disappear. You would not have Canada versus somebody; there would be a multilateral agency.

To what extent are we doing these studies and making our decisions, even in the bilateral sphere, on the basis of consultation and co-operation with multilateral agencies?

Mr. Strong: Our starting point is the existing knowledge. We begin with the World Bank studies and the U.N.D.P. information. We, as members of these organizations, of course, get this information. This, combined with the development plan of the country concerned is the way in which we carry out these studies. Our job is not to duplicate the

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efforts of others, but really to look at those particular areas which are of concern to our program. Our studies are related to developing a Canadian program, and that means we must know what others are doing so that we may select the areas in which we can make our best contribution. However, in the process of doing this, we too make a contribution to the store of international knowledge. I have just come back from an important agricultural meeting in Europe, where we had most of the key people associated with the agriculture revolution. I was told by the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee that the report of our agricultural task force was the best contribution he had seen to this whole agricultural field. We take something from the international experience and we like to think that we do make a contribution to it too.

Mr. Lewis: Do you want to stop me, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: We do have quite a few others who want to ask questions, but continue, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: May I take you to one other point? Are you attempting to stimulate private investment in the developing nations?

Mr. Strong: We are attempting to stimulate interest in Canada in investing in those developing nations where the nations themselves here, or do you let our industry and business have a policy of encouraging private investment. We have no policy of urging the countries themselves to do this if this is not something that they already want to do.

Mr. Lewis: What do you do in that respect, if I may ask specifically? Do you let the developing country know what might be available in Canada know what might be wanted in the developing country, or is it still a hope?

Mr. Strong: No, I would say we have made a rather modest start. Our program is not extensive in this area. We have really just started to do it on any scale. We have just set up the particular division for this purpose. The idea really is to provide information primarily to those Canadian companies, particularly smaller and medium sized companies, that are interested in extending their own operations into the developing countries. We provide information based on that which originates in the countries concerned.

Mr. Lewis: Is it equity investment that is going out? Are we going to be in the position of owning some proportion of somebody else's economy as our own is owned by somebody else, or are we providing loan capital to those countries?

Mr. Strong: No, it is usually a combination. These deals are worked out by the private companies concerned, but in general they would involve, I would think, equity and loan capital. However, the total amount of money we are speaking of here would be relatively small. In many ways the public sector is not really in a position to provide the combination of capital and technical assistance in some of the areas that we are talking about—in industrial plants, and so on. Under our system it is not really feasible for governments to make that kind of expertise available, except to the extent that private enterprise is willing to transfer its experience by making an equivalent facility in the developing country.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather has a supplementary question.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, I was struck this morning by your evidence concerning the Commonwealth Caribbean, and knowing the long history of the Canadian banking system there, I would like to ask specifically what the Canadian banks are doing over and above the pursuit of profit; what are they doing either in the development bank field or in concert with the development bank or on their own?

This seems to me to be an area where the experts are there, the money is certainly

there, and the moral obligation is there. What is happening to the Canadian banks in the Caribbean?

Mr. Strong: I could really give you only a general answer based on general knowledge. We do not have any specific figures, but from my general observations I would say that the Canadian banking community is very active down there. They, of course, accumulate sav-

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ings in their branch banking system there and so it does not always represent a transfer of resources from Canada. It is very often an accumulation of local resources and a reuse within the local area of those resources. I think about as much as I could say is that they are very active. We find them coming to us very often for information and taking an interest in particular projects.

We know that they provide financing locally for some of the projects that are, in part, financed indirectly by us through our aid programs, so we know they are very alert and active, but I could not put any figure on that opinion.

The Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt on a supplementary.

Mr. Nesbitt: Have any inquiries been made to the Canadian commercial banks in the Caribbean area with respect to making interim credit available, and I have in mind credit of the nature of the Farm Improvement Loans Act, and the Small Businesses Loans Act. I might say, in this regard, that I visited a number of the islands not long ago, and discussed the matter with representatives of two of the largest banks; they said they would be very interested in doing this if there could be some appropriate guarantee similar to the Farm Improvement Loans Act.

Mr. Strong: We have no fixed program at this point. We have not received, to my knowledge, any specific request of this kind; however, we do have a study under way at the present time of various ways in which assistance to private enterprise might complement and supplement our official aid program in the Caribbean area specifically.

Mr. Nesbitt: In Trinidad they wish to develop a certain variety of cattle raising and convert sugar cane raising to corn raising for beef cattle and they need this interim kind of capital for that purpose.

The Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt, you almost answered your own question. Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: Yes, I have one final question, Mr. Chairman. I offered to end whenever you told me to but I have a final question. I know the answer may be difficult, or there may be no answer. May I put it to you this way? I have done a little reading in this field over a number of years, and I have wondered a great deal about whether some of the developing countries are putting too much emphasis on industrial development as opposed to agricultural development thereby improving their methods of producing food for their people and putting that on a firm basis before any large part of available capital goes into industrial development. I appreciate there are some things that must be done such as building power grids of one sort or another for the future et cetera, but I wonder if in your studies you have reached any conclusion about that.

My attention, I may say, was first drawn to this by a long article I read several years ago on precisely this point—I cannot tell you where now, but I am sure it impressed me—this constant problem of providing food for the people so that at some point you get to the position where you can start accumulating capital instead of being constantly in the famine or hunger situation.

Mr. Strong: I think most people now looking back over the past two decades of experience in development would agree that probably too little emphasis was placed on agriculture up until recent years. It is I think, in the process of correction now. I do not think it necessarily follows that the efforts made at industrialization were necessarily wrong, it is just a matter of emphasis within the total approach. There is a lot of concern now being expressed through, about the future of industrialization because we see that one of the aspects of the agricultural revolution is that more food can be produced by fewer people. If you look at this in conjunction with the population increases, you can see that the number of people for whom jobs are going to have to be found in the next few years are very, very great. Many of these people can really only be employed in industrial-type operations. I think that without in any way detracting from the emphasis on agriculture, there is going to have to be a renewed emphasis again on industrialization, and the two have a very close relationship.

Mr. Lewis: To provide jobs for those displaced from the farms.

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Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, perhaps we could pause here just for a moment. I had called a meeting of the steering committee, to discuss our future agendas and procedures, for 5.00 p.m. because I thought perhaps we would be finished with Mr. Strong and his assistants by that time. However, I still have seven members on my list who wish to ask questions. I certainly have no wish to rush the questioning or to bring it to an end because it has been extremely helpful. It occurs to me that if we thought we could finish say, by 6.00 p.m. or thereabouts this afternoon that we could continue now. Perhaps members of the steering committee who would be willing to meet tomorrow to deal with the matters we had intended to deal with this afternoon. What is the wish of the members of the Committee? Do you wish to continue.

Mr. Lewis: As one person who has taken, I am sure, a long time this afternoon I want to say Mr. Chairman, that I think this is as important a subject as any other we have before us as a Committee. Personally I would like to read the transcript of the presentation this morning to see if there are other questions that occur to me which I think need answering. In order to be able to ask them of Mr. Strong and his associates, I strongly urge the steering committee to plan for another day with these gentlemen if they can find one mutually suitable. Even though I have taken a long time, there are still a lot of things that I would like to ask about and I am sure there are other members who have many questions. I do not think we ought to try to end this part of our discussion in the next 55 minutes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My problem, Mr. Chairman is that there are other meetings and there is the work of the House as well. It is not possible to stay—

Mr. Lewis: The house is only dealing with abortion.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer):—until 6.00 p.m.

The Chairman: Is it the wish then of the members of the Committee to adjourn now and work out another day. It might be rather

late in the month perhaps around May 20 or sooner.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What about this evening, could we come back this evening?

The Chairman: We could come back this evening; would this meet your problem Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: I cannot make it.

Mr. Cafik: I do not mind, I have no objection if the Committee meets, although I think some of us may not be able to attend.

Mr. Lewis: I cannot be here but I cannot tell you not to meet because of that. I would still like to urge meeting another day, even if it is two or three weeks from now; there is no rush about this.

The Chairman: What is the wish generally of members of the Committee. Do you feel that we could spend another full day on this?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, I think that it is an important subject. We are faced with greatly increased expenditures in this field; we have not met our commitments thus far, and if other members have additional questions, I do not think we should curtail them if we can avoid it.

The Chairman: I do not think we should rush the questioning or bring it to a premature conclusion. I do not think there is much point in continuing now when some members who are interested have to leave unless we can pass the estimates today or tonight. If not, then I think we might just as well perhaps adjourn now. Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Chairman, it is true that the subject is an important one but I do not know of any subject that comes before us that is not. It seems to me the most important thing that we have to do is to get on with our review and if the steering committee has to meet in order for us to be able to get on with that review then I think that should be done.

The Chairman: The steering committee can meet either today or tomorrow as far as that goes. I think the steering committee could work out its timing but it is a question of what the members now wish to do about these particular estimates.

Perhaps, in view of the number of members who have to leave, it might be well to

adjourn now and try to arrange another day with Mr. Strong, at which time we can continue our examination of these estimates with full time for everyone to carry on questioning. Mr. Legault, did you have a question that you wanted to ask?

Mr. Legault: I did, but I could forego it, Mr. Chairman. I was going to suggest that perhaps we could pass the estimates and then the steering committee could plan further. We are dealing mostly with the questions of policies, intentions, and of corrections that we could very well plan for at a future meeting which cannot be determined at this time. If we could pass the estimates now, this would be one thing.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? Are we under any deadline as to when this Committee must refer back these estimates of Defence as soon as they are dealt with?

The Chairman: There has been no specific deadline given to me except that they are anxious to get them back as soon as possible. The Clerk tells me by the end of May.

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Mr. Winch: I asked the question because, as far as I personally am concerned, I would like to get the estimates through if it is going to restrain us from getting on with our policy review and other very important matters.

The Chairman: I do not think we should delay our policy review. I am going to submit to the steering committee, a program which I think we should carry through as far as our policy review is concerned. If it is necessary to hold special meetings in order to finish our estimates, then I think members should be prepared to do that without interfering with the general policy review. I assumed that this would be agreeable.

Mr. Winch: Did you say possibly "by the end of May"?

The Chairman: We must get the estimates back, the Clerk tells me, by the end of May. But we will be starting on our policy review, I hope, before that time. Mr. Prud'homme?

Mr. Prud'homme: I would go along with Mr. Legault's suggestion. My questions are not directly related to the Estimates; they are on the general policy of *L'Agence canadienne de développement*. Personally, I have no objection to voting on the Estimates today as

long as we make provision to call Mr. Strong and his advisers back. I have a series of questions that I am very much interested in, but I doubt very much if they will affect the voting on the Estimates. If there are no strong objections, perhaps we could agree to pass the Estimates today. Between now and the end of May, we will be pressed by other urgent business and we might not have time to pass the Estimates. We could pass the Estimates today and discuss this at another sitting on a day agreeable to Mr. Strong and the Committee. I am willing to go along with that.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me, and I may be wrong, that surely our over-all terms of reference for policy review and so on allow us to call Mr. Strong back any time we wish. I cannot see that the old traditional means of doing this by keeping the Estimates open is necessary. For that reason, I go along with other members who have spoken on this issue and propose that the Estimates be passed now.

The Chairman: Is that generally the feeling of the Committee?

Mr. Nesbitt: I agree in part that Mr. Cafik is quite right. There is only one thing, I think it would set a very bad example if these committees, which are supposed to be dealing with Estimates and taking the part of the role of the Opposition as they did when estimates were discussed in the House, were to deal with these Estimates by saying, "Well, we will be discussing them in some other way, so we are just going to pass them sort of without having considered them". I think we might be open to some rather severe criticism, and I do not think members of this Committee would want to set an example of just in practice getting rid of the government's spending Estimates without consideration.

I realize that because of the open policy review we have—and I quite agree with Mr. Cafik—in this particular instance it is probably quite all right because we can question Mr. Strong later. However, I think we might be setting a pretty unfortunate precedent in this new committee system we are trying out, a system which has not in some ways worked all that well so far without going into the details—I am sure everyone knows what I mean. I do not think it would be very good if we set this kind of an example. I just bring this to the Committee's attention as there might be a lot of criticism if we did.

Mr. Lewis: There is no need for it; we have a month.

The Chairman: As long as it is possible, I do not know what Mr. Strong's plans are; I understand he is going to be away a great deal in May.

Mr. Prud'homme: I propose that we vote.

The Chairman: Mr. Strong says he will make himself available, and I think Mr. Nesbitt has a point.

Mr. Prud'homme: Could we take a vote to find out the feeling of the Committee and if it is turned down we can come back again.

The Chairman: We do not have a quorum at the moment anyway. I am inclined to think the point made by Mr. Nesbitt is quite a sound one, although there would be no practical problem in this instance. As Mr. Strong will be available later in any event, and as long as members are prepared to come together to complete the hearing and pass the Estimates, I think my preference would be to do it on that basis rather than to pass the Estimates and then call Mr. Strong back later.

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Mr. Winch: I would like to make a suggestion because I understand you are having a meeting of the steering committee immediately after this Committee adjourns. We have not yet passed Defence Estimates, we have not yet passed External Affairs Estimates and I would like to suggest that the steering committee take it under advisement that no future general policy hearings be held until we have completed the Estimates.

The Chairman: That is a point which can be taken up at the steering committee meeting. Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, without prolonging this any further, I have listened to the comments of the hon. member for Oxford and I think, perhaps, there is a great deal of merit in the consideration of the argument put forward by him. I certainly would not want to do anything to set a precedent indicating that committees do not take a thorough and proper look at Estimates, and perhaps we ought to let it sit.

The Chairman: That is our basic job and I think we should carry it through.

Mr. Lewis: D'accord.

The Chairman: D'accord? Then, perhaps we will adjourn, and arrange another time to discuss these Estimates with Mr. Strong.

On your behalf, I would like to thank Mr. Strong and his assistants very much for their presentation this morning and for the very frank answers they expressed this afternoon.

There will be a meeting of the steering committee in this room immediately after we adjourn.

Mr. Prud'homme: Before adjourning, I would like you to keep your list of speakers.

The Chairman: The list for the purposes of the record is: Messrs. Legault, Thompson, Prud'homme, Forrestall, Fairweather, Nesbitt, Ryan and then Mr. Nowlan on the second round.

APPENDIX WW
CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
PARLIAMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS, STATUTORY AUTHORIZATIONS AND DISBURSEMENTS
(Millions of Canadian dollars)

Fiscal Years	1959/60	1960/61	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	1966/67	1967/68	1968/69
Total Appropriations and Statutory Authorizations.....	75.99	82.02	69.25	69.36	65.36	148.07	159.50	247.88	253.22	288.60
Total Disbursements.....	72.82	77.46	59.16	61.66	66.23	100.28	118.32	221.36	190.23	208.81
Cumulative Undisbursed Balances *62.97		67.53	77.62	85.32	84.45	132.24	173.42	199.94	262.93	342.72**

*Amount includes undisbursed balances from Colombo Plan Fund from its establishment in 1951-52 to March 31, 1960.

**The cumulative Undisbursed Balances at March 31, 1969 were apportioned among the following non-lapsing accounts:

International Development Assistance Account.....	\$ 86.4
International Food Aid Account.....	3.0
Special Development Loan Fund.....	253.4
	<hr/> \$342.8

FLOW OF DAC MEMBER RESOURCES TO LESS-DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES AND MULTILATERAL AGENCIES 1962-67


	1962			1963			1964		
	Expendi- tures US \$ million	Percent- age of National Income	Percent- age of Gross National Product	Expendi- tures US \$ Million	Percent- age of National Income	Percent- age of Gross National Product	Expendi- tures US \$ Million	Percent- age of National Income	Percent- age of Gross National Product
AUSTRALIA									
Official.....	73.8	0.53	0.43	96.9	0.63	0.51	104.0	0.62	0.50
Private.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	14.8	0.09	0.07
Total.....	73.8	0.53	0.43	96.9	0.63	0.51	118.8	0.70	0.57
AUSTRIA									
Official.....	13.8	0.25	0.19	2.1	0.04	0.03	14.6	0.22	0.17
Private.....	17.2	0.31	0.24	3.8	0.06	0.05	6.7	0.10	0.08
Total.....	31.0	0.56	0.43	5.9	0.10	0.08	21.3	0.33	0.25
BELGIUM									
Official.....	69.8	0.67	0.54	79.7	0.72	0.57	71.3	0.57	0.46
Private.....	48.4	0.47	0.37	95.0	0.86	0.68	93.0	0.75	0.59
Total.....	118.2	1.14	0.91	174.7	1.58	1.25	164.3	1.32	1.05
CANADA									
Official.....	54.4	0.19	0.14	98.0	0.32	0.24	127.7	0.39	0.29
Private.....	55.2	0.19	0.15	32.5	0.11	0.08	14.1	0.04	0.03
Total.....	109.6	0.38	0.29	130.5	0.43	0.32	141.8	0.43	.32
DENMARK									
Official.....	7.4	0.12	0.10	9.7	0.16	0.12	10.6	0.15	0.12
Private.....	7.3	0.12	0.10	0.8	0.01	0.01	21.2	0.30	0.23
Total.....	14.7	0.24	0.20	10.5	0.17	0.13	31.8	0.44	.35
FRANCE									
Official.....	977.0	1.76	1.34	850.7	1.39	1.05	831.2	1.24	0.94
Private.....	418.2	0.75	0.58	391.3	0.64	0.48	529.2	0.79	0.60
Total.....	1,395.2	2.51	1.92	1,242.0	2.03	1.54	1,360.4	2.04	1.53
GERMANY									
Official.....	467.8	0.69	0.53	437.2	0.60	0.46	422.9	0.53	0.41
Private.....	182.2	0.27	0.21	167.3	0.23	0.18	284.2	0.36	0.27
Total.....	650.0	0.96	0.73	604.5	0.83	0.64	707.1	0.89	0.68
ITALY									
Official.....	106.1	0.31	0.25	105.2	0.27	0.22	49.1	0.12	0.09
Private.....	284.3	0.84	0.67	215.9	0.56	0.44	187.7	0.44	0.35
Total.....	390.4	1.16	0.92	321.1	0.83	0.66	236.8	0.56	0.45
JAPAN									
Official.....	86.8	0.19	0.15	140.4	0.26	0.21	115.7	0.19	0.15
Private.....	199.4	0.43	0.34	127.0	0.24	0.19	174.1	0.29	0.23
Total.....	286.2	0.61	0.49	267.4	0.50	0.41	289.8	0.48	0.38
NETHERLANDS									
Official.....	65.0	0.59	0.48	37.8	0.32	0.26	49.2	0.35	0.29
Private.....	49.2	0.45	0.37	96.6	0.81	0.66	69.2	0.49	0.40
Total.....	114.2	1.04	0.85	134.4	1.12	0.92	118.4	0.84	0.69
NORWAY									
Official.....	6.9	0.17	0.13	20.6	0.47	0.36	17.1	0.35	0.27
Private.....	-0.1	0	0	1.0	0.02	0.02	5.9	0.12	0.09
Total.....	6.8	0.17	0.13	21.6	0.49	0.38	23.0	0.47	0.36
PORTUGAL									
Official.....	40.8	1.63	1.41	51.1	1.90	1.65	61.9	2.11	1.84
Private.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total.....	40.8	1.63	1.41	51.1	1.90	1.65	61.9	2.12	1.84
SWEDEN									
Official.....	18.5	0.16	0.12	22.9	0.18	0.14	32.8	0.23	0.18
Private.....	18.8	0.16	0.13	30.5	0.24	0.19	34.4	0.24	0.19
Total.....	37.3	0.31	0.25	53.4	0.41	0.33	67.2	0.47	0.37
SWITZERLAND									
Official.....	4.9	0.05	0.05	6.2	0.06	0.05	9.2	0.08	0.07
Private.....	156.2	1.74	1.47	196.6	2.01	1.69	100.9	0.93	0.78
Total.....	161.1	1.80	1.51	202.8	2.07	1.74	110.1	1.02	0.86
UNITED KINGDOM									
Official.....	421.0	0.64	0.52	414.5	0.59	0.48	493.3	0.66	0.53
Private.....	324.1	0.49	0.40	305.6	0.44	0.36	425.5	0.56	0.46
Total.....	745.1	1.13	0.92	720.1	1.03	0.84	918.8	1.23	1.00
UNITED STATES									
Official.....	3,535.55	0.77	0.62	3,699.0	0.76	0.62	3,445.0	0.66	0.54
Private.....	819.0	0.18	0.14	880.0	0.18	0.15	1,325.0	0.25	0.21
Total.....	4,354.5	0.95	0.77	4,579.0	0.94	0.76	4,771.0	0.91	0.74
TOTAL DAC COUNTRIES									
Official.....	5,949.5	0.71	0.57	6,072.0	0.68	0.54	5,855.6	0.60	0.48
Private.....	2,579.4	0.31	0.25	2,543.9	0.29	0.23	3,286.9	0.34	0.27
Total.....	8,528.9	1.02	0.82	8,615.9	0.97	0.77	9,142.5	0.94	0.75

1965			1966			1967		
Expenditures US \$ Million	Percentage of National Income	Percentage of Gross National Product	Expenditures US \$ Million	Percentage of National Income	Percentage of Gross National Product	Expenditures US \$ Million	Percentage of National Income	Percentage of Gross National Product
121.6	0.66	0.54	128.1	0.66	0.53	167.2	0.79	0.64
15.3	0.09	0.07	11.1	0.06	0.05	14.9	0.07	0.06
136.9	0.75	0.61	139.2	0.72	0.58	182.1	0.86	0.70
33.8	0.48	0.36	36.5	0.48	0.36	38.8	0.48	0.36
13.5	0.19	0.14	12.8	0.17	0.13	9.0	0.11	0.08
47.3	0.68	0.51	49.3	0.65	0.49	47.8	0.60	0.45
101.6	0.75	0.60	81.1	0.56	0.45	98.8	0.65	0.51
119.5	0.88	0.70	96.9	0.67	0.53	54.6	0.36	0.28
221.1	1.62	1.30	178.0	1.24	0.98	153.4	1.00	0.80
124.3	0.35	0.26	211.7	0.53	0.40	213.0	0.50	0.37
45.0	0.13	0.09	55.0	0.14	0.10	40.9	0.10	0.07
169.3	0.47	0.35	266.7	0.67	0.50	253.9	0.59	0.44
12.9	0.16	0.13	26.1	0.30	0.23	28.0	0.30	0.23
2.3	0.03	0.02	-2.0	-0.02	0	-3.2	-0.03	-0.03
15.2	0.19	0.15	24.1	0.28	0.22	24.8	0.27	0.21
752.2	1.05	0.79	744.8	0.97	0.73	831.1	1.02	0.76
547.2	0.77	0.58	574.9	0.75	0.56	512.8	0.63	0.47
1,299.4	1.82	1.37	1,319.7	1.72	1.30	1,343.9	1.64	1.24
471.0	0.55	0.43	485.9	0.53	0.40	546.8	0.60	0.46
255.1	0.30	0.23	251.6	0.28	0.21	593.6	0.66	0.50
726.1	0.84	0.64	737.5	0.81	0.61	1,140.4	1.26	0.95
87.7	0.19	0.15	121.9	0.25	0.20	202.8	0.38	0.30
177.8	0.39	0.31	509.7	1.04	0.83	82.1	0.15	0.12
265.5	0.58	0.47	631.6	1.29	1.03	284.9	0.53	0.43
243.7	0.36	0.29	285.4	0.37	0.30	390.6	0.42	0.34
241.8	0.36	0.29	383.9	0.49	0.40	464.7	0.50	0.40
485.5	0.71	0.58	669.3	0.86	0.69	855.3	0.93	0.74
69.6	0.44	0.36	93.9	0.55	0.45	113.5	0.62	0.51
169.2	1.07	0.88	160.2	0.94	0.77	113.5	0.62	0.51
238.8	1.52	1.25	254.1	1.50	1.22	227.0	1.24	1.01
11.8	0.22	0.17	13.1	0.22	0.17	15.5	0.25	0.19
26.6	0.49	0.38	4.0	0.07	0.05	14.7	0.23	0.18
38.4	0.71	0.55	17.1	0.29	0.23	30.2	0.48	0.37
21.2	0.65	0.57	24.3	0.69	0.60	46.6	1.22	1.06
9.3	0.29	0.25	15.4	0.44	0.38	31.8	0.84	0.72
30.5	0.95	0.82	39.7	1.13	0.98	78.4	2.06	1.78
38.1	0.24	0.19	56.9	0.34	0.27	59.9	0.35	0.27
34.6	0.22	0.18	51.1	0.30	0.24	60.8	0.35	0.28
72.7	0.46	0.37	108.0	0.64	0.51	120.7	0.70	0.55
3.0	0.03	0.02	2.6	0.02	0.02	3.9	0.03	0.02
196.2	1.69	1.42	107.0	0.86	0.72	117.6	0.90	0.75
199.2	1.72	1.44	109.6	0.88	0.74	121.5	0.93	0.78
480.6	0.60	0.48	525.9	0.64	0.50	498.0	0.57	0.45
547.1	0.69	0.52	418.6	0.51	0.40	377.0	0.43	0.34
1,027.7	1.29	1.00	944.5	1.14	0.90	875.0	1.01	0.79
3,626.8	0.64	0.52	3,660.0	0.59	0.48	3,723.0	0.57	0.47
1,892.8	0.33	0.27	1,323.0	0.21	0.17	1,844.0	0.28	0.23
5,519.6	0.97	0.79	4,983.0	0.80	0.66	5,567.0	0.85	0.70
6,199.9	0.59	0.47	6,498.1	0.57	0.46	6,977.4	0.58	0.46
4,293.4	0.40	0.33	3,973.2	0.35	0.28	4,328.9	0.36	0.29
10,493.3	1.00	0.80	10,471.3	0.92	0.72	11,306.3	0.93	0.75

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968-69



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 40

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1969

Respecting

Estimates, 1969-70, Department of National Defence.

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn
Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Barrett	Harkness	Nowlan
Brewin	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Buchanan	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Cafik	Laniel	¹ Roberts
Carter	Laprise	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Fairweather	Legault	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Winch—(30)
Groos	Marceau	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹ Mr. Roberts replaced Mr. Anderson on April 30, 1969.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Thursday, May 1, 1969.
(61)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Buchanan, Cafik, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Legault, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (17).

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance; Brigadier General S. M. Davis, Director General, Systems Management; Brigadier General G. R. Truemner, Director General, Personnel, Plans and Requirements; Colonel C. L. Kirby, Directorate of Operations, Deputy Chief Operations and Reserves.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Estimates 1969-70, Department of National Defence.

The questioning continued under *Items 15 and 20* relating to *Defence Services*. Dr. Arnell made a further statement regarding grants to *Canadian Universities—Military Studies* in the Prairie region. Dr. Arnell will provide additional information on aircraft as requested by Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*).

The Chairman reported recommendations of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure which were agreed to at its meeting on Tuesday, April 29, 1969. The recommendation concern a time-table for further meetings of the main Committee and a program of work for the continuing defence policy review. The Members concurred in these recommendations.

The Clerk was authorized to send copies of the working papers prepared by officials of the Department of National Defence, on the subject of North American Defence and strategic weapons systems, to those expert witnesses who have already appeared before the Committee, to the chairmen of departments of political science in all Canadian universities, to professors of military and strategic studies in Canada and to the editors of major Canadian daily newspapers, for their comments.

Members continued their questioning of Dr. Arnell, who was assisted by Brigadier General Davis, Brigadier General Truemner and Colonel Kirby.

The Vice-Chairman took the Chair at 11:40 a.m.

At 1:05 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(62)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Buchanan, Cafik, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Marquette*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(18).

Witnesses: Same as the morning sitting plus Mr. J. G. Grant, Superintendent Parliamentary Returns, Directorate of Information Services, Department of National Defence.

Members continued their questioning under Items 15 and 20 of the Estimates 1969-70 relating to the Department of National Defence.

Dr. Arnell was asked to provide additional information with respect to the terms of the contract with the Corps of Commissionaires and finances for the Town of Oromocto.

Items 15 and 20 were allowed to stand.

The Chairman called Items 25, 30, 35, 45, 48, 50 and Item 55, relating to Defence Construction (1951) Limited, which were discussed and allowed to stand.

At 5:50 p.m., the Committee adjourned, until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING

(63)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:15 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Buchanan, Cafik, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch—(18).

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance and Brigadier General D. R. Adamson, Director General Operations—Air.

Resuming consideration of the Estimates 1969-70, Department of National Defence, the Chairman called Items 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48, 50, 55 which were severally carried.

Item 1 was called and carried, *on division*.

It was agreed, *on division*, that the Chairman should report the Estimates 1969-70 relating to the Department of National Defence and Defence Construction (1951) Limited, to the House.

There was a discussion concerning the CF-5 aircraft.

At 8:50 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until Tuesday, May 6, 1969, when the witness will be Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, May 1, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we can begin. At our last meeting we were on Votes 15 and 20 of the Department of National Defence and reached the point where we were dealing primarily with equipment. Dr. Arnell and his assistants are with us again this morning, so we will continue from that point. I believe Dr. Arnell has a few introductory remarks that he would like to make. Dr. Arnell.

Dr. J. C. Arnell, (Assistant Deputy Minister Finance, Department of National Defence): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Before discussing equipment, I think for the record, I would like to add one piece of information. At the meeting on the evening of April 17, I was asked a question regarding information about the universities that applied for participation in the strategic studies chairs, by Mr. Guay, and although I have not obtained full information from Mr. A. D. P. Heeney the Chairman—Selection of Committee on Professorships of Military and Strategic Studies—the group which does the selection outside the Department, I did find that the only Prairie university that applied for participation was the University of Calgary. There were no applications from either Manitoba or Saskatchewan. I would just like to put that into the record.

That I think, Mr. Chairman, is the only outstanding piece of information that we have been asked, which is not in the hands of the secretary.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Arnell. I have names from the last session so I will call them. Mr. Roberts, and then Mr. Stewart. Mr. Roberts, I think you had a question from the last meeting.

Mr. Roberts: That is right, it is in relation to the External Affairs estimates that Mr. Cadieux reported to the Committee. I would still like to be kept at the top of your list.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart, (Cochrane): I wonder if you could tell us how many aircraft there are in your Department—the Canadian Armed Forces?

Dr. Arnell: Could I, before trying to answer that, make a few remarks generally about the equipment side. I think then we might attempt to answer the question.

To help look at the equipment program, I would like to relate today's discussion to the piece of paper that I tabled—I think it was the night of April 17—which listed the selected major equipment items that were on procurement. At the time I said that this was an updating of the similar table that I produced for the Committee last November when we were looking at the 1968-69 Estimates. In order to allow the Committee to see the progress of the various procurement programs, we have attempted to present these two tables in essentially the same form. The other one appeared as Appendix "T" to the minutes of the 14th meeting. Also at that meeting I gave a short summary of the capital equipment program which is still essentially valid because there have been no new items in it.

The only other point that I would like to make is that, while last year's estimates were only in the blue book form, the distribution of capital moneys was in fact only shown by Command and in total. This year that information may also be found in the Blue Book on page 243. Moreover, on pages 27 through to 31, we have attempted to show, by equipment category, how the capital program is related to the various major activities, as revealed in the new form of estimates. I just wanted to put that into the record.

With respect to the numbers of aircraft, at the moment we have more than 1200 of 28 different types.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): 1200 aircraft?

Dr. Arnell: More than 1200 aircraft.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): There are, I realize, certain types of aircraft used with our squadrons overseas, certain types used for transport, and other types used for training purposes. Now, the point that I want specifically clarified is the number of aircraft maintained in order to provide continuous training for pilots. When I was in the air force, there was such a thing as risk pay or flying pay. I am wondering if this still exists, how much is involved in it and what are the criteria? In other words, is a fellow who is flying a

desk kept current through a program of training and how many aircraft would be used for this purpose?

● 1115

Dr. Arnell: I think the answer to your question, Mr. Stewart, would be that there is no proficiency flying as such for people at desks any more and, therefore, there is no flying pay, in the sense that there used to be, for people who were non-operational. When the pay system was entirely revamped in 1966, pilots were one of the groups which, in fact, had a separate pay scale along with several of the professional groups—the lawyers, the doctors, and so on. Pilots were essentially people who were actively operational, or were directly involved in operations. These, in fact, were the only people that were classed as pilots for the sense of drawing a pilot's salary.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I see, Dr.

Dr. Arnell: What, I think, you were referring to was the old system under which there used to be small flights to various places, such as here at Ottawa. These were entirely provided for the headquarters people to do their proficiency flying. This no longer exists.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I see. So there are no specific aircraft kept for that purpose then?

Dr. Arnell: No. A few senior officers are expected to stay current. The Brigadier General—who, in fact, is within the operational sub-branch of the Vice-Chief's organization and whose entire business these is to be the headquarters' link with operations—is a case in point.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Well, Dr. Arnell, what about a squadron commander whom you bring back from Europe into headquarters and keep in an administrative job, or for a tour, for a year or so? What would he do about his flying?

Dr. Arnell: He stops flying. Anybody who is taken out of the operations, in fact, stops flying for the period. If he is to go back into flying—for I think the present philosophy is that he may not go back on the same aircraft that he was current on before—he would be phased back through the operational training unit before he went back into an operational job.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I see. I wonder could we have some kind of a general idea of what all these aircraft are. 1200 aircraft sounds a sizeable number. Could we have some kind of a general breakdown as to how many would be used operationally and how many for other purposes?

Dr. Arnell: Perhaps the easiest way for me to obtain the information is to identify the main training aircraft and let you see the numbers which are involved.

The first of the training aircraft is, of course, the Chipmunk, of which we have listed 51. Of the Tudor, the next plane one might consider, we have 179. The conversion from pure training to getting into a little more sophisticated aircraft brings us to the T33, of which we have 204. I am not certain though, that those would be all training, but that identifies, after a fashion, the major training aircraft. Between 450 and 500 aircraft, therefore one could say are directly related to training as such. There are some aircraft in operational training units of which there are small numbers—conversion units and so on; and the rest have an operational role of some sort—search and rescue, transport, air defence and the like. Now, we could, in fact, provide a list of these, if desired, have it appended, and give the whole . . .

● 1120

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I think it might be helpful, Mr. Chairman, if we had that kind of a list.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, may I ask a supplementary.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson on a supplementary.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I did not hear your figure on the number of Chipmunks. Besides, might I just add this question: with the non-continuance of the ab initio jet training program, what do you have in a propeller driven basic training aircraft other than the Chipmunk?

Dr. Arnell: The Chipmunk.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Just the Chipmunk?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, the Chipmunk is, in fact, the only propeller . . .

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): How many of those do you have?

Dr. Arnell: We have 51.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Have you any intention of adding a new type of propeller driven aircraft in view of the small number of this type of aircraft?

Dr. Arnell: Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Dr. Arnell, are any of these training aircraft used by auxiliary personnel or militia?

Dr. Arnell: No, I think only the armies that are in the auxiliary itself.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We still have a number of auxiliary units across the country, do we?

Dr. Arnell: We have six.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Is that in all the Canadian Forces, not only air?

Dr. Arnell: There are six reserve squadrons in air. There are, of course, the land force reserve and the maritime reserve as well.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I understand that a few years ago there was a reduction in auxiliary forces. Is this continuing, or are they going to be maintained at the present strength, or increased?

Dr. Arnell: I cannot, in fact, make any prediction because at the moment, as you know, there is the whole question of the final examination of what is going to happen as a result of the recently announced policy by the Prime Minister. Studies are still under way concerning how some of the intentions of the government are to be met by restructuring the forces.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I asked this because I would like to consider this question of our re-assessment of the forces. I think, perhaps, this could be an important point. I had the pleasure of serving for one year as a regular support officer to an auxiliary unit, and my recommendation at the end of my year's tour was that it be abandoned.

● 1125

I have a tendency to think, perhaps, all auxiliary units should be abandoned for reasons of economy and, also, because I feel that it is not possible to attain any degree of efficiency in that kind of a force, particularly, since we have a permanent force. That is why I wanted to consider this question of auxiliary units. Is there some kind of study going on in that regard?

Dr. Arnell: In the current examination of the entire defence establishment, the reserves, along with everything else, are being reviewed in the light of the recently stated policy. In answer to your question, I must say it is being examined along with everything else.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Do you have an approximate figure in your over-all budget of what the reserves cost, including equipment and salaries? Is it \$50 million, \$100 million?

Dr. Arnell: The total cost of the reserves including cadets and some of the civil emergency operational support that we give, comes to \$45 million in total. \$3.7 million of this is capital. I am afraid I cannot subdivide it using the information I have here, but the bulk of that is certainly reserves.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): That is very good, Dr. Arnell. It gives us a general idea. It is somewhere close to \$50 million, in any case. Would fulltime civilians such as janitors who are required in the buildings that the government owns for these purposes be included in that as well?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, they would. As a matter of fact, the breakdown of the basic military personnel costs, which would be largely the reserve pay, plus those regular forces that work with the reserves to support them, is just over \$29 million. There is a civilian cost of just over \$3 million, and this is the janitors and the various civilian support.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I see.

Dr. Arnell: So, about 10 per cent of it you could say is civilian support.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you very much, Dr. Arnell. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to talk about the navy, but I will come to that some time when we are talking about navy only.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, before continuing with the questioning, this might be an appropriate time for me to inform you of the recommendations of the steering subcommittee with regard to our future work.

The steering subcommittee has met and recommends that this Committee commence a policy review of all aspects of Canadian air defence, including NORAD. Included also would be a preliminary examination of the implications for Canada of the American anti-ballistic missile defence, the ABMs. In the hope that this would meet with your approval, we have already requested the Department of National Revenue to prepare a comprehensive working paper on this subject.

Mr. Harkness: The Department of National Revenue?

The Chairman: The Department of National Defence. The Committee expects to discuss this working paper with General Sharp, the Deputy Commander of NORAD next Tuesday, May 6, if it is decided this program meets with the approval of the Committee.

The Minister of National Defence and the Minister of External Affairs will be asked to appear before the Committee on May 8 and there will be additional meetings on NORAD and ABMs in May and June. As you know, we have scheduled May 15 for further examination of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs and then CIDA estimates will also be coming back before us.

We would also like to arrange, if it meets with your approval, to submit this working paper from the

Department to an independent military commentator for critical evaluation and for a written report. Then, to encourage the widest possible participation and involvement it is proposed to send such working paper and critical report to those expert witnesses who have already appeared before the Committee, to the chairmen of departments of political science in all Canadian universities, to professors of military and strategic studies in Canada and to the editors of Canadian major daily newspapers, and that they be invited to assist the Committee in its work by giving the Committee comments in writing, including comments as to the objectivity and content of the working paper and critical report.

After considering the working paper and critical report, evidence presented to us and comments received from all sources, it is then proposed that the Committee would decide what questions require further investigation and after hearing any other evidence that may be required the Committee would then prepare its report.

It is also suggested by the steering committee that we commence a review of Maritime Command. A rather similar procedure would be followed. A basic working paper and critical evaluation would be obtained and circulated to the Committee's mailing list. We hope to establish a subcommittee of this Committee which would study these documents and any comments received, while our main Committee continued its review of NORAD and ABMs. Then, when the Committee has completed its work on NORAD and ABMs, we would go on to Maritime Command. The work of the Committee should be expedited as a result of the preliminary work done by the subcommittee.

The steering subcommittee also recommends that in the course of our future work we should make use of subcommittees to the greatest possible extent because it is felt that in no other way could we possibly cover in a reasonable time the wide reference given to the Committee by the House of Commons on January 16, 1969. You will recall that reference was to review and report on all aspects of Canada's external and defence policy.

In addition to NORAD and Maritime Command, the steering subcommittee has prepared a list of other possible subjects for review at an appropriate time. The specific items would include Northern and Arctic defence and sovereignty, civil defence, United Nations peacekeeping, disarmament, foreign aid—not necessarily in that order. In more general subjects in the field of external affairs, being considered for review by the steering subcommittee is included relations with the United States, relations with the United Nations, relations with South America, including OAS, and relations with the Pacific area.

This is quite a broad program; a very likely program. Of course, it would take a great deal of time to complete and these items which I have just mentioned are just being considered now by the steering subcommittee and the order will be determined in due course. However, we would commence on NORAD immediately if that meets with the approval of the Committee.

Mr. Winch: I would move acceptance of the recommendations of the steering committee.

The Chairman: I do not think we need a formal resolution, but is it generally agreed to proceed on this

● 1130

basis?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Chairman, I assume that with the study of NORAD which would be undertaken immediately and the study of the ABMs as a part of that, the obvious place to get the bulk of our necessary information is Washington. Is this planned in the initial part of the review?

The Chairman: We are considering methods of getting the available material from the United States. Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: With regard to the meetings next week on Tuesday, you said the meetings are with whom?

The Chairman: Lieutenant-General F. R. Sharp. We will have the working paper, I understand, before that time perhaps for distribution on Monday.

Mr. Allmand: With General Sharp, will our questioning be directed to NORAD in general or to ABMs?

The Chairman: It really would be directed toward the working paper which is being prepared on NORAD, not on ABMs.

Mr. Allmand: I see. On Thursday with the ministers, will that be generally with respect to NORAD, or to both ABMS and NORAD?

The Chairman: It is intended that it should be on NORAD; that there be a technical briefing on ABMs at a later date in May.

Mr. Allmand: Could I suggest, although this was brought up by Mr. Stewart, that we try to get the testimony of the American Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Committee, which has had hearings they started just before Easter, I believe, and continues after Easter on the ABM issue. It might be

valuable for us to have the booklets of their testimony available with the Clerk for consultation purposes because they questioned many expert witnesses on the subject and I think we could probably get them in Washington.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Allmand. We will go into that as well. Today we have scheduled meetings that are required not only this morning but this afternoon and this evening. We really should try to finish the estimates of the Department of National Defence today, because as I mentioned, we also have the estimates of External Affairs and CIDA, and as I mentioned also, both ministers will be available later. I would hope therefore, that members would keep their questions as crisp as possible and that we could finish the questions some time today.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman. Concerning the business of the future weeks or months, something that was mentioned the last time when we talked about our

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program, have you had any consultations with the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister as to the fact that this is all going to be done parallel to the Cabinet decision, or that they are going to hold up, as on the NATO thing, until we finally come in with our report on these various topics, or are we going to go ahead and make our own report regardless of what they say? I would be most interested in that frankly, but I just want to know what is the direction in relation to the Cabinet review itself on all these various questions that you mentioned.

The Chairman: I have discussed the question of NORAD, ABMs and Maritime Command with both ministers, and they seem to think, that this program made good sense. They did not indicate just when the Cabinet would be making decisions, or just what the Cabinet schedule is, but they did seem to think that our program would be useful.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, there has been a couple of indications in the House that specific dates had already been determined for the bringing forward of reports on specific subjects of this policy review, and phase II of it. I wonder if that could be clarified so that all members of this Committee would know when the government intends to make statements in certain areas in order that we may judge our activities accordingly.

The Chairman: I will certainly try to get more definite information regarding matters which might affect our activities.

Mr. Nowlan: This is what I was directing my question to, in view of some of the statements that have

already been made; to make it a meaningful study by this Committee, as meaningful as can be. That may be in quotation marks.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, you are next on the list of questioners.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman. I have a number of questions on this phase of defence. Maybe I can restrict myself for the moment to one, and in order to expedite matters, on the first question I will make mention of both the army and of the navy so that there will be just one comment in reply. I am certain that this Committee is interested not only in costings but also in efficiency, and it is on that phase that I would like to have comments from Dr. Arnell.

I have been advised by military men that when we obtained the self-propelled or 155 mm guns, which have been in service now for some time, no spares whatsoever were obtained in the original position, that they have no traps, and no extra gun barrels, with the result that they are having to cannibalize on others. I am further advised also by military men that we made purchases of equipment from Italy because it was available and cheap, but also without spares with the result that they are having to, and have done for many months, cannibalize there also. On that phase, I think it would be interesting to have a comment as to whether one has to have a policy of purchasing a given number with no spares, or if it is not a better policy to lower the number of pieces of equipment and have spares. Along with that one phase of questioning on army equipment, I want to bring up the navy.

The Public Accounts Committee some few weeks ago made a visit to the *Bonaventure*. We saw there (I am going to give two examples) that in the refit, \$285,000 was spent on what is known as a Fresnel and landing equipment, highly sophisticated, with no spares. The result was that approximately five months ago when the heating elements had burned out in the lights, and they are very important, they endeavoured to get spares, and up until four weeks ago after five months endeavour, they still did not have any replacement spares for the Fresnel equipment, resulting in a great loss of efficiency.

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Also, just a little while ago we were discussing aircraft. The Tracker is the aircraft serviced by the *Bonaventure* and has highly sophisticated electronic equipment. Our subcommittee of the Public Accounts Committee visited the aircraft's electronic repair shop and discovered that the highly sophisticated electronic equipment as it breaks down has to be replaced with complete units which contain perhaps dozens of circuits, although only one is broken down, because

for 13 months they have been trying to get the specific type of soldering iron required in order to be able to make repairs. Since they have not received that piece of equipment yet—it is now 13 months—they have had to replace highly expensive electronic units, instead of being able to repair them. When we take the position, as I have outlined it—on our self-propelled 155mm gun, the equipment purchased from Italy, the position on the Fresnel and on the Tracker aircraft—I think that there is a logical question to ask from this Committee. What do you think of the policy and what do you think of what I maintain or allege, that this is high cost inefficiency in some regard?

Dr. Arnell: I cannot give you specific answers to several of your questions, Mr. Winch, although they may be able to dig them out for me. In respect to your self-propelled 155mm Howitzer question—when I was looking over the equipment procurement program that is in this year's estimates—one of the places where the program had decreased in price since I was before you last year, was in fact the self-propelled Howitzer. While investigating I obtained the information that the decrease was due to two things. One was that there had been a reprieve on the sales tax that we had expected to pay for, which in fact reduced the total cost: the other was that the spares that had originally been ordered for the 155mm Howitzer had, in fact, been cut back. After the guns had been introduced and the first experience of use was being gathered in the field, they found that they had, in fact, over-programmed the amount of spares for the gun. This was the information that I was specifically given on that particular item.

With respect to the Italian equipment, the information here does not, in fact, relate spares to the guns themselves, but I would have to check back and produce this.

Mr. Winch: My information advice is that when it was purchased there were no spares, so they cancelled that one.

Dr. Arnell: If they are the same guns that I am referring to here, they are for the DDH-280s which in fact...

Brigadier General S. M. Davis (Director General, Systems Management, Deputy Chief Engineering, Department of National Defence): I think Mr. Winch is probably referring to the 105mm Pack Howitzer which has just come into service.

Mr. Winch: Are there spares?

Brig. Gen. Davis: We are just establishing what precisely the spare situation is.

Dr. Arnell: We will try to get you an answer on that one.

Mr. Winch: How about...

Dr. Arnell: Again, are you trying to get the Fresnel...

Brig. Gen. Davis: There was an initial difficulty in procuring spares for the Fresnel lens system from the United States. I am now getting you more precise details on all of the items that you have just raised.

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Mr. Winch: The Fresnel was purchased through the U.S. Navy and as an operation on the ships in the U.S. Navy. Yet it is now over six months and they do not have this replacement part. There were none bought in the original purchase. Now, are you also getting the information of this amazing, extraordinary situation concerning the electronic equipment on the Tracker? They are not able to repair, so they must put in a complete new unit.

Dr. Arnell: I do not know about that situation Mr. Winch, but I do know that in a number of electronic equipments—and this has been the policy for years—it has been found cheaper and more efficient, when a particular piece of equipment goes unserviceable at the front line, to replace it and to repair it farther back in the second and third line maintenance. Quite frankly, I find myself in a slightly embarrassing position, with respect to your questions, because I presumed that these were being pursued in the Public Accounts Committee and I did not, in fact, come prepared to answer these questions.

Mr. Winch: Well, we have the information that this is the situation. My question to the Defence Committee was one of efficiency. A wonderful repair shop and highly trained technicians are available to repair—and it was drawn to our attention that they cannot repair, because they do not have this one piece of repair equipment. They have had it on order for over 12 months and they still have not received it. Therefore, they have to put in a complete new unit.

Dr. Arnell: Well, as General Davis said, he has sent out to get some information. I hope that we can give it to you later today.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other questions, but I do not want to hold up other members. Perhaps I should let my other questions wait until other members have had a chance to question the witnesses.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch, is there a bank of equipment in support of what is in operation at this site which you are discussing?

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, would you repeat that?

The Vice-Chairman: Are there extra electronic boards that can be slipped in?

Mr. Winch: If you are referring to sophisticated equipment for the Tracker, they have a big supply on board of the complete units. It may have dozens of circuits. They must have them there and they do because if only one circuit breaks down, they cannot repair it. Therefore they have a big supply of the full units to put in, because they cannot repair even one circuit.

The Vice-Chairman: I think you should make it clear, Mr. Winch. How big are these complete units you are talking about.

Mr. Winch: Well, the complete unit is about the size of a cigar box. Under modern electronics, you can have dozens and dozens of circuits, since you do not have the wiring system that you previously had. It may fulfil a dozen or two dozen functions. If one breaks down, it is necessary to put in the whole unit, because they do not have the soldering iron—which must come from the manufacturer—in order to be able to repair it.

Dr. Arnell: I would like to conclude this by saying that subject to confirmation I think this may be a case of where the policy is. This is policy in commercial operation and industry as well. In many things of this type you provide replacement circuits rather than assume you are going to have someone who can fix it on the spot. You always get a man—I mean it is quite likely you will have a man up front who could fix this but you cannot be certain you will always have him. There is a lot of policy . . .

Mr. Winch: If I may tell you, a Chief Petty Officer informed our subcommittee—of which I was Chairman—that he had men who were fully qualified to repair this equipment, if they had that soldering iron.

Dr. Arnell: I am sure in that particular . . .

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): In how many hours?

Mr. Winch: In about 20 minutes.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay on a supplementary.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I would like to say to that it may even be cheaper to replace the entire unit when you take into consideration man hours and everything else involved. Although they may be able to repair it. I would agree with Dr. Arnell that it might be more economical to replace the whole unit. Therefore, on

that particular note, I think that we could probably get an answer.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, sir, but I would not like to close on that particular note. I happen to know electronics; it is my trade. I can assure you that you could not repair it at a price that was approaching the full unit. As a matter of fact, it is my suspicion, that the reason why you do not have the repair cost is because the supplier will not supply it. He would rather sell you a full unit that be forced to make repairs of the ones that are broken.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. Could Mr. Winch then give us more

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information if this is his speciality, his field? He certainly could give us more information to enlighten those of us who do know little about electronics.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay, we have an assurance from Dr. Arnell they will go into it thoroughly and that they will give us the complete picture. I think perhaps we should move along.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, I do not want to sit here and listen to any member saying: "Ha, ha, ha, I know something I will not tell." If we have a question and we know some of the background, I think we should all be given the knowledge which pertains to that particular matter; then we and everyone else concerned will benefit, rather than go through a long period of questions and answers to see who is the best of the two.

Mr. Winch: May I just say—and I have right to say it here—it is not only my view that repair is much cheaper than a complete unit, but this matter was drawn to our attention by the Chief Petty Officer and his staff in the electronic repair room of the Tracker aircraft. That was their opinion as expressed to our Committee.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): There are just a lot of words, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: It will be elicited by Dr. Arnell later.

The next questioner, Mr. Thompson

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My questioning follows an altogether different vein, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Arnell. In the integration of the forces, what has happened to the army ground forces pilot training program and the propeller aircraft that they use in their normal communications and observer type of duty. Are these now all integrated into one or are they retained separately as before?

Dr. Arnell: The aircraft themselves are still retained. There are, in fact, the L-19's and this type of aircraft, the Cariboo in essence, or the Buffalo, which are directly related to the ground forces. However, the pilot training, *per se*, is integrated.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Where does that take place at the present time?

Dr. Arnell: It takes place in the various flying training schools, which are Portage, Gimli . . .

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am speaking now of elementary flying training. Do you have elementary training programs in Gimli and . . .

Dr. Arnell: Borden

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It is Borden, is it?

Dr. Arnell: Just to finish the answer, I think there is a single *ab initio* training program, and the policy has been all along to convert the pilot through the operational training unit to whatever particular role he was trained for.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is it true that you are tapering off the *ab initio* training program?

Dr. Arnell: Not that I am aware of. Our flying training program is directly related to the estimates of pilot requirements which, in fact, are made by the personnel people from their forecasts.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): That was not the question I was referring to. Are you continuing the program whereby you put the recruits directly into jet aircraft, as the *ab initio* training does, or are you discarding that and coming back to elementary training on propeller aircraft?

Dr. Arnell: A few do train Tudors but I think most of them still train in Chipmunks. Perhaps I could ask General Truemner to give you the facts of this particular case.

Brigadier General G. R. Truemner: All *ab initio* pilot trainees off the street, if you will accept that, still start in the Chipmunk program and from there go to the Tudors. You asked if we are tapering off the program. We have been cross-training certain people who were already in the service. If you have a feeling that fewer young men are coming off the street to pilot training, this is correct, but the pilot production program is carrying on.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am not as concerned about pilot production as I am about the method of training. My question relates to whether or not you are tapering off the *ab initio* approach to training and

concentrating in your elementary training on propeller aircraft, as has already happened in the U.S. airforce, or are you continuing with the *ab initio* training as it . . .

Brig. Gen. Truemner: Sir, *ab initio* means from the beginning.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): That is correct. Off the streets into jets.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: This occurs after 25 hours—it could be plus or minus 5—on the Chipmunk aircraft, which is a low wing propeller-driven aircraft.

Dr. Arnell: There was discussion some years ago, before we got the Trudor, about the possibility of doing *ab initio* directly into jet. It was, in fact, found with a little experience that it was better to have these few hours of propeller-driven Chipmunk before you put people on jet. This has been the policy, as far as I know, for the last few years.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am asking if there is any change in that program.

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Dr. Arnell: No, there is none at the moment.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am surprised that you have only 51 Chipmunks. Are you converting to another type of aircraft to replace the Chipmunk?

Brig. Gen. Truemner: I do not think there is any objection to that and, apparently, our 51 Chipmunks are handling our flying load.

Dr. Arnell: I would think they get quite a number of flying hours a month out of a Chipmunk, compared to a fairly sophisticated jet aircraft.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You do after 20 years, too, in the same aircraft.

My second question relates to the routine maintenance of bases that are not yet assigned to the new integrated training program and are, more or less, being kept in mothballs. That is not a correct comparison, probably. I am speaking of the situation in which the training program is not up to the maximum capability of that particular base and the base is contemplated as probably being used. How much is being spent in this particular type of maintenance due to the integrated training program, as far as base allotment not yet having been completed?

Dr. Arnell: I do not think that the way you phrase this is really correct in speaking of bases that have not

been allotted. Perhaps, I can answer your question in a different way. The base structure for training, the schools, were really designed for training in toto of the order of 12,000 - plus recruits a year. Last year there was, in fact, a decrease in the total number of forces. Recruiting was cut back, with the result that last year the total number of recruits that was put through the training system was, in fact, only about 75 per cent of previous years.

At the moment, this has built back up to what is considered to be the requirement to hold a stable level. The schools are being operated at capacity. In fact, recruiting is being done on the basis of having next month's trainees already recruited well ahead of time.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am asking specifically about a situation that relates to one base, but I know that it will apply to several bases, and that is Penhold. For eight years that base has been operating at partial capability. It is being retained because of the investment and the value of the base. The officer's mess is being maintained for approximately 10 or 15 officers. The RCMP had moved in to occupy it temporarily, but they are now moving out, leaving a half vacant base. This is due, I am told, to the inability to complete base allotment, or base assignment, under the new integrated program.

Dr. Arnell: I would like to suggest in this particular case there is a little history that one must take into account.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I know that history.

Dr. Arnell: Some years back, when I was Scientific Advisor to the Chief of the Air Staff, Penhold was one of our pride and joys, in terms of flying training school. Because of the commercial traffic of that day—this was before the days of jet, in the days of propellers—it was decided for reasons of safety of the commercial air that Penhold could not be kept for the type of flying training that was being done at the time.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have to differ with you there. It was not kept because of the type of training that you were going to do. That traffic did not interfere with Harvards, it interfered with Tudors.

Dr. Arnell: It came out of that. The situation with respect to Penhold is that now that the commercial pattern of flying has changed, coupled with a vast improvement in the air traffic control system, the Department of Transport no longer has any restriction on the use of Penhold for this type of thing. It is planned, once facilities and so on can be sorted out, to make use of Penhold to a much greater extent than in the past. You are seeking the costs of running Penhold?

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Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am not just thinking of Penhold. I am thinking of Rivers and of a number of other bases that are not operating to maximum capacity. This is due partly to integration, partly because of the indefiniteness of policy and what will be the requirements under any changes therein.

Dr. Arnell: Well, the final decisions on this are, of course, still pending with respect to the review of defence policy at the moment.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Yes.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): Could I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): I would like to ask Dr. Arnell: when you make a decision on a base, does the Department of National Defence take into consideration whether or not it is in a designated area; whether the base is closed or relocated? Do you work in conjunction with the Department of Regional Development?

Dr. Arnell: Yes. In reviewing this whole question, during recent times—the last year or more, certainly—we have been in touch with them every time there is any consideration of this, and after it has been looked at among officials of the departments concerned, the matter, of course, then goes to Cabinet, where the overall view is looked at. In effect, the Cabinet takes all these other matters into account, but we certainly do discuss any consideration of this type with the Department of Regional Development.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, I think it is very difficult to get at what I am trying to question about. You mentioned a little while ago that Lieut. General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander, NORAD, was going to appear as our witness next Tuesday. When he took over Western Command about three years ago, one of the objectives which he stated at that time was the decision regarding base allocation in view of the new integrated program, as far as Western Command was concerned. This situation has continued for some two years, and it is further complicated by the fact that, since we do not know what our defence policy is going to be, we do not know what our defence needs are going to be.

It seems to me that in this period of vacuum, we must have been spending literally several millions of dollars in maintaining bases because we do not know how and for what we are going to use them, if and when we formulate a policy. It is all very well to talk about, say, Penhold, having had the Harvards

withdrawn because, due to the format of the commercial air patterns, it was decided unsafe to use them for tutors or for *ab initio* jet training. But this occurred six years ago. Wastage goes on year after year. It seems to me that a fairly sizeable portion of our defence budget is being wasted simply because we do not know just where we are going or how we are going to do it when we do know.

Dr. Arnell: With respect to Penhold, we have been concentrating on the flying side of Penhold, and your assessment is quite correct on that. But the base at Penhold is also there for the radar squadron that is associated with it. In addition, a communications squadron operates out of the place. Besides, it housed the regional EMO headquarters.

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Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): ...Occupying a very minute part of the base, but nevertheless it is there. I do want to take the time of the Committee on this because I have one other series of questions I would like to ask.

In this regard, one thing disturbs me, and I mention this without asking a question, just to inform you of it. When, for example, the radar base that you refer to was built, it had to take a right of way through expropriation from a number of farms. In the agreement that was made in the expropriation of this land, the Defence Department assumed the responsibility of building and maintaining all the fences that were involved in this particular private road. It also included the maintenance of the roadway itself, along with the deterioration of the base. Due to the fact that the latter is not being used, the fences and the road have completely gone. This is the type of thing that disturbs me very much. It seem to me that in the maintenance and the equipment that is included in this vote, in a lesser way of course, the very thing that has been brought out by others relating to larger pieces of defence equipment applies; and it disturbs me, both insofar as the inefficiency and the waste of money, are concerned. Having said that, though, there is really not a question to ask, unless you would like to make a statement about it. I will be glad to bring this to your attention.

Dr. Arnell: I do not think I could make a statement on the subject, but we will certainly take note of your remarks.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I will send you a memo today. Mr. Chairman, one quick series of questions. It relates to the cadet programs. I am not clear at all just what is happening under integration, either in regard to dollar allotment and expenditure or policy. As far as the Navy League, the Air Cadet League, and the Army Cadet Corps are concerned, will they be

retained as supporting structures? Is there any attempt to integrate these cadet training programs or to change them in any way?

Dr. Arnell: We discussed this at some length at the meeting of the 17 of April. You will find in Vote 5 under Grants that this year, for the first time, the Navy League of Canada is getting a grant similar to the Air Cadet League of Canada. In fact, the three programs are continuing as entities because these units are largely volunteer organizations. There is no intention at all to change this, because the department recognizes the sterling service, if you like, that these volunteers are giving to them. These men are really dedicated to seeing the cadet movement go forward. For that reason you will find two of them listed here. Moreover, as I said that night, we anticipate that the army side may find that they need help too. The navy were proud of being a completely self-financed organization until increases in costs really forced them to come and ask for help.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You are standardizing your grant policies in regard to these three support organizations?

Dr. Arnell: We feel that this is why the navy is in there, at \$50,000 under Vote 5 to match the air cadets. We are prepared to recognize that they be treated as equal in all respects.

Mr. Harkness: Just a supplementary question there, if I may. How much financial support is provided for the army cadets?

Dr. Arnell: I do not think, from the point of view of a grant there is any at the moment. To my knowledge, they have never come forward and asked for any. When we considered the Navy League's request, which is now reflected in these estimates, we anticipated that the Army would find itself in need of some help someday. To date, though, the army has not indicated that, in respect of a grant, it requires assistance.

Mr. Harkness: There has been support in the past as far as uniforms and so on are concerned. Is that no longer the case?

Dr. Arnell: Yes; I think that is still in effect, but I thought you were referring to this question of Mr. Thompson to the actual grants. I think that the support itself in the material sense, as far as I know, is continuing the way it was, and would have been included in that capital that I mentioned.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): A Supplementary Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Just a minute, will you wait until Mr. Harkness has cleared up his point?

Mr. Harkness: I have not been able to find anything in the estimates any item covering support for the Army cadets. This is why I ask the question. What financial support is provided?

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Dr. Arnell: I do not believe there is any direct financial support that can be charged up to the cadets per se, because I think we have viewed the support as being essentially a grant to the organization that runs the cadets. I know that there must be some small material assistance because we do, in fact, make available to them certain facilities for summer camps and suchlike, but this, as far as I know, has never really been priced out. However, the Cadet corps, as you know, are sponsored by local boards of education with school corps, or by units of the Army, service clubs, or similar organizations which are the open corps. Each cadet corps is administered and trained by a staff of Cadet Services Association of Canada officers or of civilian instructors. The over-all training, organization and administration of the Royal Canadian Army Cadets is carried out by officers and men of the Canadian Army (Regular) at the establishment of CFHQ and at the district headquarters. I think, in large measure, this is just volunteer part time work. I might be able to get you some actual dollar values.

Mr. Harkness: Funds used to be provided for the purchase of uniforms, equipment, etc. If they are no longer provided, I do not know where the funds for this come from.

Dr. Arnell: I will have to check this, and perhaps, will have the answer this afternoon.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson are you finished?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Yes, I am finished.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Harkness: I have a number of questions in regard to this material which you supplied to us on selected major equipment items.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, I forgot you had a supplementary.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Harkness spelled out the question I was going to ask. I feel that they are receiving help in grants. I was going to question that, but they are going to get the information for him. This is satisfactory to me.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. For the benefit of those present, would you read the list of questioners in order so we will know where we stand?

The Chairman: There is only one other, and that is yourself, Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: I did not know whether there was a long list or not.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch is on the second round.

Mr. Winch: Second round, yes.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness, Mr. Cafik and Mr. Winch.

Mr. Harkness: Yes. First, I have a question in connection with the first item on this list; that is, the four helicopter carrying destroyer escorts. How many of these have now been contracted for and how far along is the construction?

Dr. Arnell: I think I will ask General Davis to give you the facts of the case.

Brig. Gen. Davis: All four have been contracted for, Mr. Harkness. The first two, at Marine Industries Limited in Sorel, are presently under construction; they are manufacturing the steel sub-assembly. The second two are at Davie Shipbuilding Ltd., and they are working on the preparatory work so that they will be able to begin steel fabrication shortly. At the present time they have about 50 per cent of their steel delivered in the second yard.

Mr. Harkness: As far as the initial two are concerned, are the hulls now constructed?

Brig. Gen. Davis: They have begun construction of the sub-assemblies of the hulls. There are to be 57 sub-assemblies and they have, so far, manufactured about seven.

Mr. Harkness: What about the machinery and armament?

Brig. Gen. Davis: The machinery is well in hand at United Aircraft of Canada Limited.

Mr. Harkness: This is the engines, you mean?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes, the main propulsion—the gas

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chamber propulsion engines. The armament is also under construction in Italy at the Oto-Melara Company, the same firm that are building the Pack Howitzer.

Mr. Winch: You ordered some spares I hope?

Brig. Gen. Davis: I propose to deal with your question on spares later, Mr. Winch. Spares are included in the over-all program cost.

Mr. Harkness: What type of contract are these on?

Brig. Gen. Davis: I suppose you would have to describe it as a target incentive contract. I am not quite sure of what, precisely, you were seeking.

Mr. Harkness: I want to know whether or not it was on a specific cost figure.

Brig. Gen. Davis: There is a ceiling cost, but I think, Mr. Chairman and Dr. Arnell, it would be better if DDP were to comment on this.

Dr. Arnell: We would have to get the direct information, I think, from Defence Services.

Mr. Harkness: What is the estimated cost, now, of these four destroyers? Is it \$220 million?

Brig. Gen. Davis: This is so.

Mr. Harkness: However, there is no firm contract that this will be the final cost. That is a cost of \$55 million apiece for these ships.

Brig. Gen. Davis: That is the total program cost, yes.

Mr. Harkness: It works out to approximately \$55 million a piece for these ships.

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes, it does, for each of them.

Mr. Harkness: We have no assurance that that will be the final figure though. This is a rough estimate, is it?

Brig. Gen. Davis: No. I do not think you can say that it is a rough estimate. It is the present estimate which is one of a series, each one coming closer to the actual fact. I think one would be rash to say, though, that is the absolute final cost.

Dr. Arnell: I think there is another point here, Mr. Harkness, which I must add. When you look at the history of some programs of this magnitude, stretched over this period of time, often you have a union decision, or at least, a union settlement, which, in fact, gives you a great increase in labour costs. None of these contracts that extend over five or six years are, in fact, completely ironclad with respect to your labour costs. You have to be prepared to increase the contract to take care of labour costs, at least. This, in fact, is something of which, I am afraid, I cannot give you the total story, because this is handled for us by DDP.

Mr. Harkness: That was my next question. What percentage of this total sum has been put down for escalation of costs? On the basis of the history of the past 20 years, at the time the cost estimates were made, everybody knew that labour and other costs were going to go up. Therefore, a figure was inserted in each case to take care of this escalation. What percentage of this figure is to cover escalation?

Brig. Gen. Davis: I think DDP would have to be asked to come and deal with the contract in detail.

Mr. Harkness: We will leave that at the moment. The next item concerns the operational support ships. Where are they being constructed and how far along is that program?

Brig. Gen. Davis: These are being constructed in Saint John.

Mr. Harkness: Both of them?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Both in the same yard. The first one is due to be delivered at the end of July of this year, the second one probably in January of next year. So, the first one is well along towards completion.

Mr. Harkness: Is it anticipated that this figure of \$63 million is a firm figure as far as the cost of those two ships is concerned?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes, indeed it is. There may be a relatively small increase in cost in the Sea Sparrow

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Missile System with which these ships, and the DDH's are being fitted. This is the only increase that we are expecting at the moment, and as I say, the program is running on to its conclusion.

Mr. Harkness: As far as the *Restigouche* conversion program is concerned, in what yards is it being carried out and how far along is that?

Brig. Gen. Davis: So far, the only vessel which has been converted is HMCS *Terra Nova*, which was done in the dockyard in Halifax. It was done, essentially, as a prototype so that DDP would have a better basis for the costs of the remainder of the class. There are three more to be converted, two of them will be put out to competition across the country. The third we expect, will go to the West Coast.

An hon. Member: Is that the *Chaudiere*?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes, I believe it is. However, we do not yet know how this program will fare in the current review, and particularly, we do not know which yards will be involved.

Mr. Harkness: Is the one ship completed? Is it true, then, that the cost of it was this \$10,296,000?

Brig. Gen. Davis: It is not easy to say that, Mr. Harkness. This program cost includes all the equipment that is being required and indeed, the equipment costs for the conversion are the larger proportion of the total cost. A good deal of the money that has been spent so far, has been for equipment for the class.

Mr. Harkness: One ship has been completed, and the amount that has been spent to date is this \$10 million?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes. This \$10 million is nearly a quarter of the cost.

Mr. Harkness: Well, it is about a fifth.

Brig. Gen. Davis: About a fifth, yes.

Mr. Harkness: This is the reason I wondered why these other three ships apparently were going to cost considerably more than the one already completed, particularly as the \$10 million includes some equipment which will be used in the other ships.

Dr. Arnell: I think it is a question of labour costs.

Brig. Gen. Davis: The original concept of the program was for more ships in order that we would have more equipment.

Mr. Harkness: The point I am getting at is this. You have completed one ship. You have secured some of the equipment for the other ships.

Brig. Gen. Davis: It is in the process of being secured.

Mr. Harkness: You have spent 10 million. Your estimate for the four ships is \$49 million which is nearly five times as much; apparently, you are estimating for these other three to cost very considerably more than the one which is completed.

Brig. Gen. Davis: Well, certainly. The one that is done, was completed in the dockyard at a much lower cost than we will have to pay for those vessels which are being built in private yards. What we wanted in the case of the ship being done in the dockyards, was a firmer idea of the man hours involved in the conversion, so that DDP would be able to assess better the prices they will obtain from the yard.

Mr. Harkness: You have not then, in this figure, allocated to the cost of this conversion the labour costs of the dockyard work?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes, we have. However, we do not pay overhead in the dockyard. The overhead costs, the costs of running the yards in question, for which a private yard would have to charge along with its profit, will not be included when we carry out the refit for the conversion in the dockyard, as when the first ship was done.

Mr. Harkness: Why, then, would you not do all of these conversions in the two dockyards we have, at Esquimalt and Halifax, at a very considerable saving of money?

Brig. Gen. Davis: I think I will ask Dr. Arnell to answer that.

Dr. Arnell: I would have to say, Mr. Harkness, that this type of decision is not entirely one for departmental officials.

Mr. Harkness: Well, I realize that, but I thought you would be able to give us the reasons for what is proposed, rather than construction in the dockyards.

Mr. Winch: It will be a good question when we have the Minister before us next week.

Dr. Arnell: I think that my possible statement of the reasons might be the same as those for which you are probing for the answers.

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Mr. Harkness: I do not understand what you mean. However, would you prefer not to answer that question?

Dr. Arnell: I really do not think I can.

Mr. Harkness: In regard to the Oberon submarines, I see that most of the estimated total has been expended. What is the situation as far as those three vessels are concerned?

Dr. Arnell: They are all in service. The amount of money that is needed in 1969-70 and in the subsequent year, will be essentially to buy spares.

Brig. Gen. Davis: The over-all program for Oberon submarines when it was set up, included a very considerable amount for spares and the money that will be needed in 1969-70 is to deal with the final acquisition of those spares, which takes a considerable time to arrive from the Admiralty.

Mr. Winch: That does not negate my question at all.

Mr. Harkness: The figures as far as the Oberons are concerned, are firm and essentially complete?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Since I personally negotiated this contract, I thought you would say that this was one of the very few we have had, which has been on time and for the price that we were supposed to pay.

Mr. Winch: Do those figures include the Oberon which is under refit now in Halifax?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Certainly not. Refit parts were not part of the initial procurement program.

Mr. Harkness: As I personally authorized this program, I am very happy to find that this is the situation!

An hon. Member: Very good.

Mr. Harkness: What is this naval research ship, and what is its situation?

Brig. Gen. Davis: It is a vessel being built for the Defence Research Board; it is to operate on the East Coast and is somewhat similar to the *Endeavour* which has now been in service on the West Coast for some time. It is, however, a good deal more advanced than the *Endeavour* in that it is to be used for antisubmarine research, and is being built to an extremely low noise level; this noise level has probably not been achieved before in ships in the western world. It is nearly complete, but there are some delays being experienced and we do not expect trials to begin until the summer. It is really one of the more advanced vessels with which we have been involved. Do you wish to add any information, Dr. Arnell?

Dr. Arnell: I think that is all.

Mr. Harkness: Does that ship carry any armaments?

Brig. Gen. Davis: No.

Mr. Harkness: None at all.

Brig. Gen. Davis: It will probably at some time, have experimental antisubmarine sonar equipment. You might perhaps regard that as a weapon, but they do not have guns or weapons of that sort.

Mr. Harkness: There are not any depth charges or anything else?

Brig. Gen. Davis: No. It might have explosives on board which will be of use in their sound, but they will not kill anybody, except inadvertently.

Mr. Harkness: On page 3, concerning the armoured personnel carrier, is that program complete?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, sir.

Brig. Gen. Davis: Essentially.

Mr. Harkness: How many armoured personnel carriers have we now?

Brig. Gen. Davis: We bought 461 in the first buy, and 500 in the second.

Mr. Harkness: How have these stood up to use?

Brig. Gen. Davis: There was a major fault in the fuel tank. Speaking as a naval constructor, I have to advise that they were not designed by naval constructors; had they been, this fault would not have occurred; the fuel tanks were connected directly to the hull and became rapidly susceptible to fatigue and fracture. It was a serious complaint since the APC became full of fuel rather than people; we have had to replace all of these tanks. They are replaced with a separate tank which does not have this fault. This was the major fault that we have had; we have tended to use ours more severely, I think, than the other nations, so that it came to a head with us rather quickly.

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Mr. Harkness: What was the cost of this repair program?

Brig. Gen. Davis: I do not think I could tell you that, but I could find out.

Mr. Harkness: Have there been any difficulties as far as trackage is concerned?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Not that I know of. This really has been the only complaint we have had.

Mr. Harkness: What is the situation as far as spare tracks are concerned?

Brig. Gen. Davis: I could not tell you. Do you mean how many?

Mr. Harkness: Yes. I found from personal experience in tanks and track vehicles that one of the major difficulties that we always ran into was breaking of trackage, replacement of trackage, and so forth.

Brig. Gen. Davis: We can establish that for you.

Mr. Harkness: Concerning these 155 millimeter self-propelled howitzers, how many of them have we secured?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Fifty.

Mr. Harkness: How many of those 50 are in actual use, and how many are kept as spares?

Brig. Gen. Davis: I could not tell you that.

Mr. Harkness: How many regiments are equipped with them?

Brig. Gen. Davis: They were to equip the artillery regiments.

Colonel C. L. Kirby: The regiment in Germany is equipped with that, but I do not know what the equipment is in Canada.

Mr. Harkness: Well, that would be 24 guns; as far as the regiment in Germany is concerned, apparently the idea was to have equipment for two regiments.

Mr. Harkness: Is there any program to secure more spare guns? They are not only guns, but in this case, they are complete pieces of equipment.

Dr. Arnell: As I said earlier, Mr. Harkness, this year's budget is a strictly hold-the-line one and there is no new program in it at all. The final decisions are pending, and then we hope that we will, in fact, embark on a new equipment program in which this type of thing will be considered.

Mr. Harkness: What use is being made of the other half of them, the twenty-four? I imagine at least one spare is with the regiment in Germany. Where is the other half? How are they being used? Who is equipped with them?

Dr. Arnell: It is Shilo, is it? We can find out for sure, but I am certain it is to train them.

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Mr. Harkness: How much firing per year does this ammunition estimate provide for? I am talking about, practice firing, of course.

Brig. Gen. Davis: You are asking about the number of rounds per year and that sort of thing?

Dr. Arnell: This, of course, is the stockpile of ammunition rather than the actual number that will be fired in the year. With all new procurements they always build up to the level of war stocks.

Mr. Harkness: I was somewhat concerned that the balance to be paid in future years will be \$1 million. This would not provide for very much practice firing, which is an essential.

Brig. Gen. Davis: One would say here, Dr. Arnell, that we are procuring ammunition every year. This is a complete buy, but almost certainly, in future years, there will be further buys of whatever kinds of

ammunition are required. We are spending approximately \$25 million to \$30 million on ammunition, so this is not necessarily the end on the M109.

Mr. Harkness: No, but as far as artillery ammunition is concerned, you do not make an initial buy and then just keep it in stock indefinitely. You have to keep on using it and replacing it because if you leave it over a certain length of time, it deteriorates and is no longer dependable.

Dr. Arnell: I think the point, sir, which General Davis was trying to make is that this reflects the initial order that was placed along with the guns themselves. It includes both provision for training as well as whatever stockpile was built up. The question of the re-supply for training purposes would not, in fact, appear in this list at the moment. I would judge from this that the decision for the next buy has not, in fact, been made yet.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, your assumption is that there is no provision in this concerning the amounts required for practice firing?

Dr. Arnell: There is about \$30 million in this year's estimates for various types of ammunition and bombs which is a straight replacement for training. I do not have this broken down for you.

Mr. Harkness: We will leave that at the moment. What type of gun is this 105 mm pack howitzer, could you give us a brief description of it?

Dr. Arnell: Could you come forward, Colonel Kirby?

Colonel Kirby: I am not a gunner, but the 105 mm is a gun that can be broken down into 12 loads. I think this was described the other day in public as 12 mule loads, but I do not think we intend to use mules. It makes it very efficient, however, in breaking down into small vehicle loads, into helicopter loads, and that kind of thing. It does use a standard 105 mm field gun ammunition with a range reduction. It is usable in a low-silhouette anti-tank role or in a high-silhouette howitzer role. It is a very versatile weapon, in other words.

Mr. Harkness: How many of these guns have we secured?

Colonel Kirby: Twenty-eight.

Mr. Harkness: 28. So, this is essentially the equipment for two batteries?

Colonel Kirby: Yes, sir, although again I am not quite sure of the distribution—in what batteries they are in or in what formations they are located. I can find that out for you for this afternoon.

Mr. Harkness: Possibly, with a light gun like this, they are probably located in three batteries. You do not know the details on that?

Colonel Kirby: I can get the details of the distribution of them very easily.

Mr. Harkness: Yes. I would like a little more elaboration on just what this equipment is, what its range is, and what the organization of the batteries will be. It is

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probably a light regiment, I do now know. This is the information I would like.

Colonel Kirby: I think at the moment they are broken down in batteries, not in one regiment.

Mr. Harkness: Independent batteries?

Colonel Kirby: Yes, sir.

Dr. Arnell: Mr. Harkness, if I could go back for a moment. The distribution of the 155 mm howitzer is this: there are 12 with Mobile Command, 26 overseas, 11 with Training Command, and one held back in reserve.

Mr. Harkness: I will let someone else do some of the questioning.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Arnell, I noticed in looking at the revised form of estimates and taking some details from there that you have broken down the details of construction and acquisition into certain categories, such as NATO, the Joint Defence of North America, etc. I will give you one of the figures for an example concerning the total capital cost, or estimated cost, of the Hydrofoil. I notice that 75 per cent of that cost is allocated to NATO, and 25 per cent of the cost is allocated to the Joint Defence of North America. Does this mean that the value you put on the Maritime services is allocated in that kind of proportion?

Dr. Arnell: No, Mr. Cafik. As is expressed in the notes that come with this which are included in this new form of estimates, and which was the point that I was trying to make the first night when talking about this, this new form of estimates is, in many areas, a straight pro-rated thing this year because we simply have not built from basics. As is stated on page 23, which discusses the explanation of the various programs, the Maritime forces do, in fact, meet our responsibilities under NATO, under Joint Defence with the U.S., and also certain purely Canadian responsibilities.

For the first time around, because we simply did not have any other way of doing this, and because of the nature of putting this together, we assigned, as is

stated here, the East Coast Maritime forces to NATO, because this has been said many times by the Prime Minister and others as being one of his prime tasks. On the other hand the West Coast forces are assigned in this breakdown to the Joint Defence of North America, because the West Coast forces operate under the joint Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group.

As the explanation brings out, it is not really a 100 per cent assignment. For purposes of this display, we had to just pro-rate at the moment. When you look at the forces it breaks down to about three to one. The Hydrofoil is, in essence, a developmental vessel. We cannot predict just where it is going to be used. We presume that it will go in the same general proportions as the Maritime forces themselves. It is as simple as that, right or wrong.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Arnell, then one could draw the conclusion that at least at the time that you were preparing this new form of estimates in this particular area, that you yourself felt that 75 per cent of Maritime forces, at this moment anyway, would be accurately ascribed to NATO?

Dr. Arnell: We made it on the basis that for this year, three-quarters of the Maritime forces would be on the East Coast. That is really what we have assumed.

Mr. Cafik: All right. However, I bring to your attention as well, the question of the Hydrofoil which is confined to the East Coast at the present moment; I do not suppose you are going to use and transport it, contributing a quarter of it in the Pacific. Therefore, I presume that in that particular example you must have

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drawn some kind of a conclusion, whereby you felt that roughly three-quarters of this type of force was assigned to NATO.

Dr. Arnell: It would be on the East Coast.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but surely three-quarters of the Hydrofoil was not going to be on the East Coast?

Dr. Arnell: No, not the Hydrofoil itself.

Mr. Cafik: Then did you mean three-quarters of the ones that are to be built?

Dr. Arnell: After all, it is development; you never use the developmental vehicle operationally.

Mr. Cafik: Okay, I understand.

Dr. Arnell: But if the development of the Hydrofoil leads to Hydrofoil vessels in any number above four,

we would expect to have at least one on the West Coast, if we were to have them on the East Coast.

Mr. Cafik: I pursue this point a little bit further because I think it is relatively important in judging our military posture. In other areas such as improvement to communications, which is sort of a general thing that I am sure would apply to East and West Coast, do you find the same break-out? That would be roughly three to one. Again, I say that I do not expect that this is a development project.

Dr. Arnell: This is improvement of communications to the ships themselves. If we have a quarter of the ships on the West Coast, any improvement is on all the ships. As I say in the text here, because we had to prorate in some way, next year we must be much more precise in this. This is only one way of trying to give you more information, about some of which we have to be arbitrary; as the text states, we took the decision that we would put all the East Coast Maritime forces under NATO but they do have responsibilities to joint North American and others. Therefore, whatever we do to those three-quarters of the ships, will appear as 75 per cent supporting NATO. We could have been completely arbitrary and said we did not have any of them for NATO; we could have put it all in joint defence in North America. Of course, they have responsibilities for NATO.

Mr. Cafik: If you were now to make a more accurate judgment on this, not based upon these figures, what would you think is the appropriate proportion of cost to be assigned to NATO?

Dr. Arnell: I am hoping that the exercise that is going on at the moment and which is beyond my control, will tell me what I should do.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but I am talking about our existing policy; perhaps you would rather not answer that, I do not want to embarrass you.

Dr. Arnell: No, it is really a discussion point rather than a point of substance. The Maritime Commander develops the bulk of his operational strategy in consultation with the Americans at SACLANT. Because he does that, he is really developing, primarily, NATO strategy. One of the real difficulties is that when we speak of the joint defence of North America there is also within NATO, the regional defence area; therefore the joint defence of North America, if you want to be terribly legalistic, is supporting NATO in any case. Whether we speak of joint defence or regional defence of North America, you could in fact, put it all under NATO. However, we decided, particularly because the air defence side is one that I think most Canadians recognize as being truly a defence of North America, whether there is a NATO or not, that we did not want

to put it all under NATO and say everything done in North America relates to it, so that we made the distinction. I can assure you that this Maritime case caused me more trouble than everything else that is in the book. The obvious answer in dealing with it would have been to make a separate activity, which would operate Maritime forces; this would have solved the question as far as you people are concerned today; it would not, in fact, have answered the program question, however, because the only reason for having that

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activity was to operate Maritime forces; you would have asked why, and then I would have had to go back and deal with it another way.

Mr. Cafik: I can appreciate, Doctor, your dilemma here. Mr. Harkness brought up the question of ammunition and bombs. I had intended to do the same thing. I notice in the column of "total estimated costs of projects," that when you add up all the ammunition and bomb totals, you end up with roughly \$112 million, of which \$33 million roughly is for this year's expenditure. It says "total"; is this a specific contractual order for ammunition or how far back does it go? Obviously it does not go back to the Boer War; it must start somewhere.

Dr. Arnell: This is a compilation of what is essentially the five-year re-equipment program that was initiated in 1964; procurement began really starting in 1965. Included in this is a very wide range of things. It is not just shells for guns. There are the Mk. 46 torpedoes; there are aircraft bombs, there are air to air missiles. Everything is grouped here. In terms of ammunition, some of the major items are included in the selected major items which I tabled April 17. In fact, Mr. Harkness was asking specifically about a couple of those ammunition programs. The 155 mm howitzer order that cost \$15.7 million was the ammunition order that went for that particular one. It is part of that \$112 million or whatever you suggested.

The \$2.1 million that is shown in this year's cash phasing for the 155 mm howitzer is part of the \$31 million that you obtain for the total.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Arnell, the obvious question—as far as I am concerned—is if defence policy and position were to remain the same, does this mean in effect that we can look forward to expenditures in the neighbourhood of \$20 to \$30 million per year for ammunition and bombs?

Dr. Arnell: I believe that this will be approximately the level that you can expect to look forward to for years. This is typical of the cost of ammunition. Ammunition is terribly expensive.

Mr. Cafik: I think anyone can see that.

Dr. Arnell: I think that you were given a reflection of the cost when Mr. Harkness told us that he did not think that we had enough money in the estimates for the 155 mm ammunition. I am not sure of the cost of a single shell of that.

Mr. Harkness: Just a correction. I did not say that. My intended question was: What amount was in for practice purposes? I do not know whether you have enough, or whether you have too much.

Mr. Cafik: Are ammunition and bombs used for training purposes on an annual basis?

Dr. Arnell: There are two points. The first is that you buy for training; the second, that ammunition has a limited life. You were referred to the latter point earlier.

The standard policy attempts to equate the war stocks—which are arrived at by a fixed formula as to the amount required for certain types—with the shelf life and the training needs. Hopefully, as ammunition reaches the end of its service life it may still be used for training. Obviously, this cannot be balanced perfectly. One's annual buy reflects new war stocks or perhaps new equipment, all the annual training, and replacement ammunition. If you managed to work out the formula, the training and replacement will become the same. In fact, it may not. One of the difficulties that technical people who are concerned with the ammunition encounter, is to maintain safe ammunition, by using it sensibly without having to destroy too much when it becomes unsafe. This is the best answer I can give you.

Mr. Cafik: There is one supplementary. I cannot remember the gentleman's name, but he was discussing

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armoured carriers and fuel tanks being put in the wrong positions. This caused some degree of difficulty in the Department. Now you said that if you had the responsibility, this situation would not have occurred. The obvious question is, Why did you not have the responsibility, if you had the knowledge?

Brig. Gen. Davis: These vehicles were procured to an American design and essentially from American production lines, so that, from an economical point of view we were not able to introduce considerable changes into the design at that time. As the operation of the vehicles began, it became clear—as it had not been clear before—that these tanks resonated and vibrated to a great degree. Hence, very quickly they failed.

This is a problem which is bound to occur when one is joined to another's production line.

Dr. Arnell: It is much broader than that. This is the same problem that you see every week or two in the newspapers now, where automobile manufacturers withdraw automobiles that have faulty parts.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but they pay for it.

Dr. Arnell: Perhaps to lighten the thing a little, I might say that the Navy always built very heavily since they had to withstand very large seas compared to bumps in the roads. When I heard General Davis make his remark earlier that—if he had designed it, he would have done it differently—I passed the quip that it would probably have weighed half a ton more.

Mr. Winch: Why do you not test this kind of equipment on Ottawa roads?

Dr. Arnell: If I might change the subject a little. While General Davis has been at the table, he has handed three of the answers to the earlier questions to me. I thought that if he provided them, he might like to comment on your Fresnel lens.

Brig. Gen. Davis: First of all, I would like to say that I do not want to comment on the *Bonaventure* Tracker situation at the moment. From the experience of my colleagues, I do not want to discuss the *Bonaventure* until I know what I am talking about.

Mr. Cafik: I think that we feel the same way. Yes, learn, as you say.

Brig. Gen. Davis: The 105 pack howitzer was bought from Italy and will be coming into service at the beginning of this year. There was a small kit of spares with the guns. We were a little late ordering the bulk spares, but they are now being delivered. We also pressed for the guns to be delivered quickly, so that they could get into the training role, as soon as possible. I think that the pack Howitzer situation should now improve quite markedly.

Mr. Harkness: While you are still discussing the pack howitzer. Is the ammunition purchased from Italy or is there any other source of supply?

Colonel Kirby: Yes, it uses the standard charge and as I say the only difference is that there is a slight range in which they cannot use the higher charges in the ammunition.

Mr. Harkness: We can manufacture the ammunition ourselves in Canada for this?

Colonel Kirby: I am not sure whether the standard 105 pack howitzer ammunition is manufactured in Canada. I think it is, but I am not sure.

Mr. Harkness: It used to be manufactured so I presume . . .

Colonel Kirby: It is the standard ammunition made.

Brig. Gen. Davis: The 155 mm Howitzer spares were ordered with the gun. However, as is not unusual, there were subsequent design changes made on the gun. Due to these changes, the spares that were initially provided could not be used. It is a U.S. responsibility to change the spares, and they are now rectifying

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the situation. We are told that the majority of the correct spares have been delivered.

Mr. Winch: That is only in the last month.

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes.

Mr. Winch: In the previous months you did not have spares, traps or barrels.

Brig. Gen. Davis: It was largely due to American problems. The Fresnel lens situation is another of the same character. We were able to obtain the Fresnel landing system only with great difficulty.

Mr. Winch: You received it through the U.S. Navy.

Brig. Gen. Davis: We did indeed, but it was not easy. We ordered the spares at the same time we procured the equipment, and they have not yet been delivered.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, sir, I want to get this straight. You ordered at the same time.

Mr. Davis: Yes.

Mr. Winch: That Fresnel system has been on there now for over two years, almost three.

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes. We are pressing, naturally, for the delivery of these spares. We are optimistic that we are going to get them shortly.

Mr. Winch: Two and a half years late.

Brig. Gen. Davis: Mr. Winch, we are dealing with an armaments industry that has greater problems than ours. They have a war on their hands. This problem may well be characteristic of both the howitzer and the Fresnel lens. It is not, in any event, for want of trying on our part.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): May I ask a question? You also told us that there had been some changes made in these parts.

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes, with the 155 mm howitzer.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Right.

Mr. Winch: There is no change on the Fresnel to my knowledge.

Brig. Gen. Davis: I was speaking of the Howitzer only when I spoke of changes to the gun which caused the spares not to be accepted. That was the only one.

Dr. Arnell: I think, in fact, the type of change that he is referring to could perhaps be illustrated by the story of the gas tank on the armoured personnel carrier. After all, if you bought it with the tank in a certain place, you could probably have bought some spares and replacements. If you had to change the tank you are, in fact, going to be in a different spares category. You do, in fact, find in all these equipments some modifications for operation.

Mr. Winch: Dr. Arnell, what is the position of our brigade in Europe which is completely equipped with 14, is it not, Mr. Harkness, of the 155? Are they in this position now, because of changes, of not having spares?

Mr. Harkness: They have 24.

Mr. Winch: Yes, 24.

Brig. Gen. Davis: They were, yes, except that each has a small case of spares. The bulk spares are now being delivered. We are advised here that they will very shortly have all of these delivered.

Dr. Arnell: I think I should interject at this point to say that it is 1:05 p.m., and we should adjourn now until 3:30 p.m., unless there are only one or two questions on this point.

An hon. Member: I want to ask some questions on the second round.

The Vice-Chairman: We will adjourn and we will have a further opportunity to ask questions. General Davis, if you will be here at 3:30 p.m. there may be further questions that you can answer.

(Afternoon Sitting)

Thursday, May 1, 1969.

● 1533

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we are ready to begin. Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I have discussed this with you and Dr. Arnell a moment ago because I would like

to assist in expediting our business on Defence estimates. May I, under the Vote we are now under, put three questions together? If I do so, it will make a better presentation and Dr. Arnell and his staff will have a chance to get the answers. Is that all right, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Winch: First, when I am finished, Dr. Arnell, will you please comment on the estimate for 1969-70, which is on page 242 of the Blue Book, of \$64,497,000 for Professional and Special Services. I ask, Dr. Arnell, for your comment on this, in view of the fact that of 98,300 in our armed services, 106 are Brigadier-Generals or higher, and on our military staff at NDHQ, which amounts to 3100, 1800 are commissioned officers?

● 1535

Second, Mr. Chairman, concerns the same page. It deals with Rentals. Under Rentals we note for 1969-70 the amount of \$11,545,000. I would like to ask, Dr. Arnell, if it is not a fact that for the past three years, approximately, there has been on the drawing board the building of a multi-multi million dollar defence headquarters? If so, why this amount? In particular, will you please advise this Committee if it is correct that the Defence Department has signed contracts amounting to millions of dollars, and running from 10 to 40 years, with the owners or operators of office buildings?

If I am correct that there is, and has been on the drawing board, this \$100 million NDHQ building, on what basis do we have this amount of money for Rentals? Have contracts been signed by the Defence Department with private operators running from between 10 and 40 years?

On Rentals, but not dealing with that phase, there is a matter, Mr. Chairman, which you know is of considerable interest to members of this Committee who made a trip overseas. I would like to ask, and I know members of this Committee are interested in asking, on what is based the policy of the Department of National Defence, that coincidental with increase in wages to our armed forces, you increase rental charges to those who are subject to same as members of the armed forces? May I also ask on what basis do you establish a policy that increased rentals to our members overseas is related to increased rentals to the civilian population in Ottawa?

Third, on the same subject, because this was most certainly drawn to our attention on our visit a few weeks ago, on what basis, by policy, did you increase the rentals to our armed forces at Lahr, which went into effect on April 1, when we as a committee were informed by General Lane that your Department does

not pay rent for our establishment at Lahr, you only pay taxes?

Will you further explain how and why, that coincidental with increased wages to our armed forces and increased rentals—and we were told this at Lahr and Zweibrücken—a number of our armed forces were subject to increased rent which exceeded the increased salary, so the take home pay was less. Would you please, sir, explain?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, Mr. Winch, I will do my best.

● 1540

First of all, with respect to your first question on the Professional and Special Services. . .

Mr. Winch: \$64,497,000.

Dr. Arnell: Within this amount of money we provide for expert advice on legal services, engineering services, training and educational services, health and welfare services, professional services, and others. Among the specific items that are covered within this are: tuition costs for service personnel who are sent away for either graduate work or to special courses, non-resident school fees for the children of military personnel when they have an overseas posting. . .

Mr. Winch: I am sorry. Do I understand that included in this is all the cost of the teachers overseas?

Dr. Arnell: No, these are the non-resident school fees. Every so often we post service personnel to a place where they cannot get adequate education for their children. It is necessary, in effect, to assist those particular families by allowing their children to go to school somewhere away from home.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry. Then perhaps, sir, if I may, because I do not want to hold it up . . .

Dr. Arnell: This goes on . . .

Mr. Winch: Could you give us a breakdown as to the moneys spent on the meaning of Professional and Special Services.

Dr. Arnell: The actual description is the following: it pays for the Corps of Commissionaires; the school teachers for all the children's schools come out of this; within this are some of the overseas capitation payments which are the moneys that we pay to the British for assistance which we get from them overseas; and also are included the overseas indigenous labour that is, the Germans that are hired to go through it. Within these you get changes and so on, but I think the main point would be the school teachers' salaries, overseas indigenous labour that support our bases, as well as

such professional fees as we need to pay to get legal advice, engineering advice and so on. This covers all the professional consultant advice and in fact, special services.

Mr. Winch: Could I just ask two questions on that phase, Mr. Chairman? Can you give us the figures of how much you pay civilian personnel overseas, who are as you said, German?

Dr. Arnell: The overseas indigenous labour, Mr. Winch, is \$3.9 million.

Mr. Winch: \$3.9. I will check it formally.

Dr. Arnell: I might add that the capitation payments that are associated with the Brigade Group amount to \$13 million.

Mr. Winch: That is the German civilian employees?

Dr. Arnell: This is paid to the British for the support we get for the Brigade Group from them.

Mr. Winch: Would you please explain that? You pay \$13 million for what purpose?

Dr. Arnell: It is basically the food we draw through the British supply line.

Mr. Winch: Before you go on to the second point, may I ask, in view of the fact that you have a highly integrated legal section in National Defence Headquarters, why you said this includes money for legal advice, and how much is it?

Dr. Arnell: I am just looking to see how much it is.

● 1545

Mr. Winch: Well you included this, sir, so you got away from the question.

Dr. Arnell: The legal fees that are provided here are \$50,000 and they relate for the most part to civilian court costs and other miscellaneous services. Often we have to pay for a court stenographer or something like that, and that would come into the legal fees.

Mr. Winch: That is only \$50,000.

Dr. Arnell: I might point out that one of the other big items, the salary for school teachers includes \$15.5 million of this.

Mr. Winch: You are still short about \$30 million.

Dr. Arnell: Yes and I have about four pages left.

Mr. Winch: What kind of services does that cover?

Dr. Arnell: The Corps of Commissionaires is \$8.5 million.

Mr. Winch: At \$8.5 million, what is the Corps of Commissionaires doing?

Dr. Arnell: You will find them as night watchmen on various armouries and so on; they are present at the gates of most of our bases; you will discover that we use the Corps of Commissionaires in a very large measure for our guards; you see them operating at Uplands for example. In fact, you find them all around the parking areas and generally around National Defence Headquarters, and on the front door there, also.

Mr. Winch: Do you pay the Corps of Commissionaires?

Dr. Arnell: We pay them. We enter into a contract with them for services.

Mr. Winch: With the Corps of Commissionaires?

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Winch: You pay the Corps of Commissionaires as a whole, not the individual man?

Dr. Arnell: We buy their services just as anyone else does so. They undertake to provide a certain service for us at a standard fee.

Mr. Winch: Do you insist that they live up to the regulations and the law of the Federal Government on holidays and so on?

Dr. Arnell: I would have to check exactly what the contract is. I have always understood that we buy the same service from the Corps as does everybody else.

Mr. Winch: You do not ask the headquarters of the Corps of Commissionaires with whom you contract that they must live up to the status of holidays with pay, holidays off and overtime?

Dr. Arnell: I would have to have somebody check the contract. I simply do not know.

Mr. Winch: Would you mind doing that for me?

Now then, sir, would you mind if I go over this rental business, especially on contracts? First, do you have contracts going over many years?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, there are some, where for married quarters on base we have entered into contracts of

various duration, where rather than building our own married quarters we have in fact made a contract with an entrepreneur. I do not have the actual detail of the various. . .

Mr. Winch: I am sorry sir. I am interested in what contracts you have made in Ottawa.

Dr. Arnell: We do not; Public works make our contracts for us here.

Mr. Winch: Under your information?

Dr. Arnell: No, Public Works provides us with space in Ottawa.

Mr. Winch: But you tell them what you want?

Dr. Arnell: We will say that we need so much space. The question of the new building is again within the over-all government building program; Public Works will be involved in that in exactly the same way as any other building. We are involved in the design of the building, but the actual question of the timing of the building and so on, is in the hands of Public Works.

Mr. Winch: Then has your Department over the past few years asked for certain accommodation under a long term contractual agreement? Public Works, I presume, would not make this available or sign contracts, except upon your own request for supplying this space. Have you and the Department put in a request to Public Works for certain space, available and contracted for, over a long period of years?

● 1550

Dr. Arnell: It has always been my understanding that we merely ask Public Works to get us space; we outline what we need.

Mr. Winch: Do you also outline the length of time for which you will need it?

Dr. Arnell: In any cases to which I have heard reference it has been predicated that we will need the space until the time we have our building.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I am afraid Dr. Arnell . . .

Dr. Arnell: But the timing of the construction of the building, Mr. Winch, is not in the hands of the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Winch: Do you make the request to the Department of Public Works?

Dr. Arnell: Only for space.

Mr. Winch: You do not put down at any time for how long you think you may require it?

Dr. Arnell: We can say how long we think we will require it, but the length of time for which we will require it is up until our building is completed.

Mr. Winch: In other words . . .

Dr. Arnell: The timing of the building is not a matter of our own choice.

Mr. Winch: Oh I understand now: you put in a request, but it is entirely up to the Department of Public Works if they sign contractual agreements.

Dr. Arnell: As I understand it, yes.

Mr. Winch: It is not your responsibility?

Dr. Arnell: They do all the contracting for space.

Mr. Winch: If they have signed contracts in private buildings for years on end, that is their responsibility and not yours?

Dr. Arnell: As I understand it, yes.

Mr. Winch: Thank you. Now will you please deal with this matter of rental charge?

Dr. Arnell: I want to make one other point, Mr. Winch, on this question of rentals. Included in these rentals are those of computers and in face, data processing as well. This is rentals in the total sense of renting something; within this total there is something better than \$2 million, out of this, related to data processing equipment not to accommodation.

Mr. Winch: Now, I may say just one thing. I want you to know, Dr. Arnell, that what you are saying now about this rental charge to our people will be noted overseas by our armed forces. I just want to say that! I have seen letters to the editor in their papers and they were raising hell!

Dr. Arnell: The whole question concerning the rentals of PMQs goes back to the fall of 1966 when the changeover of the method of military pay was converted from pay and allowances—with allowances graded by rank—to that of salaries aimed at being equivalent to that in civilian life in terms of equivalents for trades, and so on. One of the things that was part of the changeover was that PMQs would be put on—I am trying to think of the right adjective for this—a rental that was, if not equivalent, at least could be compared with rents with respect to the location. Prior to the fall of 1966, the question of whether a member of the military service drew any

allowance to assist him with rent or not, was directly, related to whether he was given permanent married quarters or not. In other words, he got it free, but the man who did not get a PMQ received a living allowance which was said to be equivalent with respect to the rent of PMQs.

One of the things that arose that one might say was disparate when you were trying to put things more on a basis of salaries and living in the same world as the civilians was why should the rent of an individual house vary with rank? In effect, you were saying that the senior officer received a greater allowance—before this time in order to pay rent—than the private or the NCO. When allowances were withdrawn and the people were given salaries, which were spent on the same things that civilians spent their money on, the whole question as to the treatment of the rent of the government-owned quarters arose. It was originally very strongly recommended,—that might not be putting it strongly enough; in fact we were practically told—that we must put the rental on a directly comparable basis to the locale in which the man was serving. This meant that if a service man had the misfortune, from the point of view of the service, to be posted to Toronto, he would have been expected to pay, or we would have been directed to charge him, a rent that might have been \$175 a month for a house that was exactly the same as the house that he would have been placed in if he had been posted, say, to a small area in Saskatchewan where rents were low and for which he might have only paid \$65 a month.

● 1555

The military—in this I entirely agreed with them—argued very strenuously, and it succeeded in convincing the Treasury Board and others, that since a military man served on a national basis and was paid on a national basis,—regardless of where he was he drew the same salary—therefore, they should make the rents of married quarters the same, irrespective of the location of the man, even though this would produce some disparity . . .

Mr. Winch: Overseas too?

Dr. Arnell: No, only with the local. I am coming to the overseas situation in a minute. This only covers the question in Canada. So it was agreed, after a year of very detailed study. Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation helped us, and there were surveys across the country. We had a tremendous amount of data, which included the actual pricing, of the equivalent rental of every married quarter in Canada owned by the Department of National Defence. An estimate was made of the total list and when it was finally all sorted out, it was agreed that rather than have the rent of an

individual type of house vary across the country, we would strike a national rental to this house that would be the same everywhere.

This would, in fact, return the same amount of revenue to the Crown. This, of course, ended up by producing rentals so we worked out a formula—because it is terribly difficult to find what the going rent is in a city. All that is required is to look at Ottawa and you will find the same house within five miles renting for as much as a \$25, \$35 or \$40 difference. When the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation did their survey, it is interesting to note that the Uplands PMQs were given lower rentals by CMHC than the ones in Rockcliffe. There is a difference in the level of rents between the Uplands and the Rockcliffe stations. We produced a formula that satisfied Treasury Board, and everybody else, as to how we would arrive at the rent.

These rents are actually a little lower than those which, most people believe are the going rents in any given area. Since they were higher than the allowances which the lower ranks were receiving, it was agreed—when this was first instituted, either in 1967 or 1968, and I think it was April 1, 1968 when we finally worked it out—that nobody's rent could be increased more than \$15 per year until it rose to the figure that had been produced as being a reasonable equivalent to the market price. The government has a regulation—a rider of the previous one—which states that: in the lower income groups up to a salary of \$5,000 or \$6,000 . . . someone should check to be precise . . . no person can be charged more than 20 per cent of his salary for the rent of a government-owned accom-

● 1600

modation, or if all services are provided—including water and electricity—25 per cent. There is an upper limit that, in particular, privates can be charged for their rent. This system went into effect—there was wide announcements of the subject at the time—over a year ago now.

The question concerning the accommodation charge in Europe was one that could not be handled at the same time. On the other hand, it had to be fitted in to the general and broad principles that had been established. Before I deal with Europe, I must say one thing. As a result of this decision to put the government housing on an economic basis in relation to the civilian economy—which was aimed at the removal of what presented to be disparity between those who were lucky enough to get into a PMQ and those who were forced to live outside, because we had enough houses for only a third of the personnel—by the time the government completed the survey with respect to National Defence it was discovered that only about two-thirds of the total government-owned housing was the housing of the Department of National Defence.

Some—I forget how many thousands of housing units—were owned and used by other government departments—personnel of other government departments.

You may recall that at the time that the military rental scheme was announced, the government announced that precisely the same principles were being applied to all government-owned housing. In fact, the public servant who lives in a government owned house is experiencing exactly the same adjustment in rents as this.

When we came to the question of Europe, it was a matter of just how to deal with this. Two things were involved. First, there was the principle that was being applied to all public servants within Canada. The principle could be applied equally in Europe because there were those who were living in the PMQ's, and there were, in fact, those who were having to live on the economy.

Second, there was the fact that the government has a foreign service personnel policy which attempts to equate the costs and the conditions under which Canadians live abroad with the costs and conditions in Canada. A very elaborate scheme has been worked out, and this again took even longer than the rents.

The Committee that worked out the foreign service personnel policy was chaired by the Treasury Board staff and, in fact, had as representation all the major departments which have personnel serving overseas. This included, of course, External Affairs, Trade and Commerce, Manpower and Immigration, and ourselves, to name the four principals. I think there may have been one or two others.

Before anything was done with respect to the Canadian Forces in Europe, a very detailed survey was done of Europe by the members of the Bureau of Statistics, the Treasury Board staff, Central Mortgage and Housing, I believe, and ourselves. A similar type of survey was done over in Europe as was done in Canada. At the end of this, an equivalent set of data was accumulated to that which had been obtained here a year or two years before.

● 1605

April 1 is the anniversary date of these rentals. The first increase in Canada was April 1, 1968, I believe. Again rents went up \$15 for those who had not reached the ceiling under the guideline I mentioned. In fact, the European ones went into effect this year for the first time. This is the result of a policy that was announced a year and a half or two years ago. It was widely disseminated through the services and it is entirely unrelated, in fact, to any particular raise in pay right now, because it goes back to the decision of October 1966 to convert the military pay and allowance system to salary.

I hope I have not talked too long about this but I have been attempting to give you the philosophy that is behind this. Of course, it always gets equated to the present, but this is something that must be studied from October 1966 to April 1, 1969. The same thing will probably be true on April 1, 1970.

All the facts are available. If people are interested, we can show you, or at least can provide, a table that, in fact, shows the average rents that have been arrived at for the different classes of houses.

Mr. Winch: May I just ask this? To my knowledge, the last two increases in rent have been co-incidental with the increases in salary.

Dr. Arnell: The salaries were increased October 1 and the rents were increased on April 1.

Mr. Winch: I know, but prior to that there was an increase. When I was in Europe, it happened at the same time.

Dr. Arnell: Sir, the conversion from pay and allowances to salaries was in October 1966, and every change in military pay was in October 1967 and October 1968. We introduced the rental adjustments on April 1, 1968, and there has been a second adjustment, so they are, in fact, six months out of phase.

Mr. Winch: What I am referring to is that a few years ago a committee of this nature was overseas, and at that time there was a co-incidental increase with rents. It is a few years ago. However, I would like to ask you this because I think it is rather important.

Dr. Arnell: This, I think, is your overseas allowances business, which is quite a different matter again.

Mr. Winch: However, I would like to ask you this question because I think it has a great effect on morale. We discovered when we were there on a recent visit, and I had officers come to me and speak about this matter, that the increase in salary went into effect on April 1, and the increase in rentals resulted in a number of ranks receiving less than the take-home pay they had received previously.

Dr. Arnell: I think what you were talking about, Mr. Winch, does not have anything to do with salary at all. This is, in fact, the overseas allowance. The overseas allowance is related to Ottawa.

Mr. Winch: Why Ottawa?

Dr. Arnell: If you refer to the whole foreign service personnel policy, Ottawa was originally taken as a guideline because more people went from Ottawa

to overseas service than from any other part of the country. You could tie it to almost anywhere and exactly the same thing would happen.

What, in fact, has happened in recent years with this overseas allowance is that the effective inflation between Canada and Europe for a number of years was in a direction which resulted in the increase of the overseas allowances. This last year for the first time, I believe, I could be wrong in this, the inflation trend was reversed from what it had been in the past and, in fact, the allowance, instead of automatically going up, either dropped slightly or held the same level.

● 1610

Mr. Winch: Whether it is called salary increase or overseas allowance, may I ask if you are interested in the situation whereby through the increase in rents a number of our overseas armed forces are now receiving less in take-home pay? Are you concerned with that?

Dr. Arnell: We are very concerned with this, Mr. Winch. However, we are also concerned with the fact that almost every civilian in our Department is being met by increasing rents which are going up faster than our military rents. Those military personnel who must live in the civilian economy are having their rents increased faster than are PMQ's. We are attempting to introduce more equality; that is all.

Mr. Winch: I have been taking a look at this situation where a number of our armed forces are actually since April 1 receiving less take-home pay.

Dr. Arnell: We are fully aware of this and we are also aware that those who are not in PMQs are in fact getting less take-home pay; they are experiencing even a bigger loss in take-home pay because their rents have gone up faster than the ones that we have. As I explained to you, this is in fact part of a policy that has been agreed to, promulgated, and hopefully, understood by all, for several years and of which we are terribly conscious and sensitive. We have been trying all the way along to arrive at the best way of trying to make people live in an inflationary world.

Mr. Winch: I just have one more question. Has your Department, Dr. Arnell, stopped making any representation for the payment to our families overseas on family allowance?

Dr. Arnell: I cannot tell you precisely what the story is right at the moment. This has been a continuing matter of consideration in this whole question of foreign service personnel policy; I am not completely up to date. However, I know that the last time I was

involved, this was in fact one of the items on the books.

Mr. Winch: I have never been able to understand why the children of our armed forces overseas, are not allowed family allowances.

Dr. Arnell: I think the answer is that it is still under consideration. There is income tax consideration and other things.

Mr. Winch: Family allowance is not included in income tax? I could never understand why our people overseas cannot get this money.

The Chairman: Order, please. Mr. Buchanan, and then Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Buchanan: Dr. Arnell, I have been trying to extract the NATO costs from your presentation here. I can see from the Brigade and the Air Division, approximately \$150 million and another \$15 million, roughly, in vote 45 under Mutual Aid. Of course, in addition to that you have a certain amount of the Air Transport Command, Training Command, Canadian Forces Communication System, and so on, which are attributable to our involvement in NATO. Do you have any particulars on this that I could have, please?

● 1615

Dr. Arnell: As I attempted to explain to Mr. Cafik just before we recessed for lunch, we had had to do a certain pro-rating within these activities because, as I said on the first evening that we were meeting, the Blue Book was the way in which we had to prepare the estimates this year in the old form; if we went over to the other we really could not build it from the bottom up, because the way you put this type of budget together is different, so that there is a certain amount or pro rating.

We attempted to explain this in the narrative that begins on page 23 and goes on into page 24. Within NATO, you see that we indicate that this activity includes the following forces: the Brigade Group, the Air Division in Europe, the operational Maritime sea and air forces on the east coast of Canada, which are earmarked for service to NATO in an emergency. Included in this list are the support forces and installations directly related to those; then we go on to talk about the other roles in Maritime forces. Within the figures that you find on pages 22 and 23 in the table under NATO, you see that the proposed estimate for 1969-70 is \$321,658,000. These are the straight administrative O&M figures. This particular figure is made up of \$66,857,000 for the Brigade Group, \$67,654,000 for 1 Air Division, \$118.8 million for the Maritime forces and \$68 million for Direct Support.

This would include charging up the dockyard in Halifax, charging up the CF-104 OTU at Cold Lake, and this type of thing. That adds up to a total of \$321,658,000.

The capital which we show on pages 27 and the top of 28, and there we show it by ships, fighting vehicles, aeroplane engines and so on, breaks up in the same way to Brigade Group \$11,185,000, Air Division \$4,365,000, Maritime forces \$97.6 million, and Direct Support \$800,000. And NORAD . . .

Mr. Winch: What page is NORAD on?

Mr. Buchanan: Excuse me, before you go on to NORAD, you have lost me.

Dr. Arnell: I am talking about this book, Mr. Winch.

Mr. Buchanan: I am sorry, Doctor Arnell. You have lost me with your figures. I have the one vote here which is fairly straightforward in this book.

Dr. Arnell: I am talking of pages 22 and 23 on the White Paper, the top line; it is the NATO Alliance. You have the proposed man-years which are broken down in terms of the Brigade Group, 1 Air Division, the Maritime forces on the east coast, and Direct Support. They are not in the book, but if you are interested in how we made up that 27.9 . . .

Mr. Buchanan: And the \$321.7 million.

Dr. Arnell: And the \$321.7 million. I went through the \$321.7 million but I thought you were following it. I will go through the whole thing again. The same can be done for everything else, however, this I think will illustrate what we are doing here. Within the proposed man-years, at 27,826, Brigade Group is shown as 5,862 military, Air Division 4,597 military and six divisions, the Maritime forces—this is the East Coast Maritime—8,511 military and 40 civilians, and Direct Support is 3,446 military and 5,364 civilian. These give you 22,416 military and 5,410 civilian, which if you add them together—I am glad to see—comes to 27,826.

● 1620

If we go to the \$321,658,000 AO&M, the Brigade Group is \$66.7 million, Air Division \$68.0 million, Maritime forces \$118.8, and Direct Support is \$68.1. The capital that matches that in this particular case is \$11.2 million for the Brigade Group, \$4.4 million for Air Division, and \$97.6 million for the Maritime forces; I guess it is \$900,000 for Direct Support. To give you a figure of \$113,967,000 which is in the first column on page 23, if you follow across the table, it is the first one past the staple. That is how

we made that one up. In each one of these we have done pro rata of this type.

In order to be able to equate that to a figure like the Maritime Command that you find in the blue book, you have to pick up the other Maritime forces which are in the Joint Defence of North America and which, as I explained this morning, we have charged up to the West Coast. It is charged up on that side, and so it goes all the way through.

The figures are not necessarily going to come out to exactly the same dollar value. It will be essentially the same because there is some pro rating we had to do here. For this year it is an attempt to give you an understanding of the manner in which the forces are assigned.

Mr. Buchanan: Dr. Arnell, your forecasted expenditure for 1968-69 for AOM, I think you call it, Construction and Acquisition, is roughly \$406 million, which you would class as directly attributable to NATO? Am I correct?

Dr. Arnell: \$406 million?

Mr. Buchanan: I took the \$304,724,000 . . .

Dr. Arnell: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

Mr. Buchanan: . . . and added it to the \$102,677,000.

Dr. Arnell: These figures are even more uncertain than the ones this year, because this year we put them together with the knowledge that we had to produce this book. When we did last year's budget, it was a year before the new format had even been settled. We attempted the same type of chart, but this chart had not, in fact, even been sorted out when I appeared before you in November talking about 1968-69 figures. However, those were the best numbers that we could put on it when we put these estimates together.

Do not forget these estimates were originally put together last fall when we were trying to forecast how the money would flow in the last four or five months of the year. In fact, the forecast expenditures, as they are coming out right now, as we have now finished the end of the year, have modified somewhat from this. I do not have them here at the moment. But that is indicative of the way things have changed. Does that answer your question?

Mr. Buchanan: Fine, thank you.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The expenditure is about \$400 million a year for NATO?

Dr. Arnell: The navy, the Maritime forces on the East Coast, accounts for about \$120 million of that,

which you can, in fact, charge up in any one of three ways.

Mr. Buchanan: You have arbitrarily broken it down here.

Dr. Arnell: As we defined it, NATO accounts for all of this because, as I explained this morning, the Maritime Commander tends to develop his strategy in consultation with the Americans as SACLANT, rather than as a regional pact within NATO.

Mr. Winch: Does that mean, basically, that our Maritime Command comes under the Admiral in Norfolk, Virginia?

Dr. Arnell: In an emergency it does. It is an national command . . .

Mr. Winch: At Norfolk, Virginia.

Dr. Arnell: No, it is an national command in Halifax in peacetime.

Mr. Winch: It comes under Norfolk, Virginia on the operations.

Dr. Arnell: It does in the same way that the brigade group comes under SACEUR when we assign them in an emergency. They are national forces that are assigned in the emergency.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan do you have further questions?

• 1625

Mr. Buchanan: Yes. Dr. Arnell, does that \$120 million figure which you mentioned include the construction and acquisition, or is that AOM?

Dr. Arnell: You are speaking of the \$120 million?

Mr. Buchanan: Yes, I might have misunderstood you when you were referring to Maritime Command.

Dr. Arnell: No, that is the AOM figure. I gave you a figure of \$118.9 million as the AOM under Maritime. So I was just relating to that particular figure. The capital would, of course, be the \$98 million figure I gave you.

Mr. Buchanan: I am sorry. The \$98 million . . .

Dr. Arnell: When I went through the capital, I gave you the figures \$11.2 million for the Brigade Group, \$4.4 million for the Air Division, and \$97.6 million for the Maritime Forces.

Mr. Buchanan: Maritime Command comes to roughly \$400 million.

Dr. Arnell: The Maritime Command, East Coast.

Mr. Buchanan: I am sorry, East Coast accounts for half of it.

Dr. Arnell: The West Coast accounts for \$56 million total.

Mr. Buchanan: What percentage, or dollar amount, of our total budget is for new equipment?

Dr. Arnell: You can say the capital figures that are listed through Pages 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 relate to new equipment in the sense that it is equipment being delivered under contracts that go back anywhere from about one to four years. The highlights of this equipment are, of course, in the piece of paper that was distributed before the April 17 meeting, the Selected Major Equipment Items. So, it is roughly \$243.5 million.

Mr. Buchanan: Does that figure include construction and acquisition of buildings, and the upgrading and improvement of existing equipment? I was just wondering if we could segregate the actual cost of new equipment as opposed to new construction and upgrading of existing equipment?

Dr. Arnell: In terms of major equipment, the only program that is listed in this list of Selected Major Equipment Items is the Restigouche conversion. The conversion, if you want to call it that, is an updating of existing equipment.

Mr. Winch: It has nothing to do with the four destroyers?

Dr. Arnell: No, they would be new equipment. But in the upgrading of equipment, the only major item that is in this whole list is the Restigouche conversion program. In addition to this, you could argue there is some upgrading of a minor nature that goes on in standard resupply. However, I do not think that you are talking about that.

Mr. Buchanan: Does this include the guns on the Centurions and this type of thing?

Dr. Arnell: No, I think if you have new guns, this would be new equipment. I mean smaller items again.

Mr. Buchanan: Then there is roughly \$200 million, or would you decrease that?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, the best figures to take are the ones on page 242 of the blue book which, in fact,

show \$19.6 million as the construction figure and \$210,432,000 for the acquisition of equipment.

Mr. Buchanan: Yes, that is roughly one-ninth. Is there not some suggestion that this is a very low figure to have for a modern force when you are spending up to ten per cent on new equipment. Is it not a bad ratio?

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Dr. Arnell: The point that I tried to make when first introducing this particular budget is that it is a hold-the-line budget with no new equipment programs in it at all. It reflects the end of the five-year equipment program that was embarked on and was approved in the fall of 1964. This was done consciously, and we were directed to do it this way because of the defence policy review.

It is our hope that one of the first things that will come out of the defence policy review will be new equipment programs. If some of the modified roles, or whatever it is that is going to come out or, in fact, if there are continuations of some roles, we will have to start thinking of re-equipment because it will eventually lead to that. It is our belief that next year's Estimates, will essentially be the beginning of another five-year program.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness has been waiting patiently.

Mr. Buchanan: One final question. I also noticed that roughly 10 per cent goes to new equipment and 10 per cent goes to retirement allowances of various sorts. I think it is around \$107 million. It is an extension from the \$128 or \$129 of last year, which seems like a pretty substantial hike. Here we have a budget on which we are paying as much for retirement allowances as we are for new equipment. I wonder, in modern military forces, if it is not true that there is really much less stress on the physical fitness of the men concerned, than there is on expertise and acquired knowledge, than there has been in the past. Are we giving any serious thought to changing our retirement policy in the forces so that a lot of good men who were retired in their forties who are quite capable of carrying on the roles which they have for another 10 maybe 15 years, are kept on for that period? I think that you realize that to retire a man in his early forties and pay him a pension for the balance of his life is an extremely expensive proposition. Also, I think that man still has much to contribute; we might well be losing that contribution.

Dr. Arnell: There were several recent changes in the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act and one of them in fact, introduced the possibility of a deferred

annuity rather than a pension in the old sense for people over 20 years old. The other thing which is being seriously considered in the public interest is the question of finding a better way of integrating the military man as part of the Public Service, particularly the specialist type of man so that he may plan a full career.

Mr. Buchanan: In the service?

Dr. Arnell: Within the Public Service. As it is now, a man formally retires and then he goes into the Public Service and almost begins another career. This is not purely a departmental matter. This is being looked at on a broader basis. I would just like to draw your attention to one point in relation to the superannuation account. In the Superannuation Act the wording requires that we cover the government's contribution to the Superannuation account as part of our estimates. As far as the rest of the Public Service is concerned, this is covered in the Treasury Board account.

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Similarly, whenever there is a pay raise, the Department of Finance or the Department of Insurance in the Finance Department does a review every five years of the actual state of the account based on a standard formula. I am sorry, I said every five years; that should be everytime there is a pay raise, they assess what this should have added to the account to make up for this increase, and we get a figure from the Department of Insurance or Department of Finance for which we have to automatically provide, divided into five equal—

Mr. Buchanan: To meet your obligations?

Dr. Arnell: Yes—divided into five equal parts beginning the year of the pay raise. This is a Statutory item; you will notice on page 248 of the Blue Book that it is marked Statutory. In fact it begins on page 247, Statutory-Payments under Parts so and so. In addition to the several build-ups, we got a big actuarial addition at the time of the conversion from pay and allowances to salaries, because many allowances were not classed as salaries for pension purposes; so, the man's pension, the changeover to salary, gave the military man a much better pension.

Mr. Buchanan: Based on his total salary?

Dr. Arnell: The point is that this year we had to make up a five-year deficit. You may recall that there was a tabling, I believe it was in the House, of the deficit in the superannuation account that we had, so this has added to the increase. If you would like to look at page 439, you will find the equivalent at the

second last item from the bottom, of what the pay raises on the civil side has done to the rest of the actuarial adjustments. And you will find, in fact, that that actuarial has gone up more than ours has.

Mr. Buchanan: This is the \$139,333,400 and the \$228,623,000.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, now that represents the Public Service. I think it is about twice the size of the military forces. Much has been said you know, about changing the percentages and this sort of thing of calculation, but it is a Statutory item; it is not a cash item.

Mr. Buchanan: I was not as concerned about that; it is the principle. There are many competent and knowledgeable men who are going out of our services, in their mid-forties who still have a great deal to contribute.

Dr. Arnell: We are very conscious of this; the question still stands of finding a way of continuing them in Public Service. A lot of them, of course, do end up as civilians within the Department of National Defence. But they tend to be limited to that.

Mr. Ryan: A supplementary question. Does a military man have to relinquish his pension for the time that he takes another government position, like a member of Parliament has to do?

Dr. Arnell: As I recall, the regulation is that he can draw a pension up to the Warrant Officer level, and then draw his salary.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: I have a few questions in regard to personnel. In March I got three returns in regard to the total strengths, discharges and so forth. The first of these gave the strength in the armed forces of January 31, 1969 as 97,798 but in the same return of those figures, there were 1,960 who were on terminal leave; therefore, they were in effect, out of the armed forces, which cuts down the figure to 95,838. There were a further 1,621 women with all respect to the lady members of the forces, who are in most cases doing what are really civilian jobs. If you subtract that, it brings us down to 94,217 men in actual military

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service at that time. Now is it the policy at the present time to maintain the strength at around that figure, or is it to be built up to the 100,000 that has been spoken of?

Dr. Arnell: For the last several years, the figures that have been quoted as the total military strength have been based on total personnel, including those on retirement leave. The 100,000 of last year, and the

98,000 of this year, are intended to include the amount of men on retirement leave. In fact, when we were answering, Monday afternoon a week ago, questions on the military establishment with Commodore F. D. Elcock, we discovered that the establishment itself carried a number of positions, not by ranks, in order to cover the retirement leave. The retirement leave in the establishment is shown as privates.

An hon. Member: As what?

Dr. Arnell: As privates for the purpose of numbers. As we discussed the other day they are included in the rank structure in the other book if I recall. We show in the new form on page 26, 1,388 within our total on Terminal Leave.

Mr. Harkness: The policy at the present time, is to maintain the number of people in actual service and doing a job around this 94-95,000 figure. I am talking about men now.

Dr. Arnell: I think it would fair to say that the ... What is the total number of females?

Mr. Harkness: You gave me the total of 1,621 as of January 31st.

Dr. Arnell: There is the book. The number on terminal leave or females is about 3,000.

Mr. Harkness: Well it is ...

Dr. Arnell: Females can be effective in non-operational jobs.

Mr. Harkness: It is actually over 3,500, but in any event the point is that this is the total general figure ...

Dr. Arnell: The total figure must include all these things.

Mr. Harkness: Which gives us really 94,000 to 95,000 men in actual military service. One of the other returns was the discharges of tradesmen by trade groups from August, 1968 to January, 1969 inclusive, and for the month of August, 1968 the total number of discharges in another return was 1,350. Looking over this list of 3½ pages of tradesmen, I find stewards, artillerymen, infantrymen, and military policemen. I have not counted those people as I do not look upon them as being people who have had highly technical military training. If you disregard them, the total becomes 240. This leaves 1,110 discharged people who are reasonably highly trained tradesmen of one sort and another. I have not done the same calculation for the other months, but by briefly looking at the return, it appears to me as though they would be very

comparable. It seems to me that the taxpayer has a large investment in the loss of these people. With the weakening of the forces, and in order to carry on the job effectively it is going to be a very difficult job to train a sufficient number of other people up to those standards.

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Dr. Arnell: This has been a matter of very great concern to the whole department. The simplest answer is that it relates to the problem of competing in the marketplace. In many of these specialized trades you cannot respond quickly enough and in some areas, where there is a shortage in the civilian side the men practically get hired away.

I think that it is a problem that everybody faces. Although this is out of my own particular area of responsibility, it is an area in which I have been very interested. I have not seen any very recent statistics, but I would like to take you back to the sort of problem one finds when examining these types of statistics. Seven, eight, or nine years ago—in fact I am not sure, it might not have been at the time when you were minister and perhaps you will remember this—but there was great concern expressed at the loss of the ROTP officers that had gone through either university or military colleges. The air force, in particular, were very concerned since after the fulfillment of the required service, one out of every three, left. Everyone said that losing a third was really very serious.

At that time, the general wastage figures in industry, taken in the total, was in the order of 9 to 13 or 14 per cent per yearly turnover. The loss of a third of the young officers came to be a terribly high one. I was Scientific Advisor in the air force at the time, but was an employee of Defence Research Board. Defence Research Board, at that time, had an extremely low wastage rate in relation to the national average. In fact, the DRB wastage rate was around 8 per cent, but it was two or three points below national average. I checked the DRB figures over a period of three or four years before that and found that it had lost one out of every two new employees within three years, even though they had one of the lowest wastage rates in the country.

A young college graduate particularly an engineer is traditionally taught that he should get experience in two or three different areas before settling down. From my study at that time, I had to conclude the fact that when a man was required to serve for three years following his graduation, the chances are greatly increased of retaining him. That was, in fact, the case.

Mr. Harkness: Did you say it was not, in fact, the case?

Dr. Arnell: The fact that you required him to serve the three years tended to keep him much more than if he had been allowed to go at his own whim in the first three years.

Mr. Harkness: That is the reason why we increased the period to five years for certain people.

Dr. Arnell: I feel that—although as I say, I have not seen any recent figures—the movement rates are probably not as bad and may be better than the movement rates of the equivalent tradesmen in industry. After all, industry pays a lot of the costs of training also. This does not answer the question. It does not make us happier but at least some of it is just human nature. I wish that we had an answer because I do not pretend that. . .

Mr. Harkness: Whatever the various reasons may be, the thing that concerns me is the extent of the shortage that now exists particularly in the more highly

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trained trades. Looking at the return, such people as artillery surveyors. . .

Dr. Arnell: I think, perhaps, that General Truemner might be able to give you some specifics on this.

Mr. Harkness: Those are the ones that are at the head of the list. I could pick out others such as cardiographic draftsman, bosuns in the navy, and so on.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: Artillerymen, sir.

Mr. Harkness: No, I was not talking about artillerymen. I subtracted them from my list.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: Name another and I will try to give you an answer.

Mr. Harkness: The artillery technicians, chief artillerymen, artillery surveyor happen to be the ones at the head of this list because it begins with "A", of course. In this return, he lost two artillery technicians in August, four in September, two in October, none in November, one in December and two in January. He lost 6 chief artillerymen, in December and three in January.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: I think I should try to answer this in a slightly different way. I think you will realize that we started the beginning of the fiscal year, 1968-69, with a strength of approximately 102,000 people. Our man-year average, or the number we had the ability to pay for, was 100,000. Therefore, by the end of the fiscal year we had to have the strength adjusted to 98,000. That is what you see there.

The attrition during that year was 12,000. We could hire only 8,000 people to bring about the 4,000 adjustment. Am I still making myself clear, sir? Of that 8,000 people—as a matter of interest, we brought in within 100 of the 8,000—about 1,000 of them were officers; the remainder were men and I know that at least 64 per cent of these men went into what I would call the “sharp end”, or the critical trades. That is the effort we made to cover up the shortages that you speak of.

Mr. Harkness: The point I am concerned about concerns the 1,350 who were discharged in the month of August, 1968. 1,110 of them are what I would call reasonably highly trained technicians of one sort and another. Only 240 people who entered the infantry, and spent their three years, received a minimum of what you might call technical training apart from the training as an infantryman itself, and then left. The replacements for these 1,110 men who you hired, these 8,000 you have mentioned, are all raw men who have to receive their training. The point that concerns me, which Dr. Arnell was talking about, is the drainage of these highly trained personnel and the effect which this has on the general effectiveness and efficiency of the forces.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: I believe you raised this question last autumn when this Committee sat, and you were given some figures, to which, I can refer, which showed that our operational effect was going up. I admit it was a percentage point. I can still report that the trend is in the direction that you would look for. I have the figures if you would let me look them up.

Mr. Harkness: I think you will perhaps remember I took considerable objection to those figures. I did not think they proved what you people were attempting to show they proved.

Dr. Arnell: Mr. Harkness, I must say I agree entirely with the point you are making, and it is a matter of very great concern to us. I really do not know that there is much else that we can say at the present time on this.

Brig. Gen. Truemner: I think you may know, sir, that we are instituting a program whereby after a five-year tour we are offering a man, under certain conditions, not another five-year tour but a career tour. This should help us redress to a considerable

inevitably, is going to reduce the efficiency of the forces. It is a problem. I think, which steps have to be taken to meet.

Dr. Arnell: There are some very major surveys that have continued to be made of the comparable salaries of equivalent jobs in industry so that one can attempt to match salaries. However this is not easy.

Mr. Harkness: However, I think there is one thing that has a bearing on this, and from complaints I have had from a considerable number of people, I think it has a considerable bearing, I have a return on this also. The question I asked was under present regulation are warrant officers and NCOs no longer allowed to read their confidential reports? If so, for what reason? The answer was that they no longer do see these confidential reports.

In other words, when an adverse report is made on them, they are no longer allowed to see it, and this has undoubtedly been a cause of very considerable complaint. I do not think there is any doubt that it is the direct cause of some of these highly trained warrant officers and other non-commissioned officers leaving the services.

The explanation that was given to me was along the line that discussions with supervisors concerning good or bad performance are encouraged and are taking place continually, as well as at the time of evaluation. In this way no shortcomings should be contained in the report unless the man is aware of such. Perhaps they should be, but very frequently they are not.

This is the complaint that I get, and I think that this change is one of the reasons why you are losing a certain proportion of these very highly trained men. I certainly would think that it would be highly desirable to return to the previous practice in which it was obligatory to show these people any adverse comments made of them in a report.

Dr. Arnell: We will certainly take note of your views, Mr. Harkness. I do not think there is really anything that I can comment on now. I think it is a valid comment and I will certainly see that it is seriously considered.

Mr. Harkness: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard; I am sorry, Mr. Harkness:

Mr. Harkness: I have have two or three questions yet. I do not know to what extent this might help in the situation, but I am pretty sure it would help to some extent. There is the matter of the Town of Oromocto which was always the cause of very great difficulty all the time I was Minister, previous to that, and since that time. I see that the transitional grant this year is down to \$700,000. What I wanted to ask

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degree the problem that you were worried about.

Mr. Harkness: I hope that proves to be the situation, because on the basis of these figures supplied to me, I, personally, have very little doubt that there is far too high a wastage of highly trained personnel, which,

was what is the situation with Oromocto? Are you finally getting rid of that headache?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, we have worked out an agreement with the province and, as it said, this is a transitional grant. I believe the first election of a real honest-to-goodness town council will be occurring this year.

Mr. Harkness: Will this mean that the Department will no longer have any responsibility for the Town of Oromocto?

Dr. Arnell: I believe the Province of New Brunswick is going to make it a real New Brunswick town.

Mr. Harkness: The Department of National Defence will then pay the usual municipal grant in lieu of taxes to the municipality, rather than running the town with these grants?

Dr. Arnell: They are going to elect a purely democratic elective council.

Mr. Harkness: What will be the amount of the grant in lieu of taxes which will be paid rather than these expenditures which have been made from year to year?

Dr. Arnell: I do not think we have it here with us.

Mr. Harkness: What I was trying to get at is what the actual savings on this will be?

Dr. Arnell: I think it will be a straight municipal assessment. I know I have not got the information here. I am not even sure that we would have anything other than a very general estimate. There has been a

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tremendous amount of discussion and meeting on this. I think our main aim is to make it a normal town and then attempt to treat it, in terms of any moneys we pay in lieu of taxes, exactly the same as anywhere else.

Mr. Harkness: You have no idea what the saving will be as a result of this?

Dr. Arnell: Somebody may have it, but I am afraid that I have not got it.

Mr. Winch: May I ask a supplementary on Oromocto? I do so as a member of the Public Accounts Committee because every year, including this year, we have the Auditor General's report. The amount of money advanced to Oromocto over the years runs into the millions of dollars, and the advances include the paying back of the interest. It is millions of dollars. Could you tell me, Dr. Arnell, whether or not you are

making, or will consider making, any recommendations from your Department to the Treasury Board that this now be wiped out, and not be a loan but a grant, so as to get it off the books, because it is millions of dollars and we get it in the Public Accounts every year.

Dr. Arnell: I am afraid I have not got the information with me, Mr. Winch, and I would think that in view of the recent agreement worked out with the province it should be possible to . . .

An hon. Member: Have it wiped out.

Dr. Arnell: . . . in fact to give the whole story to the Public Accounts and perhaps clear the books all together. It is not in my immediate area, and I really have not got the information here with me.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: I have a further question in connection with another return I got, which asks whether Canadian armed Forces took part in an exercise in the Caribbean.

The reply was that;

. . . there were two exercises . . .

The further question I asked was:

2. Were they accommodated in a hotel or hotels and, if so, how much accommodation was provided and at what cost?

The return just says

2. 413 personnel were accommodated in commercial establishments . . .

It does not say for which exercise, and

. . . at a cost of \$41,585.24.

I would like to know on what exercise these people were? What was the cost per person for accommodating them per day in these hotels or wherever they were accommodated?

Dr. Arnell: Do you have that information, Colonel Kirby?

Colonel Kirby: I have not got the information specifically sir, but I think that the basic breakdown would be that the two exercises consisted of a reconnaissance for the exercise itself, because this was the first exercise that had taken place in that area.

That is probably why a higher number of personnel that usual were accommodated in civilian accommodations. I will have to get that information; I do not have it broken down.

Mr. Harkness: Is this the exercise NIMROD CAPER about which you are speaking?

Colonel Kirby: Yes, NIMROD CAPER was the RCR exercise itself, sir.

Mr. Harkness: The other exercise was purely a naval and air exercise and I presume there would be no hotel accommodations for it.

Colonel Kirby: I am sorry, that is another exercise entirely. That is a naval concentration.

Mr. Harkness: This return mentions both exercises, yet it does not say to which one the rental of hotel accommodation belongs.

Colonel Kirby: I would have to break that down, sir.

Dr. Arnell: If you would be agreeable we could provide you with more information on this. I think we could give you the actual information.

Mr. Harkness: I might say in explanation, that I received a couple of letters of complaint as to the fact that the armed forces were occupying very high priced hotel accommodation in the Caribbean. I do not know if this was Jamaica or where it was. It does not say here. It was in the Caribbean area and at the taxpayers expense; this is a complaint of some people who had been down there at the time; and they thought that this was a waste of the public money. I say this was the basis of the question to begin with.

Dr. Arnell: If you would be agreeable, we could give you more information in a return than we could give to you at this point.

Mr. Harkness: All right, that is fine.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard.

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Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am intrigued by an item on page 30, Project MALLARD. I see that we are spending \$876,000 on it this year and we will have spent a total of \$1,080,000 on Project MALLARD. I am wondering what it is. It sounds like a duck hunting project. I would like to know if this is a recreational project for generals.

Dr. Arnell: I will ask General Davis to brief you on it. It is a communication system for the Army.

Brig. Gen. Davis: It is a very advanced communication system which is being developed by the four

armies of Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States. The word "MALLARD" is just a code name or was at the beginning; it has not any particular significance. It has nothing to do with NIMROD anyway.

The money being spent so far is in development, which is moving on in two or three phases and the cash that you see for 1969-70 is the DND share. The major part of this development cost, will in fact be dealt with by the Department of Industry. They will be providing the funds. This is so because it is a very expensive project. The Canadian share is 5 per cent of the total development costs, but it is expected that when this system goes into production, all of the countries that are engaged in the development, all four countries, will have at least a proportion, or perhaps larger than a proportional share in the manufacturing. This is very important to the Department of Industry, because through this particular development program there will be developed a large number of new techniques in digital switching and that sort of thing. They feel it is essential that Canadian industry should take part in this, and ultimately should take part in the very large production runs. This production of the over-all program—and this is talking in the era of the 1980's—is well over a billion dollars, including of course the U.S. point.

Dr. Arnell: I think that one might summarize this by suggesting that this is, as General Davis said, developing new techniques in a defence development project, in very much the same way as the ALOUETTE satellite program provided the basis for what is now a communication satellite development in Canada, which has nothing to do with defence, *per se*. In a sense it is really helping to build the basic industry, but this one is based on a military requirement, however, it is a *quagripartite* military requirement.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Is the actual detail of what is involved, a classified subject?

Brig. Gen. Davis: Yes, the equipment certainly is.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, and it is a four country project management group.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you. Are any provisions being made to harden Canadian bases, either in Canada or overseas?

Dr. Arnell: I do not think there are any at the moment.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In that case then, are all our military facilities completely vulnerable to any kind of nuclear attack?

Dr. Arnell: Not North Bay.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): North Bay is the only one? That is the only facility we have in our whole defence system that is reasonably invulnerable to nuclear attack?

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Is there not any provision being made at the present time in any of our thinking or in any of our planning, to convert any other bases in this way?

Dr. Arnell: I think we largely believe in deterrents.

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Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I ask you, is it a deterrent if you are so easily wiped off the deterrent classification?

Dr. Arnell: The question that gets in here might be a subject of an entirely separate meeting, not really trying to deal with estimates. There are several ways of meeting this; an example which I am sure you were exposed to when you were in Europe, is the deployment plans for the CF-104's.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes.

Dr. Arnell: This is a different way; some people say it is cheaper while others say it is more expensive; it depends on how you look at it. This is a matter that needs study and that could be discussed if the Committee was interested in going into it, however, it is really not a subject that can be related to this year's spending.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): All right.

Dr. Arnell: We have not got any right now, with the exception of maintenance checks.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I see that we are continuing our expenditures on the anti-submarine hydrofoil with another \$748,000 this year. That would bring our total expenditures to \$37.5 million.

Dr. Arnell: This is based on the trials because the hydrofoil is now in Halifax. My latest information is that it has now completed 10 foil-borne runs on three separate days. This is really the culmination of what has been a long period of developing a piece of equipment that now can be evaluated.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What do you feel we have accomplished here with a hydrofoil that we could not have accomplished with a destroyer and a helicopter?

Dr. Arnell: There are a number of things. One of them is the hydrofoil provides a speed that is intermediate between the ship and the Maritime Patrol airplane. It also has durability, or whatever you want to call it, endurance, in that it can sit somewhere. The trouble with the airplane itself or the helicopter is that it has limited endurance before it has to return home. The full tactical use of deferred speed within the Maritime is something that has never been evaluated. Here you have a whole new set of capabilities of sitting quiet at no speed or flying on your foils at a speed intermediate of the destroyer and the aircraft.

One of the things that really appealed to the Department when it was first put forward was the promise of operating an effective naval vessel to do many of the things that the big destroyer did with a tenth of the crew. The present DDE has a crew of 210 to 215. The hydrofoil's crew is estimated at 20 to 25.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you. I have a question concerning nuclear submarines. Do we have any proposals or plans concerning nuclear submarines at all?

Dr. Arnell: There may be some plans buried somewhere but there are no proposals. People have been dreaming about this sort of thing for years, so I am sure somebody is dreaming, but there are no proposals at the moment.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What is the rough cost of a nuclear submarine without missiles?

Dr. Arnell: I do not know what it is at the moment. I was going to say that a few years back it was \$100 million. I hear he is still saying \$100 million. I thought it might have gone up.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Fine, thank you very much.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, if there are no other questions on votes 15, 20...

Mr. Winch: Yes, I have one.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Concerning amounts recoverable, \$99,158,000, may I ask the doctor if we may have just a little bit of a breakdown here? I am particularly interested in our work. I believe that in Cyprus we are paying a fair cost. I would like to have a breakdown of this \$99 million and in particular what we get back. Do we get back anything for the services of our armed forces in countries such as Pakistan and Laos, and the peace commission in Viet Nam?

● 1715

We have carried on this work for years on behalf of the United Nations, etc., and I was wondering just what we get back of this \$99 million? As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, may we have perhaps a general breakdown of how you arrived at amounts recoverable of \$99 million?

Dr. Arnell: While someone is checking the U.N. figures, because I do not see it here, the largest item in this whole figure is the estimated return on the rentals of lodgings. The married quarters rentals is \$37.5 million and the single quarters rentals is \$5.6 million.

Mr. Winch: I am awfully glad I asked the question. Outside of the fact the majority of what you are going to get back is on rentals, which I raised before, I am awfully glad I asked that question now. However, on the straight use of our military forces, shall I say, in Cyprus, Pakistan, Laos, and the Viet Nam peace commission, what do we get back from that, if anything?

Mr. J. G. Grant (Information Services, Department of National Defence): Mr. Winch, this is for the fiscal year 1967-68 which is the latest that I have—in UNTSO, Palestine, non-recoverable \$281,000, recoverable nil; in UNMOG, India and Pakistan, a total of \$299,000, recoverable \$68,000; the forces in Cyprus, 1967-68, of a total of \$8,989,000, we were able to recover \$938,000. For Korea, we do not recover anything.

Mr. Winch: What about Viet Nam and our peace commission?

Mr. Grant: I do not think we cover that. That comes under External Affairs, I think. It is the International Commission for Supervision and Control.

Mr. Winch: This is most interesting because we are doing a job that we are apparently not recovering.

Dr. Arnell: It has been Canadian policy . . .

Mr. Winch: I agree with it . . .

Dr. Arnell: In cases like Cyprus we provide our forces. We pay for the cost of our forces.

Mr. Winch: Yes. I am not disagreeing with that. I only wanted to know what we are doing. I think you said Pakistan, \$290,000, of which only \$60,000 was recoverable. Why is there the difference between what you anticipated and the \$60,000 which was actually recoverable? Of so much, why was only \$60,000 recoverable?

Dr. Arnell: This was the total cost of that particular operation. He was giving you the total cost.

Mr. Winch: It is the total cost, but there was \$60,000 recoverable. In other words, except for a few thousand dollars then, this \$99 million is basically what you are charging our forces for rent, lodging, etc.?

Dr. Arnell: No, a great deal is recovered through cost-sharing with the Americans on our joint communications and air defence.

Mr. Winch: How much are you getting back from our armed forces on lodgings and rents?

Dr. Arnell: There is a total of \$43 million.

Mr. Winch: Your charge to our armed forces on rentals is \$43 million? You are getting back from our armed forces \$43 million for charges on rentals and lodgings. Does that include what they are being charged on other matters, or is the \$43 million just for Lodgings and rentals? What is the next biggest item there?

● 1720

Dr. Arnell: The charge for meals was \$12 million.

Mr. Winch: You charged \$20 million for meals?

Dr. Arnell: No, the charge was \$12 million.

Mr. Winch: This is becoming very interesting, but I want to hold up. May I ask then, with this kind of money coming back from our own armed forces being charged by the Department, do you not get any credit for the money which is made in the PX's?

Dr. Arnell: We have a certain name for that now—CANEX.

Mr. Winch: CANEX.

Dr. Arnell: It is not in direct relation to this type of thing.

Mr. Winch: Do you get any return in the Department from that?

Dr. Arnell: There are some charges for utilities and so on.

Mr. Winch: Are they charged rent?

Dr. Arnell: There is a charge for certain uses such as resale outlets etc. There is a total new policy being worked out. I think in the very near future

there will be a whole new policy promulgated on this, so I would suggest that it will become much clearer in the immediate future.

Mr. Winch: So, we should ask for that next year and not this year.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, I would suggest that this would be the best thing.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman, a very brief one, and it is with regard to the liquor store. In that particular store that Mr. Winch referred to, does the profit on the liquor sales come back to the government or is it retained by those who are in charge of the stores? I am making reference now to the liquor sales only.

Dr. Arnell: I am not sure that I can identify those liquor stores.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): You can buy any liquor that you want in these particular—what do you call them?

Dr. Arnell: You mean in Europe?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes.

Dr. Arnell: The European setup is, in fact, entirely different from the Canadian one. I am not really sure exactly the details of the way in which it operates, but it is essentially to provide facilities that are not immediately available to the forces overseas. There is nothing equivalent to that in Canada.

Mr. Winch: I want to get this matter clear, if I may, because it has been raised, particularly if we read yesterday's or today's paper about Oromocto. In view of the fact that they can buy through CANEX without the normal taxation, is there any reason why that money does not come to your Department?

Dr. Arnell: No, they are required to pay all the normal provincial sales taxes.

Mr. Winch: No, I am talking about Europe.

Dr. Arnell: Oh, in Europe?

Mr. Winch: Yes.

Mr. Grant: In so far as the liquor store is concerned...

Mr. Winch: No, I am not talking about that...

Mr. Grant: Concerning the sales out of CANEX, I am informed that the profits go to the base concerned for

recreation purposes—if they want to build an ice rink or the like.

Mr. Winch: That is certain, is it?

Mr. Grant: Yes, indeed.

Dr. Arnell: There are no individuals making anything off this, I can assure you that.

Mr. Grant: Nor does the Department. It is returned to the men. It is the men's CANEX, and if they...

Mr. Winch: Could we have some indication, sir, just in principle, as to what type of planning—of which you are going to tell us about next year—is going on?

Dr. Arnell: A total new policy—at least a total policy on the entire operation—is in the final stages of being worked out now in consultation with the Treasury Board, and this will be available.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): My questions are along the same line. In certain bases, particularly Camp Shailo in western Canada, they are discontinuing medical service to the dependents from April 1. The minister of Defence stated in the House that this scheme, upon which a three month trial was run, was costing too much money. What I do not understand is that the payment is deducted from the paycheques anytime these services are used, and this money is forwarded to the Receiver General for the use of the equipment in the laboratory and such like. However, less than 30 per cent of it ever gets back to the Department of National Defence.

● 1725

Dr. Arnell: This year we were able to have the regulation changed and we are in future to be allowed to recover the full cost of this treatment to dependents.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): Will this change your policy then as far as dependents' medical service is concerned?

Dr. Arnell: I think one of the questions that does come into this is whether there are sufficient doctors and medical personnel to take care of all the dependents in these camps. It has been the policy, because we simply do not have enough medical facilities to take care of all the dependents everywhere, to limit the provision of dependent—or at least medical service to dependents—to camp or base areas which are remote, where there is just no civilian equivalent available to them. I do not know specifically about Shailo, but it may have had its category changed in terms of medical...

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): I think that at Shilo approximately \$6,000 a month was deducted for this and forwarded to the Receiver General. As I say less than 30 per cent of it gets back to the Department.

Dr. Arnell: Now it will be 100 per cent.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): If the doctors were available, they could have dependents' medical service then.

Dr. Arnell: The present policy is that medical service is provided only to the dependents in remote areas. There is a definition of this. It is limited to where there is a need rather than trying to run a medical service to take care of all the dependents in a place like Ottawa, for example.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): You do not know what the definition is used for remote areas?

Dr. Arnell: I think Mr. Grant can add to that.

Mr. Grant: Mr. Stewart, as you know, there was a project carried out in Base Shilo which is not, essentially, an isolated base. In an attempt to try to make available medical facilities to the dependents at Shilo, the Canadian Armed Forces carried out a pilot project for about three months, during which time they provided the doctors and the care for the dependents. At the end of that three month pilot project, a plan, which estimated that they would have to have quite a number of doctors and nurses in order to make the thing work properly, was sent in to training command. We just do not have the doctors available; those who are available have to go to isolated places and to the Armed Forces.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): Very good then. How do you define an isolated base?

Mr. Grant: An isolated base, I would suggest, is one where it is almost impossible to get to a civilian doctor, such as . . .

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): Would 25 miles not be an isolated base?

This happens quite often in western Canada. In a case where the serviceman himself might be away on a course and the family were left by themselves on the base from which they would have to drive 25 miles for medical service—there being no other form of transportation as their private transportation, I think that would be an isolated base.

Mr. Grant: As I recall it, Mr. Stewart—this is just off the top of my head—there was a doctor at Base Shilo, a civilian doctor. The Department of National Defence had made available to him certain facilities that he

could use. I think he even lived on the base and a PMQ was rented. The doctor left that practice, and I am informed it was because he was not getting the number of cases that would allow him to practice at his level. This, then, is where it started out. Before that the dependents were going into Shilo.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): The dependents, yes—they were at that point. How do you classify an isolated base, though, in, say, a case of 25 miles with no transportation?

● 1730

Mr. Grant: Base Shilo had been not considered to be an isolated base because there were good highways—they are only 25 miles away—whereas in Cold Lake there are very few doctors and they are far away from the medical centre.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): There is no bus service.

Mr. Ryan: Dr. Arnell, Brigadier Amy before he left the command of the Fourth Armoured Brigade at Soest in Europe, was very concerned about the lot of his single soldiers—that is other ranks, soldiers who were living in barracks of quite a low grade. Has anything ever been done to improve the lot of the single soldier?

Dr. Arnell: There are, of course, a number of those old barracks that had been converted from whatever number were in it into the smaller units, rather than everybody living in one big open room.

Mr. Ryan: They are still stable-like quarters of rather low . . .

Dr. Arnell: There has been no program to do anything other than convert the insides of the building.

When you were there did you see any of those converted barracks that had been turned into the four-man rooms?

Mr. Ryan: No, not when I was last there.

Dr. Arnell: I thought perhaps you might have, because in this most recent one there have been a number of those old blocks converted into quite modern quarters—four-man rooms for the privates, two-man rooms for the corporals, and single rooms for the sergeants. All contain wash basins in the rooms, and the whole thing has been brought more into line with what you would expect for modern living quarters, multiple accommodation.

Mr. Ryan: I am glad to hear that. When we were at Soest the Committee did not have an opportunity to

inspect those quarters. I am glad to have that cleared up.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, let me put it this way. I do not know if you are going to sit tonight, but if you are, I was going to say that unfortunately I will not be here because a number of us have a commitment on an interview on Public Accounts. As far as I am concerned there is only one question on defence estimates which I would like to ask.

The Chairman: Is it about these votes or on some other vote? We would like to finish the defence estimates today.

Mr. Winch: If it was asked in the ten minutes that I was absent this afternoon, because we were at Public Accounts, then I apologize. It is the only question I have. In this morning's newspaper it is reported that the CF-5 is now being delivered to our forces. Could Dr. Arnell tell us what is the role of the CF-5 which is now, I am informed, being delivered?

Dr. Arnell: It continues to be the close support of the ground forces.

Mr. Winch: In Canada?

Dr. Arnell: With the Mobile Command forces. The first training squadron, I think, is what is being built up now, and it is the intent, as the pilots are trained and the aircraft becomes available, to establish two squadrons.

Mr. Winch: I am just going now by this one statement that said deliveries are now being made, the aircraft had a very short range, and no orders have been put in for a refuelling tanker. Is this correct? I just want to get the picture of it now.

Dr. Arnell: I think the question of the refuelling tanker was discussed last year, Mr. Winch. It is the problem that when we attempted to buy an aircraft it was not available to us. In fact, we attempted to place an order, but could not place it for the C-141 which was to be bought for that job.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, but would you please explain to this Committee how the short range CF-5 is in support of ground forces in Canada? It cannot be used overseas unless if you have a refuelling tanker.

Dr. Arnell: It can be used overseas.

It can be ferried overseas but it cannot be flown non-stop.

● 1735

Mr. Winch: How is it in support of our ground forces in Canada?

Dr. Arnell: The forces are, in fact, being developed—if we go back over the history of some of this—to be able to do certain jobs away from Canada. The question of air transportable forces is only one of the ways that the forces can in fact be ferried away from Canada. It is possible to put the types of forces that are intended to be trained under the present programs where the CF-5 squadrons will train and exercise in support of one or other of the combat groups in Canada. Thus, the ground troops of those combat groups and the CF-5 could, in fact, be moved to another place. They cannot be flown as a single package on a non-stop flight, but the airplanes and the troops could, in fact, be delivered to Europe, or to somewhere else, given a period of time. It could be short, depending on how many troops, but the CF-5 could get across the Atlantic in exactly the same way that the Sabres get across the Atlantic.

Mr. Winch: Is my understanding correct that the aircraft is now being delivered in Canada to be used for training of our people as a plane for ground support; but in Canada, in actual fact, it has no use of support of our ground forces. This can only be if it is overseas and transport. Have I got that right or wrong?

Dr. Arnell: I think that, in general, you are right, but on the other hand one of the commitments that our forces have is the question which, I think, we judge as being a very low risk. We used to call them enemy incursions. I do not know what we would call them now in outposts of empire within the country. In fact, if you want some close ground support of forces, if we have to have enemy lodgements, dislodge enemy lodgements, this is an airplane that could be used.

I might say that the whole future role of the CF-5 like everything else in the forces is currently under review—as is everything else that we own.

Mr. Winch: But you are already committed?

Dr. Arnell: At the present time the plans are, as I recall, that we are going to establish one training squadron, which will be at Cold Lake, plus two operational squadrons in close association with two of the combat groups. I think I am right on that.

Mr. Winch: Am I also right, from my memory of the paper, that you are committed to \$205 million worth of CF-5's?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, we are taking delivery of 115 airplanes.

Mr. Harkness: The most ill-considered expenditure we have ever made, in my view on defence.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions on votes 15 and 20?

Mr. Ryan: I have a supplementary just on that point, Mr. Chairman. Could we not get some assistance from the Americans in connection with refuelling these planes if we wanted to send them overseas in an emergency? This, we feel, is always a possibility, but one of the problems is you have to train for refuelling before you could send somebody over, and we have not, in fact, looked into this possibility yet.

Mr. Winch: Could I then ask, Dr. Arnell. Are these CF-5's we are now getting, equipped for refuelling?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, they are.

Mr. Winch: They are equipped for refuelling. You have no plans of getting your own tankers for them?

Dr. Arnell: We had plans but we could not get them, so we have no way of getting them at the moment.

• 1740

Mr. Ryan: I was just going to ask if you have lost all hope of getting a C-141. Perhaps they might have one on the secondhand market—that might be helpful.

Dr. Arnell: There might be one on the secondhand market some day.

The Chairman: We can then, perhaps, go on to the next series of Votes. I will call Votes 25, 30 and 35 under Defence Research.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Defence Research

Defence Research Board—

25	Administration, Operation and Maintenance	\$33,515,000
30	Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment	\$ 6,384,000
35	Contributions in support of defence research programs	\$ 7,500,000

Are there any questions on those votes? We will stand them and take them as a group a little later, but there are no questions, I gather, on any of those votes?

Mr. Winch: May I just ask a question here on Defence Research—and I am coming back now to the hydrofoil. The government paid a considerable amount of money to various companies in Canada to undertake research for equipment on the hydrofoil,

and I know for a fact, because I was there, that research paid off in certain areas. The Public Accounts Committee were informed that there was no procedure and nothing done on patents or licensing. In view of the fact that you are directly responsible in your Department for the hydrofoil development, have you given any thought at all to following through that the Canadian investment with Canadian companies on research has paid off?—that you should not, as a department, get a return? I am not going into details but I could give you details on where it really paid off.

Dr. Arnell: I am not sure of what the actual arrangements are that DDP make in their contracts to companies with respect to patents in that sense, but I think the procedure has become fairly standard now in a number of countries. If in fact, there is a successful development which goes into production, and that production is successful in offshore sales, there is now a formula that everybody recognizes—development costs are amortized against the sales, and in the case of the industry the latter pays back to the Crown certain things that it has received. There are a number of areas in this, and I would suggest that the detail would have to be obtained from DDP. But it is recognized, there are ways, and the Crown reserves the right in any development with respect to other military forces.

Mr. Winch: Thank you. I would like to say that, had it been brought to your attention, I would be glad to discuss with you one development that really paid off and has already been bought by the United States Navy, the United Kingdom Navy, and others who are interested in the development of Canadian research.

Dr. Arnell: The Crown has recovered for some of these, I know.

Mr. Winch: Not on this one. They have not recovered on it.

The Chairman: If there are no further questions on the Defence research votes, perhaps we could stand them for the time being and pass on to Mutual Aid, Vote 45. Are there any questions on Vote 45?

I will call Vote 45.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Mutual Aid

- 45 Contributions to infrastructure and the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the transfer of defence equipment and supplies and the provision of services and facilities

for defence purposes in accordance with section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, not exceeding a total of \$15,486,000 including the present value of defence equipment or supplies or the cost of services made available by the Canadian Forces estimated in the amount of \$1,286,000 and provided by appropriations for those Forces in the current and former years in respect of which, notwithstanding sub-section (3) of section 3 of the said Act, no amount shall be charged to this appropriation or paid into a special account; provided by this vote . . . \$ 14,200,000

Vote 45 stood.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

- 48 To authorize, notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act and section 11 of the Surplus Crown Assets Act, the payment into the special account in the Consolidated Revenue Fund referred to in National Defence Vote 48 of the Main Estimates for 1965-66 of all revenues received during the current and subsequent fiscal years from the sale of surplus buildings, works and land \$ 1

Pensions and Other Benefits

- (S) Payments under Parts I-IV of the Defence Services Pension Continuation Act, Government's contribution to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Account, Government's contribution under the Canada Pension Plan in respect to Canadian Forces and Government's contribution to the Regular Forces Death Benefit Account under Part II of the Public Service Superannuation Act \$195,720,764
- (S) Annuity to the widow of the Honourable Norman McLeod Rogers and payments to dependants of certain members of the Royal Canadian Air Force killed while serving as instructors under the British Commonwealth Air Training plan \$ 11,720

The Chairman: If there are no questions on Vote 48 we will stand that vote for the time being and pass on to Vote 50, which I will call.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

50 Civil Pensions as detailed in the
Estimates \$ 2,390
\$ 195,734,874

The Chairman: Stand Vote 50 and we will pass on to Vote 55 which deals with Defence Construction (1951) Limited.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

B-DEFENCE CONSTRUCTION (1951) LIMITED

55 Expenses incurred by Defence Construction (1951) Limited in procuring the construction and maintenance of defence projects on behalf of the Department of National Defence and procuring the construction of such other projects as are approved by Treasury Board \$ 2,195,000

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, on a point of information. I am sure it does not come under this department, but who operates Canadian Arsenal's? Is that the Department of Supply and Services or Defence Production?

● 1745

Dr. Arnell: It is a Crown company but functions through the DDP which. . .

Mr. Cafik: I see, it is under Supply and Services. That is under their jurisdiction, thank you.

The Chairman: Are there any questions on Vote 55, Defence Construction (1951), gentlemen? A number of our members have had to leave. Since this hearing has gone on so long, we will have to come together at 8 o'clock tonight to pass all the votes which we have stood. However, I would assume that there would be no further questioning—or very little further questioning, at any rate—but possibly, Dr. Arnell, if we could impose upon you just in case there are additional questions, we should be able to conclude our review of the Defence estimates, I would think, rather quickly. . .

Mr. Winch: Unfortunately, Mr. Cafik and myself will have to be absent tonight.

Mr. Cafik: I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if a census could be taken by all parties to make sure that we have a

quorum at 8 p.m. I think that the thing could be dealt with rather quickly. Perhaps we could all attend. I know I could be here for 15 minutes or so?

The Chairman: We will try to make such arrangements. If those who are not at other Committee meetings could be here for even a few minutes, I think, perhaps, we could get a quorum and get all the votes passed.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, perhaps while we are waiting for a quorum this evening, we could have from Dr. Arnell an indication of what the difficulty is of this aircraft that Mr. Harkness earlier so vigorously integrated. I understand that there is still a good deal of use in this plane as far as training purposes and utilization overseas is concerned.

Dr. Arnell: It was designed, of course originally as a trainer and it has never lost its utility as such. It gives a supersonic capability in the training role, and I think it has always been our intent that, ultimately, it would replace the T-33 as our advanced jet trainer.

Mr. Ryan: I think that it is still of great use to us, despite the fact that no refueler has been designed for it.

Dr. Arnell: We are now getting a number of them as duals for training and it is the view of the trainers that, if we did the conversion, we would have to acquire more of them as duals. You do not have to get them all. But there is a stage at which you want people to learn to fly the real single-seater, anyway.

An hon. Member: A supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: If I may interrupt for a second. Could all members of the Committee who are here now be sure to be here at 8 o'clock sharp, and ask any other members of the Committee who are back from other meetings to be here at that time?

Dr. Arnell: I would assume that my experts are not required tonight?

The Chairman: I would think that they would not be required.

Mr. Guay (St Boniface): On a supplementary, I believe that some of the members are leaving, including Mr. Harkness. I feel, with all due respect to you, Doctor, that the answer to the question regarding the CF-5 was not in the least the type that I had anticipated. In view of the answers, pertaining to the use and importance of those planes overseas, which we did receive, I will concede that, possibly, it was relatively short notice for you to give an appropriate answer, as suggested by Mr. Ryan just now. But I think it would be of great importance if this Com-

mittee were to get an answer pertaining, to their use and how important they are. If indeed, they are not, then I think we should be made aware of it. While we were in Europe we had occasion to discuss the matter with certain army personnel of our own Canadian forces, who told us that these were very good planes—and spelt out their uses and everything else.

Mr. Ryan: I think we are mixed up between the CF-104 and the...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes, maybe I am.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, it is confusing.

Dr. Arnell: I started to say though, I was under the impression that, when General Dare gave you the long briefing on the military forces and the forecast for the immediate future, he covered the CF-5 and its use in some detail. I was going to say to Mr. Ryan that if he really wants me to talk about it for a few minutes tonight, I am, in fact, going to go back and check to see what you have already been told, because I do believe that it is all in your record.

Mr. Winch: I see.

Dr. Arnell: From General Dare's presentation.

● 1750

Mr. Cafik: Just one question. I am a little mixed up now. I agree with what you have said on this. I have the opposite impression as to the usefulness of the CF-105.

Mr. Ryan: Have we agreed that it is the CF-5 that you are talking about?

Mr. Cafik: The CF-5, yes.

Mr. Ryan: Are you not talking about the same one they are using in Europe, the CF-104?

Mr. Cafik: Yes. I am now asking a question as to the range of the CF-5.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I am sorry, in fact. . . .

Mr. Cafik: I had the impression it was some 400 miles in each direction.

Dr. Arnell: How do you get something of that sort?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, the reason why I do not believe, that I am so mixed up is because when we did speak of delivery of these planes, we were told in Europe by someone—and I think that I may have it in some of the notes that I have in my office—that we could take delivery

of them in Europe, because then they would not be all in one piece. They could be assembled once they received them overseas.

Dr. Arnell: Of course this is no problem. I mean we can always take the wings off and put them on the aircraft carriers.

Mr. Ryan: I am sorry Mr. Guay, I just thought—

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): But over and above that there was quite a bit of discussion. I do not say a lengthy discussion, but sufficient to make us believe, or at least make me believe, that they were excellent planes for the use to which they were going to be put. I think that no one on this Committee—to whatever party they may belong—or the press, should be left with the impression that we are going into something which might be of very little use. I think this should be spelled out to the Committee.

Dr. Arnell: I will try to get that information before 8 o'clock.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is agreed that we try to be here at 8 o'clock and pass the votes as the first item of business. Then, perhaps, in an informal way, Dr. Arnell can describe the function of this particular plane. The meeting is now adjourned until 8 o'clock in this same room.

EVENING SITTING

Thursday, May 1, 1969.

● 2013

The Chairman: Gentleman, we are ready to begin our formal proceedings.

Votes 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48, 50 and 55 are agreed to. Shall Vote 1 carry?

Mr. Winch: On division.

Vote I agreed to on division.

The Chairman: Shall I report these estimates to the House?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Winch: I say "on division" because we have not had a proper statement. So I say "on division" on Vote 1.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. However, we should have carried every vote. Gentlemen, this completes our formal proceedings but I think Dr. Arnell wishes to say a few words about the plane which was referred to this afternoon.

Dr. Arnell: As a result of Mr. Ryan's suggestion, I have asked General Adamson, who is the Director General, under General Dare, concerned with air operations, to give you a short outline of the current plan and program for the introduction of the CF-5 into the service, so that you can see just how it is going to be phased in. I will now ask General Adamson to outline it quickly.

● 2015

Brigadier General D. R. Adamson (Director General, Operations — Air, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Dr. Arnell. As Dr. Arnell has said, I am the Director General, Operations — Air. The CF-5 is a twin-engine, tactical, close support aircraft, with a super sonic capability. It was procured for close support of the ground forces, interdiction, and reconnaissance in a conventional role. It has the additional capability of becoming, at some time in our program, a replacement aircraft for the T-33 trainer. The aircraft has a still-air ferry range of 1,500 miles. It can, of course, carry a number of operational weapons loads within that range, depending on the weapons carried and the altitudes flown.

At this time, the aircraft is in operation at OTU at Cold Lake in limited numbers. The unit there is the Operational Training Unit, and it is training crews for the two squadrons that we are going to form, one at Bagotville and one at Namao.

The Chairman: Are there any questions?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): I have a question concerning the range. You said it had a range of 1,500 miles. Is this a ferry range?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: That is a ferry range.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): What is its fighting range?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: As I indicated, it depends. It has any number of combinations that you would care to mention within the 1,500 miles, depending on the weapons you supplied it with and the altitudes at which it is flown. I am sure you will understand this in the vernacular. If you go high, low, high, you are going to get more range out of the airplane than with a low, low, low profile. I think if you wanted to pick on the optimum balance between weapons and fuel, at a 200 nautical mile radius, or a 400 mile range—these are nautical miles I am quoting now...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): In other words, it could not fly from Toronto to Montreal and back again under operational conditions?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: Well, I cannot . . .

Dr. Arnell: I think the point is that in close support of the land forces, one wants an attack close to them rather than 100 miles ahead of them. Once you get beyond a certain point the plane ceases being a close support weapon. One then enters into tactical or strategic strife.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): In the European role of our air brigade in Europe, would this range be satisfactory? Working from the base at Lahr, for example, could it perform the function that the 104 is doing now in being able to attack Soviet bases from Lahr?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: The quick answer of course, is that it was announced at the time the aircraft was procured, that it was not intended to be a replacement for the 104.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): No, but I am just suggesting this as an example. That range would be too great?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: I do not know what bases you have in mind, but, no, it cannot fulfil the role that the 104 is fulfilling in Europe now.

Dr. Arnell: There are problems other than the range itself. The 104 has an extremely sophisticated navigation system that is designed to allow it to penetrate deep into enemy territory and, in fact, to hit a pinpoint target. Close support of the land forces is an entirely different role that has an entirely different sort of navigational problem. The CF-5 has not been given, for example, the navigation equipment that is equivalent to CF-104.

● 2020

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): I can understand the role of the CF-104, but I am trying to envisage a position in which you would put the CF-5 in today's fighting. It would be useless to us in Europe, in other words, under NATO conditions at the present time. Our bases are too far back from the Soviet border for it to be of any use to us now. I am just trying to envisage a role for it in Canada.

Dr. Arnell: I think the problem is this business of roles in Canada. If you go back to the time at which the decision was made to buy it, we spoke of two things that were to be roles for the Canadians: these I do not think were fully understood by a lot of people, peacekeeping and peace restoring. Many people did not appreciate what peace restoring meant. Peacekeeping is where there is peace and you go in to stop them from fighting again. Peace restoring

is where you have to fight your way. One of the concepts, rightly or wrongly, of close support of land forces, is where in fact you were peace restoring, where there was a war, perhaps a small one. If you were to analyse, as I think you have done already with many of your witnesses, what has really changed in this, particularly is the U.N.—the concept of how the U.N. might work these days—peace restoring is not spoken of today with the same freedom and goodness that it was spoken of four and five years ago.

This, I think, is one of the essential problems that one finds, because people do not give this too much credibility today. You do not go in and fight to stop a war under the auspices of the U.N. Our tendency has been to do peacekeeping work rather than peace restoring. In fact, another word has arisen and this is the peace observance, as well as the peace-keeper. The peace observer is essentially the officer professional who is there to judge what he sees rather than to keep the peace.

This is where you get the difference between what we did in the Indian-Pakistan situation over Kashmir, where we practised peace observing; there was a very small group of senior officers who were present to judge what they saw. Cyprus has been peacekeeping, UNEF was peacekeeping where, in fact, we were put in between two groups that had, been fighting and who we hoped would not fight again.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Does the CF-5 require a technically advanced base as the CF-104 does? Or is it a type of front line fighter that can operate out of comparatively limited fields, short take-off and landing or anything else of this kind? Do you have to have all the facilities of long runways and sophisticated equipment that a CF-104 must have?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: Once again, you must come back to the question of what you want to put on it for it to do any particular thing. However it can operate with less sophisticated facilities than the CF-104 can: it is not an airplane that is going to operate off dirt drifts in the front line, sort of thing, but it can operate under less sophisticated facilities.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): It could operate from a permanent basis, in other words.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: It can operate from a hard surface runway, yes.

● 2025

The Chairman: Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman and General Adamson, the immediate impression that was left with

me after listening to the various questions this afternoon by some members of the Committee, created a question in my mind, as to the usefulness of these planes. I am asking this question to you then, because of this impression and because, possibly I know very little about the planes. My question is, is this an item that your department really wanted? Is it an asset to your department in its training program, whether it is overseas or in Canada? Is this plane something that has been, more or less, forced upon you to take and make use of. Is it not as effective as another type of plane which you would rather have? I think that my question in its final analysis would be, if it is not the type within the category which I have just explained, I think that this Committee should be made aware of it, and to outline once and for all, if it is an asset or if it is not. If it is not, then we will take another turn of questioning to that end.

Dr. Arnell: I would like to answer this by a little historical review, if I might. I might preface my remarks, Mr. Guay, with something that I believe I discussed in a slightly different context on the night of April 17, in response to a question of Mr. Nowlan about system studies. I do not know if you recall, he was asking me how we did various things. I alluded to this, as I recall, but I would like to discuss it in a little more detail now, because I think it is very pertinent.

In this period, as the study went on over 18 months or 2 years, the Air Force, in looking forward as to future operational requirements to try and identify the kind of aircraft that might be in the next generation, if you like, of aircrafts, set up as a broad system of study, a look at what has since become commonly known as a broad set of scenarios of all the possible sorts of things that might, in fact, happen to disturb the peace. Within the broad cut of the scenarios was everything from what I would suggest would be a tribal war in the desert, through to a nuclear war in Europe. It was narrowed down for handling into a limited number of things, but in the extremes, there was little more than the type of thing in which the British spent all their time between World War I and World War II, involved in trying to keep the peace among warring tribes in various parts of the tropical zone, through to a nuclear war in Europe.

This study was to attempt to identify the kind of aircraft that, in fact, would be needed in the future in the Canadian Air Force if the Canadian Forces were to be assigned roles over this very broad front.

We studied all existing aircraft that were on the drawing board or in developments, at the time, and also the kind of operations you would have to do from the very sophisticated environment that you get in Europe to, in fact, the desert of the Arabian Peninsula, where there are virtually no navigation aids and virtually nothing even to navigate.

● 2030

When that study was over and a number of different ways in which two sophisticated forces would come together, or might have to cope with, or a single sophisticated force might have to cope with the tribal rebellion sort of thing, it was quite clear that at least two different kinds of aircraft, high performance aircraft, were required. One was a very sophisticated type of aircraft, an expensive one, of which the current example today is the F-4 in one or other of its configurations, the Phantom. At the other end, this study says, that what was really needed was a modern version of a late World War II fighter, the kind of thing that was just coming into service towards the end of World War II.

At that time the British said—because I happened to be in a position where I could talk to some of them out in the Arabian Desert at the time—that you wanted something like the hunter, where you could fly along, look out the window, and be able to count sand dunes as they went underneath, because you really could not use any of the sophisticated sensors and things. If you were going to see an Arab in the desert, you were going to have to see him, and if you flew by at mach 2 you would not see him, type of thing.

At the end of that study there was not, in fact an aircraft that really fitted into this lesser role. That particular study, I would suggest, had quite an influence on the decisions that were taken just after the White Paper, because one of the things that the White Paper was stressing, as I was saying earlier to Mr. Howard, was this peace-restoring area. This is where you encounter the less sophisticated environment and the problems of this less sophisticated environment. The F-5 Freedom Fighter was, in fact, an unsophisticated airplane in relation to the Phantom.

We were looking at that time—if you go back and look at the record, it is quite clear—for this concept of mobility, of being able to go into tropical areas where there was not a sophisticated environment; where you could not, in fact, count on having American pipe lines, or some other logistics line, that could keep you fed. It was in this context that this whole thing was set up. This is still the basic context into which the CF-5 is being fit.

Whether or not this will be valid a year from now will in very large measure be determined by the decisions that I believe are going to be taken within the next month or two. To attempt to forecast whether or not the CF-5 will have a role three years from now will be much clearer in month or two. I do not think that any of us sitting here at the table could really attempt to forecast for you what the situation is going to be as a result of the present studies that are being done for the government.

I am afraid we really have to leave it that way. I can give you the background information of how we arrived at these concepts and say they are applicable if you wish to accept them. If the concepts are not accepted, we always have a replacement trainer for this T-33, as General Adamson said. It is a good trainer because that is the purpose for which it was originally designed.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, have you any questions?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I appreciate your comments and I think that you have explained this very well. However, is it not rather a big gamble, considering the number of aircraft which will be acquired, when we are not in a position to say today that they will be made good use of, they are something which the Department requires, and they are something that is appropriate for our training program? And yet you seem, again, to leave us under the impression that it is not yet defined whether or not this will be the case.

Dr. Arnell: The decision on the CF-5, I must remind you, was taken over four years ago. It is just like saying we do not need the DDH-280's. Suppose they decide next month that we do not need the DDH-280s. Was the decision wrong four years ago?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): In other words, at the time at which this was decided, it was the best plane for the use it was to be put to?

Dr. Arnell: The White Paper was quite specific concerning a new role, a mobility that, in fact, had never really been developed in the context of the White Paper. This was part of a \$1.5 billion equipment program and was clearly spelled out. If you go through

● 2035

it, you will find we have, in fact, procured almost everything that was in that original equipment list. We either have it in its entirety or we are getting towards the end of it. I would suggest that the DDH-280s is the only major expenditure still left of the five-year program. We noted today there is \$100-odd million still to be paid after this year. It can be documented from late 1964 right through to today that about 75 per cent or 80 per cent of the total program has been obtained. We have spent to date, as I recall, in the order of \$1.3 billion of the total. Given the increased labour costs and so on, the original program, as laid out in 1964, will probably cost, in its entirety, about \$1-3/4 billion instead of \$1.5 billions.

I think, personally, that this is pretty good for a five-year program, bearing in mind the inflation which we have experienced which was not, in fact, anticipated. The whole program was based on a 3 per cent per year increase in inflation. In fact, last year the

official figure, I believe, was 5 per cent. If a project's labour costs go up 10 per cent, no government is going to say, "we will not pay your increased labour costs".

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I am not interested in the cost at all.

Dr. Arnell: No, but I am just trying to show you that this is part of a complete program which, when read in its entirety, is quite a reasonable program, judging by the White Paper which was the basis for the program.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): You can appreciate the fact, Doctor, that I have not had a chance to read your program, particularly those sections concerning defence.

Dr. Arnell: I am only trying to explain to you that there is a rational history to these programs. It is only when you look at them out of context that they really do not make as much sense as they do in context.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It would be rather difficult for you at this time to say that this will be the type of plane that will be efficient and appropriate for your training program. This would be relatively hard to define at the moment, would it not?

Dr. Arnell: The one point is that it will always be good as a future trainer. We will never have any problem using it as a trainer, even if it loses all other roles.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I see.

Dr. Arnell: I think this is the point that General Adamson tried to make earlier.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: Exactly.

Dr. Arnell: We plan to use it for other purposes first, but its final role will be as a supersonic trainer to take the pilots from the tutor stage to the level of a high performance airplane, regardless of whatever else may be in the system.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: In point of fact, as Dr. Arnell well knows, we have what we refer to as a future resources requirement for a replacement for the T-33 in the early 1970s. If it so happens that the CF-5, as a result of the deliberations that are now being taken, ends up as a training aircraft, then as far as I am concerned, as the Director General Operations - Air, we are going to end up with an excellent trainer that will, in fact, replace the other resource requirements that we were going to have to put up anyway. Therefore, my feeling is that we have had the best of both worlds, as it were, and we are reaching a decision that is not going to cost us more money.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: I might just refer to the question of the previous questioner, if I may. He said that the aircraft could not fly from Toronto to Montreal. It could, in fact, do that and drop a load, although the load would not be as heavy as if it carried half weight from Toronto to Montreal. It is just a combination of what you want to equip it with within the total 1,500 mile range that it has.

● 2040

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: After hearing about the plane's advantages, I would say that it is not a lemon at all. It is an all-around plane and it will have a great deal of utility in the future. It will not only serve 50 per cent of its life as a trainer, but in the interim, it could be useful in the event of war in Europe. In Canada, in the event of lodgements, it could be used as a tactical or even a strategic weapons carrier.

Dr. Arnell: You should not use the word "strategic". The point is, you encounter navigation problems with a strategic carrier. You are on your own for too long, and this is not designed with sophisticated navigation equipment at the moment. This is not to say that you might not be able to upgrade it, but this equipment is not in the aircraft which we are buying.

Mr. Ryan: Would you be inclined to agree with me that the fact it does not have a refueling plane to complement it is being used against it in rather an unfair way. It was really designed as an all around plane, and not just as a plane to replace the CF-104 in Europe.

Dr. Arnell: As I said earlier, and General Adamson reiterated the deployment of the aircraft, whether you have a refueling tanker to accompany it or not, is essentially a question of time, not of capability. As you said, you can fly this 1,500 miles on a ferry range. There is virtually nowhere in the world that you cannot go in 1,500 mile sections. The only thing is, it takes you longer if you have to stop and refuel every 1,500 miles than, in fact, if you . . .

Mr. Ryan: This would not be any good to us in the event of a nuclear war in Europe. Immediately it would not be of any use to us, and likely it is not of any use at all.

Dr. Arnell: It was never intended for that; it was intended for the other role.

Mr. Ryan: Yes.

Dr. Arnell: If you go back to the White Paper, there the other roles are made evident.

Mr. Ryan: But if we did have it in Europe on our bases there, it would still be useful as a tactical carrier. It might not reach the Russian border, as Mr. Guay points out, but it would certainly fly into the countries between the German and the Russian borders, it could be used to get through concentrated areas.

Dr. Arnell: Yes, but here again, I must say that this is looking for an alternate role for it than the one for which it was originally bought. If you go back to 1964, which is when this was put in the program, you will remember that the CF-104 was still a very new airplane. It was in Europe with a known life of the best part of 10 years. Therefore the CF-5 was not being bought for a job in Europe. This is about the one thing that you can say it was not being bought for.

You might have queried some of the other things, but the White Paper says these were some of the things we were going to do. Now we are five years down the line on the CF-104 and people are questioning the role of the 104s and so on; it is almost in looking for an alternate role that they say, "Can you not use this instead." But the 104s were there when this was bought and, in fact, can be there for a while longer, as you well know.

Mr. Ryan: I take it that this plane could fit in perfectly, or almost perfectly, into a new policy which is being involved. It might not, but it might.

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: It is a very useful bit of hardware to have in our cupboard. Would this be correct?

Dr. Arnell: Anyone who might be critical about it now, is prejudging.

Mr. Ryan: Prejudging, that is what I wished to say.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions about this? Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I was wondering about this business of repelling some lodgement. This term "lodgement" is used in Canada. I assume this means that anyone making such a "lodgement" would be kind enough to do so within 200 or 300 miles of a paved runway, from which the aircraft

could operate; otherwise it would not be of any use to you, would it?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: I think the words were those of the previous questioners and were not agreed to by myself. No, the airplane could not be used in that role. At least it would be very difficult and the lodgement would have to choose its place, as you suggested, within the range of the runways from which the airplane might operate. The airplane as Dr. Arnell has said at great length, is in full support.

Dr. Arnell: I should say something about the lodgement. I must admit that this afternoon I did not, in fact, go into this fully. Within this context, as it has been used within the military in looking at it, there are, in fact, areas, particularly on the two coasts, that are very much within the range of this aircraft which were in the old context of enemy lodgement. One can question whether this is a significant thing today, but do not forget that particularly, as a result of the fact that there were enemy lodgements during World War II, this has always been a possibility that can never be ignored com-

• 2045

pletely. Enemy lodgements were there, in fact, they were within the range of adequate airfields. We tend to think of Baffin Island as being the only place where there could be any lodgements, but there are many rather isolated coastal areas, on both coasts, within the province. I am not trying to raise a trivial point here at all. This is something that has been in the books since World War II. I do not say that there are any particular risks involved, however, it is a point that the military must have in the back of its mind along with everything else.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Prud'homme: Supplementary question. Right now is there one . . .

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme on a supplementary.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Prud'homme: Right now, is there one or are there any countries which have manifested their desire to use the CF-5?

[English]

Dr. Arnell: He is asking whether there are many countries that have decided to use the CF-5.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: The CF-5?

Dr. Arnell: Well, the F-5.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: Well the CF-5 has been purchased by Holland as well.

Dr. Arnell: I mean figures on the F-5.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: The F-5 is in service in a number of countries around the world. We could get the number for you, but at this time I can quote some examples: The Philippines and Norway have it and it has been given on the Military Assistance Programs, by the Americans, to some of the Middle East countries. It is used extensively around the world, that is, the American version of the aircraft. Our version of it has been considerably modified.

Mr. Prud'homme: What does Holland use it for?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: Holland is using the aircraft for the same role in which we are intending to make it useful—close support.

Mr. Prud'homme: Do you think other countries might follow Holland's example in using it?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: I think Mr. Pepin was in Malaysia, suggesting that we might sell some there. That is one other example. It is a minor sale, but it is a possibility.

Mr. Prud'homme: Mind you I knew about Holland. Many people are under the impression that it is a Canadian mistake, but now, if it were a mistake, it would be a collection of them.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: It is an airplane that has been very successful in its original role in the States, and that role was as a trainer. It is now being modified in the United States from the original engine combination to an updated engine called the -21 engine, to give it greater capability than our airplane, because the engine will have more thrust. It is again being looked at by them for various combinations that they might be able to make useful themselves, in addition to other Military Assistance Programs that they might be considering. It is in wide use throughout the world.

Mr. Prud'homme: Would it be very expensive for us to modify it accordingly?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: We have no particular wish, within the concept that we are intending to put it into use now, or for any other use that we might want to use it for, to modify it. It is perfectly adequate as it is.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions for Dr. Arnell or General Adamson? If not, on your behalf I would like to thank Dr. Arnell for being so patient with us. I would also like to thank you, General

Adamson, for coming here this evening to give us information about the planes. Thank you very much Dr. Arnell.

Dr. Arnell: Although some of the questions have been difficult, I cannot say that I did not enjoy it.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we will adjourn until Tuesday, May 6, 11 a.m., in Room 308 West Block, when the witness will be Lieutenant General F.R. Sharp, the Deputy Commander of NORAD. We will commence our NORAD investigation next week. Thank you, very much.

HOUSE OF COMMONS


First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN



MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 41

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1969

Respecting
Policy-defence and external affairs.

WITNESSES:

(*See Minutes of Proceedings*)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn
Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand
Barrett
Brewin
Buchanan
Cafik
Carter
Fairweather
Forrestall
Gibson
Groos

Guay (*St. Boniface*)
Harkness
Howard (*Okanagan
Boundary*)
Laniel
Laprise
Legault
Lewis
MacLean
Marceau

Nesbitt
Nowlan
Penner
Prud'homme
Roberts
Stewart (*Cochrane*)
Stewart (*Marquette*)
Thompson (*Red Deer*)
Winch—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

Tuesday, May 6, 1969.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

SIXTH REPORT

Pursuant to its Order of Reference of February 20, 1969, your Committee has considered the following items listed in the Estimates 1969-70:

Votes 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48 and 50, relating to the Department of National Defence; and

Vote 55 relating to Defence Construction (1951) Limited.

Your Committee commends them to the House.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 36, 37 and 40*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Tuesday, May 6, 1969
(64)

The Standing committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch (20).

Witnesses: Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD and Brigadier General N. L. Magnusson, Deputy Director, NORAD Combat Operations Center, Colorado Springs.

The Chairman made an opening statement, introducing the witness, Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD. General Sharp made an introductory statement respecting NORAD.

Members of the Committee questioned General Sharp about NORAD, especially in relation to his working paper on this subject, which had been distributed previously.

Copies of a NORAD booklet entitled *Aerospace Defence Information*, were distributed.

It was agreed that General Sharp's advance presentation and his biography be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix XX*)

With the questioning continuing, at 12:40 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING (65)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Buchanan, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, Nowlan, Penner, Roberts, Ryan, Wahn, Winch (12).

Witnesses: Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD and Colonel Henry M. Walsh, Director Continental Plans, Canadian Forces headquarters.

During this afternoon sitting, Members completed their questioning of General Sharp. He agreed to provide the Committee with additional information concerning the cost of the various Canadian components in NORAD.

The Chairman thanked Lieutenant General Sharp, Brigadier General Magnusson and Colonel Walsh for their testimony.

At 5:15 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until Thursday, May 8, 1969 at 8:00 p.m., when the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister on National Defence will appear.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, May 6, 1969. • 1110

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I think perhaps we are ready to begin.

Today the Committee begins its review of Canadian air defence policy, in particular its review of NORAD. I would like to welcome to these hearings on your behalf as our first witness Lt. General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD.

The Committee requested the Department of National Defence to prepare a comprehensive working paper on North American air defence to serve as a basis of this preliminary discussion with General Sharp. This paper was received yesterday and the clerk has distributed copies to members. The paper outlines the historical background of the NORAD Agreement, the current organizational arrangements of NORAD, the threat that NORAD is designed to meet, the current forces and capabilities of the NORAD system, the potential evolution of the threat and possible improvements in the air defence system.

I would like to point out that, having only received the working paper yesterday, our discussion today can only be of a preliminary nature. After completing it, and after giving the paper detailed consideration, the Committee may wish next month to invite General Sharp to appear again if that would be possible for him.

General Sharp has had a distinguished career in the Canadian forces. Prior to his present assignment as Deputy Commander of NORAD, he served as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. A detailed biography has been circulated to members. We are grateful to General Sharp for coming from Colorado springs to appear before us today.

Before asking the witness to make any introductory remarks he may wish to make, I should mention that General Sharp is a public servant. He is here as a representative of the Department of National Defence and is not in a position to express his personal views in a public forum such as this committee's hearing. In particular it may be difficult for him to comment in areas of policy where the government position is currently under review. I am sure members will respect his position in this matter.

And if a question is asked which would be difficult for General Sharp I know he will free just to indicate that he is not in a position to answer for this reason.

General Sharp, do you have a few introductory remarks?

Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp (Deputy Commander of Norad): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to tell you that it is a privilege to appear before this Committee again; I hope that this subject will not be quite as controversial as was the subject during my last appearance.

Although time has been short, I understand that most of you have had an opportunity to read the paper. I hope it will help you in your deliberations. I am here today to answer any questions that I can concerning NORAD. I have with me, General Magnusson, who is the Deputy Chief of the Combat Operations Center in Colorado Springs, and Colonel Walsh, who is a member of the Planning Staff at Canadian Forces Headquarters in Ottawa.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Sharp.

Before calling on questioners, I might mention to members that we will be meeting at 8 o'clock Thursday night when the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, will be here to give their views on NORAD. That will be this coming Thursday in the evening. Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: General Sharp, I note on page 4 of your presentation that there are 683 American NORAD personnel in Canada and 249 Canadians in the United States. I understand that the 249 Canadians are well spread throughout the four main regions that cover parts of both the U.S. and Canada.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct; they are also concentrated in NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. Would there be any place other than the headquarters where they would be con-

centrated, or would they be pretty well spread through the U.S.?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, there is a concentration in Brunswick, Maine, and also a smaller concentration in Tacoma, Washington state.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, thank you. In your opinion, do our Canadians learn everything about NORAD and its equipment, or do they just learn about those things that they need to know?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, as far as NORAD equipment is concerned, they can learn everything. However, they should first of all learn about the equipment with which they have to work. They can learn about equipment with which they do not have to work; there is no restriction in this sense, if that is what you are trying to determine.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. Do our men receive much in the way of training from the Americans, or is this all Canadian training?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: There are some special courses in connection with the computers that we receive from the Americans. There are also some weapon training courses which we receive from the Americans.

Mr. Ryan: When we were with the NATO tour in the southern United States last September, apparently there were two Canadian officers at Fort Bliss who ranked one and two in the class there. What would that work be with which they were associated there?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not know, Mr. Ryan. I would have to get their names and see what courses they were on.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. You point out that the continent has been divided into five regions to enhance operational control: the Western, Eastern, Central, Northern and Alaskan regions. Apparently, however, no Canadians are in Alaska; we are not represented there at all. Is there an explanation for this?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes. The general principle is that where a region's geographic area includes Canada, there will be Canadians on the staff; if it does not, there probably will not be any Canadians. Alaska does not cover any Canadian territory, and therefore no Canadians are on the staff.

Mr. Ryan: I see. You say that the main threat direction would cross Canada, that is, from Russia across Canadian territory, to hit the main part of the United States, presumably, and that it is still necessary to have defence against manned bombers over Canada. Would you explain why this is necessary?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Well, from the military point of view, NORAD has been given the responsibility by both the Canadian and American governments to provide for the air defence of North America; as long as we have that responsibility, we must look at the threat in terms of capabilities. The Russians have the capability of bombing this continent, and since the governments have given us the responsibility to defend against this threat, we need the wherewithal to do so.

Mr. Ryan: I understand that the Russians have developed a stand-off capability with their bombers. In other words they can fly within a certain distance from their target, let us say 200 or 300 miles, and let loose an atomic weapon that would zero in on its target with great accuracy.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Ryan: I understand also that the Russians have not abolished their present bombing fleet.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, they have not done away with it, however, to be quite fair about this, neither have they increased it.

Mr. Ryan: No. I understand that they have the capability of producing a more sophisticated bomber than the one they have now, but that they have not proceeded with it. Is this the case as far as we know?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is the case as far as we know, right.

Mr. Ryan: Why is it, General, that we place so much emphasis on the North when, in these days, the FOBS can come around at us from other directions, and particularly from the East and the West more than from the North? What do we have to guard against the threat from France or Russia or some other country, by nuclear submarines or nuclear emplacements, along our Continental Shelf?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is a large question. I think you have to go back and look at the development of Russian weapon systems. It started out with the bomber; their only means of approach, taking into consideration their range, was over the North. We began to get into the ICBM era and, again, the only means of approach was over the North. When your development which you have mentioned was coming along...

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, excuse me. We are having great difficulty in hearing the witness.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am sorry. Your developments which you have mentioned do indeed, or might indeed, give the Russians the capability to approach, with something such as FOBS, from another direction. You will notice in the paper that was given to you, a mention of a new radar which is being located in Florida, and which is designed to look to the South for the very reason that you have mentioned. However, I believe I am correct in saying that although the Russians perhaps have this capability, they have not demonstrated the FOBS capability as yet. In other words, up until now, the threat has been from the North; in the future it might be from anywhere—not necessarily will be, but might be.

Mr. Ryan: Are we in a position to prevent nuclear missiles from submarines or emplacements on the

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Continental Shelf from landing in Canada and the United States, from our Eastern and Western coastal areas?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes. If we take the case of ballistic missiles launched from submarines. At the moment, these are of relatively short range—within a few hundred miles—and they would have to come in off the North American coast. To counter this threat and, at least, to give us warning of this—again I believe that it is mentioned in the paper—radars along the coast are being modified so that they will be able to detect launches from submarines.

Mr. Ryan: What do we have that can stop the missile, once we know that it is coming in?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Nothing.

Mr. Ryan: Nothing at all?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Ryan: Do we now have devices that can detect the placing or the actual existing emplacement of submarine silos or banks of weapons, either on our continental shelves or under the ice of the Arctic?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am sorry. I prefer to answer that question in closed session.

Mr. Ryan: On page 25, paragraph 2, you say:

The threat of a ballistic missile attack is increasing as the Soviet Union increases its' inventory of inter-continental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched submarine ballistic missiles.

Is this an increase of a large order, or is it just a gradual increase over the last few years?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It is both. It is a steady increase in totals, and it is of a fairly large order. I would like to make one statement about the threat. I know that the papers say that the threat has increased. From my own personal point of view, the capability has increased. Threat also includes intention. I do not know the Russian intention. However, the Russian capability is increasing.

Mr. Ryan: And you state, also on page 25, paragraph 3, that:

At present, there is no method by which such satellites . . .

Which would mean the space vehicle satellites.

. . . could be identified as hostile and; therefore, warning of an attack would not be available.

This is the present situation. Am I correct?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: This is the present situation. That is correct.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I wonder—if you would agree, in order to expedite the work of the Committee—if I could present my Thursday's questions at once. Would that be agreeable, sir?

The Chairman: I think that Lt. Gen. Sharp could make a note of the questions and answer them one at a time.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Of course.

Mr. Winch: Are you agreeable? I think that it might expedite the work.

First, General, could you inform us if NORAD is strictly an alliance for defence against man-bomber aircraft and if so, in the event of attack, is it's purpose to down the bombers over Canadian territory?

Secondly, does NORAD have control graphs situated at Colorado Springs which show on the screen all flights on and around North America? What co-ordination does NORAD have with air and sea rescue if—I think I have the right term—a blip disappears from your screen? Is there still an aircraft headquar-

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ters for NORAD in the air, over the United States, 24 hours a day? What is the purpose and the efficiency of the NORAD control headquarters in Canada?

Lastly, what is the purpose and the function of NORAD exercise, which I understand is to take place next week as a joint United States and Canadian manoeuvre?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I believe you first question was, "Is NORAD strictly an alliance for defence against the man-bomber?" In so far as active defences—that is, being able to do something about the bomber vis-à-vis, say, an ICBM—the answer is yes. However, NORAD also has the responsibility for attack warnings by other means, say ICBM's or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, I do not want to interrupt. Do I understand, that the NORAD system is such that it can detect ICBM's?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct. There is no doubt about it.

Mr. Winch: Can you state the height and range or is that classified?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We can detect them at any height at all, but the length of warning it will give depends upon the height of the trajectory. We can detect that.

Mr. Winch: Is it the idea to shoot them down over Canadian soil?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, the idea is to warn. We do not have the capability to shoot them down. The idea is to warn in sufficient time in order to retaliate, if it is decided to do so. Hopefully, this will be sufficient deterrent.

Mr. Winch: You mean, to warn the Strategic Air Command, is that the correct term?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, it is to warn much higher than that. Actually, it is to warn the President of the United States.

Now, is the purpose to shoot down bombers over Canadian territory? Our aim is to shoot down bombers as far North as possible, in most cases that probably would mean over Canadian territory, but it might mean over Alaska which is American territory.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry. Can I then ask, is your warning system such that you would have the time to give the warning and get the alliance forces to shoot them down over Alaska?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Oh yes. The answer is yes, definitely.

Mr. Winch: The next is on your relationship with air sea rescue.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, there are . . .

Mr. Winch: I had the privilege of being in Colorado and of seeing the screen graphic that you have.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We have a very quick and close relationship with the air-sea rescue agencies. The co-ordination, in the situation that you postulated, would not take place from Colorado Springs. It would take place from the division headquarters, one of the lower formations which keep minute to minute track of aircraft—not all aircraft but certain aircraft—and co-ordination would come from that headquarters, if the blip disappeared and if other circumstances indicated that search and rescue was required. It would be from this headquarters that the search and rescue organization was contacted. They have direct and, in most cases open, lines. In other words, it is not even a question of dialing; it is a question of picking up the telephone.

Mr. Winch: Then as far as air-sea rescue is concerned, it is divisional and you do not require the establishment at Colorado Springs? I am now speaking of the civilian, not the military aspect.

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: I may be wrong, but I do not believe that we have a civilian search and rescue aspect at Colorado Springs, have we not?

The Chairman: Would you approach the table and use the microphone, Brig. Gen. Magnusson.

Brig. Gen. N. L. Magnusson (Deputy Director, NORAD Combat Operations Center, Colorado Springs): We do not have a search and rescue organization at Colorado Springs. We simply monitor all flights. They are also monitored within each position and region. As Lt. Gen. Sharp mentioned, co-ordination of search and rescue would be shared between the division and the search and rescue agency.

Mr. Winch: Thank you, sir. The next question concerns headquarter control.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The question, as I understood it, was based on the assumption that you thought that there was a NORAD control aircraft in the air 24 hours a day. To my knowledge that is not true now. I do not think it was in the past.

Mr. Winch: My understanding was—when our Committee flew to Colorado Springs—that in the event that Colorado Springs went out, there would be an

aircraft somewhere over the United States that was there 24 hours a day and that could take over. I mean is it up 24 hours a day? That was my first one. What then is the position of North Bay?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Mr. Brewin, those are SAC airplanes. They are not NORAD airplanes that perhaps you are referring to.

Mr. Winch: I understand that they have some connection with Colorado Springs.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: There are not any NORAD airplanes that do this.

Mr. Winch: What is North Bay's position?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The Headquarters at North Bay is a regional headquarters, which is the next lower organizational formation below that of NORAD Headquarters. It is also a divisional headquarters which is one step further down. The function of the divisional headquarters is to give day-to-day control to the SAGE system of intercepts, to intercept aircraft during exercises and to provide actual intercepts, if necessary.

Mr. Winch: If Colorado Springs went out, is North Bay capable of taking over its function?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Not at present.

Mr. Winch: I beg your pardon.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Not at present.

Mr. Winch: Is it anticipated?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: There is a NORAD request—a recommendation, I imagine—to give North Bay this capability.

Mr. Winch: Can I now ask about the exercise next week?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, I am sorry. Each week we conduct many exercises. I am not familiar, in detail, with the purpose of this particular exercise. In general, we conduct the exercises in order to give training to our ground and air crew, to our computer operators, and to our battle management staff in an attempt to keep them up to date on procedures and to attest their effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, it is training. Each exercise might be designed for a particular purpose. It might be designed particularly to give training to the people in the SAGE centre or particularly to give counter measures training to the air crew. I do not know what this particular exercise is designed to do, but in general, it will cover one of those things that I have mentioned.

Mr. Winch: May I finally ask, is it contemplated that the organization of NORAD, if continued, will have any part to play in a proposal of anti-ballistic missile, missile anti-anti et cetera?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Is it contemplated by whom?

Mr. Winch: Is there any tie-in, any relationship, or any function for NORAD, if this policy now being discussed goes into effect in the United States?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think, Mr. Winch, that this is a
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controversial problem even in the United States. I do not think that it would be proper for me now to make any comment on ABMs.

Mr. Winch: You cannot even state whether NORAD would have any function if that went into effect?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Since the United States has not decided to go ahead with it, they cannot possibly have made a decision like that.

Mr. Winch: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan, and then Mr. Ralph Stewart. Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: General Sharp, perhaps you are not able to comment on this, however, it does flow a little from Mr. Winch's last question. There is some evidence or testimony in the United States that submarine lodge missiles, the Polaris, which everyone thought at one time were beyond detection and/or destruction are now not quite the deterrent which we thought that they might be. Could you comment on that?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I have read what I think is the piece of paper that you have read. I cannot comment on it simply because I do not know the answer. As a general comment, however, due to the rate of progress, or increases in knowledge in science and technology these days, it would certainly not surprise me if someone were to discover a way of countering this weapon.

Mr. Nowlan: This leads me more or less to the other question of Mr. Ryan's which you answered earlier. You pointed out that NORAD has not the capability to intercept or destroy ballistic missiles. That is on page 14 of the paper which we received. It is mainly a detection agency as far as ballistic missiles are concerned. The concept has been until now, at least, that the retaliatory force of Minutemen sites, Polaris submarines and airborne SAC bombers was the deterrent. You cannot discuss this area at all; although, you do say that the capabilities, the assets and the liabil-

ities in these different types of deterrents have changed so that the whole picture might change. Is that a fair way to put it, as far as you are concerned?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: There must have been a conscious decision at one time, not to attempt the interception and destruction of inter-ballistic missiles and instead rely on the deterrent of the second strike.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not think I would completely agree with that. The technology has not existed until recently.

Mr. Nowlan: I see.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not think that you could say that it was a conscious decision not to build something. I do not think that it was possible to do so until recently.

Mr. Nowlan: We were aware of interballistic missiles.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Nowlan: We were also aware of other types of these formidable devices in the air. I appreciate that this is an area in which you may not be able to explore, but certainly someone must have thought that the retaliatory deterrent force of Minutemen, large missiles and the SAC bomber would be enough to scare off anyone who wanted to use the intercontinental missile.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Nowlan: That must have been assessed and considered?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would think that is correct.

Mr. Nowlan: I do not know how this Committee is able to make any value judgment on this, unless we obtain some information. Have those three factors changed so dramatically because technology has changed, that this is no longer a valid assumption? This is my point.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: You can get some very conflicting answers to that one.

Mr. Nowlan: In my view, the answer is yes. The technology has changed, and this makes these assumptions invalid or subject to revision.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, subject to revision and reassessment.

Mr. Nowlan: Re-assessed. I will not press much further with that. I must say that unless this Committee, Mr. Chairman, can obtain information on that at some stage, then it will make our job of discussion or definition of the interballistic missiles as an ABM program a little difficult. In the discussion of what we have today—in contrast to what we might have or what any other country might have—I would like to direct my questions, General Sharp, to two areas. One is the CF-5, the other is the BOMARC Missile. Concerning the CF-5, as I understand it, we have three interceptor squadrons now, the CF-101 B Voodoo. From your point of view—and this is strictly technology or within your competence, I would hope—is there any suggestion or could the CF5s be used anywhere within the NORAD concept?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: To my knowledge there is no suggestion that they will be. Certainly, they could not be used in the present NORAD concept without significant modification. It would be necessary for me to check with the engineers to discuss if that is even possible.

Mr. Nowlan: Are the three CF-101 B Voodoo squadrons, which we have along with the 18 American squadrons, equipped with nuclear warheads?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: Has that always been the case?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It has been the case for a considerable period of time. I am not too sure whether or not it was always the case. Did we ever have 101's without nuclear warheads?

Gen. Magnusson: No, sir. The 101's have always been equipped with nuclear weapons. They also have conventional weapons.

Mr. Nowlan: I want to speak of the Bomarc. Is that the Sidewinder the 101 uses? That really was not my supplementary.

Gen. Magnusson: The Sidewinder is the Genü.

Mr. Nolan: The Sidewinder is not a nuclear device, is it?

Gen. Magnusson: It can be.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It can be.

Mr. Nowlan: In any event, coming to the Bomarc and the two squadrons that we have at Mazacaza or wherever . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Macaza.

Mr. Nowlan: I massacred the name. However, they are at Macaza and North Bay. Are those two squadrons equipped with nuclear warheads?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, they are.

Mr. Nowlan: Are they fully operational?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, they are.

Mr. Nowlan: How long has this been in effect?

Mr. Cafik: Since Mr. Diefenbaker left office?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Since 1963, I think.

Mr. Nowlan: You say they are fully operational now. There is no hiatus here. The government said they were going to go ahead with it, and yet I understood there was a pause which almost reflected that they really did not equip the Bomarc at North Bay or Macaza.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: You are going back a few years.

Mr. Nowlan: A couple of years.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: At the present time they are fully operational.

Mr. Nowlan: What I want to find out is when did they become fully operational in the NORAD sense? In the same sense than the eight squadrons in the . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: 1963.

Mr. Nowlan: Again, the Bomarc is purely a bomber deterrent?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: So, as far as the intercontinental missile is concerned, whether it is from a submarine or from another continent, as you said earlier, NORAD has no intercept or destroy function as far as this device is concerned?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Nowlan: That is all.

The Chairman: For the information of the members, I might mention that we hope to have a briefing next week on ABMs by Dr. Lindsey of the Department of National Defence. Mr. Ralph Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to have some of these pieces

of literature sooner? Is it a question of not having them presented in time? Even if it is on a weekend, this would be fine. We usually work weekends and we do not mind reading them on weekends. We are at a bit of a disadvantage if we cannot read these before we come in.

The Chairman: I know it would have been helpful if we could have had this particular working paper, which is a long statement and a very helpful one, available to members before the weekend. We did, in fact, receive it from the Department of National quite late on Friday which made it impossible to distribute them. However, are doing our best to get them as soon as we possibly can so that members will have a more adequate opportunity of studying them.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Perhaps the steering committee could also consider the possibility that briefings to familiarize the Committee with the various aspects of NORAD would probably be much better and more useful if they were given on the site of either North Bay or Colorado Springs.

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The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): General Sharp, I wanted to go back to this threat question for a moment. When we were in Europe we spoke to different people and some of us seemed to have a difficult time getting them to admit that the defence of North America was, in fact, a contribution to NATO in the over-all sense that we are members of NATO, and any defence for this continent is also a defence of NATO.

In speaking about the threat the opinion there was that the threat to Canada lies in Europe. Some even went so far as to say that there was no threat to North America. Could you compare the two threats—the threat from that angle and the threat to North America directly? Would you say that the threat in Europe is greater, or that the threat to North America is greater?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not know that I am capable of giving you a reasonable answer on that. I suppose this is to a certain extent a personal view. The idea is to take the minimum action required to deter war, because it must never happen.

I do not think one can say that you can deter it better, or all more likely to be able to deter it, by having forces in Europe rather than by having them in North America, or vice versa. I think both contribute to the deterrence. I really do not think it is fair to try to make a comparison saying that the threat is greater in Europe than in North America. They are together,

but the idea is to be able to somehow deter war and to do this at minimum cost.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): In any case, General, would you agree that there is a threat to North America?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would agree that the Russians have a capability of destroying North America. To say that there is a threat at the present moment, right now, would mean that I was also saying that they had the intention of doing so right now.

An hon. member: You do not believe that?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Is that a supplementary question?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): He was asking for a personal opinion, I think.

General, when you are at NORAD and you overlook the plotting board, or the tote board or whatever is in operation at the moment, and you see the whole picture for North America, could you tell us, if it is not classified, is our air space, North American air space, being violated?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: As of right now, the answer is no.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Does it happen often that aircraft come into our area?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: With a possible one or two exceptions, although there have been many that have approached quite closely to our area, they have not, in fact, penetrated.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We were talking a while ago about submarines. I assure that you have on your plotting board the location of submarines that are close to North America. Can you tell us anything about that or is it strictly classified?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It depends on what you want to know about it.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I would like to know their numbers, how close they are, do they come down the St. Lawrence like they used to, and that kind of thing?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The answer is that they do not come even near to that close.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I wonder if we could change a little bit. In the defence of North America we consider the Maritime role as part of this defence. Is Canada capable of making a contribution in that regard with our present equipment in the navy?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I can answer that question. It really does not have much to do with NORAD. Of course we

can make a useful contribution with our present equipment.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Does NORAD have control over the sea forces?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): What about SACLAN? Is that a separate thing?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It is completely separate.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): That has nothing to do with NORAD?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): General, this next question deals with your previous experience before going to NORAD, but it is tied in with it. We have a number of reserve forces in Canada which train from time to time. Do they make a contribution to the defence of North America, or would they if we were attacked?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: They make a contribution to the defence of North America, yes, but they are not forces designed to assist in the direct air defence of North America, and therefore do not come under NORAD. However, they certainly would make a contribution to the defence of North America if required to do so.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): If suddenly we did not have them any more, would you consider that we had lost a great deal, besides the fact that we would have gained \$50 million?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think that everything we have right now in the services is very useful; if we lost them we would lose to that extent. I think they are useful, yes.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you very much, General.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson and then Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Gibson: General, sir, at page 14 of the brief, I quote:

THE SPACE THREAT

It has been known for some time that the USSR has been developing a space vehicle which could have a "fractional orbital bomb" capability.

I am unfamiliar with the terms and the concept; I would be most obliged if you would enlarge on that, sir?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes. Present space vehicles orbit around and around the earth; this gives you a better opportunity to determine their exact trajectory. If, however, somebody could develop a vehicle that would only go part way around the earth, and then come back down again, you would get much less warning and much less opportunity to determine its trajectory; so the fractional orbit means exactly what it says.

Mr. Gibson: It means then, just going a part of the way. At page 17 of the brief, sir, you referred to and I quote again:

All NORAD interceptors are equipped to carry air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads.

This puzzles me. I thought the object of an interceptor was merely to knockout an enemy plane in its course. What is the purpose of these nuclear warheads on these particular interceptors?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Their purpose is to do what you said, to knock it out.

Mr. Gibson: I see. If these nuclear warheads are fired, is there any danger of proliferation from the knocking out of the aircraft?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Of course there would be some fallout.

Mr. Gibson: Yes. They are designed to be effective over Canada, I presume.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes. They are designed to be effective; they are equally effective over Canada and the United States. They were not designed specifically to be effective only over Canada.

Mr. Gibson: No. Thank you, that is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes, there are two or three questions I would like to ask if I may, General. The questions all relate to those raised by Mr. Stewart: I realize that you may not find it possible to answer some of them.

First then, how many approaches to North America from the Atlantic side, from the Pacific side and over the Polar regions, have been made in the last 12 months by Soviet aircraft?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: I cannot give you a direct answer to that, Mr. Nesbitt. I can say however that there has been a number of approaches in the last few months; there has been an increase over previous approaches.

Mr. Nesbitt: Could you tell us . . .

Mr. Winch: I wonder if I may have a supplementary on that Mr. Nesbitt?

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch on a supplementary.

Mr. Winch: Yes, General, in view of the question just asked, as evidence is conclusive of the use of U.S.A. spy planes over certain territories, can NORAD as a detection system, detect if any spy planes have flown over Canada, and if so, have they been noticed?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The answer is yes; in recent times I have been down to NORAD, and there have not been any.

Mr. Winch: But you cannot detect?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Correct.

The Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes. I am not pressing for answers if it is not wise to do so, but could you give us any indication of whether the increased number of approaches have been from the Pacific region, the Arctic region or the Atlantic region?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The Arctic.

Mr. Nesbitt: The Arctic region. The second question . . .

The Chairman: May I ask a supplementary? How close would they come on an approach or can you say, General Sharp? What do you mean by an approach?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Generally speaking an approach is within 30 or 40 miles, and sometimes even closer.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Nesbitt: The second question relates to submarines; you mentioned that they do not come into the St. Lawrence area, but that they regulated farther out. Could you give us an idea of how far they come from the actual coast line of North America? If you cannot, I realize that it may not be wise to answer that.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not know the answer to that question. In very general terms, I would say, 300 miles; some, I am sure come closer. I would like to be more precise in answering your question.

Mr. Nesbitt: If they came within 300 miles of the coast, their capability at the present time of sending missiles accurately to major targets, would be somewhat limited.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes. You must also remember, Mr. Nesbitt, that there are a great many Russian submarines that do not have the sublaunched ballistic missile capability, a great many.

Mr. Nesbitt: Now, the third question; it is composed of a couple of parts. Is the military assessment at the present time presuming that a deliberate surprise Soviet nuclear attack on the mainland of North America is perhaps unlikely?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: At the present time?

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In my view at the present time, it is unlikely. You are getting into the assessing of intentions and this is really a political—

Mr. Nesbitt: It is really a political capability plus intentions which requires an assessment.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It is more of a political assessment, when you get into assessing intentions, than it is a military one.

Mr. Nesbitt: That is why I phrased the question in that way: it is military assessment which is, of course, capability plus intention; for which information is gathered from other sources.

The second part of my question is this. Is it considered likely—and this comes closer to capability perhaps, than to intention—that any Soviet military adventures of a conventional nature might eventually escalate into a nuclear war, against mainland North America, such as the Arctic Islands of Canada, the Aleutians or even Greenland?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think not.

Mr. Nesbitt: It is not considered at all likely that there will be a conventional seaborne invasion, or airborne invasion, or something like that?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would think not.

Mr. Nesbitt: Is it considered possible that a Soviet military venture of a conventional nature might conceivably take place in central Europe, let us say against the Baltic coast of Germany or Denmark, or perhaps against Berlin or some other place? Is that considered a possibility from a capability point of view?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: They are certainly capable of starting such an adventure, but whether they, at the present time intend to do it, I should think not.

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Mr. Nesbitt: When one considers capability plus intention, there is a much greater likelihood of a conventional military thrust by the Soviet Union against Germany or Denmark or perhaps even Sweden, than there would be against North America?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No doubt.

Mr. Nesbitt: If a conventional military thrust occurred in this area, this could escalate into a nuclear war?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Nesbitt: It could?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Nesbitt: Thank you.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a supplementary to the supplementary that Mr. Winch asked on these spy planes?

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan on a supplementary.

Mr. Nowlan: The General said that they had been picked up from time to time but not, as I understood it, while he had been there?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, I am sorry. If I said that, I did not mean to imply that.

Mr. Nowlan: NORAD has not picked up any of these over flight spy planes?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Not while I had been there.

Mr. Nowlan: Were there any before you were there, do you know?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am sorry, I do not know.

The Chairman: Before calling on the next questioner, would the Committee agree to print General Sharp's advance presentation and his biography as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: I should correct an announcement that I made earlier. The briefing next week by Dr. Lindsey of the Department of National Defence will be on AWACS. The briefing on ABM's by Dr. Lindsey will be several weeks from now.

The next questioner is Mr. Laniel followed by Mr. Brewin. Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, it is said in the brief, and it has been said before, that the principal function of NORAD is merely the protection of the U.S. deterrents and at the same time, it will minimize the damages that occurred from any attack. The reason why I asked you this question is I am wondering when we speak of our participation in NORAD how far can we go in thinking of this as a defence of North America? It is only a protection as far as we protect the deterrents, but it is not a protection against the destruction of North America, is it?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Presumably, if you are able to protect the deterrent so that it remains credible in eyes of the Russians, they will be deterred from any nuclear war. Surely, that is the best protection that one could give the people of North America. If a war ever starts you will never get military equipment that will protect the population. You may minimize, but there will be a vast wordly nothing in comparison. It must be arranged in such a way that the deterrent is credible and one way of doing this, amongst many others, is to provide protection so that it can withstand the first strike.

Mr. Laniel: You say in your brief that the Russian threat and capability has increased and it still is increasing. On page 7 of your brief you say:

In the past six years interceptor and missile defence forces have been reduced by approximately one third.

Does this mean that the capability of defence in that sense is also reduced or is it because of our improved sophisticated system or aircraft that we have kept the same capability?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It is a little of both I think. The number of bombers that the Russians have has decreased so in that sense their capability has diminished. On the other hand they have improved their electronic counter-measures and they have introduced air-to-surface missiles. In that sense their capability has increased.

However, we have in fact reduced our defence forces against the bomber by about, in rough terms 30 per cent, and I think we probably still have about the same capability. It may be a little less than we had before the reduction was made, taking all these other factors into consideration.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but I am trying to conclude here whether or not by reducing the forces we can maintain our capability. I am just asking myself the question. Could the United States not protect its deterrents, because this is the main function of NORAD, without the contribution of Canada. In your brief you say that no adequate defence system could be established or it

would be doubtful unless Canada participated in it. Would the withdrawal from Canada on a long-term program permit at the same time the maintenance of the defence capability of NORAD?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: You are receiving a briefing on AWACS next week which will outline for you some of the changes and proposals that are under consideration to improve the air defence against the bomber. I think you will see from this that Canadian territory and airspace at least, is still necessary from the point of view of defending the deterrent against the bomber.

Mr. Laniel: Somewhere at the beginning of your brief it is said that Canadian territory and U.S. territory is unrestricted to the use of NORAD airplanes.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Laniel: Does this apply to SAC bombers too?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In the case of both American airplanes in NORAD and SAC bombers, there are agreements between the two governments which outline when and under what circumstances flights over Canadian territory can take place.

Mr. Laniel: This is controlled? You mean by this that any flight by a U.S. aircraft, let us say carrying a warhead or a nuclear bomb, is known by Canada and by the Canadian Forces?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Laniel: There was a question, I think by Mr. Winch, to which you gave the answer that NORAD had no capability to intercept or destroy an ICBM. However, to the question asked concerning command and control of the eventual ABM system, you dodged a little. As a military person, would not you think that if this or such a system be installed or put forward it should come under NORAD because it is merely a defence system? Is it not?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It is merely a defence system and from a purely military point of view I would say the answer to your question is yes. However, there are other important considerations that would also have to be taken into account when one is deciding under whose control you are going to put it. For example there are political considerations that are very important.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but NORAD's radar system is capable of determining the target or the track of an ICBM with a 15 to 20 minutes warning. All right, you have direct lines, but one can ask himself all kinds of questions especially when you speak of submarine

launches. Perhaps you could answer that one. How much time would you get to warn of a launch coming from a submarine outside of our coast?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: A very few minutes.

Mr. Laniel: A very few minutes. Is that five minutes?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: A few more, but not many more. I do not think it is quite the black and white situation that you state, Mr. Laniel. You are quite correct in that the various warning systems which are now in existence and those that will be included in the Safeguard system, if it is built, intermesh. From the point of view of warning it would be desirable that they be part of a single total system, but this may not be desirable from the point of view of who commands and controls the ABM's, provided the warning was given to the appropriate authorities in a timely way. While I might personally argue that it come under NORAD, I think there would be a military argument that would say that it need not come under NORAD.

I think also that until this system is approved in one form or another it is a little premature to try to work out the details of who is going to control it; it depends to a certain extent on the kind of system and where it is going to be placed.

Mr. Laniel: Something come to my mind right now. I am thinking about the contribution of Canada to a big system such as NORAD, which has also a defence capability; I wonder, if we follow this possibility of giving authority to someone else over the ABMs, why not give authority to NORAD over the Bomarsc and the Nike Hercules, then NORAD could become a detecting organization and we could be at a more comparable level with the United States?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I agree. From that point of view, it would make sense to put it under NORAD.

Mr. Laniel: One way or the other let us make the choice. One last question, Mr. Chairman. In the brief it is said that the bomber threat is the cheapest way to lay an attack, have a larger payload and more flexibility. However, the defence against it is easier, and unless NORAD develops and remains capable of defending against bomber attacks, it prevents other countries from launching nuclear attacks by conventional planes over North America. How can you come to such a deduction? I do not think there is a danger in any way. No one would be enough of a fool to launch an attack without having the capability of a deterrent behind it; I think that only Russia can do this.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I agree.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: General Sharp, I wanted to concentrate my questions on the reality of the threat from manned bombers. I understand that the purpose of NORAD installations is to deal with the threat of manned bombers. I want to go into the question with you of the reality of that threat. First of all, I suppose that you go into the reality from the point of view of capability and intention. Dealing with capability, it is clear, is it not, that the Russians have not expanded their capability in this field for many years?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In the sense that they have not expanded the number of bombers, that is correct. In the sense that they have improved their electronic counter measures and have introduced the air-to-surface missile, your statement is not correct. In that sense they have expanded.

Mr. Brewin: On the other hand, they have concentrated on and immensely expanded their ICBM capacity to launch a blow on North America.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Right.

Mr. Brewin: Then dealing with intention, as I understand it, if the manned bombers were launched,

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they would give ample warning; I do not mean that they would intend to give warning, but with our warning devices there would, in fact be ample warning of a couple of hours, of any attack by manned bombers. Is that correct?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Brewin: I want to suggest to you that with the tremendous destructive power, most of it in the position of invulnerability, that if one had warning of the attack, first of all, many of the targets, if the targets included the SAC, would be off the ground: in addition to that, an immense and unthinkable destructive power could be struck on the USSR by a retaliatory blow. Is that not correct?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Brewin: If that is so, do you not agree that if the Russians launched an attack by manned bombers under those conditions, with warning plus retaliation, they would have to be stark raving mad.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: You are asking me, Mr. Brewin, to agree with you, that the undertaking to which the Governments of Canada and the United States have agreed, to provide for bomber defences, is wrong; I am not about to do that.

Mr. Brewin: It would hardly be fair to ask you to do that. I understand, but I just wanted your opinion. If we are dealing with intention and the reality of the threat, and you have dealt with that in your paper, we can judge it from a political point of view to the best of our ability; even from a military point of view, you have to assess the intention to some extent, with this capacity of warning, and massive retaliatory power, massive from a military point of view. If you were giving advice to politicians in the USSR, for example, if you can imagine that, surely you would tell them that they would be crazy to try such a thing.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Let us look at situation if we were to follow your advice and do away with our bomber defences. Does that include doing away with our radars?

Mr. Brewin: No, no, no. I suggested that the part of this which made it crazy, was a warning system plus retaliatory powers.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: So we are going to keep the radars?

Mr. Brewin: Oh indeed, but improve them.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Are we going to keep some interceptors so as to give positive identification of unknown incoming aircraft?

Mr. Brewin: I think you are putting me on the spot now.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am sorry, Mr. Brewin, I am trying to understand your question.

Mr. Brewin: My question is whether or not under present conditions, not under some imaginary conditions, you do not think that with this power of detection that we have, and I presume we will improve it, so far as the approach of manned bombers is concerned, plus the power of retaliation which is invulnerable to some extent, would it take the intention of a mad man to launch any such attack?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not think that they would launch a purely bomber attack at the moment, I believe to a certain extent that this is true, because we can defend against it. If you take the situation where we cannot defend against it on the other hand, what is to prevent these aircraft, even though we can detect them from roaming at large over North America? Do you want that?

Mr. Brewin: Well I would think that if they started roaming at large, they could be warned to stay off. I do remember Cuba as you do.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is fine. Now let us carry that one step further. You warn them to stay off and they do not stay off. Your only alternative then, is to threaten with nuclear war; I do not think that this is the kind of brinkmanship in which we want to get involved.

Mr. Brewin: I want to pass to another aspect of the question. I would like to ask you about the vulnerability of our installation, our Bomarc and our Voodoo interceptors. In your view are they vulnerable and to what extent to a missile attack?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, with the air-to-surface missile, our radars become more vulnerable than they were in the past. In other words, we would have less time

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to intercept an incoming bomber than we had previously when they only had free-fall bombs. We would, however, have a chance of intercepting them. In the case of the Bomarc that is less true, because in general terms, the range of the Bomarc is greater than the range of the air-to-surface missile.

Mr. Brewin: What about the surface-to-surface ICBM? Are our installations not vulnerable to them?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, absolutely.

Mr. Brewin: Therefore, supposing one was going to use the bombers, if one was in the USSR, would it not be the part of prudence to take out a good many of these installations with the ICBMs, before you sent your bombers over?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think it would be the part of prudence to concentrate everything that you could on the second strike capability of the United States; once you have knocked that out, you can do anything else you want, can you not? That is why in my view it must be protected.

Mr. Brewin: But what I am suggesting to you is that installations which are vulnerable to missiles—and I think in your paper you say the Russians have somewhere in the neighbourhood of 1,000 missiles—not too useful, are they? If they are vulnerable to this sort of attack, would they not be taken out before they could be used to defend against an incoming bomber threat?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If they wanted to use their weapons on that rather than use them in trying to knock out American second-strike weapons, your postulation is correct.

Mr. Brewin: Are we committed in any way to this airborne warning and control system or are we just discussing it?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The question should be asked of someone else, I suppose, but to my knowledge we are just discussing it.

Mr. Brewin: What about the new interceptors? I do not know whether the word obsolete is too extreme or rude to use in describing the Voodoos, but assuming that they are obsolete, are we replacing them? Is there any discussion of a new interceptor?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: There is no plan I know of at the moment that has been approved to replace the CF-101. On the other hand the air staff, or the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in Ottawa, are always trying to look ahead and see what new aircraft, what new ships, and what new tanks, if they are still going to be required, will be necessary for the future. So, there is discussion in that sense.

Mr. Brewin: We are not committed to any new family, if that is the right word, of interceptor.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, General Sharp has very kindly said that if necessary, he will be available this afternoon to continue the questioning, and we have a room lined up if we do find it necessary. That will be room 371, West Block. Therefore, we do not have to hurry our questioning if we do not want to. I still have four questioners. Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: General, earlier in the evidence that you were giving you informed us the Americans had made some overtures to Canada, I gather, in regard to expanding the facilities at North Bay, so that . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am sorry, it was NORAD.

Mr. Cafik: NORAD. Yes, NORAD had made a request to, I presume, the Canadian government possibly to consider the expansion of North Bay so that it could replace Colorado Springs if something happened.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It would be as an alternative headquarters.

Mr. Cafik: How long ago did they do this? Do you know?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, I do not recall how long ago they put in this request. I understand, however, that it

is under consideration now and I think there will be a decision shortly on it, one way or the other.

Mr. Cafik: I see. Has it been going on for a number of years or is this a recent development?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, there have been as I understand it, tentative NORAD plans or proposals to increase the facilities at North Bay so that it could become an alternative headquarters. When this was put up as a firm proposal I do not know, but I do know that it has been under consideration at NORAD for some number of years.

Mr. Cafik: And are they also considering establishing other alternate sites; in other words, making three or four such sites, or are they quite content with just the North Bay alternative?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: There is one other right now.

Mr. Cafik: There is one other that is being considered?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, it is in existence.

Mr. Cafik: Is that in the United States?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Cafik: Our whole strategy seems to be based around the deterrent system, of course, and the capability for a second strike. This leads me to ask if you are in a position to inform me of what the Russian capability is in terms of ABM, how effective it is, or how long it would be before they had an effective system. I would like answers to questions along this line so that we would know how effective our deterrent really is. To have it is one thing. It is another thing if they could destroy it before it did them any damage. Do you have any comments in this regard?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The only comment that I could make on this would be to give you the information which has already been given publicly by, I believe, Mr. Laird. It might have been Mr. Packard. Their statement was that they had in position about 50 or 60 ABM sites.

Mr. Cafik: Are these ABM's effective against any kind of incoming ICMB's?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I cannot give you that information I do not know the answer, and if I did, I do not know whether or not I would be allowed to give it to you. However, I do not know the answer to that. I presume that the Russians must feel they are effective or they would not have put them in.

Mr. Cafik: Do you have any projections in terms of time of how long it would be before Russia was in a position to totally defend itself against any incoming missiles? This seems to be the real central question. If they are working toward the achievement of this objective, our whole deterrent system would collapse if they ever reached that objective.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: You are moving out of the scope of my responsibilities, but I think I can make one comment on this. Defending a population or a city against an ICBM is one problem and defending a hardened ICBM against an incoming ICBM is a completely different problem.

In the case of the cities, only a few have to get through, or maybe just one, to destroy a city. It does not have to be all that accurate with today's warheads. On the other hand, to destroy a hardened ICBM in the ground, one needs to be very accurate, or alternatively, have a very large warhead. So, the defence problem is different. When you ask me if the Russians could ever develop systems to defend themselves against all ICBM's, I would say no, in the case of populations. In the case of their hardened ICBM's I do not know the answer, but chances are they could better do that than defend their cities. It just follows from the technology of it.

I do not have any inside or secret information about this, so I am not trying to hide anything from you. I am just giving you my personal opinion based on very layman-type knowledge.

Mr. Cafik: There has been a lot of talk recently about the protection of our northern frontiers, Canada's sovereignty, etc. In your opinion do the Russians, in fact, recognize the sovereignty that we express over the north? Is there any danger to our northern frontiers? I am sure they do not have to launch an invasion, I would think they would only have to walk across and take over a certain territory at the present moment.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I could not give you anymore than a layman-type answer on that.

Mr. Cafik: Do they use the airspace over the far north without any recognition of our claims to the sovereignty of that territory?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Are you speaking of our airspace?

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Cafik: They do not?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: They approach it, but they have not flown over it. There may be one or two exceptions to that but the number would be very small.

Mr. Cafik: That is fine.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask a supplemental to the question that was being put by Mr. Nesbitt a while ago. It dealt with the frequent visits of Russian bombers off our coast. As you recall approximately a year ago the press certainly brought out something sensational indicating that there had been a number of these Russian bears, I believe they called them, which came within a certain range of the Newfoundland coast. At that particular time when inquiring, I was led to believe that this was practically a daily occurrence. Would that be so?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, it would not.

Mr. Legault: Thank you. I would like to return to the question of the Bomarc which has a nuclear warhead. If I understand correctly, the range is approximately 300 or 400 miles, which definitely indicates that the explosion would be over Canada. This is compared to the manned bomber. Would you consider that the new concept of the AMB's is a more sophisticated system of destroying nuclear arms that would be directed against Canada, or the United States?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The Bomarc is designed to destroy bombers.

Mr. Legault: That is right.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The ABM is designed to destroy ballistic missiles, not bombers.

Mr. Legault: Then, you would not require the use of both?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If you intend to continue and to provide a defence against the bombers, the AMB will not give it to you.

Mr. Legault: Could you tell me, General, if the present use of NORAD would consider some civilian uses as far as the need would be for aircrafts? We can definitely make use of this, in order to direct or to help the domestic aspect of our air space.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If I may be permitted a personal view on this, I believe that the control of civilian traffic—which is rapidly increasing over North America and particularly around our more populated areas,—could be improved considerably by adopting the same type of radar computer control that we use in intercepts. I would agree completely that the same

installation. the same radars and perhaps the same computers, but different programs, could be used both for intercept purposes and civilian control of aircraft. I think that there is great room for combining these two, and as a matter of fact, in the United States they are now giving consideration to this. They may be in Canada, I am not positive. I have now been gone for three months.

Mr. Legault: A while ago, you said that consideration is now being given to establishing North Bay as the alternative to Colorado Springs. Some previous witnesses, I believe, stated last fall that in case Colorado Springs were knocked out, then North Bay, would be the alternative. From your statement, this is not the case.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Any one of the regions could be an alternative. To be an effective alternative they must be kept up to date, be given up to date information on everything that is going on, much the same as we have in Colorado Springs. They must have this in their computers, and be able to display it. At the moment, they do not have the ability at North Bay to accept, or to display all of this information. They

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are able to accept some, so that they would only be moderately effective as ALCOP, as we call it. The necessary changes would include increasing the communications, changing the computer program, and perhaps some of the displays.

Mr. Legault: Thank you.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, before the others leave, the room in which we will be meeting this afternoon will be 307, West Block directly across the hall. It is not 371 as I mentioned earlier. 307 West Block then at 3.30 p.m. Mr. Roberts? I am sorry; Mr. Guay and then Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): My question is a very short one, General. On page 9 of the Aerospace Defence Information brief, you made a simple statement; in fact as you say

Simply stated, the mission of the DEW Line is to detect unidentified objects flying over the northern Polar regions and relay the warning to NORAD Combat Operations Center near Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Are these unidentified objects of concern to you, and are they similar to those that have been reported across Canada from time to time?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, I think that it was an unfortunate choice of words. There is no connection. We are thinking of bombers.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Are you concerned with unidentified objects, in the sense of the word that I am putting it, rather than in yours?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, the responsibility for that concern has been passed to another department. I have forgotten which one.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): The reason why I ask that question is due to the fact that on page 24 of the other brief you mention camera that will take satellite identifications by photographing them while they are illuminated by the sun, and yet the camera is in the darkness. Can you give us an explication of what is involved there?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I will try. In the first place, a newspaper report in Canada—I believe it was a few months ago, and I am sure it was through no one's fault—appeared to misunderstand the capability of this particular camera. Actually, it will fix the relative position, or determine very accurately, the position of a satellite relative to the earth. It performs this by taking a photograph. However, it is not a photograph in the sense of blowing it up and seeing the appearance of the object.

We pass information to this camera which allows it to point directly—or as closely as we can point it—at the object. The camera moves at the same speed, and in the same direction as the object. It then takes a time exposure, and if it is moving at precisely the same speed and in the same direction, the object will appear as a spot. Everything else that is not moving at the same speed, or in the same direction will appear as a trace.

In that sense, we are able to determine precisely the position of the object. If it appears as a bit of a trace, then your prediction of the trajectory and position is a bit out. It fixes it in this manner, but it does not take a picture in the sense of blowing it up and examining the object.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: This might be a convenient time to stop before lunch. Mr. Roberts will be the first questioner when we reconvene at 3.30 p.m. Thank you very much, General Sharp.

AFTERNOON SITTING

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The Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we can start. Our first question this afternoon will be Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, Lt. Gen. Sharp, I apologize if I go over some ground that you have

already covered this morning. If I do so then simply tell me and I will read the report. There may be a surplus of manned bombers in the hands of the Russians but there is a deficiency of piloted passenger aircraft between Toronto and Ottawa, which is one of the reasons why I was not here for your presentation this morning.

I really want to direct most of my questions essentially to pages 10 to 12 which concern the Bomber Threat to try to get some of these things clear in my own mind. Can you give me some idea of the overall cost of anti-bomber defence, which is one of the various military functions NORAD performs. What percentage of the budget would be devoted to anti-bomber defence? Is it possible to give a budgetary breakdown?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Do you wish a breakdown of the Canadian budget?

Mr. Roberts: No, the total budget. I think in your paper somewhere it said the Canadian costs would run somewhere between 8 to 10 per cent of the overall budget of NORAD. Therefore, I assume by pro rating it, if we knew how much the overall cost of anti-bomber defence was, we could give a Canadian percentage of it.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We prepared the first draft at NORAD of this paper but not the final draft. One of the questions we tried to answer in the short time available to us concerned the costs. We were not able to break them down in the form which you ask for primarily because a lot of the systems that we use in anti-bomber defences, communications for example, are also used for other reasons. It is very difficult. However, the annual operating costs—I hope you will accept these very rough figures—are \$135 million for Canada and \$1.76 billion for the United States.

Mr. Roberts: Would I then be right or wrong in saying, very hypothetically of course, if Canada and the United States decided that anti-bomber defence was outmoded or useless and wished to get out of this particular aspect of NORAD while preserving the warning systems and the anti-missile defence arrangement, the budget would then be reduced by this amount?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am sorry. Did you say preserving the warning systems?

Mr. Roberts: Yes.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The bomber warning systems?

Mr. Roberts: No, the missile warning system. Would we then reduce the budget by \$1.76 billion for the United States and \$135 million for Canada?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If you got out of everything I suppose the answer might be yes. The system we have does other things. For example, if you want to get out of the actual anti-bomber defences but still maintain a capability of surveillance in peacetime over your own air space, even if you cannot do anything about it, then you would not make anything like those savings.

Mr. Roberts: Could I now ask you something about the effectiveness of the anti-bomber defence against the roughly 150 Russian bombers? I have heard it said, and I do not know whether these figures have any real justification or not, that the most pessimistic interception rate is one out of ten, and the most optimistic is five out of ten. If those figures were correct, at the most optimistic rates we would be able to intercept about 75 out of the 150 bombers, assuming the whole force was sent against us. Are those figures roughly accurate or are they wildly inaccurate?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would think that the most optimistic rate is not nearly high enough and I would think that the pessimistic rate is too low. It is not all that easy however to make an exact prediction on this. Let us take two hypothetical extremes. If everything that could possibly go wrong for the defences went wrong, and if everything went exactly right for the offenses,

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then the interception rate might be fairly low. The probability of this happening, however, is very remote.

Mr. Roberts: What about the reverse side of the argument? Assuming that things work well on both sides, both the attacking and defending side, what percentage of the bombing . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would rather give that in the closed session.

Mr. Roberts: Are we going to have a closed session, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: We do not have one organized at the present time. I might consider that. There are a number of questions of that type.

Mr. Roberts: Obviously not for this one question, but is there are other questions that arise, it might be useful.

I was very interested in your reasons for the design of NORAD, which stressed that the anti-bomber defence was developed as a means—and I believe I am accurate—of defending the deterrent power of North America. As you went on, you explained the situation that with technological developments, war and other things have become much more complicated. Is the justification now, that our anti-bomber defence is a defensive arrangement which prevents unpleasant things happening to us, or is it part of a deterrent

arrangement that protects the deterrent power retaliating against the Soviet union? These two justifications are not exclusive. What is the primary justification for the anti-bomber defence?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In my view, the prime justification is to protect the deterrent force, in the hope and belief that by protecting this force, war will be deterred. Although anti-bomber defences may help you prevent some casualties, once war has started, there will still be a large number of them. However, the idea is to prevent the war from starting.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps, we could go into that in some detail because frankly, I do not understand exactly how it does that. Presumably it is to protect the deterrent power. If 150 nuclear weapon-bearing airplanes are flying at us, can we not detect and assess them in sufficient time to release our retaliatory power?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, we could Mr. Roberts: If the 150 bombers were brought into play, we would already be in a situation in which Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles are being used on both sides, would we not?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The Russian believes—and it is credible in his eyes—that the decision will be made that rapidly, and probably it would. Take the two situations: one where Russian bombers are allowed to roam over North America at large and the other situation where they prohibited. Which of those two situations is most likely to deter? After all, the deterrent factor is what you want. I say that the situation in which we can stop a large percentage of their bombers is more likely to deter than the other.

Mr. Roberts: But is not the whole doctrine of deterrence based upon not so much the interception of the delivery of the nuclear weapons against you but your capacity to retaliate regardless of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the opposing attack?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Roberts: In *The New York Times Magazine* of this weekend, a very interesting article quotes Mr. McNamara's last official statements on the American capacity to retaliate. It gives the number of warheads which would be delivered to the Soviet Union, and describes their effect. The figures are quite startling. If 100 warheads were delivered to the Soviet Union, almost 59 per cent of their industrial capacity would be destroyed. The number of Soviet dead would be approximately 15 per cent.

If you increase to 200 warheads, the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union which would be destroyed would be 72 per cent. If only 200 of approx-

imately 1,000 of the missiles in silos, plus the bombers and the submarines, reached the target, the Soviet Union would have, at most, 28 per cent of their industrial capacity maintained. The article then states that they are now equipping these with multiple warheads, so that in the very near future a capacity of 10,000 to 11,000 warheads will be reached.

The sufficient power for a retaliatory strike is the arrival of at least, 200 out of 11,000 warheads on

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target. In those circumstances, is it rational to say that the defence against bomber attack against the American retaliatory capacity actually increases our effective retaliatory capacity? Is it not the case that even if 150 or more bombers got through, it would still be difficult to conceive of a circumstance in which the United States would not have a sufficient second strike capacity to deter the Soviet Union from such an attack?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not know where the paper obtained those figures.

Mr. Roberts: These were released by Mr. McNamara—at least according to the article.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Not the ones about 10,000, I believe.

Mr. Roberts: No, this was mentioned in a Senate hearing on the ABM in the United States.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I can only present this situation to you. I believe that it is a matter of judgement. I do not know who can make an accurate judgement to the size of force that can survive a first strike and still be able to deter. How do you make that judgement? But, on the other hand, imagine that you make a very fine judgement and err on the wrong side. The consequences of making such a mistake could be extremely disastrous. Admittedly, you do not want to have more weapons than you actually need since they are very expensive. I presume that they tend to escalate and we want to avoid that. It is very important, in my view, to deter. I do not know how to make the judgement of how many survivable weapons you should have in order to deter.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I could put it another way. Is it really conceivable—anything is conceivable I suppose—or very likely that we would receive an attack by armed bombers without also being subjected to a ballistic missile attack? Are one of the scenarios which the military have, a possibility of a purely bomber attack which is not accompanied by the use of missiles?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not know whether they have that scenario or not, but in my view, that is unlikely

unless you have no bomber defences. I think that you can visualize a situation where they could send over reconnaissance flights and you would not really know whether they were reconnaissance flights or not. You could either ask or warn them to leave. If they did not leave, but persisted, then the only alternative left to you under these circumstances is to threaten them with nuclear war. Again, as I repeated this morning, I do not think that this is the kind of situation that we want to get involved in.

Mr. Roberts: You could wait to see if they do attack, and even if they did so and the attack was successful, you would still have the capacity to retaliate.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not want to wait and see if they attack. I think that we want to avoid being attacked and prevent that from happening.

Mr. Roberts: I think that the whole purpose of a deterrent system is not to have a preemptive attack, but to maintain the power to retaliate irregardless of the nature of the attack which is brought against you.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Do you really want to be in the position in which you know that there are bombers coming in, you have not any defences, you cannot do anything about it, and you must wait to see if they are going to drop atomic bombs on you before you can do anything about it? I do not think that you want to be in that position.

Mr. Roberts: You are now switching from deterrent defence. The whole logic of a deterrent argument is that, in point of fact, regardless of the effectiveness of any attack that can be brought to bear against you, you are still able to inflict extraordinary damage on your opponent.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am sorry. You were the one who said: "Let us wait and see", in the first instance. I agree with you in that.

Mr. Roberts: If there were an all-out exchange of nuclear missiles, do we have any effective defence against the destruction of an enormously large part of our society?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, we have not.

Mr. Roberts: Under those circumstances, what would the bombers that do come through, have left to bomb? If we were to receive an attack of a wave of bombers, which I think would also involve an exchange of Intercontinental missiles . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Right.

Mr. Roberts: If the missiles are flying back and forth, there is no real effective defence.

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: Correct.

Mr. Roberts: Assuming that the bombers got through, what would be left for them to bomb?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Again, you have got into the position in which the attack has occurred, and you have just finished making the statement that the idea is to deter it. I am quite prepared to admit that—if we have not succeeded in deterring—although the bombers may find some targets, by that time most of the North American civilization will have gone. The question is: Do the bomber defences add to the credibility of the deterrents? Surely, that is the criterion by which you must judge it.

Mr. Roberts: Yes, but if they are deterring a non-existent threat, then they are not much of a deterrent.

I notice your phrase here in the first paragraph on page 10. It says:

The manned bomber continues to be the cheapest and most effective means for delivery of nuclear weapons.

What I am really suggesting is that it is also a superfluous means and therefore, perhaps, it does not make all that much sense to defend against it. And it is superfluous . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If there are no defences against the bomber it is not superfluous and it is the cheapest.

Mr. Roberts: It would be superfluous if even under the breakdown of a deterrent system there were no targets for the bomber to attack.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: This is if the deterrent system breaks down. All I am saying is that it adds to the deterrent. If it has broken down they can use it as a second strike. However, how valid that is I do not know.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I could try another attack which I admit is related to the same question. Do you think that if we could effectively defend North America against the manned bomber and against the intercontinental ballistic missiles that we should do so?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: First of all I would like to say that kind of a major and important decision is not one that should be made by military people. It should be made by governments. We in NORAD are charged with the responsibility of defending against the air attack and

warning against other kinds of attacks. As long as we are charged with that responsibility, we will continue to recommend the kind of equipments we need to do it.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I could again put this in another context. Professor Yarmolinsky, as you probably know, testified before the Committee earlier this year, in February, and what I took from his testimony was that we have reached a position of nuclear stalemate which depends for its balance on both sides maintaining an effective second strike capacity.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Roberts: He argued that in relation to the Chinese threat, the most dangerous stage was the one between the stage where they have a first strike capacity, but no second strike capacity. At that stage they will have a temptation to strike first, because they know if they do not strike first under attack, they may never get a chance to strike at all.

He argued very forcefully, I thought, that the balance depends on both sides having the capacity, if they are attacked, no matter how effectively they are attacked, to be able to strike back. So, we find ourselves in this paradoxical situation that one man's effective defence, if we could get to it, would destroy the other man's effective deterrent, and that would be a very destabilizing thing to do in the world.

In other words, while we have a vested interest in the maintenance of a credible and efficient second strike power in the hands of the United States, we also have an interest in the maintenance of the credible second strike capacity in the hands of the Soviet Union.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is right.

Mr. Roberts: If the NORAD anti-bomber defence is, as you say, a more or less effective defence, does that not, to the extent that we make it effective, diminish the Russian deterrent, and therefore the balance on which we depend?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, only if it is taken in isolation, but considering the ICBM threat as well, I would think not.

Mr. Roberts: Are you not then saying that through anti-bomber defence we are, in effect, reducing the number of times that we can be destroyed, but we are not diminishing the fact that we are going to be destroyed if we get into this kind of all-out war.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If a war starts you may just as well face it. Many people are going to be destroyed. You

have got to create a system which will deter this from starting, and there is a subtle difference here.

Mr. Roberts: Yes, but . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: There is another point, if I may be permitted to give a personal opinion. The effectiveness of military deterrents will not last forever. There eventually has to be an agreement between governments.

Mr. Roberts: I agree entirely. My point really comes down to this. What I am trying to get at is how does an increased or an improved bomber defence improve the protection of our deterrent system? Since our deterrent is based upon our ability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at them and their deterrent is based on their ability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at us, in both cases successfully, that is what the deterrent depends on. Therefore, a bomber defence is superfluous to that equation. This is my argument and obviously not yours.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Bombers can destroy missiles and hardened silos.

Mr. Roberts: By the time the bombers get there the missiles and the silos will have gone.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: This gives them about two hours to make that kind of a decision. I would say if they had longer to make that decision, the deterrent would be more credible. I am not saying they would not make the decision in two hours. However, if the Russians think that the West has to and will make this decision in two hours as opposed to knowing that they will have a second strike survive, then surely the latter situation is more of a deterrent.

Mr. Roberts: I find it hard to believe that the Russians would send the planes and wait to see whether or not in two hours the Americans are going to decide to retaliate with their continental missiles.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I am not suggesting that.

Mr. Roberts: If they are not going to do that, I would suggest they would operate on the assumption that the Americans, having detected an attack, would reply with their retaliatory force. At least, that is what we are trying to make them believe in establishing a credible deterrent.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Without any defences against bombers, how do you detect it?

Mr. Roberts: Is it credible to believe that the bombers will go without missiles also going?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: They would if they could get through to all of the second strike force of the United States.

Mr. Roberts: Is that really feasible to do?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It would be if there were not any defences.

Mr. Roberts: With the number of planes that they have at their disposal, or likely to have at their disposal?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It would take quite a bit, yes.

Mr. Roberts: Could they reduce the over-kill potential that we have to, in effect, so disable the Soviet Union as to make this attack impossible?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think a discussion along that line which Mr. Cadieux gave in the House is quoted in the paper.

Mr. Nowlan: On pages 10 and 11 your own Minister of Defence sets all this out in very logical form, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Nowlan, I can only suggest you have a look at my speech which took apart the Minister's arguments piece by piece.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would not want to get into that one.

Mr. Roberts: I will be glad to send you a copy.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I will take Mr. Cadieux any day in front of Mr. Roberts on this theory, but not on everything, perhaps.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, did you have any further questions?

Mr. Roberts: I just wanted to go on, in fact, to deal with these. Are you limiting me? Sometimes we operate on a 20 minute basis.

I thought we might go on and look at that defence which was provided by the Minister of National Defence whose arguments I should respect, I suppose.

Mr. Nowlan: There is a recent precedent for you to follow too, Mr. Roberts. You could walk across the floor.

Mr. Roberts: I am already across the floor. You can see where I sit.

Mr. Nowlan: You could shift your seat.

The Chairman: What page is this on, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: It is on page 11. Perhaps we could go to page 12, because I think that contains the fundamentals of the argument. At the end of the first paragraph the argument is that if you did not have anti-bomber defence,

The balance would be quickly distorted to a much greater degree than that implied by the original "bomber threat".

and that:

... such a situation would be destabilizing and must be discouraged.

However, on the basis of the strategy we have already discussed, that is to say if you are relying upon a deterrent, that is not true is it? What would really be destabilizing would be the destruction of the other side's deterrent by an effective defence system.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Or vice versa.

Mr. Roberts: Or vice versa. I am not asking you to comment on this, but Mr. Cadieux's argument that increased bomber defence would render the situation more stabilized is, in fact, contrary to the situation on the basis of the doctrine which we have been upholding since 1960. I know I cannot ask you to speak for the Minister, and I am not trying to push you into that, but could you perhaps explain to me why the balance ...

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The Chairman: The Minister will be here on Thursday evening in case you wish to put the question then.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps General Sharp will want to defer to him.

Why would the balance be quickly distorted? As I think I said earlier, the balance that counts is not whether we have equal retaliatory capacity with the Soviet Union. It is not that we can kill them as many times as they can kill us. The important balance is in spite of an attack we have a sufficient capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on them. So that within those limits that, they have increased or improved bomber defence, it simply meant that we would preserve 15 per cent more retaliatory capacity than we otherwise would have; that would not in fact change the nuclear stalemate at all. To go back to Mr. McNamara's figures, if we came down from getting through 1600 warheads to getting through 400 warheads, that would mean that we would destroy only 76 per cent of the Russian industrial capacity, rather than 77 per cent. That is not much of a change in the balance for an increased protection in your deterrent.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: You are asking me to make a judgment on what level of second-strike force is sufficient to act as a credible deterrent; I do not know.

Mr. Roberts: You do not know.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not know the answer to that, no. Do you, as a matter of interest?

Mr. Roberts: Knowledge, I suppose, is a one hundred per cent thing, but you have to make some kind of assessment.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The consequences of being too low are terrible.

Mr. Roberts: You have admitted that we have no second defence at the moment against destruction; you have also said that no matter how strong the attack would be against us at the moment, a reasonable assessment is that we will be able to retaliate in such a way as to virtually destroy their society.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: You are really asking me to say what is the American assessment of the size of survivable or second-strike force required to deter. I think that kind of a question should be put to the authorities who make that decision. Our job is to defend.

Mr. Roberts: To defend or to deter?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Deter by defending.

Mr. Roberts: But you cannot really estimate how effective your defence will be?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes I can.

Mr. Roberts: In closed session.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Sure.

Mr. Roberts: One of the arguments presented in Mr. Cadieux' argument is that if we did not have an effective anti-bomber defence, the Russians would be able to mount an effective threat at a much lower cost. Am I right in thinking that one of the reasons that we maintain an anti-bomber defence is to drive the Russians to more expensive forms of attack?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That could be but I am not privy to that political reasoning.

Mr. Roberts: Could we reverse it and say that perhaps the Russians might maintain one, two or three long-range bombers, to ensure that we would maintain an expensive system of anti-bomber defence and detection?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I have seen that suggested by certain people. I do not believe it.

Mr. Roberts: Would you agree that basically our defence depends upon the effectiveness of our retaliatory strike force, not upon the costing arrangements, dear or cheap, which the Russians would have to develop in order to attack us.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes I think I would say it depends upon the effectiveness of our survivable, retaliatory strike force.

Mr. Roberts: One last question: would you agree that it is not the effectiveness of the Russian attack which should worry us but that what we would be really destabilizing, would be a situation where we could defend ourselves sufficiently against a Russian attack?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, I would not agree to that. From the Western point of view that would be destabilizing. If I were a Russian, I would certainly say so.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Gentlemen I have a number of members for the second round of questioning, but before calling on them, are there any members who are on the first round of questioning? If not, I have a few specific questions myself. I wonder if I could ask the witness before we go to the second round of questionings. The questions relate to the specific working paper; in reference to the first question on page five of the working paper, General Sharp, where you give the manning for the various regions; the total comes to 9,380; on page four you mentioned that we had 14,000. Could you tell us, where are the missing 4,620?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Page four includes civilians and page five does not.

The Chairman: These approximately 4,620 civilians account for the difference?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That would account for most of the difference, yes.

The Chairman: There is some other military support.

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

The Chairman: Do you have the American figures for these various regions? Can you give them to us?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We could get those for you.

The Chairman: If you would please, and have the copy go to the Clerk. Towards the bottom of page five you say that:

Canadian Officers are in command of the Northern NORAD Region and two of the thirteen NORAD Divisions . . .

If we look at the map of the region, the Northern NORAD Region is quite far to the north. It does not include many populated areas, I would think, in Canada. Then it comes down, with the exception of Divisions 41 and 36, which come further south.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Generally speaking, that comment is correct.

The Chairman: Which are the two NORAD Divisions in which Canadian officers are in command?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The 41st NORAD Division with Headquarters at North Bay, and the 36th with Headquarters in Brunswick, Maine.

The Chairman: Do either of those Divisions include any American territory?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes the 36th includes American territory, and a little is included in the 41st.

The Chairman: There is some American territory.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, but a very small amount.

The Chairman: In 41. Is there very much in 36?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Most of Maine, and some of New Hampshire and Vermont are included.

The Chairman: On page four you refer to the Alaskan Command as being "a separate U.S. unified command." Does that have any special significance? It would appear from the statement to be in a different category than the other regions. Is this directly under the command of NORAD or is it a separate command?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: For air defence purpose, it responds to our operational control. However a "unified command" means it has, in this case, ground elements in it too, which are commanded purely by Americans, for the purpose of protecting Alaska.

The Chairman: Well is it correct to say that the air component is under NORAD Command, or does it merely have its activities co-ordinated with NORAD?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: None of the components are under command, in the sense of the word's military under-

standing. They take their operational instructions from us and respond precisely to our operational instructions. In that sense they are under command.

The Chairman: But is the air component of the Alaskan region different in any respect from the other regions, which, as I understand it, are under your direct command?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: From the point of view of intercepting aircraft and investigating unknown aircraft, the answer is no. They are not different in any respect.

The Chairman: Turning to page one, General Sharp, it says that the NORAD

. . . agreement was reached only after the conduct of analytical studies, all of which led to the conclusion that the air defence of North America is a single, indivisible problem.

Were those analytical studies published and are they available, or by studies do you just mean discussions?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, they were published, but they are not available as far as I know to the public.

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The Chairman: I see.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In other words words they are still classified.

The Chairman: Farther down that page it says:

The Commander-in-Chief of NORAD was to be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee of Canada (now superceded by the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff) and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States.

Is it really possible for a military officer to be equally responsible to two separate commanders who may or may not agree, in theory at any rate? This is a nice statement, but is it meaningful?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, it is meaningful from a purely military point of view you, and I suppose even if you are not in the military one would prefer to have one boss instead of two. This is the arrangement that the government has decided on and it seems to me that it was the best that they could make under the circumstances. To the best of my knowledge it works.

The Chairman: Does this mean that before any action can be taken by NORAD the command must be given by both the Canadian authorities and the US authorities?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, in most cases concerning actions, these are agreed to prior to the need to make the decision. In other words we have very specific operating procedures which allow the Commander to make decisions and which have been agreed to by both governments. There are, however, some specific actions that cannot be taken until proper authorities in both governments agree, but there are very few of those.

The Chairman: Turn to page 2 of General Sharp's statement:

A single integrated command to exercise operational control was, therefore, a mandatory requirement.

It is probably quite clear that it is certainly convenient to have a single integrated command, probably most efficient to have a single integrated command, but is it absolutely essential?

I am referring to the fact that before NORAD came into effect there was a high degree of co-operation and co-ordination between the American and Canadian forces which seemed to work quite well.

I am also referring to the fact that when this Committee was in Europe discussing the French withdrawal from NATO, we were told on many occasions that although they theoretically had withdrawn from the joint command structure they replaced that with a form of liaison. In effect, everything worked out exactly the same as it had worked before in that everything was working quite satisfactorily, apparently, on a co-operative or co-ordinated basis rather than as a joint command.

I am really asking for your comment on this sentence. Realizing that it is convenient, is it essential to have a joint command in NORAD or in your view, could much the same result be achieved by a co-ordinated effort between the two countries?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, I do not think the same result could be achieved. It is much more effective to have it under one command. The difference between the situation we had before NORAD and now is the

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methods by which we intercept aircraft have changed considerably because of the introduction of computers and the communications networks that go with them.

The fact that both the interceptors and the bombers operate at increased speeds and the decision has to be made very very quickly, we have to be able to pass along vital information from one part of the country to the other. To do this you must have it

under—must is a pretty strong word—or you should have it under one command for effective defence. If you want as effective a defence as equipment will give you, it should be under one command.

In the case of NATO, I suppose I am not really qualified to speak on that, but in that situation they are setting up a similar air defence network to SAGE. Am I correct in saying that France is in on this?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, you are.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In that particular case, in the case of air defence, they are certainly operating under one computer system.

The Chairman: Yes, I can see that you need a computer system, but does it follow that there has to be a joint command?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, it does.

The Chairman: If you turn to page 6 of the working paper, there is a reference to the SAGE system, I do not know whether this is described elsewhere in the paper or not, I cannot recall it. Could you tell us what this does briefly, or is it possible to summarize just what this does?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: What SAGE does?

The Chairman: Yes.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I can give you one or two examples and you can see if that helps. If not, you can ask additional questions.

Take the example of an aircraft whose presence is picked up by radar. The information concerning the aircraft that the radar has, its position, its speed and its course, is transmitted automatically into the computer. The computer is programmed in such a way that it keeps track of the progress of this object, it computes the direction that an interceptor would have to fly to intercept it, and it knows the interceptors speed.

These instructions can then be transmitted automatically by data link to the interceptor aircraft or can be given by voice over radio. In other words, it computes very quickly a large number of complicated mathematical decisions which were previously made manually. Does that help?

The Chairman: Yes, I think that explains to my satisfaction the purpose of the equipment.

... the concept of Air Defence has been changing from an overall to a perimeter type defence.

What does that mean?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: When NORAD was first set up or after it had been set up a few years, we had radar coverage over most of the southern part of North America; that is, from the Pinetree south. There was some overlap of radar coverage on the principle that if one became unservicable or was knocked out for some reason the two beside it could cover the same territory.

In recent times some of the radars which used to exist in the central part of the United States have been de-activated. This means that we now have radar coverage around the periphery of the populated part of North America. A reason for this, of course, was the introduction by the Russians of air-to-surface missiles, which meant that they did not have to come in so far to hit their targets.

The Chairman: On that same page you mention that in 1969 the present five NORAD Regions will be reduced to four, as indicated on chart 2. Is Alaska one of the regions referred to?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: Alaska is one of the regions that will remain.

The Chairman: That will be the forth region.

On page 8 you state that there is no evidence of the introduction of a new Soviet bomber. What was the date of introduction of the latest Soviet bomber?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I cannot give you the answer, but it is approximately ten years ago.

The Chairman: There has been no change, or there has been no new bomber, introduced within the last two years by the Soviets?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

The Chairman: Later on that page, near the bottom of the page, you refer to the fact that:

... the Soviet Union has had about 45 ballistic missile launch tubes in their nuclear powered submarine force, but a new class of submarine having 16 missile tubes is in series production.

Does NORAD have a function here?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We have a function in the sense that one of our responsibilities is to detect and warn of sub-launched ballistic missiles.

The Chairman: Yes, I think that is referred to somewhere in this paper. On page 13, reference is made to the BMEWS system. Is that under command of NORAD or is that just an ancillary organization?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It is under our operational control.

The Chairman: On page 15, there is a reference to the Space Detection and Tracking System. Is that under NORAD, or is that again an ancillary organization?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That provides us with information. It is under the command of the United States Air Force.

The Chairman: There is no problem of co-ordination in view of the fact that it is not under your direct command?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

The Chairman: Referring to your earlier suggestion that it is very difficult to operate these systems unless there was a . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, in one case they provide us with information and in another case it is a question of actually taking decisions to fight an air battle.

The Chairman: Turning to page 19, General Sharp, there is a reference to the Nike and Hercules air defence weapons. They are designed to defend against what?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Against bombers.

The Chairman: Against bomber attack. On page 20, there is a reference to the Distant Early Warning Line. You mention there are six major stations and 23 auxiliary stations. Are these radars? Down below you refer to long ranger radars, but you do not mention radars.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, these are radars, but they have no control point.

The Chairman: Coming to that question of the "Pinetree" Line which is referred to later on the page, is there any reason why that is not shown on the third chart which is entitled "NORAD Warning Systems"?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It is still operational.

The Chairman: It is still operational although it may not be shown on that chart. Is there any suggestion that it is going to be discontinued?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think when you receive the briefing on AWACS one of the possibilities, if this new system is introduced, is that some of these radars can be closed and perhaps the remainder co-ordinated with the Department of Transport, in the case of Canada, and FAA in the case of the United States. However, I

think you would get better information if you waited until you received the briefing on AWACS.

The Chairman: On page 23 there is reference to the Space Detection and Tracking System. Is that under the command of NORAD or is that an ancillary organization?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The information-gathering parts of it are not under the command of NORAD. The part that actually analyses the information, although not under the actual command of NORAD, is, in fact, located in the mountain in Colorado Springs and responds directly to our request for information.

● 1625

The Chairman: On page 24, there is the reference to a Space Detection "fence" provided by the U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System and the BMEWS system. I presume those are not under NORAD command either?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, but they do respond in the same way as explained with the others.

The Chairman: A more general question, General Sharp, and perhaps this is just a matter of personal opinion as far as you are concerned. Evidence has been given to this Committee from time to time that the greatest danger that Canada faces is a nuclear interchange between Russia and the United States. We hope it does not happen but we face the possibility, I suppose, that it could. Would you view this as the greatest possible military danger that Canada faces?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: It could certainly by all measures cause the greatest damage to Canada, and in that sense, yes, I would agree it is the greatest danger. I am trying to think of other things that would cause less damage but which might be more likely to happen. It depends on how you put it. I would say in answer to your general question, yes.

The Chairman: If that was so, if that could cause the greatest damage, can you answer this question? Is it important that Canada should try to develop an effective civil defence system to at least minimize the damage which might be caused, or as some people think, is such a system just impossible as a practical matter?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Again, to be quite honest with you, I cannot make up my own mind on this. I try to look at it from this point of view: will it increase deterrence? Is it a thing that is likely to reduce the likelihood of war? On that basis, I would have a hard time convincing myself that it would. On the other hand, I also find it very difficult to argue against any program

which, if war did occur, would help save lives. I am caught in that dilemma.

The Chairman: I was thinking of that latter aspect. If you say, as you do, that a nuclear interchange is the greatest danger that we face in Canada from the point of view of destruction, and if we have to concede the possibility that it may happen, despite our best efforts, then should we not do the best we can to minimize the damage and loss of life that would result?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If you put it that way, I would have to agree.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Sharp.

On the second round of questioning I have Mr. Ryan, Mr. Nowlan, and Mr. Legault. Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, with respect to SAGE which is the semi-automatic ground environment computer, you have listed 30 site locations in Canada. I am looking at chart 4 of your presentation and there are also apparently some manual long range radar sites in Canada. Could you give us a little more detail on the difference between these two types? If one is completely computerized and the other not at all, or is one of more use in the north, and the other in the south. What is the picture on this?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In the first place I want to make sure I understand your question. SAGE is not a radar site. SAGE is a computer that takes information from many . . .

Mr. Ryan: Yes, but it ties in with radar.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, with radar. There are two divisions which do not have the computer to receive the radar information. It is received instead by people who go through the same mathematical computation that the computer goes through and make the decisions. There are two of them. One is in Alaska and the other is in the Goose Bay area.

Mr. Ryan: There are three or four in Labrador too, according to this.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Those are the radars that feed into the centre which is not computerized. These are radars that feed into the centre which is computerized.

● 1630

Mr. Ryan: Yes, that would be at North Bay, would it, the ones which you are pointing to?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That would be at North Bay, yes.

Mr. Ryan: It is quite clear that none of these systems have any capability at all of tying in with anything that could shoot down an ICBM or a satellite—just bombers, or other aircraft coming in?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Ryan: Do you have under your control the Pilot Sentinel system or the Pilot Safeguard system?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Ryan: In fact, both these systems not only have radars but they also have tied in with them, computers and the actual missiles, the Spartans and Sprints. I would take it that if an ABM system is deployed, it is almost a must that it tie in with NORAD and your detection system, would it not? Or would there not be danger of duplication, mis-identification, and this sort of thing?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, because radar detects and identifies bombers, and the ABM system detects and intercepts ICBMs. We have other radars that also detect ICBMs, and it will be very important that these other radars, plus the SAFEGUARD radars, are tied into one centre. It would have to be that way.

Mr. Ryan: Would not your ships at sea, your aircraft on the coast have radars that would feed into you too, and be able to pick up ICBMs?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No; possibly ships at sea.

Mr. Ryan: Would there be any conflict between one system which is a multiple array system and the other which is a standard type of radar?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Ryan: Do you have any problem at NORAD headquarters over the question of the height of air space? In other words, is there any internationally recognized standards as to how high up the atmosphere is? When is an object a satellite which can pass freely over a country, and when is it an aircraft which must be identified and possibly even shot down?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I had occasion to ask that same question at about the same time that you wondered about it. The answer that I received from our legal people was that there is a height. At the same time they could not give me an precise height. I believe if you want to dig any deeper than that, you would be well advised to ask the appropriate legal office. I cannot give it to you other than in that general area.

Mr. Ryan: Generally the atmosphere goes up about 100 miles and the highest plane can fly as high as 20 miles or so. Is that roughly the situation?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: They have gone much higher than that, to 100,000 feet.

Mr. Ryan: There would be quite an area between, roughly, the 20-mile and the 100-mile distance. Some satellites could come in under the 100-mile ceiling, can they not, without burning up?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes. It is possible to construct a missile (I do not know whether you would call it an ICBM or a satellite) which has a lower trajectory, but whether you could claim that the one having the lower trajectory is violating your air space and the one having a higher trajectory is not, I do not know. In any event if it is coming after you, it is a bit too late.

Mr. Ryan: If it is not classified, General, could you tell us how many Russian satellites, if any, are presently flying over North American, or sufficiently close that they could be photographing our continent for military purposes?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We keep track of all in distant space. The last time I looked at the board, and they change it almost daily, there were over 1600 of them. Of the 1600, there are some that are of particular importance to us for the very reason that you suggest, and we keep precise track of them. How many Russian satellites there are flying over North America at this particular moment, I cannot tell you, but I can assure you that there are some.

● 1635

Mr. Ryan: Do we keep track of the docking operations of the Soviets with their satellites? Is this going on at the present time to any extent, to your knowledge? What I am getting at is, would it be possible to have a Trojan horse situation with a satellite?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We are able to keep track of the positioned satellites, and in the majority of cases we know the country of origin. We do not know in every case the intention or what is in the satellite. The only way we could positively determine that, and we cannot possibly determine it at the moment though there are proposals being put up by various scientists that would help us in that assessment, would be to go up and look. It seems to me a pretty crude way of doing it, but I submit that I cannot think of a better one. We attempt to assess the intent of the satellite or the reason it is up there, but we cannot do so in every case.

Mr. Ryan: Do you have any standard height at which you do not take any objection to objects flying over our air space?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If it is an aircraft, and it is not an authorized flight, or it is an unknown flight, we inves-

tigate and try to find out. Actually, we do find out what kind of an aircraft it is and from where it is coming. We are able to do this. If it is a satellite, on the other hand, we cannot do anything about it except to know that it is there. Again we get back to the question of international law, with which I am not all that familiar, but I do understand it is within international law to fly satellites over any country.

The Chairman: May I ask a supplementary question?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: How do you know that a satellite is a Russian satellite? I do not suppose they paint a red star.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, we detect it when it takes off so we know where it comes from.

Mr. Ryan: Are you ever advised of the taking off of a satellite by the Soviets and told that it will fly over a certain area?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Ryan: Are there any flying over North America now that are close enough to take photographs of military value in your opinion?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: I take it that they do not need to have high-flying spy planes if they have sufficiently good cameras in the satellites for military purposes?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In general terms, that would be a fair assumption. There may be specific installations or other things that might not give you a precise enough picture and therefore you would want an aircraft. However, at the moment I cannot think of any.

Mr. Ryan: It has been said, General, that if you knock out with nuclear weapons a block of land, roughly from Boston to Montreal, to Chicago, to St. Louis, to Norfolk, Virginia, you would knock out North America. Would you agree with that from what you know of the picture at Cheyenne Mountain?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would hate to agree or disagree. I am as familiar as any ordinary layman would be in economics and population distribution in North America, but I would, at least, want to think about that question before answering it.

Mr. Ryan: Supposing in that scenario that Russia's ICBMs knocked it out on a first strike, would Russian manned bombers be able to knock out our second-strike capacity? In other words would they be able to

come in and finish the job on heartland, and there go after any other installations they were interested in?

● 1640

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Not with our present defences.

Mr. Ryan: Not with your present defences.

On page 3 of the Aerospace Defence Information which has been submitted to this Committee, the fourth paragraph from the top... First of all I should say that NORAD means North American Air Defense Command. Does it General? A lot of people are confused at the initialling.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: I would take it that, generally, anything to do with the air above or about the country is your responsibility for detection purposes.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: For detection purposes, yes.

Mr. Ryan: You say on page 3 of this presentation that:

The NORAD mission has been broken down into three basic actions... detect, determine intent, and, if necessary, destroy.

If this is your role, I submit that you are only fulfilling it in part, since you can pretty well detect, you cannot really determine the intent too well, and in many cases, in fact in the worst cases, you cannot destroy at all. Is this the picture?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Do you include ICBMs?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, I am. This is definitely in your area, is it not?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Ryan: I am also concerned with FOB's and the like—satellites. Are you not responsible for what comes up from under the sea, or the land for that matter, right to Mars and beyond?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: When the plan was originally drawn up, when it was originally conceived and agreed to, at that time the only threat was from airplanes and, therefore, the terms of reference were written to cover air. Some people could argue and, in fact do argue, that from the point of view of destroying, while our terms of reference cover air, they do not cover beyond that.

Mr. Ryan: In other words, they are thinking of the atmosphere.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct. However, we argued about the responsibility for detecting a bomber in space beyond the air. Our NORAD officer would argue that this also includes the responsibility for destroying, if we can, objects in space. However, there are many people who do not agree.

Mr. Ryan: I take it that the NORAD mission as defined in this presentation is rather antiquated in its outlook.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I believe it would have to be "if the ABM system is destroyed". However, a re-clarification of the terms of reference will be necessary.

Mr. Ryan: You have told us that you are only capable of defending against aircraft of different kinds, and possibly submarines and ships.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, it is not our function to attack submarines or ships.

Mr. Ryan: I see. Yes. Of course, you have a few ships in your command, but they are mostly for detection purposes.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We no longer have ships in our command for detection purposes.

Mr. Ryan: You have some ships according to your presentation. Are these not with you any longer? I do not wish to go into this at the moment.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: What is said there in that respect is wrong.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. The situation is, in fact, that your capability is only against aircraft and possibly submarines. Is there anything else?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: From the point of view of actual defence, this is correct. From the point of view of being able to detect and warn, we can do this in respect to ICBMs and satellites.

Mr. Ryan: Is there any other capability in North America of stopping ICBM's and satellites?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Ryan: Then this is all we are capable of. NORAD has everything that we are capable of. There is no question about it.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, we have.

Mr. Ryan: There is a tremendous gap, then, in our defence of this continent.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, with . . .

Mr. Ryan: We can only defend against part of the main threat.

● 1645

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Except that aside from the Russian SS-9, the U.S. Minutemen are protected in hardened silos against ICBM's. They are not similarly protected against bombers.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. I have a few more questions, Mr. Chairman, if we have the time.

The Chairman: Please proceed, Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: You refer in your presentation to IFF—Identification, Friend or Foe. Apparently this is a radar that challenges and accepts automatic replies from friendly aircraft.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Ryan: If it challenges an aircraft and does not get a reply, the aircraft is then suspect?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Or the wrong reply.

Mr. Ryan: I suppose it has something to do with codes and radar and this sort of thing?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: This ties in with flight plan information?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Correct.

Mr. Ryan: Does this system work to your complete satisfaction?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I do not suppose a military man is ever satisfied with the equipment he has. Of all the equipment we have had, we are satisfied with this system the most. Let me put it that way.

Mr. Ryan: When this Committee was in France, we had the pleasure of listening to General Gallois who was supposed to have been a right hand man to General De Gaulle in the development of the "force de France". He advises that France has the capability of 200 or 300 megatons of nuclear ammunition and its missile-carrying submarines and manned aircraft will knock out any country in the world. Would you believe it would be possible for France to do this to the United States today?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think that you really should ask either the United States or France. I would have to say no.

Mr. Ryan: You would have to say no. In this presentation it is revealed that there are 225 giant SS-9 missiles in being in the U.S.S.R. They stopped production in early 1968 and resumed production again last December. Do we have any idea of the numbers that are being produced in the reproduction run? What is the real nature of, and could you give us some details on this SS-9?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In the first place, I cannot answer your first question. The essential difference between the SS-9, however, and the other ICBM's is that it carries a much larger warhead and, therefore, does not have to be as accurate as do the others to be equally effective. It is mainly a matter of warheads—much, much larger warheads.

Mr. Ryan: It is not so much a question of range? It has the same range as the other ICBM's?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, it has the same range as some of the others.

Mr. Ryan: On page 23 of your presentation you speak about CADIN cost-sharing. Could you tell us what that is, General, please.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: If you do not mind, Colonel Walsh can, I am sure, explain this better than I can.

Colonel Henry M. Walsh (Director of Continental Plans, Canadian Forces Headquarters): CADIN stands for Canadian Air Defence Integration North. It was a program in the early 1960s to install 7 new radars; 5 in the West, 1 in Chibougamau, and the other at Moosee. It also included the two Bomarc squadrons, as well as the tying in of all the radars in Canada into the computer system. It was a joint Canada-U.S. program where the costs were shared in a certain way for these new installations. Does that cover the question?

Mr. Ryan: Yes it does, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, those are all of my questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I will try to be fairly brief. I was interested in one of the General's answers earlier concerning the components of this NORAD defence system and personnel, and the question you raised, Mr. Chairman, about page 4, of the totals mentioned and how the Canadian figure includes personnel and families or civilians . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Not families.

• 1650

Mr. Nowlan: . . . or civilians. I wanted to ask first before I started the other questions, is that true also

for the other figure on page 4 of 144,000 personnel that is used as a total group figure?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The answer is yes.

The Chairman: I wonder if you would explain that? The 144,000 are all military, or military and civilian?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: My understanding is that they are military and civilian. If I am wrong in that, we will send word in and it can be corrected.

Mr. Nowlan: I only asked it to clarify and get the right term of reference. In talking about the Canadian component part of that as far as the service personnel are concerned, of 9,380, has there been any change in that in the last, say, five years? And if so, in what way?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, there have been some reductions in the last five years.

Mr. Nowlan: I mean, I am not talking about the odd reduction.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, no.

Mr. Nowlan: I wonder if it is possible to find out where the changes have occurred?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: They closed some radar stations which resulted in a reduction in personnel.

Mr. Nowlan: Only in that way has there been a reduction?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: Fine. Well, talking about radar, is it fair to assume that of the 683 Americans in Canada, they would basically be in the radar area, either on the Dew Line or that portion of the Pinetree Line the Americans are in? Or where else would they be?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would say approximately one-third are in radar, about one-third associated with the security arrangements for nuclear weapons, and the remainder spread about.

Mr. Nowlan: Are there, in turn, any Canadians serving in the American Pinetree area?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Do you mean in Canada or the United States?

Mr. Nowlan: Pardon me: Canadians in the United States. You mentioned it earlier.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The only Canadians in the United States are in the headquarters and controlling elements.

Mr. Nowlan: That is the only place where there are any Canadians in the United States, basically?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In NORAD, yes.

Mr. Nowlan: I do not have too many more questions but I want to try to get something clear in my own mind. In talking about the Canadian contribution to NORAD—and all the questions here today are trying to find out history and the projection, perhaps,—as I interpret the figures as far as personnel are concerned, we contribute about 12 per cent of total personnel. Would that be fair? I am talking about the armed services.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: My assessment would put it a little lower but it would be 10 or 12 per cent.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, 10 or 12 per cent. You may not be able to have this figure but surely, perhaps, we could get the figure somewhere. What is the NORAD cost? What I understand from the paper and what you have said today is the summary of our NORAD contribution and, as I understand it, that includes three of 18 interceptor squadrons, two of 10 Bomarc squadrons . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No. I am sorry, that was a misprint; it is two of eight.

Mr. Nowlan: Two of eight Bomarc squadrons?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is, two of 10. Did you say regular? The Air National Guard of the United States are almost regular. What page is that?

Mr. Nowlan: That is page 19, the part on the Bomarc story. Well, would the Bomarc National Guard be a figure that the Americans consider cost-wise as part of their NORAD contribution?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes. They would cost the National Guard.

● 1655

Mr. Nowlan: Canadians contribute three of 18 squadrons, we contribute two of eight Bomarc squadrons and we operate, perhaps with help, 27 of 99 long-range radar stations. Is that not correct?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

Mr. Nowlan: On top of this and separate from it, is the DEW system, but that, as I understand the paper and the evidence, is still administered in effect by the American Air Force under a special contract. There are no Canadians involved.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The DEW Line?

Mr. Nowlan: The DEW Line.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We command the stations belonging to Canada, but they pay for it.

Mr. Nowlan: Is there any other area then, other than these squadrons, Bomarcs, and our participation in the long-range or Pinetree radar system, where cost to Canadians is involved?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: At least that I can think of, two very small elements. One is the Baker-Nunn camera at Cold Lake which is very small as far as cost is concerned to operate, and the electronic warfare squadron that we use in exercises which is located in Canada. I cannot think of anything else.

Mr. Nowlan: Other than those two exceptions, this is the basic contribution of Canada, and also the cost to Canada in these three areas—the interceptors, the Bomarcs, and the Pinetree.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Right.

Mr. Nowlan: Now, the only cost in dollars in the paper really was on page 19. It said that the operation and maintenance of the Bomarcs in Canada was about \$3.4 million, and as a man who was on the NATO committee and heard the cost of the brigade and the air division, I wondered if it was possible, General, to give us a cost figure for our contribution. In other words, for the three squadrons of interceptors or the two of eight Bomarcs, and our Pinetree contribution?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think it is possible to obtain the cost figures of the Canadian contribution for this Committee. I do not have it right here but I think that is possible. If you want to compare it with the American contribution, however, their cost figure are difficult to get for two reasons. In the first place, some of the units that perform functions for NORAD, perform functions for other commands as well, and you would have to make an arbitrary division of costs in that respect. Secondly, even their cost factors, let alone their actual costs, is classified information.

Mr. Nowlan: I see. Of course from the paper and from history we know they contributed very greatly in capital costs when we wanted those early warning systems, but I was trying to get the relative comparison of the present operating costs for . . . It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that for our personnel contribution of 10 to 12 per cent . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We did give an approximate comparison this morning or this afternoon: \$135 million, Canada—\$1.76 billion, U.S.

Mr. Nowlan: What were those figures? That is what I wanted to get.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Those are annual operating costs.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, but it is very approximate.

Mr. Nowlan: This is what I wanted, so could I have those again, please?

The Chairman: A supplementary question, does that include any capital costs, or is that purely operational?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: \$135 million for Canada and \$1.76 billion for the United States.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Annual operating costs.

The Chairman: General, is that for the entire NORAD system? Not the bomber system. Is it the entire NORAD system?

The Chairman: It does not include any amortization of capital costs over a period?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is the entire system.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No.

Mr. Nowlan: There is no division, but you think we could get it, of the \$135 million between the component parts that Canada contributes to NORAD. In other words, breaking down the \$135 million . . .

The Chairman: Or if you did get something, you would spend something on capital items.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Breaking it down into squadrons and radars and things like that?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Our accounting system is not such that they amortize.

Mr. Nowlan: That is right. Also Pinetree.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would think so. I am sure that could be given.

The Chairman: Could you get that information then?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Right.

Mr. Nowlan: I was going to come to it but you have come to it in anticipation. In our contribution dollar wise—I have not figured it out but perhaps five or six per cent of cost is personnel cost or, our contribution is 10 to 12 per cent, you say. Yet in the three component parts, interceptors, Bomarc and Pinetree, we contribute 16 per cent of the squadrons, 20 per cent of the Bomarc and 15 per cent of the Pinetree.

Mr. Nowlan: I have a last leading question, Mr. Chairman. Then for would it not be fair to say that the \$135 million, in our contribution both to the squadron's Bomarc and Pinetree, is out of all proportion to our dollar contribution? Our percentage contribution to these three component parts, excluding the Air National Guard squadrons, is much higher in proportion or in ratio than our dollar contribution.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I suggest that you should not exclude the Air National Guard squadrons, nor should you exclude the Nike/Hercules which would add greatly to the American dollar figure. You have not explored one other aspect of it: our contribution in geography vis-a-vis the Americans.

An hon. Member: We could give them the Maritimes!

Mr. Nowlan: Thank you, very much. That is under NATO Maritime Command.

● 1700

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We do not contribute any Nike/Hercules.

The Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Nowlan: I see.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The National Guard squadrons are not included in your percentage.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, could you please tell me if the Bomarc installation could be effective? Could it carry a warhead other than the nuclear warhead?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The answer is no, not the Bomarc B which is the kind of Bomarc we have in Canada.

Mr. Legault: This was the definite plan, when they were constructed in 1958?

Mr. Nowlan: I see. This is an added contribution . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That brings it down to, as Colonel Walsh says, about eight per cent.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: About eight per cent. This comparison in dollars, while it is an approximate figure, it is one that you have used before? It is accepted, is it, within the trade—\$135 million to \$1.76 billion?

Mr. Legault: Could you tell me if in the case of a bomber attack of a conventional nature, would NORAD immediately assume that these bombers were

carrying nuclear arms? Would you react as if they carried nuclear arms?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: May I first of all go back to my answer concerning the Bomarc's? I want to be as fair as possible in answering. I think I know what was behind the question.

Mr. Legault: It relates to a question that I asked you this morning: would the nuclear warheads, if launched, explode within 300 or 400 miles of the base?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Legault: This was the intent of the question.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I wanted to make this point. The Bomarc A, which the Americans originally installed, did not carry a nuclear warhead; if there was any controversy years ago in Canada, there was room for misunderstanding, because the old one did not have the nuclear warhead and the new one did; we bought the new one.

Mr. Legault: Thank you. In the case of a bomber attack such as in my second question, do you have to assume and react as if these bombers were carrying nuclear bombs?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We do so assume, yes.

Mr. Legault: You would then react as if they were carrying them. However, it might be retaliation, as encountered in the difficulties between China and Russia today where nuclear arms have not been used, just conventional arms.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is a valid comment. However, at the moment we assume that the Russian bombers will be carrying nuclear warheads.

● 1705

Mr. Legault: You would react in that very way?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Legault: Would the political implication at the time, have some bearing on your decision?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I suppose it would.

Mr. Legault: Do commercial airliners that fly in and out of this country carry the IFF, Identification Friend or Foe?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The answer is no.

Mr. Legault: If a commercial airliner not identified as a military aircraft, was coming into the country

with the intent of attacking, and was carrying some nuclear bombs would there not be any possible way of identifying the origin of that aircraft? Retaliation would not be possible?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Commercial airliners have to file flight plans. If we see an aircraft coming in through our radar, at a time and place that does not correlate with any flight plan, we send up an aircraft to investigate and try to identify it.

If this was a commercial airplane and it was carrying a nuclear bomb, we would not be aware of that fact, at least . . .

Mr. Legault: I am thinking in terms of the last world war: all hopes had been placed on the Maginot Line as a military achievement that would protect France; it did not serve any purpose whatsoever. In this particular case I think that it would be . . .

Lt. Gen. Sharp: In this particular case, France did not have a strike force to protect. There is a difference between that situation and the one of today, is there not?

Mr. Legault: Yes, but I am only referring to possibilities. Anyone who would attack and would be aware of the retaliation forces, would come into the country with something that would confuse the Military; that would create a situation where retaliation would be impossible.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I would agree with you that they would attempt to confuse; whether they could do this to the extent where retaliation would be impossible, is doubtful in my estimation.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, General.

The Chairman: General Sharp, may I ask a question with reference to these cost figures mentioned? I realize how rough they are. You mentioned \$135 million as being the Canadian portion for the operating expenses of NORAD. Looking at the new form departmental Estimates we have and which were reported to the House today, there is a heading under Activity:

Maintain Suitable Capabilities to participate in the Joint Defence of North America

If I read these figures correctly, it shows the Forecast Expenditures of 1968-69, that would be for the fiscal year which has just ended, as \$258,731,000 or approximately \$259 million; the proposed estimates for the coming year are shown as \$267,114,000.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: What was the heading again, please?

The Chairman: The heading under activities is:

Maintain Suitable Capabilities to participate in the Joint Defence of North America

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, it must include not only air, but also ground and sea.

An hon. member: Would it include part of the Maritime Command as well, Mr. Chairman?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We would like to give you, according to Mr. Grant, a paragraph or two on the full costs; that would be more factual than any information we could give you at the moment.

The Chairman: That would be very helpful. I gather that this figure of \$135 million, does not include capital items.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: That is correct.

The Chairman: That might also be one reason for the divergence from these figures in our Estimates. My second question is this. Can you give us, even a rough guess, as to the proportion of the total NORAD program, which is involved in the bomber defence on a cost basis? Is it one-tenth of the total, or a quarter of the total?

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Lt. Gen. Sharp: A rough guess?

The Chairman: I was wondering what proportion of the total NORAD cost commitment, is attributable to bomber defence?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I cannot answer that now. I think we could try to get the answer to that for you, although it will be difficult.

The Chairman: It might require an allocation of costs.

Col. Walsh: May I say that the \$1.76 billion is for bomber defences.

The Chairman: Only for that?

Col. Walsh: I am pretty sure of that.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I think we had better find out the estimate to be certain of our facts; several people want to make comparisons. We better have the right figures.

The Chairman: I continue to come back to this because originally I thought that the reference to the \$1.76 billion was for bomber defences, however, on the second line of questioning, it was suggested that it was for the total NORAD program.

Col. Walsh: Yes, it is for bomber defences: I am quite certain of that; also, it does not include ABM's.

The Chairman: Then similarly, the \$135 million would constitute only the Canadian portion of the bomber defence, rather than the Canadian portion for the total NORAD budget?

Col. Walsh: We do not have anything on this.

The Chairman: Thank you. It would be helpful if we could get this information, Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Thank you. There was something said about the NORAD system being a two-key system. If any retaliatory action were necessary, permission would have to be obtained from Washington and Ottawa. In Ottawa, who gives that permission?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: We contact the operation centre at Canadian Forces Headquarters which is manned 24 hours a day, They would contact the Chief of Defence Staff who would either contact or go directly to the Minister. It would then be the Minister's judgment as to whom he would talk to or discuss this with. I think that it would be a matter of timing.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Does the Minister of National Defense have the authority to make a decision to . . . ?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: I recommend that you ask Mr. Cadieux when he is here on Thursday, I believe that it is.

Mr. Ryan: We know that there is a hot line telephone in his office.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Perhaps politically, but I am now speaking of the military aspect. President of the United States is accompanied by a very complicated system for instant communication and that two automobiles, both equipped with elaborate communication systems, are required.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Perhaps our Prime Minister is a better communicator than the President of the United States.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Perhaps politically, but I am now speaking of the military aspect. What mechanical system is involved in communicating with the Prime Minister if he goes skiing or with the Minister of National Defence if he is at a political meeting in Rimouski, Quebec? What system do we have to ensure that we will not hold up the war?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: To be certain that you get the right answer, ask the man involved! He will be here on Thursday night.

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Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): All right. Thank you.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions from the members? Gentlemen, you may or may not have seen the press release which the Committee issued, but in it we indicated that we were distributing copies of your working paper throughout the country to the academics and the important and intellectual people such as the editors of the major newspapers. We also invited comments. We are looking forward, with a great deal of interest, to the comments that we receive from the community of intellectuals situated across Canada.

If questions are received from them, or if a member of the Committee has further information, would it be possible to funnel further questions through the Department of National Defence to you? Hopefully,

we might obtain answers to questions which may come up if you are not available.

Lt. Gen. Sharp: No, I am sure that will be possible.

The Chairman: On behalf of the members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for your attendance in Ottawa today, and for the manner in which you have answered our questions. I think that the intensity and the length of the questioning indicates the intensity of the interest of the members in this particular subject. Thank you very much, Lt. Gen. Sharp, and thank you Brig. Gen. Magnusson, Col. Walsh and the other members of your staff.

We adjourn until Thursday, May 8, 1969 at 8:00 p.m. when the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence will be present to discuss NORAD.

APPENDIX XX

NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The intergovernmental agreement to form a combined U.S./Canadian command for air defence of the continent was signed 12 May 1958. This agreement was reached only after the conduct of analytical studies, all of which led to the conclusion that the air defence of North America is a single, indivisible problem. The original agreement stipulated that NORAD would be maintained for a period of 10 years or such shorter period as agreed to by both countries. The Commander-in-Chief of NORAD was to be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee of Canada (now superseded by the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff) and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. It was stipulated that the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD and his deputy would not be from the same country, and that, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, command would pass to his deputy. Canada and the United States have since renewed the agreement for a further five years from 12 May 1968 with the new proviso that either party can request a review at any time but after such a review can terminate the agreement on one year's notice.

The need to make provision for the coordinated defence of North America arose from the development of a nuclear capability by the Soviet Union combined with the development of a long range bomber force which made it clear that the newly developed weapons could (if desired) be delivered against North America. Canada's geographical position astride the most likely strike routes for the Soviet bomber force made the air defence of U.S. and Canada a common problem. Canadian airspace would have to be penetrated to attack primary targets in the U.S. even in the event that the attacker had no desire to attack Canadian targets. It was concluded that effective air defence of the North American continent would require the coordinated efforts of both countries and the unrestricted use of Canadian and U.S. airspace by the defending forces. A single integrated command to exercise operational control was, therefore, a mandatory requirement.

The emergence of a direct threat to North America provoked a serious debate in the 1950's. Doubts were expressed about the feasibility of establishing an air defence system which would be fully effective against manned bombers. It was argued that even if a few bombers armed with thermo-nuclear weapons suc-

ceeded in getting through, they would be capable of inflicting enormous devastation on North America. It was also argued that, since the security of the West rested primarily on the deterrent in the form of the Strategic Air Command, there would be a greater gain in security if any additional funds were allocated to SAC rather than to an air defence system.

The counter argument, which ultimately prevailed, was that SAC bomber bases, owing to the large concentration of bombers on each base, were vulnerable to an attack by a relatively small number of aircraft. Such vulnerability could serve as a temptation for the USSR to launch a preemptive attack. To guard against this danger a detection system was developed to provide the maximum warning time for SAC bombers to get off their bases and be launched on retaliatory missions. An active defence system was also needed which required that any attack against North America be launched in considerable strength, thereby significantly increasing the chance of warning. At the same time an active defence made penetration of North American airspace by hostile bombers extremely difficult and costly. The principal function of the air defences of North America during this period was to enhance the survivability of the U.S. deterrent forces (SAC) and to minimize the damage caused in any attack by destroying as many bombers as possible before they could reach their targets.

CURRENT NORAD
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The command and control facilities for the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD are now located in a hardened facility in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs. Their eight computers sift and sort the great variety of information which is received from NORAD and worldwide sensor systems and other sources to give CINCNORAD and his staff constantly updated information in supervising the air defence of North America.

NORAD operational forces are made up of some 144,000 personnel at some 350 locations. These forces are provided by three military component commands, the Canadian Armed Forces Air Defence Command, the USAF Aerospace Defense Command, and the U.S. Army Air Defense Command. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of Alaskan Command, a separate U.S. unified command, is responsible to CINCNORAD for

the air defence of Alaska. Of the 144,000 personnel, 14,000 are provided by the Canadian Forces, 108,000 provided by USAF ADC, and 22,000 by the U.S. Army (these figures include civilians). There are 683 American NORAD personnel in Canada and 249 Canadians in the United States.

The Commander-in-Chief of NORAD exercises operational control only of the forces made available to him by the component commands. To enhance operational control the continent has been divided into five Regions (Western, Eastern, Central, Northern and Alaskan). Four of these Regions include both U.S. and Canadian territory and airspace, while Alaskan Region is solely within U.S. boundaries (Chart 1). Each Region is commanded by a general officer who is responsible to CINCNORAD for the air defence of his geographical area. He monitors and coordinates the air action, plans the use of assigned forces, and supervises the methods and procedures by which an air battle would be fought in his area.

All Regions are jointly manned by Canadian and U.S. servicemen, with the exception of Alaskan NORAD Region. The Canadian manning is as follows:

A	Western	1,600
B	Central	1,400
C	Northern	6,200
D	Eastern	180
E	Alaskan	NIL

NORAD Regions are further sub-divided into Divisions and the number of divisions is determined by the amount of air traffic and the number of vital targets located within the particular Region. The manning of NORAD Divisions (see Chart 2) is largely dependent on the geographical area involved and the forces made available. That is, in those Divisions where both Canadian and U.S. forces or territory are involved, joint manning is in effect. Canadian officers are in command of the Northern NORAD Region and two of the thirteen NORAD Divisions, and Canadian officers serve as Vice Commanders of two Regions and four Divisions.

The NORAD Divisions exercise direct control over the defensive forces which include manned interceptors, Bomarcas, Nike/Hercules and Hawk missiles. All Divisions with the exception of those in Alaska and the 37th NORAD Division at Goose Bay, Labrador, are equipped with the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) system. The system includes computers which are capable of accepting a large volume of information and transposing it into a readily usable form for air battle management.

The overall operational command and control of NORAD forces is exercised by CINCNORAD by means of a sophisticated command and control

system. The computers at each Division and Region provide information to the computers in Cheyenne Mountain where the data is analyzed and correlated and presented in the form of constantly updated displays. At the same time information flows in from a great variety of other sources. All of this information is checked and double checked and displayed to assist the Commander-in-Chief and his staff in carrying out the air defence of the North American continent.

There have been many changes in the NORAD posture since the inception of the command in May 1958. Due to technological advances and changes in the bomber threat the concept of Air Defence has been changing from an overall to a perimeter type defence. This has made possible a substantial reduction in defensive forces and consolidation of command and control facilities. In the past six years interceptor and missile defence forces have been reduced by approximately one third. Corresponding reduction has also been carried out in radars and in the control system. A further reduction in the control system will be effected in 1969 when the present five NORAD Regions will be reduced to four (see Chart 2).

THE THREAT

The nation which poses the most serious threat to North America is the USSR. It is estimated that the Soviet Union will have achieved numerical parity with the U.S. in land based intercontinental ballistic launchers by mid-1969 and will have a larger inventory than the U.S. by 1970. This will permit them to plan on the basis of strikes against more targets and provide them increased assurance of destruction of their present targets if deterrence fails and intercontinental nuclear war were to occur.

The size and character of the threat has changed very significantly since the inception of NORAD in 1958. The emphasis has shifted from a solely bomber threat in 1958 to a massive missile and a limited but still significant bomber threat in 1969. However, the nature of the bomber threat is changing from that of the 'free fall' bomber to that of the air to surface missile carrier with improved survivability and stand off strike capability of several hundred miles.

Although there is still no evidence of Soviet introduction of a new bomber of intercontinental range in the early 1970s, improvements in the present force continue to be noted. For example, sophisticated electronic counter measures are now employed to complicate the air defence problem.

Analysis of the threat to North America reveals the following:

- a. The Soviet Union has between 950 and 1000 ICBM launchers operational including a significant number of SS 9 which can carry a warhead in excess of 20 megatons and is the missile on which

the Soviets have been testing Multiple Re-entry Vehicles.

b. Until now, the Soviet Union has had about 45 ballistic missile launch tubes in their nuclear powered submarine force, but a new class of submarine having 16 missile tubes is in series production. It is expected to have the capability of firing a missile of 1500 miles range and thereby markedly improve Soviet strike capabilities.

c. As of now, the Soviet Union has about 150 subsonic jet and turbo prop bombers of intercontinental range. About half of these are equipped with air to surface missiles, one per aircraft. These bombers have a two-way mission capability to any target in North America. The Soviets also have about 700 medium bombers which are believed to be targetted on Eurasia, but a few might be committed to an attack on North America. In a "Greater Than Expected Threat" situation it is conceivable that something less than half of these bombers might be used on one-way missions, but in view of the growth of Soviet ICBM/SLBM capabilities this is not considered very probable. In this unlikely case the obvious targets would be in Hawaii, Alaska and Canada.

THE BOMBER THREAT

Developments during the past decade such as the airborne alert concept for Strategic Air Command bombers, the maintenance missiles in hardened silos, and the U.S. Polaris submarines have eased the requirement to protect the deterrent forces of the U.S. from bomber attack. However, the requirement for these defences has by no means been eliminated. The manned bomber continues to be the cheapest and most effective means for delivery of nuclear weapons. The recent increase in Soviet training flights to the periphery of North America seems to suggest a renewed interest in this means of attack. It is generally more accurate than a missile, can carry a larger payload and is more flexible. Moreover, the effectiveness of the bomber increases in inverse proportion to the effectiveness of the defences against it. If North America anti-bomber defences were eliminated altogether the megatonnage which the USSR would be able to deliver in an attack would be greatly increased.

In addition, any other country with a nuclear capability would be able to launch an effective attack against the U.S. and Canada with relatively cheap and unsophisticated delivery systems.

Thus, NORAD's defences serve to "put up the price of admission" by forcing a would-be attacker to either concentrate all his weapons against fewer targets, or to produce more sophisticated and expensive delivery systems in an attempt to circumvent the defences.

The Minister of National Defence speaking in Ottawa on 27 January 1969, expressed the need for continuing anti-bomber defences in this way, quote:

"Let us look more closely at the place of the bomber in the strategic system. At the moment, the superpowers find it more economical to concentrate offensive capability in intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles. But why is this so? Simply because effective defence against bombers is feasible and both sides maintain such defences—just enough to discourage the other side from investing in the cheaper and more accurate delivery system that bombers represent.

"What would happen if one side abandoned its bomber defences? In all likelihood, the other side would immediately do most of the following things:

- *Refurbish the bombers it still has in service.
- *Modify some of its transport aircraft to carry bombs.
- *Build more bombers.
- *Perhaps use tankers and heavy tactical aircraft as bombers.
- *Remove the jamming equipment from its bombers and replace it with more bomb racks.
- *Forget about using load-limiting stand-off missiles, and finally
- *Target to cities intercontinental missiles which had previously been aimed at air defence facilities.

The balance would be quickly distorted to a much greater degree than that implied by the original "bomber threat".

"One side would have available an inexpensive offensive system, which would threaten both the population and the land-based second strike forces of the other. Any movement toward such a situation would be destabilizing and must be discouraged. Thus, air defence will be needed as long as bombers represent either an existing or a potential threat to second strike forces.

Because of our geography, it is doubtful that the United States could, in the foreseeable future, maintain an air defence system adequate to meet the requirements I have just reviewed, unless there is close and active cooperation from Canada. If we made life difficult for the United States in its endeavours to establish adequate air defences, we would only make the nuclear balance less stable. Such behaviour on Canada's part would be acting against Canada's own security interests. Canada's defence cooperation with the United States has developed by

a series of carefully negotiated agreements, arising out of the joint pronouncement of Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt at Ogdensburg in 1940. NORAD is an important example of such cooperation, and has served Canada well. In my view, NORAD is still important to Canada's security."

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

In relation to its responsibility for warning, NORAD carries out certain tasks with regard to the detection of ballistic missiles and sub-launched ballistic missiles. At present a good capability exists to detect and determine the intention of any ICBMs launched over the polar regions. This capability is provided by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) located in three sites at Clear, in Alaska, Thule, in Greenland, and Fylingdale Moor, in England. These sites were established between 1960 and 1963 by the United States at a cost of approximately \$920 million dollars. The sites at Clear and Thule are operated by U.S. personnel and the site at Fylingdale Moor is under the operational control of the Royal Air Force.

The BMEWS sites consist of radar scanners and trackers which have the capability of constantly probing space for possible missile launches. The warning capability of the BMEWS is between 15 and 20 minutes. The information gleaned by the BMEWS sites is sifted and correlated by a computer system and relayed automatically to the computers in the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain complex at Colorado Springs, over cables and radio circuits, much of them through Canada. At the NORAD Combat Centre the data is processed by the NORAD computers and displayed instantaneously. Processed warning information is passed to all user agencies such as National Defence HQ in Ottawa, the National Military Command Centre in Washington, SAC, SHAPE, RAF Headquarters, etc.

In addition to the BMEWS system the United States Air Force in modifying seven of its coastal radars to provide a detection and warning capability against submarine-launched ballistic missile attack. This new system employs modified radars which are capable of both searching and tracking and can detect any missile launched or approaching within several hundred miles of the Canadian and U.S. coastlines. As is the case with BMEWS, the computers at the radar sites can calculate the launch and impact points for any detected missiles which appear to be a threat and automatically transmit the threat message to the NORAD Combat Operation Centre.

In summary, NORAD has a capability to detect, identify and give warning of ICBM and SLBM attacks against the North American continent. NORAD does not, however, have any capability to intercept or destroy ballistic missiles. The preservation of the

retaliatory force, through hardened Minuteman sites, Polaris submarines and airborne SAC bombers, has been considered the best counter against any ballistic missile attack and a sufficient deterrent to a pre-emptive first strike.

THE SPACE THREAT

It has been known for some time that the USSR has been developing a space vehicle which could have a "fractional orbital bomb" capability. Although there is no indication as yet that such a weapon is being deployed, NORAD must be alert to all possibilities and have the capability of providing warning of any space events that occur.

The Space Detection and Tracking System consists of a network of radar, radio and optical sensors concentrated in the northern hemisphere supplying data to the NORAD Space Defense Center on orbiting satellites. The system is multi-service, composed of USAF, US Navy and Canadian Armed Forces sensors (the Canadian input is a Baker Nunn Camera located at Cold Lake, Alberta) along with a number of civilian scientific agencies which contribute data on a co-operative basis. A computerized master catalogue of space vehicles—payloads and debris—is maintained by the Space Defense Center in the NORAD Combat Operations complex in Cheyenne Mountain. The center also determines orbits of space objects, keeps a schedule of their positions, predicts their future positions, and predicts the time and general location of their re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. Even after precise data are established on a satellite position, surveillance of the object must continue to ensure updating of the orbital information. More than 12,000 observations are made daily on approximately 1600 objects by the sensor network and are processed by space object identification experts using both computer and hand processed data. Orbital information on satellites of interest to NORAD is fed into the data base of the computers which support the NORAD Combat Operations Center and is presented in constantly updated displays for the CINC and his staff.

SUMMARY OF CURRENT NORAD CAPABILITIES

Although the threat during the past decade has changed from solely a bomber threat to a mixed missile and bomber threat the basic tasks of NORAD have not changed. CINCNORAD is charged with the responsibility of defending North America if we are subject to an air attack. Unlike the strategic offensive forces, whose mission is to strike those enemy forces not yet launched into battle, NORAD's mission is to defend against those enemy bomber forces en route to their targets. NORAD's task, therefore, is to defend the North American continent against air attack in a "hot war" and to effectively "police" this same area in peacetime.

With present equipment and facilities NORAD is capable of:

A. Detecting, identifying and destroying the manned bomber.

B. Detecting, and providing warning of an ICBM attack over the northern regions.

C. Detecting satellites, predicting their orbits and their future position.

PRESENT FORCES

Fighter Interceptors

NORAD has at present assigned to it three Canadian Air Defence Command fighter interceptor squadrons totalling 48 aircraft situated at Chatham in New Brunswick, Bagotville in Quebec and at Comox in British Columbia. These squadrons are equipped with the CF101 Voodoo interceptor. The USAF provides 18 squadrons of F106 Delta-Dart and F101B Voodoo fighter interceptors deployed around the perimeter of the continental U.S. and in Alaska. In addition, the USAF provides 21 other fighter interceptor squadrons manned by the National Guard and equipped with first line aircraft such as F102 Delta Dagger. All NORAD interceptors are equipped to carry air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads. The fighter interceptors are directed and controlled by the NORAD divisional commanders within whose area of responsibility they are located. A percentage of the interceptor force is maintained on a five-minute state of alert 24 hours a day to ensure the interception and identification of any unknown aircraft penetrating North American air space. The remainder of the force is kept at lower states of alert under normal peacetime conditions but the entire operationally ready force must be capable of responding within three hours. When there is an increase in world tension the CINCNORAD will raise the alert status of this force after obtaining the authority to do so from the governments of Canada and the United States.

Under certain circumstances and at the request of CINCNORAD, other forces augment those already assigned to NORAD. These forces are provided by the U.S. Navy and the USAF Tactical Air Command and the Canadian Forces Air Defence Command, and consist of several squadrons of fighter interceptor aircraft.

It is difficult to accurately assess the relative contributions made by Canada and the U.S. to the NORAD interceptor forces. Canada provides three Regular Force interceptor squadrons as compared with 18 U.S. regular squadrons (or approximately 14% of the regular interceptor force). If the U.S. National Guard interceptors are included the Canadian percentage of the force is about 8% of the total.

BOMARC MISSILES

NORAD has a total of 10 Bomarc B missile squadrons in its inventory. Two squadrons, one located at La Macaza in Quebec, and one at North Bay, Ontario, are provided by Canada. The remaining eight Bomarc squadrons are in the northeastern United States. The Bomarc missiles are on a constant state of alert, ready to be launched within seconds if hostile forces penetrate North American air space.

The Bomarc squadrons are under the direct operational control of the division commander. The operational concept includes a "fail safe" system of control which ensures that the launching of a Bomarc missile can only be actuated from the SAGE direction centre. To ensure positive control a "two-key" procedure is employed whereby a Canadian and an American officer are each required to turn a key to make the launch system operative. The officers carrying the "two keys" are on duty in the SAGE direction centres 24 hours a day. The activation of the launch system can only be carried out on the receipt of properly authenticated instructions from the NORAD Combat Centre. These instructions would be passed by the CINC only after he had obtained authority from the governments of Canada and the United States. Equivalent control procedures apply to nuclear equipped interceptors.

Canadian forces operate and control 20% of the inventory of NORAD Bomarc missiles. The Bomarc sites in Canada were constructed under the US/Canada cost-sharing agreement for North American defence in which the US paid two-thirds of the capital costs of all CADIN (Continental Air Defence Integration North) facilities, and Canada paid one-third. These included the SAGE (Semi Automatic Ground Environment) system for the Northern NORAD Region and 41st NORAD Division situated at North Bay, the long-range radar sites in Canada, the telecommunication requirements and the Bomarc squadrons. The overall capital cost of this entire program was approximately \$450 million dollars. The Canadian share was about \$150 million dollars. At the present time the total annual operating and maintenance costs for the two Canadian Bomarc squadrons is \$3.4 million dollars per year.

Nike/Hercules Missiles

There are no Nike/Hercules air defence weapons situated in Canada. This short-range weapon is provided to NORAD by the U.S. Army Air Defense Command. Nike/Hercules batteries are deployed to provide point defence of 24 major cities and industrial areas in the continental United States. In addition, the Nike/Hercules is used in the Alaskan NORAD Region.

Surveillance and Warning Facilities

The first detection of a manned bomber attack is provided by the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line.

This warning line which consists of six major stations and 23 auxiliary stations, was constructed by the United States and is maintained by the USAF through a civilian contract with the Federal Electric Company. Four of the main stations are located in the Canadian Arctic (see Chart 2). The Military Commander at each main station in Canada is a Canadian Forces officer and he exercises operational control for NORAD. Warning provided by the DEW line is sufficient to permit CINCNORAD to alert the civil defence agencies of Canada and the U.S. and to provide the time for the strategic retaliatory bomber forces of SAC to become airborne. At the same time NORAD defensive forces would be brought up on alert status prepared to meet an attacking force.

Long-Range Radars

The second element of the surveillance and control system is the "Pinetree" Line of long-range radars positioned in southern Canada and in the United States. At present there are 27 long-range radars manned and operated by the CF Air Defence Command, and 99 operated by the United States Air Force. In addition, the radars are supplemented by a number of gap-filler radars in the USA and Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft patrolling the coasts. Three of the USAF long-range radars are situated in Newfoundland and Labrador.

A typical surveillance radar continually scans the air-space surrounding the station to an approximate distance of about 250 miles. Supporting the search radar are two height finders. Working in combination, the search radar and height finder radars track the incoming aircraft and measure its speed and altitude. An electronic device at the radar site called IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) challenges aircraft by the surveillance radar and accepts the automatic replies from friendly aircraft. In the computerized part of the NORAD system (which includes all but Alaska and the division at Goose Bay) all data are converted at the radar station into digital form and transmitted directly to the appropriate SAGE or BUIC (Back Up Interceptor Control) facility where the data are entered into the facility's computer automatically. The computer then assists the interceptor and weapons control personnel in directing NORAD fighters to intercept the penetrating aircraft.

Twenty % of the NORAD long-range radars are operated by Canada. The USAF gap fillers and airborne radar systems are an additional contribution made by the US. While it is difficult to make an accurate comparison it would be safe to assume that in terms of numbers of units only, the Canadian portion of the overall radar system would comprise about 15% of the system. Approximately one third of the capital costs of the Pinetree System was paid by Canada. The distribution of radars on the North American continent is shown in Charts 3 and 4 attached.

Command and Control Facilities

Command and control facilities available to the Commander-in-Chief NORAD are shown in Chart 1 attached. As stated previously, the North American continent has been divided into Regions which, in turn, have been divided into Divisions. Within the Divisions, are alternate control centres called BUICS (Back Up Interceptor Control facilities). All Regions with the exception of Alaskan NORAD Region embrace both US and Canadian territory and airspace.

Northern NORAD Region is equipped with the SAGE system and is automatically tied into the NORAD COC at Colorado Springs. Construction of the underground facility at North Bay was undertaken by Canada under a cost-sharing agreement. Of the total cost of 51.8 million dollars, approximately one third was paid by Canada. The US paid the capital costs of construction of all other Regions in the NORAD system as well as the Combat Operations Center at Colorado Springs (approximately \$142 million).

There are two NORAD Divisions situated in Canada, one at Goose Bay (which is a manual operation) and the other at North Bay co-located with Northern Norad Region, and sharing its computer and communications. CADIN cost-sharing was applied to the capital costs of construction of the Division at North Bay and USAF paid all the costs at Goose Bay. All other NORAD Divisions were constructed with U.S. funds.

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

The contribution of this system to North American defence and the cost to the United States was outlined on page 13.

Space Detection and Tracking System

The entire Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) has been provided by the United States. Canada's contribution consists of manning the Baker-Nunn camera located at Cold Lake, Alberta. The system (see Chart 5) includes various sensors operated by:

- U.S. Air Force Aerospace Defense Command Spacotrack system
- U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System
- Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
- Canadian Armed Forces Air Defence Command Satellite Tracking Unit.

The system operation is relatively simple. The Space Defense Center in the NORAD COC tells a specific sensor where and when to look for a specific satellite and then the sensor sends the resulting data back to the Center.

The U.S. SPADATS System comprises detection and tracking radars at Shemya, Alaska; Moorestown, New Jersey; Diyarbakir, Turkey; Eglin AFB, Fla, and

Trinidad. In addition, there are three optical sensors in the system (Baker-Nunn cameras) situated at Sand Island in the Pacific, Edwards Air Force Base in California and Jupiter, Fla.

A space detection "fence" is provided by the U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System across the United States from California to Georgia. The system which has been in operation since 1959, has three powerful transmitter stations and six receivers all located in the United States. The information from this system is processed by high speed computers and the position of the satellite is precisely determined and passed by data link to the NORAD Combat Operations Center.

Other supporting systems in satellite tracking include the BMEWS system which provides about 25 % of the satellite observations reported to the Space Defense Center. Baker-Nunn cameras, including the Canadian installation at Cold Lake, provide satellite identification by photographing objects illuminated by the sun while the cameras themselves are in darkness.

In summary, it is estimated that Canada contributes approximately 8% to 10% of the overall costs of maintaining and operating the NORAD system.

POTENTIAL EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT

The threat of a bomber attack will continue to exist as long as the USSR maintains a significant bomber force. Such a force exists today and probably will continue to exist for the next decade. What is less certain is whether the Soviet Union will develop and produce a new supersonic bomber to supplant the existing force. A technological capability to place such a bomber into production has been demonstrated by the recent flight of the Tupolev 144 supersonic trans-

port aircraft. One of the objectives of a manned bomber defence is to discourage Soviet bomber development.

The threat of a ballistic missile attack is increasing as the Soviet Union increases its inventory of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched submarine ballistic missiles.

It is hoped that all nations will abide by the provisions of the treaty banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space since it is within the present state of space vehicle technology to develop orbital satellites which can carry several nuclear warheads. At present there is no method by which such satellites could be identified as hostile and, therefore, warning of an attack would not be available. However, if such a threat were to develop, it is very likely that methods could be developed to identify possible hostile objects and provide a means to destroy them.

POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN AIR DEFENCE

Against the present threat there are a number of improvements which could be made in the air defences of North America. To counter the threat of attack by bombers whose capability has been improved considerably by the introduction of the air to surface missile and improved electronic counter-measures, a combination of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and an Advanced Manned Interceptor would be desirable.

A number of options have been proposed for both an AWACS aircraft and for an improved manned interceptor. In discussing alternatives before the Senate Armed Forces Committee in 1968, Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense for the U.S. provided these alternatives:

ALTERNATIVE AIR DEFENSE FORCES, 1976

	Alternative 1	Alternative 2	Alternative 3
Interceptors	F101, F102 F4, F106	F12	F106X
Airborne Command & Control	E121	AWACS	AWACS
Ground Based Control	SAGE/BUIC	FAA	FAA
10 year Prog. Costs	\$11.7B	\$13.7B	\$12.3B
Annual Level-off Cost	\$1.12B	\$.75B	\$.69B

Mr. McNamara concluded that while the F12 would be a superior aircraft in discouraging such future threats as very long range air to surface missiles and supersonic bombers, the F106X would be best in the light of present requirements. In his testimony, he indicated that the U.S. would proceed with the development of the AWACS and F106X and to this end allocated

funds in the 1969 budget. The AWACS development program is now in the contract definition stage with \$40 million allocated in FY 1969 and \$75 million in FY 1970. The F106X program would improve the existing inventory of F106 aircraft giving them a "look down, shoot down" capability.

Since Mr. McNamara's announcement, the concept for modernizing the air defence system has continued to evolve. The details of the modernized system and present thinking as to how its components might be employed will be the subject of a separate paper being prepared for the Committee, and can be examined fully at a later meeting.

The North American Air Defence Command has functioned successfully in a spirit of cooperation between the United States and Canada and has pro-


vided protection to the Western retaliatory forces which, by their strength, have prevented nuclear war. The nature and form of Canadian contribution to NORAD must be kept constantly under review.

The NORAD umbrella provides Canada with an effective air defence for a fraction of the cost of an independent defence posture. Quite obviously, Canada could not independently achieve a comparable level of defence for anything like our present level of expenditure for air defence.



SECTION IV MAPS

NORAD ORGANIZATION





REVISED NORAD AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
(EFFECTIVE 15 AUGUST 1969)






NORAD WARNING SYSTEMS










SPACE DETECTION AND TRACKING SYSTEM
(SPADATS)



APPENDIX XX—Continued

LIEUTENANT GENERAL FREDERICK RALPH SHARP, DFC, CD

Lieutenant General Frederick R. Sharp was born in December 1915 in Moosomin, Sask., and educated at Moosomin Collegiate and the Royal Military College, Kingston. While at the College he was attached to the Assiniboia Regiment in the summers of 1934, 1935 and 1936, and with the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery in 1937. He joined the RCAF on graduation from the College in July 1938.

He trained as a pilot and became a flying instructor at 3 Service Flying Training School, Calgary, in September 1940. In April 1942 he was transferred to the instructional staff of 15 Service Flying Training School, Claresholm, Alta., and in 1943 joined the staff at 2 Flying Instruction School, Vulcan, Alta. He was posted on course to the War Staff College in January, 1944.

He went overseas in March 1944 to fly heavy bombers of 408 Bomber Squadron of 6 Bomber Group, eventually as squadron commander. He completed a tour of operations and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. He returned to Canada in June 1945 to serve in the directorate of postings and careers at Air Force Headquarters in Ottawa, and in April 1947 was appointed officer commanding the Central Flying School at Trenton. In September 1949 he attended the University of Western Ontario and graduated a

year later with a diploma in business administration. He was then transferred to England in November 1950 as an exchange officer attached to the directing staff of the RAF Staff College and returned to Canada in January 1953 to assume command of RCAF Station North Bay. In June 1954 he was transferred to AFHQ to the directorate of organization and establishments and later the directorate of management engineering.

He attended the National Defence College, Kingston, in August 1959, and on completion of the course in August 1960 was appointed deputy commander of the 25th Region, NORAD. In September 1962 he was named to command the Bangor Sector of the 26th Region, NORAD.

In December 1964 he was appointed director general, management engineering and automation at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Air Marshal Sharp was promoted to Air Vice Marshal in June 1965 and appointed commander of Training Command in August 1965. In July 1966 he was promoted to air marshal and appointed Vice Chief of the defence staff. Upon reorganization of the Canadian Forces Feb. 1, 1968 he assumed the rank of lieutenant general. In January, 1969, he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) with headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

JUN 16 1969

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 42

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs.

APPEARING:

Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs and
Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence.

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,	Harkness,	Nesbitt,
¹ Anderson,	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Nowlan,
Barrett,	<i>Boundary</i>),	Penner,
Brewin,	Laniel,	Prud'homme,
Buchanan,	Laprise,	Roberts,
Cafik,	Legault,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
Carter,	Lewis,	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>),
Fairweather,	MacLean,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
Forrestall,	Marceau,	Winch—(30).
Gibson,		
Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>),		

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹ Mr. Anderson replaced Mr. Groos on May 7, 1969.

[Text]

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, May 8, 1969
(66)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Ian Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Forrestall, Gibson, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Marceau, Nowlan, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (16).

Also present: Messrs. Macdonald (*Egmont*), O'Connell, M.P.'s.

Appearing: The Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence.

Witness: Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD.

The Chairman introduced the Honourable Mitchell Sharp and the Honourable Léo Cadieux.

Mr. Brewin suggested that the Members should be provided with copies of the study commissioned by Senator Edward Kennedy on the ABM system, the study prepared for the American Security Council on the same subject, and the proceedings of the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee dealing with this question. The Committee agreed and the Chairman will endeavour to obtain copies of this material.

Mr. Sharp and Mr. Cadieux delivered prepared statements on the subject of North American defence. Copies were distributed, in English and French.

It was agreed to print the notes of agreement dated March 30, 1968, between the Governments of Canada and the United States of America, concerning North American Air Defence Command, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix YY*)

Members of the Committee questioned the Ministers on current policies in relation to North American defence.

The Chairman requested a memorandum describing Command structure and procedures for the operation of Canadian and American interceptor squadrons over Canadian territory. The Minister of National Defence agreed to provide this information, subject to any security considerations which may be necessary.

At the end of the questioning, the Chairman thanked the Ministers.

The Committee adjourned at 10:30 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, May 8, 1969.

Mr. Cadieux: I understand.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe we are ready to begin.

This evening we have with us the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence. The discussion will be limited to NORAD.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs will start off and then will be followed by the Minister of National Defence. Questions can be directed to either or both of them.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, before you ask the Minister to begin there is one thing I think the Committee would be interested in. Apparently, we will be discussing the ABM system later, and according to the press, a group of professional, scientific, and other experts in the United States prepared a report on the ABM system which they presented to Senator Kennedy. It is apparently the first non-Pentagon report that has been made on this subject. The authors include a number of very eminent scientists and experts.

I am wondering if the Committee would try to get this report and make it available to all the members of the Committee. It does not seem to be very long. They say it is an ABC and if the American legislators find it useful, we might, too.

The Chairman: Would it be agreeable that we attempt to get a sufficient number of copies, not only of the Senate Committee Hearings, but of the report that Mr. Brewin has referred to, and if possible, enough copies of the Kennedy report, if I may call it that, for each member, the senate...

Mr. Cadieux: My information is to the effect that there were two reports coming to conclusion, so maybe we should try and get the two.

Mr. Brewin: From both sides; I always prefer the opposition's side.

Mr. Brewin: I want the non-Pentagon report.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have both reports including the one which is going to be published into a Kennedy book. That is what the newspapers said today. The other, as I read in the paper today, is also by eminent scientists and a former chairman of one of the reputable bodies down there that may have some associations or had some association with the Pentagon. It is a so-called independent report and in the same context as the Kennedy report. We certainly should have them both, if we are going to have one.

The Chairman: We will make arrangements to see that a sufficient number of copies are available for the convenience of the members. Mr. Sharp?

Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I wish to thank the Committee for inviting me to participate in this session, which I understand is one of several devoted to North American defence.

I should make clear at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that this is not a subject on which there is anything very new to say, particularly in terms of foreign policy. My colleague, the Minister of National Defence, will deal with matters falling within the purview of defence policy. I will take advantage of this opportunity to look again at the circumstances in which the NORAD Agreement was made, and renewed last year, and the reasons why, with regard to NORAD, this Government is continuing the policy established by its predecessors.

NORAD is purely and simply a defensive arrangement that provides for joint USA-Canadian air defence in case of an attack on North America. It is not designed for offensive purposes and has no offensive capacity. This is an important point to bear in mind, since it has been suggested that our NORAD

● 2015

Agreement with the United States in some way involves Canada in American initiatives in other parts of the world, thereby limiting our capacity for independence in foreign policy matters. I have studied this allegation very thoroughly and find it to be completely insubstantial. NORAD is a defensive arrangement and nothing more. Certainly, participation in NORAD has not inhibited us in the development of our own policy in areas where our objectives are not identical with those of the United States.

As honourable Members are aware the Government has rejected any suggestion that Canada should assume a non-aligned or neutral role in world affairs. In particular, as I have said, it has concluded that Canada should continue to cooperate closely with the United States within NORAD and in other ways in the defence of North America.

This important decision, along with others announced by the Prime Minister on April 3, marked the conclusion of the first phase of our review of defence policy which is still continuing in the broader context of an overall review of our foreign policy.

I welcome the fact that this Committee is now embarking on an examination of the problems of North American defence, and more particularly, Canada's present and future role in that defence. The Government has announced its intention to continue to cooperate with the United States in the defence of North America, but the nature and extent of our future participation remains to be determined. We will follow your proceedings with close attention.

The Government's decision announced April 3 to continue the NORAD arrangement reflects its concern with both domestic and international realities. We have a vast territory, a relatively small population, and great potential. Our domestic objectives are to promote national unity, preserve our sovereignty, and to develop our national strength through a vigorous and growing economy. The achievement of these objectives is dependent on the maintenance of a stable and peaceful world. It is in this context that NORAD should be seen.

A primary aim of our foreign policy is the prevention of war. The only real military threat to Canadian security is that of a general nuclear war. Canada lies between the two superpowers and such a war poses a particu-

larly direct and personal threat to all Canadians. Our contribution to the prevention of such a war can best be made by participation with our friends in collective security measures. These measures must be consistent with our vital interest in maintaining the peace and must not unduly impair our freedom to pursue our own foreign policy or limit our sovereignty to an unacceptable extent. NORAD, in the Government's view, is a part of such a collective security measure.

NORAD is a manifestation of effective cooperation between the United States and Canada. Ours is probably the closest and the most intricate and many-sided relationship of any two neighbouring countries in the whole world. There is hardly any field of our respective national activities which does not have a cross-border impact. The important thing is that Canada and the United States approach these problems in a spirit of friendship, trying where possible to resolve them by working together. It is surely consistent with this relationship that we should cooperate in defence matters.

In the immediate post-war period it was recognized that the air defence of Canada and the United States must be considered as a single problem. Arrangements between Canada and the United States provided for the coordination of separate Canadian and United States air defence plans, but did not provide at that time, for the joint control of the air defence system deployed in both countries for the detection and identification of and, if necessary, defence against hostile aircraft.

The advent of nuclear weapons, combined with the development of the long-range bomber made it necessary that the air defence control system be capable of quick reaction in emergencies. It was considered essential, therefore, to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including weapons, facilities, and command structure, which could carry out peacetime surveillance and operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single North American air defence plan approved in advance by national authorities.

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I might interpolate here that a rather similar sort of development took place in connection with NATO, which originally was just a defence alliance and which later developed a command structure so that it could respond quickly for exactly the same reasons. It was

the development of the kind of weapons that made this kind of joint command so desirable.

With this in mind in 1958, the NORAD Agreement established an integrated system of operational command and control of the air defence forces of both countries. This command and control system is manned and operated by units made up of members of the services of both countries. Participation in NORAD does not commit either Government to a specific force contribution. The nature and extent of each Government's contribution is a matter for decision by each Government as the need arises, in consultation with the other Government.

As Members will be aware, the Governments of Canada and the United States exchanged Notes on March 30, 1968, for the purpose of renewing the NORAD Agreement for a further period of five years. Although the renewal does not change the substance of the NORAD Agreement, it does stipulate that a review of the Agreement may be undertaken at any time at the request of either party, and that it may be terminated by either Government on one year's notice following such a review. The renewal expressly states that there is no Canadian commitment to participate in any way in an active ballistic missile defence. I understand a briefing on ABM defence is to be given to the Committee at a later meeting.

Bomber defences must be kept under regular review so that modifications and improvements can be made when necessary. In response to advances in technology and to known changes in the potential threat, the United States has proposed a new concept for air defence. This involves certain ways of modernizing our defence systems which will make them more effective and less vulnerable. These proposals are under study both in the United States and Canada. The renewal of the NORAD Agreement means that close consultation of this kind, which is of great value to Canada, will continue.

The Government does not share the view of those who would leave the entire burden for North American bomber defence to the United States. This might keep the cost to Canada to a minimum but it would run counter to the aim of maintaining national identity and independence. Furthermore, the influence we have on the development of air defence policies—policies in which we have a vital interest—would be drastically reduced.

Co-operation in the NORAD partnership illustrates the soundly based friendship between our two countries which enables us to speak to each other frankly and to differ publicly on many important international issues. When two countries, however close their relations, pursue their own independent policies in international affairs, there are bound to be occasions when differences of opinion and differences of interest arise. Continuing to play our part in the defence of the continent will help to preserve the friendship and co-operation which has contributed so much to the phenomenal growth of our country. Development of a distinct Canadian identity in the shadow of the greatest power on earth offers a real challenge to the people of Canada and their Government. Success in meeting this challenge need not, I believe, jeopardize our close relationship with the United States.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Perhaps it would be best if we deferred questions until we heard the statement from the Minister of National Defence. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Mr. Cadieux.

[*Interpretation*]

• 2025

Hon. L. A. J. Cadieux (Minister of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, I think that the Secretary of State for External Affairs has given you a clear and concise exposition of why we have decided to continue to cooperate with the United States in the air defence of North America. Perhaps I might take a minute or two to expand a little on the strategic rationale underlying this decision.

First let me state what I believe to be the major functions of the present air defence system:

First, to conduct surveillance of our air space, and to quickly and accurately analyse and interpret the vast amount of data such as surveillance produces.

Second, to be able to identify beyond doubt any peculiar or suspicious element turned up in the surveillance process.

Third, to ensure that we are able to make any aircraft comply with the legitimate constraints we have imposed on the use of our air space.

Those three functions represent the minimum any modern nation does to control

activity in its own air space. If we are to make the best use of present technology in carrying out the three functions, we are led to a requirement to maintain radar coverage for surveillance, to keep high speed manned interceptors and an associated control system ready to investigate questionable air activity, and to equip the interceptors with the means to deal effectively with that activity, if necessary.

If we now add the consideration of national security, remembering that the major threat to Canada is that of global nuclear war, and remembering that long range bombers are one of several means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the question naturally arises—can our air defence system contribute to lessening the likelihood of such a terrible event occurring? Now, in trying to find an answer to this question, we don't get very far by bringing in speculation about the futility of defence once nuclear war has been initiated. If the war ever starts, the complex structure of deterrence will have failed, and all our efforts in national security will have been in vain. The only way to get a meaningful answer is to reverse the question, that is by asking whether the likelihood of nuclear war might be increased, if air defences were not maintained. I think the answer to this is yes, the chance of nuclear war occurring would be increased, and I gave the reasons why I believe this in my speech last January on Canada's essential security requirements.

In its simplest terms, the argument is that complete dismantling of our bomber defences would very likely induce the Soviet Union and possibly others to develop and deploy an enlarged bomber force which they could contemplate using with impunity against the land-based component of the U.S. retaliatory forces. If, as is possible, such a situation were compounded with unforeseen developments which made it feasible to deploy systems to threaten the invulnerability of other components of the retaliatory forces, then the present situation of stable mutual deterrence could deteriorate into one of precarious instability.

The counter-argument goes something like this: "If the air defence system were completely dismantled, what you say is perfectly true. But that's not what we are getting at—why not just maintain the warning portion of the system?" Why not indeed? Let's see what this entails. First, you will need a surveillance system such as I described earlier;

second, you will need a capability for positive identification, as I described earlier; and, third, you might as well make the addition of the ability to deal effectively with hostile aircraft. All three elements are necessary if the system is to be sufficiently flexible to avoid having the threat of nuclear annihilation as the only response to apparent hostility. What you end up with is a system which looks very much like the air defence system we maintain today. Furthermore, a system like this not only provides warning and flexibility, but also gives us confidence that bomber aspirations of potentially hostile nations will be discouraged. It might be noted in this context that the Soviet Union does not appear to be expanding the size of its long range bomber fleet, nor to be developing a supersonic bomber.

So far I have been talking about air defence in a rather philosophical way, and I haven't said anything about NORAD. Let me put the defence rationale for NORAD in as concise terms as possible. Given that Canada and the United States need the kind of air defence system that I have been talking about, it takes little analysis to conclude that cooperation in the collection and processing of surveillance data, and joint command and

• 2030

control over the facilities both nations maintain to meet their similar objectives, is the most convenient, economical, and militarily efficient way to do the job. There are no offsetting benefits to be realized by trying to do it any other way.

As I have indicated, NORAD is the joint command and control organization whose continuation both Canada and the United States consider to be in their common interest. This is not to say, of course, that either the facilities which NORAD uses to exercise command and control, nor the forces assigned to it by the two countries, will remain indefinitely in their present form. In fact, you are well aware from statements we have made in the House, that proposals for modernizing both the NORAD command and control system and the forces assigned to NORAD are now under study.

A factual description of these proposals has been put together in a paper which I understand will be made available to you tomorrow, and will be followed next week by an appearance of Departmental officials before you to answer any questions you may have. I would

like to say two things now, however, about the proposed modernized air defence system. First, the system being studied is entirely consistent with the principles and objectives of continental air defence that I have been going over this evening. The new systems are not a reflection of a fundamental change in philosophy, nor do they require that such a change be made. Second, since our studies as to the specific ways in which we might participate in the new system are in a very early state, I regret it is just not possible to tell you how we see this participation developing. Any speculation, on our part, at this time would not be appropriate in view of the consultations with the U.S. now in progress.

The question has been raised, I understand, about the relationship between NORAD and the "Safeguard" ABM system which President Nixon recently approved. Again, speculation in this area would be very much premature. There is no need to come to an understanding about this in the immediate future, and if past experience is any indication, much could happen between now and the time a decision might have to be made. This normal uncertainty about the future would make any discussion at this time of the pros and cons of various alternative arrangements rather pointless, to say the least. You will recall, however, that during the recent debate on our NATO policy, I undertook to provide you with a full briefing on the Safeguard system, and I understand this has been arranged for later this month.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Minister. I believe that there might be a large number of questions. We must finish by, 10 o'clock or perhaps 10.30 p.m. at the latest. Would it be in order if we were to limit the first round of questioning to five minutes and then pick up a second round of questioning? Would that be a satisfactory way to proceed?

Mr. Brewin: I do not think that it would be satisfactory to me, Mr. Chairman. We are here to discuss NORAD, a defence arrangement, which has never been discussed by any branch of Parliament since it was renewed shortly before the last election. I think that a five minute examination might turn out to be quite a futile waste of time. I do not think that there should be any undue restrictions.

The Chairman: It was merely a suggestion. Perhaps then, if there is not unanimity, we

could proceed and see how the discussion progresses. Then if necessary, perhaps we could come to some decision.

Mr. Brewin: I did not mean that I intended to make the threat of a prolonged examination...

• 2035

Mr. Gibson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I think that we ought to try the five minute plan and to see how it goes, sir. Perhaps that way, everybody will become involved in the discussion rather than just one or two.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I sympathize with Mr. Brewin's point here. I think that it is quite a complicated arrangement and it will probably take some following up questions in order to get at some of the nuts and bolts of the issues involved. We might not be able to deal with these in five minutes.

The Chairman: Why not proceed upon the following basis: members remember that there may be others who might also have good questions, and that it is not necessary for an individual to cover the complete spectrum in their original questioning? Let us see how we get along. Mr. Allmand.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Chairman. Before Mr. Allmand begins, could I ask if it would be possible for Mr. Sharp to table these notes of agreement with regard to NATO that were exchanged last March 30? If at all possible, it seems to me that it would be useful material for the Committee to have.

Mr. Sharp: I have them with me. Have we extra copies? Yes, I have copies with me.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman. I think that Mr. MacDonald has a good point. It would be useful to have them printed as appendices to our Proceedings so that someone reading this discussion can see what we are talking about.

The Chairman: Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, I have some questions which can be answered by either the Minister of National Defence or the

Secretary of State for External Affairs. These two questions are related to each other. My first question is: why could we not have the same type or a similar type of defence of North America conducted in close co-operation between the United States and Canada, but not under a joint command? In other words, why could we not do these things through co-operation, rather than through an agreement and the joint command that we now have?

We learned the last day that of the five regions that make up NORAD, a Canadian is in command of only one of those regions, although two others include Canadian territory. This means that American commanders are making decisions relating to the type of military activity that occurs over Canadian territory. To me this appears to be open to question. Secondly, as an alternative to the first possibility—that of a defence system through co-operation—why could we not have all the Canadian territory, if it had to be under a NORAD agreement, subject to Canadian command? This means that we would make the decision as to whether or not we would launch certain counter attacks or attacks to stop foreign bomber attacks.

Mr. Cadieux: First of all, I think the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained that due to the changing nature—the technological nature—of the weapons and the narrowing gap of alert, that you would have in the event of an attack it was found necessary to have a joint command and control. He assimilated that to the necessity of being in NATO, and of having an integrated command in order to be able to respond quickly to the new kinds of attack to which you could be exposed. This is the rationale behind the joint command and control.

Now, your second question as you say...

Mr. Allmand: Concerning my first question, sir, did you say that you could not respond as quickly, unless you had a joint command? If you had a co-operative effort between Canada and the United States could you not set up something that would be as effective, but under our control?

Mr. Cadieux: If you did, you would immediately find it necessary to refine it to

• 2040

the point which amounts to the same type of operation as you now have. All the informa-

tion that is gathered by the radar system is computed and in an actual attack must be correlated in a very short time. I believe that you would reach the same conclusion that it is necessary to correlate all these efforts. This is the type of process, I imagine, that went on before they eventually found that it must be under a joint command and control.

Now, in the question of the regions, some of them overlap between the two frontiers and I do not think in this kind of over-all defence of North America you could hope to have systems separated by boundaries. It is true that some Americans have a position of command on partly Canadian territory, but also, the Second in Command in Colorado Springs is a Canadian. This is, I think, one of the best arrangements that could be worked out.

You seem to indicate that the release of weapons is the responsibility of the Commander. It is not. It is the responsibility of the governments. There is a procedure for that which I cannot elaborate on, but it is not for a commander to decide by himself.

Mr. Allmand: Is it not just the Bomarcas that require the governmental...

Mr. Cadieux: No, the release of the weapons have to be authorized by...

Mr. Allmand: The interceptors also?

Mr. Cadieux: ...by the governments.

Mr. Allmand: Is it not true when such defensive weapons are released, whether they are the Bomarcas or the interceptors, that most of the alleged enemy aircraft would be knocked down over Canadian territory? This might have been answered the last day but I cannot recall whether it was or not. Does this mean that these bombers, if they were knocked down over Canadian territory, would involve nuclear explosions and extensive fallout over Canadian territory but not over American territory?

Mr. Cadieux: I think you have to talk in terms of the level of interception. I think in the case of the Bomarc, for instance, the level of interception would be high enough for the fallout to be limited to the degree of fallout that occurred with the nuclear test explosions. It was not a significant fallout.

One has to choose, I believe, between having the bomb fall on Canada or the United

States or trying to destroy it in the atmosphere. I think the second option is obviously the one you would choose. You are trying to intercept the bombers before they really come over populated areas.

Mr. Allmand: Most of the bombs would be directed, we would expect, to the United States and not to Canada.

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know if you can assume that.

Mr. Sharp: Why would you assume that?

Mr. Allmand: Would it not seem that most of the targets would be in the United States because of the Strategic Air Command. The other day Gen. Sharp stated that the main purpose of NORAD is to protect the Strategic Air Command bases. These bases are in the United States. Therefore, if the enemy is trying to knock out these bases he is targeted for the United States.

Mr. Cadieux: We always come back to the same rationale, whether you accept or not. This is another point. We believe what you have to protect here is the deterrent, and that it is the only sensible way of approaching this problem. Whether you do it by protecting the SAC bombers or the bases, what you are trying to achieve is the protection of the deterrent. This is part of the over-all strategy.

Mr. Allmand: I will pass for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I would like to make a supplementary comment directed toward the Command because I think it is important.

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According to the map which was filed as an appendix to Gen. Sharp's working paper, all British Columbia and Alberta are in the Western Region which is under American commanders—Regional and Divisional Commanders. All the Regional and Divisional Commanders in the Western Region are American.

Practically all of Manitoba and Ontario are in the Central Region, according to this map, and all the Regional and Divisional Commanders are American.

The Northwest and Yukon Territories, a very small part of Northern Manitoba and Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces,

and that very small part of Northern Maine that juts up into New Brunswick, are in the Northern Region under Canadian command.

This map would indicate that practically all of the heavily populated area of Canada is under American Commanders.

Mr. Cadieux: You always have a Canadian Deputy Commander.

The Chairman: Yes, but the question is whether or not it is desirable that the air defence of almost all of Canada should be under American commanders, and that the only area under Canadian command is the unpopulated regions of the Arctic and the Yukon Territory. Alaska, of course, has been excluded from the Northern area and put under sole American command.

In other words, although it may be hard to draw a map based upon national boundaries, the Americans seem to have done it quite successfully.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, but when you talk of an American commander or a Canadian commander, you are always talking of an integrated command where the functions are sort of integrated in themselves. I think it is North American air defence, and it is not strictly either American or Canadian defence.

The Chairman: This is true.

Mr. Cadieux: You view this problem as being indivisible.

The Chairman: True, and as you pointed out, Mr. Cadieux, the decisions are made by governments which would indicate that there would be no reason why we should not have perhaps more Canadian commanders as well as American commanders, particularly where Canadian air space is involved.

Mr. Cadieux: The whole apparatus was designed that way and I suppose they were very good reasons. The investment that the Americans have made in this system is more than 10 times as much as Canadians have made, and I think they have certainly the right to have their share of command.

The Chairman: You are right, they certainly have. Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, I only have one question and it is prompted by, for example, the most recent issue of one of the

United States Air Force journals, the *Aerospace International*, in which in a strategic survey they very strongly indicate that 1968 was the year in which many of the tensions and obscurities in Europe and other parts of the world may have become clearer to us, particularly here in Canada. The events of Viet Nam and the events of Eastern Europe, particularly in Czechoslovakia, have promoted what they describe as an increase in the tension that exists between the two super powers.

With that in mind, and coupled with the very serious concern that I sincerely believe does exist in the minds of many observers of the military scene in North America, including our own middle and senior-ranking officers, and bearing in mind the Minister of National Defence's statement—and this is not to get into the pros and cons of your defence review—may I ask you a question or two about the timing and the schedule, particularly as it applies to a final conclusion about NORAD, but more particularly, as it will relate to other major decisions; for example, Maritime Command?

Specifically, can you tell at this time approximately when a decision will be made by Cabinet on NORAD?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, as I said in my presentation, the government has already made its decision to remain in the joint command. That decision was announced on April 3. It stated the continuation of the policy that we now have to provide for joint air defences under an integrated command. That decision, as I said in my presentation, does not in any way determine the contribution that either country will make to those defences. Each country makes its contribution and they will integrate it in the joint defence.

The decisions that we have to make which arise from our foreign policy and defence review in all fields in relation to the air defence of North America, to the defence of

ter than I do—determine the deployment of our forces. Decisions relating to the deployment of our forces will come out of this review. In connection with the NATO review, some of those decisions are now being made. The government, as you know, has announced that we will stay in NATO and have a planned and phased reduction of our contribution there. That will determine one part of the deployment of our forces.

The decisions that we make about our co-operation with the United States in the future—this depends upon the character of technical developments in which we will meet the bomber threat—will affect the deployment of our air force. It will also produce an effect upon our ground support and upon the way in which the United States and Canada will operate in one another's territory. This is the best answer that I can give you. Some of the decisions are now being made as to the NATO review. In turn this will lead—as the Prime Minister's statement indicated—to the placement of greater emphasis upon the defence of North America. This also will result in some further changes. I think that it will take quite some time before all of those changes occur. They are now in the process of being made.

Mr. Forrestall: Will it take a year or six months, Mr. Sharp?

Mr. Sharp: I do not know. Mr. Cadieux, would you care to offer an opinion, as to the length of time that it will take?

Mr. Cadieux: It will take quite some time, as we have found.

Mr. Forrestall: In other words, until such time as the individual decisions have been made, there will not be a conclusive position given on any one of our strategic roles either one way or another, or internally or externally. There will not be a final decision until an over-all decision is made.

Mr. Sharp: Yes, some decisions...

Mr. Forrestall: According to the comments of the Prime Minister about redeployment.

Mr. Sharp: My view is that decisions will appear gradually, as part of what we hope will be an over-all plan. We cannot delay every decision until we have made them all. However, we will approach a general plan for the deployment of our forces in collective security, and in our own defences here in Canada.

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our sovereignty or the surveyance of our territory, to our contribution to collective security in Europe, all relate to the contribution that we will make either under the NORAD agreement or any other arrangements that we may have for the defence of North America; for example, our naval contributions on the Atlantic and in Europe. All of these—as the Minister of National Defence knows even bet-

Mr. Forrestall: Can you indicate whether or not we could expect to have some final decision before the end of this year?

Mr. Sharp: I should think that in some fields we will have to make some decisions; for example, in connection with NATO. Our allies expect us to state exactly how we are going to be participating in the collective arrangements.

Mr. Forrestall: Like August 25?

Mr. Sharp: I beg your pardon?

Mr. Forrestall: Such as the day after August 24? Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, à propos what the Minister has just said. The production of a White Paper was discussed at one time. I assumed that it would contain that which is contained in the White Papers of other coun-

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tries which is a total review, more or less, of the defence commitments, plans, strategies and so on. Is this objective being phased out—in this process of phased production of a policy—in these matters? Can we still hope for a White Paper in our time?

Mr. Sharp: I think that it is fair to say, Mr. Brewin, that the production of the White Paper is becoming a much more complicated question than we had originally estimated. It is certainly my objective to be working on the foreign policy side of this and on the presentation of an approach which can be placed before Parliament. Now I am not certain whether or not the White Paper will include all parts of the defence planning. I am certainly looking toward the time when I will be able to present the government with a statement that might be published on our foreign policy.

Mr. Forrestall: Could you say when?

Mr. Sharp: One should not give too many hostages to fortune, so I will just say, "As soon as possible".

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, most of the rest of my questions will be directed to the Minister of National Defence. I would like to ask him first of all—I do not wish to go into this extensively—about the ABM situation. In

the paper which the Minister presented to us, he held the view that because we are not asked to make early or immediate commitments, that any discussion would be premature. I would like to suggest the following to him and to ask his comment on it: If our allies in the United States are actively discussing this problem—which affects the defence of North America—would it not be appropriate that we formulate our own views on the matter? If, on our independent judgment, we should come to the conclusion that we do not want any part of this system, this can then be made known to our allies and they will be able to take that into account in their own discussions and debates. Is this not a matter in which we have a concern that ought to be dealt with now, instead of easily putting it off until some future date?

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin, may I interject for a moment? I gather that you are not intending to start a discussion on ABMs. We will have briefings and a full discussion in due course. If it is just a single question that you wish to ask at this point...

Mr. Brewin: The Minister made a statement which includes a proposition that we can, in a sense, afford to delay this matter and that any discussion about it would be premature. I am asking him about that.

The Chairman: I do not think that it would be in order for you to continue questioning with regard to the ABMs.

Mr. Brewin: I have not continued, but perhaps you could stop me when...

The Chairman: I was issuing a warning notice.

Mr. Brewin: I know you were.

Mr. Cadieux: My answer to that would be that initially we must know the precise kind of system and the precise type of deployment which the Americans are projecting. This has not been decided there. How can you form a rationale, posture, or policy pertaining to a decision which they have not taken themselves?

Mr. Brewin: But is it not true that the present government of the United States—subject of course to Congressional appropriation of funds—has in fact produce a very definite system, called the Sentinel system? Admittedly it may be expanded, contracted

or altered. This is a fairly definite proposal. If they can discuss it now, is there any reason why we should not discuss it?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, they are discussing it within the context of their own parliamentary process. This could be changed, for instance, if the proposition that was approved, in principle, by the President were changed by Congress.

Mr. Brewin: It appears to me that as good allies, we should be in the planning process. We should not wait until they have produced a final plan and then say—perhaps to their disappointment in view of our co-operation in most other fields in defence—“No, we want no part of this.”

Mr. Cadieux: This is a decision that we can make, of course—as far as we are concerned—but I do not think that we can make a decision as far as they are concerned. Surely until now, this has been an internal matter of the United States. I do not think that you could now expect us to project ourselves into their discussions and state that we do not approve or something of that nature.

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Mr. Brewin: Could we not say: “We do not approve for ourselves, but you could judge for yourselves what your actions...”. Surely, this would be proper among allies.

Mr. Cadieux: You seem to have come to the conclusion that we should disapprove. I have not come to that conclusion personally. You must see...

Mr. Brewin: I am not talking about...

Mr. Cadieux: No, no.

Mr. Brewin:... the conclusion that we reach I am talking about whether the proposal to put off the discussion is reasonable in the light of our alliance with them and the fact that we are involved.

Mr. Cadieux: I should not say that we postponed discussions completely. We are briefed on what is planned, and at the research and development level, we are in constant consultation with them. We know what the concept is, but I do not think that you can postulate a policy for Canada, until they themselves have decided what the deployment is going to be; then, I think, you have to judge whether or

not you want to co-operate; will it be to the advantage of Canada. This decision, I believe, would be premature at the present time.

Mr. Brewin: It seems to me, as a Canadian, and as an ally of the United States, that it would not be premature for us to express our view on their present plans. Perhaps your view would differ from mine; I do not know, but that we should have a view, formulate it, and state it to our allies, is the duty of a good ally. Consequently they would not be misled into thinking that we would co-operate with the plan if we had formerly expressed our disapproval of it.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin, is this not the very type of thing that this Committee is going to be investigating and making recommendations on, at a later date? This particular meeting was called for the purpose of discussing NORAD. ABM is related to it, however you have asked the Minister a question and he has answered it. I do not think that we can pursue the question of ABMs further this morning.

Mr. Brewin: If you do not wish me to pursue it, I will not pursue it.

The Chairman: But there is not any reason why you should not pursue the NORAD question.

Mr. Brewin: I think it is a perfectly proper question and I will probably save time...

The Chairman: It is a proper question.

Mr. Brewin: Instead of directing me away from the question, rule me out of order, if you think I am out of order.

The Chairman: I think you are out of order at the present time.

Mr. Brewin: I do not need shepherding or advice from the Chairman all the time, thank you.

The Chairman: I will rule you out of order on the ABM Mr. Brewin, because we are going to discuss that at a later date.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Minister, I would like to put one or two questions to you about the NORAD matter. In preface to my question, I think that Canada should co-operate with the United States' surveillance of our air space identification; this is a matter that seems to be controversial as far as the reality of an

attack by manned bombers is concerned. I would like to ask your comment on the second paragraph of page 2 where you say:

In its simplest terms, the argument is that complete dismantling of our bomber defences would very likely induce the Soviet Union and possibly others to develop and deploy an enlarged bomber force which they could contemplate using with impunity against the land-based component of the U.S. retaliatory forces.

That seems to be very central to your strategic argument; I want to ask you whether or not it bears any relation to reality? Is it not a fact, quite apart from any bomber force, that if we had the protection of the United States, that within hours of warning of any bomber attack, that country has forces of such magnitude that she speaks about the Soviet Union launching bombers with impunity? It is just concrete to the realities and the facts of the situation.

Mr. Cadieux: Mr. Brewin, what do you think of the incident that we had last year and the last couple of years? We identified at least 36 bombers coming between 30 and 40 miles of the Canadian coasts.

Mr. Brewin: I will give you my own explanation, sir. I thought that you were giving the evidence. I think that if I were the Soviets, I would be delighted to see us take the situation so seriously; we wasted our money, I think, on defending ourselves against the possibility of a fully manned bomber force coming over to attack us. I think they know perfectly well that it would be an incredible thing for

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them to do. If they can keep us on guard by making us waste our money in that way, perhaps it would please them. I do not know.

Mr. Cadieux: That is a speculation.

Mr. Brewin: Is it your suggestion that the presence of these bombers in our air space, indicates in a casual way, the probability or even the possibility of a main attack on the SAC, by manned bombers, in this missile age?

Mr. Cadieux: You are talking of this as being casual but I have seen a picture of one Russian bomber with a missile underneath it. Do you really believe that to be casual? I suppose the same reasoning could apply to

ICBMs; you may think, would it not be irrational for the Russians to send ICBMs over North America, when they know that the Americans could retaliate and probably destroy their country? This is also irrational but this is the kind of irrationality that exists in the world; I think you have to take measures in case the irrational should overcome the rational.

Mr. Brewin: I am content to leave the discussion with the proposition that our policy in regard to defence against manned bombers, is based upon the concept, that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is going to pursue an irrational course. This is the proposition.

Mr. Cadieux: The proposition that I believe in is this: you have a deterrent which is neutralized and you want to keep it that way because you have forces to oppose; you have an interceptive system and a detection system which will allow you to react and we believe—you are entitled to your opinion—that your position is not the one that should be taken. You know we have gone over both sides of that question for a long time; what I believe is that we should neutralize the opponent by having sufficient forces to retaliate and in such magnitude, that he would not dare to attack.

Mr. Brewin: I presume, Mr. Minister, that we will resume this discussion from time to time, so I will not pursue it now. However, I would like to suggest to you that the problem you must face and that we all must face, but particularly you, because of your position, is that we have very limited resources; we should devote the ones that we have to meeting real threats and not imaginary ones.

Mr. Cadieux: It is a question of debating whether it is a real or imaginary threat. It is obvious that we certainly do not agree on that point.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard.

Mr. Roberts: Are we accepting supplementaries today? I do have a supplementary.

The Chairman: Is it a real supplementary?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, it is related to the same paragraph and to the same point. It is a real supplementary as opposed to an imaginary one.

Mr. Cadieux, disregarding the validity of the argument, what puzzles me about this

paragraph, is that the second sentence which begins, "If, as is possible" etcetera, does not, in my opinion, support the argument of the first sentence. Perhaps I could put it this way. Are you saying that we might experience unforeseen developments, which would make it feasible to deploy systems which threaten the invulnerability of the second strike missile response? If that did happen, the fact that we had or had not maintained our bomber defence would not change the situation; in other words, the situation of mutual deterrents would deteriorate into one kind of precarious instability, once that kind of defence against missiles had been developed in the Soviet Union. This would be the case whether or not we had maintained the anti-bomber defence; therefore, while the point that you make in the second sentence might be true, it is not relevant to the argument that the anti-bomber defence must be maintained in order to protect us, if that hypothetical situation should arise.

Mr. Cadieux: No, but I am trying to point out here that there is also a further development which is possible, and which is probably happening; it explains why the Americans are thinking of an ABM system as protection for their own deterrent. However, that does not remove the possibility of a bomber threat; you must also be able to react to that situation, and this is the rationale that we have for it.

Mr. Roberts: Yes but those developments . . .

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Mr. Cadieux: The Americans think that they could react to this unforeseen development by ABMs, but the bomber threat in our theory, is not dissipated. It is still there. Therefore, you should be ready to meet it.

Mr. Roberts: Since this is a supplementary, perhaps I had better defer my remaining comments.

The Chairman: Yes. I have Mr. Howard on the list, Mr. Roberts. Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, some of the questions tonight have reminded me of that famous saying of Neville Chamberlain's. It went something like this: "There will not be any nuclear bomber incursions in our time." I feel that we are taking this possibility somewhat lightly. I am concerned with the maintenance of . . .

An hon. Member: The French had a Maginot Line.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes, the French had a Maginot Line too. That is quite correct and that is what my question is leading to. Of all our defence commitments it seems to me that our NORAD defence commitment is the one that is most justifiable. It is more clearly defensive than anything else we do. It is not a threat to other powers.

I am concerned about this matter of the political decision that is involved in the case of using the facilities that are available. I know that the Americans have a very complicated system for making that political decision, including the considerable equipment that follows the President of the United States around wherever he goes.

First, I would like to know what facilities we have that would duplicate that and make it possible to make such a decision one way or the other should the occasion arise?

Second, what would happen if it were not possible to find the Prime Minister, or whoever has to make that decision, on the required day? What would the Americans do? Would they not be able to carry out their deterrent efforts without Canada?

Mr. Cadieux: I think the general answer would be that communications are such that you could reach the Prime Minister or the Acting Prime Minister at any time instantly. That is the way it is now.

You are assuming these communications might breakdown, but I am assuming they will not.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I know for a fact that the Americans have complicated procedures for this communication. I am not aware of any such procedures which follow the Prime Minister of Canada around when he travels, any back-up facilities if those supposed facilities are knocked out, or any facilities that follow the Acting Prime Minister around.

Mr. Cadieux: I hope you do not complain about this secret being so well kept.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You are telling me that the facilities are there but they are invisible.

Mr. Cadieux: No, they are very visible when you are near them.

Mr. Sharp: I think it is also true, if I may add, that there is a difference between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada under our respective systems of government. That is, the President of the United States must exercise his power. It is very difficult to devolve it upon anyone else. In Canada this responsibility does devolve naturally upon other members of the government, who in their respective spheres have a responsibility that the Secretaries do not have within the American system.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): As elected representatives they can make that decision?

Mr. Sharp: No, the nature of our government is quite different. The Prime Minister is *Primus inter pares*. Each of us is a Minister in his own right, responsible and sworn to discharge his responsibilities.

The President of the United States is the government of the United States and each of the Secretaries just carries out his instructions. This is not so in our system, and therefore, what happens in our system is that when the Prime Minister is not available his responsibilities devolve upon the next senior minister. If I were around they would devolve upon me.

I would support what the Minister of

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National Defence says that this contingency has been thought of.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): All right. We require a two-key system. What happens in the event that Canada decides, no? Is the whole American system then going to be out of action?

Mr. Sharp: It is a two-key system.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In other words nothing happens if Canada says, no. It is a veto system, is that right?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, it would not be a veto without the use of an artifact—weapons, of course.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Fine. I have one other minor technical question.

Mr. Allmand: May I ask a supplementary on that question?

The Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: This concerns the commanders that I was asking about. The Canadian government says, no. The Americans decide, yes, and they tell their commanders, yes. Their commanders, as the Chairman pointed out, command a lot of aircraft and so forth which fly over two-thirds of three-quarters of Canadian airspace. To follow through the scenario set up by Mr. Howard, what happens then? Do these American commanders obey their American President and launch Canadian aircraft which are under American commanders?

Mr. Cadieux: I believe in a case like that you have the two-key system again, and it is not up to a commander to release Canadian weapons without the consent of Canadian authorities.

Mr. Roberts: I have further supplementary.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, a supplementary.

Mr. Roberts: Canada's veto would not affect the ability of the United States to launch its thousand Minutemen in a retaliatory strike?

Mr. Sharp: That is right.

Mr. Roberts: Therefore, the Americans would have an effective response against any kind of attack whether or not we agree to do anything.

The Chairman: I have a further supplementary. Nor would it prevent the American commanders launching the American interceptor planes over the central and western regions which include most of the populated areas of Canada, because these are American weapons.

An hon. Member: Right.

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know about this. There are restrictions of the airspace. We are not going to extend to them Canadian airspace without...

Mr. Winch: Do you think they would worry about that if the bombers were flying across Canada?

The Chairman: Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I have a minor technical question. What over-the-horizon radar equipment do we have? Are we protected against low flying aircraft on the kind of mission that our CF-104's are expected to perform?

Mr. Cadieux: The over-the-horizon radar is the future development of the defensive system which should be complimented with the AWACS system. This is the advance phase that is going to be introduced in the coming nineteen-seventies. It is not in existence yet.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): We do not have over-the-horizon radar now?

Mr. Cadieux: No, I do not think so.

Mr. yan: I have supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, on a supplementary.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, on a supplementary.

Mr. Cadieux: No, I do not believe so. The over-the-horizon radar would be below the aurora belt you see, and over the aurora belt you would have the AWACS to complete the system. This is the new concept.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In other words, we have a gap in defences in this regard?

Mr. Cadieux: No, I would not call it a gap. The over—the—horizon radar was conceived to combat Fractional Orbital Bombs. They are not considered a real threat yet, but in reaction to that possibility, this kind of radar was developed, at least theoretically, and it is going to be introduced in the nineteen seventies. This is the development that is going to take place and which you are going to hear about in the next briefing.

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Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What about the low flying aircraft?

Mr. Cadieux: What do you means exactly?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What radar protection have you got against aircraft flying below 300 feet?

Mr. Cadieux: You have the DEW Line, you have the Pinetree line, etc.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): They are not capable of detecting aircraft at ground level.

Mr. Cadieux: You would not have a bomber flying at ground level.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I do not know. Our aircraft in Europe are programmed to do that kind of flying. Why would they not...

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): That is all, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, when Mr. Brewin began his questioning I found myself in the incredible position of almost agreeing with him.

Mr. Brewin: I am sorry to do that.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I do not know whether I should continue this questioning at all in light of the later questions which might develop. I cannot get by the Chairman either, I do not think, in regard to a question that I have in mind, so maybe I might just make a brief statement in regard to it.

Mr. Sharp, you mentioned that on page 3 of your submission:

The important thing is that Canada and the United States approach these problems in a spirit of friendship, trying where possible to resolve them by working together.

Then, on page 5 in the middle paragraph you said:

This involves certain ways of modernizing our defence systems which will make them more effective and less vulnerable. These proposals are under study both in the United States and Canada. The renewal of the NORAD Agreement means that close consultation of this kind, which is of great value to Canada, will continue.

A little further along:

...the influence we have on the development of air defence policies—policies in which we have a vital interest—would be drastically reduced.

I find myself in difficulty, even though it has been suggested that we not discuss the ABMs here tonight, to reconcile those statements with the statement of the hon. Minister of National Defence in which he says that consideration of the ABM system is very much premature.

It seems to me that just to divorce ourselves from this consideration and take up a position in which we either accept it or reject it when the time comes and know what it actually is, is rather abdicating our responsibility to ourselves. However, I recognize the Chairman's decision that we should not be discussing it here tonight.

I think there is a very very important relationship between the potential of what might be the ABM system and NORAD as it is today. I think we ought to be considering it very very definitely in its various aspects as we understand it as it relates to our own defence.

I have just a couple of elementary questions to renew our memories and to place them on the record. Mr. Sharp, first of all, how long does the present NORAD Agreement continue as it relates to our participation in the joint command as was announced on April 3? What is the time duration of this agreement?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, the NORAD Agreement was renewed on March 30, 1968, for a period of five years, I believe, but it is subject as I said in my presentation to being cancelled on a year's notice if we decide that we no longer want to be part of it. This is the only substantial change that was made when we came to renew the agreement.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Part of that agreement then was also that the degree of participation and the extent of participation by our two different governments would vary or would change as policy developed in the future?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, as I tried to make clear in my presentation, the NORAD Agreement is an agreement for joint and integrated command. It is not an agreement on our respective contributions to the air defence, which will be varied as technical changes take place. My colleague, the Minister of National Defence, was recently in Washington, and he has been there more than once recently, and...

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Will our contribution vary as the ABM system develops as well?

Mr. Sharp: That is not covered by the NORAD Agreement, and if we are going to co-operate on ABMs in the future that is the decision we would have to make. We have decided that we are not going to have ABMs

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and we have decided that the ABM so far is not a part of NORAD. If that policy were changed that would have to be the subject of a separate decision.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What is the situation, Mr. Cadieux, relating to the Bomarc at the present time?

Mr. Cadieux: The Bomarc is, I am told, one of the last weapons that is going to be phased out of the present set up. That will be around the mid nineteen-seventies if the new system is installed; that is, the over-the-horizon radar the AWACS, and the new interceptors. The Bomarcs would go at the end.

It is, notwithstanding what some people think about it, considered as the cheapest and most accurate weapon that we have. It is being tested every year, and out of about 1,000 tests of which I am aware I do not think there were five misses. It is cheap to maintain, to survey, and to guard. Therefore, it is going to stay there until...

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): And still have some practical use?

Mr. Cadieux: That would have to be proven in an emergency. We hope that we will not have to demonstrate that it is effective.

Mr. Prud'homme: A supplementary.

The Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme on a supplementary.

Mr. Prud'homme: Is there any discussion going on at the moment either in the government or with the United States, regarding what could happen in phase two of the government review of our defence?

Mr. Cadieux: No, what we are going to do is that I am going to Brussels in May and will start discussing with the members of the Alliance, and no doubt with the Americans there, what our plans are and how we are going to fit them in the over-all plans of NATO. This is a decision that we have to take ourselves, and after that, we have to inform our allies and discuss with them how it is going to be integrated into their own plans.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan, on a supplementary.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, it is really supplementary to Mr. Thompson's earlier question about con-

tributions. The other day when General Sharp was here he gave us the paper from the Department of National Defence which described the physical contribution of Canada in squadrons, Bomarc squadrons, the DEW Line, and the Pinetree components. He was going to prepare some figures.

However, just to put this all in perspective about NORAD and our contribution in terms of annual operating cost, has the Department firmed up, and/or in your conversations in Washington have you been told, just what the ratio is? I think the figures General Sharp used were \$156 million for Canada and \$1.7 billion for the United States. Admittedly, these are approximate.

There was some discussion amongst some of the officials that day as to whether or not this is a fair assessment. If not, what is your idea of the ratio of contribution on this whole NORAD thing?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, our ratio is less than one-tenth of the over-all cost.

Mr. Nowlan: Obviously, if we want more command, we must pay more, in effect.

Mr. Cadieux: No, I do not think you can put it that way. I do not think you would want more command. I think the way this is set up now is working pretty well.

Mr. Nowlan: I will not trespass further on command, but you say 10 per cent. If my figures are right it is much less than 10 per cent.

Mr. Cadieux: It all depends on what you include there. I think it should be around, as General Sharp said, \$156 million. My figure would have been \$138 million or \$140 million; something like that.

Mr. Nowlan: That may have been his figure. Frankly, I am just going from memory today.

Mr. Cadieux: I think the American contribution was something like \$1.6 billion last year.

Mr. Nowlan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Nowlan: This is annual operating expense, basically, we are talking about.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, it is not the capital expenses, it is the operating expenses.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): The supplementary questions have covered part of my next question which might be summarized briefly as saying that our personnel contribution is about 10 per cent. According to these figures, our operating contribution is now 9 per cent or something like that.

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Mr. Cadieux: I do not know whether or not that ratio is still the same in the number of personnel. I know we have about 12,900.

An hon. Member: What is the American figure, do you know?

Mr. Cadieux: I am told it is 144,000 over-all, so we have about 14,000.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It is approximately a population ratio then.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It is that rather than a gross national product ratio. I gather, Mr. Cadieux, you are genuinely concerned about the visible and known Russian surveillance of our shores.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): This bears out General Sharp's testimony which he presented before the Committee the other day and which justified Canada's continuing participation in NORAD. Could you inform us whether or not the surveillance activity of the Russians has increased during the last year or two, as compared to say five years ago during the regime of Mr. Khrushchev? Is it holding steady, or is it on the decrease?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I can hardly compare it to five or six years ago. I was not directly involved, but I would say that it is fairly important. Some people think that it has increased. I have no personal opinion on that. I have to rely on what I am told.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Would you say...

Mr. Cadieux: I would say that it is significant.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Would you say that the surveillance of our shores by the

so-called fishing trawler spy ships is on the increase?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I must say that there is a lot of activity going on.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Sharp or Mr. Cadieux, how would you interpret this in the light of some of the changes of policy under the present administration in Russia?

Mr. Cadieux: Do you assume that there is a change of policy?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Oh, I think that under Brezhnev there has been a very definite change of policy.

Mr. Cadieux: Dealing which way?

An hon. Member: The invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Czechoslovakia is one way. Looking at the age group of those who are in charge I find that they are all pretty much men of the Stalinist era. Those who probably favoured co-existence, have receded into the background during the last two, three or four years. I think that this is general knowledge, is it not? I think that perhaps the military situation has changed due to the death of 14 or 15 generals by tragic means during the last day or two, I do not know.

An hon. Member: I think it is only four.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Oh, no, no. Today it is 14; it was four yesterday.

Mr. Cadieux: I am a little puzzled by the situation. I noticed, for instance, that the Russians cancelled the military parade on May 1. I would have been more relaxed if they had cancelled some armaments at the time. The parade, itself did not mean much to me.

Mr. Nowlan: They did not have any generals to lead the parade!

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Do I interpret, then, that you are convinced that it is necessary for us to keep our guard up?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I believe so, yes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Does Mr. Sharp have anything to say in this regard?

Mr. Sharp: No, I agree with what the Minister of National Defence said. It is impossible to say what the intention of the

U.S.S.R. is. We do know something about their capabilities, and they remain extremely high.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Cadieux some simple questions—which may indicate that I am simple-minded about strategic principles. Would you agree that the present, so-called nuclear, stalemate is based on both the Soviet Union and the United States having effectiveness of the initial attack against them, they still have sufficient capacity of retaliation to effectively destroy the other side?

Mr. Cadieux: Generally, yes. Yes.

Mr. Roberts: Would you agree that—it is hard to assess degrees of stability—if we moved towards a situation in which one side had a second strike capacity, while the other had only a first strike capacity, that this would be a much less stable situation than the present one?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: Therefore, we have a very strong interest in maintaining the second strike capacity of the United States since we also have a very strong interest in maintaining a Soviet Union second strike capacity, we would be ill-advised to move to a policy which through a more and more effective defence would put the second strike retaliatory capacity of the Soviet Union in doubt.

Mr. Cadieux: However, there is the possibility of the development of a new weapon. I am quite sure that both sides are trying to overcome this second strike capability. The danger then, reverts to the original situation, in which you can strike with impunity.

Mr. Roberts: Suppose that we were on the track of developing such a weapon. Would it be wise for us to pursue it, and therefore destroy the second strike capacity of the Soviet Union, and create a less stable situation?

Mr. Cadieux: What about the situation in which the other fellow is developing it?

Mr. Roberts: Well, what about that situation?

Mr. Cadieux: What about that situation? Well, it means—and this is exactly what

seems to be happening—that you must react to it in order to defend yourself. Therefore, you must consider ABMs and a few other things. We would be in the position of being able to destroy the second strike capability, and therefore, be in the position to strike with impunity.

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Mr. Roberts: Our purpose then, is really to maintain—hopefully on both sides—not a nuclear support superiority, except in the sense that each side should be able to have a sufficient capacity to destroy the other side if it were attacked. That would be the objective of our policy.

Mr. Cadieux: The purpose is to maintain the balance.

Mr. Roberts: Let me ask what I suppose will seem a bizarre question. Suppose that in the present context of weapons—I admit future developments as you have indicated could radically change it—we had no antibomber defence, so that the 150 Soviet Union bombers arrived over United States. Would this compromise our effective deterrent, in any significant way, or would the difference only be marginal? Would this tend to take our capacity to respond below the capacity to respond below the capacity to effectively destroy the Soviet Union?

Mr. Cadieux: It all depends on what the targets were, and if they hit the targets. If you had 150 bombers with nuclear warheads, I think that you can inflict quite considerable damage.

Mr. Roberts: How much damage could they then inflict? You may have seen the *New York Times*...

Mr. Cadieux: I would believe that they would kill most of the population of the United States. It is as simple as that.

Mr. Roberts: But that would not, in itself, destroy our deterrent power.

Mr. Cadieux: Suppose they hit...

Mr. Roberts: That would still not destroy our deterrent power.

Mr. Cadieux: It would not. If they did not hit them, but suppose they did hit them.

Mr. Roberts: But even if they did hit them, it would not destroy our deterrent power,

because our deterrent power is based upon the capacity of the Minutemen missiles to strike back.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, but what makes you think that they might not hit the sites?

Mr. Roberts: How many sites could they possibly hit with 150 bombers?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I suppose that everyone of them could be hit. Why not?

Mr. Roberts: A thousand sites?

Mr. Cadieux: Look, are you talking of a bomber coming with only one bomb?

Mr. Roberts: How many bombs can they carry? What is their capacity to destroy, on the basis of 150 bombers?

Mr. Cadieux: I am sorry, I cannot provide the answer.

Mr. Roberts: Well, perhaps you have seen the article which appeared in the *New York Times* this week-end. Could I go through some of the figures with you to see whether or not they are accurate? It says at the moment the United States have a 1,000 Minutemen in underground silos. Is the United States, or are we as part of that alliance, now preparing to equip them with multiple warheads?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know.

Mr. Roberts: You do not know. I see. What kind of percentage of those 1,000 missiles would have to get through to inflict basically unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union?

Mr. Cadieux: Now, look! This is obviously a United States' problem. I am not provided with accurate information on problems like that.

Mr. Roberts: But, surely this kind of information is extremely relevant to the efficacy or non-efficacy of bomber defence?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, but an ICBM with a 5 or a 25 megaton bomb may be coming. Who am I to say, ahead of time, which one is coming?

Mr. Roberts: Does not a great deal depend not only upon the size of the megaton, but the accuracy—if you are talking in terms of taking out the Minutemen?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, both are very relevant.

Mr. Roberts: You are unable to give any conception of how many missile Minutemen, for instance, or sites would be left in operating order on the basis of an effective bomber invasion of North America.

Mr. Cadieux: Not enough to deter, certainly.

Mr. Brewin: Did you say not enough, or enough?

Mr. Cadieux: Not enough.

Mr. Roberts: We would not have enough missiles left to deter.

Mr. Cadieux: No.

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Mr. Forrestall: That is only one line of defence, Mr. Minister, is it not? Surely the United States...

Mr. Cadieux: It is one of many lines of defence; you are now getting into hypothetical areas. You can even discuss fantasy in this particular area.

Mr. Roberts: But, of course Mr. Minister that is what we must do when we are talking about the strategic doctrines of nuclear deterrents; since we have not yet tried them out in practice, we must try to make some estimation of their efficacy.

Mr. Cadieux: Mr. Roberts, you are presenting all sorts of partially hypothetical questions. For instance, you made mention of 150 bombers coming through Canada and bombing the United States. Are you assuming that they will come through?

Mr. Roberts: Yes that was the assumption that I was making, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Cadieux: Oh well, of course there is not any defence.

Mr. Roberts: According to the figures which were given by Mr. McNamara, as quoted in the *New York Times*, as long as 200 of the present 1,000 missiles, manage to reach their target, they would destroy 72 per cent of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity.

What I am trying to get at is this: would the effect of the bomber attack by the Soviet

Union, even if it were effective to the maximum degree, diminish our capacity of response to a level where we would no longer have a sufficient retaliatory power? Are you saying that that is such a hypothetical situation, that we cannot possibly come to any conclusion on it?

Mr. Cadieux: I think it is a hypothetical scenario when you talk of 150 Russian bombers coming through and delivering their bombs on target. I hope it is hypothetical.

Mr. Roberts: The question is, in that hypothesis, would it compromise our effective deterrent?

Mr. Cadieux: It all depends on how they would hit. They could be very serious. What is the rationale behind the present attempts of the Americans in installing only two ABM sites to protect the deterrent? Surely they are not going to protect 1,000 sites with two ABM's. Yet they think that number is a sufficient amount to protect the core of the deterrent.

Mr. Roberts: The Chairman would preclude me from getting into an analysis of the ABM situation, which may be beyond my knowledge in any case.

I assume that we will make some estimation as to the maximum capacity of the bombers to destroy. While of course it would be very unpleasant to lose a lot of our population, the basis of our protective strategy is to protect a retaliatory power. What I am trying to get at is whether or not our retaliatory power is compromised by that threat.

Mr. Cadieux: It certainly is, in my estimation, if you assume that 150 bombers will come through; this is why we maintain that you must be able to stop them, thereby protecting your deterrents.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I can return...

Mr. Cadieux: It is not only a question of deterrents in this particular case. You seem to dismiss the possibility of 75 per cent of the population being destroyed.

Mr. Roberts: I would hate to be placed in a position where it is said that I am gladly prepared to dispense with 75 per cent of North America. However, the strategic justification for our anti-bomber system has not been put in terms of defence; it has been put

in terms of deterrent. The two things are quite distinct. I admit freely that I do not want to see anyone killed, but in terms of the strategic justification, the relevance of anti-bomber defence is to the protection of nuclear deterrent, not to the number of people who may or may not be killed.

Mr. Cadieux: They hope that is not...

Mr. Roberts: Do you want to stop me now, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Could I put you down for the second round?

Mr. Roberts: Certainly.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan, did you have a question earlier that you wanted to ask? I had you down on my list, for a question.

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Mr. Nowlan: I will pass. A lot of ground has been covered.

The Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two or three short questions. Mr. Cadieux, last Tuesday I was asking General Sharp about the Bomarc, nuclear warhead which has a range between 300 and 400 miles; Which way are these directed? Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa are all within that range and I feel it would be like killing the fly on the baby's head with a hammer, if ever it were used in those directions. Could you tell me if they are all directed towards the North. I am sure that they would not be.

Mr. Cadieux: The ones that I have seen are directed North.

Mr. Legault: Yes, but are they not tuned in on the target, and if that target is too fast could they not follow through and hit it?

Mr. Cadieux: It is a proximity bomb and a nuclear warhead is necessary because it is a proximity bomb. It is assumed that you have to destroy an atomic warhead; this is why it also must be atomic.

Mr. Legault: I have a second question, Mr. Cadieux. Do you believe that Canada should approve of the AWACS and the new manned interceptor, such as those being studied in the United States?

Mr. Cadieux: We are studying it now. If you are asking my personal opinion, I believe we should approve it. However, if we decide that we do not want to continue participating in the NORAD organization, we must make some arrangements for the use of our air-space.

Mr. Legault: I have a third question. On the first page of your presentation it is stated, [Interpretation]

I have the French document here. You talk about some of the main functions, and secondly:

to be able to identify beyond doubt any peculiar or suspicious element turned up in the surveillance process...

One of the things that worries me and which was mentioned earlier, is the Maginot Line that was absolutely useless in the last war. It was supposed to give all the protection possible to France. I can hardly believe that an aggressor would use anticipated means. I gave as an example to General Sharp an unexpected attack by, let us say, four or five commercial airplanes which could paralyse the country without knowing the origins of these planes.

Is there no way of protecting ourselves? Our airplanes are identified. I am sure that it is very difficult for our planes to penetrate Russian air space without being stopped immediately on crossing the boundaries.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, it is the same thing here: as soon as a plane appears, it must be identified. If it is not identified, we have to be sure of its intentions and consequently we intervene with all available means. I believe that this hypothetical case has been foreseen.

Mr. Legault: Thank you.

[English]

I wonder if I could direct a question to Mr. Sharp concerning the policies and her own reaction. I am referring back to the 1962 Cuba crisis, where we were very disturbed by the events. Could the negotiation bring about a situation whereby the United States, for some reasons other than those we fear now, would be involved in a war? I think Cuba is a vivid example of this. Would Canada be implicated automatically in this war?

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Mr. Sharp: If there was an attack by bombers which threatened the security of North America, then under the two-key system, we would make our decision as to whether or not

we were going to respond. If it did not come within the compass of the NORAD agreement, then we would have the option of co-operating with the United States or doing otherwise. The NORAD agreement only relates to a particular form of attack; if it is another form of attack, then it is up to us to decide whether or not we want to proceed and co-operate with the United States in that defence. I think this is the best answer I can give you.

Mr. Legault: But the present contract does not carry this stipulation?

Mr. Sharp: The present contract is quite precise; it provides for the joint command of these facilities for a bomber attack on North America.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Cadieux, do we at the present time participate in Strategic Air Command in any way, except possibly in the way that NORAD gives warning to SAC? Do we give them permission for over-flights over Canada, for instance, on practice runs and that sort of thing?

Mr. Cadieux: Oh yes, we have the flight pattern, and the flight path. This is all agreed upon ahead of time.

Mr. Ryan: Are there any other ways in which we might co-operate with SAC, other than these two?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, the question of refueling bases which did exist before, but which do not exist now has not yet been decided. There is that particular aspect of it.

Mr. Ryan: I understand from General Sharp's evidence yesterday, and from the evidence of both of you hon. Ministers today, that Canada has reasonably good defences, if not excellent defences, against manned bombers. However, this country and even the United States, for that matter, is utterly naked, defence-wise, against ICBM's, FOBS or possibly satellites. Is that the situation?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, first of all the NORAD agreement concerns bombers. It is an anti-bomber defence system. The FOBS that you are talking about is a development that represents a threat. Against that threat you have to use the over-the-horizon radar, which is now an operational radar but not in operation.

Mr. Ryan: Not deployed yet.

Mr. Cadieux: This is the next phase of the continental defence system. As far as the ICBM is concerned there is this new development in United States—this possible development.

Mr. Ryan: My question is at the present time, right now—there is nothing that can stop an ICBM, a FOB or a satellite from dropped nuclear weapons on this continent. Is there nothing?

Mr. Cadieux: No, there is nothing.

Mr. Ryan: I understand that we have a good deterrent against the reasonable men in control in Moscow. But, we have no defence whatsoever if an attack should be launched by a madman, or by accident?

Mr. Cadieux: Except the possibility of frightening them.

Mr. Ryan: The main deterrent is all that we have?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions? Mr. Laniel and then Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Laniel: A couple of points, Mr. Chairman. First, I arrived late and maybe the question has been asked. Do the electronic counter-measures really affect our present system, or do they weaken the system of radar? Do we know enough of the progress that has been made in that field by the Russians?

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Mr. Cadieux: We are subjected, of course, to electronic counter-measures warfare, but we also have some of our own to neutralize them. This is part of the operation.

Mr. Laniel: In the past months or years, have we experienced any difficulty identifying aeroplanes because of the use of such electronic measures?

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Laniel: We assume that because we are doing research in that field, that they must be doing the same thing. Is this the only basis for that assumption?

Mr. Cadieux: I think it would be more so in the case of the ICBM's, in which you

would have chaff, duds, fakes, and all sorts of things. Your job would be to identify the real warhead. In the case of aeroplanes, there is no problem as they are detected and identified. The determination of intent is easy to make because interceptors can be deployed that could intervene if the bombers were to come over Canadian territory.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laniel: In his statement, Mr. Sharp told us that the defence of North America would be dubious without the participation of Canada, without a military contribution by Canada. I think he meant the participation of our Bomarc or of our CF-101, the Voodoos.

Do you agree with him? Is the fact that we have a Bomarc base in northern Ontario at a latitude that is somewhat higher than the bases that are located in the United States in the West of any great help to the defence of North America at the present time?

Mr. Cadieux: Of course, this is the problem. If the Americans were obliged to take off from American bases to intercept over Canada, then, of course, these would be problems relating to time, fuel, and so on. If they have to go back to their own country to patrol, they are unable to do so. Strategic bombers do not have that problem because they have enough fuel. If you have an airplane, flying, let us say, near Newfoundland, and if you don't have any bases in Canada, the interceptors have to take off from the United States, and meanwhile, the bomber can travel quite a distance.

Mr. Laniel: I am asking this question, sir, precisely to know whether, for political reasons, we have not reduced our defence capacity by putting our installations too much to the South. The best way to stop an attack against North America, against Canada and the United States, would it not be by placing our defence installations as far north as possible? Isn't this something we should have done in the past?

Mr. Cadieux: They are placed as far north as possible. The DEW line is very, very far North. And there is the...

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but the interceptors...

Mr. Cadieux: The interceptors we have in Comox are quite far North!

Mr. Laniel: Nevertheless, Comox is to the east.

Mr. Cadieux: I beg your pardon, to the west.

Mr. Laniel: You are right.

Mr. Cadieux: Obviously, in case of an attack the approaches of populous cities must be protected. And here interceptors would be used. In Newfoundland, they can intervene from the base at Chatham, which would give you relatively adequate protection.

Mr. Laniel: The population, especially in the densely populated area of the south of Canada, fears that, even if we succeed in making any kind of interception, the fallout will really affect the population. I wonder if we should not be thinking about a defence that would be farther north, so that interception would occur even farther away.

Mr. Cadieux: Well, the detection is done very early by the Dew Line (Distant Early Warning System) and the interception may be carried out very far north, as soon as the detection is made. Russian bombers have never yet flown over Canadian territory. They have come close to our shores, at a distance of some thirty miles.

Mr. Laniel: Since the first objective of Norad is the protection of the American deterrent force, namely the intercontinental nuclear force, don't you agree that, if we ever decide to set up the ABM System, it should come under NORAD too, in the light of the political implications, as it is the case with the Bomarc and the Voodoo squadrons? Briefly, if we want to provide protection, the decision must be taken at the same place, instead of having some people taking decisions as to the interception of ICBMs, and others who will decide of the interception of airplanes.

Mr. Cadieux: Then the problem is to reconcile the military decision with the political decision. We have to know whether the government of Canada wishes to accept to participate in an ABM system. And if so, then there is no problem, since the military command takes over. But, if on the other hand the government of Canada decides not to take part in the operation of the ABM system, then there is a decision to be taken vis-à-vis the role of the Deputy Commander of NORAD, who is a Canadian.

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Mr. Laniel: In other words, it would mainly be a political reason that would bring about a division.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Cadieux, reverting for a moment to that question of command, would it be possible for us to obtain a memorandum clearly summarizing the command procedures which would be followed in order to put Canadian and American interceptor squadrons into operation over Canadian territory. You made a reference earlier to the two-key system and incentive governments and that sort of thing.

Mr. Cadieux: I believe there is the element of classification and...

The Chairman: This is subject to classification. Is a general description possible? I am not referring to the use of the ICBM by the Americans, just the use of the interceptor squadrons.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

The Chairman: We have three Canadian interceptor squadrons. Could you tell the Committee to what regions these three squadrons are assigned: the Western, Central or Northern?

Mr. Cadieux: There are two Northern, I believe.

The Chairman: There is one squadron for the Western region and two squadrons for the Northern region.

Mr. Cadieux: I think the East is covered by the Americans.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: I would like to ask a procedural question first, Mr. Chairman. The other day when we had General Sharp before us, I asked some questions about the interception rates that we could expect through bomber defence at the moment, and I was told that we could not have this information in open committee. I wonder if perhaps this evening just at the close of our session we might meet

briefly in camera and see if it is possible to answer some of those questions. Would that be procedurally possible?

The Chairman: General Sharp is here this evening but I do not know whether that would be possible or not. Apparently, the information is not yet available, but we will if brought to the necessity of a closed session, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you. I do not think I have too many more questions, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps with your permission I could read one paragraph—it is only four sentences long—from Mr. Yarmolinsky's testimony to the Committee. I think it puts in a nutshell the strategic problem. I was hoping that I would get Mr. Cadieux or Mr. Sharp, or both, to comment on it to see whether they agreed with it or not.

One consequence of this nuclear standoff is to make the idea of nuclear superiority irrelevant. If each side has enough weapons, well-enough protected, to inflict unacceptable damage in a second strike, it doesn't do either side any good to acquire more. The arithmetic of this situation is that one attacking missile is not enough to be sure of destroying each missile reserved for a retaliatory strike, provided the retaliatory missiles are adequately protected and dispersed. In any nuclear arms race, therefore, the retaliatory force can keep ahead of the first strike force.

Is that statement of Mr. Yarmolinsky's one with which you would agree?

Mr. Cadieux: What was the last sentence, please?

Mr. Roberts: In any nuclear arms race the retaliatory force can keep ahead of the first strike force.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. That is to the effect that you should de-escalate, and this is the attempt that is being made now.

Mr. Roberts: His argument is, I think, that at a certain stage it does not do any good. Perhaps the image might be of two men standing with machine guns looking at each other and one has 25 bullets in his gun and the other has 40 bullets in the gun. It does not matter to either one of them whether they increase the number of bullets in the gun.

Mr. Cadieux: You may be right but this is the kind of exercise that NATO itself is going through now and has been trying to go through for the last two or three years.

Mr. Roberts: And can we apply the same argument. . .

Mr. Sharp: This is the reason why Canada has been so strongly in favour of negotiations, because we agree entirely that there is no
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point in over-kill. Indeed you can achieve the same deterrent results at a much lower level of over-all armaments.

Mr. Roberts: Could we then reverse this argument and say it does not do either side any good to defend itself any longer, unless by defending itself it could protect itself below the level of nuclear destruction? That is to say, if you are protecting yourself at the level of intercepting 25 per cent of what is coming your way, it does not really matter whether you improve your defensive batting average to 35 per cent because the difference between 75 per cent of the missiles arriving and 65 per cent of the missiles arriving makes no difference in terms of destruction.

So, at a certain stage it does not really pay you to protect yourself more effectively than at the present level, unless your protection went down so far that your retaliatory force is compromised.

Mr. Cadieux: You might devise a system that could protect you 75 or 80 or 90 per cent.

Mr. Roberts: I have just one other question, Mr. Chairman. Again it relates to Mr. Cadieux's statement. I did not grasp the logic of the first full sentence on page three in which he is talking about surveillance and interception systems and describes the three elements that are in it to make it effective. It says that:

All three elements are necessary if the system is to be sufficiently flexible to avoid having the threat of nuclear annihilation as the only response to apparent hostility.

It that not a contradiction, in fact, of our present position, which states that the system we have today does not permit us to avoid the threat of nuclear annihilation, but invokes the threat of nuclear annihilation against the other side? That is, the system today does not

permit us, if there is an over-all bomber attack coming at us, with or without a missile attack, to avoid the threat of nuclear annihilation. What our present system does is invoke our threat of nuclear annihilation in return.

Mr. Cadieux: No, I believe the system we have could destroy the bombers if they came.

Mr. Roberts: I see. Would the bombers ever come without also missiles being fired?

Mr. Cadieux: We are dealing with bomber defence. As I said before, we have no defence against missiles.

Mr. Roberts: We do not, in fact, at the moment, looking at it from the over-all point of view of missile and bomber defence, have a system which avoids the threat of nuclear annihilation. What we have is a system which invokes the threat of nuclear annihilation to the other side.

Mr. Cadieux: Except that the rest is the deterrent, and this is the rational. . .

Mr. Roberts: Indeed our objective is not to go to a system where we can avoid the threat of nuclear annihilation. Our objective is to maintain a system where both sides can invoke the threat of nuclear annihilation against the other side.

Mr. Sharp: I was just going to say that if you follow this logic through, you would then come to the conclusion that you should never have any defences except the deterrent. However, this is not a very sound argument because it means that the only weapon you can use is the threat of nuclear annihilation against any sort of an attack at all.

Mr. Roberts: What other weapon can we use at the present time?

Mr. Sharp: No, I am talking about the over-all system. This is the Maginot Line of defence. It is always a mistake to depend upon what seems to be the final destructive or defensive power. You must be able to have a flexible response, otherwise you are open to the terrible risk that all you can do is respond massively.

Mr. Roberts: Is that not all we can do at the present time to respond to an all out attack by the Soviet Union?

Mr. Sharp: No, . . .

Mr. Roberts: We do not have in this sense any flexible response at the present time because there is no defence against missiles.

Mr. Sharp: We could shoot down a few bombers.

Mr. Roberts: If you are looking at the system globally, missiles and bombers, we do not at the moment have any system of flexible response. All we have is the threat of nuclear annihilation for the other side. It is not a nice situation to be in, but is that not the present situation?

Mr. Sharp: It depends on how wide you are casting your net. If you are talking about the over-all system of collective defence, there are other means of flexible defence which might avoid the escalation to nuclear war. You cannot, I think, just look at NORAD alone. You have got to look at the over-all collective defence including NATO. The place

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where the risk of a confrontation might arise is in Europe, and it is there that it is most important to be able to meet an attack by accident, miscalculation, or somethin like that, which would not require you to go in for nuclear arms.

Mr. Roberts: Within the context of the North American defence...

The Chairman: Would you permit a supplementary, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I will after I have asked this question. Within the context of the present NORAD system, I am leaving aside NATO and conflicts below the nuclear level, is it possible to conceive of a bomber attack which does not also involve at the present time a nuclear attack? In this context, considering missiles and bombers together, we are dependent upon the threat of nuclear annihilation to the other side, and we have no flexible response within that system.

Mr. Cadieux: Did you not give yourself the example a moment ago of 150 Russian bombers coming through?

Mr. Roberts: Can you imagine any circumstance, Mr. Cadieux, in which that would happen without missiles being fired at the same time?

Mr. Cadieux: Why could I not imagine it? You can imagine that 150 bombers come through.

Mr. Roberts: Do you think that is a likelihood?

Mr. Cadieux: No, but I can have that scenario too. I think the problem is simply this: Can I quote this as the six objectives for an improved, and continued air defence program? "(a) Peace time identification to prohibit unopposed access to North America by unauthorized foreign aircraft." Surely you will agree with that, whether or not they are bombers.

Mr. Roberts: To be frank, I do not think that it matters, Mr. Cadieux. It is of no greater concern than having a nuclear missile submarine 20 miles off the coast of the United States.

Mr. Cadieux: We are citizens who do not think the same way. "(b) Limiting the damage could be done to the urban-industrial complex by Soviet bombers in the event that deterrence should fail." I think that this is a very important point... "(c) preventing damage from a bomber attack by any other country". Cuba is specifically mentioned.

Mr. Roberts: You are now talking in terms of defence. We have been talking in terms of deterrence.

Mr. Cadieux: I am talking about a bomber attack. "Precluding a bomber attack from strategic missile forces that are being intentionally withheld." This is, also, a possibility. "Discouraging the Soviet Union from developing and introducing new bomber threats which would be too costly to neutralize." I think that this is a valid rationale.

The Chairman: There is a supplementary for Mr. Laniel, and for Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Roberts: I have finished, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Do we have a bomber response available in North America under SAC, or do we depend on interceptors that...?

Mr. Cadieux: We do not have a bomber response within NORAD.

Mr. Laniel: Not within NORAD. I mean in North America.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, of course.

Mr. Laniel: Do we have a bomber force that could be used—let us say in the same way as the bomber force was used in the Cuba affair—to turn them back?

Mr. Cadieux: Not ours, but it does exist.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin, then Mr. Prud'homme on a supplementary.

Mr. Brewin: My question should be addressed to Mr. Sharp because, I think that he was discussing this matter with Mr. Roberts. He suggested that the doctrine of flexible response required us to maintain the type of defences, specifically the anti-bomber defences, that are in NORAD. I want to suggest to him that the flexible response doctrine has no application whatsoever, to a situation in which your defence is, by definition, not against a small or casual attack, but rather an all-out attack. 160 bombers is a fairly substantial attack, according to the Minister of National Defence. I am sure that it could be. This, surely, is the type of attack that must inevitably trigger a retaliatory response. I suggest that the only defence against an attack of that sort is, in fact, the threat of massive retaliation. Furthermore, it is a sufficiently affective deterrent. Under no imaginable circumstance—short of complete insanity on the part of the people controlling the situation in Russia—will they launch such an attack when faced with the quite fantastic result of retaliation.

Mr. Sharp: May I ask you a question in return, Mr. Brewin? Why then, does the Soviet Union maintain such a large bomber fleet that is capable of doing this?

Mr. Brewin: I am game. I am not privy as to why they started. I think that they are capable of doing stupid things just as we are.

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I suggest that they have very little maintenance of that. They have kept a fairly small force, and have concentrated all their major efforts on the ICBM's. If by maintaining this force, they are able to keep our attention directed to meeting a non-existent threat, then I think that, perhaps, from the military point of view, it might be a useful objective. Short of insanity, I still challenge anybody to explain to me the scenario of the Russians deciding to launch an attack with manned bombers on the North American continent. If that is the case, I do not know why we waste money defending ourselves against it.

The Chairman: Do you care to comment on that?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. My only comment is that you must defend yourself against any possibility of a threat. You must prepare, for instance, defensive measures and go through exercises to defend yourself against biological and chemical warfare, even though your assumption is that it will not happen. It did not happen in the last war, although everyone was prepared to waste money on that kind of warfare. However, they were all scared, so eventually it became a conventional war. You certainly must be ready in case it is used. In the case of NORAD, which is an anti-bomber defence, you are diverting \$138 million out of \$1.8 billion. You are not putting all your eggs in that particular basket. However, there is a threat.

Mr. Brewin: I could suggest a more useful purpose for the \$138 million.

Mr. Cadieux: I know that you can. But, you must live to do it.

Mr. Brewin: I do not think your force is helping me live one little bit.

Mr. Cadieux: I hope that we do not have to demonstrate it, sir.

The Chairman: Are you finished with your supplementary, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Yes, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme on a supplementary.

Mr. Prud'homme: Mr. Sharp, I would like to have a comment from you and Mr. Cadieux. In your discussion with Mr. Roberts, you said that that kind of attack could also occur in Europe. Is that why NATO is still very vital in importance?

Mr. Sharp: Yes. I have no doubt about the importance of the NATO alliance.

The Chairman: That is almost as relevant as the ABM question that arose earlier.

Mr. Prud'homme: I believe that NATO is an important question.

The Chairman: Do you have a question on the NORAD issue Mr. Prud'homme?

Mr. Prud'homme: No.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: I wonder if Mr. Sharp or Mr. Cadieux would care to comment, a little further, on the question of whether or not we have a defence. Based on the comments that have been made, it seems incredible. I thought that the United States concept of the defence aspect of the deterrent lay in the existence, and in the strength of the hardened containers. I believe that there are allocations this year further to harden the installation and increase their dispersal throughout the country. Viewing the concept in the light of the bomber, brings it into perspective. The credibility of a bomber threat—as I understand it—is that the bomber still remains as the only instrument of accuracy. Under the extended hardening, it would require an absolute, direct hit in order to wipe out the deterrent, which Mr. Brewin was discussing. Is my assessment of that incorrect?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not believe that it is quite correct to say that the only accurate weapon is the bomber. I believe that some ICBM's are now fairly accurate.

Mr. Forrestall: In an hour long program carried on American television networks less than two weeks ago, the observers all commented that the degree of accuracy was not known and therefore, was not reliable over the long range.

Mr. Cadieux: Reacting to the accuracy of the Russian ICBM's, the Americans have now decided to shift the emphasis from protection of the populated areas to the protection of the deterrents, using the ABM. The Russian ICBM's are considered accurate enough to hit the deterrent.

Mr. Forrestall: A near hit?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know.

Mr. Forrestall: Near enough to knock it out?

Mr. Cadieux: With the 25 megaton bomb, even if it is a near miss, you really destroy.

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Mr. Forrestall: Yes. Of course. This is an argument that is raging in the United States. I am wrong then, in assuming—and I have not seen anything to indicate that they are building up their bomber fleet, which has been in existence for quite a while now, and which does not even have replacement aircraft—that the maintenance of the existing Russian fleet was for the purpose of ensuring accuracy.

Mr. Cadieux: It may be...

Mr. Forrestall: Or greater accuracy.

Mr. Cadieux: I question—without being more accurate myself than you—the proposition that the ICBM's are not accurate. I think that at least, some of them are very accurate.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman I would like to make a comment on the point which Mr. Brewin brought up and also on Mr. Forrestall's discussion. When General Clark was our witness, it seems to me that he indicated that the ICBM's would come in probably within 15 minutes to half an hour. Then the manned bombers would come in two hours or so later. The Russians now have them so sophisticated that they can stand off 200 or 300 miles and pick off sites that have not been eliminated by the first strike. The bombers would be very useful to give a second, third or fourth bomb, if necessary, on these hardened silos. Apparently you can get to them, if you repeat the bomb two, three or four times as may be necessary. As I gathered from General Sharp, there is quite a role for a manned bomber backup. He is here tonight. I may be wrong on this.

Mr. Cadieux: I think the general idea is that the Russians have not increased their bomber fleet, but as our intelligence tells us, I think, they have improved the quality of the bomber. They have been improved, and are now more sophisticated.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, they have a better ability to stand off and hit the target. They probably have more decoys aboard ship and so on, to make it difficult to discriminate what kind of...

The Chairman: Material given to us at the last hearing indicated that our DEW Line facilities can track manned bombers and air breathing missiles, as contrasted with the BMEWS system which was used to track the ICBM's. What is the difference between an air breathing missile and an ICBM. Which is which?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Basically, one is an airplane and the other is a missile. It is similar to a satellite in that it goes up and comes down.

The Chairman: The air breathing missile that they refer to in this air space defence information on page 9...

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes, they can launch some missiles that use engines which require oxygen in order to operate.

The Chairman: Would this be a short range missile, then?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

The Chairman: How short?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: There are several kinds. The types that the bombers carry have air-to-surface-missiles. There are, also, sublaunched air breathing missiles as opposed to ICBM's, which go way up and come down.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Sharp.

Mr. Forrestall: Are these intermediate range?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: The sub-launched ballistic missile? Yes, they are.

Mr. Forrestall: The air breathing one?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Yes.

The Chairman: My second question, Mr. Minister, is; Has any costing study ever been undertaken to determine whether or not we are paying more or less than our fair share of NORAD defence costs? Can it be done?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, it can be done, but only by comparison of what the other fellow is paying, and on the basis that we are now—I think if you take the population, not the gross national product, of course; that is a different proposition.

The Chairman: How do you decide what is the right basis?

Mr. Cadieux: That is the problem. We contribute deployment forces which we think are adequate. The bill happens to be what it is. We have a lot of co-operation from the Americans on that. For instance, the operation of the Bomarc does not cost us very much; the operation of the DEW Line is paid entirely by the Americans, although 95 per cent of it is manned by Canadians. We have all sorts of varying things like that because even in Canada we do not pay for everything that is going on.

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The Chairman: I was merely wondering whether or not we had ever asked ourselves the specific questions; Are we paying our fair

share, or more or less than our fair share of joint defence costs, and Have we made a specific computation and study, or have we just gone along and done what we thought was right?

Mr. Cadieux: I think that you would have to define your criterion. First of all what is your "fair share"?

The Chairman: Has that been defined? If it has not been, then I presume that no such study was been made.

Mr. Cadieux: We have, I think, had the arrangement by which we were required to do some specific things which we thought were adequate. We said that we would take our share of that. We have been negotiating many times, as a matter of fact, for the manning of the radar stations. At times we have different trading arrangements with the Americans.

The Chairman: I understand then, that over-all, there have not been any studies made really to determine what should be the basis for the determination of what the American's and our own fair share should be. We have just gone along and...

Mr. Cadieux: I would be afraid of doing that because I have noted, in the past three years, that the Americans' share has been increasing and yet ours has been stable. Therefore, if you apply a type rational in which you establish that we should spend, let us say 10 per cent, since the Americans are spending \$1.7 billion we should then be contributing \$170 million. In four or five years the projection of their share will be \$2.5 billion. I do not think that it would be in our interest to raise that question and establish...

The Chairman: This is one incident in which it is to our benefit to be unbusinesslike.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, did we not have a witness who told us that we were getting a cheap ride? Not a free one, but a cheap one.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Sharp, surely, we have asked ourselves the question in terms of NORAD, NATO, Maritime Command and so on and so forth. Perhaps we applied the test to it, rather than asked the question. Are we getting a benefit both politically and militarily from the amount of money in relationship to one command or function to the other? Are we getting out of these our fullest measure of

political and military return for the dollars which we are investing?

Lt. Gen. Sharp: Perhaps I can answer it this way. Both Mr. Cadieux and I, in the discussions on our foreign and defence policy review, were asked this question over and over again by our colleagues.

Mr. Forrestall: I hope that Maritime Command comes up heads, and not tails.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps, I can stop being argumentative, and end on a happy, constructive note. In view of all the concern about accuracy, I can contribute the Pentagon's figures as quoted in *The New York Times*

Magazine. You must get 25 megaton missiles within 1.1 miles of the site, and if you are dealing with 4 megatons, you must get within $\frac{5}{8}$ of a mile of the site. The Pentagon's estimation is that 20 per cent of the Russian missiles would fail at take off and that 20 per cent more would be intercepted, so that 16/25 or 64 per cent of them would arrive sufficiently close to the Minuteman to render them inoperative.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions? If not, on your behalf, I would like to thank the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence for their very helpful evidence, and for their patience.

APPENDIX YY

Agreement to extend for a period of five years the agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the organization and operation of the North American Air Defence Command signed at Washington, D.C., May 12, 1958.

Washington, D.C. March 30, 1968
Entered into force March 30, 1968

Accord prorogeant pour une période de cinq ans l'accord entre le Gouvernement du Canada et le Gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique concernant l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Commandement de la Défense Aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord signé à Washington, D.C., le 12 mai 1958.

Washington, D.C., le 30 mars 1968
Entré en vigueur le 30 mars 1968

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1968

His Excellency

A. E. Ritchie,
Ambassador of Canada.

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to discussions in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and elsewhere regarding the mutual interest of the United States and Canada in the continued cooperation between the two countries in the strategic defense of the North American continent. In particular, these discussions have concerned themselves with the North American Air Defense Command established on August 1, 1957 in recognition of the desirability of an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over assigned air defense forces. The principles governing the organization and operation of this Command were set forth in the Agreement between our two Governments dated May 12, 1958. That Agreement provided that the North American Air Defense Command was to be maintained in operation for a period of ten years.

The discussions recently held between the representatives of our two Governments have confirmed the need for the continued existence in peacetime of an organization, including the weapons, facilities and command

structure, which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defense plan approved in advance by the national authorities of both our countries. In the view of the Government of the United States, this function has been exercised effectively by the North American Air Defense Command.

My Government, therefore, proposes that the Agreement on the North American Air Defense Command effected by the exchange of notes, signed at Washington, D.C. on May 12, 1958, be continued for a period of five years, from May 12, 1968, it being understood that a review of the Agreement may be undertaken at any time at the request of either party and that the Agreement may be terminated by either Government after such review following a period of notice of one year.

It is also agreed by my Government that this Agreement will not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defense.

If the Government of Canada concurs in the considerations and provisions set out above, I propose that this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, effective from the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:
Sgd. JOHN M. LEDDY

CANADIAN EMBASSY
AMBASSADE DU CANADA

Washington, D.C.,
March 30, 1968.

No. 115

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your note of March 30, 1968 setting out certain considerations and provisions concerning the continuation of the agreement between our two Governments on the North American Air Defence Command effected by the exchange of notes of May 12, 1958.

I am pleased to inform you that my Government concurs in the considerations and provisions set out in your note, and further agrees with your proposal that your note and

this reply, which is authentic in English and French, shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments effective today.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) "A. E. RITCHIE"

The Honourable
Dean Rusk,

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

(Traduction)

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer aux entretiens des membres de la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense et d'autres organismes sur l'intérêt mutuel qu'il y a pour les États-Unis et le Canada de continuer à collaborer en vue de la défense stratégique du continent de l'Amérique du Nord. Plus précisément, ces entretiens ont porté sur le Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord, créé le 1^{er} août 1957 en raison de l'avantage qu'il y avait à former un commandement unifié qui serait chargé des opérations des forces aériennes de défense affectées à cette région. Les principes régissant l'organisation et le fonctionnement de ce Commandement ont été tracés dans l'Accord conclu entre nos deux Gouvernements le 12 mai 1958. L'Accord stipulait que le Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord devait être maintenu en fonctionnement pendant une période de dix ans.

Les entretiens qui ont eu lieu récemment entre les représentants de nos deux Gouvernements ont confirmé la nécessité de prolonger la vie, en temps de paix, d'une organisation dotée des armes, des installations et des rouages de commandement qui lui permettent de passer à l'action dès le déclenchement des hostilités en exécutant un plan unique de défense aérienne, approuvé à l'avance par les autorités nationales de nos deux pays. Selon l'avis du Gouvernement des États-Unis, cette tâche a été remplie de façon efficace par le Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord.

En conséquence, mon Gouvernement propose que l'Accord sur le Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord, effectué par un échange de Notes et signé à Washington (D.C.) le 12 mai 1958, soit maintenu en vigueur pour une période de cinq ans à compter du 12 mai 1968, étant entendu que les termes du présent Accord pourront être révisés en tout temps à la demande de l'une ou l'autre partie et que l'Accord pourra être résilié par l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement à la suite d'une telle révision après un préavis d'un an.

En outre, mon Gouvernement consent que le présent Accord ne puisse en aucune façon lier le Canada à participer à des opérations de défense au moyen de missiles balistiques.

Si le Gouvernement du Canada donne son accord aux dispositions énoncées plus haut, je propose que la présente Note et votre réponse constituent, entre nos deux Gouvernements, un accord qui entrera en vigueur à la date de votre réponse.

Si le Gouvernement du Canada donne son accord aux dispositions énoncées plus haut, je propose que la présente Note et votre réponse constituent, entre nos deux Gouvernements, un accord qui entrera en vigueur à la date de votre réponse.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma très haute considération.


pour le Secrétaire d'État
John M. Leddy

le 30 mars 1968.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

43
Government
Publications



STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 43

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1969

Respecting

Policy—defence and external affairs.

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Marceau
Anderson	Harkness	Nesbitt
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Nowlan
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Penner
Buchanan	Laniel	Prud'homme
Cafik	Laprise	Roberts
Carter	Legault	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Fairweather	Lewis	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	MacLean	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson		Winch—(30)

(Quorum 10)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

TUESDAY, May 13, 1969.
(67)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11.10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Lewis, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Cochrane*) Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn—(21).

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Dr. George R. Lindsey, Chief, Defence Research Analysis Establishment, Defence Research Board and Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance.

The Chairman introduced Dr. George Lindsey and explained the nature of the briefing which the Committee would receive.

Dr. Lindsey made an introductory statement, dealing with the question of strategic balance and new developments in the field of air defence. Dr. Lindsey illustrated his comments with a number of slides.

The Committee agreed to incorporate the slides used by Dr. Lindsey in his introductory remarks as part of the Evidence of this morning's sitting.

The Committee also agreed to print Dr. Lindsey's advance presentation to the Committee and his biography as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix ZZ*).

On motion of Mr. Brewin,

Agreed,—That the Clerk be authorized to obtain, for members of the Committee, copies of the Proceedings relating to Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, as contained in the hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

On motion of Mr. Laniel,

Agreed,—That the Committee commission two detailed working papers, one to be prepared by Mr. John Gellner on North American defence, the other by Mr. Michael Sherman on the ABM question; the total cost of each to be paid to the respective authors, not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.).

The Committee agreed to print the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix AAA*).

Dr. Lindsey and Dr. Arnell answered questioned for the remainder of this morning's sitting.

At 12.35 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 3.30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(68)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3.35 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Allmand, Anderson, Brewin, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Laniel, Legault, Nowlan, Penner, Ryan, Roberts, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(17).

Witnesses: Same as the morning sitting.

Members of the Committee continued their questioning, which began during the morning sitting.

The Chairman took the Chair at approximately 4.25 p.m.

The Department of National Defence will provide additional information concerning the composition and functions of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, as suggested by Mr. Ryan.

On completion of the questioning, the Chairman thanked Dr. Lindsey and Dr. Arnell for their testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 5.10 p.m., until Thursday, May 15, 1969 at 11.00 a.m., when Members will resume their consideration of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, May 13, 1969

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we are ready to begin. I would like to welcome to this hearing Dr. George R. Lindsey, the Chief of the Defence Research Analysis Establishment of the Defence Research Board. Dr. Lindsey will also be appearing before the Committee on May 22 when he will deal more specifically with the ABM question.

Dr. Lindsey's presentation deals with the question of the strategic balance, stability, and the prevention of nuclear war, and with new developments in the field of air defence: AWACS, improved interceptor systems, and over-the-horizon radar. It goes without saying that these subjects are very relevant to the Committee's deliberations on NORAD.

Dr. Lindsey, whose biography has been circulated, is without doubt highly qualified to testify on these subjects. He has indicated that he will try to be as explicit as possible in giving evidence, but it should be noted that he may not be able to give precise information in all instances due to the classified nature of much of the information. One particular concern here is that much of the relevant information originates from non-Canadian sources and its divulgence in detail might prejudice further provision of such information.

I understand with respect to AWACS and other technical innovations the testimony will be in the main an exposition of the features and capabilities of the proposed systems. Members will know that, although the system has been proposed, the United States Government has not yet made a decision as to whether the proposal will, in fact, be adopted as a defence system.

As has been the case with other witnesses, Dr. Lindsey is a public servant and I am sure members will respect his position as they have with other witnesses.

Also I draw members' attention to the warning note which appears at the bottom of the second page of the written presentation which reads:

This paper has been prepared by officials of the Department of National Defence for the information of the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. In order to elucidate fully the issues involved it has been necessary to touch on matters which are still under review. Therefore, the Committee's attention is drawn to the fact that this does not necessarily represent the policy or views of the Government of Canada nor the Department of National Defence.

It is on the bottom of the second page of the presentation, just under the index.

A written statement prepared by Dr. Lindsey has already been circulated in advance, but he also wishes to make an introductory statement before questioning begins. This will be illustrated by slides. Those members who have studied the paper realize that it is divided into two parts. The first part deals with strategic weapon systems, stability, and the prevention of nuclear war. This is designed to give an essential general background for Parts II and III. Part II is included in the written paper which members have and deals specifically with AWACS and possible future developments in North American air defence.

Part III which has not yet been received, but which will be distributed as soon as it is received, will deal specifically with ABMs. Part I which does refer to ABMs and other matters is really just in here for the purpose of giving the Committee background information for the purpose of discussing Part II dealing primarily with AWACS and future developments in North American air defence. On Part III dealing with ABMs we will get more information later.

It probably would be most logical and most helpful and most beneficial from the Committee's point of view if questioning could be concentrated this morning on AWACS and possible future development in North American air defence and leave for our later meeting detailed questioning with regard to ABMs. Dr. Lindsey.

Dr. George R. Lindsey (Chief, Defence Research Department of National Defence) Analysis Establishment, Defence Research Board: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Both subjects that we are planning to discuss in the next two sessions are terribly complicated. Either air defence or ballistic missile defence are subjects of such complexity that one could spend a great deal of time talking about them in themselves, but you cannot really do that very sensibly if you are trying to get down to the basic purpose of the two. One has to consider them as part of an even bigger system, and an even more complicated one. Perhaps, in these days of systems analysis, we are dealing with one of the biggest and most important systems that has ever been created by men, and it is a terribly dangerous one. That is why in the written material a certain degree of space was taken to discuss the strategic background and the whole question of stability and the possibility of nuclear war.

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The third part, about the implications to Canada of ballistic missile defence, will be distributed before the next meeting, and we will talk mostly today, I hope, about the air defence problem.

Slide 1 shows the titles, including Part III that you have not received yet.

(Interpretation)

I think that the first two parts of the report have been distributed to the members of the Committee. It took a lot of work in order to have them ready by Friday last, and unfortunately, it was too late to have the translation in French. This is a pity, but indeed in order to discuss the matter we have used several new words in the odd terminology of the American nuclear strategists, and I have great sympathy for the translators.

[English]

Stable Mutual Deterrence

In the first part of the written text, the subject to which the most attention was paid was the one of stable mutual deterrence. It is believed by a great many responsible people that this does come as close to a solution of the difficult problems of the world as we are liable to find for many years.

Stable mutual deterrence is imperfect, it costs a lot of money, and it is fashionable to cast aspersions on it. But it really has served us very well, and I think it behooves us to

study it pretty carefully before we consider trying to replace it by something else.

I would like to say a little bit about each word, "stable" "mutual" and "deterrence". By deterrence, we mean the ability of one country to be able to punish its adversary no matter what the adversary may do to it. If we want to talk about A and B, to prevent specific names from being mentioned, A deters B if B recognizes that no matter what B does to A, A can still reply and mete out a dreadful punishment on B. In that case we say we have deterrence.

The word "stable" is very important, and by stability we have tried to imply in our paper two different features of deterrence. First of all, to be stable it is important that the ability to meet out the retaliation should not depend on having what is sometimes called the hair trigger response. That is to say, if A wishes to be able to reply to B for something that B has done to him, it is highly desirable that A should not have to act in a big hurry; or to have to set all his degrees of response to a level where he would have to reply violently to a dangerous situation, or what looks to him like an attack, although it has not actually been confirmed.

He should be able to reply deliberately, involving all the processes of consideration that one would wish to exercise with a terribly important thing like this. He should not have to reply in a hurry, if necessary he should be prepared to let the attack fall, to ride it out, and to have available to him, hours later if necessary, (conceivably even more than that), sufficient deterrence that he could still punish the attacker for everything he had done. One of the features of stability is that you should not have to reply in a hair-trigger way.

The other feature of stability is that it should not be sensitive to the exact numbers of weapons held by the two superpowers. In other words, if the deterrence were stable today, then if one side hears that the other side has developed a few more weapons of

• 1120

one kind or another, it should still be stable tomorrow. This should not cause either side to panic and have to take some immense reaction. So stable implies both of those things, as used in the paper.

SLIDE 1

STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS, STABILITY,
AND THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY CANADA

PART 1

STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS, STABILITY, AND
THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

PART II

POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS TO NORTH
AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE

PART III

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA OF
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

The third word, "mutual" is fairly explanatory in itself. It just means that whatever applies in one direction, from one superpower to the other, applies equally in the other direction. In discussing this sort of thing I think we have to be rather nonpartisan, talk about A and B, and treat the two superpowers equally. We do not want either one to start a nuclear exchange.

The Interaction of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems.

In order to talk in a little more detail about these systems we have to discuss something of the technical features of the offensive and defensive systems that form part of the mutual deterrent.

On Slide 2, we have shown the United States at the top, the Soviet Union at the bottom, we have grouped the United States offensive weapons at the upper left, the Soviet defensive weapons below them, and the Soviet cities and rural population on the lower left. Then on the right side we have the Soviet offensive weapons, the American defensive weapons, and the American cities.

We will discuss these blocks in a bit more detail. Let us start with one of the United States offensive weapons, the bombers. The main features of bomber aircraft are as follows. They are very vulnerable on the ground. Once they are in the air they are not subject to bombing by other aircraft or to attack by strategic missiles. They can carry a large payload and deliver it very accurately, but it takes them quite a few hours to fly from their home bases in North America to their targets in the Soviet Union. They may have to penetrate air defences. They are effective in bombing missile sites or bomber bases, provided the missiles and bombers are still there to be attacked when they arrive, and they are very effective in attacking cities.

The second weapon is the ballistic missile submarine. The better ones today have nuclear propulsion, and they fire submarine launched ballistic missiles-SLBMs. To carry out their task they have to penetrate an anti-submarine defence which is directed against the submarine itself, and if they fire their missiles the missiles may be intercepted by a ballistic missile defence system. When we put an anti-ballistic missile system here on the diagram we are assuming that if it is able to


intercept an ICBM in flight it can probably also intercept an SLBM in flight. Because the weapons carried by the submarines are somewhat less accurate and somewhat smaller than the ICBMs they are not likely to be effective in attacking ballistic missile sites if the sites have been hardened. They would be very effective in attacking bomber bases and very effective in attacking cities. The SLBMs that one hears about today are the Polaris and Poseidon of the U.S. Navy.

Then the third and perhaps the most important element in the offensive system is the intercontinental ballistic missile. It can be made comparatively invulnerable by burying it deep in a hardened silo, and both sides have done that with practically all of their ICBMs. It is very accurate, carries a large payload, may have to penetrate a ballistic missile defence, and has a certain effectiveness in attacking the opposing ICBMs, but that depends very much on technical features like accuracy, weapon yield and the hardness of the targets. It would be very effective in attacking bomber bases if it could catch the bombers on the ground. It would be no good for attacking submarines at sea, which are practically invulnerable once they have left port, and of course very effective in attacking cities.

As far as defensive systems go, air defence opposes the manned bomber, anti-submarine defence opposes the submarine itself, and ballistic missile defence opposes intercontinental ballistic missiles and also submarine launched ballistic missiles. Then we have civil defence, which will reduce the casualties, and perhaps save property by stopping fire spreading in the cities.

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One of the advantages of civil defence is that it applies against all these weapons, and if somebody invents a new way of delivering nuclear weapons on cities it is very likely that civil defence would help to save the city against that one too. We should remember that both countries also have a very large fraction of their population outside the larger cities, and they are generally not endangered by this sort of exchange nearly as much as the people in the large cities. The only condition under which they would get in serious danger would be if there were dangerous fallout spread widely around whole areas of the country.



The bottom half of slide 2 is really just the mirror image of the top, and we could say the whole thing again, although some of the labels on the national weapon systems would be different.

There is a certain jargon which one finds in the literature on this sort of subject today, and I think we will have to use some of those words if we are going to understand it thoroughly. Also, it helps us to comprehend the literature that comes out today. Generally, the Counter Force Strike is one which is delivered against the offensive systems. A Counter Value Strike is delivered against population, but it could also include other valuable assets of a country like a big dam or power station.

What we have tried to show you on Slide 3 is a very rough picture of the situation as it exists today, and to illustrate why we have mutual stable deterrence in 1969. The way that we illustrate it is to show what would probably happen if the Soviets should try a Counter Force First Strike, say, today. Suppose, for the purpose of the argument, that they use all their ICBMs on this Counter Force First Strike. The American anti-ballistic missile box is empty, because today the United States has no ballistic missile defence. Therefore the ICBMs could be directed against the American Minutemen and Titan ICBMs and the bomber bases. If they were caught by surprise and did not react fairly quickly, undoubtedly a number of bombers, and also a number of ICBMs would be lost. However, today, knowing the vulnerability of these, we would assume that the vast majority of the ICBMs would survive and probably quite a few of the bombers. The submarines are really not at risk against the Counter Force First Strike—at least not the ones that have put to sea. They are not vulnerable to this sort of thing. If the United States wishes to make a Retaliatory Counter Value Second Strike against the Russians they have the survivors of these systems, and there are lots of them, but they have to cope with the Russian air defence, which is quite good, the Russian anti-submarine defence, which is probably not as good as the western one, and they would have to cope with an anti-ballistic missile system which is not a very thick one. It is almost certain that each one of these three weapon systems would be able to penetrate these defences and would be able to wreak on


the urban population, in spite of the best that the Russian civil defence could do, a dreadful punishment. That is why we say that there is deterrence. It is stable because these systems are sufficiently invulnerable that they do not have to start the second strike the minute they think the first strike might be coming; they can sit and take it, and still deliver a completely adequate reply. Therefore it is stable from that point of view. It is also stable from the other point of view. If there are perhaps 1,000 of these ICBMs today, but if it went up to 1,100 tomorrow, or if the number of SLBMs and the number of bombers went up a little bit, the condition would still apply, and we would still have the mutual stable deterrent tomorrow.

In slide 3 I did not show the submarine launched missiles and the bombers taking part in the Counter Force First Strike. But they could do that. They very well might, but if they did, it is not believed today that even that would enable them to be successful. The other thing that they might do with some or all of these weapons is to save them as a threat against the cities. Presumably what the first strike man would like to do would be to disarm his opponent and then tell him in the subsequent confrontation, "I still have enough weapons to murder you—you had better give in." They could save any of these for that rather unpleasant purpose. Today, if all of them were in the first strike, they still would not get away with it.

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A lot of the plans and discussions that we have heard about recently in the United States on strengthening of defenses are being considered because there is a real fear in some quarters that this desirable state of mutual stable deterrence might not last very many more years.

So what we have indicated on Slide 4 is a possible development that might lead to the loss of the mutual stable deterrence. For example, if by 1974 the Soviets increase their offensive force by having 500 of these big SS-9 very large payload rockets with multiple independent re-entry vehicles, they would then have 1,500 of those warheads. They would also have their other 800-odd ICBMs. Perhaps, their submarine fleet will build up to have 1,000 deliverable warheads, probably from SLBMs with multiple warheads. Finally,



they may keep their 150 bombers, or even build some additional ones. In order to upset this balance, they would also have to do something on the defensive side. Let us suppose that they strengthen their air defence, and build a thick anti-ballistic-missile system. Now what could happen? Supposing they deliver their Counter Force First Strike which is based primarily on the missile attack, and that the United States has done little or nothing to change what it has today. The ICBM's would not have a ballistic-missile defence with which to cope. The submarines would still have to face anti-submarine defence, which is not as effective against the first strike as the second. The SLBM's would have nothing to oppose them, so they could deliver a very heavy attack on the Minutemen and bomber fields. The submarines would still be invulnerable, except the ones which were left in port. Now the U.S. have a greatly weakened ability to reply in the second strike. The number of surviving ICBM's might be only a small fraction of the ones before the attack. A certain number of bombers would probably escape, but perhaps not very many. However, all of the SLBM's would still be available. This very reduced number of bombers would have to cope with a strengthened air and civil defence. The submarines would have to cope with an anti-submarine defence of an unknown strength, and a strong ballistic-missile defence. The very greatly reduced number of ICBM's would be faced by a ballistic-missile defence. By the time that the strength of the attack had been filtered down to this comparatively weak degree, and the civil defence had had some effect as well, perhaps the resulting punishment which could be inflicted on the Russian cities would be too little to deter them from initially carrying out the operation. That is what people are afraid of. Of course, if this situation arose, we would have lost our mutual stable deterrence. The bombers might be used in this sort of attack. If the air defence had lost both its' eyes and teeth, this would be a very important addition to the threat. For example, if there were no air defence warning, all of the bombers could be added to the short warning counterforce attack. If there were no teeth in the system then they could use more bombers and they could carry a heavier pay load. Alternately, the bombers might be used as the threat to hold the cities to ransom after the disarming process had occurred.

That is, perhaps, enough about the details of the offensive and the defensive systems. What I have tried to do is to underline the importance of the mutual stable deterrence and to explain the importance of those three words.

Possible Future Development in North American Air Defence.

I think that we might discuss the second part of the paper. Indeed, this means that we are now moving into the area of study which is mainly on the agenda for today, that is to say, anti bomber defence.

What we have attempted in this part of the study is to make special reference to the future developments in anti bomber defence which might be of interest to Canada.


Next, let us make a brief review of anti bomber defence in North America starting in its early years, around 1950 building up to 1962 where it had stabilized into a form which is not too different from the present time. The outlines in those early twelve years are that the deterrent was horribly vulnerable. It consisted, at first, of bombers on the ground, which were not able to get off on very short notice. Toward the end of the period, a few soft ballistic missiles, were produced which were also very vulnerable, and which could not be used in a hurry. Quite rightly, there was a genuine fear of surprise attack. One of the things which was done in the face of this hazard was to build up early warning. The DEW Line was built along the northern coast of Canada. It was actually designed and financed by the United States but a good deal of its' length was in Canadian territory. It also extended into Alaska, and Greenland. The Mid-Canada Line was built along the fifty-fifth parallel. This was entirely in Canada and was designed and built by Canadians and paid for by the Canadian government. Then the Pinetree System was built, which is the outer layer of the solid ground based control cover used to direct fighter aircraft in interceptions, as well as to control air traffic. There were several layers, but the Pinetree was the outer layer, and was in Canada. It was jointly financed and manned, but Canadian servicemen did provide the greater proportion of the manning of the system. Then there were Interceptor Aircraft which included the CF-100 which was designed and built in Canada. It was later

RURAL
POPN

URBAN
POPULATION

**USA
1974**

CIVIL
DEFENCE



replaced by the Voodoo. There were Bomarc Surface-to-air missiles, in both countries. In the United States, there were two other surface-to-air missiles, Nike-Hercules and Hawk, but Canada elected not to procure or deplore those weapons.

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That is a quick summary of the early build-up of the air defence system. It would be possible if we wished, to continue with this type of system for quite a long time. However, certain elements would require replacements. It seems a good idea—when we are deciding whether or not to continue it—to also decide if improvement is required, instead of simply replacing items by things of the same kind.

Let us now discuss some of the problems which will face us in the future years. We should remember when we are talking about air defence, and perhaps when some of us are making rude remarks about it—that 100 unopposed bombers could destroy North America. It is also most unlikely that 100 unopposed bombers would come by themselves. However, they are a very lethal weapon and should not be underestimated. They have equipped themselves, in recent years, with an air-to-surface missile which enables them to deliver a weapon onto a target without coming closer than a few hundred miles from it. This makes them a much more difficult weapon with which to deal. The air-to-surface missiles will probably be too small and fly too fast to be easily intercepted. Another thing that has come about since the ICBMs were installed in great numbers is that the important installations for air defense, such as the airfields, the radar stations and the control centres are now very vulnerable to attack by missiles as well as by bombers, so that the vulnerability is much worse than it used to be. An option which is available to us would be to continue the present type of system. This would give us a good defense against 100 or 150 high-altitude aircraft, with bombs that simply fall freely through the action of gravity. However, it is now unlikely that an attack would be delivered from high altitude, because the bombers have learned to fly quite low, which makes them much harder to detect. It is unlikely that they would use free-falling bombs, now that they have these air-to-surface missiles. If we continue the present type of system, it would be weak against the low-altitude penetration and the air-to-surface missile. In

short, if we are going to continue air defence, we should try to make it more widely dispersed to reduce its vulnerability, and should try to extend its' cover downwards so that it can catch the low flyer. It should also be extended outwards so that it can catch the bomber, even if he does not have to penetrate right into the target. These are the improvements which we would like to bring about, if we intend to stay in the air defence business.


Let us talk a little bit about these types of improvements. We would like to extend it outwards and downwards to make it less vulnerable. Now we will talk about ways of extending the air defence system outwards. One way to do that is to improve the radar cover, and in these questions of long distance radar cover we will find we are always dealing with the curved earth. We are talking of quite long distances now, hundreds or thousands of miles, and on this scale the fact that the earth is curved is a very important fact indeed. If we have a transmitter and a receiver roughly on the surface of the earth, its radiations will have to go out horizontally or higher. They cannot bend around and come below the horizon. So that, normally one would not be able to detect an aircraft if it were below the horizon, and if it is flying low it will stay below the horizon until it is very close.

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Over-the-Horizon Radar

A system that attempts to overcome this is called "over the horizon back scatter radar" and it uses an effect that is known to everybody who has a shortwave radio and has communicated with radio stations on the other side of the earth. This is done by making use of the ionosphere, which is a series of layers of ionized gas some distance above the surface of the earth, and I have shown it on Slide 5 by the dotted zone. This ionized gas will reflect or turn back radio-waves of certain frequencies and it depends somewhat on the time of day. You will know that too, if you have worked with shortwave radio. It is possible, then, if we use the right sort of radiowaves, to send them up to the ionosphere and have them bounce back again to the surface of the earth. If we send them almost vertically they will go right through, but if we send them on this angle they will bounce down here, or about at the horizon

EXTENDING COVERAGE OUTWARDS



OTH BACK SCATTER

DETECTING AIRCRAFT

AWACS INTERCEPTOR RANGE BASES

they will come back to earth at a great distance away, many hundreds of miles.

It is possible to make a radar work on that principle and that implies, if a bomber is approaching, that anywhere between here and here, which would represent many many hundreds of miles—and it does not matter whether it is low down or at high altitude—it can be detected by this radar because it is bouncing signals off the ionosphere.

Here on Slide 5 I have shown the ionosphere disturbed, because in the polar regions, including a good deal of northern Canada, we have the northern lights or aurora borealis, and that represents a disturbance of the ionosphere. When the ionosphere is disturbed it is as if the mirror that we were using to reflect our signals here had been broken. If the disturbance has occurred in this zone then the OTH radar would not work. So there are some doubts about the effectiveness of the device in Canada although it would probably be quite good in other parts of the world where they do not have these disturbances.

We were talking about extending our radar cover and our air defence outwards. Obviously, one very good way to do it is by using OTH for detecting aircraft at long range.

Another way of extending it outwards, which we will talk about in a minute, is to put some of the control and warning radar into aircraft, the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) but there are other ways of extending cover outwards and that is to use interceptors with longer range or to put interceptors on bases that are farther forward. So, we have several ways of extending the cover outwards, the OTH back scatter radar being only one of them.

The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

On the next slide, number 6, we talk about ways of extending the cover downwards, which was another of the important improvements that was needed. Here we have the curved earth and here we have a radar on the ground which can only see above the horizon in this blue zone. If an aircraft were approaching at high altitude, it would be picked up at a considerable range, say, 200 or 300 miles from the station. However, if it were approaching at low altitude, say, 500 feet above the earth, it would come right in

very close to the station, perhaps 25 or 50 miles away, before it came above the horizon and could not be detected until that had happened. So that, a radar on the ground, unless it uses the OTH principle, is bound to give rather poor warning of a low-flying approaching aircraft. A rather extraordinary thing is that if the radar is moved just a few miles up in the air, say six or eight miles, that it drives the horizon away a distance of some hundreds of miles. Of course, you know very well that if you climb a high mountain or go up in an aircraft you can see a tremendous area underneath you, far far more than you ever could from ground level. This is simply a manifestation of the same principle. The thing that I always find surprising is that by just going up six miles you can see hundreds and hundreds of miles farther.


● 1145

If we have this radar in an aircraft, then, just a few miles up, he can see into this shaded zone on slide 6, which is very much greater than the other one. A high-altitude aircraft might be picked up 500 miles away and a low-altitude aircraft would be picked up still, say, 200 or 300 miles away. This seems pretty easy: why did we not think of it years ago? We did think of it years ago, but there is a catch to the method of solution and that is that when the radar is looking down at the ground, naturally enough it receives a tremendous amount of energy reflected back from the ground. After all, a radar works by detecting a tiny quantity of energy that is bounced back from the surface of the aircraft target. Obviously mountains and other objects on the surface of the earth are going to return far more energy than that, and normally return so much more that they create ground clutter which completely obscures the aircraft, so that it is practically impossible to see the aircraft because of the ground clutter.

The improvement in electronic technology that has made this thing possible is a method of distinguishing the moving target of the low altitude aircraft against the much greater clutter from the ground, and if this technique turns out to be completely successful, then in the AWACS aircraft we would expect to be able to pick up all these low flying aircraft and to have solved the problem of the low altitude tracking and detection.

However, if we are going to do that, it will take a big airplane with long endurance and

EXTENDING COVERAGE DOWNWARDS



COVERAGE OF GROUND BASED AND AIRBORNE RADARS

AWACS

A.I.

A.A.M.

it will have to fly at high altitudes. Since it is a big airplane with all those features, we might as well ask it to do the other things which we do in a radar station as well as simply detect distant aircraft. So that is why it is called an AWACS—an airborne warning and control system. The control implies that we would put into the aircraft the personnel, the displays, the computers and the data handling that would enable it to control the air defence system as well as simply performing the detection. It would be able to carry out identification, to match aircraft echoes with flight plans, and to control interceptors if necessary.

Improved Interceptors

That, then, is part of the scheme to extend the coverage downward and it involves the airborne warning and control system. But if we are going to be able to intercept low flying bombers, the AWACS will not do the whole job by itself. There has to be an interceptor that can operate against the low-flying bomber, and that means that the radar in the interceptor aircraft has got to work in spite of ground clutter. If there is an air-to-air missile controlled by radar, it has got to work in spite of the ground clutter as well. Fortunately the electronic techniques, that look as if they are going to solve the problem for the warning radar, can also be applied to the airborne intercept radar in the interceptor, and to whatever sort of guidance of a radar type there is in the air-to-air missile. So the coverage extending downward is largely to be solved by the successful application of this radar technique that enables a low-flying airplane to be detected against the ground.

Reduction of Vulnerability

I said there were three weaknesses to the present system and they were that the coverage should be extended farther out and lower down, but also that we were very vulnerable. I have not said very much about vulnerability here, but obviously if the radar is in an AWACS airplane it is not going to be at risk to a missile. So that one way of reducing vulnerability is to put our radars into the air.

Another way of reducing the vulnerability would be to disperse the units more completely. The fighter bases are vulnerable but if we were to increase the number of fighter bases and distribute the aircraft more widely we would have reduced our vulnerability. If we did that by simply setting up more per-

manent bases it would be a very expensive undertaking. A much more cost-effective solution seems to be to have a small fleet of maintenance aircraft that would carry the men, the instruments, the spare parts, the reload missiles, and everything else needed to keep a fighter squadron going, and fly them to these dispersed bases. That is another means of reducing the vulnerability.

I think the OTH radar will be vulnerable and not very much can be done about that.

U.S. Objectives for Air Defence

Those, then, are three ways in which it is hoped to reduce the weaknesses of the air defence system.

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We should say something, I think, about the overall objectives of continuing this improved air defence system and this is a problem that has been thought about very carefully in the United States over the last few years. On Slide 7 we have summarized the exact statement of the U.S. Secretary of Defence when he was explaining what he hoped to achieve by improving and continuing the air defence system. This was a statement made by Mr. Clifford early in 1969. The first objective was peacetime identification. They want to be able to keep track of aircraft flying over North America and identify those that have come in without permission. They would like to be able to limit damage to our—and that means American—cities from a Soviet manned bomber attack, but they are quite modest in their claims in this regard and they state elsewhere that they realize they cannot do that to a very great extent without having a comparable defence against missile attack. They would like to be able to prevent damage from air attack by other countries, and in the case of the United States they have Cuba very much in mind.

They would like to preclude a manned bomber attack on the withheld strategic missile forces, and this bears on the point I mentioned earlier. They do not want to have to save their missiles by firing them at the first sign of trouble. They would like to be absolutely certain that they really want to fire them, and this means being able to take their time and be deliberate and not be panicked by the approach of manned bombers.

They wish to discourage the Soviet Union from developing and introducing new bomber

SLIDE 7

U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR AIR DEFENCE (1969)

- "1. PEACETIME IDENTIFICATION
2. LIMITING DAMAGE TO OUR CITIES FROM
A SOVIET MANNED BOMBER ATTACK
3. PREVENTING DAMAGE FROM AN AIR
ATTACK BY OTHER COUNTRIES, E.G. CUBA
4. PRECLUDING A MANNED BOMBER ATTACK ON
OUR WITHHELD STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES
5. DISCOURAGING THE SOVIET UNION FROM
DEVELOPING AND INTRODUCING NEW BOMBER
THREATS WHICH COULD BE COSTLY TO
NEUTRALIZE
6. PROVIDING A COMPLETE MOBILE "AIR
DEFENSE PACKAGE" "

threats which could be costly to neutralize. They feel that if they show that they are going to continue to oppose the present type of bomber, perhaps they will not get into a large increase in the anti-bomber competition.

They would like to provide a completely mobile air defence package, and this is primarily because the United States wishes to be able to conduct air defence operations in other parts of the world on fairly short notice and to be able to deploy the system widely.

The importance of Canadian Geography

I think in completing this briefing I should say something about the peculiar advantages of Canadian real estate in air defence of North America. It has been fairly clear from what has been said, I think, that it is important to extend this system outwards. As far as the inhabited area of North America is concerned, outwards means east over the Atlantic and west over the Pacific, but northward has to be over Canada. Many square miles of real estate or of air space are needed in order to make a system like this work. It cannot be done in a thin layer.

If we are going to have aircraft operating many miles to the north, it is, of course, more efficient to have them based fairly near the operating area, otherwise they expend a good deal of their fuel and endurance time in simply flying out to the job rather than doing it. I think it is clear that Canadian geography would have an important part to play in a really efficient deep air defence system.

As far as the positioning of radars goes, there is this problem about the Aurora and whether a certain type of radar would work as well in Canada as elsewhere, and I think research is needed to find out more about that.

When we are discussing the North American air defence problem, we have to realize that we do own a good deal of the territory over which it will have to be done if it is going to be done very well. That, I think, is a fact that is unlikely to change as long as there is an air defence.

Sir, I think I have talked enough about this. There is a great deal of material in the brief that I have not covered, but perhaps we should go over to the questions now.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Lindsey. Before calling questioners there are

one or two procedural items to be dealt with. First, would the Committee agree to incorporate Dr. Lindsey's written presentation and the slides used this morning as part of the evidence of this morning's sitting. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: At the last meeting I was asked to make arrangements to obtain copies of the Senate Committee hearings in the United States and also copies of the reports prepared for Senator Kennedy's committee. The Clerk advises me we should have a formal motion for this purpose.

Mr. Brewin: I move that the Clerk be authorized to obtain, for members of the Committee, copies of the Proceedings relating to Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, as contained in the hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Also copies of the reports prepared for Senator Kennedy's group.

Mr. Laniel: I second the motion.

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Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: Also arrangements are being made, as we had previously been informed, to obtain detailed working papers from Mr. John Gellner on North American defence and also from Mr. Michael Sherman on the ABM question. Could we have a motion to authorize this?

Mr. Laniel: I move that the Committee commission two detailed working papers, one to be prepared by Mr. John Gellner on North American defence, the other by Mr. Michael Sherman on the ABM question; the total cost of each to be paid to the respective authors, not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500).

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, was this proposal agreed to by the steering committee?

The Chairman: Yes. I discussed it with party representatives on the steering committee.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I thought there had been some discussion as to whether Mr. Gellner should be asked to prepare a paper in view of the fact that many other people in Canada might feel that they also should be preparing papers and be treated in the same manner. I did not know that that had been resolved.

The Chairman: I spoke to representatives of each of the parties and they felt that this was a reasonable suggestion.

Mr. Allmand: During the first round of our hearings on NATO, did we pay anybody to present papers to this Committee?

The Chairman: No, just their expenses.

Mr. Allmand: All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that I was not too impressed with the paper that Mr. Gellner gave us on NATO. But if the majority of the Committee feels it is worth \$500 ...

The Chairman: It is a maximum of \$500. I believe it is on a per diem basis but with a maximum of \$500.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I was not here. I was not on the steering committee, but perhaps the other members know and therefore will answer my questions at the present time. What is the particular purpose of commissioning these papers from these particular men?

The Chairman: We have had a departmental paper prepared on North American defence. It was felt we should have a paper prepared by an outsider as well for the use of the Committee to help to ensure the greatest possible degree of objectivity. As I think I indicated at earlier hearings, we felt perhaps by way of an experiment, rather than calling a large number of witnesses as we did on the NATO inquiry with each one presenting a personal point of view, we would try this time to have working papers prepared, first of all on a departmental basis, but then have someone outside review them and make any comments and also add anything which might be considered relevant.

Mr. Lewis: Perhaps this is a good idea if Mr. Gellner and Mr. Sherman produce papers that some of us would like to see contradicted by equally distinguished experts. What is to

prevent us from insisting at that point that the other people we suggest also be commissioned to prepare working papers?

The Chairman: There would be nothing to prevent it if this was considered desirable. As I say, this is a new procedure and somewhat experimental, but we have emphasized in speaking to both Mr. Gellner and Mr. Sherman that the object is not to present an argument in favour of a particular point of view. The object is to review the departmental working papers, comment on them, and also to present on an objective basis any additional information which may be considered desirable. If members of the Committee feel that additional information should be obtained after these papers have been reviewed, then of course we can proceed on that basis.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I think frankly it may be a good idea, but I do not think we can very well go into this business of setting a precedent in this particular way of paying for papers and confining it to two people. I think it has certain dangers and I agree with Mr. Lewis that anyone could come to this Committee afterwards and say, "My particular pet view on this has not been expressed in a working paper and therefore we should commission someone to do it". I do not know what we as a Committee could say to offset that kind of argument when arbitrarily two others have been chosen to give what may well be an objective view. I think it is something that perhaps deserves a little more careful consideration before voting on.

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The Chairman: If there is any inclination not to pass this motion at the present time, it could be deferred. We could discuss it further in the steering subcommittee.

It is not a new procedure to commission papers. This was done by the Defence Committee a number of years ago. Timing requires that if we are going to have papers commissioned at all, we have to inform those who are going to do the work promptly. I have already spoken to Mr. Gellner and Mr. Sherman, but they can be told to defer their efforts if this is the wish of the Committee. However, I really think as an experiment it would be desirable to proceed and not to delay, otherwise the papers are just not going to be ready in time.

Mr. Harkness: Who is Mr. Sherman?

The Chairman: Mr. Michael Sherman is a Canadian, as I understand it, with the Hudson Institute who has done a great deal of specialized work on this subject. He is a man who was recommended by Mr. Dobell who is an adviser to the Committee. I have also discussed his qualifications with Dr. Lindsey who spoke very highly of him and it seems he is about the only man in the field who could do the type of work that we want done.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Do you have reason to believe Mr. Chairman, they would not do it without payment or is this something that you want to offer them, or have they requested it?

The Chairman: It was thought it was only fair if they were asked to present an objective study requiring time that they should be paid at least a nominal amount for their work. It is on a very reasonable basis, I might say, it is a maximum of \$500. As I say, parliamentary committees before have very often retained counsel to assist them in their deliberations and also have reached agreement on paying them.

Mr. Laniel: On this point, Mr. Chairman actually we want to keep in mind that this is not an opinion paper that we are asking from them, we are asking them to go deep into the subject matter.

The Chairman: It is basically a research paper. Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I personally favour the idea of this Committee seeing fit to get outside consultants on subjects as technical and difficult as this. The only thing I have in mind is that we all know that there has been a great controversy in the United States, which is primarily concerned with the antiballistic missile system; we are indirectly very much concerned. The only thing I would be worried about in this proposal is that if it turned out—I do not know what their views are—that both Mr. Gellner and Mr. Sherman were strong advocates of the system, I would certainly want to urge that we have some equally qualified people and there are very highly qualified people, like Professor Wiesner, for example, in the United States, who would give the other side of the story. That is the only note of warning I sound, that if we are going to have a presentation at all, we cannot hear all the experts, but at least we want to hear experts who can present, perhaps, two contrasting points of view.

The Chairman: I think that is a very reasonable attitude, Mr. Brewin. As I say, we did have a problem of timing. If we are to end our investigation within a reasonable length of time, we felt we could not possibly hear all the witnesses, or a large number of witnesses, as we did on NATO, as I say this procedure is experimental. Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I think this is an interesting experiment, Mr. Chairman, I think we should proceed with this. I hope it would be one step along the path to developing more expert assistance for the Committee. I think we should go ahead on the basis that you suggested, but I do feel quite strongly that the steering committee should not make the decision about who should be invited then and there. I think those people to be invited to work in this way should, in future, be discussed by the Committee as a whole rather than decided upon by the steering committee.

The Chairman: That was one purpose of bringing this motion before the Committee. As I say, in all frankness I have to tell you that in order to get the papers done in time, I asked Mr. Gellner and Mr. Sherman to proceed, but they have not gone so far that it cannot be stopped if this Committee feels strongly about it.

Mr. Roberts: My recommendation about that was simply for the future. In future when we get into this kind of thing really the people to do the papers should be discussed in the whole Committee before we proceed. However, I think given the present circumstances we should go along on the basis that you have described.

The Chairman: Then subject to all these qualifications and warning notices, is this agreed by the Committee?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

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Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, before you proceed may I speak on a point of order? I wonder if it would not be possible to have the NORAD agreements distributed amongst the Committee, not only the original agreement, but the rearrangements made a year or so ago.

The Chairman: That would be the renewal of the NORAD.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, I understand that there is nothing classified about them, that they have already been tabled in the House and that

there would be no reason why they could not be distributed. I think it would be very helpful if we could read them over and then consider what future changes may be required.

The Chairman: The Clerk points out that the notes of the agreement are printed as an appendix to our last hearing.

Mr. Ryan: Is this in full, or just notes?

Dr. Arnell: I understand there is a complete note.

The Chairman: If that is not so it is agreed that we should make arrangements to have those delivered to the members.

Mr. Ryan: When could we expect the printing of these notes to be at hand?

The Chairman: We are not in a position to tell you.

Mr. Lewis: Does that include the original agreement or the notes of changes made last year?

The Chairman: Those would just be the changes, would they not?

Dr. Arnell: They were actually handed to the Clerk by Mr. Robinson of External Affairs when we were here last Thursday night. I am not sure just how much he did give to the Clerk.

The Chairman: If not, the original agreement should be included as well. If the printing has gone too far we will make arrangements to have this printed as an appendix to the proceedings of this meeting. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin some questioning?

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman I would like to compliment Dr. Lindsey on his very clear exposition of a difficult subject. One of the objectives he listed that the United States have must be limiting the damage that could be done to the urban industrial complex by communist bombers in the event that deterrence should fail. I would like to call Dr. Lindsey's attention to a statement made in his report on the previous page, taken from Secretary McNamara's statement in 1968:

...No air defense system can provide significant "Damage Limiting" capabilities against the U.S.S.R. unless accompanied by a strong, effective ABM, a capability which is at present unattainable.

I am speaking of the situation in 1968. It is still correct though, is it not, that no one has suggested it is possible under the present technology to have a strong effective ABM capability against all-out ICBM attack even with what the Soviet has now let alone looking forward.

Dr. Lindsey: I believe that is exactly true, sir. It was pointed out that if the ICBMs could destroy all the cities it does not really make much difference whether you can stop bombers from destroying them. So they do not make a big claim for the value of "damage limiting" in the absence of ballistic missile defence.

Mr. Brewin: Ballistic missile defence not being attainable it is perhaps good reasoning to say that they do not make any great claims about the damage limiting feasibility of any air defence system.

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think they do. I think the most important reasons for continuing it are the other five.

Mr. Brewin: May I ask you about the AWACS? As I understand it, its main objective is to give better detection through putting your radar screens, or whatever they are, into an airplane so that they can be higher up. Is that correct?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, sir.

Mr. Brewin: I take it that provision of a new series of interceptors, is an independent

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proposition altogether. In other words, you could have new interceptors theoretically without AWACS, although that might be foolish, but you could have AWACS without the provision of the whole new series of interceptors; could you not?

Dr. Lindsey: If your only object were to extend the warning feature of the air defence system you could indeed do that with AWACS and no interceptors, but if you want to be able to identify, and if necessary chase away, or destroy, aircraft then of course you have to have the interceptor. If you want

them to go farther away from their present homes than they can today you either have to have more range or move their homes farther forward.

Mr. Brewin: Am I not right in assuming that the ability to detect manned bombers at least a matter of hours before they appear over their targets, or even near their targets—even near enough to use the air-to-surface missile—is in itself a tremendous element of protection against the use of such manned bombers? As I think you suggested in your talk, it would enable the targets to be off the ground to a very large extent and, therefore, the purpose of the attack to be frustrated before it has been made. Is that not correct?

Dr. Lindsey: That is particularly true in the case of the manned bombers that might be attacked by the approaching bombers. You can send your bombers into the air, if necessary armed, and you can either have them orbit overhead for self-protection, or you can send them part way towards their target. But that is done today on the fail-safe principle, so that they will not complete their attack unless the orders are confirmed later.

But in the case of the ballistic missile, as I was trying to explain when I spoke of stability, you do not want to have to save them by firing them. It is true that you can save them by firing them, but you would like to be able to use them when you want to, if you want to, and not when the enemy forces you to use them because he has appeared on your radar screen.

Therefore, I think that early warning does provide good protection for your bombers; but the protection it provides for your missiles comes with the provision that it obliges you to shoot them quickly, and you do not want to have to do that.

Mr. Brewin: I just have two further questions. I am not sure whether it appears in your paper—if it does I did not grasp it particularly—and I know that the AWACS system is still for the future and is still under investigation rather than deployment—but can you give any indication of what I might call the price tag? How many of these large airplanes would be required to provide an effective AWACS system for the North American continent?

Dr. Lindsey: Plans have been made. It is a very expensive airplane. I would say that

they would need several dozen, and the price tag would probably run \$1 billion or \$2 billion. It is a big, expensive program. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. Brewin: This is my final question. I understood you to say that our present interceptors are highly vulnerable, certainly to missile attack, and that this might be dealt with to some extent by dispersing them more. I am not sure that I understood that.

When do you start the dispersal? If you start the dispersal at an early stage does it not acquire a degree of permanence and therefore a degree of vulnerability? Does not dispersal at the last minute present quite a problem?

Dr. Lindsey: The probable use of the ability to disperse the aircraft would be that you would keep a certain fraction of them dispersed all the time. And if the situation appeared to be becoming more dangerous, and you were bringing your defences to a higher state of readiness before any hostilities had commenced, you would increase the degree of dispersal.

Mr. Brewin: Would not the sites of the dispersed interceptors be a matter for the intelligence people on the other side?

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Dr. Lindsey: It is quite possible they would, and it would at least mean there were far more targets that the other side would have to find.

Dispersal could be changed. You would not have to leave everybody in his dispersal field all the time. The fact that you have these transport aircraft around, would to some extent show that something was happening, but you can move the transport aircraft, and the ability to maintain the interceptors, almost as quickly as you can the interceptors themselves.

You have not absolutely removed your vulnerability, but you have given the attacker dozens of targets, and he is not sure which are the right ones, instead of perhaps a dozen targets. It has reduced the vulnerability. I do not suppose you can say you have absolutely eliminated it.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Because of the number of questioners I have made arrangements to continue our hearing this afternoon in room 112N in the Centre Block at 3.30 p.m. and, if necessary, this evening in the same room at 8 p.m. We therefore have adequate time for questioning.

In view of the discussion on this working paper I should inform the Committee that we have asked the Department to prepare the working paper on Maritime Command which, as was mentioned, is to be investigated by a subcommittee in the first instance. This may not be ready until the end of this month.

We should also give consideration to the desirability of having some outside source prepare, on much the same basis as I have outlined, a critique of the departmental paper. If any member has any suggestions about who that expert might be, perhaps he would pass them on to his party representative so that they can be considered by the steering committee and approved by the Committee, as was suggested earlier.

The next questioner is Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Lindsey, when we were discussing AWACS I had to step out of the room for a moment. I hope I am not asking something that has already been explained. Is there no possibility of performing this function through satellites as opposed to aircraft?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think it would be nearly as attractive a proposition. For one thing, the satellite would have to be 22,000 miles up, hovering over North America. An aircraft is a very small target and there could be an awful lot of aircraft in the little eyeful that it would see from that height.

I also think the difficulties of putting a very large radar with very high discrimination into a satellite are extreme. An airplane is big enough for a high-definition radar, but without very much to spare. From the picture one sees of the mock-ups of the AWACS, it appears to be a very distorted sort of airplane. It has an enormous lump on top of it. I think it is a bigger thing than one could put easily into a satellite. It is also a delicate sort of mechanism. I do not think it would be easy to launch it in a satellite. I doubt very much that it would be either as cheap or as effective to put that type of thing into a satellite.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Lindsey, to pursue the argument for the satellite, I understand from previous discussions and information I have and I may not use exactly the right term—that the Russians have orbiting multiple head missiles either on the drawing board or in existence. Do we have any kind of defence for this?

Dr. Lindsey: Here we come into a subject that I think we will discuss in more detail at the second meeting. I do not believe there are such objects in orbit today. I think what you are speaking of is described as the fractional orbital bombardment system, or the multiple orbital bombardment system. They are indeed practical. Many people think they are not as effective as a simple ICBM.

The defence against them poses certain problems. They would be detected later than an ICBM because they keep lower. It is not believed that such objects are ready to be used today, but it could be done.

Mr. Cafik: In your view, Dr. Lindsey, to have effective deterrence and defence do you feel it is essential that the United States involve itself in an ABM system? Or do you think we can maintain the deterrence without their doing so?

Dr. Lindsey: It depends very much on what the other side does. If the picture illustrated by my Slide 4 were to arise, where the Soviet Union greatly increases their offence and puts in a strong defence, then I would hope that the West would react in such a way as to retain stability.

There are two general ways in which they can do that: by making their offence stronger, or by making their offence less vulnerable. One way to make it less vulnerable is to put in a ballistic missile system.

I think it is very important for the safety to the world that stability be maintained. I think we have stability today. If one side does something very strong in the direction of taking stability away, one hopes the other side will do something to retain the stability. Perhaps it will cost a lot of money, but they will still retain stability.

Mr. Cafik: The Russians, in fact, do have ABM at the moment do they not?

Dr. Lindsey: We believe so, yes, although not a very thick or effective system, perhaps.

Mr. Cafik: I would presume that one would draw the conclusion that they intend to continue with their ABM system. If this is so, do you feel it is essential that the Americans proceed with their system along the same lines?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think you want to simply match system for system. What seems to me important for the West as a whole is that we are sure we have mutual stable deterrence. We have it today. Let us keep it. There are different ways of trying to keep it, and of course it depends perhaps more on the opponent than it does on one's own side.

The Chairman: I would remind members on this question of ABMs that we are going to deal with that more specifically next week. For that reason I suggest that possibly at today's meeting we should limit any detailed enquiry to the AWACS and improvements in North American air defence.

Mr. Cafik: That is fine Mr. Chairman. I have concluded my questioning, anyway. Thank you.

Mr. Lewis: May I ask a supplementary question that has nothing to do with the ABM but a general theoretical one that bothers me very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis on a supplementary.

Mr. Lewis: You talked, Dr. Lindsey, about the stable deterrence. At the moment somebody else has substantially more; you have to get substantially more in order to retain the stability, if I understood you correctly. My mind boggles at that. If you have the capacity to over-kill, as have both the USSR and the USA, do you not retain stability for a very long time, no matter what the other side does, because you will always retain a capacity for some very damaging second strike. Why do you constantly say, "Every time the other fellow goes up here I have to go up here, despite the fact that I may still retain, after the first strike, quite a lot of capability of damaging the other guy pretty seriously." How far does this thing go? Forever? Every time you make a new technological discovery and somebody pushes it up, the other fellow has to push it up and you just keep on keeping level: is that the theory of the mutual deterrent that you have, if I may say so, preached? That was my impression of what you said.

Dr. Lindsey: I think that is a fair comment, sir. I would like to say that the question really comes down to "How much is enough?"

Mr. Lewis: Exactly.

Dr. Lindsey: You said that today we have over-kill and I think you are quite right. We have enough today and we have mutual stable deterrence, and if no more weapons were built the problem would be solved. I think because it is stable that if one side does a little more, the other side does not have to react; but if the other side, as you said, does a lot more, then there is the question of whether the stability will be retained. If one side would have a little less, perhaps the other side could have a little less. But the really important thing is to not let the balance fail. Unfortunately it is quite true that there can be no balance if one side loads his end more and more and more because then the other people have to react or stability is lost.

Mr. Lewis: I do not agree with you.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Harkness: Dr. Lindsey, first I would like to ask in connection with the anti bomber defence of North America, what would be the most effective areas for these AWACS planes to fly in as far as securing warning is concerned?

Dr. Lindsey: That depends largely on the other instrument that I described—the over-the-horizon radar. If the over-the-horizon radar turns out to be very successful, and if it is not disturbed by the northern lights and that sort of thing, perhaps the AWACS would

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only be needed at the time that you wished to control interceptors. On the other hand if the OTH has gaps in it, or if it does not work when the sun spots are out, or something like that, you might have to fill in the gaps with the AWACS.

So it is hard to give a numerical answer, but I would imagine that AWACS would not be needed very often in normal peace time operations, but in the event of emergency you would deploy far more of the AWACS and you would put them at the distance where you expect to make your first detections and where you could carry out an interception. In

other words, they must be close enough to home that the interceptors can come within their radius without running out of fuel.

Mr. Harkness: Geographically, where would those most effective areas for the deployment of the AWACS be?

Dr. Lindsey: Over the Atlantic and Pacific coast and over Canada, probably a bit to the north of the Pine tree Line.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, you say roughly along the line of Edmonton, Saskatoon and so forth.

Dr. Lindsey: I think there, or perhaps a little farther north; something like that. Probably a bit farther north than that. They could always go out and then fly back. If the bomber is subsonic and the AWACS is in large jet aircraft, it will be nearly as fast as the bomber, so it could go out and on first detection fall back almost as fast as the bomber was moving.

Dr. J. C. Arnell (Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) Department of National Defence): On your other point, Mr. Harkness, to help you visualize this, as Dr. Lindsey pointed out in the briefing, the section detection range of one of these aircraft is so vastly increased over the ground station that the number that it takes to cover a given area is reduced to just a handful. The result is that you have a fairly wide choice of just exactly where you might orbit or, in fact, operate one in order to cover quite a wide area. As I recall from his slide, I think he referred to being able to detect the high flying bomber—was it 500 miles?

Dr. Lindsey: Something like that.

Dr. Arnell: Something like this, which is quite a different order of magnitude then we think of in ground stations. So that, one must not think of AWACS being positioned in the air at distances similar to the Pine tree.

Mr. Harkness: My original question was really as to where the most effective areas were for AWACS to be deployed if this system comes into operation. I would take it, it is roughly in the area of possibly 400 miles north of the Canadian Border, something in that area.

My next question, then, would be, to what extent would the effectiveness of the AWACS

system be degraded if Canadian air space was not being made use of and they were positioned roughly along the Canadian-American Border.

Dr. Lindsey: I think it would be seriously degraded because the desire to push the system outward would be utterly frustrated. It would make the contribution, of course, of allowing tracking to occur down to low altitudes, and it would reduce the vulnerability of the system and it would give flexibility because if a ground radar were to go unserviceable you could perhaps fill the gap with an airborne one. But one of the most valuable assets of the system, the ability to fly it forward, would be denied.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, the essential effectiveness of this system would depend on the use of Canadian air space.

Dr. Lindsey: For defence from the north, yes.

Mr. Harkness: That is what I mean, as far as defence from the north is concerned, which, of course, is much the most likely area or direction of any bomber attack.

Dr. Lindsey: So we believe.

Mr. Harkness: As to how many of these AWACS planes would be required, I gather from what you have said that in peace time very few would be required, but in the event of threatened attack, you would need a very considerable increase, particularly for control purposes, rather than for warning purposes.

• 1230

Are you in a position to give us any general idea as to the numbers that might be required in peace time?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think you could say that you had to keep a certain number on station permanently in peace time. If the OTH is completely successful, you might not have to station any permanently in position in peace time. That does depend on the OTH very much.

Mr. Harkness: In the event of the OTH not being very successful, what would be the answer?

Dr. Lindsey: Then if you wished to thicken up the long-range cover over the ocean you

would have to have, I suppose, one or two on station in each direction. If there were some suggestion that the AWACS would be used instead of the DEW Line you would have to have, I suppose, two or three in that area. Perhaps you would only put them there at random rather than continuously on station. It is very hard to give an exact number.

Mr. Harkness: In view of what has just been said, to what extent is the effective air defence of the whole North American Continent dependent more or less on the same amount of participation as we have been giving to the whole NORAD system if this new system comes in? In other words, what effect would it make on the necessity for Canadian participation?

Dr. Lindsey: I think the use of Canadian airspace would be essential. The AWACS could be based in the United States and fly out and do its operational mission and fly back to the United States. The interceptors could be based in the United States and fly out but they would not get nearly as far as if they were based in Canada. With the OTH we do not know.

I think the biggest contribution that we can make, since interceptors have shorter range and less endurance than AWACS, would be to allow interceptors to be based in Canada. Now, that does not say they have to be Canadian interceptors with Canadian airmen on board. However, if there are no interceptors on Canadian bases then the system would be considerably weakened in its ability to intercept before targets were reached.

Mr. Harkness: Would it be a fair statement as a summary to say that the change from the present system of the DEW Line, the Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line and so forth and the present system of interceptors, Bomarc and other ground-to-air missiles, if it is changed to this projected AWACS system, would not make any material difference as far as the importance of Canadian participation is concerned.

Dr. Lindsey: I think that is so.

Mr. Harkness: All right, thank you.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On a point of order, many of the members have been sitting on the various committees since 9:30 this morning, and due to the fact that we have two additional sittings today, could we not

adjourn now and then carry on with our work in the two other meetings that we have today?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay, I have a note from Mr. Thompson suggesting that we adjourn after the next questioner for the same reason. What is the wish of the Committee? Mr. Laniel is the next questioner.

Mr. Laniel: I can wait until after.

The Vice-Chairman: Is it agreed that we adjourn now?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: All right, we will adjourn until 3:30 p.m. The meeting this afternoon as will be noted, is in room 112N in the Centre Block.

AFTERNOON SITTING

Tuesday, May 20, 1969.

The Vice-Chairman: I call the meeting to order. If we can have some order we will get back to the questioning. Next on my list are Mr. Laniel and Mr. Thompson. They are not here. The next two on my list are not yet here either.

An hon. Member: We are making lots of progress.

The Vice-Chairman: Is it the wish of the Committee that we wait for another five minutes or is there anyone who would like to go ahead with some questions in the interim?

Mr. Legault: I think that we should go on with the questions that other members have. When those members arrive whom you have mentioned perhaps we could return to them.

• 1540

The Vice-Chairman: All right. Is there any member signifying that he would like to ask questions now? Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: No, I do not think so, sir.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, sir, I have another commitment this morning, so I am not in a position to question.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I could start. To be absolutely honest I have not had time to finish reading the paper. What I had read of it impresses me very much. I was rather hop-

ing that some other of the four questioners would be here to ask some questions before you got to me, but perhaps I can start with one or two things which may be elementary and which may have already been covered. If so I apologize for redundancy.

I think it is a first rate paper; at least, the first part that I read.

Assuming the airborne radar detection system was in the complete control of the United States, would we be able to link that with a control or an interception function which was entirely in the hands of Canadian armed forces? In other words, I am making a distinction between detection and the interception of hostile aircraft. Are there insuperable technical difficulties why these two functions of warning and control cannot be separated?

Dr. Lindsey: It does not make any difference which air force uniform is being worn, of course, either by the flyers or by the people on the ground. I think if one is going to go to the expense of putting this large radar into the air in a big aircraft with lots of endurance it probably is quite efficient to add other functions to it as well and, of course, the control is the thing that was planned. However, I think the answer to your question is that it would be technically possible to have the warning in AWACS aircraft and the control on the ground but, of course, the area in which the interceptors could go would then be limited by the present cover of the ground-based radar. That is not too bad, but it would mean you would not have the ability to go farther forward.

Mr. Roberts: The interceptors would then be dependent upon the ground-based radar. There is no way of linking the interceptors, as it were, to the airborne radar.

Dr. Lindsey: Oh yes, there is. I thought you were postulating that the AWACS aircraft were only used for warning and not for control. It is intended that they be used for both. In the big AWACS aircraft you have radar that enables you to detect a bomber and you have computers, personnel and display facilities that enables the crew to control interceptors to make identification runs on the bomber or to attack him if necessary, and they will have all the information they need to identify by flight plan correlation. Indeed, the intention is that in the AWACS aircraft you can carry out all the functions that are done on

the ground today, so I think you can do everything in the air that is done on the ground.

Mr. Roberts: You may have answered my second question already, but perhaps I will put it in any case. I am puzzled why we need both defensive missiles as well as interceptor aircraft to bring down aircraft. I wonder, for instance, if it would not be possible to abandon interceptor aircraft and rely entirely upon missiles to bring down hostile airplanes. Is the answer that you need the interceptors in order to make identification? Is it to make assurance doubly sure, or would it not be technically feasible to simply rely upon a missile defence rather than using manned aircraft as well?

Dr. Lindsey: One of the functions that are carried out in peacetime is the identification of incoming air traffic. The first step in that connection is to compare their position and their track with flight plans, and virtually all of the tracks are identified in this way. However, once in a while you will find an aircraft that does not meet up with any flight plans and an attempt is made to contact them on the radio. If he cannot satisfy the people on the ground as to who he is, the next step is to send up a manned interceptor. The manned interceptor is not going to attack him, he is there to identify him, and in order to do that he has to fly close to him and, if possible, read his tail number and find out exactly who he is so that he can be punished by some sort of legal means later on for breaking the rules. Of course, you must have a manned interceptor to be able to do that. A missile could not do that for you.

Mr. Roberts: Right. Could I perhaps turn the tables a bit and ask if we could rely entirely on manned interceptors and do away with a missile defence, or is that again not feasible?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, you could do that. Of course, for many years that was the basis of all air defence. There are several reasons for having two or three different sorts of weapon systems. It complicates the problem for the attacker. It is a type of insurance against some unexpected catastrophic failure. Actually, it is probable that the surface-to-air missile would be more efficient against a highly concentrated attack. You could get along with

• 1545

manned interceptors only, but I suspect it is

not as efficient if you are going to have a fairly strong defence.

Dr. Arnell: It has been brought out a number of times that it is much cheaper from the cost-effectiveness point of view but it does not have the identification capability. So, you can cheapen your defence by having some for the kill but you have to have your interceptors for identification.

Mr. Roberts: Is it possible to say if this identification function is one which is often exercised? Does it happen often or is it a very rare occurrence?

Dr. Lindsey: On the average, it happens several times every day—today and yesterday.

Mr. Roberts: To go on to a slightly different point...

Mr. Winch: Before you leave that subject, may I ask if a manned interceptor also has a kill capability?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, he does. Having given him the performance necessary to make one of these identification passes, it does not require a great deal of additional weight in the airframe to give him a weapon he could use if he ever had to. I believe all of the interceptors we use for identification are also armed, and they could kill if necessary.

Mr. Winch: They are even armed in peacetime?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, they are.

Mr. Brewin: May I ask a supplementary?

The Vice-Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: As I understand it, the using of the Bomarc or other missiles from the ground would be appropriate to a fairly large scale attack but it would not be appropriate to an incidental invasion of Canada's air space. Is that right? In order to justify the use of a full scale missile response or defence you would have to be reasonably assured there was going to be a fairly large scale invasion of the North American air space with hostile intent, would you not?

Dr. Lindsey: I think if a small number of unidentified aircraft appeared and you were

not quite sure whether they were bent on mischief or not, you would almost certainly cope with them by manned interceptors. This is partly because you could call them back right up until the last moment if you found you did not want to attack them.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Harkness on a supplementary.

Mr. Harkness: Is it not also a fact, as far as the Bomarcs are concerned, that as they are only armed with a nuclear weapon they could not be used until authority had first been secured from the President of the United States and then from the Government of Canada.

Dr. Lindsey: That is a very pertinent point, sir, and you are absolutely right.

Mr. Harkness: So it is only under these circumstances that the missiles would ever be used.

Dr. Lindsey: That is so.

The Vice-Chairman: Are you finished, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: No.

The Vice-Chairman: Go ahead, then.

Mr. Roberts: I appreciate that obviously it is more efficient if the necessary facilities for an AWACS system are based in Canada as well as outside Canadian territorial limits, although you mentioned this morning that it would certainly be feasible, though more expensive and more inconvenient, to organize the airborne warning and control system entirely from United States territory. I realize this is a hypothetical and difficult kind of question, but could you give any kind of estimate of how inconvenient it would be? What would the increase in cost or expense be of providing a system entirely from American territory, perhaps with the use of Canadian air space but without the necessity of using Canadian-based ground installations.

Dr. Lindsey: One way to give a rough numerical answer to that would be to say that if the aircraft had an endurance time of 16 hours and it took him three hours to fly from the northern United States to his operational station, then six of his 16 hours would be fruitlessly spent in transit and 10 of them would be usefully spent on task, so I suppose it would have cost you sixteen-tenths as much

as if he had lived right at his operational station. Simply in terms of flying time that sort of ratio would apply. Of course, it might be more expensive to build and maintain an air base in the North than it would be in the South.

• 1550

Mr. Roberts: I certainly do not want to provoke a debate but I wonder how important that kind of a consideration is. I know the United States sends countless training flights and exercise flights all over the world, but would an increase of 10 hours of time necessarily be a very expensive factor in the over-all operation of such a detection system?

Dr. Lindsey: I think it would be because it would be reflected in the number of aircraft you would have to buy to carry out your task. If you had to buy 60 per cent more of these very expensive aircraft, then the bill would be substantially increased.

Mr. Roberts: Did you give us a cost estimate of each aircraft this morning? Perhaps I missed it.

Dr. Lindsey: No, I did not. I said it was very expensive and the total bill for a few dozen would probably run \$1 billion to \$2 billion. Somebody told me afterwards that this was based on an estimate of 45 AWACS aircraft.

Mr. Roberts: Forty-five for \$2 billion.

Dr. Lindsey: Well, it is somewhere between \$1 million and \$2 billion; it is somewhere in that region. They are very expensive.

Mr. Roberts: Well, that makes it what?

Dr. Lindsey: You should not just divide.

Mr. Roberts: They are about \$40 million each on the average.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, but this would include the maintenance and the personnel and all the backup and overhead costs. This is an expensive program without question.

Dr. Arnell: There is another point I would just like to add, Mr. Roberts. You have been raising questions on the control aspect. As I think Dr. Lindsey brought out this morning, the AWACS airplane really produces a more versatile ground control radar set-up and because of its range it really does the equivalent

you might say, just to use an analogy, of a sector of radar; it is where there are a number of radars. While within a sector on the ground you have to provide another level of controls in order to pass from radar to radar, within the AWAC System there still has to be a higher level of control in the same sense that we have within NORAD the northern regions and so on.

So one could still envisage an upper level of control above the AWACS airplane because there is still going to be the problem of handing over, if you like, from one sector as represented by one aircraft to another one. Although this has not been analysed through to this point yet, you could, in fact, say that the northern NORAD region would still be retained as the top control level being passed to a particular aircraft to exercise the control of interceptors within it. I think you should look more at the tactical control of the interceptor rather than the over-all control.

Mr. Roberts: What I am trying to get at in my stumbling fashion is the extent of the increased costs of this AWAC System. What it provides for us that is not provided otherwise and how important that is to us. I, at one time, had almost hoped it might cost us a lot less than the present system. Could we have some estimation? The over-all estimate we have received for NORAD at the present time, I think, is \$2 billion a year, of which Canada's percentage runs roughly between 8 to 10 per cent or I think the figure was \$135 million or \$136 million. If Canada and the United States went into the AWAC System, what kind of costs would we be looking at in comparison with that present \$2 billion figure?

Dr. Lindsey: I think we can answer that one, yes. If the American plan is carried out for the next 10 years, they estimate that the total cost over the 10 years would be \$12.3 billion. If they keep the present scheme going for 10 years, it is somewhat less than that \$11 point something billion. However, the \$12.3 billion would involve heavier than average expenditure in the early years for buying the capital equipment like the AWACS aircraft. Toward the end of the 10 years there would be far less people in the system, and people are very expensive these days. The annual personnel operations and maintenance bill for the last few years of the 10 years was estimated at \$690 million and that is a lot less than the annual cost today. So, you are right; in

the end once you had spent the capital costs you would have made the system cheaper to operate on a straight maintenance basis.

• 1555

Dr. Arnell: I think it was really said at the time that this new program was designed to provide the whole new system and taking the 10-year cost it was essentially the same as would have gone into the present system. However, by gradually running down the present system and using that money for capital you ended up with a system whose operation and maintenance costs would be something in the order of 60 to 65 per cent of what the present system was.

Mr. Roberts: I really was asking questions along that line because I was encouraged by page 7 of the brief which expressed very clearly some of the things I was trying to get at the other day. It makes the point which is paradoxical, but I think true, that increased defence is an extremely dangerous thing if it brings into discredit the other side's effective deterrent and that leads to a less stable situation than we have at the moment when each side has an effective second strike deterrent against the other.

I wondered, therefore, whether these changes which are being considered were going to increase our defence or whether they were simply going to provide us with roughly the same kind of defence we have had in the past, but do it more efficiently and more effectively. If the argument were that this system were going to radically improve our defence posture rather than our deterrent posture, it might run into criticism along the line of the arguments that you have presented on page 7?

Dr. Lindsey: I think the total ability of the improved and modified defence would really just be to cope with about the sort of attack that we might get today, except that, if it were to come in low or to use the air-to-surface missile we would then be able to cope with it. If we do not make these improvements we would then be open and less effective against that sort of attack. The total number of interceptors in the modified plan is quite a lot less than we have today. I do not think it really gives us very much more capability. It is rather more a matter of plugging the holes that there are and not paying any more for it either, making it in the end a little cheaper.

Mr. Roberts: May I ask one further question, Mr. Chairman, along these lines? We had a discussion the other night in the Committee and I had been taking the point of view that essentially bomber defence was irrelevant because the bomber threat was irrelevant to our present situation of nuclear deterrence which is based on the intercontinental ballistic missile. An argument was presented which I think is worth considering; that is, if in fact you do develop some kind of safeguard or control system or defence system against ballistic missiles then the manned bomber would come back into its own as a threat. Then it would have been unwise to dismantle the bomber defence system in view of the fact that a bomber attack system could be easily mounted again.

Would you agree in the present situation of mutual deterrence which depends upon the ability of both sides to deliver effectively intercontinental ballistic missiles that what we are talking about when we talk about the maintenance or the improvement of bomber defence is the maintenance of a defence effort which is not crucial at the moment but conceivably could become crucial in the future if there were effective missile defence systems developed?

Dr. Lindsey: I think that is true in terms of the major strategic balance which is what we are discussing today, but also a modest air defence capability does useful things for you in peacetime as well, such as identifying air traffic and policing airspace. We do want to continue that as well. However, it is quite true that if we suddenly wanted a good bomber defence in 1978 it would be much harder to create it out of nothing than to have maintained something and then make it a bit stronger.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps some of your other questioners have arrived by now, Mr. Chairman, and I could come back later if there are other questioners.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Roberts, that is the case. Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, the questions I wanted to ask were more or less the same as Mr. Roberts'; therefore, I will only ask a supplementary question.

• 1600

On page 21, your brief states that the total cost of the program is \$12.3 billion. I under-

stand this to cover both the AWACS and the modified interceptors, as a matter of fact to cover the whole program. Is it contemplated that if Canada were to participate in this new program it would share in that total amount or would its expenditures be in addition to that amount?

Dr. Lindsey: This cost estimate was made by the United States and it was only the expenses they expected to pay for their part of the system. If we used some of their equipment, then I suppose it would all come under the same total cost. If we bought some additional equipment of our own I suppose it would have to be added. Do not forget, though, that we now maintain quite a substantial part of the air defence system; the Pinetree radar line and the interceptor squadrons, and they had assumed that we would continue to do that.

Mr. Allmand: You have stated that the purchase of approximately 45 AWACS aircraft would cost between \$1 billion and \$2 billion. What about the interceptor side of the program? What sort of interceptor would Canada use? I notice you mention that the Americans contemplate modifying certain aircraft that they have. Would we be required to purchase those aircraft? Or do we have any aircraft on the horizon that could be used in this interceptor role? I was going to ask if the CF-5 was appropriate, although I do not think it is. I was going to ask you that question further on, Dr. Lindsey.

Dr. Lindsey: We do not have the answer to your question. Presumably if some of these aircraft are operated in Canada they should take advantage of these new abilities to operate at low altitude and to work with the AWACS. And we do not know yet what fighters we would like to buy or modify if we were going to do that.

I do not think the CF-5 would be up to this job. I think you would have to have a rather bigger aircraft than that, able to carry a larger radar and a larger air-to-air missile. But there are studies underway to see what would be the best solution to that problem.

Mr. Allmand: So we would probably have to purchase new interceptor aircraft for which we have not yet made any estimates or proposals?

Dr. Lindsey: I think that is true.

20374—3

Mr. Allmand: So that if we purchased these 45 AWACS which would cost approximately \$1 to \$2 billion, we would also have to purchase interceptor aircraft. We have no aircraft to modify.

Dr. Lindsey: There is no expectation that Canada would be footing this bill of \$1 to \$2 billions for the 45 AWACS. This would be the rement for the entire system.

Mr. Allmand: Oh, I see.

Dr. Lindsey: It would be either all or mostly an American purchase.

Mr. Allmand: It is good that you clarified that.

Dr. Lindsey: I am sorry. I did not mean to . . .

Mr. Allmand: Maybe it is my fault. Would Canada be obliged to purchase any of the AWAC aircraft?

Dr. Lindsey: Canada would not be obliged to do anything. That is really our business what we decide to do.

Mr. Allmand: I realize that, but if we were to co-operate in the program, is it suggested that we share in the cost of the program?

Dr. Lindsey: There has not been discussion down to the level of deciding who would pay for what yet. That problem has not been faced yet.

Mr. Allmand: I see. In the Department of National Defence, do they use the standard or methods that I am led to believe are used in other departments, the cost benefit ratio?

Dr. Lindsey: Oh, that is one of the ways that we try to judge what we should do. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Lindsey, this morning when you were describing the possibilities for attack by the Soviet Union, in preparing a scenario for that attack you did not contemplate the use of bombers. The first line of attack you thought would be the ICBMs, and the next line of attack by the Soviet Union would be the missiles from submarines. You yourself said it was unlikely that there would be a bomber attack. With this great expenditure of \$12.3 billion for anti-bomber attack, it would occur to me that if you use a cost

benefit ratio, there are high, high costs with very little benefits if you expect that there would be very little likelihood of a bomber attack. You are spending an awful large sum of money with very little expectation that there will be that type of attack.

Dr. Lindsey: It is true that on the chart we discussed this morning, we did not have the bomber partaking in the counterforce first strike, and I thought I tried to explain afterwards that indeed the bomber would play some part in this exchange. It might partake in that first strike along with the ICBMs or it might be withheld for the threat against the cities if the first strike had disarmed the opposition.

• 1605

I think the bomber would be used. But one of the things about a bomber attack is that even after it is on its way you cannot tell whether it is coming to forces or cities. It does not have a ballistic path that can be foreseen and it can be used in either way. If I left the impression that I did not think the bomber would be used at all, then, I am sorry. I did not mean to.

Mr. Allmand: I think you made it clear that it might be used, but I got the impression that its use would be very marginal, that our expectation of its use would be very small compared to the expectation with respect to the ICBM and the submarine-based missiles. Therefore I asked myself the question whether a \$12.3 billion program is worth it in view of the expectations which are very marginal.

Dr. Lindsey: Well, I do not think the expectations really are marginal. I think that if the enemy has provided himself with 150 intercontinental bombers, he would use them and he would use them in a way that would hurt us. There is no doubt about that. But it is difficult to forecast right now whether they would be used in a counterforce or a counter-value attack, and whether they would be used first or withheld.

I think before one gets too concerned over the \$12 billion, one should try to think where we would be if we did not spend a nickel on air defence. First of all we would not be able to police our airspace; we would not be able to know whether we were being overflown in peacetime; we would not be able to discipline intruding air traffic. We would be inviting the 150 bombers to exchange all of

their expensive penetration aids like air-to-surface missiles and ECM jamming equipment and the extra fuel they have to carry if they are going to come in low and take evasive routing—to exchange all of that payload for more bombs. So that, in effect, the 150 bombers would probably arrive with the payload that it would have taken twice as many bombers to deliver if they were opposed. So, if we have no air defence we are in bad shape in many ways.

Mr. Allmand: Yes, but with respect to some of the things, the roles that you have mentioned, we have already decided to purchase so many CF-5s which perhaps could be used for some of the things that you stage, although they could not be used in this new program. They could be used for identification; they could be used for a certain type of interception, I understand, and a certain type of strike role. But they cannot be used, I do not think, with the AWACs in the type of interceptor role that is contemplated in this program.

Dr. Lindsey: No.

Mr. Allmand: Another type of aircraft would have to be used by the Canadian forces if they co-operated in this program. It seems to me that the possibilities of a bomber attack are very marginal. I am open to be convinced, but I still cannot seem to be convinced that it is a strong possibility.

How far, Dr. Lindsey, has the United States proceeded in trying to introduce this program? How far have they advanced in getting their own Congress to approve of it, and so forth?

Dr. Lindsey: They still have a long way to go and I do not think Congress has authorized all of the money that was requested for the research program on the F106X. The AWACS still has to undergo a great deal of development and trials. The OTH is still in the experimental stage, so it is only a plan. It is not on the air yet and it is not intended that it would be for several years, perhaps 1974 or 1975 for the complete system. In 1969 it is really just an idea on paper with some research and development going on. It is not fully authorized today.

Mr. Allmand: Yes. From what you told us before, I get the impression that the plan necessarily includes the use of Canadian airspace and land space. Could the program be

used, the AWACS and the modified interceptors, if we refused to allow use of our air-space and land space?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think it would be very effective without the use of Canadian airspace. I think it could work if all the bases were south of the border, but it would not work very effectively. It would not be nearly as cost-effective. But it would probably still be worth trying from their point of view.

• 1610

Mr. Allmand: Could they operate out of Alaska and their bases in Greenland?

Dr. Lindsey: Well, that would be a different type of scheme from the one that they have proposed.

Dr. Arnell: I think the answer to that, Mr. Allmand, is that it would be basically an ineffective scheme. After all, there are not that many airfields, particularly in Greenland—and that is a long way from anywhere.

Mr. Allmand: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Can we assume from your comments this afternoon and this morning that if the United States decides to eventually go ahead with this system that we would, first of all, continue with roughly the same proportional arrangements and, if so, would this conceivably be minus the capital costs to the equipment? Do I understand you correctly, that if you take the capital costs and some of the other expenses out of that \$12 to \$15 billion program Canada's ultimate share in this in terms of dollars and cents would be less than what we are paying today?

Dr. Arnell: I think, Mr. Forrestall, that Dr. Lindsey really answered that question earlier—that the studies as to just where Canada would participate in this have not reached a point where one could even start to predict what sort of hardware we will be involved with. I think one of the problems of trying to anticipate this was really reflected when Dr. Lindsey in his briefing this morning outlined to you what was the essence of this new system, namely the ability of a radar to look down and see the moving object in the background clutter. This was really the key element, as he brought out this morning, between—between...

Mr. Forrestall: I am sorry, in relationship to what we might ultimately have to pay?

20374—3j

Dr. Arnell: Well, to this whole new system. The question now as to just how you use this one piece of new technology, we call it the downward looking radar, is by no means finalized, as he indicated a minute ago. The AWACS aircraft, as a final piece of hardware, has not been decided yet.

Mr. Forrestall: Surely we would not participate in the capital cost of that?

Dr. Arnell: No. I mean the question of an interceptor also involves this radar and other sort of new black box development, if you like.

It is really too soon to be able to predict how these particular developments can be incorporated into existing platforms, if you like—available aircraft. The American program, as was just brought out, involves modifying the F-106 interceptor. One of the things that has not really been worked out at all is whether the total available number of 106s, because there is a finite number of them, would be in fact available to meet the entire interceptor needs of the entire continent or whether in fact it needs some augmentation. These are things that are still under study and it is just too soon even to be able to forecast whether we could share in the 106s or whether we would have to get another aircraft. There are just so many unknowns that one cannot say today that there is a particular capital program that one must think about say three years from now.

Mr. Forrestall: Then you cannot at this point in time, because of the nature of the discussions and so on, say whether or not we would participate in the interceptor aspect of this program?

• 1615

Dr. Arnell: As long as there is to be operation in Canadian air space we have the freedom to say that we will take care of that part of the operation, as was brought out last week. The whole concept of joint air defence of North America is one of an integrated command and control organization that commands and controls the forces that each individual component contributes to it. And Canada has a wide freedom of choice as to whether it wants to offer its air space to somebody else or in fact take over all operations.

Mr. Forrestall: If we did that we would have to get out of everything else, would we not?

Dr. Arnell: It is obvious, I think, that the two extremes are completely impractical.

Mr. Forrestall: You would suggest that it might be as much as two to three years before we could determine finally what roles, first of all, Canada would ultimately play if the United States go ahead and if we decide to stay in it.

Dr. Arnell: I would suggest that the roles are not that much different. I think it was brought out this morning that this is essentially an updating of equipments to do certain things. There is at the present time the ground-controlled radar in the various radar lines, there is at the present time interceptors in the various configurations. The equipments that are being designed at the present time that Dr. Lindsey went through this morning are in fact the next generation of doing the same things. To my mind the roles for Canada in air defence are basically the same ones. We are interested in identification in peacetime. In order to have identification you have to have some kind of warning capability that tells you there is an unknown in your system and you have to have the ability of flying and looking at it to see what it is. So you begin from there and you come to the conclusion that by some method or other—and I think we feel that the cheapest way is a joint system with the Americans—you take part in early warning, in a controlled thing, in interceptors and so on. I would say that probably the easiest way to look at it is that we hopefully will continue to run along at about the same percentage, which is a kind of a per capita cost.

Mr. Forrestall: With the spin-out and given the assumption that the Americans bore the burden of the capital cost of a new interceptor or, for example, the modified 106 that you mentioned a moment or two ago and that Canada did not replace the 104 then, presumably—

Dr. Arnell: No, the 101.

Mr. Forrestall: Yes, the 101. Then in order to maintain in the order of 8 to 10 per cent of the program we would either have to get involved in hardware or pay a substantially less amount of money than we are paying today.

Dr. Arnell: To do the things that we would want to do, like identification in air space, I think we would have to have some hardware.

Mr. Harkness: I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. What is the estimated continued life-span of the 101?

Dr. Arnell: About the mid-70s. I am not sure whether we have a precise date, but 1974 or 1975. It goes out at about the time that this system will be coming in.

Mr. Harkness: Approximately another five years.

Dr. Arnell: That is right.

Mr. Forrestall: Dr. Lindsey, getting back to the \$12.3 billion that the Americans have estimated that this program would cost, given your background, technical experience and undoubted expertise in this field, sir, are you satisfied with that as an estimate, and can you break down that \$12.3 billion in rough percentages—how much for capital equipment, how much for men, and how much for air bases if that were necessary?

• 1620

Dr. Lindsey: I could not do that very well. I suppose the biggest capital item would be the AWACS which I think could run to \$2 billions. I think replacing the F106 by the F106X would probably be somewhat under \$1 billion. The OTH's would be \$100 million or \$200 million, I would think—perhaps a little more but certainly less than half a billion. All the rest of it would be personnel, operating and maintenance for ten years. The vast majority of it would be paying people's salaries, buying fuel, replacing worn out equipment and that sort of thing.

Mr. Forrestall: With your very deep knowledge of this type of a program, would you think the \$12.3 billion would hold very firmly or would it accelerate to a substantially greater amount?

Dr. Lindsey: Whatever knowledge I have of these matters does not run very deep in the financial end. I would not like to say; I am not much of a judge of these things.

Mr. Forrestall: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Lindsey some questions

that relate to background information rather than to the type of questioning we have just had. Insofar as you are aware is the U.S.S.R. planning the development of a new supersonic bomber that would replace the existing force and might change the bomber threat?

Dr. Lindsey: The only activity that we know about that the Soviets are engaging in with regard to supersonic aircraft is for civilian transport—a supersonic transport. It is true that the lessons they learn in the supersonic transport would make it a lot easier to make a supersonic bomber. But I do not know of any evidence that says they are actually starting to do it.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What you are saying, then, is that the existing bomber force is the known quantity or the known force as far as the future is concerned of the Soviet program?

Dr. Lindsey: The hundred and fifty odd bombers of the type that they have had for several years are all that we foresee being against us in the immediate future. They will be slightly improved by things like the air-to-surface missile. I do not think a huge fleet of supersonic bombers is likely to appear next year. But who knows what will happen several years hence? We really could not say about that.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): A second question relating to the SLBM's. What significance do you place on the tremendous expanding program of the Russian nuclear submarine force? I base that on reports that I have seen in the public press.

Dr. Lindsey: I think their submarine force has always been a big one, for the last 15 or 20 years.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): No, their missile force.

Dr. Lindsey: It does look as if they are going to put a much larger fraction of their submarine fleet to the ballistic missile role than they ever have before, and that could effect the strategic balance if carried out to a very large degree. At the moment, of course, the American ballistic missile submarine fleet is very much bigger than the Russian one. I think in the paper we said that the Americans had 41 ballistic missile submarines each carrying 16 missiles which adds up to 656 Polaris, and they will soon be replaced by a

better missile, the Poseidon, and I think we gave the Russians today only 45 SLBM's. However, that number will certainly increase quite sharply in the next few years if their present rate of building persists, but it would be some time before it got up to 600.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am referring to a report which appeared in the press, other than the one I think you referred to, that says it is only a matter of two or three years until the Russian submarine missile force will pass or will equal the Americans, and only a matter of a few years beyond that until it will exceed it. My question is based on that.

• 1625

Dr. Lindsey: Yes I think if we go back to the mutual stable deterrent, if the Russian force built up to the point where it was roughly equal to the American one I would assume that would make for a fairly stable situation and we would not have to be terrified. If it starts to go far beyond it, then we should be worried about stability. But as they are building up from a position of inferiority towards one of equality, I do not think that in itself is a terribly dangerous sign. However, if it goes far beyond equality then it could be worrisome.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is the detection and the interception of a submarine ballistic missile similar to that required for an intercontinental land-based missile.

Dr. Lindsey: Roughly, yes. In some ways it is a little more difficult because the missile will not be in flight for as long and it will not rise to such a high altitude, so that the radar might not detect it until it came a lot closer than an ICBM. But then, it is going slower which makes it correspondingly a little easier to intercept. I think a system that was really good at intercepting ICBM's would have at least a fair capability against SLBM's and perhaps a very good one.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Do you regard the OTHB important in relation to this type of missile threat as well as to the intercontinental? I am speaking now of submarines, the SLBM.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, I think the OTHB radar would have some ability to detect missiles in flight. But I think if there were to be a serious effort to build an anti-SLBM system, probably some special radars would be provided for just that role.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What does this all say of our own anti-submarine effort as far as detection is concerned?

Dr. Lindsey: Our anti-submarine effort is, of course, devoted to the submarine and not its missile.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Yes, I understand that.

Dr. Lindsey: If an enemy missile-firing submarine succeeded in firing a missile, we have no way of preventing the missile from completing its trajectory today. Our ASW effort is entirely against the submarine itself.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): The range of the Russian ballistic submarine, as far as the missile itself is concerned, keeps it out and beyond our normal detection area as far as the submarine itself is concerned, does it? It keeps the submarine out of range?

Dr. Lindsey: No, not necessarily. Our anti-submarine forces can go right across the Atlantic if necessary. If you are speaking of the area of responsibility SACLANT has divided up the Atlantic Ocean into zones and the CANLANT zone does extend some distance out to sea and, of course, that is where most of our patrols are done. If you like, we are responsible for that piece of ocean, as much as one can be. I am sure the Russian SLBM's could be fired from either inside or outside that zone and reach shore.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Are you satisfied with our present anti-submarine detection as far as the immediate future is concerned? Are you satisfied that it is adequate, let me put it that way?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think anybody in the anti-submarine business is ever satisfied that he has reached the ultimate. It is a very difficult art and we are not perfect at it; nobody in the world is now ever will be, I suspect.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I did not mean it exactly in that way. I meant as an effective detecting system.

Dr. Arnell: I think the answer is yes. I think we are satisfied with the detection system. There are a number of inherent questions in the total anti-submarine warfare picture.

Coming back to your earlier question, I think in large measure the operation of these

types of ballistic missiles and submarines would tend to be outside the actual CANLANT area, because if you look at the map of North America the optimum positions are really to the south of us where one would tend to sit in order to look at the heartland of Canada. People forget that the nearest salt water to Montreal is off Maine, not off the Canadian coast. It is only a couple of hundred miles from Montreal to salt water if you go south-east.

• 1630

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): This morning in your presentation, Dr. Lindsey...

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one supplementary before we leave anti-submarine warfare?

The Chairman: Are they extensive supplementaries? If so, your name is down for other questions.

Mr. Roberts: I do not think that they are very extensive, but when I ask them perhaps you may want to rule me out.

The Chairman: Do you have a number of supplementaries?

Mr. Roberts: I just have two: First, is present anti-submarine detection based upon acoustical devices; second, with the development of submarines is this whole system of detection through acoustics likely to become archaic or outmoded by present technological developments?

Dr. Lindsey: The present systems do depend primarily on acoustic means and as submarines become quieter the systems will become less effective. As technology improves we hope that they will become more sensitive and it will be one of these measure versus countermeasure and offence versus defence contests. Certainly, as the submarines become quieter they are going to be more difficult to detect.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My last question, Mr. Chairman, refers to a point in the presentation this morning where Dr. Lindsey pointed out the fact that any intercontinental ballistic missiles coming from a source at this end run directly into an ABM system on the other end. You tended to say that this might not be so dense or so completely capable as

what might be the hope for an ABM system over here. However, you left that similar place on the chart of any ICBM coming from the other direction completely open at this end. Just how extensive is the ABM system that Russia has developed and how far advanced and how thorough is it?

Dr. Lindsey: There is a lot of controversy about that and I only know what people who have studied it tell me, and they do not agree with each other. I think it is fairly clear that the Russians have built some sort of a system that was supposed to have an ABM capability but they have not gone ahead and thickened it up in the way that you would have expected them to do if it had been brilliantly successful, and if they had been aiming at a thick system. Perhaps they have run into technical difficulties and are improving their equipment. I do not think today that it is really a very effective thick system, but whether it is the base that they will build on, or whether they are going to stop, or start all over again, I do not know.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is not one of the arguments in favour of the development of an ABM system over here that the Russians already have such a system in effect there?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think it is very good strategy to just match something your opponent did with something similar on your side. I think what you do should be matched to an obvious need that you have, and I do not think just because...

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You cannot disrelate those two points.

Dr. Lindsey: No, but you have to ask why did he build his ABM, and why did he put it where he did, and does it fit in with his strategic problem? It could be that good strategy would advise the Russians to build one and the Americans to not build one, or build a bigger one, or put it there for a different purpose. I do not know how much influence the fact that the Russians were building one had on the Americans. It is very difficult to say.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): As I listened to you this morning it seemed to me that you were saying to us that any missiles that might originate in this direction going that way faced an obstacle that missiles originating over there coming this way would not face?

Dr. Lindsey: That is true today.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): If that is so then it seems to me you are also saying that the ABM system is necessary. At least one of the reasons for it being necessary is that very lack in the defensive posture here.

Dr. Lindsey: I would rather make the reasons for and against an American ABM system on the threat that they face, and their vulnerability, as opposed to whether the Russians have one, and they just want to equal the score board on both sides.

Mr. Laniel: Dr. Lindsey, first I want to start with the SLBM's. You did not say what the range of the missile was that you find in the Russian submarine. How close do they have to come to the American coast really? I am trying to establish the value of our anti-submarine warfare role right now.

• 1635

Dr. Lindsey: The SLBM's listed in the military balance for 1968-69 show one Russian SLBM with a range of 400 miles and one of them with 650 mile range. So we are dealing with something of a few hundred miles range. I believe that the one that they expect to come in the next few years will be more than that, perhaps over 1,000 miles.

Mr. Laniel: You said this morning the submarines actually were practically invulnerable as a second strike force, I imagine, once they had left port. What did you mean by that? Do you only mean that they could not easily receive a direct hit from our ICBMs or does this include the contribution of our anti-submarine force?

Dr. Lindsey: I meant that the counter force effort by one side's offence could not be used against the other's submarines. I meant that they could not be engaged with bombers, ICBMs, or SLBMs. They are, of course, vulnerable to an effective ASW system.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but you said that the ASW role would not be as effective on the first strike.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, I did, and it is for this reason. If the war has not started, and we, for example, have a good ASW system, we perhaps can track the other submarines and perhaps even come quite close to them, but we cannot attack them. The war has not started. If the way we learn that the war has started is by their launching missiles, then we cannot prevent them from at least launching

the first few missiles, and these missiles could be launched in very short sequence.

Mr. Laniel: Do you know if right now we succeed in tracking them?

Dr. Lindsey: On occasion we do, yes.

Mr. Laniel: On occasion.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, not always.

Mr. Laniel: Why? Is it because we are just playing war in the Atlantic or is it because the ASW role is not as effective as it should be or as we say it is?

Dr. Arnell: I think the real answer here is the one I gave in attempting to answer Mr. Thompson earlier. They do not come into our area very often. I mean this is the real answer from the Canadian point of view. They really go outside and south and this does not really get us intimately involved operationally unless we happen to be...

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but are you aware of whether or not Americans succeed in tracking them?

Dr. Arnell: I think they have a fairly reasonable success level.

Mr. Laniel: Would you not think that this would be a priority—to know where they are in case of an emergency?

Dr. Arnell: I think perhaps what you are reaching for is a slightly different aspect of the problem which was something in the early days of our air defence system that prompted us to put in the Mid-Canada Line. You can detect something and lose it and then need to detect it again. One of the concepts of the Mid-Canada Line was that you could detect anything that came over the DEW Line.

However, something could cross a certain point in northern Canada, it could then disappear out of all the surveillance system for a long time and you would have absolutely no way of knowing whether it had flown south-east, south-west or due south. We conceived the Mid-Canada Line as being a way of spotting it to determine just which part of the mainland it was aiming for.

There is not any real answer to your question. There will be a certain point at which detection is high. There may be another area

where, in fact, you have lost them for a while and then you find them again. So that detection by itself does not really mean anything.

Mr. Laniel: From the impression that I got this morning from Dr. Lindsey when he did speak of the possibility of an attack, he seemed to leave out this element of the Russian forces because of a lack of accuracy. Is it of little importance in comparison to the accuracy of the ICBM and to the threat of supersonic bombers?

● 1640

Dr. Lindsey: The missiles that can be carried by a submarine are, not surprisingly, rather smaller than those that can be launched from land or than can be carried by a bomber, and they are not quite as accurate. For that reason, if the one side has only a small force of ballistic missile submarines it may be that he would prefer to use them in the second strike role rather than in the first strike role because they would be very effective against cities.

Mr. Laniel: The reason why I asked this is because we are repeatedly told that the first purpose of NORAD is the protection of the deterrent.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: I am trying to evaluate as to where is the best place to spend money; that is why I asked this question.

Dr. Lindsey: I think that the submarine launched ballistic missile would be used most effectively against the deterrent by bombarding airfields, especially ones that are near the coast; so that they could catch them with very short warning and destroy the bombers on the ground. I do not think that they could be used against ICBM sites; they are not accurate enough. Also, most of the ICBM sites are far inland.

Mr. Laniel: I will leave the ICBMs for now. I just have a question or two about the BMEWS. Are they the same type of radar as the other lines that we have, or have they not any over-the-horizon capacity?

Dr. Lindsey: No, and they do not have any capacity for spotting aircraft. The BMEWS can only detect missiles and space objects.

Mr. Laniel: They are not used at all for aircraft.

Dr. Lindsey: No.

Mr. Laniel: They will not pick them up. What is their range?

Dr. Lindsey: The BMEWS range is very long and effective; it can detect anything above the horizon, and it picks up many objects in space orbit; it would spot anything in a ballistic course.

Mr. Laniel: Are they affected by the atmosphere or any of the things that you have mentioned?

Dr. Lindsey: No.

Mr. Laniel: They are not reflected?

Dr. Lindsey: It is a direct radar which sends out a pulse which is reflected off the objects in space and then comes directly back again. This is the sort of thing which we will be talking about on May 22.

Mr. Laniel: When we speak of electronic counter measures, do we only mean measures that are there to disturb the defence system, the radar or other such things? Is there anything that has come out of the possibility of using electronic measures to off-balance the controls of ICBMs? Could you one day disturb the control of the electronic machinery so that an attack would be set-off on North America with ICBMs?

Dr. Lindsey: Most ICBMs have what is called inertial guidance; it is only applied during the first few minutes of their flight; after their rockets have burned out, which is within five minutes after launch, when they are still close to home, they become literally a ballistic object; all the rest of the flight is simply coasting, so there is not any more guidance. The chances of upsetting the guidance are really very limited; they would have to be applied during the first few minutes while it is still being boosted. That is very difficult to do of course.

Mr. Laniel: Yes. What do you think would happen if Canada decided not to contribute or participate in the defence of North America? What could the United States do by themselves really to protect...

Dr. Lindsey: Are you speaking of antibomber or antimissile defence?

Mr. Laniel: I am speaking of NORAD.

Dr. Lindsey: If the United States were unable to fly aircraft over Canada, they could not provide a very good air defence for many of their own important areas. They could defend themselves against attacks from the East and the West, but it would be very hard for them to make a good defence against the North, if it started right at the border.

Dr. Arnell: I think one must say that they could not do it, because with the air-to-surface missile, a Russian bomber could in fact stay north of the border and launch onto a large part of the American heartland.

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Mr. Brewin: I have a supplementary. They would not do it against the ICBMs now, would they?

Dr. Lindsey: No.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): My question, Mr. Chairman, is really a supplementary to Mr. Brewin's of this morning, when he questioned the AWACS. My question is, Dr. Lindsey, if they were to implement the new system of AWACS would you then delete or do without the radar ground stations, or could you do without them?

Dr. Lindsey: The Americans have considered this. One must remember the peacetime as well as the wartime role of the air defence system. We do intend to identify aircraft, make them obey their flight plans and identify those that disobey them; this would mean that we would have to have an identification and control system working at all times. It is questionable whether that could be done very efficiently from AWACS aircraft. There is also, of course, the possibility of using the civilian traffic control radars for many of these functions; the Americans are hoping to do that to a large extent.

It is too early to say whether or not the AWACS will enable the replacement of many ground control stations. I think that some of them could be replaced. Perhaps they could be thinned out a little, and the AWACS could then be used to fill in gaps. However, we really do not know yet.

If the AWACS fulfils the most optimistic hopes and it turns out to be fairly efficient

economically, it might well be able to replace a number of the activities on the ground; on the other hand, it may be a very expensive way of doing it.

Dr. Arnell: May I add some information to this, Mr. Guay? There are two things. One is the over-the-horizon radar; when it comes in, it will in fact be involved in a part of this early warning. For the second part, I will expand on what Dr. Lindsey said about the inter-relationship between the civilian traffic control and the military control in peacetime.

In a recent press release the Americans have announced that the FAA will be taking over three military radar sites within the next fiscal year. This is in the beginning of a program—I do not know how complete it will be in the end, and I am not sure that they themselves really know—of really integrating wherever possible, the civilian and military use of the same equipment. I think that when many of the present radars become obsolete and have to be replaced, they will undoubtedly be replaced by a radar which meets those needs, rather than continue having any double radar system which does, in a sense, exist today.

In Canada we do have DOT radars, which are essentially based along the main airline traffic routes. In other places they use some of our materials, or at least some of our information. This is part of the future; whether the military radar stays or whether it can be integrated with the civilian radar is something that is actively under study for the whole concept. This is being viewed, I believe, by all of us, as a possible way of reducing the over-all cost of the system.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, may I ask Dr. Arnell a question? To your knowledge, have any studies been made with regard to the possibility of establishing the cost of the implementation of the AWACS program? Also, would the difference of this particular program extend to the ground radar as well? In view of what you have just told me, it appears that they would retain certain ground stations. Have any studies taken place at all, to your knowledge, in regard to the AWACS program and its cost?

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Dr. Arnell: I think Dr. Lindsey touched on the general cost figures earlier; perhaps that was before you came in. However, in attempting to answer your question more directly, the ground radar is in essence a

peacetime operation. As Dr. Lindsey mentioned this morning during his brief, and in the questions afterwards, AWACS is essentially a control system for an emergency. The question of whether or not AWACS aircraft are used operationally in peacetime, is a matter that has not yet been finalized, and will be the result of future studies. The peacetime need is essentially one of identification of unknown aircraft. This does not need control, in the military sense, in an emergency. A civilian traffic control radar can identify the location of an aircraft of which you have no identification, because at the moment, the identification on the civilian side is a voluntary one. The man on the ground calls up and says: "Will you identify who you are?" If the fellow does not hear the message and does not reply, you do not know who he is. This is one who does not have a flight plan. In this situation, as we answered earlier, an airplane is sent up a couple of times a day to have a look. The airplane is not sent up because you believe that he is an enemy, it is just that you have an unknown in the system. He has not answered, so you want to see who he is. You do not need the kind of control we keep talking about in the military sense, because an interceptor can find that airplane and look at it, without having a very elaborate control system. An elaborate control system is needed when the first pass is aimed at being a kill, and you must get that interceptor lined up because you may not get a second chance. Here, you get into a different order of controls. The ground radar refers to what I was saying earlier, that is, the national need that we have—and the Americans have a national need—of identifying aircraft in our own air space. There will be a continuing need for this. By the time we finish all our studies, we might find that our present Pinetree line or an integration of our present DOT system and that, or a combined new system if radars wear out, might be the cheapest solution for the long haul of updating that. These are things which will come out in the course of the next year or two. Precisely what the answer is to that, I do not know. I can say that as long as there are airplanes we must have ground radars in Canada for peacetime identification.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Even though you may have the AWACS?

Dr. Arnell: There may be no peacetime use for AWACS. It may be essentially for emergency use.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): This part intrigues me because you keep saying that the ground radar is peacetime, and AWACS is really emergency time. Since you are using the peacetime radar, it could very well be that by the time you are aware of an emergency it would be too darn late to use the AWACS system.

Dr. Arnell: Here we are only talking of the days when there would be Over-The-Horizon Radar. This Over-The-Horizon Radar will tell you that there is a flock of airplanes, perhaps a thousand miles away. If you get six or eight airplanes that have no flight plan at all, and that are coming from an unusual direction, no military commander will sit quietly and say: "I do not believe that there is any need to go into an emergency." In this situation, the AWACS, if it is not on operational duty at that particular moment, will be airborne and put into position to take over control and to bring interceptors in at a chosen point.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Dr. Arnell the other part of my question—which I do not believe you have answered, or at least, I did not hear you—is Has any studies been made to determine the approximate cost of the implementation of AWACS, if we were to use them? What is involved in the cost?

The Chairman: This question has been answered.

Mr. Guay: I was not here, I guess, at the time. I am sorry.

Dr. Lindsey: What I was able to say was that one of the American plans, which we have seen, involves the purchase of about 45 of these AWACS aircraft. The cost was something between \$1 billion and \$2 billion for the total cost of procuring and operating this fleet for 10 years or so. They are a very expensive aircraft, but they are able to do many things.

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Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, first I would like to clear up a matter with Dr. Arnell, and then I have a few questions for Dr. Lindsey. I would like to direct your attention, Dr. Arnell, to the agreement to extend the NORAD arrangements for a period of five years, and particularly to the note sent to our ambassador at Washington which was written by Mr. John M. Leddy for the Secretary of

State on March 30, 1968. The beginning of that note says:

I have the honor to refer to discussions in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and elsewhere regarding the mutual interest of the United States and Canada in the continued cooperation between the two countries in the Strategic defense of the North American continent.

After reading this, I thought that we should have, on the record of this Committee, details about the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. What is it? Who does it discuss? How long has it been in existence? Why is it called "Permanent"? Has it more relation to NATO or to NORAD? How does it fit into the whole picture?

Dr. Arnell: I would suggest, Mr. Chairman,—as I know that you are going to be seeing the Department of External Affairs either on Thursday or at the beginning of next week—that you ask them for a more complete story on this. In general terms, the Permanent Joint Board of Defense was the result of the Ogdensburg Agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1940. It was 1940 was it not, Mr. Brewin?

The Chairman: May I interject for just a second, Dr. Arnell? Does it still exist, or was it replaced by the Joint Command?

Dr. Arnell: The Permanent Joint Board of Defense is a creature of that earlier agreement and—

The Chairman: Does it exist now, Dr. Arnell?

Dr. Arnell: Yes, it exists now. I am afraid I cannot tell you who is on it, but External Affairs could give you this directly. It is the oldest consultative body, in defence, that exists between the two countries. It meets every three months or something of that nature. As it is essentially an external matter, it is managed by the Department of External Affairs with the U.S. State Department, but it has military representation. I suggest that the question be put to the Department of External Affairs and then they could provide the details. I am sure that if the Clerk asked the officials from the Department of External Affairs they could prepare the information and give it to you when they appear before the Committee.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you very much, Dr. Arnell.

Dr. Lindsey, with respect to the Cover-the-horizon" radar, is this really proven at this moment? Is there a pilot project in which we have confidence? Is there any development of it anywhere in North America, or anywhere else?

Mr. Lindsey: It is not operationally deployed. The plan which the United States government has, at the moment, will not be in service for several years. It still has some tests to pass.

Mr. Ryan: We do not know whether or not it will work for us?

Dr. Lindsey: I think the principle is well established, but it is not yet clear just how effective it will be when the Northern lights are active, and that sort of thing, so there is still a lot to learn about it.

Mr. Ryan: I understand that the downward radar which is airborne by this AWACS system has a lot of kinks which must be ironed out. With regard to that is it in a better or worse position than the Over-The-Horizon, at the moment?

Dr. Lindsey: I think the best authority on that subject is Clark Clifford's statement which occurred earlier this year in the U.S. defence budget—and I may have put it in the paper that we have—but he says:

The over-land radar technology program is progressing satisfactorily, and the tests to date have been encouraging.

Then, he continues and says that they will allot money to see how it passes its' test. They will then give them more money—to make sure that they do not bet their shirt on the thing until it has passed a few more tests. He goes on to say:

We intend to pursue this program with great prudence, holding our investment to the lowest practicable level until the prime contractor selected has successfully demonstrated by actual flight tests a useable radar detection and tracking system. If all goes well, the first of these aircraft should enter the force in the mid-1970s.

It still has to prove itself, and be bought. It has not yet reached that stage.

Mr. Ryan: Dr. Lindsey, Are there any Canadians participating in the development of

this radar capability, such as you have yourself? Have you been given an opportunity to study this development, as it progresses?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not believe there are any Canadians involved in the development of it. From time to time, we are given progress reports by the United States. I do not think that we are actively involved, in the form of any actual Canadian participants.

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Mr. Ryan: You are not personally in a position to evaluate it for us?

Dr. Lindsey: No.

Mr. Ryan: And there is no other Canadian, I take it, that would be?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think so.

Mr. Ryan: This is pretty well true of both radar systems, the downward as well as the Over-the-Horizon, is it?

Dr. Lindsey: I think we are perhaps more closely involved in the research on the Over-the-Horizon radar, partly because for many years Canada has been doing work on propagation of radio signals in the ionosphere, and some of our laboratories, I suppose, are the most knowledgeable in the world about the conditions of radio propagation in the auroral zone. So our people are consulted on this, and they are probably closer to the progress on the OTH type of work than on the AWACS type.

Mr. Ryan: Doctor, I note with great interest that you have been personally associated with anti-submarine warfare in a major way, as you were the chief of the operational research group at the anti-submarine warfare research centre of NATO in La Spezia, Italy, for three years. During that time, you would be involved very deeply with radar and sonar in a downward respect and would become quite familiar, I would think, with the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea. What problems would you run into in anti-submarine warfare detection? Is it a great deal more difficult to detect a submarine than it would be a plane flying low?

Dr. Lindsey: I think it is more difficult to detect a submarine. The ocean is a more complicated medium than the atmosphere. There are layers of water of different temperatures that bend the rays. A submarine can measure

these temperature differentials and can find shadow zones and hide in them. The sea is full of fish and layers of small marine plant life. I think in many ways the problems are considerably more difficult than with radar. After all, an aircraft has to move quite fast in order to stay up and it is very different from the surrounding air. A submarine can go very slowly and to a sonar it looks very much like a whale.

Mr. Ryan: I take it you have every confidence that the downward radar will likely develop and be a great asset in the defense against manned bombers coming in.

Dr. Lindsey: I think the prospects for it are very good, but I would not say that it was absolutely proven and certain yet.

Mr. Ryan: Have you, personally, investigated our effort on our Eastern Seaboard with respect to antisubmarine methods of detection? Have you familiarized yourself with it as a result of your experience in the Mediterranean?

Dr. Lindsey: I have not been personally connected very closely with the work of our Maritime Command. Strangely enough, most of my anti-submarine experience was in the Mediterranean and not in the Atlantic.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, that is what I thought, but you might have been sent there just to take a look at what we were doing on our Atlantic Seaboard.

Dr. Arnell: Are you not going to have an opportunity to get into that later this month?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, but maybe not with Dr. Lindsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: If I may ask a supplementary question on costs, are these not dealt with, Dr. Lindsey, on page 31 of your working paper under the heading "Estimated Cost

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of U.S. Program", where you say the estimated total cost of the U.S. Program over 10 years is \$12.3 billion? We have been talking about our Canadian contribution as 10 per cent of the total cost. Is that the total cost of U.S. and Canadian, or is that just the U.S. program?

Dr. Lindsey: It is the U.S. only.

The Chairman: It is the U.S. only, so the Canadian program would be in addition to that?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, it would.

The Chairman: Similarly, the figure down below of \$.69 billion as maintenance cost is just the U.S. cost?

Dr. Lindsey: That is right.

Dr. Arnell: I believe that really this first figure, with perhaps a slight inflation, is what the Americans really figure they are spending per year at the moment, multiplied by 10. I think before you came back this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, I pointed out in attempting to answer a question earlier that the present annual cost of air defence in the United States is very largely made up of operations and maintenance. Within this total there is a small amount of new capital but not very much.

The present scheme is to try and reduce O and M costs by various economies and to divert the money into a major capital program. At the end of ten years, the capital having been procured, they anticipate a drop in annual operating costs from something of the order of \$1.1 billion or \$1.2 billion down to this \$.7 billion. In other words, it is an attempt to reduce annual costs to increase effectiveness against new threats and include a capital program in doing so.

The Chairman: Dr. Lindsey, the paper points out reasons why we should have an anti-bomber defence to defend us against a possible bomber attack, although no one knows whether it will actually come or be effective if it does come. You pointed out in your certain disadvantages with our existing bomber defence and suggested a new system which might conceivably overcome some of those disadvantages. On the other hand, the paper indicates that there is no indication that the Russians are improving their bomber technology.

Now, if our present methods of defence are successful as the paper indicates they have been, and if the Russians are not making any substantial change in their bomber technology, what is the real reason to suggest that we should consider improving defences against a threat which may or may not come and which would involve substantial capital expenditure?

Dr. Lindsey: I think when you say that the Russians are not improving their bomber technology we should make two caveats: First, we believe they are fitting this air-to-surface missile, which means they would not have to penetrate as deeply into the system; second, we believe they are able and ready to fly very much lower than bombers used to do some years ago.

There are two things this improvement in the system will do to enable us to cope with these two changes; that is, firstly, to be able to intercept a bomber before he launches this missile some hundreds of miles from his target; secondly to be able to intercept him if he chooses to come in very low.

The Chairman: I see. Thank you very much, Dr. Lindsey. Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: No, I asked my question earlier, Mr. Chairman, and I do not have any further questions.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions?

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Harkness asked his on a supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: If there are no other questions on your behalf I would like to thank Dr. Lindsey and Dr. Arnell for the information they have given us this afternoon. We will be seeing Dr. Lindsey again next week. Thank you very much, Dr. Lindsey and Dr. Arnell.

There will be no meeting tonight and on Thursday we will have a meeting on the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs and the International Joint Commission in

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this room at 11 a.m. On the following Tuesday we will be on the CIDA Estimates, the Canadian International Development Agency.

Mr. Roberts: Do you have any idea, roughly, when we will have Mr. Cadieux, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs back? We had interrupted testimony from him, I guess two weeks ago now.

The Chairman: The Under Secretary of State will be here on Thursday of this week.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, very much.

The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX ZZ

STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS,
STABILITY AND THE POSSIBLE
CONTRIBUTIONS BY CANADA

PART I:

STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS,
STABILITY, AND THE PREVENTION
OF NUCLEAR WAR

PART II:

POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE

Prepared for the
Standing Committee on External Affairs
and National Defence

1st Session, 28th Parliament

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AND THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY CANADA

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This paper has been prepared by officials of the Department of National Defence for the information of the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. In order to elucidate fully the issues involved it has been necessary to touch on matters which are still under review. Therefore, the Committee's attention is drawn to the fact that this does not necessarily represent the policy or views of the Government of Canada nor the Department of National Defence.

INTRODUCTION

A searching analysis of the means of defending North America against missile and bomber attack must be undertaken against the background of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In seeking to ensure its national security, Canada must be concerned with questions of stability and the prevention of nuclear war on the international scene. However, the part that Canada can play in the maintenance of the strategic balance is necessarily a limited one.

Consequently, this paper is presented in two parts. The first concerns strategic offence and defence in general, and the strategic balance between the two Superpowers. The second part discusses in more detail those bomber defence activities in which Canada might engage in the future. Prior to a subsequent meeting of this Committee, a third part will be distributed which will describe the implications for Canada of defence against ballistic missiles.

There are important questions relating to the prevention of nuclear war that are not touched in this paper, such as arms control, the non-proliferation treaty, and the comprehensive test ban, as well as international relations in general.

PART I: STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS, STABILITY, AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

Nuclear War Avoided for Fifteen Years

In the early nineteen-fifties, with the Superpowers developing thermonuclear bombs and intercontinental bombers, a war in Korea, and extreme tension in Europe, the outlook for the world appeared extremely ominous. The larger Western countries were spending over 10 per cent of their GNP on defence (1953¹: USA, 14.8 per cent; UK, 11.3 per cent; France, 10.9 per cent; Canada 9.0 per cent) and exhorting one another to raise rifle divisions for the NATO central front. If a "solution" had been offered that would guarantee existing frontiers and prevent the use of nuclear weapons, at an annual

cost of 10 per cent of the GNP in perpetuity, it would have been seized with gratitude and alacrity.

In fact, by halting and irregular steps, a "solution" has been found, which has not only preserved frontiers and prevented the use of nuclear weapons, but has permitted a considerable degree of detente, and all at an annual cost of less than 10 per cent of the GNP (1967²: USA, 9.8 per cent; UK, 5.7 per cent; France, 5.3 per cent; Canada, 2.7 per cent).

Before the West alters this "solution" for the sake of change per se, or allows it to slip away through neglect and preoccupation with other problems, it should reflect on the 15 years of peace, consider how badly it wants another 15 years of peace, and what risks it is prepared to accept that an abandonment of a successful "solution" could lead to the loss of peace.

Mutual Deterrence at the Strategic Level

In the years immediately following World War II, the US had a large force of long range bombers (built for the strategic offensive against Japan) and a small but growing stock of nuclear weapons. No other country had such a capability. Had an enemy taken sufficiently provocative action against the West, the US could have inflicted "massive retaliation" by striking his major cities and other assets of value (known as a "counter-value strike"). Since the US did not risk similar punishment in return, their threat was "credible". A state of "deterrence" prevailed, but it was not "mutual".

The Soviet Union made haste to offset this asymmetry as soon as it could. By the mid-1950s, it had built a fleet of intercontinental bombers and armed them with thermonuclear bombs. Had the bombers on each side been practically invulnerable, the main result of this development would have been to produce a state of mutual deterrence. However, a new and extremely dangerous factor was introduced by reason of the vulnerability of the bombers to attack by the opposing bombers (known as a "counterforce strike"). The bombers were concentrated on a few major

air bases, and the destructive power of the thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bombs was so great that, if one attacking bomber could catch several dozen opposing bombers on the ground, he had a very good chance of destroying them all. Thus, there arose the temptation to make a surprise "counterforce first strike", directed against weapons rather than population, in the expectation that its success would leave the opponent disarmed and unable to retaliate. The frightening feature of this situation was that it promised a decisive advantage to the side which struck first. It was well described in Wohlstetter's telling phrase³ "The Delicate Balance of Terror". In the terminology to be employed in this paper, this situation is labelled as "unstable".

The advent of the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's) rendered the situation even more unstable. The missiles were vulnerable and unreliable, and required a long preparation time before they could be launched. Even more then was the case for bombers, there was a strong incentive to fire them quickly, before they were destroyed. Each adversary felt obliged to maintain a high state of alert, and one heard of "the hair-trigger response".

The two Superpowers were well aware of the unstable nature of their mutual deterrence, and took urgent steps to correct it. Great qualitative improvements were made in the ICBMs, which were buried in dispersed and hardened underground silos, were made much more reliable, and had their preparation time before launch reduced to a very few minutes. The number of ICBMs was increased to the point that the probability of losing all but a very few of them to a surprise counterforce first strike became negligible. Ballistic missiles were fitted into submarines, which were able to remain submerged for weeks and to launch the missiles from below the surface. To prevent the possibility of losing all bombers on the ground, some were kept armed and airborne at all times, and radar detection lines were deployed to give early warning of attack.

In order for Country A to be deterred by Country B, it is necessary that A must believe that, no matter what A does, B will retain the means and the will to be able to destroy A's cities. B must maintain a capability for "assured destruction". Assured destruction has been defined⁴ as the ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any sin-

gle aggressor, or combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise attack.

To quote Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford⁵, discussing the difficulty of defending against nuclear-armed missiles,

"Many knowledgeable Americans, both within and without the Government, have wrestled with this problem over the years. There is now a very broad consensus that until a truly safeguarded nuclear disarmament agreement is achieved in the context of viable world wide security arrangements, the only realistic policy we can pursue at this particular juncture is one of deterrence. In other words, we must be prepared to maintain at all times strategic forces of such size and character, and exhibit so unquestionable a will to use them in retaliation if needed, that no nation could ever conceivably deem it to its advantage to launch a deliberate nuclear attack on the United States or its allies".

Deterrence through assured destruction is the cornerstone of US defence policy, and Soviet actions suggest that it is also their prime objective.

These measures to increase the numerical strength and decrease the vulnerability of the deterrent forces created a condition which can be described as "stable" inasmuch as:

- (a) neither adversary felt a compelling urge to fire first (before his forces were destroyed), and
- (b) neither needed to gauge the size of the opposing force with great precision, or to feel unduly menaced if he learned of a modest increase in the opponent's strength.

For the last few years, this stable balance has been maintained. It depends on both adversaries having the capability for "assured destruction". If it is still a "Balance of Terror", it is no longer a "Delicate Balance". In the US, and very probably also in the Soviet Union, the hair-trigger response has been replaced by a system of technical and organizational safeguards ensuring that no weapons will be launched under extreme urgency of time or before thorough assessment by the highest authorities, and certainly not by a computer, or as a result of an accidental firing by the opponent. A very considerable change in the offensive or defensive power of one or both Superpowers would be required in order to alter the situation so that one

Superpower felt that he must fire first (or even respond very quickly to what he judged to be an attack). Neither does either opponent need to view a small increase in the other's force as likely to endanger the credibility of his own deterrent.

How Much Deterrence is Enough?

In his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee^a in January, 1968, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara explained that,

"Even if the Soviet strategic forces by 1972 reach the higher end of the range of estimates projected in the latest National Intelligence Estimates and even if they were to assign their entire available missile force to attacks on our strategic forces (reserving only refire missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets) about one-half of our forces programmed for 1972 would survive and remain effective... Even if the Soviets deploy a substantial number of ABM interceptors by 1972, our strategic missile forces alone could still destroy... more than 100 million people, and over three-quarters of their industrial capacity".

In the same statements^b, he estimated that in the mid 70's each country could inflict 120 million fatalities on the other in retaliation.

Presenting the 1970-74 Defense Program in January, 1969, Secretary Clark Clifford¹⁰ said,

"While numbers of Soviet and US warheads, delivery systems, megatons and many other factors are taken into account in the analysis of our strategic forces requirements, the soundest measure of the effectiveness of these forces in the "Assured Destruction" role is their ability, even after absorbing a well-coordinated surprise strike, to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker... Our calculations indicate that the US strategic forces programmed over the next few years, even against the highest Soviet threat projected in the National Intelligence Estimates, would be able to destroy in a second strike more than two fifths of the Soviet population and about three-quarters of their industrial capacity".

Calculations of this type indicate how much deterrence is enough. It appears clear that for the conditions of 1969, the US has more than enough. The USSR, with approximate parity

in ICBMs, also has enough in 1969. We have mutual deterrence and the balance is a stable and robust one. This is the "solution". It has worked. Its cost to the US for strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, since 1965 has averaged about one percent of the Gross National Product.

Damage Limiting

Once mutual deterrence has been assured, further strategic objectives can be sought. One of these is "damage limiting", the capability to reduce the damage that can be inflicted on one's cities in the event that deterrence fails, and a counter-value attack is actually delivered by the enemy. Damage limiting depends primarily on defensive systems sited for protection of cities, but it is also possible to reduce damage by using offensive weapons in a counterforce role, provided that the enemy weapons are still there to be hit.

In a sense, damage limiting can be regarded as superfluous, in that it will not be needed if deterrence (due to the existence of assured destruction) is successful. However, there can be a more serious objection to damage limiting if it is carried to such a degree that it drastically reduces the ability of the opponent to inflict damage in a retaliatory countervalue second strike. In this case, it would be weakening the basis of mutual deterrence and moving the balance away from stability. It is a strange twist of logic, that a defensive move to save lives can be dangerous. To quote from Professor Rathjens recent paper on "The Future of the Strategic Arms Race"¹²

"The second policy dilemma—the incompatibility of a 'damage limiting' policy with other US objectives—is more difficult to deal with... there is the possibility that certain actions taken by the Superpowers to reduce damage, should deterrence fail, may lead to an increase in the probability that it will fail, particularly if the adversary should fail to modify his force posture in response to those actions..."

In short, there is an inherent inconsonance in the objectives spelled out in our basic military policy, namely, "to deter aggression at any level, and should deterrence fail, to terminate hostilities in concert with our allies under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and allied interests"⁽⁴⁾. Hard choices must be made

between attempting to minimize the chance of escalation and attempting to minimize the consequences if it does occur".

The Main Strategic Offensive Systems

The most important strategic weapon system today is based on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The US and the USSR each have about one thousand. The larger ones can reach any point on earth, and no point in the territory of either Superpower is beyond the range of hundreds of the opponent's missiles. The size of the warheads and the accuracy of delivery are sufficient to enable one missile to have a high probability of destroying a medium-sized city or all of the aircraft on a large air base. However, ICBMs buried in underground silos are tougher targets, and they are sited too far apart for simultaneous destruction by a single warhead. An attacker would have to allot several missiles against one hardened silo in order to achieve a high probability of destroying it.

ICBMs can be used against any type of fixed target small ("point") or large ("area"), military or civil. If they are used in a surprise first strike, they would be targeted mainly against the enemy's fixed missile silos and bomber airfields. In this sense, the first strike is counterforce, and its objective is "damage limiting" since the enemy missiles and bombers destroyed would have been targeted as a retaliatory force against one's own cities.

Ballistic missiles in nuclear-powered submarines are virtually invulnerable to enemy missiles. The submarine-launched missiles have less range, inferior accuracy, and smaller warheads than land-based ICBMs. All of these characteristics make the SLBM particularly well suited to the second strike counterforce role for assured destruction. However, SLBMs could be used in a counterforce first strike against airfields.

The US have 41 ballistic missile submarines, each nuclear-powered, and each carrying 16 Polaris missiles. 31 boats will be converted for Poseidon missiles, with a greater payload*. The Soviet Union has about as many submarines which are able to launch ballistic missiles, but most of them are conventionally-powered and most carry only a few missiles. The number of SLBMs which could be brought to bear against North America is probably of the order of 45 as compared to 656 for the US.

Manned bomber aircraft are vulnerable on the ground and take a number of hours to reach targets at intercontinental ranges. They can carry a very large payload and, in the absence of effective defence, deliver it with great accuracy. With a sacrifice in payload and accuracy the warheads can be delivered by air-to-surface missiles, making it unnecessary for the mother aircraft to penetrate right to the target.

Bombers can be used against control centres and pinpoint targets, but are of little value in a counterforce role against targets which are likely to be gone with adequate warning. They are very effective countervalue weapons, and those that survived and attack could be used in a countervalue second strike. Of course, in the absence of an effective air defence system on one side, the other side's bombers would be very potent first strike weapons.

The USAF have about 600 long-range bombers, compared to the Soviet total of about 150.

The Main Strategic Defensive Systems

Although much is being said about anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, very little exists in an operational state today. The Soviets have deployed a thin system in the vicinity of Moscow, but the planned US system will not have the first units in the field until 1973.

If an effective ABM system were deployed, it would probably be able to intercept SLBMs as well as ICBMs, and it is conceivable that it could have some capability against high altitude bombers. If it were of the "point-defence" type, the owners would have the option of defending cities, weapon sites, or other valuable targets. If each unit defended a large area, there would still be some choice in both the deployment and the firing doctrine as to the kinds of targets selected for defence.

If the ABM system were able to protect ICBMs and bomber bases from attack, it would contribute to assured destruction (and to stability). If it protected cities, it would contribute to damage limiting. As mentioned earlier, this could be considered as destabilizing.

Present day anti-submarine systems are directed against the submarine rather than its missiles in flight. If the submarines participate in a surprise first strike, all launching at

a pre-arranged time co-ordinated with the ICMB launchings, the defence may not know that the war has started until the missiles are on their way. Submarines can launch their missiles at very short intervals, so that the anti-submarine system has no time to prevent the first launching and very little before all the others have gone.

If a mounting period of tension preceded the first strike, it might be possible to take action against unidentified submerged submarines within a declared zone. Or, if the SLBMs were allotted a second strike role, which fits more exactly to their technical capabilities, submarine defences might have enough time to hunt them down.

Submarine defence contributes to damage limiting if the SLBMs are used against cities, but to assured destruction if the SLBMs are used against bomber airfields in a first strike.

The air defence systems protecting North America and the Communist portions of the Eurasian land mass have been essential elements in the maintenance of stability since the advent of the manned bomber threat. True, the relative importance of air defence has decreased as the offensive emphasis has shifted from the manner bomber to the ICMB and its variants. However, as long as each side maintains a bomber fleet capable of striking at the other, both must operate air defence systems to maintain the balance of stability. If one side were to eliminate its air defence system or reduce it below an effective level, this would remove the requirement for the opposing bomber force to carry defensive armament, electronic warfare equipment, or the extra fuel necessary for evasive routing and low altitude penetration. Even comparatively low performance aircraft could be used to carry heavy bomb loads. Furthermore, the side without an air defence system would find itself unable to police its own airspace from the peacetime probes and penetrations conducted by unknown parties.

A fourth strategic defensive system is passive defence, often called Civil Defence when referring to the measures taken to protect civilian population. Many of the steps such as the construction of blast or fallout shelters or the preparation for evacuation or rescue are equally valuable against nuclear weapons delivered by any of the various means, pres-

ent or future. Civil defence contributes to damage limiting. In the odd logic of deterrence, it could be considered as destabilizing.

Possible Future Developments in Offensive Systems

It is obvious that a country which has rockets big enough to propel manned capsules into earth orbit can deliver very large payloads in an intercontinental ballistic trajectory. Considerable interest has been shown in the Soviet SS-9 ICMB with a warhead in excess of 20 megatons. Such a warhead is bigger than needed to obliterate any but the largest cities. It would increase the probability of being able to destroy an underground control centre.

More sophisticated, and probably more effective, than sheer weight of payload is the capability for delivery of several separate warheads. Alternatively, the large "throw-weight" of the SS-9, the Titan 2, or other large booster rockets can be used for propulsion into complicated trajectories other than the simple ballistic path.

A large payload can contain several warheads which separate and re-enter independently. If these have no propulsion or guidance, but merely scatter (like buckshot) at random on paths slightly diverging from the mother vehicle, they are called Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRVs). It is probable that the total megatonnage of the set of MRVs would be considerably less than yield which could be obtained from a single warhead of the same total weight. The total damage done to a very extended target (such as Los Angeles) could be greater for the MRV payload, but it is unlikely that it would be as effective as the single large warhead for the destruction of a small hard target. The main advantage of MRV would be for the penetration of an ABM system, if a separate interception by a separate anti-missile missile were required for each re-entry vehicle.

A more sophisticated threat than MRV is MIRV—the Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle. It has also been called "Space Bus". Each of several independent warheads is provided with individual guidance to its own target. The extra weight for propulsion and guidance would be at the expense of the warhead, but the effectiveness of the system is likely to be much greater. It is conceivable that a large ICMB could deliver 10 MIRVs aimed at 10 of the

opponent's ICBM silos, and expect to destroy several of them.

Another way to exploit a large "throw weight" is by means of the "Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)". This consists of boosting the payload plus the last stage into a low circular earth orbit (at an altitude of perhaps 100 miles) and then deboosting it to descend on its first approach to the target. The time of flight would be less than for an ICBM, and the trajectory would be considerably lower, which would delay or prevent the detection by ground-based radars. Instead of launching in the direction of the target, it would be just as easy to choose the opposite direction, go more than half way around the earth, and descend on the target "from behind". If all the defences were pointing toward the launch site, the defenders would be struck "in the back of the head" without warning. FOBS could be a good weapon for a surprise first strike against airfields.

Simpler than FOBS is the Depressed Trajectory ICBM (DICBM). This simply follows a ballistic path that is faster and lower than the one requiring the least burnout velocity.

A variant of FOBS is the Multiple Orbital Bombardment System (MOBS). In this application, the payload plus last stage is boosted into an earth orbit and allowed to circle the earth several (perhaps many) times before being deboosted to descend onto the target.

The developments described above are intended to increase the probability that the launched missile will reach its target. All are likely to be less accurate than the simple direct trajectory. Other developments can be foreseen to improve the probability that the missile will survive attack before it is launched. The main methods of reducing vulnerability are dispersion, hardening, concealment, and mobility. The first two have already been exploited, and concealment of a fixed land installation is difficult in these days of reconnaissance satellites. However, it is quite possible that ICBM launchers can be made mobile, on railway cars, or road vehicles, canal barges, or ships. It is also possible to mount them on underwater launchers resting on the bottom of lakes or the sea.

It is not certain what the future holds for manned bombers. The US have encountered difficulties with the FB-111, and are planning to extend the useful life of the much larger B-52 by adding penetration aids and improved air-to-surface missiles. The pro-

gram to replace the B-52 with an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) has been confined so far to design and development studies. The Soviet aviation industry is pursuing the advanced technology for a supersonic transport aircraft, but it is not known whether they intend to build another bomber.

The "Safeguard" ABM System

The US Department of Defense pursued an active program of research and development in the area of anti-ballistic missile technology for many years, but it was not until September, 1967 that the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, announced that a "light" ABM system, later called "Sentinel", would be deployed in the US. The Sentinel program encountered considerable opposition, and in February, 1969, the Nixon administration suspended the program pending a review. In March, 1969, however, President Nixon announced that a modified system called "Safeguard" would proceed, subject to Congressional approval and an annual review.

The three objectives of "Safeguard", as stated by the President are,

- "(a) Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.
- (b) Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.
- (c) Protection against the possibility of accidental attack from any source."

The Safeguard system has the same components as Sentinel: Perimeter Acquisition Radars (PARs), Missile Site Radars (MSRs), and two anti-missile weapons: Spartan and Sprint.

The first warning of possible ICBM attack could come from one of several types of long range detection systems. Ballistic missiles on a direct trajectory toward North America will be detected over the polar regions by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). PARs installed in the northern US will detect and track approaching missiles over Canada, at a range in excess of 1000 miles. Information from these radars is passed to control posts where computers process the data, and, on receipt of a firing order, the MSR guides the Spartan missile to make its intercept.

The Spartan missile has a range of several hundred miles. Its effectiveness depends on

the detonation of a very large nuclear warhead in the near-vacuum of outer space. It is expected that most decoys accompanying the ICBM warhead would be cleared out of a large volume by the explosion of the Spartan.

The Sprint missile complements the Spartan by intercepting at lower altitudes those missiles not destroyed by Spartan. It is hoped that most decoys not destroyed by Spartan will be distinguishable from the ICBM warhead when they begin to experience air drag on penetrating into the atmosphere. Sprint has a much shorter range than Spartan, about 25 miles. Since it is designed to be used at low altitude, the Sprint has a very much smaller warhead yield than the Spartan.

The plan for "Safeguard" is in phased steps. The first step involves only two PARs, with associated MSRs, Spartans, and Sprints, planned to be operational in 1974. The sites which are near Great Falls, Montana, and Grand Forks, North Dakota, are intended for the protection of ICBM and bomber bases in those areas. Subsequent options, as described by the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, Packard, could be:

- (a) to extend the defence of the deterrent forces against ICBM attack,
- (b) to provide defence against submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs),
- (c) to provide light area protection for all of the US, including population.

The totality of these options, labelled "full deployment", include 12 sites in the continental US. A further possible extension is to add sites in Alaska and Hawaii. President Nixon has stated that Safeguard "will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (a) technical developments; (b) the threat; (c) the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation".

If the "full deployment" plan involving 12 sites is carried out, the estimated cost is \$7.8 billion (including the cost of the warheads). At this level, it might hope to provide a meaningful defence against the size of attack that China could mount in the mid-1970s. It might also be able to preserve a significant proportion of the ICBM and bomber strength against Soviet attack, but would not be able to prevent the USSR from being able to destroy most of the urban population.

Possible Future Developments in Defensive Systems

Safeguard represents a selection from a set of ABM components designed under a large

research and development program known as "NIKE X". All components followed the principle of "terminal defence", that is to intercept the incoming ICBM near the end of its intended trajectory. If a much thicker and heavier terminal defence system were desired by the US, it would very likely be based on a further selection of the NIKE X design.

In principle, interception could be attempted in midcourse, or even in the launch phase of the ICBM trajectory. There are advantages to the latter, since the ICBM is moving more slowly, is advertising its presence by radiating a tremendous flux of heat energy, and is still under guidance, and is, therefore, vulnerable to damage to its control or propulsion system. However, to be able to deliver an anti-missile missile to the appropriate location, it would probably be necessary to mount it in a satellite, ship, or aircraft.

Although it can be concluded that it is technically possible for a defensive missile to intercept and destroy an ICBM, it does not necessarily follow that an ABM system is an effective and advisable system to construct. By the use of penetration aids (such as decoys, multiple warheads, or jamming or indirect trajectories (depressed, extended range, fractional or multiple orbital), the offence may be able to overcome the defence. Although it may be technically possible for the defence to defeat the measures mentioned above, the cost of such countermeasures may be much greater than that required for the offensive measures.

American military satellites are for reconnaissance, for missile-launch warning, for communication, for precise navigation, and for weather reconnaissance. Thus, as far as United States satellites are concerned, they are all defensive; none are offensive.¹⁵ The Soviets have made threatening statements regarding an orbital bomb. Both powers use satellites for collection of intelligence. To date, neither has felt a need to destroy satellites in orbit, and it may well be that they never will wish to do so. The technical problems of intercepting and destroying a satellite would be comparable to those of intercepting a ballistic missile. Interception would be most difficult for satellites in highly elliptical orbits, or if it were necessary to complete the interception very soon after launch.

In summary, the state of technology in missiles, radars, and warheads is so advanced that it may well be physically possible for engineers to do almost anything in the offence

vs defence or measure vs countermeasure context, but economic and strategic factors are likely to determine what is, in fact, practicable to undertake.

Dangers to Stability in the Future

As has been discussed earlier, the two Superpowers have a stable state of mutual deterrence today. Neither feels impelled to strike first, or to reply instantaneously to a perceived threat. Neither need to be unduly disturbed if the opponent makes modest improvements to his weapon system. If the systems could be "frozen" in their present state, the stability could be preserved for the indefinite future, and at a very modest cost of maintenance.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been reducing their long range bomber fleets as their ICBM strength built up. The United States inventory of ICBMs and SLBMs rose to 1054 and 656 in 1967, and has not changed since. The USSR added ICBMs quite slowly up to 1967, but have increased from 300 up to 1000 in the last two years. They still are well behind in SLBMs. Thus, in terms of recent changes in numbers of offensive weapons, there does not appear to be any trend away from stability.

Two ways in which stability could be endangered would be (a) if one of the adversaries were to improve the capability of his offensive weapons to the point that he could destroy practically all of the opponent's weapons in a counterforce first strike, or (b) if one were to devise and deploy a defensive system so effective that he could withstand a countervalue second strike by the surviving weapons of the opponent. Both of these amount to the creation of a very high degree of damage limitation.

It seems most improbable that either of these destabilizing changes could be brought about by quantitative increases to defensive weapons of the types deployed today. It would require a qualitative improvement of considerable magnitude to shift the present stable balance into a state of real danger.

The qualitative improvements to offensive systems foreseeable today have been described. They include very large ICBM warheads, MRV, MIRV, FOBS, MOBS, DICBM, supersonic manned bombers, and bombers with long range accurate air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). Of these, MIRV has the greatest potential for a counterforce strike, against ICBM sites and airfields.

The most important improvement to defensive capabilities would be to have ballistic missile defence where virtually none exists today. A light defence such as Safeguard cannot have a really significant effect on stability. However, if a heavy ballistic missile defence were able to intercept large numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs aimed at cities, the result could be to reduce deterrence and, according to the definitions adopted here, shift the balance in the direction of instability. Both submarine and air defence have been the subject of intense research and development for many years, and have introduced a long succession of weapons and equipments without ever really reaching a state of dominance over the submarine or the bomber. Were either or both to do so, they would probably contribute more to damage limiting than to assured destruction, but this would depend on the targets which the opponent chose for his SLBMs and bombers to attack.

It has already become evident that the potential effects of changes to the defensive systems cannot be analyzed one at a time, in isolation. There are many important interactions, between the various related families of offensive and defensive weapon systems.

Because of these interactions, a strengthening (real or imagined) in one system can stimulate increases to several of the opponent's systems. For example, if the US fits MIRV, the Soviets might feel that their ICBMs were threatened and build more of them, harden them further, make them mobile, or put MIRV into them. But they might elect to build more BM submarines instead, since they are not vulnerable to MIRV. Or, if the US puts up an ABM system the Soviets might build more ICBMs, equip their ICBMs with better penetration aids, or fit them with MIRV. Or they might build a new generation of bombers, or match system for system with an ABM of their own.

Because the more advanced techniques of both offence and defence are very complex, it takes several years to develop them and put them into operational status. Even though the balance is stable, and robust rather than delicate at the moment, it is natural for each Superpower to look several years ahead and to ensure that it will not find itself with its assured destruction gone as a result of substantial changes. It is difficult for each adversary to assess far in advance what the effectiveness of the opponent's moves are going to be. Consequently, there is a natural tendency

for each side to take steps now to prepare for the worst that the opponent might have ready for him a few years hence.

As described by Professor Rathjens¹², a combination of developments which could be quite serious would be for one Superpower to put effective MIRV into its ICBMs and SLBMs, and at the same time build a heavy ABM system which could defend its cities against SLBMs and ICBMs. This could enable it to destroy a very large proportion of the opponent's ICBMs and bombers in a counter-force first strike, and then defend its cities against the weakened retaliatory countervalue second strike. However, the opponent would probably react before the new systems were operational perhaps by building more bombers, dispersing them to many bases, keeping some airborne alert, and protecting those on the ground in shelters. This would probably stimulate the first Superpower to increase his air defence. The second could then move his BM submarines close inshore, to fire under the cover of the ABM system. This could be countered by more anti-submarine defence. It is easy to see how the arms race can accelerate in such circumstances.

It seems probable that both Superpowers will always react in such a way as to maintain stability. They have too much at stake to do otherwise. The unfortunate situation into which they may be drawn is that each spends a great deal of money reacting to the other, with the only result being that a new stable balance is struck.

What could be very dangerous is a situation where Superpower A makes changes to disturb the balance and Superpower B does NOT react to restore it. As the certainty of B's assured destruction begins to deteriorate, a succession of increasingly dangerous possibilities could develop:

(a) With stable mutual deterrence, neither A nor B have to set their second strike for a hairtrigger response; they can be willing to face a threat or even a real attack without feeling forced to retaliate in haste;

(b) if B becomes doubtful of the certainty of his second strike after receipt of a heavy blow from A, he will be motivated to respond with less provocation, lowering the threshold and introducing the possibility of striking in response to an accident or false warning;

(c) if B perceives that A will soon reach a state where A could destroy B's power to

retaliate, B will be tempted to strike first, in the hope that the advantage of surprise and the initiative offers him his last chance;

(d) at this stage and subsequently, A will feel tempted to strike first in order to pre-empt B.

In the enthusiasm for ending the arms race and saving money, it is important not to be too simplistic. The stability of mutual deterrence is not to be abolished without fearful risk to the whole world. It would be best to retain it at a modest cost, unfortunate if a lack of co-operation drives the cost higher than necessary, but terribly dangerous if it is lost by the development of a serious imbalance.

PART II: POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE

Past and Present Air Defence in Canada

When air defence was being built up in the 1950s, the only strategic offensive weapon was the bomber aircraft. The USAF had many of these stationed on overseas airfields, but the main forces with the longest range aircraft were based in the United States. Canada had no bombers of intercontinental range.

The Soviet bombers of those days did not have sufficient radius of action to fly a return mission without at least one mid-air refuelling, and it was clear that they would be obliged to follow routes that kept their mileage close to a minimum. This meant that the routes to the air bases or cities of the United States came across Canada or close to her coasts. Canada felt that her cities were just as much threatened as those in the US. Consequently, the system of interceptor aircraft, warning and control radars, and anti-aircraft artillery was gradually extended to cover virtually all of the US, the inhabited portion of eastern Canada, Labrador, Alaska, and southern British Columbia. Some of the radars and interceptor bases in Canada were manned by the USAF.

When the Soviets built faster bombers, and the importance of early warning began to be appreciated for purposes such as saving of bombers by flying them off their fields as well as to bring the active and passive defences to readiness, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was built, extending along the northern

edge of the continent from Alaska through Canada to Greenland. To prevent it from being by-passed, airborne early warning patrols were flown over both North Pacific and North Atlantic. In addition, the Mid-Canada Line, particularly sensitive to low altitude aircraft and requiring a minimum of personnel, was built along the 55th parallel from British Columbia to Labrador.

Because the approaches to Canadian cities lay over land, it was possible to extend our defences by building radar stations some few hundred miles north of the border. Off their coasts, the US used Texas Towers and radar picket ships.

After detecting aircraft entering the continent, the radar warning and control system attempts to identify them by comparing their position and course with flight plans. Incoming aircraft not identified by flight plan correlation or satisfactory radio authentication are intercepted for visual identification. If destruction had ever been necessary, this could have been done by interceptors or surface-to-air missiles, under the control of the ground radar.

Before the NORAD agreement was signed in 1958, there was an increasing degree of co-operation between the USAF and RCAF, including many joint exercises, with frequent hand-over of interceptors in flight from the control of a US to a Canadian radar or vice versa. As the capability of the Soviet bomber force improved, the need for integrated control, with a high degree of automation, led to the formation of NORAD. Operational co-operation became complete with its advent.

Although NORAD is a joint command for operational control of the forces assigned to it, the selection and procurement of equipment is a national matter. Canada elected to design and build the CF-100 all weather interceptor, later replaced by the CF-101 Voodoo, build in the US. Both countries procured the SAGE computer and the BOMARC long range surface-to-air missile. Only the US elected to deploy Nike Ajax, Nike Hercules, and Hawk short range surface-to-air missiles around their cities and other vital targets.

Subsequent to 1963, as it became clear that the preponderance of Soviet strategic offensive power was being assumed by ICBMs instead of bombers, the numerical strength of the NORAD interceptor and surface-to-air missile forces has been reduced by about one-third. The present force of 48 Canadian CF-

101 interceptors represents a numerical reduction to 30% of the peak value of 162 CF-100 aircraft; although the CF-101 is a more effective aircraft.

Air defence of a target area requires radar control cover and weapons to operate in an active defence belt outside of the target area, and warning radar beyond the active defence belt. A summary of the present air defence activities in North America is that Canada mans and operates the active defence belt to the north of the populated area, while the US mans and operates the active defence belts to the east and west, and in the inner zone. The US finances the contractor-manned outer warning system.

Weaknesses in the Present Air Defence System

A serious weakness of today's air defence system is its vulnerability. ICBMs could destroy any of the installations before the bombers arrived. Bombers with radar-homing missiles could destroy the control radars.

Any system depending on ground-based radars is limited in its ability to track aircraft flying at low altitude, simply because the line-of-sight from radar to target is cut off at the horizon. Tracking can be improved by the addition of a large number of small gap filler radars, but this is an expensive solution. Flying at low altitude will increase the fuel consumption of bombers, thus reducing their payload and/or range, but it is quite feasible as a means of penetrating the defences.

Fixed radars determine the active defence belt in which interceptors and missiles can be controlled. If the bomber were equipped with a long range air-to-surface missile, he might be able to launch it from just outside the active defence belt. The ASM would be a much smaller and faster target than the bomber, although it would have less accuracy or payload.

These three weaknesses in air defence could be overcome by extending the system outwards and downwards, and making its components less vulnerable.

The Airborne Warning and Control System

If a large radar is mounted in an aircraft and flown at an altitude of a few miles above the earth, the horizon recedes to a distance of hundreds of miles. This is evident from the enormous area that can be seen from a high-flying aircraft as compared to any place on the ground other than a mountain peak.

However, a radar normally shows as a "target" any object which reflects energy back to it, and the vast area of earth visible from the high aircraft will reflect so much energy that the comparatively small reflection from another aircraft flying close to the ground will be obliterated by the "ground clutter".

New radar technology has been developed, which offers promise of separating the wanted echo of the low-flying aircraft from the unwanted (larger) echo from the ground. If this is successful, an "Airborne Warning and Control System" (AWACS) could be built which would be free of all three of the weaknesses listed above. It could fly outwards to detect and track the bomber before he released his ASM, it could track bombers attempting to fly under the coverage of ground-based radar and, once airborne, it would escape destruction if its airfield was bombed.

To be able to control interceptors and missiles, carry out identification of unknown aircraft by flight plan correlation or ratio contact, and conduct the other functions normally performed in a ground radar, the AWACS aircraft requires sophisticated equipment for communication, computing, data storage, and display. It will need a large crew and long endurance. It will be a large and expensive aircraft. However, in addition to the advantages already described, it will add a great measure of flexibility to the air defence system, permitting detection, tracking, and control to be carried out anywhere, over land, sea, ice, or snow.

To quote Secretary Clifford in January, 1969¹,

"The over-land radar technology program is progressing satisfactorily and the tests to date have been encouraging. Contract definition has been initiated and engineering development of the AWACS system can be started in Fiscal Year 1970. About \$40 million is available for this purpose in FY 1969, and an additional \$75 million is requested in the FY 1970 Budget. We intend to pursue this program with great prudence, holding our investment to the lowest practicable level until the prime contractor selected has successfully demonstrated by actual flight tests a useable radar detection and tracking system. If all goes well, the first of these aircraft should enter the force in the mid-1970s".

Over-The-Horizon Radar

The limitation which the horizon imposes on the range of ground-based radar has already been mentioned. The same limitation applies to television or microwave relay transmission, for which transmitter and receiver have to be virtually intervisible. However, long-distance wireless communication has been effected ever since the time of Marconi, by making use of reflections from the ionosphere, the layers of ionized gas 40 to 400 miles above the surface of the earth. If a radar uses high transmitter power, and one of the longer wavelengths which are reflected by the ionosphere, it is possible to obtain echoes from an aircraft at a range many hundreds of miles beyond the horizon. Since the energy detected in the receiver has been scattered back from the target, this type of radar is called Over-The-Horizon-Backscatter (OTHB).

A few OTHB radars would allow very long range detection of aircraft far from the target areas, and thus supply early warning and a good peacetime surveillance at a relatively modest cost. Because the energy is reflected over the horizon, aircraft could not avoid detection by flying low. Hence a system based on OTHB radars would overcome two of the weaknesses in the present system. The sites would, however, be vulnerable to destruction by ICBM, SLBM, or air-to-surface radar homing missiles, and could not be relied upon in wartime. Their coverage would be filled in by AWACS.

Since the OTHB radars depend on reflection from the ionosphere, they may be subject to the same disturbances over the northern regions which produce the Aurora Borealis (Northern Lights). Therefore, their operation in Canada could pose special problems.

Improved Interceptor Aircraft

A modern interceptor is a complex weapon system, in which the air-to-air missile and the fire control system are just as important as the basic airframe. The present "century series" interceptors (of which the main examples in North American air defence are the F-101 and the F-106) are quite effective against subsonic bombers at high altitude. However, the radar display is obscured by "ground clutter", especially when flying at low altitude, and radar-guided air-to-air missiles are likely to be misdirected because of reflections from the ground.

A new interceptor could be designed to incorporate the same type of radar technology that shows promise of making AWACS possible, so that the interceptor could fly high, look down, and "see" a bomber at low altitude. It could be armed with a longrange high performance air-to-air missile, able to close on a target at low altitude. The aircraft could be built to have a long radius of action at supersonic speed. This is the concept of the F-12. It would be a very expensive undertaking.

A somewhat less ambitious course of action would be to incorporate the improved radar and air-to-air missile into the F-106 airframe. This concept, labelled "F-106x", would allow the interceptor to fly high, look down, and shoot down. Although it would not have the range or speed of the F-12, it would be able to work under the control of ground radar or AWACS to extend the zone of active defence outwards and downwards. Comparing the two proposals, Secretary McNamara⁷ stated in 1968 that,

"The F-12 would be superior in discouraging such future threats as very long range ASMs and supersonic bombers, whereas the F-106x would be superior in discouraging short range ASMs, decoys and self-defense missiles. The F-106x would be best in the mobile air defense role. No air defense system can provide significant "Damage Limiting" capabilities against the USSR unless accompanied by a strong, effective ABM, a capability which is present unattainable. Our analysis also showed that (both) alternatives... provide a good capability against Nth (i.e. other) countries. On balance, the AWACS/F-106x force seems to be the proper choice at this time".

Reduction to Vulnerability of Aircraft

Airfields are vulnerable to attack by ICBM and SLBM as well as bombers. However, it is possible to reduce the risk that a substantial proportion of the interceptors may be destroyed on the ground, by dispersing them to many airfields, and changing the dispersal pattern continuously. Advanced interceptors require complex maintenance facilities, and it would be expensive to provide these, spare parts, reload missiles, and the skilled technicians at a large number of airfields on a permanent basis. Instead, the mobility can be achieved by providing a fleet of cargo-type aircraft (such as The Hercules) able to trans-

port the maintenance personnel, parts, tools, test equipment, and weapons to any airfield which has the necessary runways and traffic handling facilities.

Stated US Objectives for Modernized Air Defence Program

The US have stated six objectives for an improved and continued air defence program.⁸ These are:

- (a) Peacetime identification, to prohibit unopposed access to North America by unauthorized foreign aircraft;
- (b) limiting the damage that could be done to the urban-industrial complex by Soviet bombers, in the event that deterrence should fail;
- (c) preventing damage from a bomber attack by any other country (Cuba is mentioned specifically);
- (d) precluding a bomber attack on strategic missile forces that are being intentionally withheld;
- (e) discouraging the Soviet Union from developing and introducing new bomber threats which would be costly to neutralize;
- (f) providing a complete mobile "air defence package" which could be employed in an overseas theatre.

These are comparatively modest objectives. It is admitted that (b), damage limiting, will not make a significant contribution unless an effective ABM defence is installed. (d) and (e) are in support of strategic deterrence and stability. (a) applies to peacetime, but is particularly important in the uncertain stages of an international crisis or at the beginning of hostilities. (c) and (f) do not involve the direct balance between the two Superpowers.

Estimated Cost of US Program

The estimated total cost of the US program over 10 years is \$12.3 billion. The rate of expenditure would be heaviest in the earlier years while AWACS was being purchased and the interceptors modified. It is expected that AWACS will allow a reduction in the SAGE system and the ground-based radars, some being transferred to civil authority for air traffic control. There will be fewer interceptor squadrons to maintain. Once the new equipment has been procured, the annual cost for personnel, operation, and maintenance is estimated at \$0.69 billion, substantially less

than would be required to continue operation of the present system.

The Significance of Canadian Geography for the Proposed Plan

It was explained in earlier sections that the vital requirement for anti-bomber defence is space: space for interception well before the targets, and space beyond this for early warning. If the bombers must be intercepted before they launch an ASM, the requirement for space is correspondingly extended. The most likely routes of approach to targets in either Canada or the US are from the northern periphery. AWACS and OTH allow the defences to be extended outwards. If the plan is to be put into effect, it is evident that AWACS aircraft and the interceptors will need to fly over Canada.

If the AWACS and the interceptors conduct operations over Canada, far north of the US border, it would be much more efficient to have them fly from airfields in Canada rather than to expend a large portion of their fuel in transit from and back to the USA on every mission.

It is considered that most, if not all, of the present Pinetree radars will continue to be required until the advent of AWACS. When AWACS has attained full operational capability, it is possible that major reductions in the Pinetree line can be effected. A joint DND/DOT working group has been established to determine the civil/military requirement for ground surveillance radars in the post AWACS era.

In summary, Canadian airspace, Canadian airfields, and Canadian communications would all be very valuable assets in the efficient operation of the modernized air defence plan.

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- 3 Foreign Affairs XXXVII, January, 1959.
- 4 Statement of Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget, 22 January, 1968 (p. 47).
- 5 Ibid (p. 57)
- 6 Ibid (p. 64)
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- 8 Ibid (pp 66-67)
- 9 The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970-74. A Statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, 15 January, 1969. (p. 47).
- 10 Ibid (p. 49)
- 11 Ibid (p. 63)
- 12 The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970s. George W. Rathjens. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York, 1969. (pp 33-34).
- 13 Ibid (p. 19 et seq)
- 14 General Wheeler, Statement at House Hearings on Defense Appropriations. (p. 2).
- 15 The Changing Strategic Military Balance, USA vs USSR. Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninetieth US Congress, July, 1967. (p. 86).

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD

January 24, 1967

Dr. George R. Lindsey, 46, formerly of Toronto, Senior Operational Research Scientist at the Defence Research Board's Operational Research Establishment, Ottawa, has been appointed Chief Superintendent, succeeding the late Dr. R. J. Sutherland. He also assumed the position of Director General of Operational Research at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Dr. Lindsey, one of the World War 2 operational research pioneers, joined the DRB professional staff in 1959 and has a wide and varied background in his scientific specialty.*

* In August 1968 the Defence Research Board was re-organized and Dr. Lindsey was appointed Chief, Defence Research Analysis Establishment.

DR. GEORGE R. LINDSEY

Dr. George R. Lindsey was born in Toronto in June, 1920, where he received his primary education and obtained an Honours B.A. in Mathematics and Physics at the University of Toronto in 1942.

He then joined the Royal Canadian Artillery and served in Canada, with the Canadian Army Operational Research Group, and over-

seas with the British Army Operational Research Group.

Following his retirement from the Canadian Army in 1945, he resumed his studies and obtained a Master's degree in Physics at Queen's University in 1946. The following four years were spent in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge, England, as an Overseas Research Scholar of the Exhibition of 1851 and he obtained the degree of Doctor of philosophy in 1950.

Dr. Lindsey joined the staff of the Defence Research Board's Operational Research Group in 1950. Two years later, he was appointed Chief of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Section. Then posted to RCAF Air Defence Command at St. Hubert, Que., he was Senior Operational Research Officer and Scientific Adviser to the Air Officer Commanding until July, 1959, when he assumed the position of Director of the Defence Systems Analysis Group for the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.

In September, 1961, he became Chief of the Operational Research Group at the Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, a NATO establishment in La Spezia, Italy. On his return to Canada in September, 1964, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Operational Research and subsequently, Senior Operational Research Scientist in the Operational Research Division, Canadian Forces Headquarters. During the period 1965-66, he

attended the National Defence College at Kingston.

He returned to the Defence Operational Research Establishment in 1966, became its Chief Superintendent in 1967, and after its reorganization in 1968 was made chief of the Defence Research Analysis Establishment of the Defence Research Board.

Dr. Lindsey won numerous scholarships and awards both as an undergraduate and graduate student. His research in nuclear physics includes investigations relative to artificial radioactivity and radiation from light nuclei under proton bombardment. Most of his studies during recent years have related to air defence, strategic, missile, and naval problems. Among his many scientific papers are several prepared as a spare-time activity, which concern the analysis of the strategy of baseball games.

Dr. Lindsey is a Member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the American Statistical Association, the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada, the Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. Naval Institute, and the Operational Research Society of America. He is a past president of the Canadian Operational Research Society.

His great grandfather was William Lyon Mackenzie and another great grandfather was Sir Casimir Gzowski, a famous Canadian engineer and personality in Canada's early history.

APPENDIX AAA

AGREEMENT

between

THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

and

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

concerning

THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR
DEFENCE COMMAND (NORAD).

Signed at Washington, May 12, 1958.

ACCORD

entre

LE GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

et

LE GOUVERNEMENT DES ÉTATS-UNIS
D'AMÉRIQUE

concernant

L'ORGANISATION ET LE FONCTIONNE-
MENT DU COMMANDEMENT DE LA DÉ-
FENSE AÉRIENNE DE L'AMÉRIQUE DU
NORD.

Signé à Washington, le 12 mai 1958.

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 12, 1958.

No. 263

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place between the Canadian and the United States authorities concerning the necessity for integration of operational control of Canadian and United States Air Defences and, in particular, to the study and recommendations of the Canada-United States Military Study Group. These studies led to the joint announcement of August 1, 1957, by the Minister of National Defence of Canada and the Secretary of Defense of the United States, indicating that our two Governments had agreed to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control for the air defences in the continental United States, Canada and Alaska under an integrated command responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. Pursuant to the announcement of August 1, 1957, an integrated headquarters known as the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) has been established on an interim basis at Colorado Springs, Colorado.

For some years prior to the establishment of NORAD, it had been recognized that the air defence of Canada and the United States must be considered as a single problem. However, arrangements which existed between Canada and the United States provided only for the coordination of separate Canadian and United States air defence plans, but did not provide for the authoritative control of all air defence weapons which must be employed against an attacker.

The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improvements in the means of effecting their delivery, and the requirements of the air defence control systems demand rapid decisions to keep pace with the speed and tempo of technological developments. To counter the threat and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system, defensive operations must commence as early as possible and enemy forces must be kept constantly engaged. Arrangements for the coordination of national plans requiring consultation between national commanders before implementation had become inadequate in the face of a possible sudden attack, with little or no warning. It was essential, therefore, to

have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons, facilities and command structure which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan approved in advance by national authorities.

Studies made by representatives of our two Governments led to the conclusion that the problem of the air defence of our two countries could best be met by delegating to an integrated headquarters, the task of exercising operational control over combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries. Furthermore, the principle of an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over assigned forces has been well established in various parts of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The Canada-United States region is an integral part of the NATO area. In support of the strategic objectives established in NATO for the Canada-United States region and in accordance with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, our two Governments have, by establishing the North American Air Defence Command recognized the desirability of integrating headquarters exercising operational control over assigned air defence forces. The agreed integration is intended to assist the two Governments to develop and maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist air attack on their territories in North America in mutual self-defence.

The two Governments consider that the establishment of integrated air defence arrangements of the nature described increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two Governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America, and that defence cooperation between them can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently undertaken.

In view of the foregoing considerations and on the basis of the experience gained in the operation on an interim basis of the North American Air Defence Command, my Government proposes that the following principles should govern the future organization and operations of the North American Air Defence Command.

- (1) The Commander-in-Chief NORAD (CINCNORAD) will be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee of Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, who in turn are responsible to their respective Governments. He will

operate within a concept of air defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two Governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of the Canada-United States region of the NATO area.

(2) The North American Air Defence Command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two Governments. The jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is limited to operational control as herein-after defined.

(3) "Operational Control" is the power to direct, coordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. No permanent changes of station would be made without approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control. The basic command organization for the air defence forces of the two countries, including administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities.

(4) The appointment of CINCNORAD and his Deputy must be approved by the Canadian and United States Governments. They will not be from the same country, and CINCNORAD staff shall be an integrated joint staff composed of officers of both countries. During the absence of CINCNORAD, command will pass to the Deputy Commander.

(5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.

(6) The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be formulated and approved in peacetime by appropriate national authorities and shall be capable of rapid implementation in an emergency. Any plans or procedures recommended by NORAD which bear on the responsibilities of civilian departments or agencies of the two Governments

shall be referred for decision by the appropriate military authorities to those agencies and departments and may be the subject of inter-governmental coordination.

(7) Terms of reference for CINCNORAD and his Deputy will be consistent with the foregoing principles. Changes in these terms of reference may be made by agreement between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, with approval of higher authority as appropriate, provided that these changes are in consonance with the principles set out in this Note.

(8) The question of the financing of expenditures connected with the operation of the integrated headquarters of the North American Air Defence Command will be settled by mutual agreement between appropriate agencies of the two Governments.

(9) The North American Air Defence Command shall be maintained in operation for a period of ten years or such shorter period as shall be agreed by both countries in the light of their mutual defence interests, and their objectives under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. The terms of this Agreement may be reviewed upon request of either country at any time.

(10) The Agreement between parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces signed in London on June 19, 1951, shall apply.

(11) The release to the public of information by CINCNORAD on matters of interest to Canada and the United States of America will in all cases be the subject of prior consultation and agreement between appropriate agencies of the two Governments.

If the United States Government concurs in the principles set out above, I propose that this Note and your reply should constitute an Agreement between our two Governments effective from the date of your reply.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

"N.A. Robertson"
Ambassador of Canada.

The Honourable John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State of the United
States, Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 12, 1958.

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's Note No. 263 of May 12, 1958, proposing on behalf of the Canadian Government certain principles to govern the future organization and operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD).

I am pleased to inform you that my Government concurs in the principles set forth in your Note. My Government further agrees with your proposal that your Note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments, effective today.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

"Christian A. Herter"
for the Secretary of State.

His Excellency Norman Robertson,
Ambassador of Canada.

AMBASSADE DU CANADA
WASHINGTON

N° 263 le 12 mai 1958

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer aux entretiens qui ont eu lieu entre les autorités du Canada et celles des États-Unis au sujet de la nécessité d'unifier la direction des opérations de défense aérienne du Canada et des États-Unis et, en particulier, aux études effectuées par le Groupe d'études militaires du Canada et des États-Unis et aux recommandations qu'il a formulées. Ces études ont abouti, le 1^{er} août 1957, à un communiqué du ministre de la Défense nationale du Canada et du secrétaire à la Défense des États-Unis annonçant que nos deux Gouvernements avaient décidé de mettre sur pied un système de direction unifiée des opérations de défense aérienne des États-Unis métropolitains, du Canada et de l'Alaska, sous les ordres d'un commandement unifié relevant directement des chefs d'état-major des deux pays. En conformité du communiqué du 1^{er} août 1957, il a été établi à titre provisoire, à Colorado-Springs (Colorado), un quartier général unifié désigné sous le nom de Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD).

Depuis un certain nombre d'années, avant la création du NORAD, on reconnaissait déjà

que la défense aérienne du Canada et des États-Unis doit être considérée comme un seul tout. Or les arrangements conclus jusque-là entre le Canada et les États-Unis, s'ils permettaient de coordonner les plans distincts de défense aérienne des deux pays, ne rendaient pas possible l'exercice d'une autorité de contrôle sur tous les engins de défense qu'il y aurait lieu de mettre en œuvre contre un assaillant éventuel.

L'avènement des armes nucléaires, le développement remarquable des moyens dont on dispose pour les porter à leurs cibles, ainsi que les exigences des systèmes de direction de la défense aérienne, nécessitent une promptitude de décision du même ordre que le rythme rapide des perfectionnements technologiques. Pour parer à la menace et pour assurer le maximum d'efficacité à la défense aérienne, les opérations défensives doivent être lancées le plus immédiatement possible et il importe que les forces ennemies restent ensuite soumises à des attaques sans répit. Les arrangements prévoyant la coordination des plans nationaux de défense aérienne, qui nécessitaient une consultation entre les deux commandants nationaux avant toute mise à exécution de ces plans, ne répondaient plus à la possibilité d'attaques soudaines ne laissant à peu près pas le temps de réfléchir. Il devenait donc indispensable de créer, dès le temps de paix, une organisation dotée des armes, des installations et des rouages de commandement qui lui seraient nécessaires pour passer à l'action dès le déclenchement des hostilités en exécutant un plan unique de défense aérienne, approuvé à l'avance par les autorités nationales.

Les études effectuées par les représentants de nos deux Gouvernements ont abouti à la conclusion que la meilleure solution du problème de la défense aérienne de nos deux pays consisterait à déléguer à un quartier général unifié la direction des opérations de toutes les unités de combat des forces nationales affectées à la défense aérienne des deux pays. D'ailleurs, il existe déjà pour divers secteurs de la zone du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord des quartiers généraux unifiés dirigeant les opérations de forces qui leur sont affectées. La région Canada-États-Unis fait partie intégrante de la zone de l'OTAN. Dans le sens des objectifs stratégiques fixés par l'OTAN pour la région Canada-États-Unis et en conformité des dispositions du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, nos deux Gouvernements ont reconnu, en créant le Commandement de la

défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD), l'utilité de l'unification des quartiers généraux qui dirigent les opérations de forces de défense aérienne leur étant assignées. L'unification dont les deux Gouvernements sont convenus a pour but de les aider à développer et à entretenir leur aptitude individuelle et commune à résister à toute attaque aérienne lancée contre leurs territoires, en Amérique du Nord, en conjugant leur défense.

Les deux Gouvernements estiment que l'adoption des arrangements de défense aérienne unifiée ici prévus augmente l'importance de consultations aussi étroites que possible entre les deux Gouvernements sur les questions intéressant la défense commune de l'Amérique du Nord et que la coopération en matière de défense pourra être mise en œuvre de façon satisfaisante pour les deux pays, seulement si ces consultations se poursuivent régulièrement et constamment.

En considération de ce qui précède, et compte tenu de l'expérience acquise au cours du fonctionnement provisoire du Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord, mon Gouvernement propose que les principes suivants devraient régir l'organisation qui sera établie, ainsi que les opérations du Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord.

1. Le Commandant en chef du NORAD (CINCNORAD) relèvera directement du Comité des chefs d'état-major du Canada et de celui des États-Unis, lesquels relèveront directement de leur Gouvernement respectif. Il obéira à un plan général de défense aérienne approuvé par les autorités compétentes de nos deux Gouvernements, lesquelles devront tenir compte de leurs objectifs en ce qui concerne la défense de la région Canada-États-Unis de la zone de l'OTAN.

2. Le Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord comprendra les unités de combat et les personnes que leur affecteront expressément les deux Gouvernements. L'autorité du Commandant en chef du NORAD sur ces unités et ces personnes se limitera à la direction des opérations définie ci-dessous.

3. «Direction des opérations» désigne ici le pouvoir donné à une autorité de diriger, de coordonner et de contrôler les activités «opérationnelles» de forces affectées, attachées ou autrement confiées à cette autorité. Aucun changement permanent d'affectation ne serait effectué sans l'approbation de la

haute autorité nationale intéressée. Les commandants dont relèvera la direction des opérations pourront envoyer des renforts provisoires d'une région à l'autre, même au delà de la frontière, si les opérations l'exigent. L'organisation de base des commandements des forces aériennes des deux pays, notamment en matière d'administration, de discipline, de régie interne et d'instruction des unités, sera placée sous l'autorité des commandants nationaux qui relèveront de leurs autorités nationales.

4. La nomination du CINCNORAD et de son suppléant devra être approuvée par les Gouvernements du Canada et des États-Unis. Ils ne devront pas venir l'un et l'autre du même pays. Le Commandant en chef aura à son service un état-major unifié se composant d'officiers des deux pays. En l'absence du Commandant en chef, l'autorité sera exercée par son suppléant.

5. L'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord continuera d'être tenue, par le Groupe stratégique régional Canada-États-Unis, au courant des mesures adoptées pour la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord.

6. Les plans et les méthodes que le NORAD devra suivre en temps de guerre seront conçus et approuvés en temps de paix par les autorités nationales compétentes et devront être susceptibles d'une mise en œuvre rapide en cas d'urgence. S'ils ont trait aux responsabilités des organismes ou des ministères civils des deux Gouvernements, les plans et les méthodes recommandés par le NORAD devront être soumis par les autorités militaires compétentes à la décision de ces ministères et de ces organismes et pourront faire l'objet d'une coordination intergouvernementale.

7. Les attributions du Commandant en chef et de son suppléant seront compatibles avec les principes exposés ci-dessus. Elles pourront être modifiées par voie d'accord entre le Comité canadien des chefs d'état-major et l'état-major interarmes des États-Unis, avec l'approbation de la haute autorité compétente et pourvu que les changements soient en harmonie avec les principes énoncés dans la présente Note.

8. Le financement des dépenses relatives au fonctionnement du quartier général unifié du Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord fera l'objet d'un accord entre les organismes compétents des deux Gouvernements.

9. Le Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord sera maintenu en fonctionnement pendant dix années

ou pendant une période moindre dont les deux pays pourraient convenir en ayant égard aux intérêts de leur défense commune et aux objectifs fixés en conformité du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Les termes du présent Accord pourront être être révisés en tout temps à la demande de l'un ou de l'autre pays.

10. L'Accord que les parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord ont signé à Londres, le 19 juin 1951, au sujet du statut de leurs forces, s'appliquera en l'occurrence.

11. Le Commandant en chef du NORAD ne communiquera des renseignements au public sur des questions intéressant le Canada et les États-Unis qu'après consultation et entente, dans chaque cas, entre les organismes compétents des deux Gouvernements.

Si le Gouvernement des États-Unis donne son accord aux principes énoncés plus haut, je propose que la présente Note et votre réponse constituent, entre nos deux Gouvernements, un accord qui entrera en vigueur à la date de votre réponse.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

L'honorable John Foster Dulles
Secrétaire d'État des États-Unis
Washington, (D.C.)

"N. A. Robertson"
Ambassadeur du Canada

DÉPARTEMENT D'ÉTAT
WASHINGTON

Le 12 mai 1958

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,


J'ai l'honneur de me référer à la Note n° 263 de Votre Excellence, en date du 12 mai 1958, proposant au nom du Gouvernement canadien certains principes devant régir à l'avenir l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD).

J'ai le plaisir de vous faire connaître que mon Gouvernement donne son plein accord aux principes énoncés dans votre Note. Mon Gouvernement est en outre d'accord avec votre proposition aux termes de laquelle votre Note et la présente réponse constitueront entre nos deux Gouvernements un accord entrant en vigueur aujourd'hui même.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances renouvelées de ma très haute considération.

pour le Secrétaire d'État
"Christian A. Herter"

L'honorable N. A. Robertson
Ambassadeur du Canada
Washington (D.C.)



STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 44

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1969

Respecting

Estimates, 1969-70, Department of External Affairs.

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Buchanan	Laniel	Roberts
Cafik	Laprise	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Carter	Legault	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Fairweather	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Forrestall	MacLean	Winch—(30)
Gibson	Marceau	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[Text]

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, May 15, 1969.

(69)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Marquette*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (21).

Witnesses: From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. David Wilson, Staff Relations and Compensation Division; Mr. A. J. Matheson, Finance Division; Mr. W. S. Durdin, Chief Passport Officer.

Resuming consideration of the Estimates 1969-70, Department of External Affairs, Members questioned the officials of the Department under Items 1, 10 and 15 as previously called.

Mr. Cadieux will provide additional information to the Committee concerning military attachés, as requested by Mr. Winch.

At 12:40 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until Tuesday, May 20, 1969, at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, May 15, 1969.

The Vice-Chairman: The meeting is now called to order.

This morning the Committee is to consider again the estimates of the Department of External Affairs and the International Joint Commission. We have Mr. Cadieux with us again and various members of his staff.

You will recall that we were interrupted by a House vote on April 22 and at that time all three items of the External Affairs Department estimates had been open for discussion; Votes 1, 10 and 15. The idea is to continue with discussion on these items now and subsequently to go into the estimates of the International Joint Commission.

Our first questioner this morning is Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I could be allowed to welcome Mr. Cadieux, but when I first arrived in Ottawa in 1963. I was under his control or aegis and I was intimidated by him then and I may perhaps still be intimidated by him today.

I wanted to ask a whole series of questions which relate to the implementation of the Glassco Commission recommendations concerning the Department. I suspect that not all of these recommendations were ones with which the Department agreed and they may have been right not to agree with them. I would like to get some idea of the extent to which they have been implemented and where they have not been implemented, the reasons or the explanation for that.

Perhaps I could start off on the general question of recruitment and training. The Glassco Commission suggested on page 106:

Relatively few advanced students are now entering the foreign service, a consequence being that an increasing proportion of the entrants possess a Canadian university B.A. only.

Is that still the case, or can one give some estimation of the number of entrants or the proportion of entrants who have only first

university degrees rather than graduate degrees.

Mr. M. Cadieux Q.C. (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs): My impression is that we would have to document this and not having the specific figures with me it is rather difficult for me to give as satisfactory an answer from your point of view as I would like. The impression I have from my conversations with the Director of Personnel and Staff is that more and more of the people who are joining the Department have more than their B.A.'s and that the tendency now is to get people who have done not only graduate, but postgraduate work and who come with Ph.D.s

We also have provision to recruit occasionally above the Grade 2 level; therefore, we bring in people who have had advanced university education in some cases, or who have had the combination of more university education and practical experience. I would say that the tendency has been to achieve this recommendation.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps you could get some figures for me over the past five years of the proportion. Your comment leads me to the second question, that of lateral entry, which is something the Commission did recommend. I know that you have instituted procedures to enable this. Has the Department taken advantage of this? Would there be, say, a few people coming each year on lateral entry or a significant proportion?

• 1110

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, there is some movement. Again, I think we can produce the statistics for you. The movement works both ways. There is some movement outside the Department to other departments and with us I think it is a very significant factor. In some cases it is permanent; that is, people at some stage in their career seek further advancement or satisfaction in other types of government employment, or they move outside government service. Others, outside as part of the technique of keeping in touch with

developments of other branches of government, are loaned to other agencies. They are loaned to such agencies as Treasury Board or the Privy Council office, the Minister's office, and we deploy a considerable range of personnel to achieve this. They are loaned also to the Aid office. But, generally speaking, we always have outside the department a fair proportion of our personnel.

Then, the other way is that we have students who come in for temporary employment during the summer: these are students who we hope to interest in a career in the service. Then there are more advanced and more qualified personnel: these are the researchers. We employ some on projects nearly every year; I think in some cases it is three or four. Also on ad hoc projects there is an arrangement with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs to recruit people. We also have competitions above the grade 2 level.

The problem we get into here, which I am not sure was foreseen by the Glassco Commission, is that four or five years ago there was a considerable amount of recruiting in the Department. People came in at the rate of 50, 55, 60 a year. These people are moving up the ladder in the Department, and the problem is that it may not be desirable to bring in too many people in the lower middle level where the number is already adequate. You have to be a little more selective and find the places where there is a lack of suitably qualified people.

Last fall and well into the new year we had a group of experts, in partnership with the Department, study precisely this problem. They were trying to answer a simple question: what are the personnel policies that the Department should adopt hopefully to always be in a position to have the kind of people at the right level with the kind of qualifications that would meet the requirements of the Department? The difficulty is to project this in the years ahead because the requirements are not always easy to foresee and one must take into account that sometimes unexpected requirements may develop, not only in geographical terms but in terms of special skills, in terms of research, in terms of planning. This is not the kind of thing that universities and the current competitions necessarily bring out. These are the general factors.

Mr. Roberts: Undoubtedly too, you have a pressure: I suspect you are short staffed and therefore it may often be difficult to free

officers to take a seconding to another department.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, this is always a problem for us. We tend to run lean: there is a requirement to be as economical as we can on staff, and in the end we can only do our work with the people who are with us in the Department. The problem is to define what is our work. Our work has to involve co-ordination with other departments that are closely related with us and do work which requires a good deal of co-ordination.

Mr. Roberts: I have, nevertheless, the impression from the outside that one of the areas which is not as strong as it might be in the Department is that of economic policy, and when the Department of Finance officials were before the Finance Committee, after some questioning on my part they did indicate that they would be quite prepared to have a greater exchange of officers between your Department and Finance on, say, a two-

• 1115

year basis in order to give on both sides a bit more experience and background with problems which are of mutual concern.

Is any plan or any discussions going on which might lead to some kind of exchange in an orderly way between these two key departments?

Mr. Cadieux: We have recently developed proposals and suggested that there ought to be a deployment of officers of middle rank from our Department to a number of other departments including Finance, to achieve exactly what you have in mind.

Mr. Roberts: Good.

Mr. Cadieux: But this is the sort of thing that calls for careful planning and for a kind of co-ordination as between a number of departments in recruiting and career development. It can only be done with the consent of the officers. It is not a matter where you can sort of force the pace, otherwise the officers are less than happy in employment that does not correspond to their own ideas as to what their careers would seem to call for. This is something we have very much in mind and I am glad to hear that you confirm that this is also the view of the department of Finance.

Years ago, at the time when Mr. Hardy, who is now the Deputy High Commissioner in London, was a junior officer in the Department, we initiated this policy of exchanging

officers with Finance and he was the first one to do that. That was, I think, some 16 years ago. We were conscious then of the need to do that. The difficulty is that you do not always have the personnel to implement it or you do not always have the suitable types of people who are interested in this kind of co-ordination. Our experience is, as you suggest, that this is valuable; it makes for better co-ordination between departments. But it can only work if it is two-way street. If the Department sends somebody, it is more interested in the operation if it gets someone in return so that at the end of the operation each department has officers who have established personal contacts, who have familiar with the problems of the other department and can work more effectively together.

Mr. Roberts: I am delighted to hear of the developments which you describe.

Mr. Cadieux: We are thinking of something that would be fairly big and would involve dozens of officers. It would not be a small scale operation, considering the number of officers we have in our Department.

Mr. Roberts: So that the phrase in the Glassco Commission Report that it is not the practice to second foreign service officers to key departments for experience is certainly no longer true?

Mr. Cadieux: It is no longer true. In the Aid office, for instance, we are seconding a large number of officers, and we have a considerable number of officers in the Privy Council office all the time.

Mr. Roberts: Is it now a condition of permanent employment in the Department that an officer have a working knowledge of both French and English?

Mr. Cadieux: In effect, it works out that way because we generally do not allow them to move to something else until they have acquired proficiency in the other language. That is the first thing they do. If they do not know the other language they are sent to the language school. So that, in effect, by the time consideration has to be given as to whether they will be confirmed in their position, they have already been exposed to this if they did not have it when they came.

Mr. Roberts: It may be somewhere in one of the papers that we have been provided with, but could you give me now the salary range for a starting officer in External Affairs

and the salary range roughly of someone who had been in the Department for 10 years?

Mr. Cadieux: They have been increased lately and I will have to check with some of my colleagues here who may have the figures with them.

• 1120

The Vice-chairman: Have you finished, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: No, I have a lot more but if you wish me to break off and come back later on, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to do that.

The Vice-Chairman: I do not have many names so I think you might as well continue, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Having said that I think that the salaries are discouraging, I would like to go on to the question of allowances and regulations. I think that unless things have changed drastically over recent years, this is one of the areas where the department are still operating on a slightly archaic basis and, I suspect, through no fault of their own.

First of all, I would like to talk about the allowances or the way in which they are administered in transfer from one post to another. I think at least up until about five years ago, it was the practice to make the officers rigidly accountable for every expense that was involved. It required an enormous amount of regulation, an enormous amount of filling out of forms and must have involved a considerable number of people.

Some of the regulations are pretty bizarre or were pretty bizarre and led to some strange results. There was one regulation, if I remember correctly, where an officer could only have brought back free from his posting abroad a cargo space or weight one-quarter more in weight than the weight that he had taken out with him when he went on the posting, the result of which was to lead enormous numbers of young diplomatic officers to pack up their bricks and boards used as bookcases, which would increase their weight as they went out, and to throw the bricks and boards away whenever they arrived at where they were going so that they would have an increased weight allowance to bring back.

There were regulations providing for compensation for taking your automobile to your posting, but you could not receive compensation for bringing it back and so on. There were many other regulations which were

extremely detailed and in some cases rather bizarre. This seemed to me to use a lot of energy and time. I would say that when you establish regulations in such a detailed way you really are encouraging people to find as many ways around them as they can.

Surely it would be a lot easier simply to establish for any transfer of post from A to B for a certain sized family at a certain level in the service an over-all sum which would be generally adequate to cover that kind of transfer rather than to go through a detailed accounting, which takes a lot of time and leaves a lot of frustration. It should be possible to establish some kind of blanket covering charge for a transfer between two points for a family at a certain level in the service. Would that not save a lot in terms of administrative frustration and annoyance?

Mr. Cadieux: If you will allow me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few comments on the general points raised by the honourable member and then to invite my colleague, Mr. Wilson, who has been involved in detailed negotiations with Treasury officials on these problems, to give detailed answers to the specific points raised.

The first thing that I think has to be pointed out is that we are not the only department involved in external operations and here we are not free agents. We are very much involved in negotiations with the control agency and can only hope for the best and make the best case we can for our employees, bearing in mind that resources have to be

• 1125

handled carefully because they are not unlimited. There is always the argument for being generous as against the argument for being tight or being careful with public money.

The other point is that you have to bear in mind that any concessions that you make to one department apply across the board to thousands of people who serve abroad. That, in the end, makes for a very substantial sum and we are dealing here with figures which are not inconsiderable.

Another point I wish to make is that at the moment this whole system is under review. I think that in the fairly near future we may have a new system, so that in many ways, we are conscious of the fact that the present arrangements are obsolete or inadequate and we have been trying to improve them.

Having said this, I think that I must thank you very much for having brought up the general point. I think it is very relevant in this sense: that the employees of the government who go abroad in one way or another will not serve effectively unless the financing is adequate to give them a feeling that they are being given a fair deal. This is the problem. If they are hampered by regulations at every turn, and if it is always heads the government wins, tails the government wins and they always end up carrying the red accounts, then after two or three postings the employees may become disillusioned. They may become cynical about going abroad. They may say there is a lack of understanding of the risks associated with serving abroad. This I think, affects their disposition to give to the country and to the department the kind of service that we all want to achieve. This is something that is of the essence in this system of allowances. Unless there is enough, somehow, unless the details relate to the central objective of achieving what it is that these people are sent abroad to do, I think that the purpose is lost. This is very important.

Mr. Roberts: With that I would agree.

Mr. Cadieux: Now perhaps Mr. Wilson would comment on the specific points you have raised.

Mr. David B. Wilson (Head, Staff Relations and Compensation Division, Department of External Affairs): Yes, sir. The first point you made, I believe, was that there was in force sometime ago a rather cumbersome and administratively inconvenient system for determining how much out-of-pocket expenses should be compensated for when people move.

This was indeed recognized as one of the less sensible features of the previous system and in 1962, when the Foreign Service Regulations as they now exist came into effect—on May 1, in fact—there was brought into play a new thing called a transfer allowance which was non-accountable. I blush to tell you how little it is, but I have it in front of me. A transfer allowance of \$50 in the case of a single employee and \$100 in the case of a married employee may be paid when the employee is transferred and so on. This is completely non-accountable. The non-accountability of it was intended to meet the point that it is absurd to submit claims in quadruplicate for garbage cans you throw out and

light bulbs that do not work because of different voltage and that sort of thing. But the principle was established and it was in fact, I think, certainly a step in the direction that you are suggesting.

There are, of course, many other kinds of expenses and you mentioned car shipment expenses. Perhaps I could take a moment and speak to that point. This is rather a larger issue because in fact at present only Foreign Service officers have the privilege of having cars shipped to their post at public expense. There is a limit on the cost of shipment; that is, it is limited to the cost of shipping a car from Canada to the post, but this is one of the many areas of the Foreign Service system of compensation and benefits undergoing thorough review right now.

I might just mention, Mr. Chairman, that I came from a meeting in the Treasury Board before this meeting at which we are continuing meeting several times a week, in fact, and sometimes in the evening, to carry out consultations within the National Joint Council. The Public Service Alliance of Canada, the Professional Institute of the Public Service, and the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers are all represented and, together with officials of Treasury Board and departments, they are looking at a whole new system of benefits and allowances which we hope will be put into place in the coming months and which will eliminate many of the anomalies and imperfections of the present system. I do not want to go beyond that because it is, of course, a matter of confidentiality within the National Joint Council.

• 1130

However, the car shipment benefit very specifically is one which in many ways has to be looked at as some kind of fringe benefit, particularly if you look at the question of the possible extension of the car shipment privilege to non-officer people. You do not necessarily have a justification for shipping a car to a post and bringing it back. There may be some case of an option to the employee but these are things where there are, as the Under Secretary has said, thousands of people who may be affected. There is the collective bargaining aspect of the whole thing and there is, finally, the question of budgetary control and effectiveness. I would like to say that we are hoping, speaking as departmental management, to have in the not too distant future a substantially better system than, in fact, we have now. The points you have made

in criticism of the old system are well taken and I can only say that they were dealt with in 1962 on the transfer allowances.

Mr. Roberis: There have been several mentions of the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers and I think there are some difficulties in that area as well. The primary difficulty that I have heard a great deal of comment upon is that many of the foreign service officers are prevented from holding at least executive positions in the professional association because they are considered to be managerial staff.

The application of this particular principle operates in an extremely bizarre fashion in External Affairs and, in effect, I think to some extent creams off most of the people that you would really want running the association. Again, I suspect here the problem is not with you but with the Treasury Board, I suppose?

Mr. Cadieux: The problem is partly Treasury Board and partly the joint boards. There has to be arbitration on this and I think we are bound by a ruling. PAFSO, that is the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers, felt that the ruling excluded too many people. This was arbitrated and the decision was that the management's ruling or suggestion was essentially sustained for reasons that have to do with the structure, with the kind of operations that the service must conduct.

In the nature of things we have a fairly large establishment in Ottawa which is broken up in divisions. This is the unit here that manages the affairs. It means that a certain number of people must run your division.

Abroad you have 85 posts and people rotate between Ottawa and abroad and when they take charge of a post they become managers. It means that if you have 85 posts you have a large proportion of your people who suddenly become managers, but the minute they become managers, by the definitions accepted under the rules that are the basis of the game, they are excluded from membership in this thing.

Mr. Roberts: So this is not a decision of the department?

Mr. Cadieux: No, the Department had to accept the decisions of the arbitration board bearing in mind the structure that it has to live with. It is related to the function it must carry on with.

Mr. Roberts: Did they support the PAFSO position before the board?

Mr. Cadieux: It was not a position of supporting, really, because what we had to do as a Department was to explain the functions we carry, how we are organized, and what it is that has to be done. It was in the light of these representations on the part of the Department of how we function that a decision was arrived at that had the effect.

There is no doubt that the effect in terms of membership of PAFSO is that they are deprived of a large proportion of people who normally would be members of the association. These are in some cases the older ones, the more experienced ones, and it is for that reason, in fact, that they have the confidence of management and they become managers.

There is a compensatory element that in some cases they may go to a larger mission where they then can resume their role in the ranks of PAFSO. The point is well taken it is true that PAFSO does not have as many members as it would have if the Department was not organized, as it is, to serve abroad in small little pockets distributed all over the world.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, I have gone about half way through the questions I have but I really think it would be unfair for me to preempt so much time from the other members.

The Vice-Chairman: I will put you down for the second round.

Mr. Roberts: If you would put me down again I will come back to some other questions I have.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Roberts. Mr. Fairweather.

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Mr. Fairweather: One or two of my question I think are really supplementaries to Mr. Roberts. I am interested in senior people abroad and what opportunities they are given for what in the universities is known as a sabbatical, or after senior people have had a certain number of years abroad is there an opportunity for them to return to Canada, to travel in Canada, and hopefully spend some time in, let us say, a university somewhere?

Mr. Cadieux: We have some provisions. They do not go very far. First, every three and a half years or two and a half years,

depending on the nature of the post, there is provision for home leave and therefore they can come back to Canada and re-establish contacts with the academic community, with their families, and with their headquarters in the Department. This is one provision that is relevant.

Second, more recently we have developed an academic liaison unit in the Department and we are now beginning to develop an arrangement whereby we hope to post to universities diplomats who will act perhaps as professors or in other capacities as will be determined by the university. This will give officers who will be in the senior ranks and who will have been in our service for a good many years an opportunity to live in universities for a period of at least one year.

Third, we have on occasion sent some of our senior officers to such institutions as the National Defence College where they get a training that is of an intellectual nature and enables them really to withdraw from current operations and reflect on national problems. We have done the same thing for some other officers at advanced institutions, such as Harvard for instance, where they study international relations, but there our problem is really a problem of resources and a problem of being able to spare some of the very good people that we have.

What we are trying to do is not really to dispose of officers who may have become tired and send them to pasture for a year or two. We consider this an investment and what we like to do is to send to these institutions, or to enable those who benefit from these opportunities, those who are more promising in terms of the future.

Another thing that is related, I think, to the question you mention is this question of bilingualism where, for instance, very senior officers, those who will remain in the service for hopefully another 10 years, are given a year's break from current assignments to go to Quebec and to concentrate on learning not only the French language but to take an interest in some academic subjects that enable them to become familiar with French culture and institutions.

We have been very directly involved in all these things. We have always had people in this and considering the number of officers that we have, we have made an effort. Whether it is enough, I do not know. We would have liked to do more, and I think we have stated certainly that we would have

liked to do more, but considering our means it has been difficult.

Mr. Fairweather: I just do not understand the mechanics. Would a person of the rank of ambassador have some facility and money on returning home from countries to the west to be able to cross the country, and in reverse, if he is coming from the Pacific, or do they just come home to where they joined the service?

Mr. Cadieux: We do two or three things possibly. The first thing is that normally they come to their home. Their expenses are paid to their home, but there is more than just their salary. First, there is what we call a home leave allowance which gives them a little more mobility and they can use that to travel and become acquainted with the country.

Second, in very many cases we arrange for them to come to Ottawa for consultations because this is an opportunity for us to get a personal indication of what is going on in their country and this gives them a chance I think to re-establish contact with a number of departments, old friends, and institutions.

Third, and this has been very useful when it is not in the middle of the summer, when the season is appropriate, thanks to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, many of our returning heads of missions have undertaken tours in the country of the insti-

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tute branches and this has been very valuable for them in terms of renewing friendship, finding out more about the country, and also explaining to fellow Canadians a little of their experience in other parts of the world.

Mr. Fairweather: I think, if it is fair to observe, that public people as well as the public service are sometimes restricted if it is only to Ottawa that they come for the source of refreshment. I will speak about the transport of dependents and then I will get off this topic. I do not want to classify this at the ambassador level because surely the problems are the same with other people too, but is there a cut-off date when dependents who are in Canada for education can return to their parents wherever they are posted abroad?

Mr. Cadieux: I think Mr. Wilson who is more familiar with the details than I am can deal with this.

Mr. Wilson: Yes, it is age 21 now, but I may say that this age limit, this cut-off point, is itself one of the things that is being looked at very carefully in the National Joint Council Committee on Foreign Service Regulations. There is a limit now.

Mr. Fairweather: Really, people might be right in the middle of university and they are suddenly cut adrift in a sense and in normal circumstances would be returning to their "home".

Mr. Wilson: I do not want to mislead you; perhaps I misunderstood you. If you are talking about students at the post at the university level, we can always bring them back to Canada at any age but normally this does not happen. By the time they are at the two or three level they are normally back in North America, in Canada. I was referring to the benefit. To try to make it clear, it is really a family reunion, a school holiday travel benefit. It is the privilege at public expense for the child to travel from the school or from the university out to the city where the parents are for the summer holidays, let us say, and then back.

Mr. Fairweather: That is the point I was making but it is rather arbitrary if it is 21 because you might be in the middle of a university course at age 21.

Mr. Wilson: In effect, yes, but without defending the present system I can explain the rationale. There was an arbitrary decision that at some point in time a child ceases to be dependent and beyond that point the taxpayer should not really be expected to subvention the annual holiday trip. This is, however, being looked at again very carefully by the unions as well as management.

Mr. Cadieux: Perhaps I could add a word to this. This is one of the risks of Canadian foreign service and having allowances that are more than just absolutely related to detailed expenditures. If a man is serving his country very far from home and he learns that his son at university is very sick, for instance, there would be expenditures for going there to visit him, either he or his wife will go. This is one thing.

Then a man is away. He is away for two years and he hears that his father is dying. Again he will go and there again this is an expenditure that is connected with service abroad. I realize that people who serve in Ottawa may have similar expenditures but this

hits the foreign service officer repeatedly over his career. These are just examples of the kind of things that keep hitting foreign service officers that cannot be covered in advance by regulations that are too tight. Unless these things are done with regard to the normal complexity of life, in the end people who are in the foreign service are going to find it is no deal and it is not worth it.

Mr. Fairweather: I have one last question on this aspect. What about subscriptions to Canadian journals, not particularly newspapers—of course there are not too many of them—is there a reasonably generous allowance?

Mr. Cadieux: All missions, I think, can subscribe to a fair number of periodicals of their choice. I think it is eight Canadian periodicals. They can receive by mail eight and in some cases even more periodicals. In addition they can subscribe to local publications and then some of the internationally-known publications. We make an effort to provide them with the tools of their trade.

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Mr. Allmand: May I ask a supplementary on that?

The Vice-Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: You will recall, Mr. Cadieux, there was a question about the newspapers received by Canadian embassies abroad, I stated that I found it strange that in New York at the United Nations and at other places you received the newspapers so late and also that you only received two newspapers on a regular basis *Le Devoir* and *The Globe and Mail*. I felt this was not really adequate to keep people informed about Canada and up-to-date. Has anything been done to change that? Do they still only get *Le Devoir* and *The Globe and Mail* as late as they do?

Mr. Cadieux: We are studying the problem as I said at the time. The time elapsed since then has not been sufficient to enable us really to make a very great many additional provisions. The system that exists now is that they get these two newspapers by airmail and then they get the CBC bulletin every day.

Mr. Allmand: That is edited though?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, it is prepared by the CBC and gives them the news every day. On

top of this each time there is an important governmental announcement, if the Prime Minister or a minister makes a statement on an important policy question, then this is sent by telegram to all our missions for their information. This is essential to keep them going. On top of that they get the weekly bulletin which covers a fair amount of Canadian news. All these things come in. On top of that they receive these Canadian magazines to which they subscribe.

A number of the missions, the more important ones, get some newspapers by airmail but the cost of these things is one of the limiting factors. It is one of the problems. Many of these newspapers have a very little part that is not repetitive. If you were to send five newspapers much of this is advertisement, much of it is news that you would find in all newspapers, and we would be subsidizing, at high cost by sending that by airplane, material that would be covered five times in each of these publications. This is one of our difficulties when we have to economize. However, we are trying to find ways of improving the flow of information to missions.

We were giving thought to this question that you have raised and one of the problems we have to look at—I would be very grateful for your comments on this—is what are the objectives that we are seeking in very much increasing this at considerable expense. These newspapers are heavy to send by airmail and therefore costly. If we were to send 10 papers by airmail to all our missions this would cost us \$400,000 a year which would be far more than all that we spend now for all publications and a great deal more than we think that we can afford at the moment.

Is it to keep the mission informed? Is it for the convenience of visiting tourists? Is it for the local visitors at the embassy? These are some of the things that we have to explore to try to decide what the target is we are aiming at.

There are not many Canadians who have come back from visiting posts abroad who have told us, "I come from this city and I was astonished that at the embassy I did not have yesterday's issue of my newspaper". Nor the Canadian members of the staff who are there whose main responsibility is to keep in touch with what is happening in Canada, although undoubtedly their chief responsibility is to follow the local scene and keep us informed. If they need instructions on a point we give them advice in telegraphic form on

the basis of the best political authority we have. We go to our political masters and we say, "What do you tell your ambassadors in this country to tell the foreign minister of that country about this or that problem". It is not his interpretation of what is in Canadian papers that would be the decisive character.

I must say that the Canadian members of our embassies are not really agitating very much to get more material. If you can enlighten me on what you think the essential purpose is that would be served by increasing very considerably our expenses in this sector it would help us to carry the case.

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The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, we now have five more questioners on our list. You are second, Mr. Allmand. You have already asked two or three supplementaries. We will be coming to you in a little while. I think you are pressing a little too hard there.

Mr. Allmand: All right, I will return to it later.

The Vice-Chairman: You will be second on my list. Mr. Fairweather I believe has another question or two.

Mr. Fairweather: Yes. I have in front of me and just by coincidence today's British papers and the British weeklies prepared by the BBC and distributed by the British information service. They come airmail for a dime. They cover the spectrum of opinion in Britain from the *Daily Telegraph* to the *Daily Worker*. This is what I mean, is there that type of thing? I do not only want *The Globe and Mail*. Are we getting the *Calgary Herald*. I do not care about the ads and the news, but editorial opinion; opinion in a very simple cheap form. Is there that equivalent? I do not know whether Mr. Allmand means that but this is what I am talking about.

Mr. Allmand: Partly, yes.

Mr. Cadieux: The CBC news bulletin is really our equivalent for this.

Mr. Fairweather: Perhaps you have never seen the CBC bulletin that comes to MP's on trips, with the hockey scores, and who fell off a cliff, and whether the Prime Minister answered the Leader of the Opposition. It is quite inadequate. There is no clash of opinion. I would like to think that our services abroad are aware of some of the problems that confront politicians at home because of different opinions in the country.

That is all. I will not labour it at all.

Mr. Cadieux: We have this news thing, which is the equivalent. I am not making an argument that what we send is as good as this. My opinion is that it is slightly different. It serves a different purpose. We are not taking the responsibility, as a Department, for the selection. There is a little problem here in evaluation, and in deciding what goes in. This is a problem that we have avoided by asking the CBC to give us this bulletin. It is a judgment that is made about what is newsworthy.

As I said, any important statements in the House we are very careful to send immediately to our missions. We think that in the House many important events affecting our national life are taking place, and the missions get this. Admittedly, this is not all, but it covers part of it.

Another relevant factor that I think I should mention is that at the moment the government has appointed a group of people to examine the whole matter of information. We have been hesitant to move very fast in this sector until we know what they are going to recommend and what decisions are going to be made.

What I have in mind is that it is conceivable—although I have no way of knowing this—that they might say that the Department of External Affairs should develop more elaborate services to provide exactly the kind of thing that you have shown me now. If that were the case, this would be one situation. Or they could say: "what we need is a central unit to produce this for all agencies operating abroad", and we would rely on that and distribute it. This has been a factor that I think has slightly inhibited us about starting any new ventures lately.

But we would like to give more and make sure that our embassies get it in condensed form. Because there is a danger venture that the flow may be too much, and sending them too many bulky newspapers at great expense may not provide the answer.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Fairweather passes until the second round. Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must say, as did Mr. Roberts, that I am very pleased that Mr. Cadieux is before us today. Like Mr. Roberts, I also am a former foreign service officer. Mr. Cadieux's reputation is very high among the foreign service officers and professional people in the field.

I would like to follow up one of Mr. Fairweather's questions on the subject of home leave. I am a little diffident about doing this. I did attempt to get more information by way of a question on the Order Paper but two months is evidently not enough time for the

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Department to send a reply. Therefore, I do not know very much about the particular area. And perhaps you will not have the exact details that I am seeking.

You mentioned that home leave is given to people on their return from tours abroad. I know that in my own case I attempted to get it three times and failed on each occasion indeed, until I left the service.

Could you give me some indication of how often it is possible for people to take advantage of these very excellent regulations which allow home leave? Is it a question of home leave being granted every second time, or is it that nine out of ten offices get it on their return from abroad?

This is the type of question I put on the Order Paper. I apologize for putting you on the spot right now, but I would like to know whether this actually takes place very frequently?

Mr. Cadieux: Again, I will call on Mr. Wilson, out of his familiarity with the subject, to give you the best answer he can.

I speak with some feeling on the subject myself. I have been in the service for 28 years and I have never had home leave.

I can well see your point. It is nice to have, but you do not always manage to get it. Why? It is for the reason that it is intended to be given when, say, an officer goes abroad and serves for a period of time. The period of time is longer or shorter, depending on how the post is classified. If you go to a post where conditions are roughly similar to those in Canada, you are not intended to have home leave before about three and a half years. For instance, if you go to France, or to Belgium, and you leave now, a period of about three and a half years would have to elapse before you could claim your home leave.

If you went to a country with a more difficult climate, such as Indochina, or Indonesia, the period would be much shorter. It would be about two years. You could ask for your home leave and come back at government expense at the end of that period.

In the case of certain categories of employees serving in the United States, they are not entitled to home leave because conditions there are deemed to be so similar to those in Canada that the feeling is that there should be no entitlement.

Beyond that, perhaps Mr. Wilson may want to elaborate.

Mr. Wilson: The real question that Mr. Anderson has posed is not so much on the theory, or the policy, or the intention, as on the practice. I have to apologize for our not having been able to answer your question yet. I would have hoped that by now we would have been able to. The fact is that a few years ago we switched over to a system of keeping leave records for people abroad only at the post. We have to wait until the end of the fiscal year to get all their reports and these have been a little slow in coming in; but we should have it very soon.

But on your specific question about how often they do get it and whether it is every other term, or every third term, the answer is that it really depends very much on the employee and on whether or not he can be spared at the time he should come back. Foreign service officers, as a category, tend to suffer very much because there is always more work to be done than there are people around to do it. This is one reason that one has in the past often seen cases of people being asked to defer their home leave. They do not lose it; it does not lapse; it is not something that if they do not take it they do not get when they go abroad again.

There is not only the home leave benefit available to people abroad but there also accrues one extra week of vacation leave a year. If they have not been taking all their leave as they have earned it at their post, they may come back with anything up to 40, 50 or 60 days' leave. This creates problems for the Department in deploying its manpower resources in the most effective way. And this is really the explanation of why so often we have tried, in fact to inflate our establishment by the device of overtime and by deferring leave, simply to try to meet the challenge presented by the tasks that are before us.

I think I should mention that in future, under the recently negotiated collective agreement with PAFSO, there will be provision, after two or three years, for a cash compensation to be paid for unused leave credits. The effect of this, because of the

budgetary restrictions upon us, will be to compel managers in future to be very much more deliberate in making the hard choice between getting a job done and giving an employee leave. I would not like to make any predictions, because this will depend very much, of course, on how much is approved in estimates in future years, but I would expect that we will be found to be taking very much harder looks at the priorities of the departmental operations and very specifically at how they relate to the granting or deferring of leave.

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Therefore, to sum up, the personnel policy intention is that employees should get leave in the year it is earned; and that when they come back from a post abroad with home leave credits they should be entitled to take it within a reasonable time, and, if possible, at a time convenient to the employee.

We have to think of fair weather and school holiday leave, and that sort of thing. Very often foreign service officers have asked not to have to take their home leave in the winter when they come back. This sort of thing tends to lock them into situations where they go back to work at a desk job and it becomes very much more difficult after that for the division heads to release them. This has been so in the past but we hope it will be less so in future.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have a short supplementary question.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay, on a supplementary.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Does this leave that you are speaking of involve their families? In other words, are the families allowed to go on leave with them on these holidays?

Mr. Cadieux: The main benefit in the home leave area is in fact the transportation benefit. That is where the big money is involved—bringing them back with all their dependents, every two years from their post and taking them right to their home leave centre. In French it is called, “congé de foyer”—back to their home towns as it were, with all their families. It is not the cost of the man's salary while he is on leave that is the big item in the long run, it tends to be the shipping expenses. But the answer to your question is yes, the dependents are all included on the home leave benefit.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you.

Mr. Anderson: It appears then that the purpose of the leave is not as Mr. Fairweather suggested—an opportunity to see Canada or to get to know Canada better following their return from a post abroad or prior to a departure abroad; it is basically some sort of a rest and recuperation period after a period in a country with a difficult climate.

Mr. Cadieux: Not necessarily. After all, leave is at the disposal of the officer. He comes back and if he wants to go to his home town he is free to do that. On top of that, if he wants to divide his time between his home town and Ottawa to re-establish contacts with people in headquarters, he is free to do that, or if he wants to return to where he received his university education and visit his old professor, he has that freedom. In other words we do not try to prescribe how he uses his time.

Mr. Anderson: That is true and it is very curious that you would permit, as Mr. Wilson has mentioned, payment in lieu of this leave—because it would appear that what you are giving in that case is not an opportunity for the man to re-establish contact with either his home area or with some other area of Canada but simply paying him sort of like an extra allowance in return for service abroad.

Mr. Cadieux: You have to bear in mind that there are two possible circumstances involved here. I think it was originally conceived as a kind of break at home between one foreign post and another. If a man is taken out of Indonesia and sent to Belgrade, it sort of makes sense to say to him, “Look, you go home for a little while. Do what you want, but then you will be gone for another two and a half or three years. So make sure that you do whatever you want to do at home.” But there is another situation.

The other situation is when you say to this man, “You have been two years in Indonesia. You have earned home leave credits. Your next post is not going to be outside but back home in Ottawa.” At that point you have a choice. You may say to this fellow, “Theoretically you can go to your home town, which is 500 miles from Ottawa, and you will be gone for two months.” This is one choice. On the other hand you could say, “The man who has replaced you at the post you came from has left. We are short one man. Would you consider going to work right now and either deferring your leave or taking some money in-

stead?" Because he is in Canada he will gradually re-establish his contacts and soon, and this should help us. This is really what happens.

Mr. Anderson: I could agree with you, sir, that your theory of home leave is excellent, however, it does appear to me that the principle of making payment in lieu thereof for the convenience of the Department, which is basically what this would work out to be, is in direct conflict with the policy that you have outlined, which would be for people to come home and to have an opportunity to regain contacts. I am quite sure, in view of your shorthanded problem, that there will be more and more pressure upon officers not to take home leave but to take money instead. In view of the fact that they are returning to a lower standard of living in as much as they are not getting their foreign allowances, it is quite possible the officers themselves would prefer to take money instead to allow them perhaps to make a bigger downpayment on a home or something of that nature.

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It appears that this particular provision flies directly in the face of the logic of granting leave in the first place.

Mr. Cadieux: I do not want to be contentious about this, but Mr. Fairweather was asking me whether we were making provisions whereby people had the opportunity to renew their contacts at home. I said that home leave was one of the ways by which we were doing this. I do not want to push it beyond that, but I think that for those who want to do it it can serve that purpose.

Mr. Anderson: Perhaps we will come back to that when my question on the Order Paper has been answered. I do have the information on amounts and numbers of people.

I would like now to turn directly to the estimates themselves. Could you briefly comment why under Vote 1, on page 87 of the estimates the number of Scientific and Professional personnel employed in the Department's administration has doubled? Is there any significance to this doubling from 20 people last year to 41 this year? Does this indicate any new responsibility?...

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, we have absorbed the SRB, the Special Research Bureau.

Mr. Anderson: Similarly, is there anything significant in the accommodation costs dou-

bling, presumably for Ottawa accommodation provided by the Department of Public Works? Is this strictly an accounting device?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Anderson: That is just an accounting question. Having cleared up those couple of points could we perhaps turn to some of the costs of missions abroad.

There is no doubt that the Department has done very well to keep its increases in expenditure to approximately 8 per cent this year. I am sure all members of the Committee congratulate you on preparing a budget which is so modest in its increase. However, it may be that in future there will be no increase money available. In the light of the Prime Minister's recent statement to this effect, apparently we are entering a period of austerity.

I wonder how you justify some of your missions abroad. I am thinking in particular of some of the missions overseas which apparently cost a minimum of very close to \$100,000 each in countries where we apparently have little trade, few Canadians resident, and no direct Canadian contact. An example is Ecuador. We do not have much trade with Ecuador and there are few Canadians living there. Uruguay would be another one. How do you determine whether those countries will have a mission? Also and I am not pushing the case of this country—how does it happen that a country such as Korea, which has I think a \$40 million trade with Canada every year and a fair number of Canadians resident there, is not entitled to a Canadian mission? Could you give me some indication of how these decisions are made?

Mr. Cadieux: This is something I could discuss very easily but I feel inhibited because these are essentially governmental decisions. Ultimately the decision to open or to close or not to open or not to close are made by the government for political reasons and I think that as a civil servant it is very awkward for me to comment on this.

I could add that in a country where you have a mission the people who are there perform the usual tasks connected with the maintenance of a mission. They provide consular services, they try to promote trade, they do information work, and they report to the Canadian government on what is happening. But where the government wishes to decide, say, whether to send a mission to Latin America to emphasize our interest there, it is a matter for consideration at that very

moment whether the decision to close or to open posts would or would not be compatible with the objectives. That again is an indication of how political that could be. Beyond that I prefer not to go.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, in the particular case of Latin America it appears to me that we are not using very much of a scatter-gun technique. Many missions are probably understaffed and representation probably takes up a far greater proportion of the officers time than it would if you had more concentrated missions.

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Perhaps I could just deal with a few specific items. Could you explain why there has been such a substantial increase in the operating expenses of the mission in Australia where there is no increase in staff. The operating expenses have gone up by 33 per cent.

Mr. Cadieux: I think that Mr. Matheson can explain the details of that. I suspect that this increase in operating expenditures relates to the cost of living.

Mr. A. J. Matheson (Finance Division, Department of External Affairs): The fluctuations in the figures shown under various missions include repair and upkeep of buildings and whether new communication facilities have been added in addition to the salaries and allowances.

Mr. Cadieux: But what about Australia? Is there any special reason that there was an increase of 33 per cent?

Mr. Matheson: We would have to examine that in detail.

Mr. Anderson: Excuse me, one moment sir: repair, upkeep and expansion does not come under capital items. It is not a capital expense?

Mr. Cadieux: No, it is not.

Mr. Anderson: That may well explain that one.

There is a similar question for Uruguay: the personnel has remained the same and roughly the same type of increase has taken place. However if we have to wait until we have the Minister before us before we can ask questions as to what missions should be closed in the interest of economy, I will pass until the Minister is before us, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Anderson. Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to return to this matter of news and editorial information for the embassies abroad. The reason I ask this question in the first place, is that, whereas I found our foreign officers abroad, in places that I visited, very well informed about the countries where they were, I found them rather poorly informed about what was going on in Canada. As a matter of fact, often they seemed to be more at home and belong more to the country where they were than Canada. They seemed like expatriates. Often they asked me about this and that. I may be wrong as I am not an expert on external affairs, but it appears to me as a Member of Parliament that our officers abroad should be like a bridge and should bring information from that country back to Canada and also inform that country of what was going on in Canada in some way or other, and understand what the people in Canada were thinking and what was going on in Canada.

I do not know how it can be done but there should be some method of information better than the CBC news bulletin which I think is quite inadequate. There are those two newspapers that are good, but I still feel this is inadequate—not just with news, Mr. Cadieux, but also with editorial opinion, and several young officers have expressed this to me too. You said you have not had many complaints; maybe I just ran into people who did. In private sessions that I had with several young officers they told me that they felt quite out of touch with editorial opinion in Canada, and what people were thinking about things. I just put the problem to you. I do not know whether the solution would be to send more bulky newspapers or to make a better compilation of news and editorial opinion, but I think in some way or other more information has to be brought to our embassies.

I compared this by the way, with what was done in some other embassies, and I found that they had much more. Some other countries felt they should airmail more newspapers and news magazines and so forth. If it costs \$400,000, I think it might be worth it.

You asked me the questions, are we to have these things there for the foreign services officers or just for tourists? I say, first of all, I think it might help the foreign services officers, but in addition to tourists, I also have the impression that an embassy abroad should be there as sort of a centre of Canada for those people in that country including businessmen, students, government officials

who may have to travel to France or England and that there should be some place in these countries where they can go and get up-to-the-minute information as to what is happening in Canada. This is again my impression as an amateur. Sometimes one cannot get that information. I personally feel that old news is not worth very much. If news magazines or newspapers arrive two weeks late, they are good from an historical point of view, but for business decisions or certain other decisions that require quick information, I do not know if they are worth that much. Anyway, I put the problem to you, and I do not have the full solution.

• 1215

Mr. Cadieux: As I indicated before, I think there is a task force that is studying the problem of how we should handle governmentally the problem of information. This will have an effect on the projection of Canada abroad and will undoubtedly concern the missions abroad. There may, as a consequence, be a good deal more of the kind of material that you think is going to be helpful, such as the collection of editorial comments and interpretation of news; this may become available and would meet the requirements that you had in mind.

Another thing that may be relevant to what you mentioned, I think is that in the future, under the new financial management regulations, missions will be given a good deal more leeway than they had before. They will be given control of a budget and they will spend it as they see fit, keeping the central office informed. At that point, if they wish to use some of that money to get some particular newspapers by airmail, it will be open to them to do that. From that point of view, it will be interesting to see if they wish to do it. This will be open to them.

Thirdly, I am very grateful to you for the comments you have made. We will study this and we will earnestly seek ways of improving the present system. I certainly agree that they do not get enough. Our whole concern is to find ways of doing it within our means and trying to be as effective as we can.

Mr. Allmand: On an other matter, I would like to know how many foreign service officers or how many diplomats you have in Stockholm carrying on negotiations with China?

Mr. Cadieux: How many we have?

Mr. Allmand: Yes, how many officers both within Stockholm and outside of Stockholm are working on this problem of establishing diplomatic relations with China?

Mr. Cadieux: There is the ambassador, and, as required, he is supplemented by experts who are sent from Ottawa at the direction of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. At the moment this is one officer. There may be more in the future, but at the moment, one.

Mr. Allmand: What level of officials are we dealing with on China? Are we dealing with men at an ambassadorial level there in trying to negotiate these relations, or are we dealing with other levels?

Mr. Cadieux: At the moment the People's Republic of China do not have an ambassador in Stockholm so that our ambassador is dealing with the *chargé d'affaires* there.

Mr. Allmand: I see. Are these negotiations basically taking place in our embassy and in the Chinese embassy? Are they continuing or do they intend . . .

Mr. Cadieux: They are taking place in the embassy premises.

Mr. Allmand: Can you tell us, or is it for the Minister to tell us, if these negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not think I am in a position to add anything to what the Minister said recently, that he expected there would be another contract about the middle of May, I think he said I cannot add anything to that.

Mr. Allmand: All right. My final question deals with languages. Mr. Cadieux, could you tell us what provisions you make in the department for instructing your officers in foreign languages, other than French and English, so that they can deal with the people in the countries where they are stationed?

Mr. Cadieux: The general regulation is that when it is in the department's interest for an employee to learn the language of the host country, the department is in a position to authorize payment of tuition fees up to \$600 per annum. The same authority exists for the wives of officers, where the wives assist their husbands in their representational or promotional work. We give special training in difficult languages and at the moment we have authorized 14 people.

• 1220

Mr. Allmand: What would be considered difficult languages, Mr. Cadieux?

Mr. Cadieux: For instance difficult languages would be Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Serbo-Croat, Polish, Czech; these are the more difficult languages. Authorities are issued for training in some 26 foreign languages all told, but they are not considered difficult. For example, Portuguese and Spanish are considered to be less difficult. All told we have authorized 500 of our employees to study foreign languages.

Mr. Allmand: So if you have a young officer in the Soviet Union, he can be given an authorization for courses in the Russian language.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, he and his wife, and in some cases—it is a matter of availability of personnel—we would like to give him training in the language before he leaves, so that hopefully when he gets there, he has a knowledge of the language.

Mr. Allmand: Yes, I would expect that too. Do you do that?

Mr. Cadieux: It is a matter of how much staff we have. If we had, we would. We are short of personnel, but to the extent that it is possible, we do it. If the choice is not to have an officer on the spot, or to have an officer sent there with authority to learn the language, then this is the second solution. It is not as good as the first one, but sometimes we are driven to that, because we do not have enough staff.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Stewart would like to ask a supplementary.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Earlier you mentioned that you sent personnel to language schools here in Canada. I wondered what facilities you had for teaching English as well as French where it is necessary. I understand that some time ago facilities were not available. Are they now available to your Department?

Mr. Cadieux: You mean the bilingual facilities?

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): Yes, that is right.

Mr. Cadieux: Well, we find that most of the people who join our Department have a fair knowledge of English. I do not recall that

there has been a problem. Most of them have university education. It is a requirement and in most cases they are capable of getting along. If this was a problem we would make arrangements through the Civil Service Commission to arrange for them to be given additional tuition in the English language.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): These facilities are available if a person wants to learn English?

Mr. Cadieux: In the Public Service Commission.

Mr. Stewart (Marquette): Very good, thank you.

Mr. Allmand: Returning to the foreign languages, if I understand you correctly, you do not think what you have now is really adequate for providing training in foreign languages for these officers before they go away. You seem to indicate that it could be much better than it is now.

Mr. Cadieux: This is all very relative. It all depends on the pressure on certain posts at certain times. In some cases, the post may be low in personnel and you may not be able to afford to send a man for a year to learn the language. You may have to move more quickly. But at times the post may be well up on personnel and then it may be easier to train a man and to send him there at a more leisurely pace. This is why I do not feel it is possible to generalize. In principle I think that as often as we can, we ought to send people to their posts with as much knowledge of the local language as it is possible to give them.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question. Do other nations have a similar policy of giving an opportunity to their embassy staffs to learn the language?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not have the facts with me, but I know that many other foreign services have entrance requirements that are higher than our own. We encourage people to know French and English, but in some countries one has to know three languages before one can apply. You must know that many and then you are encouraged to pick up one or two afterwards. In many European countries, knowledge of three, four or five languages is not unusual. We in Canada at the moment are concentrating on getting the two official languages and then depending on the requirements in certain countries, we encourage people to learn languages as they go along.

• 1225

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): So I take it that these other countries—and I am putting them all in the same category—have similar programs giving an opportunity to their embassy to have someone teach the staff.

Mr. Cadieux: As far as I know, other countries do that, yes.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you.

Mr. Allmand: The reason I asked that question, Mr. Cadieux, was when we did our tour on the NATO study I found that some of the Canadian officers in these foreign countries could hardly speak the language of the country at all. I was just wondering what steps are being taken so that our officers do speak German or Swedish or whatever it might be?

Mr. Cadieux: The ideal is that they should know it, but operational requirements must come first. It has not been possible in every case to sent people who have been fully trained in these languages.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch is the last on my list for the first round. I then have Mr. Roberts and Mr. Fairweather with questions on the second round. I hope we can terminate the questioning, and then next Tuesday morning at 11 o'clock we could arrange for a quorum and pass these estimates. Perhaps we could sit for a few minutes past 12.30 to clear this up.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, may I first of all apologize for being 40 minutes late, but like other members I have not yet discovered the secret of how to be in two places at the same time. My questions will be in order and I will be as brief as possible.

Mr. Cadieux, I believe the first inquiry on this must come to the Department of External Affairs. Could you tell us how you reach a decision as to where and in what numbers military attaches shall be posted to our various embassies and whether or not there has been any reduction in the number of military attaches in view of the very strong criticism that was expressed, about two years ago I believe, when a number of members thought that we were overstaffed with military attaches?

Mr. Cadieux: As to how we reach a decision on military attaches, my impression would be that this would be a question for National Defence to deal with. But I could

make some comments which I hope will be useful.

Mr. Winch: The first inquiry comes to you at External Affairs?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. This is something we discuss with the Department of National Defence and this is something about which we would ask the views of the head of mission, as to whether it would be helpful and desirable to have a military attache somewhere.

Some of the considerations that enter into the picture are that the military attache, in terms of reporting, in terms of liaison, in terms of representation, covers some of the duties that the other officers of the embassy cover in other fields. Then you have to ask yourself about the role that the defence forces play in a particular community. For some countries you may reach the conclusion that the armed forces are important, and in some cases you may even think that there are possible outlets in terms of defence production. It could be that in some countries we may have expectations that we could sell military equipment. This could be an additional factor, apart from the others, in arranging for the posting of a military officer to serve at a diplomatic post as a military attache.

• 1230

Ultimately the decision as to how many is made by the Department of National Defence, but as I say the decision is not made without consultations with and ultimately the approval of the Department of External Affairs and consultation in each case with the head of the diplomatic mission.

Mr. Winch: I think it was about two years ago that there was very strong criticism of the numbers. Has there been any reduction? Are they the same, or have you increased the number?

Mr. Cadieux: At the moment I do not have the figures in my head.

Mr. Winch: Would you mind getting them for us?

Mr. Cadieux: I think we can.

Mr. Winch: Thank you. I will now move along to my second question. This again is in view of the fact that I think it must come to External Affairs first. Would you be good enough, Mr. Cadieux, to explain how, in co-operation with the Department of National

Defence, a decision is made to supply the cadre of military officers to train, for example, a navy in Nigeria, the army in Ghana and in other countries. I think this is rather an important matter. Just how do you decide. In many cases we do the training where there are trouble spots in the world today.

Mr. Cadieux: Let me hasten to relieve what seems to be the concern in your mind. I think the decision in every case is made by the Canadian government. What happens is that the government in country "X" calls in our ambassador and says: "We would like to have some training for the officers in our navy and we would like your country to provide us with assistance in this field." Well, the ambassador as it is his duty, will first consult with his military officer or military adviser as to what may be the implications of this order, and he will then send an assessment of this to the Canadian government here.

Mr. Winch: It comes to you first at the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Cadieux: It comes to the Department of External Affairs first and then there is a Committee, External Affairs and National Defence, where this will be analyzed between the two departments. If National Defence says that we do not have any officers we can spare, that we have no experience in this field, and are incapable of handling this, that is the end of the matter. But we would not give the answer.

Mr. Winch: No, but I am not going on that. I am going on the basis that we do have an army, a navy and an air force. How do you decide that we are going to send men overseas for the training of navies and armies?

Mr. Cadieux: The policy considerations plus the technical considerations are put together in an assessment with an indication of the costs and the duration of the possible involvement. This is submitted to the defence and external affairs committee of the government. They report favourably or otherwise. It goes to full Cabinet and they decide favourably or otherwise. In the end a communication is sent to the requesting government and this is the way it works.

Mr. Winch: Am I out of order if I ask you, although the decision is made on a political level by the Cabinet, I presume they get a policy recommendation from yourself and External Affairs, do they not?

Mr. Cadieux: That depends on the circumstances. It is conceivable that in some cases on the External Affairs side the experts, the ambassador himself may say, "From the point of view of my role here, I think this would be an opportunity", or the ambassador may say, "If we get involved here this may be very difficult", or there may be a situation where there are considerations in favour, there are considerations on the other side. It may be very difficult on purely foreign policy grounds to decide. There may be military considerations that might be the decisive factor, or you may have the impression that if you were to provide naval training that this could lead to contracts later on that could be significant in terms of activities in our shipyards and that the Department of Industry might say, "It may not be very good politically because there are no great profits this way or that way, or it may be very interesting militarily, but if it leads to further contracts in terms of our industry in Canada, perhaps this is an agreement that should be considered and given appropriate weight". So in every case the Department of External Affairs would not be in the position of beating the drum and saying, "You go ahead; you do it; it is a good thing; we think it should be done".

Mr. Winch: That leaves me with one further question on that phase before I hit my third. If we have a cadre of officers and NCO's trainers of a military nature in a country overseas and that country gets involved, such as Nigeria or anywhere else, in a brush war or a civil war, then do you pull out our Canadian training staff?

Mr. Cadieux: My understanding of the situation is that there is a uniform rule each time Canadian military personnel are sent on these military assistance assignments that they have no operational responsibilities; that is the first thing. Then, if there is any physical danger, the problem gets to be a purely consular problem of protecting their lives and evacuating them with all other Canadians.

• 1235

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, that is not my point, although I admit their lives are very important. If a country in which we have been doing the training gets involved, for instance, Nigeria or anywhere else, from a policy point of view do we pull our people out?

Mr. Cadieux: Again, in each case that is a decision the government has to make. It

depends on what you mean by involved, involved in what?

Mr. Winch: We are training while they are involved in a war, like in Nigeria today. We trained their navy. Did we pull our men out or were they out before?

Mr. Cadieux: My impression is that we do not have anybody there at the moment. I do not think we have anybody there.

Mr. Winch: You pulled them out before?

Mr. Cadieux: Before the secession started.

Mr. Winch: Now, Mr. Chairman, in view of what you just said that you hope at the next meeting we will be passing the estimates, do you mean all estimates?

The Chairman: All the External Affairs estimates plus the estimates of CIDA and the International Joint Commission.

Mr. Winch: May I ask then, because it does come under External Affairs, for some explanation of the policy thinking and the administrative action taken before leading up to this extraordinary position with regard to the issuance of passports. It has been raised in the House often. I know that I am not alone, that many, many members of the House of Commons have spent two-thirds, if not of our own time then of our secretaries' time during this past three weeks accepting responsibility for trying to get emergency passports out.

Perhaps I can put it another way, to make it brief. How did you arrive, admitting the need for tightening at some of the extraordinary conclusions that were reached. Perhaps I can explain it briefly by giving an example. I am going to use my own case, not that I want a passport right now, but just to explain this, Mr. Chairman. I had the privilege of being born in England because my mother was there. However, my parents came to Canada while I was at an early age, so I have lived in British Columbia for 59 years. I voted in every election since the age of 21. I served four years in the last war in the armed forces. I have been an elected member of Parliament, provincial and federal for almost 36 years now. I have had a passport for a great many years, but it has just now run out and I cannot get it renewed because I have to prove that I am a Canadian citizen. The only way, sir, that I can prove it is 3,000 miles away in my safety deposit box. I have to get my birth certificate from England; I have to send it to the citizenship branch; I have to get from

them the admission that I am a Canadian citizen before I can get a new passport because there are no renewals. Does that just give you an example of what these darn regulations are. Can you give us an explanation.

Mr. Cadieux: The general explanation is that not so long ago I remember, I am sure that you remember, there was a general feeling in the House that the security regulations had to be tightened, that the passports were issued too freely...

Mr. Winch: I have no disagreement on that.

Mr. Cadieux: ...and that that should be done.

Mr. Winch: But why did you go to this damn ridiculous extent that we are facing now.

Mr. Cadieux: One of the means that were adopted by the government to produce this tightening up was an insistence that the proofs of identity and the proofs of birth had to be in the form of these birth certificates. This was, I think, the connection between the tightening up of security and the proofs about birth. I think I will ask Mr. Durdin, who is the Head of the Passport Office, to give you more indications about why we ask for the birth certificates.

Mr. Winch: I want to make it clear, because I said it in the House the day before; I complimented the officials that I had worked with for their courtesy and their co-operation.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch, you advised us that you had three questions; you are now on your fifth or sixth and it seems to me we are taking a lot longer than we intended to.

Mr. Winch: Would it be possible for us to go on with questions before we deal with the passport issue?

The Vice-Chairman: We are going to have to do that anyway. Would you be present at 11 o'clock on Tuesday to continue your questioning?

Mr. Winch: As long as I am allowed about 10 minutes to get over from Public Accounts Committee meeting.

The Vice-Chairman: We could call somebody else in the interim. We have Mr. Roberts on the second round of questioning, and Mr. Fairweather as well. Then we have to

consider the CIDA estimates and Mr. M. Strong will be present. I suggest to the Committee that we adjourn now and continue with the estimates on Tuesday morning at 11 o'clock.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): In support of Mr. Winch, the reason he took a little time with his questioning today was the fact that you made the statement that the next meeting would be for the estimates.

The Vice-Chairman: It will be later in the morning, but we will have time.

• 1240

Mr. Fairweather: Could we get the special number we are to call at the passport office which is available to some members of Parliament. I called six people yesterday and I am told that if I am on the right side of the House there is a number and I would like to have it.

Mr. W. S. Durdin (Chief Passport office): The phones are being installed today. You

will be advised as soon as the numbers are known.

Mr. Fairweather: Does every member of the House have the same telephone number? I am told that government members—I am not making a charge—have a number to call in order to expedite matters. If so, I would like to know what that number is. It is a disgrace, I will tell you that.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It is not a disgrace because we are on the same level as you are. I would like to say this, Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement that has been made. If there is such a number, as suggested by Mr. Fairweather, then I also would side with him and say that I would like to know that number and I am a member of the government side.

Mr. Fairweather: You cannot get it.

The Vice-Chairman: I would like to know it myself, but he is just saying that it is hearsay he has not made any charge about the matter. The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

JUN 19 1969

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 45

TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1969

Respecting

Estimates, 1969-70, Department of External Affairs; Canadian International Development Agency and International Joint Commission.

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Cafik	Laniel	Roberts
Carter	Laprise	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Fairweather	Legault	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Winch—(30)
¹ Goyer	Marceau	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

(Quorum 16)

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4)(b)

¹ Mr. Goyer replaced Mr. Buchanan on May 16, 1969

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

TUESDAY, May 20, 1969.

(70)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11.05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Brewin, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, Lewis, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch (19).

Witnesses: From the Canadian International Development Agency: Mr. M. F. Strong, President; Mr. G. P. Kidd, Vice-President, Operations Branch; Mr. J. D. Miller, Director General, Project Development and Co-ordination Division; Mr. D. R. McLellan, Director, Finance Division. From the International Joint Commission: Mr. J. L. MacCallum, Assistant to Chairman and Legal Adviser.

The Committee resumed its consideration of Items 30, 35 and L35 pertaining to the Canadian International Development Agency, in the Estimates 1969-70 of the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Strong and he introduced the officials of CIDA who were present.

Members questioned Mr. Strong and the officials. Mr. Strong agreed to provide further information on the major special studies which CIDA has commissioned and the reports of its consultants thereon, as requested by Mr. Lewis. Mr. Strong will also provide additional information on the problem of concrete dust in certain buildings constructed in South Vietnam, as requested by Mr. Ryan.

Items 30, 35 and L35 were severally carried.

The Chairman thanked Mr. Strong and his officials and the witnesses retired.

The Chairman called Item 40 pertaining to the *International Joint Commission, Salaries and Expenses etc. \$481,700*. He introduced Mr. J. L. MacCallum, Assistant to the Chairman and Legal Adviser; and Mr. M. W. Thompson, Engineering Adviser.

Mr. MacCallum answered questions for the remainder of the sitting. Mr. Thompson distributed copies of an article entitled *Along the Common Frontier The International Joint Commission*, by A. D. P. Heeney, in a pamphlet prepared for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, July, 1967, Volume XXVI, No. 5.

Mr. MacCallum will provide additional information on subjects mentioned by Mr. Nowlan and Mr. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*).

The Vice-Chairman took the Chair at approximately 12.40 p.m.

On completion of the questioning, the Vice-Chairman thanked the IJC officials and the witnesses retired.

Item 40 was allowed to stand.

At 1.10 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until 3.30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(71)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3.35 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Brewin, Forrestall, Goyer, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Marquette*), Wahn, Winch—(18).

Witnesses: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and Mr. W. S. Durdin, Chief Passport Officer.

The Committee resumed its consideration of Items 1, 10 and 15 of the Estimates 1967-70, relating to the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Cadieux and Mr. Durdin answered questions relating to these items.

The Committee agreed to print as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, the answers to three questions asked at a previous sitting by Messrs. Roberts and Winch respectively. (*See Appendix BBB*).

The Vice-Chairman took the Chair at approximately 4.25 p.m.

At 4.50 p.m., the questioning was completed and the witnesses retired. Items 1, 10 and 15 were allowed to stand.

The Committee recessed until 5.00 p.m. At 5.00 p.m. the Chairman took the Chair.

The Chairman called Items 40, 10, 15 and 1 which were severally carried.

It was agreed that the Chairman should report Items 1, 10, 15, 30, 35, 40 and L35 of the Estimates 1969-70 relating to the Department of External Affairs, the Canadian International Development Agency and the International Joint Commission, to the House.

Members discussed the possibility of visits to North Bay, Colorado Springs and SACLANT headquarters; the formation of the Sub-Committee on Maritime Forces, and the calling of additional witnesses in connection with NORAD and the ABM question.

At 5.10 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Wednesday, May 21, 1969 at 3.30 p.m., when the witness will be Dr. G. R. Lindsey.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, May 20, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have with us again this morning, Mr. Maurice Strong. We are ready to begin. We have called the estimates of the Canadian International Development Agency Votes 30, 35 and 35L in the Blue Book. Vote 35L appears on page 462 of the Blue Book. The other votes, 30 and 35, appear on pages 101 and 102.

Mr. Strong has a number of his assistants with him this morning and I think he will introduce them to the members of the Committee. Mr. Strong?

Mr. M. F. Strong (President, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and hon. members. I would like to introduce to you various members of our personnel who would be associated with me here this morning. On my immediate right is Mr. Kidd, Vice-President of our Agency; on his right, Dr. Gaudet, Director General, Liaison and Evaluation; behind me on the left, Mr. Ross McLellan, Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration; Dr. Fergus Chambers who is Director of our Planning and Economics Division; Mr. Jim Miller, who is Director General of Operations, and sitting over at the far table on the end, Mr. Lionel Bonnell, Director General of Finance and Administration; Mr. Robert McLaren, who is Acting Director of the Advisers Division, and Mr. Neil Overend who looks after the Colombo Plan in the Planning and Economics Division.

The Chairman: Did you have any further statement that you wished to make at this time, Mr. Strong, or are you available for questioning now.

Mr. Strong: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I felt that it would be best for me to simply make myself available for questioning. I have no particular statement that I came prepared to make.

Mr. Lewis: I have not a copy of the Blue Book here, I do not know whether I am in order on these votes or not, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: We are dealing with all the votes at the same time, Mr. Lewis. It makes it more convenient in questioning so that any questions on the general subject will be in order.

Mr. Lewis: I understand, Mr. Strong, that you had a pretty fundamental review of the External Aid policies and that you commissioned a number of special consultants to make some studies for you. Could you tell us about that?

Mr. Strong: Yes, Mr. Lewis. Really there are two main streams in which we have been reviewing our activities. One is a review of what you might call our operating policies, our program policies, as distinct from those over-all issues that are more fundamental to government policy. The government has, as you know, launched an intensive review of its over-all policies. As part of that we have been reviewing some of the basic policies affecting aid and development.

Prior to that and over the period of the last two years we have been engaged in an intensive internal review of what you might call our operating and our program policies and procedures. This latter exercise has involved the use of outside consultants in a number of capacities. For example, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada has for over a year been engaged on our behalf in an intensive review of the role of the Canadian universities in respect of our aid and development programs. In particular, a review of the kind of resources that the universities can make available and are willing to make available for use in programs in the developing countries and the ways in which these resources can best be mobilized and utilized under our programs.

We have had studies of the role of agriculture in our programs and the role of forestry. I think I reported at the last meeting of this Committee that we have, in fact, in some of these fields appointed full-time special advisers. We had a special working or advisory group last summer conducting an intensive

program of instruction in cost benefit analysis. We found that the application of cost benefit techniques to our old process of pro-

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ject and program evaluation required a great deal of specialized training of our planning staff. We felt that we had some very high grade and some very high quality planning officers and that it was not going to be feasible or even in some respects desirable to simply bring in a lot of new people who knew the cost benefit techniques. It was much better to devise a set of techniques that were particularly appropriate for the job that we have to do in our operation. Therefore, we brought in people like Professor Harberger from the University of Chicago and Professor Reuber of the University of Western Ontario and a team of economists who were also from the University of Western Ontario. They conducted a program extending over a period of seven or eight months in total, in which many of our officers, on their own time for the most part, worked on the week-ends and evenings. This was integrated with their normal work pattern so that they were using real current cases to assist them in the developing of these techniques. This program has really enabled us, to put into place, a systematic process of application of cost benefit analysis techniques to our projects and programs. Now I could go on, as there are a great many other...

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Strong, you could either now or later, give us a list of the major special studies which you have commissioned either inside or outside. I was also wondering whether or not some of those studies could be made available to members of the Committee, at least the results of those studies.

Mr. Strong: A lot of these are working studies in the sense that they are not really designed to produce a report. Now the report of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada is the kind that lends itself to a report. The report of the University of Ottawa Development, Centre for International Co-operation, will come to us in the form of a report. Other exercises, of the kind to which I referred, are really internal exercises that are designed to accomplish a purpose as part of a process. These are not pointed to the preparation of a report as such.

Mr. Lewis: Let me try to illustrate what I have in mind. This is in the form of education, not of implied criticism or anything of that nature. While reading about external aid, one is struck by the divergence of view that there is regarding the value of certain types of aid. Decisions arise such as whether the aid is related to capital development in the recipient country, whether it should be advanced in order to start the ball rolling or, whether the aid should be concentrated where the ball is already rolling but in speeded up form. The various points, which are being discussed by students of external aid, and by economists in particular, concerning the best use or the best way in which developed countries can aid developing countries in their progress towards economic self-reliance always arise. I was wondering whether any of your studies deal, in that theoretical but very practical sphere, as to the type the kind, and the class of aid which is best. Have such studies been made or are they being made? I am sure other members of the Committee would be as interested, as I am, in knowing what their conclusions are in respect of the programs we have already had, and the programs you are projecting for the future.

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, the kind of fundamental questions to which Mr. Lewis points, have been the subject of rather intensive discussion and review, principally as part of the process of reviewing our over-all policies. In reviewing the operating procedures and policies, one naturally takes into account these issues. You cannot separate your operation from some of these fundamental consid-

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erations that you have raised. However, our agency is preparing a report for the government on the review process, which we have conducted, and which involved the preparation and consideration of very substantive reports from a number of outside experts on some of these varied points. Now, whether or not the government releases these reports to this Committee is not in my control.

Mr. Winch: I have just one question. When do you anticipate that the report will be received by the government?

Mr. Strong: The report will be received by the government within the next month. The reports of the individual consultants have

been completed. The gathering of those reports into a suitable individual paper showed the policy issues which were raised in the reports. The various alternative courses of action that are open for consideration by the government is now in the process of being prepared. When it is prepared, it will be delivered to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and it will, of course, be up to him to distribute them.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Strong I would like to make one brief supplementary.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch on a supplementary.

Mr. Winch: In your submission to the government, on the basis of what you are receiving, could I ask whether or not you are making recommendations or merely putting the basis before the government without recommendations, so that the decision would be made by the Cabinet and not on your recommendations?

Mr. Strong: Yes, you certainly can. As far as I am concerned, we put a paper in the hands of the government which seeks to identify the policy issues, about which they will be called upon to make decisions, seeks to evaluate the range of alternatives available to them in making those decisions, and seeks to provide them with all the supporting data which they require for that purpose. Whether or not we are asked to make specific recommendations is completely up to the government.

Mr. Lewis: I appreciate that the report that you give to the government you cannot tell us about. Could you give us the names of the consultants and the subjects that you asked them to deal with in this area? This would give us an idea as to the area which you are covering.

Mr. Strong: I am certainly prepared to give you the names of the consultants. However, I do not think I could usefully give you the names of the topics because they overlap so much and get so much into the process itself. I do not really think I could give you that information, in meaningful form, without going beyond the limits that it would be appropriate for me to go, at this point in time.

Mr. Lewis: Why do you not let us decide whether or not they are meaningful, Mr. Strong? I would be very interested to know

whom you consulted and what you consulted about.

Mr. Strong: As I have not reported to my Minister on this subject, Mr. Chairman, I am not prepared to give the names of the consultants. I should not give information to this Committee which has not yet been made available to him.

Mr. Lewis: I can appreciate that also but I must admit only with some difficulty. Could you give us the names of the consultants now, and later let us have the subjects if the Minister has no objection?

Mr. Strong: Yes. If I miss one out, Dr. Chambers you might remind me. They include: Professor Grant Reuber, University of Western Ontario, Professor Steve Triantis, University of Toronto; Professor Usher of Queen's University, Mr. Roy Matthews of the Private Planning Association of Canada, Professor Fernand Fontaine, Sir George Williams University, Mr. Fernand Cadieux of Sir George Williams University a sociologist consultant, Professor Louis Sabourin, University of Ottawa, and Professor Benjamin Higgins of the University of Montreal, who was a very important member of the team.

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Mr. Lewis: Is that the Higgins who used to be at McGill and then went out to Asia and later came back?

Mr. Strong: Yes. He has a very wide experience in the development field.

Mr. Lewis: Have all of these people had experience in external aid either as students of it or as advisors to recipient governments and so on?

Mr. Strong: In one way or another, they are all people whom we consider experienced.

Mr. Lewis: Would you undertake to inquire from the Minister whether or not he would have any objection in providing us with the subject that they discussed. I do not see how, as a member of the Committee, I can understand what your review is aiming at, or what it is our external aid policy is aiming at or hopes to aim at, without knowing what it is you are reviewing.

Mr. Strong: With great respect, Mr. Chairman, I had rather understood that I had to come to discuss the Estimates. My unders-

standing was that there would be a further and a more appropriate occasion for the Committee to consider the review. This was my understanding. Really, I find it difficult to discuss a policy review that has not yet been presented to the government. I hope the honourable members can understand the position I am in as an official when I am asked to do that.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I understand what has been said by Mr. Strong, but what I, as an individual member of the Committee, cannot understand is that as you have named these people,—not the report—why you cannot tell us what they set out to study.

The Chairman: I gather Mr. Strong feels that if he indicated the subject matters of their investigation this perhaps would give some idea of the fields which were under review, and until such time as the report has gone to the Minister, this might be undesirable.

The question I think Mr. Lewis has put is, if the Minister indicates he has no objection, then would you undertake to take it up with him and give us a list of subjects. I think that was your question, was it not, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Strong: Absolutely.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, I cannot press Mr. Strong to do something which he feels his duty prevents him from doing. If you feel you cannot give us the information without first having given it to the Minister, I cannot say you have got to, obviously, but I am concerned that we are not getting the information that would enable us to understand exactly what it is you are dissatisfied with, or what it is you are searching for, what improvements you seek to bring in, what new policies you are considering. If you cannot do it today, that is all right, but I hope, Mr. Chairman, we will have an opportunity later. I have one other line of questioning I would like to pursue.

Mr. Winch: May I make one comment here, if you do not mind?

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: In view of the fact that we are considering the estimates for this fiscal year, they must be estimates—and you are using these people and I cannot quite understand why we cannot be told in the estimates for this fiscal year, which ends March 31 of next

year, what job they are doing.

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, I have said that they are consulting on the review of total Canadian policies in this field. I have no reluctance to discuss any matter that is proper for me to discuss. I just am concerned about the propriety of my discussing something in this Committee that I have not yet...

Mr. Lewis: You will discuss it with the Minister?

Mr. Strong: Yes, indeed.

Mr. Lewis: Presumably you are paying these consultants out of the budget and presumably we have a right to know what it is you are paying them for.

Mr. Strong: Oh yes.

Mr. Lewis: But if you will not tell us today, that is a judgment you have to make. Whether I agree with the judgment or not is immaterial. Will you undertake to discuss it with the Minister, and either in person or in writing let us know what those men have been asked to do?

Mr. Strong: Indeed, I will, Mr. Chairman. I might explain that the process itself was not so highly compartmentalized that it lends itself to this sort of simple breakdown. This is really my problem, that the group acted as a group as well as individually, and it is very difficult without really disclosing the whole thing, which I understand will be done in due course, to really give you meaningful information just by naming a number of topics.

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Mr. Lewis: Mr. Strong, you are doing yourself an injustice: you did not ask Mr. X "Would you please do me a paper on External Aid?" You said to Mr. X "Will you please give me your views on A, B, C or D?" or perhaps all four.

Mr. Strong: It is a little more complicated than that.

Mr. Lewis: "A" and little "a" and "a³" and "a" or whatever it is, you gave these people instructions as to what you wanted from them.

Mr. Strong: That is right.

Mr. Lewis: It is those instructions, I think, we are entitled to have so as to know what it is you asked them to do.

Mr. Strong: Oh, yes.

The Chairman: I think we are agreed that Mr. Strong will consult with the Minister and, if there is no objection, will file with the Clerk a list of the subject matters as requested by Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: Right. I do not know whether other members are interested, but I would like to know how the cost benefit analysis applies to your kind of program. How do you quantify the benefits to compare them with the cost?

Mr. Strong: In every project there are elements which can be quantified and elements which cannot be quantified. Cost benefit analysis is simply a tool that is used for guidance. There is no single project I can think of where cost benefit analysis alone, applied in an automatic fashion, would predetermine the answer. It is simply a guide to your judgment.

For example, if you have a budget for a particular country of \$10 million: you receive from them \$20 million worth of requests; you are concerned with the relative merits of these requests. One of the important factors to be able to measure is the amount of economic benefit that will be generated by the particular project in relation to the amount of cost of that project. Economic benefit generated is not alone the basis for your judgment; there are many other factors. But in order to help you make relative judgments, you really have to know the answer to the economic part of the question.

Mr. Lewis: Excuse my ignorance, but how do you even quantify that? Suppose you have a request to build a power generating plant, how do you quantify that in relation to the economic development of the recipient country? How do you quantify the possibilities of industrial development, the value of electrifying communities, the value of the comfort given to the people who are the recipients of electricity? This cost benefit thing, which has now become the in-thing in economic analysis, which I probably do not understand despite trying to do so, has me personally completely bewildered. I just do not know how in heaven's name you quantify the benefits of anything you do, even in the economic sense?

Mr. Strong: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I can ask Dr. Chambers to give you a more sophisticated presentation.

Mr. Lewis: You mean more incomprehensible?

Mr. Strong: I could give you a very rudimentary one that I have given to my wife, for example.

Mr. Lewis: She is probably more intelligent than I am.

Mr. Strong: When we are trying to decide whether to heat our home with fuel oil or with natural gas, or with electricity, we know that it will be more comfortable in winter if our home is heated. We do not try and put a number on how much more that is worth to us. We know we feel better when it is heated than when it is not heated. However, we can say that if we have to put in oil it costs so much for the furnace and so much for servicing and so much for the oil itself, and the furnace only lasts so long, and we have to take that into account, and besides, we do not like the noise; that gas has certain advantages that you quantify too. So that, it has a place in making your decision.

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Mr. Lewis: Even this rudimentary example, Mr. Strong, points up the difficulties I have in my mind and the suspicion I have got that in the cost benefit analysis there is a great deal of personal prejudice and predilection and decisions which are made before the analysis is completed. How do you quantify the comfort you get out of having a heated home, and, Mr. Strong, may not that be by far the most important part of the benefit that is received? Whether the particular instrument you use for heating your home is A, B or C, the fact of your home being heated, which is not subject, it seems to me, to quantification...

Mr. Strong: Exactly.

Mr. Lewis: But that surely may be the very basis of the entire exercise and far outweighs the fact that doing it by oil may cost you \$5 a year more than by doing it by electricity.

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, I would be the last person to claim that cost benefit analysis is an answer to everything. I would certainly consider it wrong when it is carried to the extreme where you tend to try and put your whole decision-making process on an automatic quantitative basis. It would be an abuse

of the technique. I think that it is a logical and necessary method of trying to evaluate those factors in any decision which are subject within reason to quantification. There are many factors which I would readily admit are not so subject. If you can modify and evaluate those things that are subject to modification, it leaves you more room in your mind to devote your attention to making judgments on policy.

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: You would be able to attend to judgments on social benefits.

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: Therefore, your cost benefit analysis is not an automatic guide to your decision.

Mr. Strong: Oh no. It is simply one of many tools. I think it is a very useful one. The jargon cost benefit analysis is simply used to describe a very logical process; in one form or another, even the old horse trader used to go through such a process. However, the elements now involved in a decision are more complex than they used to be; the techniques for evaluating them are equally more complicated; at their root, however, they are still pretty simple logic.

Mr. Lewis: Excuse me. Could you also discuss with the minister whether or not he would permit you to make some of the reports of the special consultants available? I do not only mean the subject matter with which they dealt but also what they said to you on those subjects.

Mr. Strong: Indeed, I would be very happy to do that.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Dr. Strong, in January I had the opportunity to visit Saigon for a couple of days; due to the good auspices of Mr. Paul Laberge of External Affairs and Brigadier McCoy of the Joint Commission, I employed my time quite usefully. I had the opportunity of inspecting your new project on the site that was levelled by the tenth offensive. I was very proud to see that Canada was the first there with a new 75 suite apartment building for the refugees. It was nice to see this pretty well completed and the Canadian flag flying there, even as sewers were still being dug through the area in amongst the boxes of

crated Hondas which were coming into Saigon by the thousands.

I was very much impressed with this particular development of yours. I wondered who the architect was, how you went about developing your plans for this, why it was built of concrete, and why the refugees are left to do their own interior decorating when they move into these fine quarters. Also, why is nothing being done by the contractor to seal off the concrete dust that will arise in a building of this kind? It seemed to me to be extremely well designed and laid out with the purposes of the people very much in mind; in my opinion, it is a real leader as a pilot project except in this one respect.

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Mr. Strong: I very much appreciate the hon. member's remarks, Mr. Chairman. I can say in general that this project was very cost sensitive. We were very anxious to have it done quickly because the needs were very urgent. We weighed most of the normal rules in terms of procurement of this kind of thing. We got it done quickly and inexpensively; I have not seen it but I have heard other reports to the effect that it was well done.

There are 10 or 12 people to be accommodated in each one of these units. I really did not know of the problem that you have mentioned. It may be that one of my colleagues who has been more directly related to this project will be able to answer the problem in brief. I do not know. Mr. Miller, do you have more to add?

Mr. J. D. Miller (Director General, Project Development and Co-ordination Division, Canadian International Development Agency): I do not know the specific answers but I would like to explain that the specifications of such structures normally call for the finishing of concrete. There is normally a water repellent on the inside walls. Should the occupant wish to paint them, that would be his prerogative; it would not be normal for us to prepare such decorations. It is a lowcost housing unit and it is intended for refugee purposes. In all of the reports which we have received, it has been extremely well thought of and we have not been made aware of any observation such as yours until now.

Mr. Ryan: It has occurred to me that I was told that, it was almost ready for occupation. I could see that the floor, the walls of concrete, and the balconies and passageways on the outside were giving off a little bit of the

fine concrete dust. It was the only thing to which I thought attention should have been given. It may have been done since then but that did not appear to be the intention. The message I received was that the refugees went in there, took it the way it was and made the best of it. I thought that because of all the traffic that there would be, that a dust problem was inevitable.

Mr. Miller: Yes. May I ask sir, when were you there?

Mr. Ryan: I was there from January 10 to 12.

Mr. Miller: I am not sure of the exact date but I believe it was inaugurated some time in May. Possibly some of this work was done between January and May. I will be very happy to check and see when the first occupants moved in. Again I am sure that there were many occupants who were prepared to move in without these refinements being completed. I will be glad to find out this information for you.

Mr. Ryan: Do you know if it was a Canadian architect or a local architect who designed it?

Mr. Miller: It was a local architect. It was based on a plan which had already been developed for the area and it was simply adopted to the Canadian project.

Mr. Ryan: Who will manage the building in the future?

Mr. Miller: I am not exactly certain, however, I believe it will be a department of the Vietnamese Government; possibly it will be the Department of Rehabilitation of Refugees.

Mr. Ryan: Will we continue to take an interest in this particular project?

Mr. Miller: Yes. We have recently agreed to build additional accommodation very similar to that which we built earlier. I believe that it is getting under way at the present time.

Mr. Ryan: Would we continue to subsidize the upkeep and maintenance of a development of this kind in future?

Mr. Miller: No. We have agreed to the financing of a similar project. We have not to my knowledge been approached for additional units.

Mr. Ryan: We simply build them and when they have been completed, we turn them over

to the South Vietnamese Government or to some local agency of it.

Mr. Miller: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Are you familiar with the airport in Colombo, Ceylon?

Mr. Miller: Yes. I am aware of it.

Mr. Ryan: Are there any problems with that air terminal that have not been cleared up?

Mr. Miller: There are none to my knowledge. We had some problems with maintenance of equipment but we have sent out advisors to act as maintenance personnel to upgrade the quality of the selling. I am not aware of any problems that are not in hand.

Mr. Ryan: I agree that you have done a wonderful job there as well. The airport and

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the terminals are certainly fine facilities; the people in Ceylon certainly regard it as a wonder; they come there by the thousands to see it.

The Chairman: Are we clear then on where we stand regarding that first project, Mr. Ryan? You would like Mr. Strong to look into the concrete dust problem which may have existed originally.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, I would like to be reassured on that point.

The Chairman: The declaration apparently is not a problem.

Mr. Ryan: That is not the problem, no. I think it should be left up to the individual families to put the tapestries on the walls or to put in whatever beds they like. However, it does seem to me that it may be a problem in a development of that kind.

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, we will certainly undertake to look into this, to provide the hon. member directly with the information.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

Mr. Strong: I take it it would not be necessary to file this with the Committee?

The Chairman: Could you give a copy to the Clerk as well just to have it on the record.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Miller, thank you, Mr. Strong.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Strong, recently there have been some reports that your Agency was considering an increase in the living allowances to students studying in Canada with scholarships from your Agency. Is this being actively considered now?

Mr. Strong: I think I would prefer to ask Mr. Kidd, who is responsible for this area of operations, to answer this question.

Mr. G. P. Kidd (Vice-President (Operations); Canadian International Development Agency): Yes, sir, we undertake periodic review of the allowance structure for the CIDA trainees and one is just approaching completion at the present moment. We will very shortly have recommendations to put forward.

Mr. Allmand: In the present estimates before the Committee there are no provisions for increased living allowances, are there?

Mr. Kidd: Yes, there are.

Mr. Allmand: In the estimates that we are considering now there are provisions for these increased living allowances?

Mr. Strong: Mr. McLellan might be able to answer more specifically the extent to which this has been allowed for.

Mr. Allmand: Very good.

Mr. D. R. McLellan (Director, Finance Division, Canadian International Development Agency): I have known for some time that these allowances were under review and we have made provision in the aid vote, which is a nonlapsing vote, for the necessary funds to absorb increases in living allowances for our trainees in Canada in the current fiscal year.

Mr. Allmand: What will be the exact increase of these allowances, sir?

Mr. McLellan: It would approximate \$20 a month.

Mr. Allmand: I see, so they will increase from what amount to what amount?

Mr. McLellan: From \$165 to \$185 per month.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Strong, when this was first reported in the paper one had the

impression that demands were being made on CIDA by an association of students to increase these allowances. Was that correct?

Mr. Strong: We have had various representations made to us by individual students and by the universities and other interested parties. I was not aware there had been any formal representations by a group as you suggest, but a number of these individually have come to my attention. Mr. Kidd, are you aware of any?

Mr. Kidd: I am aware of no formal representation by an organization representing all the students as such.

Mr. Allmand: Could you tell the Committee if any of the students involved in the riots at Sir George Williams University, who are presently accused before the courts, have been receiving CIDA grants?

Mr. Strong: One student who is here under our auspices was involved and has been charged with involvement. I understand the case has not yet been disposed of. We have taken the position that so long as this person is able to continue to carry out her studies at

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the university and so long as no final resolution of the charge against her has been made that we would continue to allow her to receive her normal support.

Mr. Allmand: Has CIDA decided on any policy with respect to foreign students who are involved, not in student demonstrations, but what I would call destructive student demonstrations? Has it been serious enough in your opinion to have to lay down any guidelines or policy with respect to these problems?

Mr. Strong: It is a matter that has given us a good deal of concern. We have reviewed it. Individual problems often have very individual characteristics that have to be dealt with in that fashion, on an individual basis. However, in general, we feel that if a student is continuing to pursue the course of study for which he is receiving support, for which he was brought to Canada in the first place, in other words if he continues to be acceptable to the university in that capacity and has not been dealt with negatively by the law then there is no real justification for our intervening to prevent him from continuing his course of studies.

Mr. Allmand: In other words if I understand you correctly, as long as the student is still acceptable to the university he would be acceptable to your agency.

Mr. Strong: In general, that is true.

Mr. Allmand: As a result of the Sir George Williams University riot there was considerable misunderstanding and some counter demonstrations in the West Indies. Did your Agency through its people in the West Indies observe, or were you the object of, any protests towards the Canadian government? Did you do anything to try to make clear what was happening in Canada so that the people in the West Indies would understand exactly why these people were charged and so forth?

Mr. Strong: As far as our own operation is concerned, we really did not experience to my knowledge any difficulties nor were we involved in any demonstrations or specific problems arising out of the incident to which you refer. I believe that through our normal diplomatic channels, our missions in these areas, we have attempted to make clear both to the governments concerned and to the people, too, I believe, the precise nature of the problem. This is not really something that we did as CIDA, but something which would come under the jurisdiction of the Department of External Affairs. We are obviously generally interested in and affected by these things.

Mr. Allmand: Your people have not been sensitive to any worsening in relations between the people as opposed to the government in the West Indies because of these things. Their goodwill towards Canada has not been lessened as a result of them?

Mr. Strong: It is very difficult to tell at this point. We receive monthly reports from these people and I would expect over the next two or three months a review of these reports would give us a better basis for making a judgment on that. I think it is a little premature at this stage because we have not really had access to the views of all the people who are down there and who are exposed to this.

In a very general way, I would hazard the personal opinion that it would have some general effect. One would hope it would be a fairly temporary one.

Mr. Allmand: The last time we were discussing your estimates, Mr. Strong, we were discussing overseas students studying in

Canada under CIDA scholarships and the problem of having them return to their own countries and the requests you and the government have received by many of these students to stay in Canada. How does this situation stand now? What percentage of the CIDA scholarship students have requested to stay in Canada and have made real attempts to stay in Canada? Is it a high percentage?

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Mr. Strong: Less than 5 per cent have actually failed to return. It would probably be a larger percentage than that who would give us some cause for concern. There is no question this is a continuing difficulty. It is just one of the several reasons we are taking a very hard look at our undergraduate training program.

We have had some specific difficulties with the students from South Viet Nam. Wherever areas are in conflict we have this problem. Of course, in a general way it affects students from all areas, there is always a small number who wish to stay in Canada. The very large majority are prepared to and actually do live up to their commitment of returning and putting to work the training which they received in Canada. This is of course, the whole object of the exercise.

The Chairman: May I interrupt a second, Mr. Allmand? At the present time we have a quorum which we may find rather difficult to hold, because I know that some members must go to other appointments at 12 o'clock. We have had a rather extensive discussion with Mr. Strong. Would it be in order, or would the members consider it reasonable, to pass the three items of Estimates upon the understanding that we continue with Mr. Strong, and that he and his associates continue to answer as freely as they have so as to get the Estimates through? Would that be agreeable in the circumstances?

Perhaps we could make the various votes at the present time.

Votes 30, 35 and 35L agreed to.

The Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen. I am sorry, Mr. Allmand, you have not finished your question so please continue.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Strong, you say that you have more difficulty with those who are here as undergraduates than with those who are graduates in this respect?

Mr. Strong: In general, that is true for a number of reasons. When a person comes as an undergraduate, they have not generally made a lifetime commitment to a particular job environment. Also, they have made a break with their family environment; they have been in Canada during a formative period in their own life and they have acquired, over a four or five-year period, a very deep involvement in Canadian life. The temptation to remain, under those circumstances, is much greater than the temptation of a person who is married and has a family and an established position in his country before he comes here for a lesser period, which is the usually postgraduate training. All of these factors normally suggest that we would have less difficulty with the undergraduate. It does not mean that there are not some graduate students too, because some of the areas in which they are qualified, are in keen demand in Canada. These people are also tempted. However I think the reasons are more compelling in the cases of the undergraduates.

Mr. Allmand: I have one final question. Could you give me, for comparative purpose, the total number of students who are studying in Canada under CIDA scholarships and also the total number of Canadians who are working abroad under CIDA sponsorship?

Mr. Strong: Yes, Mr. Kidd would have those more immediately at hand than myself.

Mr. Kidd: These may not be exact to the last figure, but we can get accurate number if you wish. There are approximately 2,000 students studying in Canada under direct CIDA auspices or the Commonwealth fellowship plan which we underwrite financially. The total number of advisers and teachers abroad are 714 in the educational field and 248 advisers giving you a total of 962.

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Mr. Strong: If you take the calendar year of 1968 as a whole, then Table 6 in the folio of the background material, which was provided at the last meeting, gives this for the total year, and it breaks it down into countries.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather, on a supplementary. Would you permit a supplementary, Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: I have a supplementary myself.

With regard to the first group of students that you mentioned, would that also include those adults who are here under technical training and so forth?

Mr. Kidd: This would include all types of training in Canada which CIDA finances. I should also add that the 2,000 figure is what we have at present. There would be more than that in Canada during the whole year because some people come for short term courses of three or four months. They might not be included at the particular time these figures were given.

Mr. Strong: For example, the figure for the total calendar year 1968 of people in Canada for all purposes, trainees and students, was 2,795.

Mr. Allmand: Are these people under CIDA sponsorship?

Mr. Strong: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Do they include others who come over to Canada?

Mr. Strong: No.

Mr. Allmand: I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather, on a supplementary.

Mr. Fairweather: I am sorry to interrupt. This is relevant but perhaps it is not within your knowledge. However, there are many, many more students in Canada from other countries than those who are under your sponsorship. Is it not something like 16,000?

Mr. Strong: I think a couple of our people will know the more precise figure, but ours represent a very small percentage of the total foreign to students. It covers approximately one student in seven.

Mr. Fairweather: I am not too far out. Thank you.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While attending the conference of the union of parliamentarians there was talk amongst the members that would provide help to prevent wastage. The remarks were not directed to the projects which were undertaken by Canada, but as an example, in one country it was quoted that a hospital had been built and after the completion there were no professionals, or technicians to attend to it. It was built and then suddenly closed. Do we have some type of report, such as we see of the

Public Accounts of the Auditor General, which would bring forth the results of the progress being made on all of our projects?

Mr. Strong: The operations of our agency are subject to reporting by the Auditor General, similar to all other government departments and agencies. There is no additional policy audit, except for our appearances before this Committee and answers to questions in the House. There is no device which would follow this up. Our job is to assure that this kind of thing does not happen, but there is no process other than the process of this Committee and of Parliament by which these are reviewed on a regular basis. I can say to the hon. member that I know of no Canadian project that has had this particular problem.

Mr. Legault: This remark was not addressed to any Canadian project, Mr. Strong. It was from another country.

One subject which was discussed was that—not all as it could not be applied to all—the recipient countries should at least provide an equal share of interest and development. Is this being followed by our own people in our projects?

Mr. Strong: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Our basic principle is that our projects must be undertaken on a co-operative basis. By that we mean, that the co-operating country, with which the project is being carried out, must

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provide part of the costs. Now, they usually provide the local costs, the costs of local labour, local goods, services and materials. On occasion, where countries find it difficult to provide all of these, we do offer part of the support for the local costs as well. But in general, we expect the local government to provide some portion of the cost and in many instances this is very, very high.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Strong.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions on CIDA? If not, perhaps we could take a minute or two to decide what we should do for the remainder of the morning.

Mr. MacCallum, the Assistant to the Chairman of the International Joint Commission has been standing by. There is one vote, Vote 40, dealing with the International Joint Commission; and, in order to free Mr. MacCallum, perhaps members would agree to our taking that item of the International Joint Commission

now—by holding discussion and taking evidence on it, at any rate. Mr. Cadieux of the Department of External Affairs is standing by, and, in view of the hour, possibly we could start with him first thing this afternoon at 3.30. Would that be satisfactory to members?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Then, on your behalf, I would like to thank Mr. Strong and his officials most sincerely for their advice.

We will now proceed with the International Joint Commission. Thank you very much gentlemen.

Mr. Strong: Mr. Chairman, I would very much like on behalf of all of my colleagues to thank you all, not only for the interest you have exhibited in our program and for your support, but for the very fine way in which you have received us here. We appreciate it.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. I will now call Item 40.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS C-INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION

40 Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission, \$481,700.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have with us today Mr. MacCallum, who is the Assistant to the Chairman of the International Joint Commission and also the legal adviser. In addition we have with us Mr. Thompson, the engineering adviser to the Commission. I understand that neither you nor Mr. Thompson have an introductory statement?

Mr. J. L. MacCallum (Assistant to Chairman, International Joint Commission): That is correct.

The Chairman: You are, however, available to answer questions. Firstly on my list I have Mr. Fairweather, followed by Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lewis said that we did not know very much about CIDA and I must confess that this applies question will show my ignorance. I am wondering how the recommendations of the IJC are translated into some action by the respective governments. What is the procedure after the IJC has a view and studies a problem? What then happens?

Mr. MacCallum: The first step, as far as the Commission is concerned, after its report and recommendations have been formulated, is to forward these to the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States. Under our treaty—that is the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909—the Commission does not make decisions for findings of fact or findings of law as a result of its investigations. In its report it describes the circumstances, the facts as we have determined them, the conclusions and the recommendations as to a course of action. This report we forward to the governments.

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Mr. Lewis: Forgive me, Mr. Fairweather. Mr. MacCallum, I did not quite follow you. You said that the Commission does not make findings of fact, but then later said that it sets out the facts as it has found them.

Mr. MacCallum: What of course, I meant to say, Mr. Lewis, was that the Commission finds facts to its own satisfaction. The facts, as we find them, are not binding on the governments. The ultimate decisions are made by governments and they may, or may not, follow the course of action recommended or proposed by the Commission.

The fact that they have asked us to investigate and report does not tie the governments' hands in any way. What action they take on the Commission reports is up to them, and it would be presumptuous of me to indicate what they do. Presumably, though, they consult all their own departmental officials and advisers on the basis of all the information available to the governments and they will arrive at their decisions. Normally, I believe, the two governments consult through External Affairs and the State Department before finally deciding for their own part what action they will take on the Commission report.

Mr. Fairweather: Well, I come to two specific instances of your inquiry. I am showing same prejudice here, because they represent pollution on three important rivers in New Brunswick—the St. Croix, the Presquile and Saint John Rivers. The IJC studied these and I would like to know what has happened.

Mr. MacCallum: I might just comment there. We have studied pollution on the St. Croix. We have not studied pollution on the Saint John or on any of the tributaries of the Saint John. We have not been requested to do

so by the governments, although we could, if required.

Mr. Fairweather: You cannot initiate any studies?

Mr. MacCallum: We do not initiate any studies. We are inert, shall we say, until the governments ask us to go into action on a specific area or a specific problem. We did investigate the St. Croix some time ago.

Mr. Fairweather: Are those studies public documents?

Mr. MacCallum: They are public documents as soon as they are released by the governments; and the St. Croix report was released by the governments, in due course, after they had considered it. Pollution abatement is essentially a provincial and state responsibility and, as I say, the government of New Brunswick has taken the prime responsibility for abating pollution on the New Brunswick side, while similar steps have been taken by the authorities in the State of Maine on the U.S. side

Mr. Fairweather: Well, I realize the constitutional position. Two of these rivers, the St. Croix and Saint John are boundary waters, and in this connection, surely, responsibility rests for pollution abatement with the national—not the provincial or state—governments.

Mr. MacCallum: Under the Boundary Waters Treaty, Canada and the United States are bound not to commit pollution on one side to the injury of health and property on the other. To that extent your statement is absolutely correct.

Mr. Fairweather: Well, I suppose that I have always tried not to comment. It seems to me, however, that, this being your 60th Anniversary, perhaps there is a way to harden, if you like, the recommendations made by the IJC. I think the public expects rather a more active role from this body. After all we represent them.

Mr. MacCallum: Yes, yes indeed. Of course, you will appreciate that the International Joint Commission is limited by the powers that have been given to it. We have endeavoured, particularly in the last year and a half, to follow up more aggressively, shall we say, the role that the governments did give us. Taking the pollution of the St. Croix as an example, the governments approved the water quality objectives which we had

recommended, asked the Commission to establish and maintain continuing supervision over the pollution of the St. Croix River, and to draw to the attention of those having authority cases where the objectives are not being fulfilled. Well, of course, those having authority are the officials of New Brunswick on the Canadian, and Maine on the United States, side—the federal water pollution con-

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trol administration. Last September, down in St. Stephen, we had a public international meeting in the best traditions of a little town, where the officials of the New Brunswick and Maine governments, municipalities and industries were called before the Commission to explain what they had been doing and why, after a certain number of years, the objectives were not being complied with in full. The meeting, which was given excellent press, TV, and radio coverage, was in fact, on national TV news, and, although it obtained a good deal of notoriety, some results were achieved.

Now, the speed at which pollution can be abated is largely a matter of money. There is technology involved in it, but the elected representatives are the ones who must decide how much money will be spent to bring about these improvements known to be required. There, I am afraid, the Commission cannot do much, beyond pointing out to the public and to the agencies what needs to be done, and trying to build up the public support which will enable the people who control the purse to spend the necessary amounts of money.

Mr. Fairweather: There is, at the moment, no equivalent in Canada of the United States' federal pollution control?

Mr. MacCallum: No, there is not.

Mr. Fairweather: Would this be because of our constitutional aspect of...

Mr. MacCallum: I believe that this has a good deal to do with it. I keep hearing that the government is going to bring in a Canada water act which, I understand, will have some provisions—the nature of which I am not aware—to assist, at least, in the pollution abatement.

Mr. Fairweather: Just one final question, Mr. Chairman. How many classified engineers are on the staff of the commission, Mr. Thompson?

Mr. MacCallum: Two of us.

Mr. Fairweather: That is interesting; a distinguished representative and then Mr. Heeney. Who else is there—any other lawyers or engineers?

Mr. MacCallum: The total staff is 12, including the chairman and two other Canadian commissioners, a legal adviser, an engineering adviser, a secretary of the Canadian section, a technician, five secretarial helpers, and a draftsman and illustrator who draws charts, maps, and the like.

Mr. Fairweather: The charts of your frustration!

Mr. MacCallum: The charts of the areas over which we have responsibilities.

Mr. Fairweather: Neatly answered.

Mr. Allmand: May I have a supplementary to what Mr. Fairweather was asking?

Mr. Fairweather: I am through.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand on a supplementary.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Fairweather was asking about action which resulted from your reports when you spoke about the Ste. Croix River in New Brunswick. Does the same type of action result with respect to your work in the Great Lakes? Do you merely give reports, or has action been undertaken as a result of these?

Mr. MacCallum: Indeed it had. At the present time we have an investigation underway into the pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the international section of the St. Lawrence River. The investigation is at the stage where the technical board which we appointed to actually carry out and supervise the field work and the technical studies is preparing its main report. This, we expect,

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will be in our hands toward the end of this summer. Thereafter, the commission will consider holding public hearings and formulate its own report for the governments. We have put in two interim reports—the first one very shortly after we received this reference—pointing to the seriousness of the problem of eutrophication, which is the over-fertilisation of the lakes, and recommending that certain steps be taken. I believe that the authorities on each side of the line—Ontario, several States in the United States, and the United

States and Canadian governments—have taken steps to reduce the introduction of nutrients into the lakes. But final action has not been taken. This was a matter of bringing to the governments' attention that, as soon as the seriousness of the problem became apparent to us, it should be faced up to very quickly and combated without unnecessary delay.

In the connecting channels of the Great Lakes—that is the St. Marys River between Lake Superior and Lake Huron, the St. Clair, the Detroit Rivers and the Niagara River—we did, back in 1950, recommend water quality objectives for boundary waters control in these channels. These were accepted by the governments and have really been implemented largely by the Province of Ontario, the Ontario Water Resources Commission, and the several state bodies in these waters. Moreover, we have been given the role of watch dog and supervisor to initiate action towards realizing these objectives. We have had public meetings on those channels, similar to the ones I mentioned on the Ste. Croix, to find out why the objectives were not being fully complied with and to induce those responsible to take the necessary action.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis on a supplementary.

Mr. Lewis: Have you any idea what personnel comprises American part of the IJC?

Mr. MacCallum: Yes, indeed.

Mr. Lewis: Would you like to give us that?

Mr. MacCallum: They have no professional staff on a full-time basis. There are the three commissioners, a secretary, and clerical staff in support. I should just add there, that, on both sides of the line, the Commission is not limited to the professional advice which it can obtain from its staff. Each time a problem or a reference is made to the Commission for an investigation, the letter of reference spells out that the Commission may draw upon the specially qualified experts, such as engineers, scientists and economists, in the agencies and departments of the government service to assist in the investigation. They are the people who actually conduct the investigations. The engineering adviser and the legal adviser in the Canadian section, for example, primarily keep in touch with these boards to try to ensure that they are heading in the right direction, and that we know what is happening and can evaluate what they are doing. In this pollution investigation on the

Great Lakes however, there are probably over 100 Canadian technical people involved in the actual investigation.

Mr. Lewis: Are they all government people?

Mr. MacCallum: They are all government people, but if the Commission is unable to find the calibre of man, or the type of advise, or the specialist required, we have subject to you gentlemen, authority to retain outside consultants as occasion requires. We do not do that very often but there has been the odd time.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan; and then I have Mr. Ryan, Mr. Legault, Mr. Howard, Mr. Allmand, Mr. Guay. Did I miss you, Mr. Gibson? Well, I will perhaps fit you in then in an appropriate place.

Mr. Nowlan: To continue more or less along the lines of Mr. Fairweather's and Mr. Lewis' questions, I understand that we have a staff of 12, but what is the ratio of the American staff, by comparison?

Mr. MacCallum: They have three commissioners, a secretary, an administrative officer and two secretaries.

Mr. Nowlan: So, numerically, we have more?

Mr. MacCallum: That is right.

Mr. Nowlan: What is the reason for that?

Mr. MacCallum: Our government and Parliament have seen the need, shall we say, ahead of the United States government, to provide an adequate staff in the Canadian section. It is hoped that the United States

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section will be granted authority to balance their staff with ours. I know that they have been trying to do this for at least two or three years.

Mr. Nowlan: This, again, may be a general question, with all the perils attached thereunto. How many bodies of water come within your jurisdiction with this total staff of 12?

Mr. MacCallum: All boundary waters which are defined as waters from main shore to main shore along which the international boundary passes. Those would be the Ste. Croix, part of the Saint John, the St. Lawrence—all the Great Lakes system.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes.

Mr. MacCallum: Those are boundaries waters, and they are under our jurisdiction with respect to any obstruction or diversion affecting the level of water on the other side of the boundary. In addition to that, all rivers that flow across the boundary, or out of boundary waters, are subject to our jurisdiction in the sense that approval must be obtained before they may be dammed on the down stream side in such a way as to flood water back into Canada.

By comparison, the Prairie rivers, for instance—the St. Mary, the Milk, the Waterton and Belly—are not subject to our jurisdiction. Problems related to them—the allocation of their water between the countries, and suchlike—have, however, been referred to us for investigation and report with recommendations. To that extent, you might loosely say that they are under our jurisdiction. They are part of our responsibility, which extends, not only from coast to coast, but up the Alaska Panhandle—although we have had no reference involving those rivers as yet.

Mr. Nowlan: Like the Columbia River in British Columbia?

Mr. MacCallum: Starting back in 1944, we conducted, on the Columbia Basin, investigations which carried on for some 16 years.

Mr. Nowlan: As far as initiating action is concerned, do both governments have to agree to initiate action, or can you initiate action on your own behalf for your side of the river?

Mr. MacCallum: No, the Commission does not initiate action at any time. In a case where Commission approval of a structure—such as a dam—which raises water level is required, the government of the individual seeking that approval applies first to External Affairs on our side, or to State Department on the United States side, and they forward the application to the Commission for appropriate action—that is, approval or rejection.

Only federal governments can initiate requests to us for investigation. The problem or matter of difference is referred by either government—or both. Tradition has sprung up that the two governments confer in advance, on the terms of the reference, about exactly what is going to be asked of the Commission, and then both commit their resources to the same extent and we receive a joint reference from both.

Mr. Nowlan: So, while one government could initiate it, the practice has developed that this is done by conference or consultation first?

Mr. MacCallum: That is right.

Mr. Nowlan: They give the reference jointly?

Mr. MacCallum: That is right. This is at governmental level, which means that each government is equally committed to support the investigation that the Commission is requested to make.

Mr. Nowlan: Coming specifically to Vote 40, there is an item in the estimates of \$300,000, I believe—the amount this year, down \$6,000 from last year—for the boundary lake pollution study. My first question is, how long has the study been in progress, what has been spent by Canada, and what has been spent by the United States?

Mr. MacCallum: It is a little difficult to give you the exact totals because they are found in the estimates of the several federal government departments?—Energy, Mines and Resources, I believe—which have participated. To deal with the International Joint Commission vote first; the sum of approximately \$300,000 is the Canadian Section International Joint Commission commitment to share, equally with the Ontario Water Resources Commission, in the costs of a program which OWRC initiated, and which they have advanced and pursued earlier than they otherwise would have done in Lake Erie,

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Lake Ontario and St. Lawrence River investigation. Had the Ontario Water Resources Commission not undertaken this program, which is in direct support of the IJC investigation—but also of course is of value to them—then the Commission would have had to have found consultants or some other agency to do the work which the OWRC is doing. So, recognizing that we both had an interest in it, we agreed that we would share the cost of this particular program equally, subject to a maximum contribution by Canada of \$300,000.

I am afraid that the information I have on the other federal departments was compiled last fall. The Department of Energy, Mines and Resources estimated at \$3,485,000; the Fisheries Research Board \$1.5 million; the

Department of National Health and Welfare roughly \$237,000; and the Ontario Water Resources Commission—in addition to the part for which we reimbursed them—incurred expenditure of some \$383,000. Their total outlay, of which they recoup \$300,000 from us, was \$683,000.

Mr. Nowlan: Is that \$300,000 in the estimates \$3,000 which they also contribute?

Mr. MacCallum: That is right.

Mr. Nowlan: How long has this study been progressing?

Mr. MacCallum: The date of the reference was 1965.

Mr. Nowlan: Does it appear from the studies that there have been interim reports and/or a timetable for completion?

Mr. MacCallum: That is right. The timetable for the completion of the Board's first phase of the investigation—to find out if pollution is occurring, if so, from what sources, to what extent, and what should be done—will be completed this summer.

Mr. Nowlan: Do I gather from something you said earlier that the \$300,000 paid out by the I.J.C. has really been consultant fees for other professionals or people to do the work?

Mr. MacCallum: The bulk of that \$300,000 goes directly to the Ontario Water Resources Commission to reimburse them up to the maximum of the federal Commission.

Mr. Nowlan: Again, from something you said earlier, does the study from what you have found out to date, indicate that pollution can be abated or cured on, say, the Great Lakes, where, specifically the study is being taken?

It is just a question of money?

Mr. MacCallum: First, it might be an oversimplification to state that it is just a question of money. But more often than not, money is the determining factor. In a body of water as large as any of the Great Lakes, there are other technical problems which may—unquestionably do—make it more difficult; and the cure is not quite as obvious as it may be for a flowing river the size of the Ste. Croix or, perhaps, the Niagara River. Nevertheless, the preliminary information we have obtained from our Boards is that it can be stopped, the trend reversed, and the condition improved.

Mr. Nowlan: From the figures that you gave me earlier from the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, the Department of Health and Welfare, the Ontario Water Resources Commission, and the Fisheries Research Board, are these the totals that have been spent to date on that particular project? Is that all the expenditure involved?

Mr. MacCallum: They are the estimates by those Departments for 1969-70.

Mr. Nowlan: What, do you know, has been the total so far spent on the project?

Mr. MacCallum: Since the reference in 1965, I can tell you only the specific amounts which the International Joint Commission has paid. These, of course, are relatively minor in the over-all figure. The Departments, until this year, have not kept their accounting on a project basis in such a way that we could identify money spent strictly on behalf of In-

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ternational Joint Commission investigations, because some of the work is done in the ordinary course of departmental operations, after which the results are made available to this co-ordinated study. I am sorry to say that I cannot give you the current figure, and I do not think that the figures for past years would be available elsewhere.

Mr. Nowlan: When the project was started, and the reference was made to 1965, there was, then, no over-all estimate of what might be involved. Would it be fair to say that, concerning cost, it was a somewhat open-ended project?

Mr. MacCallum: Not wholly.

Mr. Nowlan: If not, what was the rough estimate of the project?

Mr. MacCallum: The first assignment the Board was given after it was set up was to provide an outline of the investigations required, an estimate of the costs and time required, and personnel. I do not have that with me. It is on our file. I could give you that as a guide if it would be useful.

Mr. Nowlan: If you do not have it right now, you could cover that in a memo to the Clerk.

Mr. MacCallum: I would be glad to. Of course those figures were based on estimates by departmental officials and so on as to what probably would be involved.

Mr. Nowlan: If you would give a memo to the Clerk that would suffice for my purpose.

My last question, Mr. Chairman, again, is in reference to the staff. I must say that I was a little surprised at the lack of numbers. How many references were you involved in during the last fiscal year, or does it vary so much from year to year that there is no average?

Mr. MacCallum: Most of them continue over more than one year. We have five major studies going on now. We have continuing responsibilities for 26 boards of control that relate to areas and problems that have arisen and have been dealt with along the boundary and the boards are sort of our eyes and ears to follow up to make sure that what we said would be done is in fact being done. But we have five major investigations.

Mr. Nowlan: You mentioned 26 boards.

Mr. MacCallum: Twenty-six boards that report to us once or twice at least annually, many of them semi-annually, on what is going on in their area and whether our orders are being complied with. Of course that is largely the role the two advisers play—keeping in constant contact with those boards make sure things are going the way they should be.

Mr. Nowlan: Would this Great Lakes water pollution study be the largest single project that you are involved with at the present time?

Mr. MacCallum: I think it would be fair to say it is, yes. One that is almost as large though is a study of the possibilities of regulating the levels of any or all of the Great Lakes, and that is proceeding simultaneously. Those are our major and most demanding studies at the moment.

Mr. Nowlan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. MacCallum, what are the other three major studies?

Mr. MacCallum: There is an air pollution study in the Sarnia-Port Huron area and the Detroit-Windsor area specifically. In addition to that, at the time the governments referred the study of those two areas to us they asked us to take note of air pollution problems that may come to our attention from any source anywhere along the boundary, in effect to make a preliminary investigation and keep them informed whether a more detailed investigation and a formal reference should

be made to the Commission. That latter point is a new departure for the governments—in giving us, as it were, a watching or a “sniffing” brief along the boundary to spot these incipient problems before they become too serious. Then we draw it to the attention of the governments and they decide whether to give it back to us for a thorough investigation. That is brand new and almost an exception to the point I made earlier—that it is the

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governments that trigger off these investigations. In this case they have asked us to short-circuit it and to draw to their attention problems that should be looked into.

We are also studying the measures that are desirable and practicable for preserving and enhancing the beauty of the American Falls at Niagara. As you know, they have been deteriorating and the Commission is involved in a study of what can be done and the desirability of doing so.

The co-operative development of the water resources of the Pembina River basin is one that has recently been completed and reported on to the governments.

The levels of Rainy and Namakan Lakes is the fifth one under active study. In that connection the Commission has a special task assigned to it under a convention entered into directly by the American and Canadian governments to determine when emergency conditions exist in the watershed, either from too low or too high water; and to determine what measures should be taken to reduce damages as much as possible. We have construed that as authority to devise a method of regulating the levels of Rainy Lake and the Namakan chain of lakes in such a way that emergency conditions will not arise, and we are engaged now in the process of modifying the regulation plan that has been in effect for about the last six years. We think we can do better.

Those are our major preoccupations at the moment.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. MacCallum, you told us that the International Joint Commission was set up under the Boundary Waters Treaty originally in 1909. Does your jurisdiction cover air pollution as well or are you getting a special reference in some way, shape or form?

Mr. MacCallum: We have received a special reference. Article IX of this 1909 Treaty is very far-sighted. It says that any questions or matters of difference arising between the

High Contracting Parties involving the rights and obligations as between the two of them or as between one government and the people on the other side may be referred to the International Joint Commission for investigation and report. It is broad enough to embrace practically any problem along the common frontier that involves those issues or potential troubles, whether it is water or air or whatever it is. This is the third air pollution reference that we have had in that connection.

Mr. Ryan: The Americans have the United States Army Corps of Engineers backing them up in large measure and I understand this is one reason that they do not need as large a staff.

Mr. MacCallum: That is right.

Mr. Ryan: But we do not have anything the equivalent here.

Mr. MacCallum: No, we do not, I suppose the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources comes as close as any of our departments to the Corps of Engineers' work.

Mr. Ryan: You said that you looked back at former references and have revived your interests in some of them. Is the Columbia River Treaty continuing to receive your scrutiny?

Mr. MacCallum: No.

Mr. Ryan: You do not look at the Upper Columbia?

Mr. MacCallum: No. Once the Columbia River Treaty was signed and put into effect the Commission has had no further role to play.

Mr. Ryan: There was an international board set up under that Treaty.

Mr. MacCallum: That is right. There is a residuary possibility as far as the Commission is concerned under the Columbia River Treaty—that a dispute or a difference may be referred by the governments to the International Joint Commission.

Mr. Ryan: There is one problem that you may or may not be still interested in—an option concerning a branch of the Kootenay going down into the States and then coming back into Canada. The Americans had to build a dam and I believe they have gone ahead with that dam.

Mr. MacCallum: That is right, Libby Dam.

Mr. Ryan: Is that finished now and in operation?

Mr. MacCallum: No. It is under construction. I am not sure of the scheduled completion date. I think it is probably another year or a year and a half yet.

Mr. Ryan: Would you not be interested if that flooded back into Canada in an inordinate way—in a way that was not contemplated?

Mr. MacCallum: The governments made provision for that in the Treaty itself. They said that Canada would provide certain territory required in Canada for this reservoir and they dealt with it directly under the

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Columbia Treaty rather than seeking IJC approval. It would be pretty awkward if there were both governments and the Commission in the act at the same time.

Mr. Ryan: So we could not get any follow-up from your Commission on how the Columbia River Treaty works are proceeding, how they are turning out, whether they are satisfactory or not?

Mr. MacCallum: Presumably it could if the governments wanted us to and asked us to, but I would think they have established their own permanent engineering board for that sole purpose, to keep the governments informed that indeed the treaty is working out the way it was intended to. I might add, though, we do have responsibility and authority over the levels of Kootenay Lake, where the Commission approved the dam that regulates the levels of Kootenay Lake and the outflow down into the West Arm. Libby Dam must be operated in such a way as to be consistent with the order of approval then in effect for the regulation of Kootenay Lake levels. We do tie in with the basin but we do not have anything to do with the Columbia River development or treaty as a whole.

Mr. Ryan: In respect to the Alaska-Yukon-British Columbia border situation and the proposed Taku-Yukon River development, are you working in any way on this proposition?

Mr. MacCallum: No, we are not.

Mr. Ryan: Are you being approached or consulted by American interests in any way?

Mr. MacCallum: No. I understand from a press announcement I saw a little while ago that there is sort of a joint study going on at the present time at the intergovernmental level, which does not involve the International Joint Commission, as to the market possibilities for power that might be generated if the Yukon-Taku or Tuya projects went ahead. The governments, at any stage, could refer that type of question to us for investigation but indeed they have not.

Mr. Ryan: So you strictly wait until you are referred to? You take no interest otherwise.

Mr. MacCallum: We are very much interested and we try to keep ourselves informed in advance of any problem that is likely to come under our wing, but it is an academic interest, shall we say.

Mr. Ryan: Yes, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan on a supplementary?

Mr. Nowlan: Is there no procedure whereby you can request a reference from the governments—not that you can initiate it, but that you can get to the governments and say that this problem should be looked at?

Mr. MacCallum: Shall we say at the staff level we work fairly closely with officers from the Department of External Affairs, and the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, and the Department of Fisheries, and the various government officials. Mr. Thompson and I are civil servants and we talk to civil servants, and if a situation is blowing up in such a way that we think it would be a fit subject for a reference, we do not hesitate to draw it to the attention of officials in the department.

Mr. Nowlan: In a practical way, compared to an official way?

Mr. MacCallum: That is right: a telephone call, or over lunch, or this sort of thing; word gets around.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is quite clear that we will not finish with Mr. MacCallum and Mr. Thompson this morning and we will proceed this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. Would you be agreeable to continuing a little longer, say until 1.00 p.m. to deal with as much as possible, and then we will continue this afternoon at 3.30 p.m.? We will probably reach Mr.

Cadieux and the Officials of the Department of External Affairs around four o'clock. They will stand by in any event.

The next one on my list is Mr. Legault, followed by Mr. Howard, then Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MacCallum, you mentioned a while ago that the other major study you have is the question of regulating the water levels. In this study are you discussing at the moment the question of additional water diversion?

Mr. MacCallum: Diversion outside of the basin?

Mr. Legault: From outside of the basin, from Canada?

Mr. MacCallum: No.

Mr. Legault: There is no discussion whatsoever at the moment about water diversions?

Mr. MacCallum: That is right. The actual diversion, say, at Chicago that is now going on unquestionably will be taken into account in the evaluation of factors that affect the level of the Great Lakes. No consideration is being given to increased diversions or new diversions either in or out of the Great Lakes

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basin; it is what can be done within the basin to further regulate the diversion.

Mr. Legault: There is no request at the moment for additional diversions from the Great Lakes like the plan at Chicago?

Mr. MacCallum: No, no.

Mr. Legault: It is anticipated that this will be undertaken very shortly?

Mr. MacCallum: Not as far as the Commission is concerned. I am not aware and cannot say whether the governments are considering that or not.

In the terms of reference that came to us I believe there was a mention of the fact that the governments agreed that at the appropriate time they would be willing to give consideration to other aspects of regulation of the Great Lakes, but it is just as general as that.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, my question is about the Similkameen River in British Columbia. It is my understanding that it was established at the time that the Columbia Treaty was set out that the upstream nation has absolute authority and jurisdiction over waters in that sys-

tem. A number of years ago, I do not know how many, the waters in the Similkameen River were bargained away to the United States at a time when the area through which it flows in Canada was not populated, or certainly was not very well populated. Today that area is much more heavily populated. Today that area is much more heavily populated, and it is an area where farming and ranching can only be carried on as result of irrigation. That water is quite vital to the people in that area, and they are not allowed to draw from the Similkameen River for irrigation purposes because some arrangements have been made with the Americans to allow the water to stay in the river. It is my understanding there have been restrictions on the right to even drill wells which might reduce the water table in that valley in order that the water may go to the Americans.

In an area where the annual rainfall is only about 10 inches a year this is a very crucial factor and results in many acres of land that could be used for very productive farming not being available.

I would like to have your comments on that agreement that was made with the Americans, and I would like to know what we got in return for the water that we apparently gave to them, and what the possibilities are of reversing that situation?

Mr. MacCallum: First of all, under Article 2 of the Boundary Waters Treaty, as you pointed out, the upstream country, the federal or the province or state as the case may be, has exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion or obstruction of waters which in their ordinary channels would flow across the boundary. Applying that in the case of the Similkameen River, British Columbia or Canada or both have exclusive jurisdiction and control over such diversions provided that for any damage that is done in the downstream country as a result of such exercise of jurisdiction and control the injured person downstream can come into the upstream court and seek damages on the same basis as a Canadian who might have been injured.

As I recall the circumstances of the Similkameen River, and it happened just before I came to the Commission, the Commission was already investigating the Columbia River reference. The United States Government raised the question of a couple of proposed diver-

sions of the Similkameen River in Canada and the Commission was asked whether such withdrawals would adversely affect the people downstream where, I believe, they had either fully appropriated or over-appropriated the water in the river.

The Commission reported that if the waters were taken from the flood crest it would

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cause no damage at all. Taking it from there, I believe the province of British Columbia issued their water rights to their local residents on that basis and may well have said, "You may take this water out of flood flows, and so on". There were certain restrictions, and I am not familiar with what they were.

There was no bargain, as I understood it; there was no treaty. Whether or not there was an exchange of notes signifying a special agreement, I would not be prepared to say. But they were not bargained away. The Commission merely said, "If you take it at this time under these circumstances you will not cause any damage downstream." I do not believe a study has ever been made to find out what damage downstream would be caused and whether or not there would be a recoverable damage if more water were taken from the Similkameen or less were taken under different circumstances. The water rights in British Columbia are a provincial matter and I assume that they have made certain studies. I do not really know what the restrictions are but I am reasonably confident that there was no bargain rate. This was a question addressed to the Commission and the Commission replied as I have indicated. What happened after that I do not know, and the Commission does not have any continuing jurisdiction or responsibility in the Similkameen for that. . .

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The provincial water rights branch then dealt through the International Joint Commission though, did they not?

Mr. MacCallum: No, they would get advice from the Department of External Affairs as a result of this question that was addressed to the International Joint Commission at that time, but what has happened since then I do not know.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Could I get information from you then as to what the possibilities are of Canadians being able to draw water from the Similkameen. Could you

investigate for me what the status is at the moment?

Mr. McCallum: The Commission really has not much ground for investigating or for asking the provincial water rights branch.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): No, but you must have some records on this subject.

Mr. MacCallum: Not subsequent to the investigation that we made or the report that was put in back in 1950 or 1951. As I say, we have not followed the matter nor do we have any particular responsibility in the field. I would be glad to check on what happened at that time if it would help.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes, this is what I would like.

Mr. MacCallum: I am a little reluctant to say that I will write the B.C. water controller to find out what he is doing there because he might be justified in saying it is none of my business.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): No, but I would be interested in knowing what happened in 1950 or 1951.

Mr. MacCallum: I will be glad to look into that and I will communicate with you.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Fine, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Could you tell me the function of the pollution research centre with respect to the inquiry going on in the Great Lakes. Is it an integral part of it or is it a completely separate entity?

Mr. MacCallum: Is this the Canada Centre for Inland Waters.

Mr. Gibson: Yes, sir, at Burlington, Ontario.

Mr. MacCallum: I would like to think that the construction of that Centre and the program that has received so much impetus from it might well have been triggered by the reference to the Commission of the study of pollution and the levels of the Great Lakes. The Canada Centre for Inland Waters is strictly a Canadian governmental centre primarily established by the Department of Energy Mines and Resources but working in close co-operation with Fisheries and Transport, I guess, and the various other departments of the federal government that are

concerned with Canada's inland water resource. They have also provided for close work with the provincial authorities and with the various universities. I think there are about ten or a dozen universities within a very close radius. They are participating, or the agencies that are represented in the Inland Water Centre are participating very actively in the IJC investigation and much of the actual field work emanates from there where they have boats and all the necessary facilities and laboratories, but they are part of our co-ordinated investigation.

Mr. Gibson: The other thing, sir, that strikes me from listening to you today is that technically we are advanced, we are working well. We are co-ordinating with other groups

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in trying to find means of conquering the pollution problem. However, it seems to me—I would be glad of your opinion on this—that legally the enforcement branch of this topic has been wilfully neglected by all the governments in the sense that there has been no effort made or insufficient effort has been made by the Canadian government and the United States government and the state and provincial governments to co-ordinate their efforts in such a way that industry can be controlled and prevented from putting harmful ingredients into the Lakes. Would you agree with that?

Mr. MacCallum: Not wholly. For instance, the introduction of pollution into boundary waters, into the Great Lakes system on the Ontario side, does not really require participation by any government except one.

Mr. Gibson: No, but supposing on the Ontario side they stop polluting and on the New York side they pollute. What is the benefit of one doing it and the other not? Would it not have the same result?

Mr. MacCallum: Yes, as a general rule, but, in fact, on the Ontario side and on the New York side there are indeed very aggressive enforcement programs going ahead. I forget the name of the New York agency.

Mr. Gibson: Are they integrated?

Mr. MacCallum: It is the counterpart of the Ontario one.

Mr. Gibson: No, but supposing Ontario and New York both decided to stop pollution at the same place, what integration is there

between the two plans, if any, in legal terms? Is there an agency that co-operates between the two to see that both sides of the river are observing the measures?

Mr. MacCallum: That is the role of the International Joint Commission. We have set up common objectives. The governments on each side have accepted those objectives and they have said they will work towards these. The Commission shall we say, is the whip that stands above both of them and says, "Why have you not got this plant cleaned up?". If they say, "We will have it cleaned up by 1971," we say, "That is not quite soon enough, why not 1970?" Then they explain why.

Mr. Gibson: My point, sir, is that you have no mechanism to enforce by injunction, have you?

Mr. MacCallum: We have no enforcement authority at all, except public opinion.

Mr. Gibson: Would it not be desirable to have some agency which could enforce by way of injunction the recommendations of the two governments?

Mr. MacCallum: On the face of it, it sounds very attractive and as a staff man with the International Joint Commission I sometimes think it would be nice to have some authority and some muscle. But the corollary of it, you cannot have the government and the International Joint Commission and the other government all with equal powers. Which government is going to first say that we will let the International Joint Commission establish the objectives and enforce them? I do not know, I do not think it will be Canada, but that is the problem. Who is going to surrender that much jurisdiction to a non-elected quasi-judicial body?

Mr. Gibson: On page 12 of this report behind the headlines, Mr. Heeney's report, he says:

...But, measured against the enormity and urgency of the problem, progress is still distressingly slow.

Do you not need dynamic and imaginative agencies set up to enforce this thing with all the publicity you can possibly get and with the law behind you, from both levels of government.

Mr. MacCallum: It would be extremely helpful. All I can say is we have the commitment of the State of Michigan that by 1970

the Detroit River and the St. Clair River and Lake St. Clair as far as the Michigan side will be living up to the objectives that were recommended by the Commission in 1950. They will be complied with. The Canadian side is almost at that point now.

I agree that this sort of mechanism we have thrown together ought not to work, but if, indeed, by the end of next year, the Detroit River, which has been rather infamous, is cleaned up...We had one of these international meetings I spoke of down there this January and although quite a bit remains to be done all the major contributors are, indeed, working under a court order or under the order of the Michigan Water Resources Commission on a schedule. They are checked on each month or each quarter. In fact, they are making progress. I am inclined to think—this is only my own personal view—that as long as governments have

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a will to get this cleaned up and with the International Joint Commission co-ordinating the efforts of the governments from both side, maybe that is about as much as we can hope for.

When one side falls notoriously behind the other then we have this public meeting and, in effect, we are calling these enforcement agencies to account for not having met the objectives they are committed to. As a matter of fact those objectives now are under review with a view to tightening them up.

We have learned a bit more about various pollutants since they were established in 1950. It is, shall we say, a clumsy, sloppy sort of thing but it enables each nation to live side by side with its full sovereignty and with the goodwill that has been shown on both sides in most of these areas, not all of them, I am hopeful. It would be very nice if some of the reluctant ones could be pushed at a faster pace.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you, sir.

Vice-Chairman: Since Mr. Allmand has left, we still have Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): My question is possible not too important, Mr. Chairman, but I have noticed that a study has been made pertaining to the Red River, which comes in from the south, though the States and into Manitoba. I have not had the occasion to read it. Did your group make this particular study?

Mr. MacCallum: We made a study of the pollution of the Red River.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Someone else asked this question but do you have the authority or can you recommend to regulate the flow of the Red River? Possibly this would solve some of the problems in the area.

Mr. MacCallum: No. We have no authority over the regulation of the flow entering Canada from across the southern boundary. Our report indicated that the water which was crossing the boundary was not polluted, as it entered Canada. This came as a bit of a surprise to the public at large, because just a short time before that it had been polluted. There was no question about it. But meanwhile, and this is a sign of the times, North Dakota and Minnesota each established their own laws with pretty tight requirements for keeping pollution out of all their waters, including the Red River. We came to the conclusion that if, indeed, their programs were properly applied and enforced that there would not likely be any pollution problem at the boundary. To make sure that they did not slack off and forget about the Canadians who were falling heir to their good works, we recommended and have been authorized by the two federal governments to maintain continuing supervision with a monitor at the boundary to ensure that the quality of water which comes into Canada is of the same high standard that North Dakota and Minnesota require for their own waters. These are very sensible and attainable objectives.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Is it polluted in Canada?

Mr. MacCallum: I am afraid so.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Where did it start?

Mr. MacCallum: Very shortly below the boundary, but primarily in the Winnipeg area. That presented a bit of a problem when the situation was under consideration in the International Joint Commission. The argument was, why should the United States side be required to provide a higher quality of water than Canada was obviously interested in having, because they immediately polluted it after it reached Canada? We had to rely solely on the provision of the Boundary Waters Treaty which says that "neither side shall pollute to the injury of health and property on the other side", and so we have an assurance of relatively clean water arriving at the boundary. It is up to Manitoba to take it from there.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes. Which was the most important study that was made, in your estimation, since you have been on this particular Commission? Was the recommendation which you made from that study, ever implemented?

Mr. MacCallum: The one that stands out in my mind, the most, is a combination of two studies and involved the application to build the power works on the St. Lawrence River, in the international section near Cornwall at Barnhart Island, and the study of regulating the levels of Lake Ontario. The results of our study on the regulation of Lake Ontario were reflected in recommendations to the government's approval, and then incorporation in the order of approval that the Commission issued for building the Barnhart Power Works. To that extent, our recommendations were all implemented, although we implemented a number of them ourselves by actually issuing an order of approval. That was one of the biggest up to that time. The pollution field is becoming increasingly important, and I am sure that it will continue to be so. The other one which is worthy of mention is the Columbia investigation which we started at a time where we did not even have appropriate maps. We had to go back to the surveying level, in order to have the data on which conclusions could be drawn. The Columbia River Treaty was negotiated very shortly after we recommended the principles on which the Treaty should be based. Those were the biggest and the most far-reaching ones in which I was engaged.

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Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Guay. On behalf of the Committee I would like to thank you, Mr. MacCallum. You have been most helpful. Adjourned.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we are ready to begin.

Mr. Cadieux has brought with him answers to a number of questions that have been asked. To save time, would it be agreed that they should be printed as appendices to our proceedings and in the meantime copies can be distributed to members present? I think a

number of them are in answer to questions raised by Mr. Roberts. Is it agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: I believe the first questioner is Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting, before we adjourned, I was asking some

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questions relative to the passport situation. Could we have some explanation as to what were the procedures decided upon by the Department which issues passports when the new regulations came into effect. Because they involve such important changes, why was consideration not given to the problems that were bound to arise for those who this year have decided to go overseas? The department is now prepared and does issue a valid passport for one year under certain circumstances. Why could a renewal of an old passport not be made? I think this would have saved a lot of trouble. I am not going to go into other aspects because, as I said last meeting, Mr. Chairman, I have received—and I think other members have—from the passport office such wonderful co-operation with difficulties. I do not want to go into that now. Almost every recommendation that has been made to facilitate has been followed through.

In addition to asking why this was not foreseen, why provisions were not made for the allowance of a renewal for one year. Instead of the procedure one has to go through now, I would also like to ask another question. When a person made application and did so on the old passport application, in which one item calls for \$5 when \$10 is required now, why was he refused if he sent in the old application? New applications were not available and are still not available, not only across Canada, but they are not available, sir, in your own office which is one block from the Parliament Buildings. I think that is enough, sir. I may have some supplementary questions when I hear from the director.

Mr. M. Cadieux Q.C. (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs): Perhaps Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable, I can make one or two general comments. Then I will ask the head of the passport office, who is more intimately connected with the operation, to answer in detail the points made by Mr. Winch.

I will start by saying that the general reason why the renewals are not as easy as before

is that this is precisely part of the process of tightening up on passport security. The idea was that passport would be issued for five years on the basis of an application. This would make it possible for the passport authorities to check on the applicant and to issue the passport under conditions which would ensure a greater degree of security than there was before. This is the essential purpose of this. This was done and the decision was taken by the government, as indicated at the previous meeting, because there was an impression that we should take greater precautions than we had taken in the past to issue a passport that would give greater assurance as to the identity of the person.

Mr. Winch: Yes.

Mr. Cadieux: It is fully appreciated that in order to achieve this, there is price to pay. And the price that you pay is sometimes a greater delay, although I am confident that in time the present difficulties will be overcome. Certainly the people in the passport office are doing their best to do that. In time the public will become educated about these new regulations and facilities will be put at their disposal, and I think passports will be issued with greater speed and there will be greater security connected with this.

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Mr. Winch: The MPs are concerned now and also were last month with what we are faced with.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, I certainly appreciate this, but I can say that we were somewhat taken by surprise by this sudden very considerable increase in the number of applications. As Mr. Sharp said in the House, the expectation was that there would be a certain volume of applications, but the volume was twice that which was anticipated. In the circumstances, the staff in the passport office have exerted themselves very considerably to try to meet this volume; the backlog is being reduced and they are disposing of current applications. Hopefully, within the next few weeks, they will be up-to-date; then they will be able to give the service to which you and we believe the public is entitled.

Mr. Winch: I have had a personal experience with this. First of all, I know that the new application form has not been distributed across Canada. Therefore, people sent in the only thing available, which is the old application form. It demands \$5. Applications have

been returned to people because they only sent in \$5. In view of the fact that they only have the old form to send in, will you please give an explanation of that? Also sir, would you explain why, in our own passport office, as of last Wednesday, you were still issuing the old form?

Mr. Cadieux: My understanding is—and Mr. Durdin will be able to compliment this—that we are still operating on the old form plus an amendment, which indicates the new regulation.

Mr. Winch: No, I am awfully sorry sir, but I must draw to your attention the fact that when you issued the old form to those applicants last Wednesday, you did not supply any addendum or change with them. Why?

Mr. W. S. Durdin (Head of Passport Division): Mr. Winch, I am very surprised that this has not been drawn to my attention previously. We undertook to have amendment sheets printed for all existing applications, and also for the additional stock needed to look after service this year. This was a mammoth compilation job but the distribution was undertaken through post-office channels; as far as we know, all forms that have been distributed do include the amendment sheets. Now you point out that as of last Wednesday our own Public Counter Section was distributing forms without amendments.

Mr. Winch: Right.

Mr. Durdin: If this is true and if the supervisor had been aware of this, he obviously would have drawn it to the applicant's attention immediately and to the attention of our own supply staff as well.

Mr. Winch: The reason, Mr. Chairman, that I am so certain about this, is that although I do not anticipate the need for a passport for some time, since my passport was no longer effective, last Wednesday I sent down for an application form to renew it. I was sent three copies of this application without any other additional sheet.

Mr. Durdin: Well, Mr. Winch. . .

Mr. Winch: It happened to me last Wednesday. That is why I know what I am talking about, sir.

Mr. Durdin: Mr. Winch, I am very glad that this has been brought to our attention, but as far as I know, all of our stock includes the amendment sheet.

Mr. Winch: That was all I got, sir.

Mr. Durdin: There are exceptions, obviously.

Mr. Winch: Well then, I was one of the exceptions.

Mr. Durdin: I am sorry, but there are exceptions; this is the result of mechanical hand-stuffing; obviously you must allow for errors. I can assure you, however, that a very mammoth undertaking was involved to ensure that all forms had the amendment sheets.

There is one other peculiarity: we are still getting forms that were issued in 1957. These were supposed to have been destroyed when we introduced the new form in 1963; however, people stuffed them away and they dragged out the form without regard to the

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fact that they were not current; this causes problems over which one really does not have any control.

Mr. Winch: May I ask one question, because this means an awful lot to people, and I represent a riding some 3,000 miles away. If they, as I, should not receive the stuffed sheet or whatever you call it, is it not possible, as long as all the other information is correct, that if you only receive the \$5, to issue a passport and then to say, "You owe us another \$5?" I think that would save a lot of trouble.

I have had more than one case, and I know other MPs have as well where people sent in a complete application with only \$5. Now they have done it because they have gone by this application, as I would have done if I had not known differently. Is it not possible sir, especially when they are leaving in four days, a week or two weeks, to accept that and to issue the passport, informing them that they owe you another \$5? Now would that be too difficult? It would save a lot of trouble on rejection of present passports.

Mr. Durdin: We do not reject the forms; we advise the applicants.

Mr. Winch: That is my very point; you advise the applicants that they only sent in \$5. and that the requirement is \$10. If I had filled this out as I got it, then I would have sent you \$5 as well.

Mr. Durdin: Well Mr. Winch. . .

Mr. Winch: Now could you not accept it and then say to them "Please send us \$5. later on?"

Mr. Cadieux: Subject to what Mr. Durdin will say...

Mr. Winch: Because I have had them turned down, sir, because of the \$5.

Mr. Cadieux: I know, but he has greater knowledge than I have of these applications; however, the amendments relates to the tightened security requirements. The amendments relate to the production of the birth certificate and the other documents that are required.

Mr. Winch: But you turn them down because they do not send \$10. instead of \$5.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes but this is only part of the story; you would be involved in correspondence afterwards trying to collect the extra \$5. and then asking them to produce a birth certificate.

Mr. Winch: No, I am saying, sir, that if they fill in everything, if they only send you the \$5. because this says send \$5., it is not security then, it is just \$5.

Mr. Cadieux: You see, the new requirement says that if you want a passport then you must send \$10. You must send your birth certificate or your certificate of naturalization.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry; I have not got it clear. You fill in everything else. You send your birth certificate or your citizenship to security along with everything else; but according to this you only need to send \$5.

The Chairman: I believe I can explain the difficulty, Mr. Winch. That form apparently does not require you to send in your birth certificate or your certificate of naturalization.

Mr. Winch: No, this is what is being supplied. I just got one last Wednesday from your own office.

Mr. Durdin: Mr. Winch do you know from which office you got this, please?

Mr. Winch: Yes, your office right at the corner.

Mr. Durdin: Which office did you get this from? Was it the public Counter Section, the Diplomatic and special Section, or from the Facilitation Section? This would help me because I...

Mr. Winch: I got it on the fourth floor.

Mr. Durdin: Thank you very much.

Mr. Winch: Look, I do not want to get them into trouble; I am only raising the problems that we are getting into.

Mr. Durdin: But I must be able to find out so that I can check.

Mr. Winch: Okay, it was on the fourth floor.

Mr. Durdin: Thank you.

The Chairman: It may be very useful to make sure that they are not still being handed out this minute.

Mr. Durdin: That is exactly the point, sir.

The Chairman: Other people might be put to an inconvenience too.

Mr. Winch: I do not intend to go away; my passport had expired, but you see the problem sir. Now it is not security, it is the \$5., so you cannot be concerned with security.

The Chairman: And the birth certificate.

Mr. Cadieux: And the birth certificate.

Mr. Winch: Well there is not anything on this application about that.

Mr. Cadieux: No; there is not.

Mr. Winch: But this is what they hand out.

Mr. Cadieux: This is the point I am making; I think we are talking at cross purposes here.

Mr. Winch: I am not talking at cross purposes. Inquiries are made by telegraph, telephone and registered mail; applications are returned with the \$5, because they sent in the old one which lacks the proper information. I myself last Wednesday could not get a new one. What is happening to our people across the country?

Mr. Cadieux: We are saying two things. One is that normally an application should not be distributed without the amendment; we do our best to see that the two documents reach every applicant; that is the first thing.

Mr. Winch: You did not have them in the post office that I went to.

Mr. Cadieux: I realize that but that was an accident; we will do our best to prevent this, but mistakes do happen.

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Mr. Winch: No, no. It also happens in the Vancouver post office.

Mr. Cadieux: The other thing is that only last week on the 17th, we put in 105 Canadian newspapers an advertisement which says: "Get your application form and amendment sheet." We say that the two are essential in completing the form to get your passport quickly.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay has a supplementary.

Mr. Winch: How in the name of heaven can they do that 3,000 miles away when I cannot even get the supplement when I make application here in Ottawa?

The Chairman: I think you have made your point pretty clearly. Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Before my supplementary, I just want to tell Mr. Winch that a lady sent me a telegram and told me it was faster to go to the moon than to get a passport.

If someone sent in an application on the old form but gave you the \$10 and the birth certificate, you would not send it back to him, would you? You would deal with the application then, would you not?

Mr. Durdin: Certainly.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Mind you, I do not see any point in pursuing this as we have in the last half hour or 25 minutes or so. It would have been a lot more interesting to have sat in the House and listened to the Minister of Justice on his amendments to the Official Languages Bill. But might I ask, now that it has come up, why or on what basis the decision was made to retain the old application forms. Surely we did not have millions of dollars worth. Perhaps there was an order issued to destroy them. Surely the Queen's Printer could have produced a new one overnight, even with the air strike because all this started long before that. We could have got effective distribution. Could I ask specifically if we had that large a backlog that we did not want to throw them away?

Mr. Durdin: Yes. When we were aware that there were to be changes in the requirements,

we had on hand almost 750,000 passport applications, and the problem of changing the form is more complex than might appear at first glance. It was decided to go ahead with the change in requirements on the basis of publishing an amendment sheet and having the amendment sheet stuck in each of the existing applications. This was not for the sake of, shall we say, trying to save money. The forms were already in location in the eight post offices in their depots and it was simply a question of amending these forms physically together with the stocks that were on hand and this would allow us to go forward and to introduce the new requirements in advance of the travel season. Otherwise there would have had to be a delay of probably ten months.

Mr. Forrestall: Was it physically impossible to have cancelled or made null and void all of the existing application forms?

Mr. Durdin: Yes, it was. I am sorry. It was.

Mr. Winch: Did I understand you to say it would take ten months to produce the new forms?

Mr. Durdin: Yes. It is a very complex process, Mr. Winch, very complex indeed; it involves design, checking the design—as a matter of fact we have had difficulties with the new design and we have had to start back almost not at point A but start back and redesign the forms.

Mr. Winch: If it takes you ten months to redesign a form, you can understand the problem in the mind of a simple person trying to make out an application for a passport, then.

Mr. Durdin: Well, no. On the other hand, it is in an effort to try and take these problems out of the forms that such care is taken.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall, have you finished with your supplementary? You have a supplementary, Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Cadieux referred to the ad which you put out recently. I saw the ad in the Montreal papers on the week-end. Did you say that ad was just put out last week? It was a very good ad, by the way.

Mr. Cadieux: I have a specimen here from the Montreal Star which says May 17, and I have a note that it was published in 105 Canadian newspapers.

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Mr. Winch: Why was it not put out in January?

Mr. Allmand: That was my next question.

The Chairman: You see, Mr. Winch, the questions will all be asked.

Mr. Cadieux: The reason is that during the first few months the system seemed to be working adequately. It was only, I think, in April that the sudden surge of applications developed and we had difficulty in keeping up with the flow. It was at that point that we realized that people were having difficulty with the form and we felt that there was a need to recommend to the government the issuance of this advertisement.

Mr. Allmand: Will the ad be repeated, Mr. Cadieux? It only appeared in one issue as far as I know.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, it will. I understand that it will be repeated.

The Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Cadieux, what is the time requested on the form that the application must be in prior to receiving the passport?

Mr. Cadieux: At least one month.

Mr. Legault: At least one month. How many applications do you receive requesting passports within ten days?

Mr. Cadieux: A great many.

Mr. Legault: Does that bring about confusion?

Mr. Cadieux: Oh, yes. It affects the work and the effectiveness of the passport office but they take into account that with the best will in the world sometimes people realize at the last minute that their passports are out of date and they ask for and expect special service.

Mr. Legault: But it is marked on the form that one month is requested.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, and we invite the co-operation of the public and in most cases people have time to do it; but very often people are under the impression that their passport is still good and it is only at the last minute that they check.

Mr. Legault: But the error is not all on the part of the Department, then, when people ask for passports within ten days. Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand, you have another supplementary?

Mr. Allmand: Yes. Mr. Cadieux or Mr. Durdin, is your staff still working overtime to clear up this backlog? If so, what type of overtime?

Mr. Durdin: Mr. Chairman, we are working extended hours in some areas but as soon as the volume of work for a particular section reaches a level where it is obvious that extended hours will not cover the situation we have added a second shift.

Mr. Winch: How late does the second shift work?

Mr. Durdin: It works from 3:30 to 11:30 a.m. There are problems, of course. You cannot in one particular section, our Passport Writers Section—there is difficulty in turning out passport writers so that we can mount a full second shift but with an intensive training program we are gradually adding to the second shift of the Passport Writers Section and I would hope that by the end of this week this section will be in production, but the productivity will not be as great as we would get from the normal shift. However, this would allow us then to operate the first shift for the normal period, which would be 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Does that answer your question?

Mr. Allmand: One of the big difficulties seems to be in finding the passport applications. I know that my office has spent sometimes two to three weeks with the office over there in just trying to find somebody's envelope that was sent. Often they have said, "We cannot find it. Please fill in a new application, give us another \$10 and get another birth certificate and you will get it within a couple of days." It would seem that there is difficulty in just filing these things so that they can be found. That would seem to be the major backlog. What are you doing about that?

Mr. Durdin: There are two problems. One is applications in process, and the current backlog, I think, is about 22,000 applications. You appreciate these applications are moving from section to section and we have a box and mark according to box lists that aid the

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file searchers. We have them colour coded so we can pick out the date that the application started through the production line.

Nevertheless, it is a moving target and if an application runs into a problem it might be necessary to withdraw that application and to take other action with it. This would depend on a number of factors such as the urgency of the application and the planned departure date, if the person has indicated this information, whereupon either the senior examiner or possibly the facilitation section, with which you are most familiar, would then undertake to call the person to try and resolve the problem. If they can resolve the problem that file would go back into the production line.

It is a very difficult thing to try and pull out precisely at a moment's notice an individual application when it is in production. It must be searched for and in the event there is a misfile, which is a human failure, this complicates the situation because then the search must be widened on both sides of where the application should be. Quite frankly in some situations we have had files wind up in areas where they are not supposed to be at all and, of course, could not be found handily.

In really urgent situations, people say: "I am sorry, we must travel." What we have to do then is recreate a new application in order that we can issue a passport on that application. Hopefully we will be able to marry the previous application up with the new application on which the passport is issued before the document actually leaves the office. Does that answer your question?

The Chairman: I have a supplementary from Mr. Forrestall and Mr. Guay. Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, my further supplementary is to enquire whether or not the large amount of backlog that has been created has come about as a result of the renewals that are required? Previously a passport was issued for a period of five years. I understand now it is for a period of one year.

Mr. Durdin: There is no renewal.

Mr. Forrestall: It is a permanent thing?

Mr. Durdin: Yes.

Mr. Forrestall: Why is mine only valid for one year?

Mr. Cadieux: Before it was five years plus five years. Now it is five years, period. In cases where there is uncertainty, to facilitate travel when there is urgency a passport can be issued for one year.

Mr. Forrestall: That is all my...

Mr. Cadieux: That is a limited validity.

Mr. Winch: That was my supplementary. Would Mr. Cadieux or the director...

The Chairman: You are not next, Mr. Winch. Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I will be very brief. Mr. Cadieux said a moment ago...

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall has another supplementary.

Mr. Forrestall: I just wanted to ask whether or not we are heading, perhaps even philosophically, away from this type of an application form, this type of passport, and get into something that is a bit more permanent? Surely we cannot as a nation in a world that is getting smaller and smaller continue to cope with the expense involved that we have had. You are smiling, Mr. Durdin, but I am asking you quite seriously whether or not there has been any consideration given to the issuance of permanent passports to those people who require them which are good for the lifetime of the individual involved? If that has been considered and rejected, could you advise me of why it has been rejected?

Mr. Cadieux: Perhaps Mr. Durdin can comment further on this. I think he is closer to the passport operations than I am. There are perhaps two general points that I can make. First, is that as a matter of policy it relates mainly to security and the validity of the document. I think the government has decided that the normal rule will be five years for the passport. Applications will therefore have to be made every five years.

As you quite correctly point out, we are now getting into an area where a great deal more people travel and they travel a good deal faster than they used to. What will happen when a super jet lands at an airport with hundreds of people on it is something that is being considered very actively in the Department.

I am glad to say that Mr. Durdin and his staff have shown a good deal of ingenuity in this area. They have developed another kind of document that would be used for that purpose. I think this is something they have submitted to the government and which they are discussing with authorities in other countries.

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What would be the validity of this document is something that would remain to be determined. It would have to meet the requirement of faster handling than the passport we now have. I think the kind of problem that you have in mind, the fast travel requirement, is being considered by the passport office.

Whether a special type of document will eventually be issued for people who are in business or who are required to travel more often, I am not sure personally, but I will ask Mr. Durdin to comment on that.

Mr. Durdin: So far I doubt very much whether any of the foreign governments are looking forward to such a solution. I think the interim solution is that of issuing possibly card passports. This would be like a credit card type of document. As a matter of fact, the International Civil Aviation Organization of which Canada is a member has a study group working on this project. However, the problem here is like credit cards which have limited validity. They are not an open-end document. The problem is the loss of documents. And the very problem that caused the government to decide to shelve the renewal feature of the Canadian document would be very real with the card passport.

There is another thing when looking further ahead. It is possible in due course that there might be agreements amongst governments whereby persons who hold valid identity cards might be able to engage in a certain amount of travel. Whether this would be on a bilateral or area basis, I am not sure. However, I am mindful of the fact that neither Canada or the United States issues identity cards. Possibly this would cause further problems for in North America.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, on a supplementary.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cadieux said a moment ago that the advertisements went in when the rush came in April. I think that is using your own words. Have you a priority system in regards to the

application whereby first come is first served? I will add to this so you can comment on it. Could it be that because some members, such as we have noted this afternoon, who are getting thousands of applications might be bogging down the works for those who applied in March, and yet they are getting their passport in a relatively short time.

I am very concerned about that and the reason is that I received a telegram today from a group on a tour. The executive director of the chamber of commerce tells me that one group requesting passports applied in March and they are still waiting, and yet others of the same group who applied later on in April got theirs. Is there a particular reason, or are you using a priority system, and if you are then I presume this would not occur?

I am just hoping that consideration might be given there, and I am making the statement at the same time as asking you the question with regards to priority. Certainly there are cases of people who applied early in ample time for a trip, and then because everyone else, members of Parliament included, rushed to your office and probably bogged the thing down, these poor people who applied back in March may not get their passport in due time to leave for a trip. Would this occur?

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Mr. Durdin: We do have a priority system, but we can only process a completed application that has been documented properly. In these situations where we encounter this problem, obviously such an application must be withdrawn from its normal position in the production line. We must correspond or telephone or in some way communicate with the people to find out if they can provide us with the additional information. When we receive this it is married with the application and goes back immediately into production. These cases that are withdrawn are actually given priority over applications that have come in recently.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, I think you had one last supplementary.

Mr. Winch: Yes, I have, Mr. Chairman, and it is an important one because Mr. Durdin knows that my secretary and I have been in touch with his office over the last two months. There is one matter in particular, I would like you to clear up, sir. I have discovered that under certain circumstances, even if the

application is irregular in some way, you will issue a passport which is valid for one year. Would you mind, please, explaining, because it is very important, on what basis will you issue that one-year valid passport if you cannot issue the five-year passport?

Mr. Durdin: As the announcement made on January 22 pointed out in situations where the person could not present evidence of citizenship, the Passport Office was authorized to issue them with a limited validity passport and when they returned from the trip, acquire the necessary documentation, return this documentation to the Passport Office with the one-year passport and we would extend it to full validity—a five-year period. That is the basis upon which we make the determination.

The Chairman: The basis is then, Mr. Durdin, that where you cannot establish citizenship by a citizenship certificate or a naturalization or birth certificate, then you will issue a one-year passport?

Mr. Durdin: Yes, particularly in situations where there is urgent reason for travel.

Mr. Winch: I think it is under the law and not under the regulation, I understand you cannot send a passport overseas, but I understand that if they are only travelling to the United Kingdom and back that if you give them a letter, although they have not got a passport, that that is acceptable. Am I correct on that? Will you please explain it?

Mr. Durdin: No, Mr. Winch, you are not correct. Persons arriving at a foreign port of entry must be able to establish identity and nationality beyond all reasonable doubt. In addition, they must satisfy the foreign immigration authorities that they are bona fide travellers and that they have sufficient funds to pay their overhead during their stay.

It is possible in some situations that a person might hold either an expired passport or a citizenship certificate, or, for example, a British birth certificate and, depending upon where one is travelling to, the latter document would be acceptable. In this case it is up to the immigration officer at the port of entry to make the determination. However, if they are to allow a person in in these circumstances, I am sure that the person is referred either to Canada House or to a British passport office in the case of a person who is actually a dual citizen—has both British and Canadian citizenship.

The Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme on a supplementary.

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Mr. Prud'homme: Yes, I would like to know what is expected for next year. The regulations have been changed this year, and in the future there will be no renewal of passports for an additional period of five years, so I think we must expect that next year there will probably be hundreds of thousands of passports whose five-year term will have expired, and which will not be automatically renewed. Once you have solved the various responsibilities you face this year, do you plan on setting up a new system for next year to avoid repeating the difficulties you encountered this year?

Mr. Durdin: Mr. Chairman, as you know, we are planning decentralization of passport issuance to three offices initially: Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. These cities have been chosen because they are international airport departure points. A further office is to be opened within the following 12 months in the Maritimes and offices will be opened elsewhere when there is a proven volume that would support the opening of such offices.

Mr. Prud'homme: Thank you.

Mr. Winch: I understand the offices in Montreal and Toronto will open on January 1.

Mr. Durdin: This is the target date.

Ah hon. Member: Why not one in all provinces?

The Chairman: Can we assume that we have pretty well finished with this passport problem, for this afternoon at any rate? Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Durdin, I have received very prompt and courteous service from your officers and I would like you to pass on for me my appreciation for the grace under pressure which they have exercised in relation to the constituent problems I have presented to them.

Last week I was asking questions about the extent to which the Glassco Commission recommendations had been implemented and I would like to go back to that.

There was a recommendation, Mr. Cadieux, that you be provided with an executive assistant in the Glassco Commission. Has that been done?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, I have one.

Mr. Roberts: There was also a recommendation that there be two deputy ministers, I believe: one responsible for the administrative services of the Department and one, I believe, who could accurately be called an undersecretary responsible for political affairs, I suppose. That, I assume, has been rejected. Can you tell me why?

Mr. Cadieux: At the moment, there is one deputy undersecretary who deals with political affairs, and there is one assistant undersecretary who deals with administrative matters, and personnel matters essentially.

There is an examination being made at this moment of the Glassco recommendation in the light of the subsequent studies that have been made with a view to determining which is the best arrangement for the Department. So, it is hard to say whether it will be rejected or not because we may end up this way. I do not know whether you want me to expand on this. There are implications and the discussion can...

Mr. Roberts: No, that is fine. We may touch some of that later on in the questions.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: Is there any plan to establish a research and planning section in the Department? I ask this, having gone through a policy review—perhaps the Department is still in one—I know that some of the officers who have been involved in this review have necessarily been taken away from their desks, and as the Department is short handed I am sure this has caused some inconvenience. I realize that it is difficult in external affairs or foreign affairs to plan in too detailed a way since one never knows quite what kind of events one is going to face, but it is my own conviction that more could be done usefully in this direction. Has the Department any plans to establish, perhaps a small section, but a group of people whose primary responsibility is to try to think ahead, anticipate problems, and suggest possible departures from or new approaches to policy?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, as soon as we can afford it. Even when we cannot afford it, we think it is very important and we assign people to it continually. Over the past year there has been a good deal of research done in a number of areas concerned with policy reviews,

and this has involved considerable research and a good deal of time because this has to be done on a five-year basis. In some cases we have had to look further ahead than that.

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Naturally, you have to define what you mean when you talk about planning because in the very nature of developing budget proposals one is engaged in resources planning. Each year when submissions are made to Treasury, one has to plan ahead five years. Then, in certain divisions of the Department there is necessarily a kind of contingency planning which is related to what happens, for instance, if the Vietnamese operation were to be terminated or expanded. This is the type of planning which is going on.

Mr. Roberts: Would the planning officers be scattered about the various area divisions, or would they be collected in one group of people?

Mr. Cadieux: Whether or not planning must be concentrated in one big unit or scattered and considered part of the operational responsibility has been an argument that has been going on for a long time within the Department. I think that regardless of what happens about the other one, it is a question of resources. We are looking at this part of the reorganization of the Department, and it is quite clear that there is one kind of planning that cannot be left to the division. It is the type of planning which involves a number of divisions of the same kind or that cannot be given to any one particular division, or to a number of divisions. There is a requirement for that. The same thing is true about research.

Mr. Roberts: Could you give me any idea of the number of officers who might be placed in such a planning division?

Mr. Cadieux: We must be guided by the recommendations which will emerge from this study, but at the moment at least two officers are engaged in this. Apart from the other officers who are engaged on the planning side, I think that this is a fairly substantial investment. We have a fair number of officers who, at the moment, are supporting the policy review operations. These belong essentially to planning, but if you add those who are still left on planning, that makes a good deal more than two. If you add to that those who will be added once a decision is made as to the centralized unit, I think that

you already have the elements in existence or of a substantial planning unit in this part.

Mr. Roberts: In other words, the expertise collected in the policy review will not be dissipated, but will be a type of continuing function.

Mr. Cadieux: At the moment you can say that you have a nucleus which is in existence and that you have evidence of the planning unit which has been assigned to the various geographical areas to support the policy review exercise. These will revert to the planning unit which will already be fairly considerable at that time.

Mr. Roberts: The Glassco Commission suggested that heads of missions abroad came back and served as heads of divisions in Ottawa too infrequently. Has this been corrected or...?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, I think a good many of them are now heads of divisions in Ottawa. I have some figures on this, for instance, I can indicate that the Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division is Mr. Bow who used to be in Czechoslovakia; the Chief of Protocol Division is Mr. Berlis who used to be in Poland; the Head of Commonwealth Division is Mr. Cornett who was the Head of Post in Ghana; Mr. Gilmour used to be in the Caribbean as High Commissioner to Trinidad and Tobago and is now Head of Consular Division in Ottawa; the head of the Franco-phone division, Mr. Blanchette was the Acting Commissioner in Cambodia; Mr. Halstead who is the Head of European Division, had the status of a head of post as Minister in Paris; the Head of the Far Eastern Division, Mr. Seaborn, was the head of our Mission, our Commissioner in Saigon. I can give you more...

Mr. Roberts: I am convinced.

Mr. Cadieux: I think the trend now is to staff divisions with people who have been heads of missions.

Mr. Roberts: One of the fairly strong criticisms the Glassco Commission made was, to the effect, that various management practices of the Department prejudiced the activities of the smaller missions.

Mr. Cadieux: I am sorry, I am not sure I understand you.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I can quote from page 114 of the Glassco Commission:

The effectiveness of the smaller missions, with limited staffs, appears to be prejudiced as a result of certain management practices of the Department.

It goes on to discuss rotational practices, the problems of leave, the replacement of officers, and transfer of officers in a short-handed department and so on. I wondered if this is a

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fair criticism, and also if various reforms have been instituted to look at the small mission problem.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, there are two basic things which have been done. The first thing is to increase the size of the smaller missions. For example, if you have a man and a boy at a mission, and the man is recalled or has to be away...

Mr. Roberts: That is like getting rid of the poor by paying them money.

Mr. Cadieux: In this case, you are really operating on the minimum and we have been trying to increase the staff of some of the smaller missions in order to give them some flexibility. The other thing is to try to decentralize management, and to give more authority to the people on the spot so that they would, in a budgetary field and otherwise, have an opportunity to use their resources as effectively as possible. This is almost a revolution in management. We are now introducing it and I think it will take a few years before people are accustomed to deal with this. They will no longer be required to submit requisitions to Ottawa saying, "I would like to have a few more chairs" or "I would like to have the porch repaired" or "I would like to do this". The idea will be to put money at their disposal for these purposes. This will save a good deal of time and will also be economical as far as personnel is concerned.

Mr. Roberts: I would now like to ask a more general question about the controversy in approach between generalist and specialist officers in the Department. Perhaps I can preface it with a remark. I am often accused, by my colleagues, of making speeches rather than asking questions, but in view of the discussion we have had over passports I feel less embarrassed than usual. The Glassco Commission suggested, fairly strongly, that the practice of having a generalist officer who, upon occasion would be called upon to deal with administrative rather than political

matters, was a detriment to the administrative efficiency of the Department. The other day, in going through a brief presented by the Department of Finance, I was caught by a paragraph which seemed to express to me what I would hope is the Department's view. It says that since the 1930s the successive ministers of finance have followed the practice of transferring detailed operational responsibilities to others in order that the Department could concentrate on a central analytical and policy work which is described in its program objectives. I hope that the Department of External Affairs does the same thing, but it seemed to me that it would be useful for them to consider establishing a separate consular service, so that the cultural attaches could come from the Secretary of State Department rather than the Department of External Affairs, just as immigration and economic officers come from the Department of Manpower and Immigration, the Department of Finance or the Bank of Canada and so on. In this way, many of the functions with which the generalist officers must handle now within the Department—for which they are sometimes not specifically trained and for which there are other departments who are in some ways more closely concerned with them than the Department—could, “shuck off” some of these responsibilities to separate administrative services. Then, the foreign service officers could concentrate on what most of them have come into the Department of External Affairs to do, and that is to concern themselves with foreign politics, and policy advice to the government. Is there any hope that the Department of External Affairs will move in that direction?

Mr. Cadieux: As a matter of fact, it is moving in that direction. As we are expanding, we are setting up a whole classification of foreign service employees, people who are looking at the administrative side. We are also trying to specialize our officers in foreign policy work. There are certain qualifications which must be added, and one of them is that while our people are at headquarters and the larger missions, there are naturally pressures for specialization, however, we must bear in mind that out of our eighty-some posts the majority of them are not large, and consequently, in most cases, our people do not go to a post where it is possible for them to specialize, to a very high degree except in being Foreign Service Officers, so they should be able to handle a combination of political,

information, consular, administrative, or whatever kind of work is necessary to keep the mission going. That is the first thing

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which we must bear in mind. Since our service produces units which are not very large, the Foreign Service Officer at that place must have a kind of residual competency. If there is an immigration man to do immigration work, the officer is not concerned with it but if there is no immigration man and there is immigration work to be done, although he may think he is a political genius, he must pay some attention to this area. The same is true about aid work. In certain countries there may not be enough aid work for a full-time aid official. So he must turn his hand to that. There are very considerable pressures in the service to turn our officers into generalists. Another point which is very important is that if the government and the country believe in the professional service, it means that the end product is going to be a generalist. The head of post, who will have spent a lifetime in the service must oversee not only Foreign Service Officers but representatives of various departments who will make up the Canadian team in whatever country he will be responsible for. At that point he is Mr. Canada in that country. He is no longer an economist even though he may have graduated as an economist, and even though he may have thought of himself as an economist at various stages of his career. He is no longer a lawyer. He must try and identify what the interests of Canada are that he must pursue over there, discover them, and then make sure that the work is done or do it himself. That is really his job. He is more of a generalist than a specialist.

Mr. Roberts: Is there an attempt to develop a separate administrative service so that foreign service officers will not be burdened with that kind of work?

Mr. Cadieux: We have 190 of these administrators in the Department, and there will be 230 of them in the year 1970-71. That is a substantial number. Gradually administrative work will tend to be assigned to an administrator so that the foreign service officers will be able to devote more and more of their time to the work for which they are qualified and have been recruited.

Mr. Roberts: The Glassco Commission suggested that the Department was making

insufficient use of local staff. Has there been any change in the Department's practices in that regard?

Mr. Cadieux: We have in the Department some reservations about this. As you can imagine, in certain countries, and I do not need to specify which, it is not always possible to use local staff. There is here a whole area where there must be some natural limitations as to what can be done. That is the first thing.

The second thing is that even in friendly countries there are certain types of work where judgment is required as to what is Canadian interest and how it is to be pursued. It is not logical to put local employees in a situation where they might find themselves in a position where there was a conflict of loyalty. So there are real limitations here. But the advantages of resorting to local employees are, first, that usually there is no need to pay the foreign service allowances and therefore they are less expensive, and secondly, they usually represent a very important element of continuity, and a great fund of experience. We have found over the years that the local employees have a very important and very useful role to play, all in their proper place, if we take into account the areas where it is natural for them to operate and taking into account that there are other areas where they cannot really be of assistance.

Mr. Roberts: The Glassco Commission was very critical of the communications and paper work procedures in the Department. It said at one stage that the telecommunications resulted in a veritable flood of messages which adds to paper work and to cost, and threatens to engulf those whose duty it is to read and digest them. It went on later to say that the Department was being frustrated in its operating procedures by inadequate filing methods and a generally poor organization of files and the flow of telegrams and working memoranda. From my own admittedly distant experience in the Department, I would sympathize very strongly with the kind of situation which was described in the Glassco Commission, for the period which it described. Has there been any attempt to bring this problem under control, and with what success?

Mr. Cadieux: As for filing, I think that we

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are trying to improve our methods for storing and retrieving information, and here we are gradually getting into methods of electronic storing and retrieval.

The other thing is the control. There is a human element here that is very difficult to pinpoint and to keep within bounds. What I have to explain is that the Department of External Affairs is a department that is scattered, and it keeps in touch with the branches really through written documents, telegrams, dispatches and letters. In a way it can be very dangerous to be too restrictive, because you may achieve results that would be stifling in terms of the communication which you want to promote between headquarters and missions.

On the other hand, if you are too permissive you may indeed get into a situation where people fire off telegrams that are too long, and that are not necessary. Here we have been trying various devices to achieve better control. We send circulars around. We have some people who sift these telegrams and when they see something that appears to be too long, or might have been sent through a different media, notices are sent that this should not have been done this way. But it is a perpetual battle because we are dealing with persons, and how to induce self-restraint in the individual who is at the end of the line, or in heads of divisions or desk officers here, is something that is, as I say, of the essence of our work, and difficult to regulate.

Mr. Roberts: At one time there was suspicion, no doubt entirely unjustifiable, that heads of mission would always send telegrams rather than write letters because they believed that telegrams would actually be read by cabinet ministers and by the Under Secretary. But I assume that you find some of them now write memoranda and letters instead of sending telegrams.

Mr. Cadieux: There was a time when it was possible to keep in touch with most of the telegrams that came in, and I think that certainly my predecessor, the very distinguished, late Norman A. Robertson, made a gallant effort to keep up with the flow. I did my best and I remember there was a time when I came to work every Saturday. I came even every Sunday. I had my work analysed by experts and I discovered that I was spending an undue amount of time reading messages.

In many cases these messages are not connected; they are not presented in an orderly fashion. You read the report from Paris, the next one may come from Cairo, and another one may come from Poland. So that in order to get the raw material, you are processing information yourself in a way that is not orderly and may not be scientific.

After an examination of the problem, we reached the conclusion that it would be more economical for senior officers to have junior officers who would screen the material for them. And what we have tried to do is put the responsibility on the operational unit. If they get a telegram from a mission that appears both urgent and important, then their job is to make certain that the Minister and those who advise him get it in proper time with the right comments. This is a more sensible way; you are not cluttered all the time.

However, there is a difficulty about this system. Previously the Under Secretary was aware of which mission was producing a constant flow of good reports, which mission seemed to have officers who had style, and who seemed to have flare in always being on top of the news. Now he receives occasional telegrams with comments and he receives them only when some decision is needed. He gets the impression that it is more difficult for him to say: "This mission seems to be healthy and clicking and the officers there are really producing a constant flow of good reports". This is what he misses. This is the price, he pays.

Mr. Roberts: One last question, Mr. Chairman. The Glassco Commission suggested that in posts where there are representatives from several government departments, that there was a serious lack of co-ordination between the various Canadian departments and agencies. And it was felt, I think, that the ambassadors had not been sufficiently strengthened to play a real co-ordinating role among all the Canadian representatives who were in the capital cities. There was direct communication, for example, between the immigration officer and the Department of Immigration, and the ambassador was often not sufficiently strong or strengthened in dealing with the various subordinates who

commissioner in a position where he has the unquestioned over-all responsibility and co-ordination in his hands?

Mr. Cadieux: There are really two answers to this. One is the degree of interdepartmental co-ordination that there is here in Ottawa. As you know, there is a constant effort here to improve the machinery, but this is a constantly changing pattern. The machinery which was good three or four years ago may be obsolete now, and you have to create new patterns and set up new instruments all the time. This is translated in the field sometimes in a belated fashion. The missions are not always up to date with the machinery which has been created in Ottawa.

Very largely also, there is a problem of personality. Heads of missions are like captains of ships or heads of military units. Some exercise authority more naturally, more directly, more effectively, than others, and this is something that is sometimes difficult to regulate. Where a comparatively young head of mission is appointed over older specialists from other departments and here a situation may exist where authority is not always asserted too easily or too quickly. Again, a situation may arise where a head of mission arrives to deal with officers who have been there for a long time, and whose experience sometimes gives them a feeling that they are entitled to help determine the proceedings. To what extent they may be allowed to do this is, of course, something which must be resolved over a period of time. In such a situation problems of personality develop, the nature of which I am not sure that the Glassco Commission has fully investigated.

I think that, normally, a head of mission who does his work effectively gradually emerges, because as the leader of the team, he has the instruments, the facilities, and the support of governmental machinery here. As any leader of any team, if he has the moral authority, the intellectual strength, and the natural vigour to utilise the resources at his disposal, he will assert himself. If not, I am not sure that regulations will achieve the result. This is the second element.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a very brief but, I think, intriguing question of Mr. Cadieux? I am not going to repeat any-

were technically under his responsibility. Has anything been done to improve co-ordination of the various departmental representatives abroad and to place the ambassador or high

thing that I have asked before or that has been said before.

Mr. Cadieux, the Passport Office comes under the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I believe that the Citizenship Office comes under the Secretary of State. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Winch: This is my intriguing question. On applying for Canadian citizenship the applicant is required to send in two photographs of a certain size. Having received these, application is then made to the Passport Office and two photographs of a certain size must be submitted therewith. In size there is a quarter of an inch difference one way and three-eighths of an inch the other between these two sets of photographs. Is it not possible for an understanding to be reached between your two departments that the photographs should be of the same size? Firstly, it would be less confusing, and secondly, it is cheaper to purchase four photographs of the same size than two of two different sizes, when these are so close together. This is a small, but intriguing point.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Winch: Why should there be a difference in the size of photographs of a quarter of an inch one way and three-eighths the other between the Citizenship Regulation Branch and Passport Division requirements? Why can you not have a standard photograph size?

Mr. Cadieux: Would you be able to comment on this?

Mr. Durdin: In the first instance, the Citizenship document is, in effect, a miniature certificate.

Mr. Winch: Right.

Mr. Durdin: Secondly, because it is a miniature certificate, there must be a photograph which will fit in the confined space.

Mr. Winch: Right.

Mr. Durdin: In the case of the passport itself, the size of the photograph and the other characteristics of the book-type passport is virtually governed by international convention.

Mr. Winch: Why can you not combine them?

Mr. Durdin: You suggest, as was asked earlier, that they be combined. I would think that this problem will resolve itself if, in fact, we evolve, internationally, an acceptable card passport, where documents are of the same

• 1645

size and the space is relatively small. The photographs, then, will be, in fact, the same size.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, sir. But what does this international concern have to do with our Canadian citizenship? Why can we not have on our Canadian citizenship the same photograph size requirement that you specify on passports? There is only a slight difference in specification, and yet applicants must obtain two different sized photographs.

Mr. Durdin: As I suggested earlier, the Citizenship Registration Bureau document is smaller than ours because it must fit into the wallet. It is the CR-100 size credit document and, because of the confines of space, they cannot accommodate a photograph larger than they do at the present time.

Mr. Winch: Put smaller printing, trim off three-eighths of an inch, and they could.

Mr. Durdin: All right.

Mr. Winch: The matter has always intrigued me as to why the difference exists.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay, did you want to ask a question?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I was just going to point out to Mr. Winch that instead of suggesting that the passport being made smaller, the other one be made smaller.

Mr. Winch: That is international.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I see.

Mr. Winch: Our Canadian citizenship is our own control, while the other is international.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I see.

The Vice-Chairman: Could I have order, please. Mr. Fairweather is not present and that completes my list of questioners.

Mr. Winch: Let us have the motions then. We have a quorum.

The Vice-Chairman: I would like, perhaps, to ask a question of Mr. Cadieux. As you

know, in January, I visited several of our chancelleries in Africa and in the Far East.

Mr. Goyer: Do you think that I could ask another question, a supplementary?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, Mr. Goyer, on a supplementary on the passport situation.

Mr. Goyer: Did you ever discuss this matter with officers of the Department of the Secretary of State?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Goyer: Can you foresee any acceptable solution?—because it is really a problem. When one has to apply to obtain a passport and another certificate is required, the applicant has to go to two photographers, or have two sets of photographs. This worries many people.

Mr. Durdin: Well, it is a very good point. We have discussed this with the Secretary of State and, obviously, it would be helpful if this problem could be resolved. I am afraid, however, this is as far as I can go at the moment.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Durdin, nothing can be done internationally, I suppose, with respect to the passport situation, but could not something be done with respect to the citizenship certificate, to standardize it with the international passport situation?

Mr. Durdin: Yes.

Mr. Winch: That was my point.

Mr. Cadieux: We can certainly undertake to raise the matter with the Department of the Secretary of State and see what can be done. I can see the logic of the point, indeed.

The Vice-Chairman: It is a point well worth looking into, Mr. Winch.

As you know, Mr. Cadieux, I recently visited a number of our chancelleries, in the Far East and in Africa, and in discussions with our foreign officers I had no complaints that I can recall from them about their salaries or situations. Some of the clerks and secretaries, however, did seem to be rather unhappy about their pay and allowances. Is it typical of all our missions abroad that Canadian clerks and secretaries are unhappy about the provisions made for them?

Mr. Cadieux: I was not aware that there was a general problem of unhappiness, but I suspect that, in some cases, the allowances in

particular countries may not work satisfactorily. This is something which we have to look into. As you will recall, at the last meeting, Mr. Wilson indicated that the whole problem of allowances was under review. I would hope that the new system will be an improvement upon the present one, and that the general system will result in giving clerks and stenographers greater satisfaction.

The Vice-Chairman: The review will be at all levels?

Mr. Cadieux: It will affect everybody. But it is a fact that if you have quick inflation in one country, until the rates have been settled, you may have a situation where, temporarily, the situation is difficult. This is one problem.

• 1650

The Vice-Chairman: I think it is the fact that probably, they need to live in a higher standard of accommodation abroad than they would be living in at home to obtain good water, clean lodgings, and the like. The main objection was just this—it does take more money to live on a higher scale.

Mr. Cadieux: We do not of course, control the salaries, because these are determined by collective bargaining. But the allowances...

The Vice-Chairman: It is the allowances, I think.

Mr. Cadieux: That, I think, is the flexible factor. As I say, it is under general review, and I hope that there will be some improvement there.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. There is no quorum right at the moment but, if we could have a little break agreed to, we might have it in about 10 minutes.

Mr. Winch: Are we short?

Mr. Roberts: How many do we need?

The Vice-Chairman: We need 16. Could we try to contact some members and bring them in?

Mr. Roberts: I would support that.

The Vice-Chairman: The movement is in process now, so could we have, perhaps, a five or ten minute break and then resume? If there is no quorum we can adjourn.

Mr. Forrestall: Some of the members, Mr. Chairman, are listening to the other debate in the House.

The Vice Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Forrester. I would take it that, perhaps, Mr. Cadieux would stay with us, but we could release the rest of the officials. We shall adjourn until five o'clock.

(Recess)

• 1655

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have called the various items. The first item we passed was Item 40, relating to the International Joint Commission. The other items relate to the more general estimates of the Department of External Affairs, and they have been called.

Items 10 and 15 agreed to.

Then we revert to Item 1.

Mr. Legault: I do not believe that Item 40 was carried.

The Chairman: Yes, it carried a little earlier at this meeting, Mr. Legault.

Item 1 agreed to.

Shall I report these and the CIDA items to the House?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, gentlemen. I would also like to thank you, Mr. Cadieux, and your officials, for your very helpful answers to our questions.

Mr. Winch: Could I have some information, Sir, on the following meetings to be announced?

The Chairman: The next meeting will be a meeting with Dr. Lindsey of the Department of National Defence on the ABM defence. Our regular Thursday morning meeting was cancelled, so we are holding that meeting tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 p.m. I would anticipate that there will be a number of questions and probably we will not finish on Wednesday afternoon, so we have made arrangements to continue on Thursday afternoon.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, I wonder (no mike on) on the advisability of having a meeting in camera. Once or twice during committee meetings with General Sharp, I raised the possibility that we might like to have a meeting in camera which would enable us to obtain some information which is not public information and would otherwise be denied to us. I would hope that we would

do that—subject, of course, to the views of the other members of the Committee on its desirability.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what the honourable member has to say, but this is a Committee of 30 members. I do not believe that it is possible to have a strictly in camera meeting with so many. Secondly, because of the importance of our work and our investigations, I believe that everything should be in public. If it cannot be made in public at a general meeting of this Committee, then we should be given very good reasons why it cannot.

• 1700

The Chairman: If you would give me the questions to which you have been unable to obtain the answers because the meeting has not been a closed meeting, Mr. Roberts, perhaps we could take a look at them, and I would be glad to take the matter up with the steering committee.

Mr. Winch: Can I also add, sir—and I speak from considerable experience—that any time a Committee of such importance as this meets in camera there is always, in public, some suspicion—and I do not want that—as to just why and what is being told to a Committee that the people of Canada are not entitled to know. I would prefer—much as I would like to get some information upon occasion—neither finger nor suspicion to be pointed at Committees that the people of Canada are not being told what we, as members, are.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Winch. While we have the members together, perhaps I could get an expression of opinion as to the desirability, before we present our report on NORAD, of arranging to go to North Bay. This could be done very quickly. Everyone is very busy now, so I would think that members of the Committee probably would not want to take a longer tour at this time down to the U.S. or to the headquarters at Colorado Springs. The question arises, however, as to whether or not the Committee should plan on going to North Bay. This we could do, I gather, very easily in one day, and see much the same thing at North Bay as we would see at Colorado Springs. What is the wish of the Committee? I am sure that we could arrange a North Bay trip without too much trouble at an appropriate time, but even then the Defence Department likes to have about two weeks' notice. If we were to

go to Colorado Springs, it might be rather more involved.

Mr. Prud'homme: To promote this, though, would certainly be worthwhile.

The Chairman: It just occurred to me—I do not know what is there, I have not seen it myself—that before coming up with a report, perhaps we should see the physical installation.

Mr. Winch: Sir, I have had the privilege of going to both Colorado Springs and North Bay, and there are other members here who have done so as well. It is my personal opinion that, although it is most interesting to see Colorado Springs, when it comes to an installation and its purpose, you can learn just as much from North Bay as you can by going to Colorado Springs.

Mr. Legault: Perhaps this could be left with the steering committee to set a date and discuss the possibility of our going.

The Chairman: Is it the wish of the Committee to leave it with the steering committee to make that decision? Is there anything else that any member wishes to bring up at the present time? Mr. Brewin, and then Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: I agree with the decision about not necessarily going all the way to Colorado Springs, when we can learn as much from expertise here in a quick trip up to North Bay, but I would add to that the reservation that the same does not necessarily hold true for any review of Maritime Command structure as it relates to SACLANT headquarters in Virginia.

The Chairman: With regard to Maritime Command, perhaps I should bring the members up to date as to where we stand. It is my understanding that the Department of National Defence will have available for us, by the end of this month, a working paper on Maritime Command. Now, you will recall that it was suggested that we might establish a subcommittee to start work on that working paper, and that they would proceed at the same time as our Committee continued its investigation of NORAD—at the same time that we are working on our NORAD report. Members might be giving some consideration to whether or not they wish to be part of that subcommittee which will be considering Maritime Command.

Mr. Winch: While that is being considered by the subcommittee, sir, if it is necessary to go to Maritime Command, I would add—because I have past experience here also—that for full information the subcommittee would have to go, I believe to the North Pole, which is the control centre for Maritime Command.

Mr. Forrestall: That was the point which I was making.

Mr. Winch: The North Pole is the command centre.

The Chairman: Do members have any suggestions as to the size of the subcommittee to do the preliminary work on Maritime Command? Are we talking about a subcommittee of, say, nine or ten? We have a total Committee of 30.

• 1705

Mr. Winch: Not any larger than that anyway.

Mr. Forrestall: I think the important principle, Mr. Chairman, is that it embraces the points of view of the Committee as such. It is not proper, I suppose, to identify ourselves politically but I think that has to be accommodated.

Mr. Winch: As long as the majority of the members do not come from the Maritime Command constituencies.

The Chairman: I feel that the party representations should be rather similar to the party representation on the Committee. Perhaps the personnel of the subcommittee to do the preliminary work on Maritime Command could be left to the party representatives on the steering committee.

Mr. Forrestall: I think what you could do, Mr. Chairman, if you are looking for a procedural vehicle, is simply to call publicly upon the various parties to suggest to you their representatives on this Committee—having regard to an upper limit—then deal with the nominations in steering committee and report back to a meeting, probably in a week or ten days' time. All I am trying to suggest is that, from our own point of view, we are ready now to recommend the appointee or appointees from our own particular party.

The Chairman: We will put that under way and take that up at the next meeting of the steering subcommittee.

Tomorrow afternoon, Wednesday, then, and Thursday afternoon we will be hearing Dr. George Lindsey on the ABM system. On May 27—that is next Tuesday at 11 a.m.—Mr. Gellner will be here to present his critique of the original working paper, our basic working paper which was presented by the Department of National Defence on NORAD. That will be next Tuesday at 11 a.m.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, what about other witnesses? Are you planning to have any other ones on NORAD?

The Chairman: Only if required. Mr. Michael Sherman will be presenting the critique on Dr. Lindsey's paper.

Mr. Brewin: On this ABM team we should have, I think, a critical scientific statement—not just supporters of the system. I raised

that point before and I raise it again. I urge the steering committee to find someone qualified to do this, and there are plenty of suitable candidates for the post. I also asked whether or not we are making any progress in getting the report of the commission for Senator Kennedy in the States on this matter.

The Chairman: I wrote a letter to Senator Kennedy asking to have his report made available to our Committee. I believe that steps have also been taken to obtain the Senate Committee reports. They have not yet been received, but steps to secure them were taken Mr. Brewin, on the same day as you raised the matter in Committee. If there seems to be any unusual delay, we will try to expedite them.

If there is nothing else then, perhaps this meeting will adjourn.

APPENDIX BBB

Questions asked by
Mr. John Roberts (York-Simcoe)

1. How many officers have been recruited over the last five years
- a) with more than one degree; and
 - b) above the FSO-1 level.

2. How many lateral transfers have there been above the FSO-1 level
- a) from other government departments; and
 - b) to other government departments.

ANSWER: (See attached statement)

STATISTICS ON RECRUITMENT OF FSO'S
CALENDAR YEARS 1965-69

Year	Total Recruited	With more than one degree	Recruited above FSO-1 Level	Transfers from other Depts above FSO-1 Level	Transfers to other Depts above FSO-1 Level
1969 (to date)	38	32	2	2	1
1968	23	20	1	1	4
1967	65	46	14*	3	4
1966	55	28	11*	1	0
1965	31	15	4	2	2

*Recruited by Special Competition.

Question asked by Mr. John Roberts
(York Simcoe)

Training in Foreign Languages

General Training

Exclusive of the arrangement for the study of French and English, the Department may pay tuition fees up to \$600 per annum for the study of foreign languages when it considers that it is in the interest of the government for an employee to have a knowledge of the language of an area in which he will represent Canada. Training also has been provided for wives of officers where wives assist their husbands in representational or promotional duties. At present, the statistics are as follows:

- Number of languages being studied 26;
- Number of employees receiving language training 83;
- Number of officers' wives receiving language training 25.

Special Training in Difficult Languages

In addition to the above general training in foreign languages, more intensive training in difficult languages is provided. During 1968-69, the following courses were provided:

- 2 officers studying Chinese (full-time) in Hong Kong on a three-year program
- 1 officer studying Japanese (full-time) in Tokyo on a two-year program
- 1 officer studying Japanese (part-time) in Ottawa
- 1 officer studying Czech (full-time) in Ottawa
- 1 officer studying Polish (full-time) in Ottawa
- 1 officer studying Serbo-Croat (full-time) in Ottawa
- 1 officer studying Arabic (full-time) in Lebanon
- 2 officers studying German (part-time) in Germany
- 2 officers studying Russia (full-time) in Ottawa

Substantially the same number of officers will continue the study of difficult languages during 1969-70.

Question asked by
Mr. Harold E. Winch
(Vancouver East)

Has there been any reduction in Canadian Forces Attachés during the past 5 years?


Answer:

In 1964 there were 17 Canadian Forces Attachés (CFSs) at diplomatic missions abroad. Since in several instances Attachés are accredited to more than one country (in

addition to the country in which he is resident), these 17 Attachés were accredited to 24 countries. In addition, there were 3 Assistant Canadian Forces Attachés.

In 1969, there are 19 CFAs accredited to 28 countries, and 3 Assistant CFAs.

Thus, there has been an increase over the past 5 years of two CFAs, and the total number of countries covered has increased by four.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 46

WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1969

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagon</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Cafik	Laniel	Roberts
Carter	Laprise	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Fairweather	Legault	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Winch—(30)
Goyer	Marceau	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

THURSDAY, May 22, 1969

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

SEVENTH REPORT

Pursuant to its Order of Reference of February 20, 1969, your Committee has considered the following items listed in the Estimates 1969-70:

Votes 1, 10 and 15 relating to the Department of External Affairs;

Votes 30, 35 and L35 relating to the Canadian International Development Agency;

Vote 40 relating to the International Joint Commission.

Your Committee commends them to the House.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 38, 39, 44, 45*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

WEDNESDAY, May 21, 1969
(72)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Forrestall, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch (17).

Also present: Mr. Buchanan, M.P.

Witness: Dr. G. R. Lindsey, Chief, Defence Research Analysis Establishment.

The Vice-Chairman introduced Dr. Lindsey who made a short opening statement and delivered a formal presentation on the subject of ballistic missile defence.

The Committee agreed to incorporate the slides used by Dr. Lindsey in his presentation as part of the Evidence of this afternoon's sitting.

The Committee also agreed to print Dr. Lindsey's advance presentation to the Committee, entitled *Part III: The Implications For Canada Of Ballistic Missile Defence*, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix CCC*)

Members questioned Dr. Lindsey for the remainder of the sitting.

At 6:00 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until Thursday, May 22, 1969, at 9:30 a.m.

THURSDAY, May 22, 1969
(73)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:45 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Fairweather, Guay (*St-Boniface*), Laniel, Legault, Marceau, Nesbitt, Nowlan, Roberts, Ryan, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn (11).

Also present: Mr. Buchanan, M.P.

Witness: Dr. G. R. Lindsey, Chief, Defence Research Analysis Establishment.

Members of the Committee completed their questioning of Dr. Lindsey during this morning's sitting.

The Chairman took the Chair at approximately 10:25 a.m.

At the end of the questioning, the Chairman thanked Dr. Lindsey for his testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 10:40 a.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Wednesday, May 21, 1969.

• 1545

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we have enough present now to commence. Dr. Lindsey is here again today to continue his testimony with respect to strategic weapon systems. Part III of his written statement entitled "The Implications for Canada of Ballistic Missile Defence" has already been distributed to members of the Committee for advance reading. The written statement has specifically dealt with the following topics: The Significance of Canadian Geography for Ballistic Missile Defence of the U.S.A.; Risks to Life and Property from Anti-ballistic Missiles; Risks to Life and Property from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles; Potential Protection for Canadian Targets; ABMs and NORAD.

I would like to mention that the Clerk has informed me that a room will be available to hold a further session to question Dr. Lindsey tomorrow at 9.30 a.m. should the Committee think this is necessary. The room would be 307, West Block.

Dr. Lindsey would you like to make an introductory statement before the questioning begins.

Dr. G. R. Lindsey (Chief, Defence Research Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence): Yes, sir, I would.

At a meeting last week, we discussed possible future developments in the defence of North America against attack by bombers with special reference to the significance of Canadian geography. But before turning our attention to the particular problem of the air defence of North America, we set the background by examining the general problems of strategic weapon systems, stability and the prevention of nuclear war between the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

This general strategic background is just as applicable to the particular subject of today's discussion, the implications for Canada of ballistic missile defence. It will be evident to anyone who keeps in touch with activities in the United States, that a very large section of the scientific and of the political community in that country are extremely concerned over the implications of one system of ballistic missile defence, the one called "Safeguard", for the United States and for the whole world.


One of the hottest debates in years is raging, with impressive lists of eminent men on both sides of the question, "Should Safeguard be deployed?" The reason that this is such a far reaching debate, with so many knowledgeable and high-principled men on each side, it that is is a problem of truly enormous complexity. It has important aspects that are technical, political (and this includes both domestic and international), military, economic, legal and moral. It must be judged in relation to other strategic weapon systems, both defensive and offensive. It involves large and vital international issues, such as control of the arms race, the comprehensive test ban, and the non-proliferation treaty as well as the basic question of the stability of the strategic balance.

I hope that some of these wider issues will be treated by later witnesses whom you may invite here. What has been prepared for you in Part III of the written material already distributed, and in the illustrated verbal presentation which I am about to deliver, is confined to the strategic and technical aspects of ballistic missile defence. Most of the discussion is based on the Safeguard system, but it is probable that many of the facts applicable to Safeguard would have some relevance to other ABM systems which might be proposed in the future.

In the studies which we have done in the Defence Research Analysis Establishment, conducted in part by Mr. J. F. Ruddell who is sitting here, we have made no attempt to judge whether ABM should or should not be deployed. We have assumed, for the purposes of our analysis, that it will be deployed in the United States according to their present plan. What we have tried to do is to deduce what the implications of such a deployed system would be for Canada.

We will start by having a very brief summary of the history of ballistic missiles, and some of this was covered in Part I of the material that was distributed a week ago. If we consider the first period 1958-62 more or less, the main characteristics which stand out is that there were not very many ballistic missiles in existence then, and they were not very good ones. They were exposed, they were vulnerable, and it took many hours to prepare one to fire. Under those circum-

Figure 1



BMEWS

Alaska
Greenland
England

stances, there was a real possibility that if one side made a surprise counter-force first strike that he could catch almost all of his opponent's missiles and bombers on the ground, and could disarm his opponent and, in effect, win.

In that period about the only type of defence that was possible was early warning, on which a great deal of effort was expended, and also the putting of a certain fraction of the bomber aircraft into the air, where they would not be destroyed if there were an attack on their home base.

The anti-ballistic missile defence systems that we know about today were very much in the early research stage. It was highly questionable whether it was technically possible to intercept a missile with a missile. That was the period that was described as "the delicate balance of terror".

A few years after that, both the super powers had taken steps to change the situation. In a period of about five years they had reached quite a different state. By then both the United States and the Soviets had built large numbers of ballistic missiles and they were much more effective ones. They were virtually invulnerable, either because they were deep in hardened silos under ground, or because they were in submarines where they could not be found. They were also more reliable and they were much more accurate. Under those circumstances, it was practically certain that if one side tried to catch the other by surprise, and disarm him with a counter-force first strike, he would not be able to do it. The maximum number of missiles they could destroy would be insufficient to prevent a dreadful devastating retaliation on their cities.

• 1550

So now we had the state where assured destruction was possessed, and that nobody could win in a nuclear exchange. That was the situation which I described last time as mutual stable deterrence.

Under those circumstances, threats to use missiles became less credible because it seemed that everybody would lose if they were used, and that was when we began to see pressure on the part of NATO, for example, to build a flexible response so that they could use other measures than the ultimate.


During that time, ABM research was making considerable technical progress, and the scientists working on it discovered, in effect, that you did not have to hit a bullet with a bullet. They discovered that by having the right sort of nuclear warhead, you did not have to actually hit your bullet. You could come within a certain fairly large miss-distance and still knock the bullet

down. A better way to put it would be that you would render the warhead inoperable. By about 1967, ABM research had demonstrated that a lot of things which people had thought to be impossible could be done.

So much, then, for the history. We will now talk about warning. There are four general methods by which the approach of a ballistic missile can be detected by the people living near the intended impact point. In Fig. 1 and the following three diagrams we will show the curve of the earth, a launch point and an intended impact point I. This is the trajectory of the missile, and we will show the first part representing the launch phase when the huge booster rockets are speeding the missile up to the point where it has enough velocity to go a quarter of the way around the earth. So at the beginning there are large rockets boosting it up to higher speeds and radiating a lot of energy. Now, one of the systems BMEWS, the ballistic missile early warning system, has been in service for several years, and it consists of a big radar with a transmitter and a receiver which sends radar energy up above the horizon into a big lobe. When the missile enters the lobe the radar detects it. But you can see that the detection occurs at about half way along this trajectory, and if that represents about a 35-minute flight then you are going to get perhaps 15 or 20 minutes warning out of this type of equipment. There are stations of this type in Alaska, Greenland and England today.

The next type of detection is one that we discussed last time in connection with aircraft, but it also has application to missiles, and is called over-the-horizon back-scatter radar. You remember that above the surface of the earth there is a layer of ionized gas, the ionosphere, which reflects radio waves of the proper frequency. See Figure 2. If a transmitter and receiver are placed here, it is possible to reflect signals off the ionosphere and get them down to a point on the earth well beyond the horizon. This disturbance caused by the great rocket exhaust ionizes the air and produces enough electrical charge to reflect radio energy. Energy is reflected off this trail, and follows the same path back. The people at this radar know that a missile has been launched. That is called back-scatter because you are using energy which is scattered back to you from the target. The target is actually the ionized gas around the trail of the missile. On Figure 3 we show over-the-horizon forward scatter, and here our transmitter and receiver are far apart, many thousands of miles perhaps, and the transmitted energy is reflected off the ionosphere, the earth, the ionosphere, the earth, the ionosphere and comes down here. It might seem that this would not work,

Figure 2



OTII BACK SCATTER

Figure 3





Figure 4



ICBM DETECTION BY SATELLITE

but that is the exact principle which is used in shortwave radio transmission. With a small radio set you can pick up Australia under the right conditions—and that signal is bounced between the ionosphere and the earth several times. Well, this rocket trail which has ionized the air disturbs the ionosphere quite considerably so it is as if the mirror which was used to reflect the signal between transmitter and receiver had been broken. So, if we had a steady signal going from here to here, and then all of a sudden it is disturbed, it is a sign that somewhere at one of these bounce points the mirror has been shattered. This gives you an indication that something has passed through the ionosphere and it would tell you that a missile was being launched.

Mind you, it could be a test, or the launching of a space vehicle—it does not necessarily have to be a warlike missile—but it does tell you that a big rocket has been launched.

The fourth type of detection depends on an earth satellite. Here on Figure 4 we have shown half the earth with the launch point, the impact point, the missile trajectory, and the period at the beginning when much energy is being radiated by the rocket. Now, this is sufficient so that a very sensitive detector can pick it up even many thousands of miles away, and if the satellite is put into one of these hovering positions about 22,000 miles above the earth so that it remains fixed above a point on the equator, it is still possible for this sensitive detector to tell approximately where a rocket has been launched on the surface of the earth. That message can be transmitted by radio back to a friendly receiving station in home territory, so that that is a fourth type of detection. This one satellite would be able to cover nearly half the earth for this sort of thing.

So there are four effective means of giving the warning that missiles are coming. The last three give you much more warning because they tell you at the launch time, which might be 30 or 35 minutes before impact, whereas the BMEWS picked it up 15 or 20 minutes before.

Well, so much then for Early Warning. Let us talk about the threat which is expected to face the West on account of the building of missiles, and the type of missiles that are being prepared in the Soviet Union. This pair of charts on Figure 5 was shown by Mr. Laird, the Secretary of Defence in Washington, a few weeks ago and it represented a release of information that had not been public before. He indicated on a time scale from 1965 to 1975 the number of land-launched missiles ICBMs which were and could be available. The Americans had built their stock up to about 1,000 a couple of years ago and their plans are to keep that number steady. The total Soviet number

of ICBMs two or three years ago was only a few hundred, but a couple of years ago the rate of building increased and the total is now supposed to have passed the American total. Of course, one cannot tell what will happen in the future, but if you project the recent rate of building it would be considerably in excess of the Americans in a few years. Another feature which was released at the same time by Mr. Laird was that a certain fraction of these missiles are very large. They are the SS-9, and the payload is such that if it were used to propel one large nuclear warhead, it could have something between 20 and 25 megatons of energy in the one warhead. The rate of building of the SS-9, if continued for some years, would give the Russians several hundred quite soon.

As far as submarine-launched missiles are concerned, the Americans built to 656—I think they reached that last year—and the plan is to keep it at that level. The Soviet submarine-launched missiles are still down below a hundred but since then they have started to build up. This year, they are only a small fraction of the American total and the rate of building is difficult to forecast, but if it is continued they will pass the American total somewhere between 1972 and maybe 1977, but no one can tell what the actual rate will be.

Those were two of the graphs which were used to explain why the Americans felt they had to defend themselves against this increasing threat. These graphs only show us numbers, but do not forget that this SS-9 has a very large payload. With a large payload it is not only possible to simply deliver a large explosion in a single warhead, but also that payload can be used instead to produce more propulsion, to deliver the missile on other than a straight ordinary ballistic trajectory.

Now if that is the impact point on the left of Figure 6, and this is the surface of the earth, the ordinary so-called "minimum energy trajectory" as shown here is the one which gets you whatever range you must achieve with the least possible expenditure of fuel. As a matter of fact, to reach a distance of 6,000 miles—I think that is the one we used—the missile must be boosted up to 24,570 feet per second. Now, by using a bit more fuel, which means using a bit less payload to be delivered at the other end, it is possible to use a lower and faster trajectory. By putting the velocity up to 24,900 feet per second, it is possible to come in on this rather depressed trajectory which is a little faster and quite a lot lower. That might make quite a difference to radar detection. If the radar is located near the impact point looking along the horizon, and its power is such that it can detect a warhead at this range, then it would have picked up the ordinary missile at this point. However, the de-

Figure 5






Figure 6



VEL. (F.P.S.)

MINIMUM ENERGY TRAJECTORY	24,570
DEPRESSED TRAJECTORY	24,900
100 MILE CIRCULAR ORBIT	25,600

pressed one will sneak in under the beam and will not be picked up until it is very much closer to the target, giving less warning time. It would also

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be possible for the owner of the missile to use more fuel in order to manoeuvre, and, if he wanted to, after having approached say to here, he could decelerate his missile and drop it down to earth on a shorter trajectory. Another trick that he can use, if he is prepared to spend even more fuel at the expense of delivering a smaller warhead, is to put the missile into orbit. This requires 25,600 feet per second, which is still only a few per cent more than the velocity for the minimum energy trajectory. That would put an object into a circular earth orbit about 100 miles above the surface, and it could go around as many times as he likes.

The so-called FOBS, the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System, depends on an orbit that does not circle the earth as much as once. As we have shown it here, it is coming in 100 miles up, and then at some point it is decelerated and it comes back to earth. Of course if the target were in behind, the radar, the reentry vehicle would not be picked up by our radar until it got to about here, so there would be a delayed detection. Even, then, of course, the defenders would not know when or even if it was going to come back to earth.

Even more dangerous, instead of orbiting in this direction where the defence is looking, it will be equally possible to fire the missile in the opposite direction, have it orbit the earth from the south instead of the north and come in this way and dive down on the defences from behind. So there are quite a few things that you can do if you have a big missile, and the advantage is not necessarily confined to only delivering a big warhead.

Another thing is available, and that is to replace the one big payload with several smaller ones. Shown here on Figure 7 are three different types of attack on a field of Minutemen. In the top diagram the little circles represent Minutemen buried in their silos. We have shown them in a regular grid. In fact I do not suppose they are in a regular grid, but anyway they are spaced out quite far apart. There is a radius, representing the distance from the point of impact inside of which the damage inflicted by the ICBM explosion is sufficient to destroy the missile silo. As it is shown here, the attacking missile lands there, and because this silo is inside the circle, it would be destroyed. The silos are shown far enough apart that even the large damage circle of a very large warhead would never be able to encompass two silos so that the best the attacker could hope for with his missile is that he will destroy one silo.

Suppose he is afraid that some sort of defence may intercept the missile, and he chooses to use some of the big throw weight, as it is called, to use a tricky approach. Rather than simply deliver a large missile he may use one of these more complicated methods of reaching his target. Very likely he will have to use a smaller warhead and get a smaller explosion, and the size of the damage circle would be reduced. However, perhaps it has a better chance of arriving and not being intercepted. The chance of his getting through will be increased but the chance of destroying the silo is somewhat reduced. And still the best that the attacker can hope to do is to destroy one silo.

Suppose instead of using a tricky delivery of a single warhead, he chooses to put several warheads into the one nose cone, and we will suppose here that he has multiple re-entry vehicles, (MRV), but that they are not guided. It is rather like using buckshot instead of a bullet. It is not possible to make the individual small warheads as efficient as the big one, so that the circles representing the damage radius of the individual warheads will be much smaller than the one you could get by putting all the material into one warhead. Because they are unguided, we will suppose that the impact points are scattered at random. For this purpose we suppose there are nine little warheads, so we have nine little circles scattered at random amongst the silos, and in this example we have shown one hit. It does depend very much on the accuracies and the kill radii as to how many hits you would get. But in general when you go from the single warhead to the multiple unguided one, you do not increase the expected number of silos hit. So we have shown one hit here. On the next round he might get none and on the next one he might get two, but on the average perhaps only one.

A much more sinister development is to include some sort of individual guidance in each one of these re-entry vehicles and this is what is called the MIRV, the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle. This time every one of those

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little warheads is steered toward a particular target. Each one of them is trying to hit a particular silo. As it is drawn here, on Figure 7, each one has come pretty close to a particular silo. I think there are six of the nine actually hitting. That depends on the accuracy, and it would be quite a feat of technology to get the accuracy so good that six or nine out of nine made hits. However it is definitely possible to get the expected number up above one by this principle. This is the sort of thing that makes a counter-force attack much more likely, if you have a very large missile and you use multiple independent re-entry vehicles.

Figure 7

ATTACK ON MINUTEMAN





Figure 8



That is a very brief outline of the possible future threat as it is seen today.

Now we will talk a bit about the defence system that is being planned in the United States, the one called Safeguard. Safeguard has four main elements to it. On Figure 8 we have show the curve of the earth and we are supposing that the system is defending some Minuteman silos. There are two big radars, a perimeter acquisition radar and a missile site radar, often called the PAR and the MSR. There are two kinds of anti-missile missiles, the Spartan and the Sprint, and both of them are shown in underground silos.

The PAR looks out to a great distance. It has a very agile beam which can scan the whole of the sky above the horizon over a horizontal angle that depends on how many faces the PAR has. It picks up the incoming missiles at a very great range, over 1,000 miles. If it chooses to attempt an interception, it will probably start by assigning a Spartan to make the interception, but for the Spartan to work it has to be guided by the missile site radar. The missile site radar has to send one of its beams out to pick up the ICBM and it has to send out another one to track the Spartan. It also sends the instructions to the Spartan. A computer calculates the course to make an interception. If it works properly it will make an interception well above the atmosphere, some hundreds of miles forward of the Spartan site.

If the Spartan succeeds in thinning out the cloud of objects that are coming in, and it is intended that it should be very effective against the cheaper and less effective kinds of decoy, then there will be only a small number of objects left. Generally speaking, the means by which the defence attempts to sort out decoys from real objects is by using the effect of air resistance as the cloud of objects enters into the thicker air closer to the ground. At that point it will be possible to notice the lighter objects being slowed down more than the heavier ones, and this is where the other missile, the Sprint, comes into play. The Sprint is also controlled by the missile site radar and it would also be using information given it earlier from the PAR. The MSR would send one beam out to follow the Sprint up and guide it and another one to track the ICBM. The final intercept would occur very much closer to the target.

Those are the four elements of this Safeguard system: two radars and two missiles, one long-range and one short-range.

We will talk about Safeguard a bit more. The plan for placing the Safeguard in the United States is in several phases, but the complete system shows the following sites, indicated on Figure 9. Phase I has a site in Montana and one in North

Dakota. The symbols here indicate the PAR and the black dot indicates the other three components, the missile site radar, Spartans and Sprints. Later stages, if the system is fully deployed, would include a full site with a PAR somewhere in the area of Washington State, one in southern California, one down somewhere between Georgia and Florida and one in New England. The complete system includes another full site in either Michigan or Ohio and other ones without the PAR's in roughly the location shown on Figure 9.

These sites are not accurately placed. I do not think that it has been decided exactly where they will go, and designations like Michigan/Ohio leave a great uncertainty as to the exact position. However, there has been more definite planning in Phase I, which includes only two sites, and these are near large Minuteman fields.

Figure 10 gives some indication of the possible future deployments that might be carried out. If it is decided to pursue defence of the land-based retaliatory force, that is of the Minuteman fields, then Phase I is to put sites in Montana and North Dakota, and that would then be followed up with

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further ones in Wyoming and Missouri where there are Minutemen and one in the vicinity of Washington, D.C., because it is the national control authority which determines the strategy and use of both the offensive and defensive systems. If it is decided to pursue defence against submarine launched missiles, then the sites down the coast would have to be put in and the PAR's would be given faces looking out over the ocean as well as looking to the North, and they would have Spartans and Sprints. If it is decided to use the system to defend the population of the United States, to provide a thin cover over the whole area of the 48 states, then all the 12 sites shown on Figure 9 would have to be implemented. It is also possible that they would put additional ones in Alaska and Hawaii, but the 12 sites do not include those.

The scheme has been drawn up with the very real hope that strategic arms limitation talks will be able to progress and that is why it is done in these separate stages. At any time it would be possible not to go any farther, or perhaps even call off one of the developments. There is to be a review every year to decide whether to proceed and with which particular phase.

Figure 11 summarizes the difference between Sentinel and Safeguard. Sentinel, you will remember, was suspended about the time that the administration changed in Washington. Safeguard is not quite the same as Sentinel, and this gives us some idea of where the changes are. Sentinel gave as its first

Figure 9

SAFEGUARD DEPLOYMENT




Figure 10

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS OF SAFEGUARD

DEFENCE OF LAND-BASED RETALIATORY FORCE

1. MONTANA AND NORTH DAKOTA
2. WYOMING AND MISSOURI
3. WASHINGTON, D.C. (NATIONAL CONTROL AUTHORITY)

ANTI-SLBM

INSTALLATIONS DOWN COASTS
PARS LOOKING SEAWARD
SPARTANS AND SPRINTS

POPULATION DEFENCE

THIN COVER OF ALL USA (EXC. ALASKA, HAWAII)
TWELVE SITES (INC. ANY ABOVE)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

FREEZING OR CANCELLATION AT ANY STAGE
REVIEWED ANNUALLY

Figure 11

	<u>SENTINEL</u>	<u>SAFEGUARD</u>
STATED OBJECTIVES	1. POP. VS CHINA 2. DETERRENT 3. ACCIDENT	1. DETERRENT VS USSR 2. POP. VS CHINA 3. ACCIDENT
TYPES OF EQUIPMENT	PAR, MSR SPARTAN, SPRINT	PAR, MSR SPARTAN, SPRINT
SITING	ALL BY 1974 - POP. AND DETERRENT VS ICBM NEAR CITIES - ADD SPRINTS LATER - RISK FEARED	PHASED - REV. ANNUALLY - DETERRENT VS ICBM - POP. AND DETERRENT VS ICBM-SLBM AWAY FROM CITIES - CAN'T USE SPRINTS FOR CITY DEFENCE
LONG TERM GROWTH	GOOD BASIS	POOR BASIS
COST	\$5 BILLION (SEPTEMBER 1967)	\$6.6 BILLION (MARCH 1969)

objective the protection of population against a light attack, which China would be capable of delivering about 1975. Its second priority was the protection of the deterrent, and its third priority protection against an accidental launching from anybody who has a missile.

Safeguard put the deterrent as the first priority, and they said that they would be protecting it against the type of attack that the Soviet Union could deliver. The protection of population against a Chinese attack went down to priority two. The same equipment appears, the PAR and MSR radars, the Spartans and Sprints.

Siting plan: Sentinel was going to put their whole system in by 1974, protecting both the population and the deterrent against ICBMs. As I mentioned, Safeguard is to follow an annually reviewed phased plan. They might build it up to protect the deterrent against ICBMs, they might protect population and the deterrent, and they may protect against submarine launched missiles as well as ICBMs. Sentinel was to put a number of the sites near cities, and this would have enabled them to thicken up the defence of cities by putting Sprints near missile site radars when the missile site radars were close enough to the cities to control interceptions on the approaches to the cities.

One reason that Sentinel was suspended was because a great fear was expressed regarding the proximity of these Sprint batteries to the cities. Safeguard takes these away from cities and therefore if the missile site radars are far from the cities and the Sprint range is rather short, it would not be possible to add Sprints easily and use them for city defence. So you can say that Sentinel would have been a good basis on which to thicken the system and Safeguard would not be such a good basis on which to build a thicker system.

The cost estimate of the first system made in September, 1967 was \$5 billion and the estimate made for Safeguard in March of this year was \$6.6 billion. It was stated later that the cost of the nuclear warheads as budgeted through the Atomic Energy Commission was not included and that would put it up to \$7.8 billion for the whole system.

Figure 12 simply reiterates the stated purposes of putting in the Safeguard system. The number 1 objective was to protect land based retaliatory forces, which is primarily the Minuteman, but also bombers, against a direct attack by the USSR. The second priority was to defend the American population against the type of attack the Chinese might be able to deliver in the next decade. The third priority to protect the population against an accidental attack from whatever source.

Now we will get around to the implications for Canada. When we are talking about Canada

in the strategic arms contest, we have to look at the map. Figure 13 is a polar projection taken from directly above the North Pole. Canada and the United States are at the bottom and then upside down from the usual way that we see them, the Soviet Union and China are at the top. These dotted lines are the ground tracks of great circle routes from points in Russia or China to points in the United States. They appear slightly curved on this projection. The way you would mark them on a globe is by just stretching a string as tightly as you could between the two ends, and that would mark out a great circle.

The thing that is very clear is that practically all of them go over Canada. Only ones from the extreme Pacific coast of Asia heading for southern California miss Canada and they do not miss by very much. We are right between the people who might be firing missiles at one another. We cannot

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help that. That is a fact of geography. Practically all of these missiles are almost certain to follow a path that goes just above the great circle. We are in no man's land and we always will be. That is something that is simply a fact of geography.

It also tells us that as far as direction of approach goes for targets in the United States, from North to South pretty well covers the general description of all the feasible tracks. Actually, of course, if you had a launching site in Eastern Siberia firing at New England, it would be coming in from the northwest, or a missile launched from Western Russia would be coming from the northeast, but generally speaking, they come from the North.

What we have tried to show in Figure 14 is the cover that a Spartan battery can afford to people on the ground. The black thing, which looks a little like an umbrella, represents the zone into which a Spartan, which was located down at the root of the diagram, could fire. It can fire in any direction, so that the black shape has a circular cross section. Because of its range limitation it can get out to the edge of the black zone, but not beyond it.

Now let us suppose that the incoming ICBMs, which are shown by the parallel lines, are rather like driving rain, being forced by the wind into a nearly horizontal trajectory. For a typical launch from somewhere in Russia or China to the United States, going over a range of perhaps 6,000 nautical miles, the angle of descent is about 20 degrees, so that it does come in at this glancing angle. Now if that were rain and this black object were an umbrella, you can see that the spot kept dry on the earth has this sort of elongated shape with the protected area extending downwind from

Figure 12STATED US OBJECTIVES
FOR MISSILE DEFENCE

1. PROTECT LAND-BASED RETALIATORY FORCES
AGAINST A DIRECT ATTACK BY USSR.
2. DEFEND US POPULATION AGAINST A 1970-1980
ATTACK BY CHINA.
3. PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL ATTACK.

Figure 13



Figure 14

3-D VIEW OF SPARTAN MISSILE
INTERCEPT ENVELOPE




Figure 15

PROTECTED
"FOOT PRINTS"



the umbrella. It is not round, even though the umbrella is round, and the extra protection because of the glancing angle comes downwind. Or, if the rain is coming from the North, the site here will give some protection to the North, but rather more protection to the South. You can see that the shape on the ground is going to be rather like that of a teardrop.

Figure 15 shows what it looks like. We just arbitrarily took a Spartan site in southern Michigan and this protected zone is quite big. It is called the protected footprint. That is drawn for an ICBM coming in from the north. You can see that it extends many hundreds of miles, but especially to the South.

The protected zone of a Sprint is much the same shape, but on a much smaller scale. It is shown here as if the Sprint were in the same position, but you can see that the Sprint is more of a point defence system, whereas Spartan very definitely provides a big area defence. I have no intelligence that says there is going to be a site here. That is just shown for purposes of illustration.

What we have tried to do on Figures 16 to 18 is to give you some idea of where the bursts might here as to be fired if there were an attack on North America. Figure 16 and the others that follow it have had to be done on an unclassified basis and what we have shown has been calculated very simply. The limits of the arcs are established by geometry, by the extent of the Soviet Union. There is a lower point here below which the Spartan will not be used for safety reasons. There is an outer zone here beyond which it cannot be used because of the limited range of the PAR and of the missile itself. We have drawn these outer limits as rather blurry and indefinite, because we do not know exactly where the outer limit is. In fact, you would not know unless you asked the Russians what trajectory they were going to use. These are not accurate, but I think if we somehow had a magic source of information that told us exactly what type of trajectory was going to be fired against us, we would probably find that these zones were not a very different shape from this.

These two points here on Figure 16 are the intended sites of the phase one installations in

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Montana and in North Dakota. We are supposing that they are also targets of an ICBM attack. The fan-shaped zone is the one on the ground above which the Spartans would have to be burst in order to intercept the ICBM before it hit the target at Great Falls. You can see that the zone extends well north of the border. I do not know whether it should be just here or just there, and whether Calgary is in or out. Certainly some of

Canada is in. You can also see that the opportunity to intercept would be reduced to almost nothing if it had to start at the border. We have shown a similar attack on the one in North Dakota, and again the fan extends up over Canada, and Winnipeg is involved. It is just a fact that if a Spartan is going to defend this place, that this is where it is going to have to make its bursts. We have shown here an attack on another Minuteman field between the two Spartan sites. It would be possible to defend them with the Spartans, and then the fan has a slightly different shape. But again, the bursts would have to be made above Canada.

On Figure 17, we have shown a similar set of drawings for the northeastern United States. Those of the 50 largest cities in North America, which are located in this area are shown as large black dots. The small dots are cities that appear in the list of the 300 largest cities in North America. Canada has quite a few of these cities; however, we are supposing in this particular diagram, that the attacks are limited to a few of the largest cities in the United States: Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, New York, and Boston. We do not know where the PARs, MSRs, Spartans or Sprints are going, but for the purposes of illustration, we have shown one here in Michigan and another in Massachusetts.

Using the unclassified figures and this simplified form of calculation we have drawn one diagram. If for example, we take the attack on Detroit, this tells us that the burst from Spartans—and it obviously would be this battery in Michigan that would defend Detroit—would have to occur somewhere to the north of this dashed arc in order to prevent damage on the ground from the Spartans. They could not occur north of this zone whose outer boundary is marked by the short lines, because there would not be the time or the range to get the interception out any farther. You can see that the zone includes some of Michigan and some of Ontario. If we have the attack here on Buffalo, the zone here representing the first possible interception comes down almost to the arc that represents the last possible point of interception. What that indicates is that it is doubtful whether sites here and here (in Michigan and Massachusetts) could defend Buffalo at all; if they could, it would be only by firing at exactly the right time. When the zone begins to look like that, it tells you that the protection at the apex is rather doubtful. All these are worked out for assumed angles of arrival, and no one knows what the real angle of arrival will be. Presumably, if the Russians were trying to attack Buffalo, they would be able to draw these diagrams too. They would choose one of the most difficult azimuths of attack, perhaps this central one here.

Figure 16

SAFEGUARD PHASE I
1974



Figure 17

ICBM ATTACK ON U.S. CITIES



- - LARGE • - SMALL CITIES
- ▲ PAR-MSR-SPARTAN-SPRINT
- ||||| } INTERCEPT ZONE

I would like to reiterate that this is just an example, and that we do not know that this is where the sites will actually go; the numbers that were used here are unclassified ones. However, I suspect that the shape is not very different from what it would be if we had a lot of the knowledge that we can never have; for example, what angles are the Russians going to use?

We have one more diagram, Figure 18, where we suppose that Canada was attacked by two ICBMs, one aimed at Toronto and one at Montreal. We are supposing that the two sites that we showed on the previous diagram are still in Michigan and Massachusetts. It indicates that to defend Toronto with a Spartan, the bursts would have to occur somewhere in this zone. If the enemy used the most dangerous type of attack, it would come in here. There may or may not be time to get in about one interception before it is too late to defend Toronto. In the case of Montreal, it would be even more difficult to defend, if the nearest Spartan were here in Massachusetts, and if all of the assumptions that we have made turned out to be exactly accurate. You can also see that, naturally enough, to defend Toronto or Montreal, the bursts would have to occur over Canada.

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These zones represent areas in our country above which Spartans would have to burst if the system were going to operate. Naturally, we are very interested in knowing what risks would be inflicted on Canadians.

Let us talk, first of all, about who might be put at risk by attacks. The light attacks that I have in this column on Figure 19 simply represent the attack on two cities, as we showed on Fig. 18. If those two cities were the two largest ones, then approximately 20 per cent of Canadian population would be somewhere near the intended impact points; while about 80 per cent would not be targeted. In the heavy attack we have 40 Canadian cities being targeted. That may be 10 per cent of 400 that would be attacked in North America. In the case of Canada, the 40 largest cities include something like 60 per cent of our population; therefore, 40 per cent of Canadian population would not be very close to the targets. However, this 40 per cent and this 80 per cent might also be underneath the Spartan bursts that were intercepting attacks on these or other cities. So we have to give thought to both of these types of protection.

Figure 20 summarizes what the dangers would be. When we are talking about dangers from nuclear weapons, we have to distinguish very clearly between ICBMs, that were put there to kill people, and Spartans and Sprints that were put there

to kill ICBMs and save people. The damage done by an ICBM which bursts where it is intended is going to be very great. The character of the damage depends to some extent on whether it is burst on the ground at zero height or a few miles above the ground. If an ICBM bursts on the ground, and I am talking here of a big one, like a megaton, it will produce very serious fallout. The large X indicates a very serious hazard to life. It will produce terrible prompt radiation, heat that will burn up miles and miles of the city and blasts that will shatter everything within miles of the point of impact.

However, if the owner of the ICBM wants to do the maximum possible damage in the city, it is very likely that he would burst it a few miles above the ground, because that will make even more damage from heat and blast. As a matter of fact, it will reduce the danger from fallout to a very low level; it will still produce considerable danger from prompt radiation. However, if his purpose is to damage the city as effectively as possible, it is likely that he would use the air burst; that does remove the fallout hazard.

I have written electromagnetic effects down below. They are not a danger to life and limb, but they may be quite a serious hazard to technical equipment. There are two sorts of electromagnetic effects: one is a sudden pulse that can short-circuit electronic equipment; the other is a production of ionization in the atmosphere that can spoil radar or communications, type of equipment. However, it will not kill people, although it may make the defences inoperative.

The ICBMs produce dreadful hazard to the target if they burst where they are intended to, whether it be on the ground or in the air. In comparison, Spartan is supposed to be burst very high above the ground, considerably more than 25 miles up. We have done some calculations for 25 miles, based on the unclassified effects of nuclear weapons, to give us a lower limit that we can use to measure from. If a Spartan warhead is burst 25 miles up, it will produce negligible fallout; prompt radiation will not be a serious matter; the heat would not start fires. There would be blasts that could be measured; it would probably break some windows. This is the point at which the Spartan begins to do damage on the ground. The small but noticeable effect is indicated by the small X on Figure 20. Below 25 miles, it will do more damage; of course, if it came down to the 5 to 10 mile region, it would do plenty of damage.

At 50 miles, even the blast effect becomes too small to break anything. Sprint has a much smaller warhead and it can be burst at lower altitudes. If it were burst three miles above the ground,

Figure 18

ICBM ATTACK ON CANADIAN CITIES




Figure 19

ATTACK ON CANADA

TARGETS

NOT TARGETS

LIGHT ATTACK	HEAVY ATTACK
2 CITIES	40 CITIES
20% POPN.	60% POPN.
80% POPN.	40% POPN.

Figure 20

RISK FROM NUCLEAR DETONATIONS

BURST HEIGHT MI →	ICBM		SPARTAN		SPRINT	
	0	5	25	50	3	20
↓ <u>RISK</u>						
FALLOUT	X					
PROMPT RADIATION	X	X				
HEAT	X	X				
BLAST	X	X	x		x	

ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS

it would produce no fallout, no important radiation or heat risk. The blast effect could be measured on the ground; it would probably break some windows. If Sprint were burst 20 miles up it would not produce any of these hazards.

Therefore, you can see on this sort of scale, the hazard from Spartan which will burst above 25 miles or from Sprint is really very small compared to the frightful hazard from an ICBM.

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Fallout is the subject of a lot of attention. Therefore, we have Figure 21 here that tells you a little bit more about fallout risks. We distinguish between air bursts and ground bursts; by air burst we mean that the weapon is detonated high enough above the ground that the fireball does not touch the ground. Actually, if it were high enough up—perhaps air burst is not the right word, it would be more of a space burst—but air burst means high up—the radioactive material that one has to fear only comes from the warhead, and it moves up with the fireball into the stratosphere. It is very widely distributed all through the stratosphere. Most of it decays, and what does settle down to earth is very widely distributed all over the world. It can be detected with sensitive instruments long afterwards. The short-term fallout radiation risk to people living near the burst is very small because the matter goes up and is distributed.

If the burst occurs on the ground, not only do you have radioactive material from the warhead but it is imbedded into the crater; the material that is flung up from the crater, which is vaporized earth, is made radioactive and traps the fission products from the bomb itself and you have a far greater volume of radioactive material, which does not go way up into the stratosphere; most of it comes back to earth fairly soon—some of it immediately, some of it blown downstream by the wind, and some of it will come out with rain. In the near vicinity of the burst there will be intense fallout which is a very serious hazard to human life.

Therefore, as far as fallout goes, it is very bad with ground bursts and not anything like as much as a hazard if the burst comes at high altitude. Remember, anti-missile missiles intended to protect against ballistic missiles are burst very high, and if they prevent an ICBM from bursting on the ground, then they have reduced fallout very considerably.

I think that covers the matter of risk about as thoroughly as we will be able to do it today.

On Figure 22 there are just a few conclusions that one can make relative to Canada. First of all, we have indicated the main conclusions if the targets of ICBMs are all south of the border. We can say

that Canadian air space—and I do not know if “air space” is the right word, but I mean the space above Canadian territory—is necessary if the United States is to protect itself by this type of system against an attack from the North.

Canadian siting of ABM equipment is not essential, as far as we can make out, for protection of important U.S. targets. With the type of diagrams we showed you before, it seems that most of the important American targets can be protected without the equipment having to be put north of the border.

The risks to Canada from these high altitude ABM warheads seems to be pretty minor in terms of the sort of contest that we are talking about here. As far as fallout is concerned, I should mention that if there is fallout in the United States because of ground bursts, Canada is going to catch a lot of the fallout too. The ABM defence produces virtually no fallout and it might save a great deal of fallout in Canada, even if the bursts on the ground are in the United States. Therefore, from the point of view of fallout, I would say that ABM defence is a good thing and not a bad thing.

Figure 23 shows what happens if Canada is the target of ICBM attack. It does appear that the full Safeguard deployment could provide some protection for many Canadians, but it depends exactly where it is and it depends on factors that would have to be worked out in great detail. It certainly cannot protect all Canadians. It almost certainly could protect quite a few but only against a light attack or an accidental launch, because this is not a thick system and nobody could hope to get much protection from it against a heavy Russian attack. This simply says, once more, that a light ABM defence is not going to be effective against a heavy ICBM attack.

Sir, I think that covers fairly well some of the points that were in Part III and perhaps we should turn it over for questions now.

The Vice-Chairman: The first questioner is Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I am sufficiently stunned by the presentation that I am not sure I am capable of asking questions, but I will try.

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Looking at it first of all from an over-all North American point of view, I understand the criticism is based upon the effectiveness of the proposed defence for the purposes for which it is intended. I take it from the very last point you made, that a light system, such as is contemplated in the Safeguard system, is not a defence against a heavy Russian attack with the type of missiles it has now;

Figure 21FALLOUT RISKS

	<u>AIR BURST</u>	<u>GROUND BURST</u>
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL MOVEMENT	WARHEAD ONLY UP WITH FIREBALL	MATERIAL FROM CRATER MOST RETURNING TO EARTH
DISTRIBUTION	DELAYED-WORLDWIDE	IMMEDIATE LOCAL AND DOWNWIND
SHORT TERM FALLOUT RADIATION RISK	VERY SMALL	LOCALLY INTENSE

- ABM MISSILES ARE AIRBURST
- ABM DEFENCES INTERCEPT ATTACKERS
ABOVE EARTH MINIMIZING GROUNDBURSTS

Figure 22

CONCLUSIONS RELATIVE TO CANADA FOR A
LIGHT ABM SYSTEM SITED IN USA (SAFEGUARD)

A. ONLY US TARGETED

1. CANADIAN AIRSPACE NECESSARY FOR FULL
COVERAGE OF USA.
2. CANADIAN SITING OF ABM EQUIPMENT NOT
ESSENTIAL FOR PROTECTION OF ANY
IMPORTANT US TARGETS.
3. RISKS FROM ABM WARHEAD BURSTS MINOR.
4. ABM DEFENCE REDUCES DANGER OF FALLOUT
IN CANADA CAUSED BY GROUNDBURST ICBMs
ON US TARGETS.

Figure 23B. CANADA ATTACKED

5. FULL SAFEGUARD DEPLOYMENT COULD
PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR MANY CANADIANS,
BUT ONLY AGAINST LIGHT ATTACK OR
ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH.
6. NO LIGHT ABM DEFENCE WILL BE EFFECTIVE
AGAINST A HEAVY ATTACK.

that it would not protect populations in any way from massive destruction. Is that right?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, sir, that is absolutely right.

Mr. Brewin: And, of course, that does apply incidentally to Canada in the very last point that you made, that whether you install the ABM system in Canada or not it could only protect against a light attack.

Dr. Lindsey: If it is deployed on the scale of the Safeguard that would be true.

Mr. Brewin: If the purpose of the attack is to destroy, as nearly as possible, the deterrent power of the American strike force, then this would not in any way be done by the light system, would it?

Dr. Lindsey: That is a different point. When I said that the system could not defend North America against a heavy attack, I was speaking of population. If the Phase I of the Safeguard is put in to defend the two Minutemen areas in those two northwestern states, it would provide a protection of some measurable quantity to those two fields of Minutemen. Perhaps it would protect a half or a quarter of the Minutemen. That is no good at a city:

if you stop three quarters of the missiles, if four come in and three are intercepted and one lands, everybody is dead.

Mr. Brewin: Taking the present contemplated system, you would only be protecting about 350 missiles, would you not?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, in Phase I that is true.

Mr. Brewin: I have a statement here referring to North America that I would like to read to you to see if you agree with it:

The fact is that our offensive deterrent is so massive and so dispersed that it needs no such protection, and in fact, except for two Minutemen sites containing 350 missiles, will not receive much protection under this system. The bulk of our deterrent is composed of 646 Polaris sized missiles on submarines and 630 long-range bombers. These, combined with the remainder of our 1,054 Minutemen ICBMs and thousands of shorter range missiles in Europe and elsewhere, provide an arsenal of deterrent to which nothing of significance will be added by the Safeguard system.

Could you comment on that and say if you agree with that deduction?

Dr. Lindsey: I am sure that the statement is true for 1969. I think the reason that the Americans

have decided to go ahead with Safeguard, or at least have requested permission from Congress to do it, is that they are not sure that that situation will still apply in 1974. They have enough and some to spare today; they say that themselves. It would require a rather unpleasant development on the part of the threat, to lose that position in 1974, but I think the purpose of the system is to guard against that possibility.

Mr. Brewin: In other words, at the present moment it does not add effectively to the Americans deterrent power to have this Safeguard ABM system installed?

Dr. Lindsey: I think, if by some magical process you could have Safeguard effective tomorrow, it would not add anything because they have mutual stable deterrence today. They are not so sure what it will be like in years hence.

Mr. Brewin: Supposing you project these things into the future, is there any reason to anticipate that by the development of even greater penetration aids, greater aids to the offence as against the defence, defensive systems themselves will become once again obsolete, and you are seeking security, but you have reached a position of similar insecurity after the expense of a very vast amount of money, and a great deal of effort being put into it?

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Dr. Lindsey: I think that is entirely possible. We may see, if there is not some sort of successful strategic arms limitation talk, an extension of this contest between offence and defence; and the defence provides a measure and the offence a countermeasure, and the defence a counter-countermeasure and so on and so on.

Mr. Brewin: Is it not a fact that in the history of these things, the reaction to any new step by one of the super powers has been an overreaction by the other super power, so that there is a spiral going ever upward of greater and greater insecurity and higher and higher cost? Do you think that would be an unfair way of describing the situation?

Dr. Lindsey: I am not sure about the greater insecurity; I am sure about the greater cost.

Mr. Brewin: I do not think there is any argument about the greater cost because I take it that this \$7.8 billion that the Americans contemplate spending is a first step and, in itself, a totally ineffective step.

Dr. Lindsey: It is being rather cruel to say "totally ineffective". Neither is it certain that it is a first step. There is no extended plan at the moment.

Mr. Brewin: If it is not a first step in regard to the projected plan, the \$7.8 billion is probably only a first step in regard to the expenditures.

Dr. Lindsey: No, the \$7.8 billion is supposed to cover the full Safeguard plan with the 12 sites. That was the intention and there is no plan beyond that that has been announced to date. The \$7.8 billion buys you the full Safeguard but it is only a thin defence.

Mr. Brewin: I think that is all.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Lindsey, you set out some of the risks as you saw them. I want to put to you some other risks that I have read about that you did not mention and ask you whether you and your officials have given any thought to these.

One of these risks was mentioned in the *Time* magazine article of March 14 entitled *The Great Missile Debate* and while I realize that *Time* is not an authoritative source I would like you to comment on this. They say in this article that

One of the most alarming arguments raised by ABM opponents is the prospect that Spartans and Sprints could accidentally explode while still in the ground, devastating a huge surrounding area.

This point is not raised only by nervous housewives but also by scientists, and they go on to refer to an article in the *Saturday Review*. Now if these Spartan and Sprint bases are very near the Canadian border and if these anti-missile missiles could accidentally explode they could cause a great deal of destruction to the neighbouring parts of Canada. So I would ask you if your Department or any of the officials in your Department have given consideration to that particular risk that I have referred to—the accidental explosion of the Spartans and Sprints?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, and we have watched with considerable interest the history of the nuclear weapons that have been deployed by the United States and by the Russians, and their record has been extraordinarily good. I think the United States has been handling about 15,000 nuclear weapons all over the world for a period of many years and they have never had an accidental nuclear explosion. We are practically certain that the Russians have not either. The safety precautions that are taken, mostly controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission, really do put safety at the top of their priority. Their safety precautions are very considerable and on the two or three occasions where there have been accidents causing nuclear weapons to fall out of aircraft or into fires, there has not been a nuclear explosion. So that the safety precautions have been tested in genuine accidents and they have worked effectively. We should remember that some of the air defence weapons like

the Nike Hercules have been deployed around cities for many years, they have nuclear warheads in them and there has never been an accident. It is true that if there were an accidental nuclear ex-

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plosion near a city it would be a terrible hazard but I think the safety precautions are so extreme and the record has been so perfect that it is not a thing that one should worry about too much.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Lindsey, it is my understanding that while the safety record has been good for the ICBMs and the traditional atomic bombs there is a difference with these Spartan and Sprint ABMs which indicates that they are a greater safety risk than the ordinary missiles—because I suppose of the type of missile they are. Are you aware of a distinction between the Spartan and Sprint. I see ABMs as opposed to atomic warheads on the ordinary ICBMs, which would make them a greater risk. The reading that I have done indicates that there is a greater risk for accidental explosion.

Dr. Lindsey: I can see that there might be one difference, that the ABM system would presumably have to be ready to be used on very short notice whereas offensive warheads perhaps would not have to be put on such short notice. There might be certain precautions that you could take 15 minutes or 30 minutes before they were used.

Mr. Allmand: That leads me to a further criticism. It seems that with the bombers which have atomic weapons and with the ICBMs the decision to send these away comes from the President but with the ABM system, because a very short reaction time is required—in other words the PAR and the other radar systems pick up these ICBMs coming from the enemy—the decision to fire such a system must be done by computer and not by decision of the President. This possibly could be the matter that is involved in the accidental explosion. There are two risks, the first is that the decision to explode is by computer and the second risk is that there is not really a human decision in firing these things off, especially if there are decoys and so forth sent up.

Dr. Lindsey: There were quite a lot of questions asked on that subject in the recent Congressional hearings and I tried to read what was said. I think there will not be firing by computer only. I am convinced from what I read there that they intend still to have some sort of a manual or human intervention but whether it will be the President or not, I do not know. Then, of course, if the anti-missile is fired, if it works properly and if it hits the target, the burst will be very high up, and if it misses the

target there will not be a burst. So I do not think that gives you the danger of a burst on the ground—which of course is the thing that would create the dreadful danger.

Mr. Allmand: I am far from being an expert but I merely put this additional risk to you as I see it. It seems that the Americans are concerned about the risk of accidental explosion on the ground. The reading that I have done is that the very conservative people of North Dakota, who usually are considered very pro-military, have themselves raised strong objection to having these ABMs on their territory because of the risk of accidental explosion on the ground. If they feel that way perhaps we should consider it too, since these sites are very near Canadian territory.

I want to put forward another risk that you did not mention. In the hearings before the American Congressional committee Professor Hans A. Bethe of Cornell University pointed out that if this system were set up the Soviet Union, or any other potential enemy, could knock out the radar system by sending a missile which would explode 100 miles in advance of the radar system, causing a fireball which would wreck the radar system, follow it up with their ICBMs and they would get through. Now if they sent this pre-missile through to wreck the radar system and exploded it 100 miles before the PARs and the other radar systems, this means that this missile would explode over Canadian territory—that is, the missile which would be geared to wrecking their radar system. Have we considered this type of risk?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes. It does not exactly wreck the radar, what it does is to produce a great cloud

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of ionized material in the upper atmosphere that would obscure the radar's view for some minutes, and when the cloud has passed away the radar is still effective—it has not been destroyed. It is rather as if they had made an enormous opaque cloud in outer space through which the radar could not see until the cloud had dissolved. So it does not create a hazard on the ground. It is indeed a means of making the defence problem more difficult, and it might be a very effective way of doing it, but it is not going to hurt anybody on the ground.

Mr. Allmand: You say that this pre-missile which would be geared to hindering the radar system would be far enough up in the atmosphere so that it would not hurt Canadians?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: I now move on to another risk and that is one which states that the enemy mis-

siles can be rigged or triggered so that they will explode as soon as the ABM missile explodes in their proximity. The ABM missile is supposed to destroy the ICBM mechanism so it will not explode. However, these critics say that this can be very easily by-passed by rigging or by triggering the ICBM to explode at the same time. Of course, here instead of having one explosion, the explosion of the ABM, you also have the explosion of the ICBM.

This would not be too dangerous with the Spartan, but if you take the explosion of the Sprint plus the explosion of the ICBM quite close in, again, to the targets which are near Canadian territory, you could also blast quite a few Canadian cities. What about this possibility of rigging or triggering the ICBM to explode despite the fact that the ABM explodes in its vicinity?

Dr. Lindsey: There has been a lot of discussion about that point and the people in the Atomic Energy Commission who design these weapons tell us that they think it would be very difficult for the ICBM to be triggered that way. To explain exactly how you would have to know about the design of nuclear weapons, and of course, that is something that has never passed out of the United States.

There are reputable scientists who think that it would be possible to have this fuse that would go off and I think the weight of evidence is probably against them, but one cannot judge without knowing all the facts.

If it were possible, then I think you can say at least the defence has caused the offending missile to burst not where the owner intended it to burst, and therefore, you probably create less damage to North America than you would have had it burst where it was intended. The Sprint is...

Mr. Allmand: That would be more true of the Spartan than of the Sprint.

Dr. Lindsey: In the case of the Spartan, I think if it did go off it probably would not do any damage. In the case of the Sprint, if it caused the ICBM to burst at low altitude it could do damage on the ground. That is quite true. However, the Sprints are short-range missiles and we do not know where exactly they are going to be located. It may well be that they are so far south of the border that their bursts will all be above the United States in which case the problem would not be one that we would have to worry about.

Mr. Allmand: Maybe we should find out where they are going to be.

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think that it has been decided yet.

Mr. Allmand: I have just two other questions, not relating to the risks but relating to two other matters. Do you know if any of our government officials have tried to interpret the Non-Proliferation Treaty which we have signed to determine if our co-operation with the Americans in an ABM system, even to the extent that we allow them to use our air space, would be a contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? It has been suggested that any sort of co-operation on our part would be against the Non-Proliferation Treaty which we have signed.

Dr. Lindsey: I have read some discussion of that in the United States and they evidently feel that it would not contravene Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but there is some dispute about that. That really is the sort of problem that I think some of the subsequent speakers will be better able to answer than I would. Certainly, if what the Americans are doing is not contravening it, I do not think that

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our little part would be. They have considered this and they do not think it would be in contravention of Article 6.

Mr. Allmand: It is in great dispute.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, it is.

Mr. Allmand: My last question relates to the strategic value of the ABM system. If the ABM system is to protect the Minutemen sites in the second-strike capability of the United States, is it not true that the real second-strike capability of the United States rests with their Polaris submarines and their bombers which are in the air at all times, and that consequently there is no real necessity of building an AMB system to protect the second-strike capability when the ABM system does not protect the Polaris or the bomber system in any case? They will have that no matter what happens with the ABM system. So from a strategic point of view, it would seem that the ABM system if it was meant to protect the second-strike capability does not really do that, and this is not really a credible argument for building the ABM.

Dr. Lindsey: I think of the three elements in the second strike, and you have named them all, the ICBMs are probably the most potent of the three. The Polaris submarines are very effective, and as you say, they are not put at risk by any missile system. There are not very many bombers kept in the air at all times and it is very expensive to keep a large number in the air. I think they are

afraid that the FOBS, the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, that might come in low or a first-strike submarine launch missile could catch a lot of bombers on the ground.

Mr. Laird has said that deterrence is so important that he would not like to have to depend on only one of the three systems. They feel that they would like to have a reasonable probability of any one of the three working.

However, none of what we have said alters your claim that the Polaris is very effective and does not seem to be at risk. It has been stated in some of the recent American testimony that perhaps developments in anti-submarine warfare in the future will put the Polaris at risk. However, it has never been said what those threats are.

They think that deterrence is important enough that they would like to have two or three ways of doing it rather than just one.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, I have completed my questions but I think that maybe we could take note of the fact that some of these questions, even through the admission of the witness, are far from being answered, and maybe we should try and get some witnesses who could answer some of the other points, especially with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and so on.

Mr. Roberts: May I ask a supplementary question?

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, on a supplementary.

Mr. Roberts: Since the ABM system is designed to protect the second-strike force, would it not be easier to simply relate the detection systems, not to the firing of a missile which would protect the site, but simply to relate them to the firing of the Minuteman itself? Since what you are presumably doing is protecting the second-strike force, and if you are being attacked by in-coming inter-continental ballistic missiles, you are obviously in a situation where the utilization of your second-strike force is going to be pre-eminently in your mind. What is the point at this stage of continuing to protect the second-strike force when what you would really be doing is thinking of using it? Of course, if you detected the in-coming missile and fired your Minuteman, there would be nothing left there for the in-coming missile to hit when it got there.

Dr. Lindsey: That is true. I think what you are advocating there is the hair-trigger response. In order to reduce the chance of a war by accident or of the sudden escalation of a war to the ultimate when it was not really necessary, the Americans are extremely reluctant to rely on firing back on

warning, and indeed, they do not have to do it today. If we are going to have a truly stable state where the risk of an accidental war is tiny, it would be a great pity to have to defend yourself that way. It is a sort of a last desperate way of defending yourself.

Mr. Roberts: If that explanation is correct then I would assume that the priorities which were listed on the chart that you gave us (Figure 12) are incorrect. In fact, the ABM system is really designed against accidental attack rather than a possible full-scale attack because otherwise you would then be in the hair-trigger situation.

Dr. Lindsey: I think the third objective was to protect against accidental attack. The assumption that there would be only one missile that went off by mistake and that could hardly be mistaken for a giant attack by hundreds of missiles.

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The feeling is that with several thousand missiles on short-term alert all over the world for years and years there is always the tiny chance that one of them will be fired by mistake. However, it is really almost incredible that the whole lot would be fired by mistake.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, will you take this up a little later? I will put you on the list. I have a long list here. I think you can get back at that later.

Mr. Roberts: I will not be able to get back at it later, but the point, I thought, had just been cleared up.

The Chairman: Is it agreed that he have another question?

Mr. Roberts: I think we agree, Mr. Chairman. I think my second supplementary was considerably more...

The Chairman: I think you are abusing your supplementary.

Mr. Roberts: I would hate to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Dr. Lindsey, I was in Washington yesterday and I noticed that there were many cars carrying the bumper sticker that says "ABM is an Edsel". I tried to interpret how this statement made some sense. Apparently, it did to some people because it was plastered all over cars all over the city. From the evidence that you have heard and the information which you have at hand is enough known about the technical side of the whole ABM program actually to give some assurance of its being technically possible and functional?

Dr. Lindsey: There are a number of very qualified physicists who have doubts about it and they have been very vocal in recent weeks. When you read their testimony, you cannot help thinking that there are a lot of unanswered questions about the program. It is an enormous undertaking. Certain features of it represent extensions and things like computer programming beyond any level of complexity that the human race has tried to do yet. So there are a lot of unknowns. I dare say they will have troubles and it will not work as soon or as well as was expected, but I think enough is known about it that the odds are it will be able to intercept some ICBMs if they were fired at it.

The real purpose, of course, is to stop the war happening and I am pretty sure that the unknowns are sufficiently great in the United States that the Soviets do not know how effective it will be either. If they were planning an attack, they would, I am sure, have to rely on the possibility that it would intercept quite a few missiles. We just do not know what the system will be like in 1975; I do not think anybody does. There is a lot of difference of opinion about whether it will be very good or not so good. I suppose the Edsel is considered to be something that was much advertised and advanced, but not very successful when it was delivered, and I suppose that is what the sticker means. They could be right.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Perhaps a couple of elementary questions, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned today that new developments in the anti-missile technical aspect of the ABM made it possible to now neutralize an approaching missile without actually contacting it. What is the basis of neutralizing that approaching missile? Does it explode? Does it trigger a nuclear explosion or does it neutralize it without doing that?

Dr. Lindsey: The Spartan warhead releases most of its energy in the form of X-rays, and X-rays are stopped in air but they can travel unimpeded through the near vacuum of space, some tens of miles above the earth's surface. They would strike the outer casing of the ICBM and heat up the outside so much that it would be vaporized and it would send a shock wave into the interior of the machine and probably shatter, bend, or otherwise distort the inside. So, in effect, the warhead by exploding delivers energy at a great distance which spoils the mechanism of the device. The intention is not that it will produce a nuclear explosion in the ICBM warhead.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): The threat of fallout on any population that might be below is not nearly as great as we have been led to think by publicity?

Dr. Lindsey: I believe that is true. The fallout hazard is very small indeed if the burst occurs at high altitude.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): That does not release into the currents which surround the earth any great amount of radiation or harmful material?

Dr. Lindsey: It does, but they will stay up there so long and they will be so widely distributed that what finally comes to earth will not be a serious hazard to human life. Of course, this is the sort of thing that was done for years in the nuclear test programs. I think there were about 400 nuclear weapons burst in the air by the five nuclear powers, and you can measure the radioactivity on the ground with a sensitive instrument, but everybody did not die.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is this what you mean then, in your summary statement, where you say:

The effects on persons or property on the ground due to interception by Spartans or Sprints will be negligible...

Dr. Lindsey: That is what I meant, yes, sir.

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Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have another question which refers to your statement, Dr. Lindsey. You implied that in a comparatively few years there probably will be new sources or new systems of missile detection and space surveillance. Is the potential for this surveillance and this detection of such magnitude that it might affect the whole program of actual physical deterrence in terms of distance and so on?

Dr. Lindsey: I think it would require rather a large change in the present state of knowledge to say that an effective heavy defence could be designed at a reasonable cost today, but one cannot tell. Knowledge is accumulated very quickly in these programs and one cannot predict what will happen. Certainly, if methods of detection and interception were greatly improved in the future it might make a defence possible at a cost much less than that of an offence, but that has not happened yet.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Another statement you make, Dr. Lindsey, is that the five Spartan batteries which will be directly across the border and the seven others that eventually will supplement them for the over-all program as it is projected now in full deployment will give all 48 states plus the American population—and I would assume that this applies to the Canadian population as well—protection from a light attack or from accidental launching. That is a very specific and definite statement you have

made. Is it actually expected to do that as far as technical knowledge is concerned at the present time?

Dr. Lindsey: That is exactly the intention of the system, yes, sir. I am not sure how far it extends into Canada.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am not speaking of theoretical intention, I am speaking of technical capability as we now understand the whole ABM system and the Spartan.

Dr. Lindsey: That is what it is intended to do and that is what the designers hope it will do, yes, but the extension into Canada is less certain. I do not know just what proportion of Canadian citizens could be given that protection. Of course, for them to get the protection it would be necessary not only that it be physically possible but that it also be arranged in the computer program. An ICBM follows a predictable path and the defence can tell where it is going to land and, if they wish, they can refrain from intercepting a missile; for instance, if it were going to fall into the sea perhaps they would let it go.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have another rather elementary question, Dr. Lindsey. You mentioned the Baker-Nunn Optical Camera at Cold Lake and apparently it has some surveillance value. Would you just explain the function of this machine?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes. Its main purpose is to support the space research program and it is a very accurate telescope with a camera attached to it. Normally what happens is that the crew at Cold Lake are told that a particular space object is expected at a certain time in a certain place, so they know about where to look. They then follow it very accurately and feed the results back into a central computer so the progress of some object in its orbit can be followed from day to day. This would help to predict when a low-orbiting object was going to re-enter the earth's atmosphere, or it would help to establish the orbit more accurately, or it would tell you if something had manoeuvred, which is very interesting, of course, if it belongs to another country. It really is a means of space research. It would not be effective in detecting a newly launched ballistic missile.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: Dr. Lindsey, because of some of the things I want to say frankly, may I first congratulate you on the lucidity of your explanations. May I then, to speak very frankly, say to

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you that I, as one member of Parliament and one citizen of Canada, resented your written presentation as well as your oral presentation today, because in my reading of the presentation and my listening to you, despite the fact that you underline you are just dealing with technical problems, you have tried to make a case for the value of the ABM system. Is that not so on the basis of your writing and your presentation today?

Dr. Lindsey: No, sir, I did not try to do that. I was trying to present to this group a number of facts that I thought they would need in order to assess the problem and to give some pros and some cons. I think I have given some of both.

Mr. Lewis: I did not hear or read many of the cons, Dr. Lindsey. I suggest to you that the major problem facing those of us who have an interest and a duty to have some decision is the effect of deploying a questionable defence system—and you have admitted all through that it is questionable—at a time when there are many unknowns—and you admitted all through that there are many unknowns—with the possible effect on the morale of the world, on the escalation of the arms race and so on. I did not see or hear anything about this basic question of the ABM. Yet, you say “one should not wax too indignant over the hazards inflicted by defensive ABM systems without contemplating the effects of the offensive ICBM, if it should succeed in its intended mission.” What relevance is that to the problem as to whether or not the ABM is an effective deterrent against the ICBMs?

Dr. Lindsey: It does not really affect that problem. I think that the main purpose of any strategic offensive or defensive system is to prevent the war from happening. There are many unknowns and disagreements about whether this ABM deployment will make that more or less likely. There are eminent people on both sides of that question. That quotation was made in the assumption that unfortunately the deterrence failed, and that there was a launching of ICBMs at Canada or at the United States. I was trying to say that if ICBMs were launched at North America the damage done to people on the ground by the presence of the friendly weapons is nothing compared to the damage that would be done on the ground by the arrival of the enemy weapons.

Mr. Lewis: May I, with respect, say that that is obvious even to an ignoramus like myself about the technical questions. What I again resent, in a friendly way, is the constant talk about “the effect will be such if there is a light attack”. What in heaven’s name do you mean by a light attack? What conceivable situation do you see where the

Russians will, for some sort of sport, send over a few ICBMs to be detected and destroyed somewhere in the ionosphere? What kind of logic lies behind this sort of presentation to this Committee? If there is a launching of ICBM missiles by the Soviet Union, is it not fair to assume that it will be the beginning of a pretty serious nuclear war?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, sir, I think it is. The normal

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background of the “light attack” which has been considered in Washington is that it would come from China and not from Russia.

Mr. Lewis: Dr. Lindsey, I suggest that even they have now discarded that.

Dr. Lindsey: They put it down to second priority.

Mr. Lewis: There is not very much talk now about the threat from China, even in the United States.

Dr. Lindsey: No, there is much less than there was.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, and now it is in the other direction.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, and also the emphasis has changed from protecting the population against the “light attack” to protecting the deterrent against a Russian attack.

Mr. Lewis: Let me again ask you about this. No matter how good this light Safeguard system may be, is it right to assume that they cannot possibly destroy all the ICBMs which may be launched against the United States? Will some of them come through?

Dr. Lindsey: I think it is almost unbelievable that a defence system would be 100 per cent effective. I am sure some would come through.

Mr. Lewis: This light system is questionable in its effect and may not work at all, and if it does work, may work only for a fraction of the ICBMs that some people assume may be sent over. What justification is there for the ABM system now, in that situation?

Dr. Lindsey: Well, it could be effective against the light attack from China. Every ICBM which is intercepted would represent the saving of millions of lives. In the case of the heavy attack from Russia against the deterrent, if you could save just a few of the deterrent missiles, that might be enough to make deterrence work. You do not have to be 100 per cent effective in protecting your deterrent missiles. Of course, in the case of cities you would like to be 100 per cent effective.

Mr. Lewis: Dr. Lindsey, I am asking these questions a little strongly, and quite deliberately, because both you and I feel strongly about this matter. Are you not going around in a circle? If the purpose of all this missile, anti-missile and all the rest of the build-up in the United States, and presumably on the Russian side, is to have deterrence against the possibility of nuclear war, then if that is the case, what is all this talk about how many people you are going to save? I suggest to you that if a nuclear war started, and a first strike was started by either of the superpowers, sooner or later their entire arsenal will be in the air and on the ground and will destroy the world, so why are we talking about saving people with a light attack and a heavy attack? I just do not understand what you are talking about.

Dr. Lindsey: I think this is the heart of a very complicated problem and Dr. Rathjens spoke very ably on it a few weeks ago. As I remember, the way he put it was that the thing which we put as our first priority is to prevent the nuclear war. We will really try to prevent that but there is always the fear that we will be unsuccessful and in that case there is the question about doing something to reduce the dreadful consequences if it does happen. The question before the country, I suppose, is how much do you put into the first objective and how much into the second? Unfortunately, some of the things that you do for the second objective may reduce the probability of achieving the first one, and that is a horrid dilemma.

Mr. Lewis: Indeed it is.

Dr. Lindsey: It is.

Mr. Lewis: Let me ask you, if I may, two or three more questions on the ABM. Let me try to summarize it in a layman's language. As I understood it, you agreed with Mr. Brewin that at the present time in 1969 the statement—I am not quoting it, I am doing it from memory—the ABM system cannot really be effective is correct?

Dr. Lindsey: I think he was talking about 1969 and I said it would not be necessary in 1969, and that deterrence is assured without it.

Mr. Lewis: Suppose you have trouble now, would the light Safeguard system be of any real value in defending when it is protecting only one third or so of the American ICBM?

Dr. Lindsey: It does not exist today, sir.

Mr. Lewis: Will the proposed plan protect only about one third or so of the American ICBM, since the Polaris submarines are out and the bombers are in the air, so that at the present time the ABM system...

Dr. Lindsey: It is not necessary today.

Mr. Lewis: It is not necessary, and it would not mean very much.

Dr. Lindsey: Not today.

Mr. Lewis: No. In what way is the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in 1971 or 1972 or 1973 of any consequence to the developments that you thought may occur in five or six or seven years?

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Is it not possible, assuming that there is some value in it, for the moment, to hold on to your know-how, to continue whatever technological development you may carry on without the additional cost of deploying these anti-ballistic missiles, and wait for the situation where the value of it is much clearer than it is now? Would that not make more sense?

Dr. Lindsey: It would if the time taken to put such a complicated and difficult system into operation were short enough. I suppose the designers of the system think it will take a long time to make such a thing effective, and they are afraid they could not do it in a hurry. They are worried about a threat that is years away and might never arrive, that is perfectly true, but they do not want to be caught in a position where it has arisen and there is not time to counter it.

Mr. Lewis: Caught in what position, Dr. Lindsey? How has it arisen, by the fact that somebody has launched some missiles against the United States?

Dr. Lindsey: No, no, no.

Mr. Lewis: At that point surely Mr. Roberts was entirely right: you launch your missiles back. But caught by what? In this connection I cannot understand that the Pentagon and the military industrial complex of the United States are talking about. What is it they are going to be caught by?

Dr. Lindsey: They are afraid that those large SS9-type missiles, of which a few hundred have appeared and which are being produced at a fast rate, will be able to carry these Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles that would enable one counterforce rocket to destroy several deterrent rockets on the other side—and that is the position against which they fear they may have to defend themselves.

Mr. Lewis: How does that do that? If you have a MIRV going, if I understood you—correct me if I am wrong—then your anti-ballistic missile that you now have, that you are going to deploy, will be lucky if it hits one of the blessed warheads on

MIRV and all of the other warheads will go their merry way to destroy the hardened silos that they hit.

Dr. Lindsey: Well, every MIRV that is intercepted will presumably save one silo from destruction, and if you save a rather small number from destruction then you have deterrence.

Mr. Lewis: Then are you talking about the MIRV actually being launched, this defence that you are describing, which I am sure you will agree is not terribly effective—if you save one silo and they can destroy several more it is not terribly effective—or are you talking about deterring the Soviet Union from launching a MIRV when he knows you have an anti-ballistic missile that cannot really do him much harm.

Dr. Lindsey: We are aiming at the Russian planner who is trying to decide whether to attack or not. The hope is that when he makes his calculations, knowing that the ABM system is there, he will decide that if he attacked he could not disarm the United States and, therefore, he will not attack. So we have deterred him and we do not have a nuclear war, and that is what we want.

Mr. Lewis: Does he not know that now, Dr. Lindsey,—

Dr. Lindsey: He does know it now.

Mr. Lewis:—even without the ABM system.

Dr. Lindsey: He knows it today.

Mr. Lewis: Is he not likely for many years to know that he cannot possibly simultaneously destroy all the American missiles that are in silos, all the Polaris submarines and all the bombers that are in the air with missiles in them? You are not suggesting that the Soviet planner is under any illusion that he can do that. And what does your ABM system accomplish for him, how does that frighten him anymore when he knows perfectly well that you are going to protect one-third of your missiles and that your AB missiles are not likely to hit everyone of his missiles but only a fraction of them? In what way is this insanity any sort of deterrence—in what way in this total situation?

Dr. Lindsey: I think you have described the position today very accurately and we would like to keep it that way—. Nobody is going to attack because he knows he cannot disarm us. The fear is that if the Russians were to build a large number of MIRV's and an effective ABM of their own and achieve some sort of anti-submarine force or, alternatively, have their ABM able to intercept the American submarine-launched missiles, then they might feel one day that they could do this and get away with it—and that is what the United States does not want to happen.

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Mr. Lewis: It is assumed that that is what the American military planners really have in mind and, frankly, I have never been impressed that that is the case—and the same for the Soviet military planners, I may add.

Dr. Lindsey: That is the case as made by the Secretary of Defence last month.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, I appreciate that that is his case.

I still ask you as the expert before us in what conceivable way does the deployment of 12 ABM sites, assuming that they are all put in place, add to the deterrent?

Mr. Prud'homme: Mr. Chairman, I think that Dr. Lindsey is here as a technical adviser to give us information about the ABM system in order that we can form our own opinions and be better informed to question further witnesses who may come before us. The witness is not here to defend a position; he is here to give us some background material and information. It seems to me a little bit unfair to put him in the position of having to give us opinions. He is here to give us background material and information in order that the committee can be better informed to question other witnesses according to the views they have formed. I do not think we should pursue this discussion with Dr. Lindsey any further along this line.

The Vice-Chairman: I will take what you have said as a point of order. Did you have something to say on that point, Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It is a very valid point of order and I think we are taking up the time of others who may wish to ask questions.

The Vice-Chairman: I do think, Mr. Lewis, that perhaps you have a little chip on your shoulder in this connection.

Mr. Lewis: No, I never have any chip on my shoulder, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: You did make an insinuation that he was biased in this whole matter and I honestly do not think this is the case.

Mr. Lewis: I did not say that he was biased. I do not make insinuations.

The Vice-Chairman: I thought you did.

Mr. Lewis: No, and I want to correct you. It was not an insinuation, it—

The Vice-Chairman: I am glad to know that.

Mr. Lewis: Before you say you are glad to know it let me complete my sentence. I do not think it

was an insinuation; it was a statement on my part—I was not insinuating anything—that the written statement which we were given and the presentation which we heard this afternoon was to me an apologia for the ABM system. I have the right to have my opinion on what I listen to and what I read. I read this very carefully, once before I arrived here this afternoon, and again. I noticed in a report in the press—I do not have it before me—that the same kind of general conclusion impressed the reporters, and I am certain that anyone who read this and listened to Dr. Lindsey would reach the same conclusion. Therefore I think it is not only fair, it is necessary to discuss with Dr. Lindsey whether he thinks that the ABM is in any real sense a deterrent in the present situation, yet alone what might happen in future developments.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, I think he has made it clear, at least to the Chair, that he does believe it is a deterrent. He has been asked to come here and tell us about the implications for Canada of the ballistic missile defence. He has not been asked to come to—

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, you are not sitting there as a judge sits in court to tell me what questions I may ask or not ask; you are here to preside over the meeting and so long as I have time you will please permit me to ask the questions that I want to ask.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, but we are now on a point of order and other members are objecting to your course of conduct at the moment. That is what it amounts to, Mr. Lewis.

On the point of order, Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lewis has just said that anyone who reads this will automatically come to the same conclusion that he has. I want to completely disassociate myself with that statement. He can speak for himself but not for me.

Mr. Lewis: I would not try to speak for Mr. Thompson in a thousand years, Mr. Chairman. I would be sure I was wrong if I did.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Brewin, on a point of order.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, the point of order I would like to make is that those in this committee who are examining witnesses should be given the

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utmost latitude to conduct the examination in the manner they see fit, as long as there is not some obvious impropriety. Mr. Lewis was conducting the examination in a manner that he saw fit. He is

eliciting a lot of useful information, I do not think he should be restricted in any way, and I hope that you, as Chairman, or any other Chairman are not going to get into the habit of telling us just what questions we are to ask and how we are to ask them.

Mr. Prud'homme: On the same point of order, I do not think the chairman is telling us what questions to ask. I still go back to what I said earlier, that Dr. Lindsey was asked to prepare for the committee a special report. You might disagree with it, and that is your privilege, but I am sure that with the explanation he is giving us this afternoon and that he gave at the last meeting we will be better prepared to ascertain the counter views of others. However, I do not think it is fair to ask him the counter views on something that he has prepared for us.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I really do object to these interruptions.

Let me read the paragraph, Mr. Chairman. This is from Dr. Lindsey's statement.

To summarize, the significant risks come from the offensive ICBM (or SLBM) and not the defensive ABM. If ABM prevents an ICBM from bursting at its intended point, both lives and resources have been saved; if it prevents it from bursting on the ground, then the radioactive hazard has been decreased, to Canada as well as the USA, even if the targets were all south of the border.

This kind of statement, Mr. Chairman, lacking what Dr. Lindsey has now said in reply, not only to my question, but to the questions of Mr. Brewin, Mr. Allmand and others, that there are other ICBMs that the ABM will not touch and that therefore there will be continuing destruction, despite the ABM, leads anyone reading that to the conclusion, in my view, that there is a suggestion that the ABM system is desirable.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lewis, there can be all kinds of development in this situation. As I see it, that statement that you have just read is a perfectly factual and perfectly legitimate one for Dr. Lindsey to be presenting to this Committee.

Mr. Lewis: I did not say—

The Vice-Chairman: If you want it expanded upon, you have your opportunity here, but let us not lay charges against our witnesses.

Mr. Lewis: I am not laying any charges, Mr. Chairman. I am saying that unless these statements are further tested, as some of us have attempted to do, and as I have attempted to do I admit with some feeling for which I do not apologize, this kind of statement, I say, conveys the impression that there is value in the ABM. I am testing just this kind of thing.

The Vice-Chairman: This I am quite prepared to let you do, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: This is what I have been doing. I do not need any lectures from you or even my good friend, Mr. Prud'homme.

Mr. Prud'homme: It was not my idea to lecture you, sir.

Mr. Lewis: I am asking you, Dr. Lindsey, whether in the present situation, with all the nuclear offensive weapons available, the projected ABM system can possibly be a deterrent in the mind of a potential enemy, if there is a potential enemy?

Dr. Lindsey: I think there are conceivable developments that would make it a deterrent by 1975. I do not think that it is necessary in 1969.

Mr. Lewis: You said "conceivable developments": what conceivable developments could make the deployment of 12 sites of anti-ballistic missiles valuable as a deterrent in 1975? This is what we are talking about.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: We are talking about this particular system that is being proposed. In what way can that be a deterrent in 1975?

Dr. Lindsey: Several things would be required to happen by about 1975: firstly, that the Russians build a lot more of these large rockets with MIRV in them, which would enable them to destroy almost all of the Minutemen in their silos.

Secondly, it would require them to build either an AMB system of their own, or an anti-submarine system of their own that would negate the deterrent effect of the American Polaris missiles.

Thirdly, it would require that by some means they disarm the American bomber force and this might be done by submarine missiles; it might be by the FOBS, or it might be by a good air defence system.

All those things would have to happen. Then the part of the 12 sites that would have a deterrent effect would be that around the four Minuteman complexes and in the control centre in Washington, but not the part around the cities.

Mr. Lewis: Therefore, Mr. Brewin's suggestion to you, which you in part negated, was surely a correct one, that this is a first step, because if all the developments which you have indicated, and you said that all of them would have to occur by 1975—and obviously, if I may add Washington sitting absolutely still and doing no research work or anything else, which is very unlikely—then, surely, this Safeguard system would not be of

very much value at that time. You would then have to have not a light ABM system, but a hard one, not \$7.8 billion, but \$60 or \$70 billion, which I think is the figure given, for the full system.

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think it would have to be

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as big as that to protect the deterrent. Of course, we talk about the 12 sites as if they were an unbroken package. Mr. Nixon made it very clear that he is going to decide year by year whether or not to extend the scheme. I think if something like we have just postulated were to happen, we would see it coming and the yearly decisions would probably be altered in that way. Perhaps there would be no deployment over cities and more over the deterrent.

Mr. Lewis: Therefore, I suggest to you that you must agree with Mr. Brewin's suggestion to you that this is a first step. May I put it this way to you: either the Safeguard is really a complete waste of money, because it is not a deterrent at all, or if the developments that you have indicated do take place on the Russian side by 1975, then the Safeguard becomes completely inadequate, and a total ABM system at \$40 billion, if not \$60 or \$70 billion, which is another figure that I have read, would be necessary, and one can take it for granted that if steps towards these developments are detected or suspected as taking place in the Soviet Union that there will be a progressive increase in the ABM system, or some equivalent system year by year? Is that in effect what you are saying?

Dr. Lindsey: That could well happen. I think correspondingly if the two super powers disliked this development and they entered into strategic arms talks, they might agree not to proceed any farther with it.

Mr. Lewis: I hope so.

Dr. Lindsey: That could happen too. But I am pretty sure that if one side makes a move which causes the other to fear that its deterrent is at stake, the other one is going to spend money to protect its deterrent. I am not sure how much it would take. I do not think it would take as big a system as you indicated to protect the deterrent, because all of it does not have to be protected.

Mr. Lewis: My memory, and other members of the Committee will please correct me if I am wrong, is that someone from the Hudson Institute who was before us in the Fall said that the hard system would be in the neighbourhood of I think \$40 to \$60 billion.

Dr. Lindsey: I think he was talking about full area protection of all the population there. I

believe we are now talking about only protecting the deterrent, which is a much less ambitious task.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, I suppose there are fewer sites.

Dr. Lindsey: You would not try to protect 100 per cent, but maybe 25 per cent of them would be enough to protect.

Mr. Lewis: To do what? To be a deterrent?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: That I cannot see.

If you do not think you should answer or do not want to answer this question, that, of course, is your choice, but if a country like the United States, or the Soviet Union, either of the super powers, has the offensive capability that they have now, which is pretty vast and pretty frightening, what would be the danger in a country like the United States saying, "We will not enter this ABM and another phase in this arms race, because nothing the Soviet Union has can possibly destroy our effective second strike capability, as Mr. Allmand and other people have brought out and you agreed.

Dr. Lindsey: Not today.

Mr. Lewis: I beg your pardon?

Dr. Lindsey: They could not do it today.

Mr. Lewis: No, nothing that the Soviet Union has today or in the next few years, as far as we can foresee: that would be correct would it not?

Dr. Lindsey: It would be.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, "...could possibly destroy our very effective second strike capability, and therefore we will not enter this kind of limitless expenditure but rather rest on our very effective deterrent that we have at the moment for the next few years, and from that adequate position of strength negotiate", as they want to, according to Washington, "some arms limitations, some arms race reduction." Wouldn't that be more sensible than entering a questionable defence system?

Dr. Lindsey: I suppose the scheme of phasing Safeguard year by year with an annual review is an attempt to do just what you said; that each year they will review the arms talks and see how they are doing and perhaps they will say, "You agree not to build the MIRVs and we will not build phase 3". I think that is a very real possibility.

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Mr. Lewis: Do you, sir? I suppose you have seen, as I have, that even before Congress has approved the Safeguard system that the Pentagon has already ordered the beginning of work on it.

Dr. Lindsey: Well, they are certainly trying to do Phase I, but . . .

Mr. Lewis: Before it has even been approved.

Dr. Lindsey: They should not do that.

Mr. Lewis: Dr. Lindsey, the fact is that they should not do that, I agree, and I am pointing out to you how unreliable these people may be. The fact is that Congress has not approved, the argument is still going on in Congress but I think Under-Secretary Packard the other day—I do not have the clipping before me but I am sure I am quoting accurately—stated frankly that the Pentagon had already given instructions to begin the construction of the sites and the deployment of these anti-ballistic missiles. He even said that if Congress does not approve it, they will have to stop and to scatter the thousands of people they are now employing—many thousands of people—I forget the number. If people are this determined to do something which Congress has not yet approved on the basis of some money they have from the year before, how reliable are such people to do the kind of thing that you say, that they will review each year and maybe stop? What reliance can one have in that kind of behaviour?

Dr. Lindsey: The President of the United States said that was his intention. I suspect that the hurried continuation of the program which you mention is probably on those two sites—in Montana and North Dakota. And they are probably using funds which were authorized earlier for Sentinel.

Mr. Lewis: They are using Sentinel funds?

Dr. Lindsey: I suppose so, yes.

Mr. Lewis: And Sentinel has been scrapped.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, although the equipment is the same and I think those two sites are probably the same as in Sentinel; it is the other sites that have been changed.

Mr. Lewis: I do not know. All I know is that the Sentinel program has been officially scrapped, the Safeguard program has not been approved and the Pentagon has now started major work on installing the Safeguard program, which has not been approved. As far as I am concerned, I cannot have any confidence that people like that are likely to be as reasonable year by year as you suggested they may be.

Dr. Lindsey: Well, sir, as a civil servant I would never recommend spending money that had not been authorized by Parliament.

Mr. Lewis: At least that part of your testimony is rather reassuring.

The Vice-Chairman: Is that it, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: That is it.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, would the Committee agree to print Dr. Lindsey's advance presentation to the Committee as we did on previous occasions, and also as an appendix, to incorporate the slides used in Dr. Lindsey's opening remarks as part of the evidence of this sitting, the latter, the slides, to be just incorporated in the evidence? Is this agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): May I ask two very simple questions?

The Vice-Chairman: I was going to ask that we adjourn until 9.30 a.m. tomorrow, Mr. Guay. Were you here when I made that announcement?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): No, I was not.

Mr. Prud'homme: Do we not usually sit at 11 o'clock?

The Vice-Chairman: We do usually but the only time we can get a room is tomorrow at 9.30 a.m.; Room 307 in the West Block.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, that overlaps with another committee that several of us are on. It is a bit difficult.

The Vice-Chairman: We would not be long tomorrow morning. We have possibly three or four questioners only.

Is it your wish that we continue now? I have Mr.

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Howard. Mr. Roberts has left now. He may be expecting to ask his questions in the morning. That is the only problem. Would it be your wish to hear Mr. Howard's and Mr. Guay's questions now?

Mr. Allmand: When somebody leaves a meeting still in progress, he has to stand the risk that we might finish. Not that I want to see Mr. Roberts not ask his questions, but it is not worthwhile bringing back the witness in the morning just for one questioner if we can finish off.

The Vice-Chairman: We have Mr. Howard and Mr. Guay here. Is it your wish that Mr. Howard proceed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I will proceed, Mr. Chairman, but I would point out that I think Mr. Roberts is very much interested in this particular subject. He left on the understanding

that there would be a subsequent meeting and I think it would be rather unfair to him not to give him an opportunity. Is it not possible to have some time other than 9.30 tomorrow morning?

The Vice-Chairman: The Clerk advises me 9.30 a.m. is the only time available tomorrow and Dr. Lindsey says he will come back at our convenience any time.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, it was mentioned by the Chairman of this Committee—I do not mean yourself as Vice-Chairman—that we would meet tomorrow at 3.30 p.m. Has that been explored?

The Vice-Chairman: We have been cancelled out on that one for tomorrow, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It is a relatively short notice, Mr. Chairman, to make a change in the plans. I think it was only yesterday that we were told, as has been mentioned, that we would have a meeting today and another on Thursday in the afternoon. There are probably others who are certainly as busy as I am, but I had planned differently. I had something else in mind for tomorrow morning, so it does cause a certain inconvenience. Although some have left and are under the impression that you will hear them in the morning, I will abide by your suggestion if you feel that we should go along and finalize it.

The Vice-Chairman: I think we are pretty well committed to a hearing in the morning. But on the other hand, if Mr. Howard cannot be present in the morning and you cannot be present, Mr. Guay, I think you should ask your questions now.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I will try to be here.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, the basic problem I think is with the Committee on Immigration and Manpower. There are several of us who overlap. It is a great difficulty to absent oneself from a Committee that was formally called prior to this meeting and I fear for a quorum or a proper hearing tomorrow morning. That is the problem.

The Vice-Chairman: I should think that a quorum will not be necessary. There will not be any vote to come to a head. That would be the probability, I should think.

Mr. Lewis: We had better ask questions or adjourn, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Howard, do you wish to proceed?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I am interested in this business of the nuclear blackout. I assume you are talking about this idea of the explosion of the missile that comes in ahead of time

and puts radar out of action. This sounds to me like a relatively simple procedure, and as there are only a very few radar installations involved in this ABM program, it would seem to me that the whole program could be put out of action with a minimum of effort.

Dr. Lindsey: I think the nuclear blackout is perhaps one of the most difficult things to counter-act. The opacity of the clouds to radar depends very much on the wavelength which is used, and one counter-measure would be to use radars of two or three different frequencies, and also to have more radars. I think this is the sort of case for which forward siting, perhaps in Canada, might have more value than for the present type of system. One of the difficulties, of course, in assessing a thing like that is that there have been very few nuclear weapons exploded at high altitude, and as long as the nuclear test ban is in effect there never will be any more, so that one has to judge it all by theoretical calculations and you just do not know

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exactly what would happen. I think it is a serious difficulty.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): This leads to another question. Assuming that we had to have an ABM system—and I am certainly not prepared to agree that we do—where is the best place to put it? I am rather shocked sometimes when I hear discussions in which we talk about placing it in such a position that it would perhaps not involve Canada, if possible, but that it is all right if millions of Americans are killed—and perhaps I am being a little whimsical when I say if millions of Soviets are killed. It would seem to me that we should try to develop a program that would preserve as many lives as possible on both sides of the world. Where is the best place in terms of saving lives for such a system to be located? Is it in northern Canada or is it along the U.S. border?

Dr. Lindsey: That is the type of problem that has been discussed between the two countries for a long time in the case of anti-bomber defence, but it has not been discussed in the case of ballistic missile defence.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Is there no technical advice on this subject?

Dr. Lindsey: I think the prospects of improving the protection of North America by siting radars farther forward might become much more important in the case of a system that depended on mid-course interception or very long-range interception. I think some improvement could be made with the Spartan type of interception, but not very much in the case of Sprint which is more of a point defence.

The problem has never really been tackled by the two countries working together because the Canadians have said so far they just are not going to participate in active ballistic missile defence, so there have not been joint studies of the problem. If there were they might produce some interesting results, but they have not ever been made.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): It has been suggested that one of the reasons for not engaging in an ABM system is that it would provoke a counter system or counter developments on the other side, and yet from what you have told us today the ABM system as proposed is extremely thin. One would almost say that it is highly ineffective against any sort of ordinary attack other than a very minor attack. In what way then would you say that it could provoke a counter effort by the Russians, for example, if it is such an ineffective system?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think it will provoke a counter effort by the Russians.

Mr. Brewin: May I have a supplementary on that?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: Would not the same reasoning that you used before apply? They would see the light installation as being nothing more than the start of or the preparation for a thicker system and they would start to say that they cannot wait until we get it thoroughly installed. If that is all unstable would it not be just another case where there might well be over-reaction?

Dr. Lindsey: It could happen and I think it was to make that less likely that one of the changes between Sentinel and Safeguard occurred. That was the alteration in the siting to put the missile site radars far away from cities so that they could not be easily thickened-up for city defence. This was just for the very reason that you mentioned.

There is always the question of who started it. Perhaps you could say Safeguard was the reply to the Russian ABM system. I think it is rather fruitless to say who started it and who is reacting. It is just almost impossible to say who made the move and who made the counter move.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): If the ABM system gives such thin defence to cities, and it is a very expensive system, from the standpoint of protection of the cities and the people in cities would the money not be better spent by putting it into a shelter program?

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Dr. Lindsey: I dare say that if you made a mathematical calculation about lives saved per

dollars spent and you postulated an attack on cities you might save more lives with shelters than with an active defence system, but then of course, it would not have the other objectives of protecting the deterrent. However, it is true that for saving lives in an attack on cities civil defence is very cost-effective.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): When did the shift take place in the thinking of the planners in the United States from protection against the Chinese to the switching back to a deterrent or a protection against the Soviets? As I recall, when this was first discussed it was designed as an anti-Chinese program. When did that shift take place?

Dr. Lindsey: I think it was between the outgoing Democratic administration and the incoming Republican one over a period of two or three months just as 1968 turned into 1969. I think that was about the time the change occurred. The reason as explained by Mr. Laird was partly because of this information about the increased building rate of the SS9 Soviet rockets.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I almost wonder if the planners or those who were trying to sell the program were accepting the fact that there was not really any legitimate reason to protect against the Soviets but there might be against an irrational leadership in China, and then when they discovered that the Chinese were not advancing as fast possible in the technical field and were actually likely to be incapable of mounting any kind of an attack contrary to their earlier fears, they changed their line of salesmanship then to the idea that they should go back and defend ourselves against the Soviets?

Dr. Lindsey: In the discussions before Congress that point of view was expressed but I do not feel that I can make a comment on it either way. The expressed reason for making the change, as I think I have tried to explain, is the official government point of view.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): If the system is not capable at this time of defending against MIRVs and the other existing systems, is it really possible to thicken this system fast enough to overcome the production rate that the Soviets would have of their multiple re-entry vehicles?

Dr. Lindsey: I suppose it would only be possible if a certain amount of progress started now and the momentum was maintained. I dare say that one of the main reasons for the desire to start the program now is to retain the possibility of accelerating the build up if they decide they want to do it. It takes a long time to learn how to make these components and to net them together, a very long time, and you could not just decide quickly to alter the pace of the program.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What is the estimated lead time involved?

Dr. Lindsey: If the authorities obtained for the phase 1 in 1969, I think they believe the sites will be operational either in 1973 or 1974. So it is nearly five years, and that is on a base of years of research and development and a Sentinel program that achieved a certain amount of momentum. One has to say it takes a long, long time between the original design and the final appearance and service, and then it takes a lot longer to make the thing work the way it is supposed to. That is why they have to plan these things so far ahead, and because they are planning far ahead there are many unknowns.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Fine; thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: We will adjourn, then, until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow and meet in Room 307, West Block.

Thursday, May 22, 1969

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, we will call the meeting to order and continue our questioning of Dr. Lindsey in connection with the ABM problem. Our next questioner is Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): As I said, Mr. Chairman, one of the questions I had intended to ask has already been asked and I am satisfied with the answer. However, Dr. Lindsey made reference yesterday to the fact that the stationary satellite could be used with regard to early warnings and I

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would like to ask if we could use the Canadian satellite that is being put up at the moment by Bell Telephone for the Canadian government in this particular respect, or will it be used in part for that purpose?

Dr. G. R. Lindsey (Chief, Defence Research Analysis Establishment), Department of National Defence: The satellite we use to survey a part of the earth to detect the launch of missiles ought to be orbiting above the centre of the zone that it is serving, so if we were trying to use a satellite to observe the launching of rockets in Asia, the satellite should really be over Asia. The Canadian communications satellite is to relay information from Canada to Canada and it will be orbiting on the longitude of the centre of Canada, so it would not be in the right place to do this job.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): When we were in France we were told something slightly different from what you are saying. At that time the French people told us that they would like to make use of

our satellite if we would allow them to do so, so our satellite certainly covers a very broad range. Also in a newspaper they showed the shadow of our satellite from the location where it has been deposited, and it certainly overshadowed almost all of North America completely. This is the reason I am asking you that. North America in particular was well covered. If I understand correctly, what you are saying is that if we were to use a satellite it would mean that it would have to be somewhere closer to, Russia or China, for example. Is this what you mean?

Dr. Lindsey: For a satellite to detect a rocket being launched in Asia it must be able to see Asia, so it would have to be in the other hemisphere from ours, and if we put our satellite over Canada or over the Atlantic Ocean in order to transmit messages from either Western Europe to Canada or from one point in Canada to another, then, it will be over the Western hemisphere, but for the purpose that we were speaking of—to detect launches—it would have to be over the middle of Asia. So, I do not see how one satellite could do both jobs.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): At the height it is at the moment, you mean to say it would not see Asia?

Dr. Lindsey: No, you can only see half the earth no matter how far away you go.

The Vice-Chairman: What about right over the pole, Doctor?

Dr. Lindsey: It will not stay stationary over the pole. It is not really stationary at all. It tries to go around the equator once every 24 hours while the equator is turning around underneath it once every 24 hours. If you put it over the pole it will not stay there. It would have to be circling in a polar orbit and it would be over the pole perhaps once every hour and a half.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): If we were to use one jointly with the United States for the purpose you described yesterday, where would it have to be?

Dr. Lindsey: It would have to be somewhere over Eurasia.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Fine.

Dr. Lindsey: It would have to be able to see the place on the ground from which the rocket was being launched and therefore it would have to be in the proper hemisphere to do that job.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have another short question, Mr. Chairman. It is with regard to the various sites in the United States that you indicated yesterday, and particularly that place on your map which was earmarked as phase 1. If phase 1, which is in North Dakota—and the same thing

would apply to any of the other areas—was closer to Canada than it is at the moment would it be to our advantage with regard to not being involved in a deployment of any of these missiles over Canada, and particularly over large cities such as Winnipeg and Calgary? If it was closer would it move the deployment further up, or would it be to our advantage if it remained where it is or if it was placed further south? In other words, is the site that has been picked by the U.S.A. the ideal site and the ideal location, not only for them but also for the Canadian people, most of whom live in the southern section of Canada?

Dr. Lindsey: If we want to obtain some protection from the site, then we would like it to be as far north as possible. If we want to be subjected to the minimum risks from the use of the missile, we

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would like it to be as far south as possible. In fact, I think the sites are far enough south that probably the short range Sprint missile would barely reach the border, perhaps not at all, but the Sparton would reach far up into Manitoba. If the site were moved 50 miles north or south it is still true that it would burst far over Manitoba, but so far above it that we expect no danger. I think the question of the exact location of a site and its importance to Canada, would depend a lot more on the later phases, after phase one. Do not forget that phase one is to defend particular Minutemen, and they are in place today so they are not going to move them. Therefore the ability to move those sites is pretty limited if they are to defend the Minutemen. But in the case of the other planned sites in the Washington State, Michigan or Ohio, and New England, I think there is considerable uncertainty about where they will go. There implications for Canada do depend on exactly where they are going, and that is not yet known.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, doctor.

The Vice-Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Legault?

Mr. Legault: Dr. Lindsey, a remark was made by someone yesterday and it was a little out of order then but it seems to follow Mr. Guay's question. You were trying to sell the impression that these sites should be installed further north in Canada and to sell that point you said that they should not be close to the border but further north so as to prevent any of these explosions over the populated area. If these sites were further north, it would provide better protection.

Dr. Lindsey: Sir, I am glad you asked that question. It gives me an opportunity to say something that perhaps I should have said yesterday. I am not trying to sell anything.

Mr. Legault: It was just a remark from someone who did not know who you were. He said, "Is he trying to sell us the idea that these sites should be further north, rather than close to the border?"

Dr. Lindsey: What I am trying to do for this Committee is to explain to them that as a result of our work, we analysts believe that if the sites were to provide the maximum protection for Canadians they would have to be fairly far north. If they are sited where we think they are going to be today, the question of protection for Canada is very much in doubt. It would protect some areas and not others. As far as risk is concerned, we do not believe that there are serious ones, but such as they are, they could be reduced even more as far as the Sprint is concerned by siting them a bit further south.

Mr. Legault: Further north?

Dr. Lindsey: If the Sprints, with a very short range, are to be kept absolutely out of Canada, then the sites would have to be whatever the range of Sprint is, and they would have to be farther south than that. The question of the value of moving sites farther north has never really been thoroughly analyzed. We have not invited a joint study with the Americans, and they have not asked for one either, so that problem has never been very thoroughly investigated.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): A supplementary if I may, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Legault. This is what I really had in mind when I was questioning you a while ago. I believe that you left me to understand that it would be rather difficult to change the sites now, because of the Minutemen.

Dr. Lindsey: For phase one, yes sir, that is true. Perhaps it could still be changed for the other phases.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): We could probably have a good discussion with the U.S.A. in this particular regard.

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think it is too late to do that.

The Vice-Chairman: Did you have another question, Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, but the doctor has answered it.

The Vice-Chairman: Do you have a supplementary, Mr. Nesbitt?

Mr. Nesbitt: Would it not be to the advantage of the United States, particularly since some of their Minutemen are located in Michigan or Ohio itself, to have the Minutemen plus the others moved very much to the north, if it were technically feasible

to do so from a defence point of view. Then there would be much less damage and danger of fallout, • 0955

if any Soviet missiles were aimed at these Minutemen bases. Would that not be correct?

Dr. Lindsey: That may be true, sir, but I think the Minutemen are very immovable. They are literally buried in concrete and I think to move a thousand Minutemen would incur an enormous expense. It is practically beyond question that they would ever think of doing that.

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes. But as I understand from your remarks and others, a great many of these are in Montana, North Dakota and Washington. I am referring to the ones which are adjacent to the heavily populated industrial areas of the United States or indeed, Southern Canada.

Dr. Lindsey: I think most of the Minutemen sites are not near large industrial areas.

Mr. Nesbitt: It was my impression that there were some in Ohio or Michigan.

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think so, sir. It was intended that there would be an ABM site in Ohio or Michigan, but I do not think that one would be assigned to the protection of Minutemen silos. I think they are in the mid-west, Montana, North Dakota and Missouri and Wyoming.

The Vice-Chairman: Where would the Titans be, doctor?

Dr. Lindsey: I think they are in one of those areas too. I forget which one.

Mr. Nesbitt: They are not near large populated cities in either the United States or Canada?

Dr. Lindsey: No, they are not.

Mr. Nesbitt: The risk from missile attack on those bases which would involve ground-blast would not be very likely, where they are located at present, to cause extensive fallout damage to major population areas?

Dr. Lindsey: I am not so sure about that because fallout can spread an immense distance. Inasmuch as it has been possible to move them away from cities and still keep them within the 48 States, that has already been done.

Mr. Nesbitt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I have many questions on my mind, but I do not seem to be able to sort them out. I will start from something that you say in your paper, Dr. Lindsey. At page 45:

From a strategic point of view, anti-bomber and anti-missile defence are part of a single problem.

This thing is not clear in my mind actually. In my view, the use of Canadian territory is for interception, not for surveillance or radar, but for interception and is important to the air defence. Both protect the deterrent but as far as we are concerned, not wanting the Americans to come over the populated area of the Canadian territory which is in the south of Canada with their interceptor, it might be advantageous for Canada to have itself an interceptor that would take the destruction of the bombers further north. If we look at it from the ABM point of view which is also there to protect the deterrent, and due to the fact that the impact will be high in the atmosphere, I do not think that the Canadian territory is all that important because of fallout. You made the point that if we use a Spartan the chances of fallout and dangers to populated areas and cities will be minimized quite a bit in comparison to what would happen with bombers. I ask myself the question you asked yourself at page 35, is it really important that there should be ABM installations in Canada? Would you agree that Canada has a more direct responsibility, as long as the need is still there to defend North America against bombers, and that as far as the defence of North America against ICBM is concerned its responsibility could be limited to a surveillance or to the radar system or other means which could still give North America the same protection or practically the same protection against ICBM?

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Dr. Lindsey: In general, I agree with what you said, sir, yes. When I said that the two problems, anti-bomber and anti-missile defence were part of the same strategic problem, what I really had in mind was the question of whether we need bombers and submarine launch missiles and ICBM's, and whether we need strategic defence for all three. The obvious purpose of the whole super-system is to deter and to prevent a war.

When we get down to the details of the air defence system, or the ABM system, there are differences and you have pointed them out. Our land bases are very important for the air defence of North America, and it would be virtually impossible to carry it out effectively without having certain installations on Canadian soil. But I think it is also true, as you pointed out, that it is possible to carry out a limited defence of the deterrent with the installations all in the United States; although, if it is ever called upon to operate, some of the interceptions would be above Canada.

Mr. Laniel: Besides, are we not dreaming when we think that the Safeguard system might be

aimed at the protection of Canadian cities, especially when we know that the Sentinel, which was meant more to protect the American cities, was put aside and replaced by the Safeguard, which is mainly concentrated on the defence of the deterrent? Are we not really just talking only to ourselves when we try to defend the ABM system and try to see the slight protection that it might give to the Canadian cities?

Dr. Lindsey: I believe that the American plan for full deployment, by which it was going to protect American cities, was intended to protect American cities only. We did not ask that the plan cover Canadian cities, and they have not asked us if we wanted to discuss it. All that we did in the analysis that was described to you yesterday was to see whether it would be physically possible to extend this cover out to Canadian population centres.

The conclusion we came to was that it probably would be physically possible if the sites were somewhat adjusted with that in mind. We have not asked that this be done, and the Americans have not offered to do it. We just have not talked about it.

But I am sure that the present plan is set up only with the protection of American cities in mind, and you would not expect anything else, because we have not been a partner to the scheme at all.

Mr. Laniel: You mean the complete—

Dr. Lindsey: The complete, 12-site deployment, yes, sir. The first two sites in Phase I are not supposed to defend population; that was never claimed. They are just to defend those Minutemen installations in the West.

Mr. Laniel: My next is a technical question. You said in your presentation that it was learned, with time, that an ABM did not have to have a direct hit on an ICBM to destroy it. Could you expand on that destruction. Would the radiation that would neutralize the ICBM provoke the explosion of the ICBM in the air, or would it just neutralize it so that even if it fell down it would not have any effect and the fallout would come only from the Sprint or the Spartan?

Dr. Lindsey: For many years, when people thought that ballistic missile defence was technically impossible, it was because they felt that one could not hit a bullet with a bullet, especially if the bullet was going at 18,000 miles an hour. The great dis-

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covery that made ballistic missile defence technically possible was the design of this nuclear warhead, which meant that if the defensive missile

were burst within quite a wide distance from the ICBM the radiation from the defensive warhead would render the ICBM inoperative.

Mr. Laniel: It would not explode, then?

Dr. Lindsey: It is expected that it would not explode, and that the pieces would fall to the ground perhaps as a single unit, or that it might break up in the air and come back to earth. But the expectation is that there would not be a nuclear explosion from the ICBM.

That point has been disputed by a number of scientists, and you could not really make a firm judgment on it without knowing how the warheads were designed, including the Russian warhead; and, of course, we do not know that. So this is a point on which there is some disagreement. But most of the expert advice that we have had from the United States is to the effect that the ICBM will not explode; that it will be damaged by the radiation in such a way that it will not go off.

Mr. Laniel: Speaking of an attack on a Minuteman site in the United States, you presented in your diagram (Figure 7) three possibilities. You spoke of MIRVS, I think, and of having a better chance to get more Minutemen on a site then you would with just a MRV. Did you take into consideration something else that you mentioned, namely, electronics, because I guess ICBM's could be classified as electronics gadgets? You said that electronics could be neutralized by—was it—radiation from an explosion within an area, which might have an effect on the operation and might even without a direct hit on a silo, have a more neutralizing effect on the deterrent than you said?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes; in the chart that we discussed yesterday (Figure 20) in relation to the risks from nuclear weapons, I spoke mostly about the risks to human life. Then I mentioned that there were also electro-magnetic effects.

The two electro-magnetic effects that seem to be the most important are the electro-magnetic pulse, which could damage or destroy electronic circuits at quite a great distance, and the blackout, which could make a great cloud of ionized gas in the upper atmosphere that would interfere with the transmission of radio waves.

Mr. Laniel: Are the silos a protection against that?

Dr. Lindsey: They are a partial protection against the electro-magnetic pulse, because it was known that this was a hazard; but I suppose if the burst were close enough it might be too much for the protection. However, steps have been taken to reduce the effect of this electro-magnetic pulse. It is rather like lightening, on, even more violent.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Nesbitt?

Mr. Nesbitt: It may be that Dr. Lindsey has answered this question. Unfortunately, I was not able to be here yesterday afternoon. If you have, Dr. Lindsey, I will just wait until I see the Committee's report. If you have not, perhaps you could provide some sort of an answer.

These matters of Safeguard and Sentinel have been widely discussed by the public and in the media. In the United States we hear a great many allegedly prominent men in your profession say that these various systems, are no goods. Of course, the media are not always accurate; they are most of the time, perhaps, but sometimes they colour reports to suit their own purposes—and, we all realize that—but could you give us the bases on which some of these people, very eminent in their own fields and colleagues of yours, make their principal objections, and why do they feel that these systems might be ineffective?

Dr. Lindsey: There has been an immense debate in the United States about this, and very eminent people on both sides either support the deployment of Safeguard, or attack it. I have made a list of the famous people on both sides, and I think it comes out about equal in eminence and in numbers of Nobel prize winners, and that sort of thing. There is just no doubt at all about the fact that there is a serious difference of opinion over this system.

Mr. Nesbitt: But in the case of those who claim the system is of no practical value, what are the principal points on which they base their support of this view?

Dr. Lindsey: To support the view that the

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Safeguard is unlikely to be successful?

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes.

Dr. Lindsey: One of the arguments that has been raised is that it is not necessary, that there is already sufficient deterrence to accept the worst attack that could be inflicted on the United States and still leave sufficient weapons to reply and punish the Soviet Union to an extent that they could never tolerate. That is one argument. I think the argument would certainly carry in 1969. The question is whether it is necessary in 1974 or 1975. That is where the biggest difference of opinion comes and it is not surprising. Who knows what the world is going to be like in 1975 when one considers the progress of scientific research in these areas and also political developments that we can-

not forecast? So there is a big difference of opinion about whether the deterrent needs this protection or not.

Another attack that has been mounted on it, particularly by scientific people, is that it will not work. They say one reason it will not work is that it can never be tested. A large complicated military system will normally take many years to perfect, and it can be perfected only as a result of many realistic tests and exercises.

In the case of an anti-submarine warfare system, you can have very realistic tests. You can have real submarines, real ships, real aircraft, real exercises, and you can find out whether the sonar works. Of course you cannot actually attack the submarine and destroy it, so you are never quite sure whether the weapon will work. But at least the majority of components in the system can be tested. That is true of air defence systems also, except that you cannot carry out the final test of shooting the aircraft, so you are not quite certain that the air-to-air weapon will be able to kill. The feeling in the case of the ABM system is that you cannot carry out a realistic test, because you will not dare fire ICBMs at the system, and you perhaps would not even fire them without the use of nuclear warheads. There are counters to that argument. There have been tests in the Pacific missile range when real ICBMs have been fired out over the Pacific and real ABMs have been fired against them, but they have not had nuclear warheads in them. They know from records that the anti-missile came within so many meters of the missile at the point the fuse would have detonated, but that does not prove that it really would have destroyed it. You then have to go back to calculations.

Mr. Nesbitt: Pretty close, though.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, and if the calculations are right it would have killed it. There is that uncertainty that you have never put it to the final test.

Another argument on the side of the people who say it will not work is that it is more complicated than anything that has ever been tried before. I think it is more complicated. There are unsolved problems in computer programming and in the network of a large system. I think one reason why the Americans are keen to do at least Phase I is so that they will have two complete installations and they can at least work on the computer programming and the electronic problems and then hope they can solve the difficulties that normally can be learned about only by trying.

Another objection to Safeguard that has been raised in many quarters is that it will fuel the arms race. You missed a very long exchange on that subject yesterday, Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Nesbitt: I think I saw some of the reports. I know what the arguments would be.

Dr. Lindsey: They were given, and one can make a good case for saying that the ABM perhaps does fuel the arms race. Then there are also doubts about the effect of it on the non-proliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban, which are both steps in arms control in which most of the world is glad to have seen progress made, and they would not like to see them hindered. There are two sides to that argument as well.

Mr. Nesbitt: Dr. Lindsey, these objections are the ones which are of a political nature rather than a scientific nature. Are they being advanced by scientists, or are they being advanced by people who are perhaps more experienced in the field of public affairs?

Dr. Lindsey: One report recently said that now more than ever in the past, scientists are getting into politics and politicians into science. I think on this subject everyone feels free to talk about everything. They are all experts.

Mr. Nesbitt: That may be. I do not know about the scientists getting into politics. That might be a good thing, but I have grave doubts about politicians getting into science.

Dr. Lindsey: They are in it now in Washington.

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It is an immensely complicated problem and it has so many aspects to it that you cannot really expect each person to have a licence to speak only in his own area.

Mr. Nesbitt: No, but a person might be a very eminent authority in one particular field of knowledge and then it seems to be a human failing that when that person pontificates on other subjects with which he is relatively unfamiliar, his eminence in one field is taken to apply to his opinions on subjects about which he knows very little.

Dr. Lindsey: You are absolutely right, sir. I could not agree more. I am hoping in subsequent meetings of this Committee that you will have some witnesses who are much more expert in the fields of international affairs and arms control. If you hear some professionals in those fields, you will be able to get more expert advice on those aspects of the problem.

Mr. Nesbitt: I was particularly interested this morning in the reasons, from a scientific or technical point of view, why these systems might or might not work. I think you answered my questions very well. Thank you.

When you mentioned some of these scientists who are pontificating on the subject of international affairs, that brought forth my other observation.

Dr. Lindsey: That is a very fair comment. I think when we talk about strategic problems it is very difficult to draw boundaries. There is a little bit of everything in that area and many people seem to feel that they have useful ideas, but I think some people do get out of their depth very badly.

Mr. Nesbitt: Yes, and if I said that I do not think they will work for technical reasons, I would be getting out of my depth, I know. Perhaps others who say they are not needed, because it is all going to be sweetness and light in 1974, might be a little out of their depth, too.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Dr. Lindsey, at one of your previous appearances before the Committee I asked you a question about the possibility of eventually developing some electronic counter-measures to put ICBMs out of control on their way to North America. You said one would have to do that at the beginning. It is too far out and once it is launched it is on its way and it has the propulsion that it needs. It just goes and it is not electronically controlled. I am trying to find in your brief the terminology that you used yesterday for the different kinds of launches that could be made to attack North America. You mentioned the normal one and a lower one, and then you said the orbital one, or something like that. You were speaking of MIRV, which is a multiple re-entry vehicle. What does the "I" stand for?

Dr. Lindsey: Multiple "Independently" targeted Re-entry Vehicle.

Mr. Laniel: But how can that kind of ICBM be controlled, especially in orbit, the one that could subdivide? You could use some kind of electronic device. Is it not controlled all along from the launching up to the point where it will be targeted to something?

Dr. Lindsey: Not necessarily controlled from the launching site or the launching country. It could have inertial guidance in it. In effect the missile, which is boosted into the velocity required to take it to North America, could have a clock inside it that makes it coast after burnout for 32 minutes and then lights the de-boost engine pointing in such and such a direction. This could all be inside the weapon. Instructions would not have to be sent from outside. Therefore I do not think you could interfere with it by spoiling someone's signal or command to it.

It is true, of course, that the internal mechanism will have to have delicate machinery and electrical

circuits and these might be vulnerable, but not nearly as vulnerable as a signal coming from another continent.

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Mr. Laniel: In that case the targets will have to be chosen in advance. They could not be selected. For a weapon going around in orbit, you could not make a selection. You would have to say: "That satellite will be there for these targets."

Dr. Lindsey: I think there would be quite a difference between the fractional orbital bombardment system, FOBS, and another type which is called Multiple Orbital Bombardment System. The Fractional Orbital Bombardment System does not go around the earth. It would go either a quarter or three-quarters of the way around and its target would be set in advance, so that when it was launched, the launcher would know exactly where he wanted it to fall.

The other type, the Multiple Orbital Bombardment System could be left in orbit indefinitely as a sort of psychological threat, and in that case the owners would have to tell it when to come down and send it a signal. However, it is not generally believed that that would be a serious threat. It would not be as accurate as ICBMs or FOBS and its opportunity to bombard a particular area would only come up several times a day when it happened to be in the right position. Therefore, it would take quite a long time to bring it to bear. It might be a frightening type of weapon but as far as effectiveness goes, it does not seem to be nearly as effective as a simpler type of weapon.

You are quite right. If they had that type, it would have to receive instructions. Mind you, the instructions could be given to it when it was near home. It comes over home-base, say, twice a day and you could send it signals which say, "All right you, in three hours and forty-two minutes let yourself off," and then the signal would be stored and it would carry out its commands three hours and forty-two minutes later. If you were going to interfere with the signal, you would have to do it when it was close to home which is difficult.

Mr. Laniel: The only reason why I recommend this system is that it is a cheaper way of defending ourselves.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On a supplementary...

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have in mind something similar to what you have just mentioned. Perhaps some device could be found to send the doggone things back to where they came from.

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think you could send them back where they came from, but it is conceivable

that you could alter their instructions and tell them to explode in an off-route place. That is conceivable.

Mr. Nesbitt: I suppose there has been work on the use of lasers in dealing with this sort of missile?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes. A lot of thought has been given to non-nuclear kill mechanisms, and of course the ultimate desire in that regard would be our old friend the death ray which we read about as boys. There has not been an effective death ray yet, however, I think the laser offers a possibility and I am sure people are working on it quite hard. However, it would have to be a very accurate and very powerful ray in order to damage something hundreds of miles away which is moving at high speeds. It is conceivable. Indeed, people are working on that problem.

The Vice-Chairman: I have no further questions on my list. If there are no further questions. . .

An hon. Member: You can ask yours now Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: I would like to ask a few questions. Mr. Wahn, would you mind taking the Chair while I ask a few questions?

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Doctor ICBMs would have to have heat-hardened noses much like a space vehicle. Would they not?

Dr. Lindsey: To re-enter the earth's atmosphere without destroying themselves, they would.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. You told us yesterday that these Spartan warheads are designed to give forth X-rays which would vaporize ICBMs. Today you say it might cause it to fall apart and come down. I know that it is impossible to have a test to actually

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prove what would happen, but what leads you to speculate between vaporizing and the fall-apart idea?

Dr. Lindsey: I did not mean to imply that the X-rays would vaporize the whole of the re-entry vehicle. It would heat up the outer near surface where the X-rays struck to such an extent that they would vaporize. They would vaporize so suddenly and violently that they would send a strong shock wave all the way through the whole re-entry vehicle which would perhaps shatter it or at least bend it. There would not be enough energy in the X-rays to vaporize the outer part of the re-entry vehicle unless it was very close to the explosion. Lighter objects like decoys might be

vaporized completely so there would be nothing left but gas.

Mr. Ryan: If it were thrown out of kilter it is likely that most of the ICBM would burn up in the atmosphere.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes. If its heat shield were damaged, then that would probably happen on re-entry.

Mr. Ryan: How does the term "cooking" apply in this situation?

Dr. Lindsey: "Cooking" is referred to when a different kill-mechanism is involved. This was very much to the fore in the debate some years ago over the BOMARC. The principle of "cooking" is that neutrons which are released in the explosion of the defensive warhead would penetrate into the fissile material in the ICBM or in a nuclear weapon carried in a bomber. Neutrons will penetrate through any sort of shield unless it is very thick. The principle of the fissile material is that by having neutrons moving around inside it producing a chain reaction, it gets hotter and hotter. The intention here is that enough neutrons would be sent into it from the defensive burst so that it would heat up inside, not to the extent that there would be a nuclear explosion, but to the extent that it would be distorted or cracked. The shape must be extremely accurately maintained if the mechanism is going to trigger properly, so the cooking consists of a sort of internal spoiling of the inside of the nuclear weapon so that it will not produce a nuclear explosion.

Mr. Ryan: I take it that it does not now look to be as reliable a method as the vapor.

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think it is the method that Spartan uses.

Mr. Ryan: Are there any Minutemen or other ICBM bases in Alaska?

Dr. Lindsey: I believe not.

Mr. Ryan: Why not? Is there some special reason for that? One would think that it would be much closer to possible targets in China and the U.S.S.R.

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, it would be. I suppose if the United States had built a large force of medium range ballistic missiles, as the Russians have done, then that would be a natural place to put them. However, they have elected to put virtually all of their deterrent into intercontinental range missiles. Having done that, they can keep them close to home, maintain maximum security over them, and provide defence if they so wish. They are quite accurate enough to do the job.

Mr. Ryan: Could it be that there might be some installations there which are classified?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes. That is possible and if it were so, I would not be able to say it. Actually I do not know of any.

Mr. Ryan: Yesterday there was some question about the risk of Spartans and Sprints in that they had to be at a ready state at all times, and on surface rather than in silos. Would the risk be any greater than the present risk which we run with our atomic warheads on our BOMARCs at North Bay?

Dr. Lindsey: I do not think they would be a greater risk than the Nike/Hercules missiles which have been deployed around American cities for years and which have never produced a nuclear explosion. I think they would be comparable with them or the ones which have been in our air defence aircraft for years.

Mr. Ryan: Further to Mr. Nesbitt's line of questioning, would you give us the odds, or the probability or likelihood in connection with this development of the ABM warheads versus the incoming ICBM? Is it probable that this technology will do the job? What are the odds on it?

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Dr. Lindsey: Are you speaking of the possibility of preventing the ICBM from going off as opposed to making it go off?

Mr. Ryan: No. I am talking about it generally. As a physicist, what in your opinion—let us put it that way—are the odds and the probabilities? Is this a good technological development? Will it work? What are the probabilities?

Dr. Lindsey: There is one piece of evidence that gives us a lot of information here. Some two or three years ago the Americans fired 14 real ICBM's out over the Pacific and they intercepted them with anti-ballistic missiles installations on, I think, Kwajalein or Johnston Island. I believe 11 out of the 14 came close enough that if their calculations about the miss distance are right they would have destroyed the warhead. I think that tells you that you can come close enough to a bullet with a bullet to have a very good chance of destroying it. Of course that is one test firing against a site that knew that the target was coming and there were no decoys or any other penetration aids used.

When you begin to build up the contest and say there are going to be measures, counter-measures, and counter-counter measures, it gets awfully difficult to say just what would happen in a particular engagement. You are also going to have it all happening in 1975. When you do not know what measures and counter-measures the other people will have and you do not even know what ones we will have, it really does become a bit of a guessing game.

I think we can say though that it is very likely indeed that one anti-ballistic missile can destroy one intercontinental ballistic missile if there are no complicating factors. However, there probably will be.

Mr. Ryan: Decoys and so on?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Can we take it though that the delivery stage the 11 out of 14, is pretty well assured? That part looks very reliable?

Dr. Lindsey: They can control the anti-missile accurately enough to put it very close to the ICBM, and that has been proven.

Mr. Ryan: All right, you say that they can put it very close. To your mind, is this warhead going to be able to destroy the ICBM? What are the probabilities of that?

Dr. Lindsey: I think they are very good. I think if the ABM can burst within the calculated kill distance of the ICBM it will probably stop the ICBM achieving its mission.

Mr. Ryan: I would take it then that you have some confidence in this system, but perhaps not a complete confidence? Would that be fair?

Dr. Lindsey: That is exactly right. I would be surprised to find any reputable scientist saying that he was 100 per cent sure that all these problems would be overcome.

Mr. Ryan: With the 12 sites fully deployed in the United States with ABM's, and having a regard to what you have illustrated for us that the umbrella of each Spartan and each Sprint installation projects a footprint, and also having a regard to the fact that the likeliest attack upon us is going to be from the North and that the protected shadow or footprints would all be to the South in the United States, there would then be what I might describe as a leading edge along our border. In your slides you also indicated that the Spartans would be expected to go out about 400 miles at the maximum and to explode in the atmosphere.

Dr. Lindsey: No, Sir, Spartan is above the atmosphere.

Mr. Ryan: Above the atmosphere. I am sorry. I meant to say that. Would this not then leave a distance under the edge of the umbrella to the earth of some height?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, it would, and I think one can explain that quite well with the analogy of the umbrella in the driving rain. If you hold the umbrella directly above your head and the rain is coming in at a glancing angle, some rain will fall on the ground

inside the lip of the umbrella that is in the up-wind direction so that the dry area will be displaced down-wind. It is quite true that you could live under

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the front lip of the umbrella and have it above your head but still not be protected from something coming in at a glancing angle; that is true.

The footprint, if you remember the shape, does extend forward of the site but it extends much farther backward than it does forward, and it extends less than the 400 miles forward for precisely the reason that you have indicated.

Mr. Ryan: Less than 400 miles. How much less than 400 miles?

Dr. Lindsey: You cannot give a simple numerical answer to that because it depends on the angle of descent of the ICBM. I think if it is coming in at 20 degrees, the warning time is sufficient, the PAR gives you enough pick-up, and so on, it would be somewhere in the vicinity of 300 miles, or perhaps a bit less.

Mr. Ryan: Would not some of the Spartans be likely to go off in the atmosphere while trying to get under this leading edge?

Dr. Lindsey: I think this would be a choice open to the owner of the Spartan, and they have elected not to burst them at low altitudes. I think there are two reasons for that: First, is potential damage to people on the ground; second is that this X-ray kill mechanism that I described does not work very well in the atmosphere because the air would absorb the X-rays, whereas in empty space the X-rays preserve their killing power to a very great distance. So they just will not burst it at low altitudes.

Mr. Ryan: As I see it, there will be at least 100 miles from the ground to where these bursts would likely occur. There would be 100 miles in height that would be vulnerable to other possible methods of entry, like skip bombing from Canada into the United States, or changing the direction of an incoming ICBM at the last few moments so as to bring it in at a much shallower angle and get in under that umbrella edge.

Dr. Lindsey: I think if the ICBM was able to manoeuvre late in its course the Safeguard type of defence would be in big difficulty because I do not think it could manoeuvre at the last minute very easily. I think a manoeuvring ICBM would call for a certain improvement in the type of defensive mechanism. It really is intended for a truly ballistic missile that comes like a stone on a predictable course without the last minute ability to manoeuvre.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. I suppose the defence could still take care of one that did come in under the leaning edge?

Dr. Lindsey: I think it is a little bit like a batter facing a pitcher. If the pitcher fires a fast ball the batter just has to judge the flight and swing at the right time, but if he is met with a curve and waits until the curve is broken and then judges the last minute flight of the ball, he might get a hit. If he starts his swing just as the ball is breaking, he will probably miss. Also, if he can hit it before it breaks he will get a hit.

Mr. Ryan: It would seem to me that we Canadians who live mostly along the southern border of our country may be in an extremely disadvantageous position in the event of an all-out attack on these sites which will be along our borders.

Dr. Lindsey: I think if we wanted to get some protection out of an ABM system we should talk to the designers about the system before they have decided exactly where the equipment is going. There is also the point that even if it were physically possible for one of their sites to defend a Canadian target we still have to find out whether the arrangements are going to be made for them to do that, because they do not have to; it is their system and we are not being very co-operative about it at the moment.

Mr. Ryan: An enemy, too, could throw in some ICBM's with dirty bombs along this unprotected edge and let the drift obliterate the population. This would be quite a possibility, would it not?

Dr. Lindsey: Yes, I think if an attacker wanted to produce heavy fall-out contamination in North America, he would certainly be able to do it. He could target points far away from either cities or deterrent bases, most unexpected places, because a big dirty bomb burst on the ground would produce dreadful fallout over a very wide area. However, if he did too much of that some of it might blow right back across the ocean and he would get it too, so I think there is a limit to how far anybody would try that sort of attack.

Mr. Ryan: Yes. Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, very much, Dr. Lindsey.

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The Chairman: Are there any other questions arising from the last member's questions or are there any other questions which any member wishes to ask Dr. Lindsey?

If not, I believe that completes the questioning and on your behalf I would like to thank Dr. Lindsey very much for his answers to our questions and for his assistance to the Committee. Thank you, very much, Dr. Lindsey.

APPENDIX CCC

STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS,
STABILITY, AND THE POSSIBLE
CONTRIBUTIONS BY CANADA

PART III:

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA
OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE
BYDR. G. R. LINDSEY, CHIEF,
DEFENCE RESEARCH ANALYSIS
ESTABLISHMENTPrepared for the
Standing Committee on External Affairs
and National Defence
1st Session, 28th Parliament

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SummaryPART III: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
CANADA OF BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENCE

The most basic implications for Canada regarding defence against ballistic missiles are the same as for the rest of the world—that is, the preservation of stability and the resultant prevention of nuclear war. However, because of our geographical position on the direct great-circle route between the two Super-powers, and sharing a long border with one of them, we are concerned with the problem in a very special way.

The Significance of Canadian Geography for BM
Defence of the USA

In the previous section, it was demonstrated that Canadian geography has a vital significance for the defence of the United States against attack by bomber aircraft. In fact, it would be impossible for

the US to create an effective defence system without the use of Canadian airspace, and very inefficient to attempt to do so without the basing of radars, air bases, and/or missile sites in Canada. Comparable questions arise for ABM defence. If the US wishes to defend her own territory against ballistic missile attack, must she launch defensive missiles over Canadian territory? Must she base ABM installations in Canada? Further questions which can also be asked of anti-bomber defence include: is it possible for a system sited for the defence of targets in the USA to give any protection to targets in Canada, and, also, what are the risks to the people and property on the ground beneath the interception?

As with air defence, the problem begins with early warning. The earliest warning that can be obtained of the approach of an ICBM is the detection of the launching. Since tremendous energy is released by the booster rockets, sensitive instruments may be able to detect this at very long range. However, generally speaking, the closer they are to the launch site, the better the detection. Canadian territory does not offer any unique attraction for the location of such sensors.

Once the booster rockets have burned out, the main means of detection or tracking is by radar. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) depends on three large radar stations in Alaska, Greenland, and England. In general, the best locations will be close to the likely ICBM trajectories, so, since Canada lies under most of the probable trajectories, her territory could be valuable for the location of future warning and tracking radars.

Many types of active ballistic missile defence systems have been conceived. They fall into three categories, depending on whether the ICBM is destroyed in the launch phase, in mid-course, or in the terminal phase of its trajectory.

Canadian territory is too far away to enable a land-based weapon to intercept an ICBM launched from the Soviet Union before its booster rockets have burned out (i.e. during the launch phase).

If a mid-course interception system were designed, it is probable that Canadian geography would be very important. Some of the tracking and control radars and the anti-missile missiles might be in ships or aircraft, but since the middle portion

of the trajectories cross over Canada, it would seem that many of the installations would be most effective if located in our territory.

If radars (or other sensors) are needed for the close examination of objects on ballistic trajectories, for discrimination of decoys, for accurate determination of trajectories, or for tracking during and after a manoeuvre, it is quite conceivable that sites in Canada would be advantageous. It is also possible that problems of nuclear blackout could make it desirable to have a widely based system of sensors. However, no requirement for sites in Canada has arisen to date with regard to active defence against ballistic missiles.

For both peaceful and military purposes, it is necessary to maintain detection, tracking, and surveillance of objects orbiting in space. Since polar orbits are concentrated on the northern latitudes, Canadian territory could have a particular value. This optical tracking camera at Cold Lake, Alberta, is used in this role. Such instruments serve useful purposes for scientific and commercial satellites, in co-operation with communication relays and telemetry stations.

In an active defence system intercepting ballistic missiles near the terminus of their intended trajectory, the anti-missile batteries will be sited in the general vicinity of the protected targets. Safeguard is such a system, as was its predecessor Sentinel. In neither case was there a request from the US for permission to locate installations north of the border. Analysis done in Canada indicates that little would be gained for defence of targets in the USA by siting missile batteries much to the north of the zones to be defended. It is possible that some advantage would be gained by placing some Perimeter Acquisition Radars (PARs) north of the border, especially if Safeguard is to have a capability to intercept missiles approaching on the low trajectories of the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) or Depressed Trajectory ICBM.

As regards the firing of defensive missiles over Canada and the bursting of defensive warheads above Canadian territory, the position of the more northerly targets in the US (such as the Minuteman complexes to be defended by the first phase of Safeguard) and the long range of the Spartan anti-missile missile make it very evident that the system cannot function unless anti-missile missiles launched from the northern Spartan batteries make their interception over Canada. Whether their altitude puts the missiles above the legal limit of national airspace, and into international outer space, is a question for space lawyers, but it should be remembered that they will only be fired as a defence against overflight by ICBMs launched across Canada with destructive intent.

The requirement to fire over Canada in defence of targets in the northern USA will apply to other long-range anti-missile missiles like Spartan. Sprint has a much shorter range, and it is quite possible that a terminal defence system specifically designed for the sole purpose of protecting small hard targets (such as Minuteman) would employ an interceptor with a range less than Sprint. Except for defence of targets within a very few miles of the border, such missiles would not have to intercept over Canada.

Risks to Life and Property from ABM

The next question to discuss is the physical risk to persons and property on the ground, whether Canadian or American. It has been mentioned that the Spartan has a very large thermonuclear warhead. The mechanism by which it destroys the effectiveness of the approaching ICBM functions best in the near-vacuum of outer space, and the intention of the system is to perform the interception far above the dense atmosphere.

Our calculations indicate that if a warhead of the general size of a Spartan were to burst 25 miles above a city, there could be some light damage to property from blast (broken windows) and, if the weather were clear, it is possible that fires could be started in tinder-like material and that the exposed skin of persons outside in the open could receive burns. These effects become very much more serious for bursts at lower altitude; indeed, it is probable that an attacker who wished to produce maximum casualties and damage to a city would fuse his ICBM warhead to burst no more than a few miles above the centre of the city, achieving most of his damage through blast and fire. However, the same effects become much weaker for bursts above the 25 mile altitude, and it is understood that all detonations of Spartan will be well above 25 miles.

If the weather is clear, a large nuclear detonation, even at high altitude, can pose a hazard to vision. If a person were outdoors when the detonation occurred, he would suffer a temporary flash blindness rather like snow blindness. If he were unfortunate enough to be looking in the general direction of the burst at the precise instant that it detonated, he could suffer some permanent but partial impairment of vision.

A Spartan burst would not produce a dangerous radioactive hazard on the ground. If all the megatons in all the Spartans in the full Safeguard deployment (12 sites) were detonated at their high operational altitude, the resulting radioactivity would be widely distributed through the stratosphere. Almost all of it would decay before eventually settling to earth. The increase to the general background level of radioactivity on the surface of the earth would be much less than that caused by

the approximately 400 nuclear explosions that have been let off above ground prior to 1968, and far below the tolerance levels agreed for industrial safety.

The other anti-missile missile, Sprint, has a very much smaller warhead than Spartan, and can, therefore, be used at much lower altitudes without inflicting serious damage on the ground. Like Spartan, it poses no significant danger of fallout. It is not yet known whether Sprints in the Safeguard plan will be close enough to the border for them to burst above Canadian territory.

Risks to Life and Property from ICBMs

One should not wax too indignant over the hazards inflicted by defensive ABM weapons without contemplating the effects of the offensive ICBM if it should succeed in its intended mission. If its target is a city, or an airfield, it may be fused for an airburst or a groundburst. The airburst produces a greater total area of damage to buildings of low resistance or to other comparatively soft structures (such as aircraft), and will not cause serious radioactive fallout.

If the target of the ICBM is a hardened missile silo or underground control centre, the probability of destruction may be increased by using a groundburst, since nothing can survive in the crater, and the shock transmitted through the earth might seriously damage underground installations.

A groundburst may produce heavy radioactive fallout, not only in the vicinity of the target but over very large areas downwind of the burst. The degree of radioactive contamination depends on the composition as well as the size of the nuclear weapon. The smaller weapons depend on fission, and it is the fission products which are strongly radioactive. Large weapons require fission to trigger them, but may achieve most of the energy release through fusion. If the proportion of fission is small, the bomb is described as "clean", and produces relatively little radioactive fallout even with a groundburst.

The possibility of serious "worldwide" fallout (as dramatized by novelists) would only exist if a very heavy attack were made using groundbursts with large "dirty" bombs. This could have unpleasant consequences for the attacker as well as the recipient, and is, therefore, unlikely to happen. Nevertheless, an attack aimed at hardened ICBM silos and underground control centres could well involve hundreds of ground bursts, and even if the weapons were "clean", the fallout within an area of many hundreds of miles from the weapon bursts could be very serious to human life.

All this has a very real significance for Canada. Depending on the political situation and the strategy selected by the USSR, Canadian cities and military installations might or might not be included as

targets. To pave the way for bomber penetration, air defence installations will be targeted. In addition, if the objective is to cripple their major opponent, it is difficult to believe that the Soviets would leave a friendly neighbour with an undamaged economy available to help in the rehabilitation of the USA.

The nature of fallout caused by groundburst nuclear weapons, and the geography and meteorology of North America, are such that a series of groundbursts in the northern half of the USA, particularly in the area of the Minuteman bases, is likely to produce heavy fallout in Canada. Consequently, even if Canada were fortunate enough to escape the impact of nuclear weapons on her own territory, she might still have to face the hazard of radioactive fallout due to nuclear weapons burst in the USA.

It may be possible that the result of detonating an anti-missile missile close to an incoming ICBM could be to make the ICBM detonate too. The designers of the ABM warhead intend that the defensive burst will damage the ICBM in such a way that its warhead will not produce a nuclear explosion, and this is most likely what will happen. However, it is believed in some quarters that the designers of the ICBM warhead can and will fit a special fuse causing it to detonate on the first receipt of radiation from the defensive explosion. Without judging the merits of this argument, it will nevertheless be true that, in every case, the total damage to North America would be less than would have been suffered if the ICBM had burst where its owners had intended.

To summarize, the significant risks come from the offensive ICBM (or SLBM) and not the defensive ABM. If ABM prevents an ICBM from bursting at its intended point, both lives and resources have been saved; if it prevents it from bursting on the ground, then the radioactive hazard has been decreased, to Canada as well as the USA, even if the targets were all south of the border.

Potential Protection for Canadian Targets

Although the Spartan anti-missile missile has a range of about 400 miles, it should not be concluded that it can protect every target within a circle of 400 miles radius centred on the missile site, and no target outside of that circle. The volume into which a Spartan can reach and intercept has the shape of an open umbrella, with the handle on the Spartan site, the stem vertical, and the rim some distance above the ground because of the need to limit the height of burst to a safe and effective altitude. The incoming ICBMs approach at a low angle (typically in the vicinity of 20-25 degrees from the horizontal for ranges of 5000-6000 miles). If one thinks of a shower of ICBMs as raindrops, driven nearly horizontal by a strong wind, it can be seen that the um-

brella will be able to keep an area on the ground dry which is not circular but oval, elongated in the down-wind direction, and with its centre down-wind of the battery site.

This "dry zone" is known as the "protected footprint". Its exact shape depends on the horizontal direction and the angle of descent of the ICBM, being shorter for the steeper trajectories. If the PAR makes an early detection of the incoming ICBM, establishes a track without undue delay and transfers the data to the Missile Site Radar (MSR), and if the decision to engage that ICBM from that Spartan site is taken promptly, then it may be possible to launch the Spartan in time to make the interception at its maximum range (on the surface of the "umbrella"). Otherwise, the radius of the umbrella and the size of the "dry zone" or footprint will be reduced.

A similar geometry on a reduced scale describes the protection afforded by the shorter range Sprint anti-missile missile.

If the USA deploys the full Safeguard system to give light area protection to all of the country, there would be five sites along the northern border, each equipped with PAR, MSR, and Spartan and Sprint. The approximate locations have been listed as:

Great Falls, Montana
Grand Forks, North Dakota
"Upper Northwest" (Washington State)
Michigan/Ohio Area
Southern New England

It is understood that the sites will not be close to large cities. Therefore, the purpose of the Sprints will be to defend the PAR, MSR, Spartan battery, and whatever ICBM and bomber installations are close enough. Thus, no Canadian protection can be expected from the Sprints of the Safeguard system. On the other hand, the protected footprints of the five Spartan batteries, plus the seven others that make up the full deployment, will cover all 48 states, providing protection to the American population against a light attack (from China), or from an accidental launching from any source.

A natural question to ask is whether it will be possible for these Spartan batteries to provide protection for Canadian population. Or, put another way, how many Canadians will live inside the "protected footprints" of the five northern Spartan batteries?

This question cannot be answered in detail without more precise knowledge of the performance of the components of the system, and of the location of the sites. Even with this information, it would still be necessary to postulate the exact trajectories that the attacking ICBMs would follow. However, by making estimates of all these factors, it is possible to state that Montreal and Toronto appear to be in a fringe area such that they could be defended

against some but not all of the most probable trajectories. If the attacker had the same information, and if he elected to attack these cities, he would presumably choose one of the trajectories least favourable to the defence. The degree of protection available to these two cities depends in a sensitive way on the exact position of the PAR/Spartan sites. The same relationship probably applies to many other of the larger Canadian cities, implying that a considerably increased protection could be given to them by moving PAR and/or Spartan sites to more northerly locations in the USA. There are, however, Canadian cities (such as Edmonton and St. Johns, Newfoundland) which are too far from the border to be protected from Spartan type installations in the USA.

It must be emphasized that such factors only determine whether it would be physically possible for ICBMs aimed at Canadian targets to be intercepted by Spartans sited in particular places. If it were physically possible, it would still have to be arranged in the firing doctrine and computer programming that the interceptions would, in fact, be attempted.

The question of potential protection for Canadian population has been discussed in terms of the planned deployment of Safeguard. However, even the full deployment (of 12 sites) can give no more than a thin degree of protection to American cities, which could be significant against a light or accidental attack but would be overwhelmed by a heavy attack. For this or other reasons, Canada may not wish to request protection for her population by Safeguard. Nevertheless, should strategic developments cause the USA to deploy a thick ABM system for defence of population against a heavy attack at some time in the future, it is probable that the capability of such a system to provide a comparable degree of protection to Canadian population would be governed by much the same factors as have been described for Safeguard.

ABM and NORAD

An important instrument for practical defence co-operation in North America is the NORAD Agreement. The mission of NORAD is defence against air attack, but its responsibilities include warning against missile and space attack as well. In the Agreement renewing NORAD for five years to 1973, it is stated "that this Agreement will not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence".

From a strategic point of view, anti-bomber and anti-missile defence are part of a single problem. To determine whether North America is being threatened, or should alter its state of alert, many types of information are wanted, and should be assessed as a whole rather than piecemeal. Strategic decisions and operations are most effectively handled as a single aerospace activity.

NORAD receives information concerning missile and space activity from many sources. ICBMs approaching over the polar regions would be detected by the BMEWS. This consists of large detection and tracking radars in Alaska, Greenland, and England, whose information is relayed to the computers in the NORAD Combat Centre. Many of the communications circuits come through Canada. Processed warning information is passed on to other organizations such as the National Military Command Centre in Washington, National Defence HQ in Ottawa, the US Strategic Air Command, and Supreme HQ Allied Powers, Europe. Radars at air defence sites on both coasts of the USA have been modified to enable detection and warning to be given if SLBMs were to appear.

In order to be able to give warning against attack from space, NORAD operates a Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) with a variety of sensors in many locations. A Canadian contribution is the Baker-Nunn optical camera at Cold Lake, Alberta. The reports of objects in space are catalogued by computers in the NORAD Space Defence Centre, which continually updates the information on orbiting satellites, spent booster tankage, and other objects. By watching these, it is possible to detect manoeuvres or disappearances, predict re-entry, and identify the appearance of new objects.

Thus, NORAD can detect, identify, and give warning of ICBM and SLBM attack against North America, and can observe the movements of objects orbiting in space. But it cannot intercept or destroy ballistic missiles.

To carry out its mission of defence of the North American continent against air attack, NORAD conducts the operational control of the air defence forces such as radar stations, interceptor squadrons, and surface-to-air missile batteries. Some of these are located in Canada, some in the USA. Some are manned by Canadians, some by Americans. Some are financed by Canada, some by the USA. Certain weapon systems (such as the Hercules surface-to-air missiles) are entirely American in location, manning, and financing, but come, nevertheless, under the operational control of NORAD.

If Safeguard or some other ABM system is deployed in North America, arrangements will have to be made for its operational control. Also, the information necessary in order to assess the overall strategic situation and make the major strategic decisions regarding aerospace defence must be provided. The necessary type of information is very much the same as that already collected by NORAD today, but five years hence there would probably be additional sources from new systems of missile detection and space surveillance.

Many of the tactical decisions made in air defence depend on the assessments by experienced

officers of a situation presented to them by the communication and display system. Although they have to make their decisions quickly, the speed of human reaction supported by the SAGE computer is sufficient to permit identification and interceptions to be made. The approaching aircraft are unlikely to be moving faster than about 10 miles a minute.

The more detailed command and control of the units of an ABM system are likely to be somewhat different in character from that for air defence units. ICBMs will approach at speeds above 250 miles a minute. There is an opportunity, in principle at least, to allot defensive weapons to attackers with full knowledge of the intended targets, since the future trajectory of a ballistic missile can be predicted (unlike that of a bomber). Because many of the characteristics and tactics of the ICBMs attack are not known, but must be assumed in order to make the decisions regarding defence, it will be desirable to correct inaccurate assumptions as soon as they are perceived, and make the improved information available to the entire defence system very quickly indeed.

The only way to handle such a problem is by a very considerable extension of the role of computers. Practically all of the operational control of the weapons will have to be performed by computer, following instructions programmed into them long before the battle is joined. The main decisions will be taken when the computer programs are designed, although further decision will probably be required prior to and during the battle.

From the Canadian point of view, it can be said that NORAD has proven to be an efficient and satisfactory means of handling the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information regarding aerospace activity, and the operational control of active air defence. It has served, in addition, as a convenient and useful channel for the exchange of technical and planning information between the two partners.

However, if ABM becomes a reality, it may or may not prove desirable to place its operational control under NORAD, quite aside from considerations of Canadian participation. At the present time, the US has not decided how the operational control of Safeguard will be organized, and it does not appear that a decision is a matter of urgency.

Summary

In order for the Safeguard system to defend targets in the northern United States, it will be necessary for them to intercept ICBMs above Canadian territory. This will likely be true for any future ABM systems employing long-range anti-missile missiles.

The effects on persons or property on the ground due to interception by Spartans or Sprints will be

negligible in comparison to the effects of ICBMs or SLBMs which reach their targets. In addition, the successful operation of an ABM system would reduce the risks from fallout for all the inhabitants of North America.

The ability of the full Safeguard system to extend its limited protection to major Canadian centres of population is not certain, and would depend among other things on the exact locations selected for PARs and Spartans. The same would likely apply to future ABM systems designed to protect US population.

NORAD is very effective for the processing of intelligence information regarding the aerospace threat, and the operational control of the forces for anti-bomber defence, and has also proven to be a useful channel for technical information and planning between Canada and the USA. It is too soon to forecast what the US view will be regarding the relationship between NORAD and Safeguard, quite apart from whether Canada does or does not elect to participate in any aspect of active ballistic missile defence.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON


**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 47

TUESDAY, MAY 27, 1969



Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

Including

Appendix DDD—Index of Issues 19-20 and ~~23-25~~ inclusive

22-35

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Cafik	Laniel	Roberts
Carter	Laprise	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Fairweather	Legault	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Winch—(30)
Goyer	Marceau	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

TUESDAY, May 27, 1969.
(74)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Goyer, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, MacLean, Nowlan, Ryan, Roberts, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (19).

Also present: Mr. Buchanan, M.P.

Witness: Mr. John Gellner, Editor *Commentator*, Toronto.

The Chairman welcomed Mr. John Gellner who had been retained to provide an assessment of the Departemental paper on NORAD.

The Committee agreed to print the comprehensive index of Issues Nos. 19-20 and 22-35 inclusive, prepared by Mr. Dobell's office, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix DDD*). The Committee also agreed to print copies of the index, separately, as well.

Mr. Gellner made an opening statement and then was questioned by Members, on subjects related to NORAD.

The Vice-Chairman took the Chair at approximately 11:50 a.m.

The Committee agreed to print Mr. Gellner's advance presentation as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix EEE*).

At 12:35 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING (75)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:05 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Cafik, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Laniel, Marceau, Penner, Roberts, Ryan, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch (12).

Witness: Mr. John Gellner.

Members continued their questioning of Mr. Gellner during this evening's sitting.

At 10:05 p.m., on completion of the questioning, the Vice-Chairman thanked Mr. Gellner and the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday May 27, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we are ready to begin.

I would like to welcome Mr. John Gellner to this session of the Committee's hearings on NORAD. Mr. Gellner is familiar to all members as he appeared before the Committee on January 21 in connection with our earlier study of NATO.

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You will recall that Mr. Gellner has been retained by the Committee to provide a critical assessment and evaluation of the paper on NORAD that was prepared by the Department of National Defence and presented by Lieut. General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD.

I think all members who have studied that working paper prepared by the Department of National Defence were impressed by its thoroughness and the value of the information contained in it. Basically however, we did want to have an outside evaluation just to avoid any suggestion that we were being unduly influenced by a departmental point of view. For the same reason, you will recall that I announced the fact that copies of that departmental working paper had been circulated to a very wide and representative mailing list for critical evaluation and comment. It went, for example, to the heads of political science departments of all universities in Canada, it went to the editors of the major daily newspapers, and it went to all those expert witnesses who appeared before us on the NATO inquiry. Moreover and I think this is vital, the Department of National Defence knew before they prepared the paper and submitted it to us that we were going to test its objectivity, completeness and content in that way. I think that we have established a pretty good procedure and one which will go a long way toward guaranteeing the objectivity and content of the working papers that are presented to the Committee.

Members have mentioned that it would be very helpful if we had an index of our NATO

proceedings. Mr. Dobells' office very kindly has prepared such an index. Although copies are available for all members it occurred to us that perhaps it would be desirable to have it printed, preferably as a separate document, so that it can be inserted in the appropriate place in our NATO proceedings.

Is this agreeable to members of the Committee?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Coming back to Mr. Gellner's paper, this was distributed to members yesterday. It deals primarily with the NORAD paper which was presented by Lieut. General Sharp, although incidently it also discusses some points raised by Dr. Lindsey in his papers where these were particularly relevant.

I should add that Dr. Lindsey's paper will be subject to the same procedure of evaluation at a later date, Dr. Michael E. Sherman having been retained for this purpose. It has been emphasized that these evaluations are to be critical ones designed to test the objectivity and completeness of the working papers, are themselves to be objective and are not to reflect personal points of view. If personal points of view are to be contained in the working paper they are to be identified as such.

As Mr. Gellner had only two weeks to prepare this paper and to appear before the Committee prior to his departure for Europe the day after tomorrow, members have had only a brief opportunity to study it.

Mr. Gellner has assessed the nine major subjects raised in the Department of National Defence paper, namely The Need for an Integrated System, Canada's Contribution to the Integrated System, American Military Presence in Canada, the Bomber Threat, Effectiveness of NORAD System in an Emergency, Defects of Present System, The Alternative: AWACS, Cost of Change-over to AWACS, and Space Defence.

Now if we were to proceed logically, it would probably be best if we proceeded

subject by subject. From past experience I am not sure that this will work in a practical way. Which way do you wish to proceed? Do you want me to ask you to limit your questions to each one of these headings or would it be more practical to permit members to range over the entire paper? Is it feasible to limit questions heading by heading or do members prefer to raise question on any one of these nine subjects when their turn comes for questioning?

Mr. Forrestall: I would prefer to ramble, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nowlan: I would agree with Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Chairman. It is nothing new to ramble in any committee, especially this one,

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with all deference. While it looks more orderly to take it section by section we did have an experience with Transport just the other day. One member had a particular pet peeve on one of the first items, kept the witness going on that subject all morning, and other members could not even get around to asking any questions. I would like to see a general approach taken.

The Chairman: It has been suggested that we follow a rambling approach rather than a scientific, one.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, I would not put it that way. I think it is difficult to adhere to one of these sections. We may pass sections 1, 2 and 3 and be on section 4 and some of the matters in that section may relate back to others. I think they are all related and it is very difficult to restrict the questioning at any one time to one section.

The Chairman: Is that agreeable?

Mr. Fairweather: This does not refer to our witness, and I realize the time limitation, but I am wondering if there is not a way we can so arrange things to get a paper of this length a little earlier than the day before the hearing. Some of us had other things to do. I confess frankly that I have read about one third of it, just because of lack of time. I am not referring to Mr. Gellner but to the principle of receiving papers a little earlier, if possible.

The Chairman: The next one will be Dr. Michael E. Sherman's and we will do our best to get that to members in time. If necessary we could postpone the meeting. We rather

hesitated to postpone this one. It seems then, if Dr. Gellner is agreeable, that we will have rambling discussion rather than limiting it section by section.

Have members had an opportunity to glance through the paper? Dr. Gellner, could you perhaps make a very short introductory remark. No doubt we will be able to complete the reading of the paper in any event before the meeting is over.

Mr. John Gellner, Editor, the Commentator, Toronto: In this case I would like only to say that I tried to have a look at the present system. It seems to me that while the present system was the one considered acceptable and necessary at the time, it was construed about ten years ago and has certain defects which the new system, the AWACS system, is trying to eliminate.

Now these defects were brought out in the previous papers and testimonies which were put before you—except that in my opinion one great defect was not strongly enough stated. This is no reflection on the previous testimony, it simply did not come to this point.

In general the defences are too far South. We speak about interception as far north as possible but if you look at the map attached to the working paper of the department and if you realize that at best the heavy radars of the system have a range of about 200 miles against targets at 30,000 feet, much less of course as you come down—it is only about 100 miles against targets at 10,000 feet—and if you then measure off a distance of a maximum of 200 miles from the radars which are farthest North, that is from the interception radar, not the DEW Line—the DEW Line has no interception capabilities—you will find that this system simply cannot intercept very far to the north because we would be out of reach of our detection apparatus.

The fact that the system is so far south therefore brings in itself a certain danger. Now you have heard, and I agree, that if it comes to a nuclear war it is possibly not

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really relevant whether we are killed by the offensive missiles or the defensive missiles. But I think this is over-simplicity because certain people—after all it is a question of individuals and groups of people—may not be touched in a nuclear war but may be touched by the fact that the defences are so far south. I gave in the paper an example at random of a city like London, Ontario. There may be no

missile or no bomber ticketed to bomb London, Ontario. It may not be a worthwhile target for the enemy. However, the Detroit defences contain a missile, the Nike-Hercules, with a maximum range of 75 miles. This missile fired northwards would explode just about in the London area, and therefore a weapon which may well have been destined for New York may then fall on London.

From the standpoint of somebody who lives there, this is significant. It cannot be said for this group of people that it just does not matter whether they are killed by offensive or defensive weapons because they may not be killed by offensive weapons. Therefore, there is a good case for bringing the system farther north. This system of fixed installations which we have now cannot be brought farther north.

As far as the ABMs are concerned, I made the point that our doubts of whether or not we should take part are not very relevant because we already participate, and we have participated for a lengthy time. We have not participated, and do not participate, in an active defence system; that is, in a weapons system which is capable of intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles. The United States is not participating in such a system because it does not exist.

In everything that exists today, the capacity to track objects in space—and this may well be ballistic missiles; we hope not—in the detection line, which is the ballistic missile early warning line, in planning at Colorado Springs headquarters, and in all these areas of space defence, we participate on an equal level with the Americans. The Americans have no active defences either. They are just planning one, the Safeguard system.

So this question about whether we should or should not go into space defence has somehow been answered, because we have decided at one point in the past to participate. This point in the past is, of course, several years ago.

I have now come to a short chapter which I may perhaps read because it is only a couple of paragraphs. There I somehow summarized, as I said in the paper, leaving out all figures, all ranges, all costs, and so on.

The present North American air defence setup—the present one—makes it mandatory for the United States and Canada to operate it in common. AWACS could be operated separately, that is, a Canadian AWACS system and an American AWACS system, but

only at the price of lesser efficiency on both sides, higher cost for Canada, probably diminished safety for the United States.

It would not be practical for Canada to continue on its own the present system, that is, a fixed installation system, on Canadian territory when the United States changes over to AWACS. Since the latter, the AWACS, puts an even higher premium on the availability of Canadian air space, airfields, and communications than does the present system, there should be a different arrangement for

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sharing capital costs from that which prevailed when the present organization was established.

An added bonus from AWACS would be that it would enable Canada to maintain a proper surveillance of Canadian air space, and that it would help in the surveillance of Canadian territory and sea approaches as well.

The question of Canadian participation in ABM defence does not arise; we already participate. Our continuing as partners in NORAD does not depend on whether or not we take part in the operation of the Safeguard system but the latter should, in any case, even if it is entirely U.S. operated, come under NORAD.

The Chairman: Thank you, very much, Mr. Gellner. I have a number of questioners, Mr. Laniel and Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Gellner, on pages 6 and 7 of your brief you point out the slowness with which the NORAD system operates due to the two key control system. You say at the top of page 7, "the fact remains that the system as a whole reacted too slowly to be fully effective if it had really come to war".

As long as we have this two-key control system, and it would seem that it is necessary with nuclear weapons, how effective can this system be? I see on page 6 you pointed out that it took the Canadian government 42 hours to make up its mind what to do at the time of the Cuban crisis. How effective can any sort of system be that needs atomic weapons to defend the territory?

Mr. Gellner: I said also in this paper, sir, that it is inevitable when two sovereign states make a treaty that there is, of course, a certain delay as two sovereign states make up their minds. I gave the example of Cuba

more as an example to show that governmental machinery will have to be speeded up if the system is to work effectively. How you are going to do it is your business. Forty-two hours, of course, is much, much too long for a decision.

Mr. Allmand: How quick would you think that the decision would have to be made to be effective?

Mr. Gellner: In the case of ABM it would not be very important if the Safeguard system came in because the Safeguard system will be entirely American.

Mr. Allmand: I am thinking of the bomber attack.

Mr. Gellner: In a bomber attack I would think—this a ball park figure, and it is pure speculation—it should not be more than two hours.

Mr. Allmand: I have another question. On page 10 you state that the Americans are now dismantling the present NORAD system. You say that "they have begun a phased dismantling" and also that they "are not installing gap-fillers". Does this mean that in this period before they have gone ahead with the AWAC system that we have a void in the air defence of North America, and if we can afford this void at this time, how much does that say for the need of proceeding with a more complicated and more expensive system?

Mr. Gellner: We have this void already and have had it for the last years. I said in the paper that the DEW Line which is only a single line can probably be avoided by flying so low that the DEW Line radars will not pick up the aircraft. This cannot be done with the Pinetree Line, or probably not. I would like to say that I will always say "probably" and "likely", because there may be many variables I do not know about.

From the look of it, the Pinetree Line cannot be avoided by low flying, and certainly not easily, because it has so much depth that a jet aircraft would have to fly low for a very long distance. It has to fly 200 miles before it comes to the northernmost radar and then it still has to go through usually three or four

Between the DEW Line and the Pinetree Line there is in any case a hole in the middle where a bomber can move freely. This hole in the middle is very dangerous because with an improvement of air-to-surface weapons the bombers may fire the air-to-surface weapons from a position where the bomber cannot be detected. This situation already exists.

Mr. Allmand: That is apart from the dismantling.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, that is apart from it. Even if the system were not in a planned way gradually weakened, this difficulty would arise. The gap-fillers which have not been installed would intercept low flying aircraft. They have not been installed, even at a time when AWACS was not yet in the cards. It is a complicated and costly thing. When I spoke about the thinning out I referred for instance to the East Coast, where the Americans in Labrador and Newfoundland have closed down certain radars. I think what you are doing is that you are taking a certain calculated risk to make the transition slower, more planned and better phased.

Mr. Allmand: You do not think that the reason why they are taking this calculated risk is because they feel rather secure, not because of the air defence system but because of the balance of power and the deterrent effect of the second-strike of the United States. That is the real security.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, I would now say that the situation is very stable. But you do now know what it will be. Perhaps they think that while the situation is so stable, and the deterrent so powerful—whereas nothing much has been found to weaken the deterrent—that they can best afford going over from one system to the other. But, we will still need a system which would deny any enemy the control of our air space, and this AWACS system would be the better one. It would also, of course, be the better one for us because as I pointed out it would come much closer to the demand put by the Canadian government on April 3 of this year to have surveillance of our own air space by our own means.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather, Mr. Brewin, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Thompson and Mr. Cafik. Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: I do not want to re-fight Canada's response in the Cuba crisis except to ask whether there might not be some validity because of our integrated command

lines of radar, and in some places only two lines of radars.

in NORAD to have been privy to the political decisions which led up to the stage of alert which you mention. As I understand it, the governments of the world were notified on that Monday and Canada, although part of this integrated command, had no advance warning. Now, history and others can say I am wrong. You cannot do it.

Mr. Gellner: Oh, no. I think the government was quite justified in saying that we were informed but not consulted. I think—as far as I know, and I am no expert on Canadian politics—but as far as we know from such authoritative works as *Canada in World Affairs*, the position of the government was that we were informed but not consulted. Now whether or not it was prudent to punish ourselves by the 42-hour delay, because it may have resulted in self-punishment since we were not consulted, is something for you to decide. The Minister of National Defence at that time, who is present here today, apparently—again following what I learned from books—took some steps on his own to alleviate the situation without cabinet approval, he considered it so serious.

Mr. Fairweather: Now, turning to the other aspects of the paper, is the AWACS system primarily orientated to a manned bomber assault?

Mr. Gellner: The AWACS system is only orientated to the manned bomber and to the air breathing missile, which is the missile that goes through the atmosphere. Of course, the Russians also have such missiles, for instance, on their submarines. An example of an air breathing missile is the BOMARC.

Mr. Fairweather: Is there any validity to the suggestion that Canadian are paying a great deal more attention to mounting an AWACS system than the Americans, now that the proposition is highly experimental?

Mr. Gellner: As far as I know they are proceeding on it with all deliberate speed. They are examining the type of aircraft, and radar. As well, they are developing a missile and proceeding on AWACS.

Mr. Fairweather: But no contracts have been let for the aircraft to carry the AWACS system yet?

Mr. Gellner: Well again, this is all hearsay. It would not take much time because the airframe of either the Boeing 707 of the DC-8s would do the trick, so the production

of the AWACS aircraft itself would not take very long. Of course, what will take time is the production of the proper electronic equipment for this aircraft. The aircraft are, in fact, available if it is true that they are only thinking in terms of the Boeing 707 or of the DC-8s.

Mr. Fairweather: I have noticed that, for instance, Senator Stennis, who is Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has expressed a serious reservation about the proposal. I think that is all for the minute.

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The Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Gellner, in your paper at least twice towards the end you refer to the fact that Canada cannot be dissociated from the idea of ABM defence, and that we already participate in it. I am referring to what you said at pages 16 and 17. I take it that they both refer to what you said at page 14; namely, that we were always engaged in ABM defence because the mission of NORAD is to defend North America against attack from air and from space. Missiles, as well as bombers, are a form of invasion of space. Is that your reasoning?

Mr. Gellner: Bombers are an invasion of air, and ballistic missiles an invasion of space.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, but your argument is that NORAD has always been involved in anti-ballistic missile considerations, and that we cannot dissociate ourselves from it. Your thesis is that we already participate in it.

Mr. Gellner: We have already participated for several years.

Mr. Brewin: Surely that does not mean that we participate in any particular system of ABM defence, whether we judge it to be effective or useful or otherwise. You are not suggesting that, are you?

Mr. Gellner: No, no. I made this special point in saying that we could continue in NORAD and in what we are doing without ever touching the Safeguard system. As an example I gave that of the Americans with a Nike-Hercules system under NORAD which is, so to speak, administered by us too, because the Deputy Commander is a Canadian and so are other important staff officers. We do not participate in the point-defence provided by Nike-Hercules, so we would not have to participate in the point-defence provided by Safeguard, either.

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Mr. Brewin: Therefore I take it that you would agree that as a sovereign nation it is up to us to make up our minds as to whether any particular system contributes effectively to the defence of North America?

Mr. Gellner: Absolutely, and we do it. I gave the example of Nike Hercules. In our judgment we did not think that we needed to link Montreal and Toronto with Nike Hercules in the same way as Chicago and Detroit are linked by Nike Hercules. This was a Canadian judgment. We did not take the weapon, but this does not mean that we have dissociated ourselves from Nike Hercules. Nike Hercules is commanded just as much from Colorado Springs as any other weapon system in NORAD, and we are co-responsible for any kind of decision which is made in NORAD because we are a partner. Therefore we could very well say that this Safeguard system protects the Minuteman sites in the Northern states. We have no Minuteman sites to protect, ergo we are not taking Safeguard for any other reason. It is our wish. I wanted to say that we have not dissociated ourselves from defence against attacks from space, we have co-operated.

Mr. Brewin: That is right, but by this statement you are not implying any approval, for Canada at least, of participation in a particular Safeguard system, to take an example?

Mr. Gellner: I am happy to say that it is absolutely up to us whether we adopt the weapon system or not. I can give you another example. We decided to adopt the defensive fighter, the F-101. The Americans adopted the F-106 after the F-101. This is perfectly all right. Of course, the Americans are responsible for our flight operations and we for the American flight operations with different weapon systems because we are an integrated command, but our freedom of choice of weapon systems is not impaired at all.

Mr. Brewin: I see. You do not intend to imply by this from your point of view, let alone what we are free to do, any particular approval of the Safeguard system?

Mr. Gellner: If you are asking for my personal opinion, for what it is worth, and it is not worth very much, I would say from what we know about the Safeguard system that it would not be of any use to us on Canadian soil. From what I can gather from the published, non-classified information this is a sys-

tem which will protect the second-strike capability of a deterrent force, and as we do not have a deterrent force we really do not need Safeguard. That is all there is to it.

Mr. Brewin: May I ask you to go a little further. At the foot of page 12 you say:

The same applies to ballistic missiles, or will, if and when some kind of active ABM defence that will work is established.

Are you implying that in your view at the present time no kind of active ABM defence that will work is established?

Mr. Gellner: No. I should have said "embraced". We know nothing more about Safeguard—and again I must make the proviso, as far as I know—except that the two missiles in Safeguard work. However, so far there have been no Safeguard installations and as far as I know none will be established until 1973, so we do not really know what is going to happen.

Mr. Brewin: You are not making any judgment, then, on whether the system when installed will work?

Mr. Gellner: I am sure that when the system is installed it will work, it will intercept oncoming missiles because Spartan and Sprint

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are outcomes of the tested system, Nike X, which was tested repeatedly and has intercepted ballistic missiles. I suppose the radar connected with it is capable of seeing ballistic missiles because we can already track ballistic missiles. So, from a technical standpoint there is no reason the thing should not work, but the question really is how far will it overcome a strengthened attack. These are again ball park figures and I am only giving them as an illustration, but if you were to ask me, "Will the system intercept five ballistic missiles?" I think I could unhesitatingly say, "Yes, it will intercept five ballistic missiles". If you were to ask me "Will it intercept 500?", that is another question and I would be more than doubtful. It depends. Undoubtedly a few ballistic missiles would be intercepted by Safeguard.

Mr. Brewin: Let me put this to you. I know you follow these things. Have you followed the hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate, of the United States strategic and foreign policy implications of ABM systems?

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: I understand that a number of distinguished scientists, including Dr. York and Dr. Hans Bethe, have objected to the system on the grounds that by stepping up penetration aids, and by what they technically call blackout and other means, the attack can easily outdo the defence. It may produce the same level of security as before, perhaps, but at much greater expense. Have I stated it correctly?

Mr. Gellner: Yes, but I think I would disagree with these scientists on this ground. There is always a tendency to look at the worst, as if everything a nation had would be used to overwhelm the Safeguard system. If you think of the Safeguard system at present—and leaving aside the mythical question of the Chinese missiles, we do not know yet whether they have a missile, and looking just at the Soviet missiles—what it wants to do is to make sure that not all the Minutemen will be knocked out and therefore—enough of a second-strike capability will remain to make it deadly risky for an attacker to contemplate an attack. There are 1,000 Minutemen there. To make it a deadly risk for an attacker to attack would probably only require—and these are again ball park figures—that 200 survive because 200 Minutemen would make mincemeat out of the Soviet Union. If the Safeguard system assures a weakening of the attack, it has already fulfilled its purpose of insuring the second-strike capability of the United States.

I will give you an example. The French are now building a missile system of their own in which they are just using hardened sites and they are confident that these sites, because of the configuration of the terrain, will withstand an attack. They are satisfied that these 30 missiles would create such havoc in the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union would think twice before it attacked. This shows you that it is not a question of beating off an attack, it is a question of insuring the survival of enough of the deterrent capacity to keep

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the deterrent operating. That is the purpose of Safeguard. I would say that if Safeguard knocks down a few missiles it would enhance the second-strike capability of the United

States. If the expenditure of \$7.8 billion to knock down a few ballistic missiles is worthwhile, that is for the Americans to decide.

Mr. Brewin: Then you apparently do not accept the view of Dr. York, for example, that there are such disadvantages, problems of design, that "the capability either of the Sentinel system or the hard-point defense ABM to accomplish its task..." is in serious doubt. You apparently do not have the same doubts.

Mr. Gellner: NIKE X has been repeatedly tested. Again, I do not have my notes here, but missiles fired, I believe, from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California were repeatedly intercepted by defensive missiles fired from the Kwajalein atoll in Micronesia.

I would like to repeat that the weapons which are incorporated in the Safeguard system are no different from the weapons of the NIKE X system; they are only refined. The whole conglomerate of radars in the two different weapons systems is new, but every part of that has been independently proven. I cannot believe that a tested weapon will fail every time. It may not do what it is expected to do, but it will do 20, 30, or 40 per cent of what it is expected to do. I would like to repeat that it cannot beat off a missile attack. It can make part of the deterrent force survive.

Mr. Brewin: But can it not be overbalanced by the development of other techniques on the other side, so that all you are doing is putting in a defence that makes the attack a little more hazardous? Then the attack, in order to get even, can react, or perhaps even over-react? Is that not correct?

Mr. Gellner: The whole story of warfare is a continuous struggle between offence and defence. Sometimes one and sometimes the other prevails. For instance, as you know, in World War I the defence had it over the offence. Barbed wire, trenches and machine guns practically stopped the biggest armies the world has ever seen. In World War II, in general, the offence had it over the defence. Here the advantages are definitely with the offence, but this does not mean that the defence does not have certain capabilities.

In the field of bomber defence, as an example, the enemy has ticketed one aircraft to destroy Winnipeg. If this aircraft is destroyed by the defence over the Arctic Circle that is very nice for Winnipeg. It is not going to beat off a possible bomber attack, in itself, but it confers a certain local advantage.

We do not know but that defence against ballistic missiles will come eventually. Plans are now afoot to provide—or there is thinking—a blanket defence. That is a pool of radiation and heat that probably, or hopefully, will destroy all missiles that come into it. If this comes, then the defence will have the momentary advantage until the offence overcomes it again. It is a seesaw battle.

Mr. Brewin: Yes. I would like to pursue it with you, but I will not. I just have one or two further questions.

Appropos what you have already said, I think, in answer to Mr. Allmand, I want to read to you again from the summary of Dr. York's evidence before the Senate Committee:

Another result of the arms race is that, due to the ever-increasing complexity of both offensive and defensive systems, the power to make certain life and death decisions is inexorably passing from statesmen and politicians to more narrowly focused technicians, and from human beings to machines. An ABM deployment would speed up this process.

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Are you in agreement with that?

Mr. Gellner: The ABM system, like any other system using nuclear weapons, still requires the release by the President of the United States of the nuclear warheads. I cannot see why an ABM system would be treated differently—that is, would not require the release by the President, if the offensive weapons do.

It is true that everything comes closer to computer control, but as long as you maintain the situation which we had in the Cuba crisis, in which the Canadian Cabinet can say "We just do not play", this over-rides all the computers in the world—and it did over-ride them.

Mr. Brewin: Are you confident of that? It seems to me quite hard to accept that where the decision has to be made in a hurry some means will not be found of delegating it, if there is any sort of tension, so that it will, in fact, be made in a hurry. Otherwise, you might as well not make the decision at all. The blow would have been launched.

It seems to me that the point Dr. York makes is a sound one, that the whole nature of the process is removing decision from presidents and politicians, however much they may have it in theory, and handing it over to

the machine that has to see in a hurry what is coming over and respond. Is that not right?

Mr. Gellner: I have full confidence in the Canadian Government. It will not abrogate its power to a computer. I am fairly certain of that.

Mr. Brewin: Will it not be too late then for them to act on this system?

Mr. Gellner: I can see the possibility, if there is terrible strain in the world, of all cabinet ministers having these little bellboys in their pockets, and being in continuous communication, so that a cabinet meeting can be held whether they are together or not. I think it could possibly be done that way, but this is speculation.

Mr. Brewin: It takes only 10 to 15 minutes for a missile to travel from Asia or Europe to North America, does it not?

Mr. Gellner: Yes; it takes about 15 to 25 minutes.

Mr. Brewin: Then I do not understand how one can have cabinet meetings of the Canadian Government, the contacting of the American government, and then a decision to respond.

Mr. Gellner: To fire the ABMs would only require the decision of the President of the United States. I do not know how fast he can respond. The firing of the retaliatory missiles is not something which has to be done immediately because they are in hardened sites. They are in submarines. The outlook may be protected by an ABM system. So there is a little more time. You do not have to react immediately. Of course, to be effective the ABM has to be fired, and the President of the United States, or his deputy, will have to be on call.

Mr. Brewin: I think that is what Dr. York has in mind. I will pass now, although there are many other things I would like to ask you about.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Brewin. Lest I forget, would the Committee agree to the printing of Mr. Gellner's advance presentation as an appendix to today's *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Laniel is the next questioner.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gellner, you say in your paper that the air defence of North America is a single and indivisible problem. This makes me wonder why Alaska is not integrated in that, or is not part of the NORAD organization? Can you think of any reason for that?

Mr. Gellner: I understand that the Alaskan command is under NORAD. It is just not one of the joint organizations. It is completely U.S.-run. But the defence of the whole of

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North America, including Alaska, as far as I know, has always been under NORAD. As I have said, the only difference is that it is not one of the joint regions. It is an entirely U.S. region.

Mr. Laniel: If the case of Alaska can be taken as a possible exception, do you think it could be possible for NORAD to re-arrange its regions to give more sovereignty to Canadian territory in the sense that if the region would correspond to the Canadian territory and to the border line, Canada could envisage a possibility of manning everything under its territory itself?

Mr. Gellner: It is, of course, theoretically possible. The defences are patterned so that they will be most efficient; that is, for the least expenditure of manpower and of money the results which can be achieved will be achieved.

When you look at your map section in the working paper you see the all-important position of the SAGE centres, the big computers into which all information is fed and which automatically give information necessary for the tracking, interception, and destruction of an attacker. You will find that out of four SAGE centres three are in the United States and one is in Canada. This is not for nationalist reasons but because of the defence pattern.

Obviously, we could install our own SAGE centres north of our border and we could have our own backup radars, our own viewing system, and man it all ourselves. It is theoretically possible. It would not be as efficient and it would not be as economical as the present system, but we could do it.

When you come to the new system, AWACS, it would be easier because the control is in the aircraft itself. I am not quite sure whether there will not be some ground installations, but probably none of very great import. The whole idea is to make the system

independent of fixed installations. Since this control would be in the aircraft we could have it in such a way that aircraft which are stationed in Canada would be entirely Canadian-manned, both AWACS control aircraft and the fighters.

In this case I would hope that there would be a very heavy financial contribution from the United States because the bulk of the AWACS aircraft would, in fact, I believe, have to be stationed in Canada and they would render the United States a very great service. So even if you decided that all aircraft stationed in Canada must have Canadian crews, must be serviced by Canadians, and there must be no Americans on the airfield or in the aircraft, then at least you would have to negotiate a very heavy financial contribution from the United States for the services so rendered. Under AWACS it is possible, but under the present system I do not think it is practical.

Mr. Laniel: The reason why I ask you this is that myself and maybe other people in Canada did not really appreciate what happened during the Cuban crisis. You said Canada was informed and not consulted.

Mr. Gellner: I think I understand that this was a statement of the government. I have no access to it.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but just assuming that this is the fact, I think that if Canada has a chance to hold a closer control than it has on part of the system, a more sovereign control, it might prevent repetition of a situation like

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this. I do not know. If you look at the map of the NORAD organization, you see that it covers the eastern region which only touches a very small part of Canada. The United States probably made up its mind that this was its own business between itself and Russia, but it could have ended up in a war.

Mr. Gellner: This is obviously a concern of the Canadian government. I will quote from the text of the government's statement of April 3, 1969. The government said, "The role assigned to Canadian forces in the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines in the interest of protecting our own sovereignty. . ." is the prime mission of the forces. In another spot it said, "We shall endeavour to have those activities within Canada which are essential to North American defence performed by Canadian forces."

My argument is that this will only be possible at unreasonable sacrifice under the present system of fixed installations, but it may well be possible under the system of mobile installations.

However, I would like to repeat, if the government will insist, first, on surveillance of our air space territory and territorial waters, then second, as long as those activities are based in Canada, we should endeavour to have those activities done by Canadian forces. I would hope that the Americans would pay a great part of the cost because they would benefit highly from the same activities.

Mr. Laniel: Taking the example of the Nike-Hercules, although you said it was not necessary that Canada be involved in the ABM system, would you think it would be better if it was? Would you admit that it would give the chance to meet the requirement and to improve the present defence system by moving it to a northern part of North America?

Mr. Gellner: I would like to emphasize that I said that we are engaged in the ABM system and rightly so. What we do not have to do is to take part in certain weapon systems which are connected with anti-ballistic missile defence. I do not believe that any purpose would be served by stationing weapons in Canada. There may be a certain purpose in stationing the connected radars farther north. This is something which I do not know really, but this would give a significant advantage. This is possible.

As far as the weapons are concerned, the Spartan long-range missiles and the Sprint short-range missiles, no advantage would be gained by having such weapons stationed in Canada because the system primarily is devised to defend certain areas in which Minutemen missiles are located. These are in Montana, North Dakota and around there. So Sprint, just like Nike-Hercules against bombers, is a point defence weapon. It is so to speak on top of the missiles to defend them at short range.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but would you mean by this that the Spartan and Sprint that would have the responsibility of defending a minuteman site would have to make the selection of the missile close enough so that it would know the intent of the missile, or is it possible to try and cut off the missile attack generally in the northern part of the country?

Mr. Gellner: You could not do it with Sprint. Sprint, I understand, has a range of only 30 miles, and therefore this is the last resort. The attacking missile has already gone through. Spartan uses space, and therefore it

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does not really matter. There the missile is intercepted. Certainly there is an advantage. It would be an advantage in intercepting the missile just at the moment when it is fired. We all know, from watching TV, that after firing it moves very slowly and, therefore, the interception would be easiest at the moment of firing. Perhaps a weapon will be found, possibly a cruising satellite, with an anti-ballistic-missile missile which could actually intercept at launch. This would be the ideal because the target would be easiest to hit. It moves very, very slowly. But once a target has a lot of speed and is in outer space I do not know if there are any advantages to be gained by having it in mid-course. I would say no, because in mid-course a target would be highest up, therefore you would have to shoot farther and, furthermore, you would have less warnings then in the last stage. I think by and large Spartan and Sprint are well placed where they are supposed to be placed, that is in the United States.

Mr. Laniel: I have one last question concerning the integrated command of NORAD. Actually the responsibility of the second in command there, who is a Canadian, is only military in the sense that once the political decision is made either he himself or in consultation with the commander decide on the tactical use of armament, where and how.

Mr. Gellner: His responsibility is the same as that of the commander of NORAD.

Mr. Laniel: It is not all that important whether this is a Canadian or an American, the decision would be a military one.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, his decisions of course are military. The decision to engage nuclear weapons is a political decision, and this will be transmitted to whoever at the moment is in command in Colorado Springs. If the commander is there, he is in command; if the commander is not present then it is General Sharp's responsibility. And you are quite right, he uses his forces by and large in the tactical field. Still, it is a tremendous responsibility; it is not a low class job to use this very far-reaching system with this tremendous capability for destruction. I agree that

even if there was an American Deputy it would not matter greatly, but it is nice that we have an influence on the tactical decision at this very high level because, obviously, this is an officer who has gone through our schools, has our concepts and our outlook on the military job. It is comforting, in my opinion, to have one of our own people in this very, very high position.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but it is still sentimental because NORAD is there to protect the deterrent, the first responsibility of General Sharp would be to protect the deterrent and he could not act as a Canadian; he would have to act as a responsible military officer in charge of the defence of North America only.

Mr. Gellner: Oh no. Safeguard, as it is now conceived, is to defend the deterrent but NORAD defends everything. NORAD defends, theoretically, Ottawa. The question whether Ottawa can be defended or not is something else again. But the fact is that the brief of NORAD is not to defend the deterrent. Certain weapon systems can only defend a certain object. Let us say Nike-Hercules can only defend the city around which it is stationed. Safeguard will defend missile sites. But the whole system defends North America and, therefore, the Canadian officer will defend Ottawa as much as New York.

I would again like to come back to the point which I tried to make. There is a tendency to say: Well, when nuclear war comes we can only duck anyway, therefore why make preparations, why think about it—we are all gone anyway. Now this is the outlook which a novelist in "On The Beach" is entitled to make, but I do not think that serious people with responsibility can make it because we do not know what the course of a nuclear war would be. It is quite possible and probable that very great sections of the population would survive and, if the defence contributes to this partial success, so much the better. If the potential enemy has the capability of attacking I think it is difficult to avoid trying to have the capability to defend oneself. This is the rationale of course of Soviet air defence also; the Soviets say since the United States has the capability of attacking them, they must have their defences.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted one question?

The Vice-Chairman: With permission, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Fairweather: I thought he was finished.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, I was finished.

The Vice-Chairman: Go ahead, Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: I was interested in the last answer about how nice it would be to have an influence on the tactical decision. But is this not the whole point—that in the Cuba affair we had no influence on the tactical decision because we were not privy to it.

Mr. Gellner: In the Cuban matter it was really of course a tactical decision. Let me make it quite clear that our Deputy Commander was still there, our officers were still in the staff positions and working, our forces with the help of the then Minister of Defence and on the basis of certain direct communications between officers in Colorado Springs and certain stations were at a certain state of defence. Now if a war had come, a tactical battle would still have been fought. This would have been fought under U.S. and Canadian joint command. But we would not have been in what the commander of NORAD considered the optimum position to repel an attack. As an example, his optimum position would have entailed the moving of certain American squadrons farther north to Canadian air fields. Now this could not be done without the concurrence of the Canadian Government. But, tactically our officers would have been privy, if you want to call it that, or would be engaged in the battle just the same as before. There were certain limitations because we did not go around with the decision to increase the alert state and that is all.

The Vice-Chairman: The list of questioners consists of Messrs. Thompson, Cafik, Harkness, Roberts and Guay in that order. It looks as if we will have to sit this evening, gentlemen, if Mr. Gellner is available.

Mr. Gellner: I am available.

The Vice-Chairman: We cannot sit this afternoon because the co-ordinator of Committees has advised that no room will be available.

I will call the next questioner, Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Gellner, in endeavouring to interpret your own summary report that we have before us, I gather that you were saying to us that you agree that the statement of the government on April 3 which reads

"the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines in the interest of protecting our own sovereignty"

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is a desirable objective and much of what we discuss as it relates to ABMs is beyond our control and beyond the necessity of our participation.

Then you go on to say also very clearly that surveillance today of North American air space is not satisfactory, that the hole in the middle is a very real thing and that it should be plugged. You have explained to us that our present surveillance system is really too far south.

Then, if I understand your statement, you are saying to us that AWACS is a legitimate and an important part of air surveillance and that we should participate in it. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Gellner: I made one proviso. It is not really certain yet. There is the difficulty of looking downwards with radar. All these difficulties can be overcome and AWACS depends on the ability to look downwards with radar, that is, against the ground with radar—to be able to distinguish an object from the ground proper.

I understand scientists are confident that all the kinks can be ironed out, in which case AWACS would be the thing to have.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Then you go on to say that the cost of AWACS is not really beyond us, that probably a squadron of 35 aircraft that are available at the present time would give us adequate surveillance over the whole of the air space in a satisfactory way.

Mr. Gellner: This figure is based on the calculation that apparently the radars of this aircraft will have a range of about 400 miles. They of course have the advantage of not being arrested by a mountain or by any other obstruction because they would be so high up and this means that every aircraft can survey about half a million square miles. Aircraft can be properly patterned to survey everything it is necessary to survey in order to really know what is moving in our air space.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You say the alternative is either the status quo or to withdraw entirely from participation in NORAD and establish our own surveillance.

Mr. Gellner: Yes. With AWACS, as I said we could do it. We could do it because of the mobility of the control stations. But I also made the point that it would be very costly. If we are masters of our air, the Americans are quite safe. They may have to bolster it, but this surveillance of our air space gives them much more security than they have now. Therefore surely we would be entitled to share the costs on an equitable basis with them for the work performed in our air space. If each country went its own way, they would have to duplicate it south of the border. This would give them less security and us more cost. This does not seem to be very reasonable.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You have then eliminated the first alternative which is the present system of surveillance, which you say is inadequate. The only other alternative is to attempt to work out something on our own.

Mr. Gellner: I think that the present system has almost, I would say, come close to outliving its usefulness and is also fairly dangerous because of the stationing of defensive weap-

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ons so far south. I gave the example of the BOMARC site at Buffalo, New York. The BOMARC fired from Buffalo, New York, at full range, would just about explode on top of Montreal. It is too far south, and this cannot be helped with the present system unless we build new lines. And if we built new lines we may just as well go into the modern mobile system.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Then, Mr. Gellner, if it would be financially and technically and militarily possible to develop our own AWACS system, of what use is that system if we have no anti-missile defence system?

Mr. Gellner: Please understand that AWACS combats bombers and air-breathing missiles only. This is not an ABM defence. It can only defend against anything which moves in the air. So far that is only bombers and missiles which are in fact unmanned aeroplanes, air-breathing missiles. Going over to AWACS does not give us any ABM capability.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I understand that, but then what would we have with which to complement AWACS if we were to accept this alternative.

Mr. Gellner: AWACS requires the fighters to identify, intercept and shoot down attack-

ers and we may take what the Americans recommend, the F-106X, or in view of certain objections to this aircraft, maybe we will choose another fighter to work with the control aircraft. All this is part of one system, the ground installations and the long-range air-to-air missiles, and so on and so forth. It still will give us a capability only against bombers and air-breathing missiles.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What I am trying to get at, Mr. Gellner, is that the alternative to participation in NORAD, both as it relates to air surveillance within a system such as AWACS or an ABM surveillance system, is either to spend a great deal more money for a less effective system of surveillance and defence or else to withdraw completely from any type of defensive participation.

Mr. Gellner: It is possible to withdraw completely. But this certainly is quite the opposite to what the government's statement on defence is. The government's statement on defence postulates a better surveillance of our territory and the approaching zone than we have now. On the contrary, so far from withdrawing from the defence function, in fact it promises a strengthening of the defence function because if we do not do anything, if we withdraw from NORAD and do nothing at all, then of course we have no surveillance at all. Then anybody can fly in our sky without filing a flight plan. This is the very opposite to what the government wants. The government wants the maintenance of our sovereignty through good surveillance.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Then what you are saying is that there is no alternative that has any logical practicality at all other than to participate in AWACS or whatever system is worked out.

Mr. Gellner: If we reject pacifism completely, then there is no alternative except to do something for the defence of North America.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Carrying that just one step farther, if that is the alternative, to withdraw altogether, what do you see would happen as far as the United States is concerned in giving themselves adequate surveillance insofar as that might relate to our own air space or our own territory?

Mr. Gellner: If they consider the threat so great that they have to have an assurance for their own protection that the Canadian air space will not be used by intruders, then they

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undoubtedly will put certain pressures on us to allow them to do the surveillance. I do not know how far they will be successful, but the fact is that it is a question of their judgment as far as their security is concerned. I would say that right now I would suspect they would say they have to know what is moving in the Canadian air space for their own security. This situation may change. I do not know, but right now I would say they would be more than keenly interested that Canadian airspace cannot be used by intruders.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Just one more question then, Mr. Gellner. You say in your closing paragraph that the question of Canadian participation in ABM defence does not arise that we already participate; and whether or not we take part in the Safeguard system or whether it is entirely U.S., it is better that the entire thing be under NORAD.

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): And this is really your final conclusion, is it not, as far as any logical policy for us is concerned?

Mr. Gellner: My belief is that if—heaven forbid—it came to an air battle over North America, an air and space battle over North America, it would be one battle. Both sides would use whatever they had and would use some makes of weapons which go through the air and of weapons which go through space. Now, I cannot see how this defence can be divided there. You have to fight a tactical battle, as was suggested, from some kind of command post. You have to have control over the whole battle. Therefore it will be difficult. I cannot see how in fact it can be done to divide defence against attack from the air and defence against attack from space. This will be very, very difficult. So logically I think General Sharp makes a point in saying that from the military standpoint it should be under NORAD, and I would strengthen it by saying that logically it should be under NORAD. After all, the detection is already under NORAD; if NORAD has already adopted the early warning and detection function, why should then the interception function be taken out of it? It is one and the same operation.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Well, then, just to state it in the simplest possible deduction, it is either to do that or to do nothing and to lie down completely in a passive way as far as any military participation at all here is concerned.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, with the proviso that we could, if we decided to, if AWACS came in, do it on our own at very great penalties for both sides, for both the United States and Canada.

Mr. Harkness: May I ask a supplementary question? As far as AWACS is concerned, is it not simply an example of new and improved technology in this particular field? And just as when the old manual methods were outdated by the introduction of SAGE and BUIC and so forth as a means of control of interceptors and Bomarcas and thus were put in in order to make an improved and more effective system, the AWACS in the same way are now supplanting the SAGE, BUIC etc., in order to give a new and improved system.

Mr. Gellner: I fully agree with you.

Mr. Harkness: There is no basic difference in regard to the whole set-up of NORAD and there would not be any difference through the introduction of AWACS. It is simply an improved technology.

Mr. Gellner: Absolutely. We already see it in the present system. In the present system, as you know, there is still manual control in Alaska and in Newfoundland and Labrador. The system simply has not come around yet to put SAGE in and probably, now with AWACS already coming, is not going to go

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into the expense of putting computers into these two flanking positions. So the system as it is now shows what you describe as gradual turning over from manual control to automatic control and then it will be the gradual turning over from automatic control in fixed positions to automatic control in aircraft.

Mr. Harkness: Yes. The point I am making is that there is no real basic difference from what has happened in the past. It is just a matter of introducing improved technology as it becomes available.

The Vice-Chairman: Is it the Committee's desire to adjourn now or shall we have one more questioner?

An hon. Member: Let us adjourn.

The Vice-Chairman: We will adjourn until 8.00 p.m. this evening. We will likely meet in Room 308 in the West Block and you will receive your notices.

EVENING SITTING

Tuesday, May 27, 1969

The Chairman: If the Committee will come to order we will resume at the point at which we adjourned. Mr. Cafik will be the first questioner.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gellner, I have two lines of questioning. The first is a series of what I hope will be short questions and short answers relative to the AWACS system.

It was pointed out earlier—and I think you agreed—that the AWACS is a natural extension of our present radar—and by that I mean the American and Canadian NORAD radar system—and I gathered from what you had said earlier that the AWACS would extend our frontier farther into the north. If this is true, would most, or all, of the AWACS be based in Canada and, if so, where would they be based?

Mr. Gellner: The main advantage of the AWACS, as you said, is that the defensive belt, the belt in which any attack would be detected and intercepted, could be moved by miles farther north from where it is now. Now the defensive belt is practically in the inhabited area. If this is so, then the control aircraft, those big ones which carry the electronics gear which detects and controls the fighters—we will call them control aircraft—would not necessarily have to be stationed on airfields as far north as Edmonton, or Mooseonee, or Goose Bay. They could be staged from the United States. But this would not be very economical, because you would have many wasted flying hours. Therefore, they would be best also stationed in the northern defensive belt.

The fighters which would be called upon to do the actual interception and the shooting down would, in any case, have to be stationed as far north as is possible, under weather conditions which would allow the use of an airfield the year around. I would say Churchill is an airfield which can be used the year around. That is roughly where I would envisage the fighters would be stationed, in any case; and the control aircraft as far north as would be economical.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Gellner, how many fighters would be required to back up this AWACS system?

Mr. Gellner: I do not really know. I said in my brief that 35 control aircraft could give us surveillance of our territory such as the present system cannot give with many more ground stations than 35.

It would depend on what the actual killing defences—that is, the ones that do the interception and shooting down—would consist of. As AWACS is only to come in in the mid-70's we do not really know what it will be. It may well not be manned fighters at all. Therefore, I cannot really give you a figure.

It depends on how many fighters one of these control aircraft can control at one time. Assuming that 10 will be in the air at one time—let us say in an emergency—and each can control four weapon systems, whatever they may be; then you would have to have 40 weapons systems to call upon. But this is something I cannot tell you.

I do not know how thick the defences would be. This would also depend on our wishes. We then have to make an appreciation of the threat and say that there will be so many, or that a lesser number, or greater number will do. This is dependent on our wishes—how thick we want to make this defensive system.

Mr. Cafik: Does the movement toward an AWAC system mean that the present systems of Hercules and Bomarc, and so on, would become obsolete? Or would they be moved farther into the North and become part of the defence system related to the AWACS.

Mr. Gellner: I am sure the Nike-Hercules could not be used. A weapons system with a range of 75 miles could not very practically be used in the North. They would have to be too close together because of their limited range.

I think the Bomarc would be perfectly usable. The Bomarc has a range of 400 miles, which is not very much less than the radius of action of a modern fighter. The Bomarc can only go one way, so it is good enough if it has a range of 400 miles; it cannot come back. The modern fighter, after all, has human

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beings in it and has to come back; so it has to have a range of 800 miles.

The Bomarc, I think, could be used. I do not think it is being envisaged by the Americans, but it is quite a usable weapon. It is a good weapon. It has a lot of speed, and it is very reliable. Therefore, the Bomarc could be used.

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We have also a fighter, the CF-101. I do not think that the question of the use of the CF-101 really arises, because before the AWACS comes in our CF-101's will be about 15 years old and will be ready to be retired. We would have to go to something more modern.

The Americans are thinking in terms of the F-106 fighter, which now exists. It is not really a very modern weapons system, but it may well do. I do not know.

Mr. Cafik: If we proceed with the AWACS program would you envisage the dismantling of the existing Bomarc sites in Canada and the moving of them to new locations?

Mr. Gellner: The present sites would have to be dismantled in any case, because they are much too far to the south. North Bay is only 200 miles north of Toronto. It is really an inhabited area. A site on the outskirts of a city of over 40,000 inhabitants is not where we would like to have our defences based. Therefore, the Bomarcs would have to be moved quite a bit forward. I would say another 1000 miles farther north.

Mr. Cafik: Is it possible to do that without the AWAC system, or does the AWAC system make it possible?

Mr. Gellner: We cannot do it now, because by moving it forward the Bomarcs would be ahead of our radar.

Mr. Cafik: That is right.

Mr. Gellner: Our radar line reaches only 200 miles out. It would be useless to put the weapons in front of the radar. Therefore, we have to leave it as it is now, with the fixed installations. But with the AWACS we could well move the Bomarcs forward.

Mr. Winch: May I ask a supplementary?

Mr. Gellner: The Bomarc is anti-bomber. On what basis do you think it can be moved anywhere to shoot down a ballistic missile?

Mr. Gellner: No, it cannot; it still remains an anti-bomber weapon, because AWACS, as we were discussing with Mr. Cafik, is a weapons system against bombers and airbreathing missiles; that is, missiles which go through the atmosphere. Therefore, AWACS would not be a defence against ballistic missiles. But Bomarc would be perfectly capable...

Mr. Winch: I have just one further question. Is not the United States going out of the Bomarc?

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

Mr. Winch: Then why would we retain it?

Mr. Gellner: Because we have it; because it would not entail buying something new. I would like to make quite clear that I am not saying that we should retain the Bomarc. I am only saying that we could well retain the Bomarc, because against bombers it remains a viable weapons system, provided it is in the right spot.

The Americans are going out of it because their Bomarcs are south of the border. Not only are they right in the inhabited area but they would also explode right over our heads if they were shot in a northerly direction. So I rather welcome the American decision to go away from Bomarcs. The Americans cannot move them forward, but we have still a lot of territory to move our Bomarcs forward.

Mr. Winch: Perhaps they will give them a new name and move them farther north. This could happen.

Mr. Gellner: I would like to make it clear that the Bomarc is a weapons system against which there is no objection. It is a satisfactory weapon, and as far as we know will remain a satisfactory weapon for many years to come. I think what is bad in the Bomarc is that it is far too far to the south, and that is inevitable in the present system. And, second, they are all bunched together. There are 28 of them in North Bay all on one pad. One hit would knock them out. But if they were spread out and were moved farther north I think they could still serve.

Mr. Winch: Thank you, Mr. Cafik.

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Mr. Cafik: Mr. Gellner, do you envisage that an attack against the United States over Canadian territory would be by bombers and not ABMs?

Mr. Gellner: I am quite sure.

Mr. Winch: Otherwise it does not make sense.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, I can very well envisage it, because if somebody decides to attack such a nuclear power as the United States, I think he would, under present circumstances, be crazy in deciding something like that.

Mr. Winch: Without the ABM.

Mr. Gellner: He would use everything he has. He would use ICBMs, bombers, missiles, satellites, and everything which he has. Surely, he would not keep anything at home to have it destroyed in the counter attack. He would be quite foolish if he did that.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, May I be allowed to proceed now for a moment?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Gellner, getting back to the AWACS, you were talking about a larger aircraft which would, in itself, be a sort of command vehicle that would direct the attack or the defensive attack by a fighter aircraft against any incoming bombers. Would they receive their instructions—say from Colorado Springs or North Bay—through the ordinary present command structure, or would the AWAC System make the present control system for early warning and defence obsolete?

Mr. Gellner: I order to simplify the systems, something must be interposed between Colorado Springs, which is a very high headquarters, and the tactical operation by ISIS controlled aircraft. I do not believe that the present system would be suitable. Some other command structure would undoubtedly be devised for the new system, but this is an administrative measure. You would simply change regions, and the locations of headquarters, and so on.

Mr. Cafik: It would seem rather difficult to me, Mr. Gellner for the individual command aircraft to direct this thing. It would be hard to control if you had a multiplicity of sources of defence such as this, as opposed to the present central one, like Colorado Springs. Does this not pose a problem?

Mr. Gellner: Oh, no! At the present time the air battle, if there were one, would be controlled at the divisional level. I hope you will go to North Bay and see it and you will see it in the ordinary staff officer at the console who directs and controls the aircraft. The same officer who is now at the console in what they call the "Blue Room"—because the lights are blue for night vision—would be at the console in a flying aircraft. There would be no change in that. There is no such thing as a control by the highest headquarters in Colorado Springs. This has been decentralized but, of course, all the threats go to the Commander in Chief. Right now, if an enemy aircraft penetrated a certain sector, the man who would actually direct a Bomarc missile

against the intruder would probably be one of the directors in a divisional headquarters. To put it on a human level, he probably would be a captain and he would fly in an aircraft and would control the veteran against an intruder. Of course, he could only control this weapon if he had been given the go-ahead to do that right down the chain of command from Colorado Springs to the region. Now some chain of command of this kind that would have to be established in the case of AWACS as well.

Mr. Cafik: I have only another two or three questions, if you do not mind.

The Vice-Chairman: I have you at the bottom of the list, Mr. Winch.

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Mr. Cafik: Mr. Gellner, if the AWACS and the necessary aircraft for defence were going to be based in Canada, and if Canada made a decision that we wanted to man all such vehicles within Canada, and participate in the AWACS in that manner, do you envisage any kind of a problem with the Americans themselves? Would they be agreeable to such an approach, particularly in view of the problems they had in the missile crisis that we spoke of earlier today.

Mr. Gellner: If I understand you correctly, you are presenting a hypothetical case in which all the control aircraft, fighters, or other missile weapon systems which are based on Canadian soil would be Canadian manned, and commanded.

Mr. Cafik: Perhaps the Americans might foot of good hunk of the bill in view of the fact that they participated.

Mr. Gellner: Quite rightly, because they would largely benefit from it. I think this is perfectly feasible, provided the Americans have some guarantee that this aircraft and weapon will be used if they are in danger of attack. Now, how, and what guarantee can be given, I do not know, because you must bear in mind that in this AWAC System the defences will be much farther to the north than they are now, and therefore practically all will be on Canadian soil with some exceptions in Alaska and so on. Now if you want them to all be manned by Canadians, then the same defences which protect us, protects them. They want to be protected, so I think they probably would have no objections against us manning and having it all, provided they knew that they will be protected.

Mr. Cafik: In other words, to achieve that it seems the only way they could have that assurance is by a pre-signed agreement which stated that upon their orders we would tell them to go. In other words, we would have no say in the decision-making as it were. That would give them the guarantee—I cannot see much short of that—if we had complete control of the operation. Can you envisage them agreeing to anything short of that?

Mr. Gellner: I can envisage a kind of arrangement very similar to the arrangement which is in Europe in NATO. They have a NATO Council, and in it everybody who has an interest in safety is represented. This NATO Council makes common decisions, so instead of decisions being made independently in Washington and in Ottawa, in two different places you could establish a North American Council in which the decision would be made by the Americans and Canadians together. This would be similar to the decisions which are made in the NATO Council. I should not say that this may satisfy the Americans, that is being over-optimistic, but it may satisfy those who are always told to retain the trump hand in the release of the nuclear warheads. It depends on them, but whether or not this is a way of doing it I could not tell.

Mr. Cafik: Would you not be inclined to think that the Americans would be less than enthusiastic about entering into such an arrangement in North American when they probably are a little frustrated that their hands are tied as much as they are in NATO. It would seem unlikely that they care to tie themselves up that much right across the whole board. If we tie them up in North American is the same way, it might weaken the deterrent by having that kind of command structure.

Mr. Gellner: My reading of the articles towards NATO is that, far from feeling that they are tied in it, they really want to maintain this system because they reached a break with France since they insisted that this integrated system of NATO should be maintained against French opposition. Therefore, I would say that United States are reasonably satisfied with the system prevailing in NATO. Now, of course, there is a difference. Here in North American they may want something much

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stronger than a common council. But this is something which would have to be investiga-

ted. The fact is that if you go into AWACS there is the possibility of dividing—that is, of saying we are going to do everything north of the border and you do everything south of the border. Then if we do not react to any intrusion of our air space the Americans could react themselves south of the border. But this would not be in our interest because the weapons would fall on us. We have an interest in the reaction being as far north as possible. Therefore there will have to be some understanding. Even if we have two different systems we must have an understanding of co-operation to make sure that the interceptions will in fact take place where they can take place in the AWAC system, as far north as possible.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Gellner, I have one last question on this particular aspect of it. With the interception of manned bombers with nuclear weapons, say, coming across into our air space I do not understand, and this may be a naive question, whether the interceptors would be in fact flying a suicide mission in trying to destroy one of these incoming bombers. Would the effect of destruction perhaps detonate the weapons and destroy the attacker as well as the defender.

Mr. Gellner: No. You must appreciate that I do not know classified information, but my understanding is that in the case of the BOMARC, which is unmanned, it would be destroyed itself. And the BOMARC is such a big warhead that if it explodes I believe anywhere within a mile of the target it knocks the target down elsewhere. It knocks itself down. Anyway, it cannot come back because it has no pilot. With a very big warhead and with tremendous power it does not have to hit the target,—if it comes within a mile it knocks the target down. The fighter has a very much smaller air-to-air missile which is fired from such a distance, let us say several miles from the target, that the explosion is not going to effect the attacking fighter at all. It is a smaller warhead and, therefore, has to come much closer. But it can come much closer because this air-to-air missile is directed from an aeroplane, from a human brain as it were, therefore it can be directed or can “home” right into the target. It is not a suicide mission. When I speak of danger of interception over our heads, you have to bear in mind that the BOMARC, let us say, will intercept the target wherever it is. It is true that it can be prevented from the ground from intercepting—it can be destroyed before

it goes—but when an attack comes in with nuclear bombs on you will have a tendency to destroy the bomber.

First of all, the bomber can see the oncoming flights on its radar. A nuclear bomb cannot explode unless it is deliberately fused. I think this categorical statement can be made because we had some very bad crashes of bombers with nuclear bombs on, one I believe in North Carolina and one in Greenland, and there were such fires that the bombers were destroyed to cinders but the bombs did not go off. They have to be deliberately fused. But let us say that the crew sees the oncoming missile on its radar, or the oncoming fighter, and they may say, all right, we have had it, but we will take as many people along as we can and they fuse the bomb and release it before they are themselves hit. That is one thing.

Secondly, as Dr. Lindsey explained to you, there is some suspicion that there exists now a device that can be put into the bomber that fuses the bomb at the reception of the first outside radiation, and Dr. Lindsey mentions this as a technical possibility.

Thirdly, the explosion of the BOMARC at comparatively low altitudes, because of the fact that it is such a tremendous explosion, will knock down a bomber a mile distant. If this exploded at 10,000 feet, of course even the BOMARC would do considerable damage on the ground. So we have every reason to hope that the interceptions will be somewhere in the subarctic and Arctic.

Mr. Cafik: Now I want to proceed to the relationship of NATO and NORAD because I think the central question facing the Committee is how can we best play some role, perhaps in the preservation of peace. I think that there are a lot of varying views on this particular question. You were here as a witness at the time. When we looked into NATO, and now we are looking into NORAD I would like to know what your views are as to the relative value of contributions to NATO versus NORAD. In other words, do you attach in any prominent way more importance to one or the other of the alliances in terms of our contribution towards the preservation of peace?

Mr. Gellner: Well, I would say that NATO can exist without us, NORAD cannot. NORAD is dependent on our air space, on our ground facilities and on our communications. Therefore, in NORAD we are a necessity. Really I do not think there can be effective

defence of North America without Canadian co-operation of some kind—even if it is only passive, even if it is only to give the air space, the air fields and the communications to somebody else. We are essential in NORAD. We cannot say that we are essential in NATO. We are very important in NATO but NATO could do without our military contribution. It is not a question of life or death. While I consider NATO, as you know from my previous testimony, to be very important, it is not absolutely essential that we should be in it. There are many advantages to our being in it. But we have to be in NORAD or North America cannot be defended.

Mr. Cafik: If that premise is true, Mr. Gellner, what choice do we have in real practical terms? If the United States superpower decides in its own mind that for the preservation of its own safety and its own freedom that it must have our space and that it must in a way violate our sovereignty, then do we really have any choice—or do they have any choice but to do it regardless of what we might say?

Mr. Gellner: Certainly you have a choice. You can say that we are going to take part in NORAD and pull our full weight. This I think is the sense of the government's statement on April 3, 1949, when the government indicated that not only will we pull our weight fully, we will do more than we are doing now. Then you have the second choice: we will co-operate but we will not take our full share. Thirdly, you have the choice of complete pacifism by saying we are not going to do anything but in view of the fact that you, the United States need it so badly, you might help yourself. This is a choice which politically the people of this country must make. But here I go by the statement of the government, which says not only are we going to pull our weight, we are going to do more than we have done before. This I understand is now the position of the Canadian government. Certainly, this was the enunciated position of the Canadian government.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much, Mr. Gellner and Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Harkness: First, in connection with the ABM system or the Safeguard system, in particular, Dr. Lindsey put forward the thesis that at the present time we have a situation of stability as far as the nuclear stalemate is

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concerned, with each side having a first strike and each side having a second strike capability, and the maintenance of peace depends to a considerable extent, or possibly depends to a considerable extent on the maintenance of this situation of stability. I think a considerable number of people are concerned that the institution of the Safeguard system would disturb this stability and would thus make the risk of a nuclear exchange greater. I would rather take it from what you have said that you do not subscribe to that theory. What is your view in that regard?

Mr. Gellner: My belief is that as long as we have not got peace, every one of these big countries is going to develop its weaponry. They are not going to stop that. I do not believe that because the United States and the Soviet Union have come to the conclusion that their theoreticians are right and that now there is a stable situation, both are going to stop their research programs. It is also, as you know, not practically possible. You have to go ahead all the time in research. Therefore, the development of offensive weapons is not going to be stopped because the two sides think that there is a stable system in the world. It is going to be stopped by an agreement amongst the nuclear powers to stop, and an agreement which is enforceable and which is controllable. They may say, "We now have a sufficient arsenal; we do not want to know more about it." But this is not the case. Therefore, whatever the United States does or the Soviet Union does for its defence, the development of boosters and warheads will go on merrily.

The very existence of a civilian space program makes this inevitable because in the civilian space programs, boosters are being developed which are very much bigger than the boosters used for weapons and which could theoretically carry warheads several times the size of the warheads which can now be carried by the boosters of the ICBMs. Therefore, I do not think that Safeguard is destabilizing. I think it does not make any difference. On the other hand, I would say that perhaps it is not absolutely necessary because this is a terrain so powerful today that some picayune thing such as Safeguard protecting some missile sites is not going to make a lot of difference. And again, the belt around Moscow probably is not going to make a lot of difference. But whether it is there or not, the development of weapons of mass destruction is unfortunately going to go on.

Mr. Harkness: Well, as a matter of fact, you said this morning that a basic purpose of the Safeguard system was to ensure that a greater proportion of the second strike capability would remain than would be the situation if there were no Safeguard system. I think I would go a bit farther than you have indicated and put up the proposition that as technology is constantly improving and as the

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offensive capability of anti-ballistic missiles and of their means of evading detection and so forth is increasing and therefore the offensive generally is likely to be stronger four, five or six years from now than it is at the present time, the institution of the Safeguard system would probably help in maintaining this stability rather than upsetting the balance.

Mr. Gellner: I myself am not very much given to this kind of theory which is now so general. You will remember that Dr. Lindsey also said that the greatest danger was at the time when the offensive missiles were themselves unsafe; that is, at the time when they were all in bombers on airfields which could be knocked out or which were like Titan and Atlas in non-hardened sites just out in the open, and that stability came once the retaliatory force became safe by being put into submarines and into silos. Now here you could have the argument that it would be even safer if you put a defensive missile on top of the silo.

Mr. Harkness: What I was getting at, which I think is quite clear, is what your views were in regard to the statement that we hear quite frequently and that the people who are strongly opposed to the Safeguard system constantly reiterate—that this will, we will say, disturb the balance; make war more likely. Your view does not coincide with that and, in fact, I put up the proposition, which I do not think you subscribe to, that it perhaps makes it less likely rather than more likely because you have a greater second-strike capability preserved.

Mr. Gellner: I would say you may well be right. It certainly does not make war more likely.

Mr. Harkness: The next thing is in regard to what you deal with on page 6, the Effectiveness of NORAD System in an Emergency, which actually comes down to a difficulty which has existed, as far as nuclear weapons

particularly are concerned, from the beginning of any alliances making use of them, that is the whole question of control. Before going further into the matter of control, I would like to point out that you state here, "The facts are" and then you go on, and some of these facts are not correct.

Mr. Gellner: Well, I stand corrected.

Mr. Harkness: I think perhaps I should make that clear. First of all, you say at the bottom of the page:

...the Canadian forces, on their own initiative...

I think this casts a reflection on the forces that they paid no attention to civilian control and went ahead.

Mr. Gellner: Yes. I said, though, sir:

...on their own initiative and with authorization from the, then, Minister of Defence...

Mr. Harkness: Yes, but as you have this stated there, "on their own initiative" certainly gives the impression that they went ahead on their own to take, we will say, defensive measures and to go on to a state of emergency. This is just not correct and I would object to this particular statement being in. The second, "With authorization from the, then, Minister of Defence...took some steps to improve their preparedness" is correct. But I think "on their own initiative" really should be out of there.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Harkness, exactly what words were you objecting to? Let us have it clear.

Mr. Harkness: To "the Canadian forces, on their own initiative". Then it says, "and with authorization".

The Vice-Chairman: That takes you over to page 7.

Mr. Harkness: Yes. It took some steps, but this was not done on their own initiative and I say I think it casts a wrong implication on the armed forces and would lead a considerable number of people, people who are opposed to armed forces in any event, to argue that the armed forces tried to take control of the situation, which is not true.

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Mr. Gellner: Mr. Harkness, I am glad that you pointed to this fact, because you will appreciate that as I am not privy to Cabinet

secrets, I have to use information which has been published, and this is information which was published. But if you say they took no steps at all without your authorization, so much the better.

Mr. Harkness: I would like to make quite clear that no steps were taken at all until I had instructed the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services to take steps. As I say, I think it is dangerous to have this in the evidence without correction because undoubtedly a lot of people would beef on this, arguing that this was a case in which the armed forces tried to take control of affairs.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Harkness, possibly you and Mr. Gellner could get together after this meeting.

Mr. Harkness: No, no.

Mr. Gellner: I bow, of course.

Mr. Harkness: I thought this should be corrected for the record so that a false impression would not go out in this regard.

The Vice-Chairman: We have already agreed that this brief become part of our Minutes of Proceedings, and I would like to be certain of the exact correction. This is my point.

Mr. Harkness: It is corrected now in the record.

Mr. Gibson: I submit that it has been corrected by Mr. Harkness' statement.

The Vice-Chairman: All right, then, if this is the feeling.

Mr. Guay (Saint-Boniface): I was going to ask Mr. Gellner a supplementary question pertaining to this. If you will allow me to do so, I will be very brief. Mr. Gellner, did you not contradict yourself with respect to the part played by the Minister of National Defence during the Cuban crisis? In one place you applauded the Minister for taking some steps on his own because he felt the situation was so serious that it was not prudent to punish ourselves by delaying, and later you went on to say that you have confidence in the Canadian government that it will not arrogate its power. Do you recall that?

Mr. Gellner: Yes, absolutely. I cannot really see any contradiction there because I also said that it is inevitable in any kind of an alliance between sovereign nations that such a thing, can in fact occur. I am not really critical of the fact that it did occur because

such a thing may well occur when two sovereign states are in an alliance. The fact is that because it did occur, in my opinion the system was not better prepared to meet an attack if it had come than if the Canadian government had been much faster about agreeing to it, but I consider it inevitable that this can happen in NATO as well. As long as these governments are sovereign, it is a privilege to go along or not go along. This is the whole idea of the two-key system, is it not? Two keys have to be turned and if both of them have the right to turn them whenever they feel they should, there may be this discrepancy of XY hours. In dealing with the effectiveness of the system, I said in the one case when it was tested there was such a delay that if there had been an emergency the system would not have functioned as well as if both governments had immediately agreed to take the same steps.

Mr. Guay (Saint-Boniface): You base it all on "if"?

The Vice-Chairman: Before we go any further, Mr. Harkness, the Clerk advises me that while it is true there is an explanation and a correction on the record, he thinks we should have it in the actual presentation which is an appendix to our proceedings. Would you now tell us the exact words that you want out of that line at the bottom of page 6?

Mr. Winch: We have objected to it.

The Vice-Chairman: We want to know the words so the appendix will go in as amended.

Mr. Harkness: It is the four last words at the bottom of page 6, "on their own initiative".

To continue, Mr. Chairman, I also take objection to the statement that Mr. Gellner has just made. He then goes on to say:

and with authorization from the, then, Minister of Defence...

who happened to be myself:

... (but not the Cabinet), took *some steps* to improve their preparedness, the most important actions, especially in terms of deployment of forces and readying of nuclear munitions, were not and could not be taken.

I also take objection to the "*some steps*". In

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actual fact all the steps that could be taken to get into Defcon 3, which in our parlance

meant a state of readiness, were taken. As a matter of fact, within about 36 hours all our ships were out at sea fuelled up, ammunitioned up, and so forth. They were all out of harbour. The air forces were all on alert, they were ready to take off at any moment. The land forces had gone out to deployment areas, and so forth. We were really in a full state of alert as far as the deployment of forces, and so on, were concerned.

As far as "readying of nuclear munitions" is concerned, there were no nuclear munitions so none of them could be ready. At that time we had not signed any agreement with the United States. We did not have any kind of nuclear weapons in Canada so therefore there could not be any readying of nuclear weapons, it was an impossibility.

Mr. Guay (Saint-Boniface): Was this a Cabinet decision, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Winch: No.

Mr. Harkness: The actual situation was that in a very short time our forces were in as great a state of preparedness as they could be gotten into in that very limited length of time.

Mr. Gellner: If I may explain. We were partners in NORAD and, if I understand what Defcon 3 entails, there are two steps which come immediately to mind which were not taken because they could not be taken; the first was the forward deployment of American squadrons to airfields in Canada with nuclear weapons and the second was the recall of people from leave. I understand, sir, there are other points but these are the two that immediately come to mind. When I say the "deployment of forces" I do not mean the deployment of Canadian forces but of NORAD forces. The "readying of nuclear munitions" is not the readying of Canadian nuclear munitions, which we did not have, but NORAD nuclear munitions which the Americans had. I think the people were deliberately not recalled from leave as they should have been because this would have drawn attention to the fact that we were in a state of high alert. As far as I understand, all steps were not taken.

Mr. Harkness: It is quite true that people were not recalled from leave, but nobody else was allowed to go on leave. The fact that a certain number of people were on leave really did not make very much difference, if any, as far as a state of readiness was concerned.

Mr. Gellner: I said the development of American forces.

Mr. Harkness: As far as the deployment of American forces are concerned, they had American nuclear armed planes at Thule and at Sondre Strom Fjord in Greenland, and less than a squadron at Goose Bay would really have made no material difference either.

Mr. Gellner: Of course, I do not want to question you, sir, but I think the facts which I presented contain a Defcon 3 overseas alert stage.

The Vice-Chairman: On a point of order, Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Chairman, I submit that this is rehashing the past and it is really out of order. We want to get on with our current and future plans and this has gone far enough.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Gibson, we have some sympathy with your views on the matter but actually it is in the presentation.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I submit that nearly everyone who asked questions this morning referred to the Cuban missile crisis and this is why I thought I really should correct some misapprehensions which this as it appears would convey.

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The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Laniel on a point of order.

Mr. Laniel: On the same point of order, Mr. Chairman. I agree with what Mr. Harkness is concerned about, but this is still a document that was prepared by Mr. Gellner and he is answering for it. There may be questions of different opinions on it or the interpretation of facts. Because of the mere fact that Mr. Harkness made a point of clarification I do not think the Committee has the authority to change the report.

Mr. Winch: You cannot change it.

The Vice-Chairman: It is changed with the agreement of Mr. Gellner, though.

Mr. Laniel: If we start to do that, Mr. Chairman, we will do it with other witnesses as well, and I think this is a completely wrong procedure. I think we should take the statement as it is. Mr. Harkness has made his point clear and he had ample time to give the facts as he lived them in those days. Mr.

Gellner spoke about facts that he knew about himself. I think it is the responsibility of the Committee to protect the witness and leave his statement as it is.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Laniel has a good point there and I do not mind putting your proposal to the Committee, but it is not exactly on the point of order. Perhaps we could take it up afterwards. Mr. Thompson, are you on the point of order?

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I might just say a word here. I do not want to labour this matter any more, and so forth. I thought the Committee itself should know what the facts were, because Mr. Gellner, with all due respect, was not in a position to know the facts.

The Vice-Chairman: I can understand why he does not mind his report being amended.

An hon. Member: I think he agrees with that.

The Vice-Chairman: Let us put the proposition to...

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch, on another point of order, or the same point of order?

Mr. Winch: We cannot amend the presentation of Mr. Gellner.

The Vice-Chairman: That is all Mr. Laniel said.

Mr. Winch: We can explain it, but we cannot amend his presentation.

The Vice-Chairman: Order, please, Mr. Winch. Mr. Thompson, on the point of order.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I do not think Mr. Harkness is asking to amend it. I do not think he is taking too much time. He has not taken as much time as some of the rest of us have. I think it is of great historical significance to have a few of these things cleared up by one who is in the know. I do not think we should go on with it, but I think the clarification that is being made is good.

The Vice-Chairman: Are there any further comments on this point of order that was raised by Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I would suggest that Mr. Harkness carry on.

Mr. Harkness: I have finished on that, Mr. Chairman. Actually, this really leads me to the main matter.

The Vice-Chairman: Do you have another line of questions, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: No. What I have in mind follows from this; that is, the matter of control of the whole NORAD system, and so on.

The Vice-Chairman: That would be quite pertinent.

Mr. Harkness: Yes. As far as the ABM part of this is concerned, if it is built and if it becomes part of NORAD, the Spartan missiles will explode in outer space and the Sprint missiles will all explode on American territory or above American territory. What is your view of, we will say, our right to attempt—as some people in this country would like to do—to say to the Americans: “You cannot put this system in because it may interfere with our air space, or the stratosphere above our air space?”

Mr. Gellner: As far as I know the two cases apply only to nuclear weapons which are destined to be used by us. There are not two cases for nuclear weapons which are used entirely by the American forces. The Safeguard system would not be in any different position than the Nike-Hercules system where we also have, of course, no influence. Let us say perhaps influence, yes, but no decision so far as its use is concerned.

If the argument is only that it should not be used because everything above our heads in some line going into the infinite is ours, then first of all it is a legal question which lawyers will have to decide. On the other hand, you have to bear in mind that in outer space objects traverse our heads continuously. I do not know how many there are right now, but I would not be surprised if a scientist came in and said that right now 100 objects are crossing Canadian territory, because I understand that something like 2,000 are continuously being monitored.

I have never heard us object to these, so there is a precedent which would indicate that we really do not have a case if it is in outer space. However, as I say, this is something for lawyers to examine. So far we have never protested against objects crossing in outer space over our heads.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, your view is that the order to use the Spartan and Sprint systems, if they are put into effect, would be a matter entirely for the United States?

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Mr. Gellner: My understanding is that this is a fact. The two-key system which requires our agreement and their agreement only pertains to those working systems and those moves which are connected with Canada.

Mr. Harkness: So far as defence against manned bombers is concerned, you have quite a different situation. It would require the agreement of the Government of Canada for nuclear weapons to be used either by our own forces or by American forces over Canadian territory?

Mr. Gellner: I think so, yes.

Mr. Harkness: There will be no question in that regard whatever?

Mr. Gellner: I tried to explain this in my paper. As far as Spartan is concerned, I really do not know what the legal position of outer space is. I would suspect that it is no man's land. As far as Sprint is concerned, the two Sprint sites which are now being established are so far from Canadian territory, and the Sprint is such a short range weapon, that really the likelihood that it could get into Canadian air space as far as we know is nil.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Harkness, may I ask a supplementary?

Mr. Harkness: All right.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch, with the permission of Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Winch: You have said the Spartan is over no man's land. The evidence we received from Dr. Lindsey shows that the Spartan would be used completely over Canadian territory. You call that no man's land?

Mr. Gellner: I call no man's land outer space. I said I suspect that outer space is no man's land for two reasons. First, I have not heard of anyone who has asserted sovereignty over outer space. No one has said outer space is American, Russian, French, Canadian, and so on.

Second, I gave the example of outer space being used over our heads as a matter of course. I do not think we have ever said that one cannot have a satellite crossing in outer space over our heads. It is done all the time.

Mr. Winch: Have you seen the graph that was presented to us by Dr. Lindsey on the Spartan explosion? A lot of that was not in outer space.

Mr. Gellner: Of course, I do not want to get into any discussion about it, but my understanding is that Spartan is trying to intercept incoming missiles from 300 to 400 miles away from the Spartan site. That is roughly the idea. The idea is to have two lines of defence. One line of defence before the ballistic missile re-enters the atmosphere and the other one after it has re-entered the atmosphere. You hope that Spartan will knock it down. If Spartan does not knock it down, when it has re-entered the atmosphere you have the back-up of Sprint.

My understanding also is that Dr. Lindsey said that not only is it going to happen in the near vacuum of outer space—I believe those were his words—but there is an advantage because actually Spartan is so constructed that it is most effective in the near vacuum of outer space. This is, I understand, from his paper. I do not know how much credence you want to give to *Time* Magazine, but *Time* shows this picture and it is 300 to 400 miles up where Spartan intercepts. That is far above the atmosphere.

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Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I had moved off the ABM system to the anti-bomber defence, really, and this is what I just started to question Mr. Gellner about. Now there was in the questioning this morning, and there has been at various other times, a considerable number of questions raised as to whether the political decisions concerning the United States forces and concerning the Canadian forces, and both decisions as far as NORAD is concerned being conveyed to the commander of NORAD, would be made in time for the anti-bomber defence to be effective. Personally, my view is that these fears are not well founded in spite of the example you gave of the Cuban crisis.

In the event of one bomber coming in, of course, nobody is going to use nuclear weapons anyway. But if the detection system shows a very considerable number of strange aircraft coming into Canadian air space, then you are still going to have two hours warning time or something along this line, sufficient time for a decision to be made first by the President of the United States as to whether he releases nuclear weapons for use, and secondly by the Canadian government as to whether we release the ones under Canadian control for use.

Mr. Gellner: I think I said this morning that about two hours would be sufficient.

Mr. Harkness: The point I am making, and I wondered whether you would agree with it is, that this does give sufficient time for the political decision to be made in view of the fact, as I say, that this situation would arise only if there were penetration by a considerable number of unknown aircraft.

Mr. Gellner: I agree with you that two hours be the absolute maximum which could be spent on this deliberation. In fact, the decision could be reached within five minutes.

Mr. Harkness: In any event it gives sufficient time. This was the only point I was trying to establish.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Gellner, do we understand from you that if the USSR were going to make an attack on North America against the United States, they would use manner bombers that give two hours notice on the radar system and not use the ICBMs which according to Dr. Lindsey would give us only 15 minutes?

Mr. Gellner: I did not say that this was mutually exclusive on the contrary, I think that twice I tried to say that anybody who would want to attack a major nuclear power like the United States would use everything he has. He would use ICBMs, bombers, air-breathing missiles, armed satellites, anything which could carry a weapon, because obviously he would know that either his first shot succeeds and he knocks out the retaliatory force...

Mr. Winch: But would not the ICBMs which give only 15 minutes notice preclude any possibility of manned bombers which give two hours notice?

Mr. Gellner: No, this is not what I said. All this could be timed to coincide. All the ICBMs could be fired let us say 3, 4, or 5 hours after the bombers have taken off in the Soviet Union. They could all arrive at the same time.

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Of course it is an opinion, but I am certain that anybody who would attack a major nuclear power would use a mix of everything he has. There is no point in keeping anything back because it will be lost anyway in the counter-attack, if the first attack does not succeed. So I do not think it is mutually exclusive. He would use bombers and ICBMs. He would use air-breathing missiles and satellites, everything together.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All the questions I have will deal with bomber defence. I have nothing on ABMs.

Most of my questions arise, Mr. Gellner, from your paragraph that begins at the bottom of page 5 and goes on to page 6. It is about the present state of NORAD defence. It is not long. Perhaps I could read it:

In other words, with more than 150,000 men, and for an annual expenditure of upward of two-and-a half billion dollars, NORAD is not altogether able to deny the air over North America to intruders. In case of war, some bombers would get through... It goes without saying that if there were no NORAD system, foreign aircraft could disport themselves in the skies over North America at will, undetected and unmolested.

And then there is what seems to me to be the key sentence:

Then, and probably only then, would a serious bomber threat arise, because what inhibits now the use of the still cheapest and most accurate means...

is the maintenance of the present defence system, roughly.

I think I follow your argument there, but perhaps I could restate it in a way which might correspond with your thought and perhaps not. If there were no bomber defence, then the bomber-delivered nuclear weapon would be a very potent and accurate first-strike weapon. But the maintenance of some kind of air defence system really translates the bomber threat into a counter-strike weapon or a second-strike weapon. Is that a fair conclusion or not?

Mr. Gellner: I do not think so. I would like to come back to the situation where, let us say, the Soviet Union decides to attack North America and here they are faced with the situation that if the first strike is successful, that is, if it knocks out so much that nobody will really want to make a reply that it will really not be worthwhile being spiteful and shooting up three measly weapons, then he has succeeded. But if he has not done this, then the counter-attack will destroy him. Therefore, I would say that from the standpoint of the attacker who mounts what he hopes is going to be a devastating surprise attack, and this is only hope, he will have no interest whatsoever in holding any kind of weapon back because his weapons will be lost anyway. So he will put everything in his first

strike, and I would then say the bomber may well be a first-strike weapon. It does not matter which it is.

Mr. Roberts: I find it a little difficult to see that because I could see how you would want to use the mix, and time the send-off of the missiles to match the arrival of the bombers, but it would seem to me that the bombers are going to be detected before they get to the target. So you would have to time your missile launch to the time of detection of the bombers and the bombers would be detected far enough ahead that the reaction of the country being attacked would be to launch its retaliatory strike at that stage. So even though the bombers have been sent out in advance of the launching of the missiles, they would still arrive at a point when the missile war had already started.

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Mr. Gellner: Absolutely, but it can be theoretically done because look at the defences as they are now. You can assume that the DEW Line detection can be avoided. The DEW Line is a single line and you can probably fly under its radar coverage. The DEW Line is very useful but it is not really a very strong defensive line, and that is why we have the heavy radar in the south.

Now this heavy radar in the south would also only give you probably 20 minutes warning because its utmost range is 200 miles if the bombers stay high enough, and if the bombers can be expected to fly 600 miles an hour, the warning which the Pinetree line gives is also only 20 minutes.

Mr. Roberts: But this equation would be changed presumably if we had back-scatter or forward-scatter radars.

Mr. Gellner: Absolutely. I am saying that this is the present system.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I can explain my quandary in this way. We have a system now for detection, we cannot because of the nature of military secrecy actually be told how effective this system of detection and destruction is, but I gather from your paper that we are likely to be asked to spend considerably more money for an increased protection and yet we do not know really how much more marginally efficient the improved detection-destruction systems are. In other words, we are groping around in the dark in a sense. We are rather like a company which is being asked to introduce a new product

when we know what the cost of the new product will be but we have really no very effective way of gauging the effectiveness of the new product in relation to the past product. Under these circumstances it seems to me that we have a very vital concern in trying to find out how much more marginal protection we would get from, say, an AWAC System and whether that marginal protection is worth the cost. I believe Dr. Lindsey indicated that there was some hope that the AWAC System might actually cost us in the long haul a bit less our present NORAD arrangements. I am not so good with figures, but it seems to me from what you have suggested that it would cost us something like \$92 million a year compared with \$11 million in the 1968-69 estimates, which is roughly over eight times the cost.

Mr. Gellner: I also of course added that this \$11 million and \$6 million is exceptional because for so long we have not invested and that even if we maintain this system the rainy day would come when we would have to invest again, even with the old system.

Mr. Roberts: Yes.

Mr. Gellner: Now, I also gave you the figure of an \$800 million capital investment in our system. Now this \$800 million worth also had to be purchased and if you spread that over 10 years, although the system is only 10 years old, you also come to \$80 million. So the difference is not so very great. However, these are old ball park figures. I believe what you have to look at are the theoretical possibilities. Now if everything depends on circumstances, the best system may fail completely. They say that the best radar system in Europe is the British one, yet apparently it did not pick up the Hercules which a mechanic flew home. This can well happen to any system but, theoretically, we know in the old system that, first of all, once you are 200 miles beyond the last radar of the Pinetree Line then comes a long, long distance of ground which is not covered at all—there is nothing there—and then there is the DEW Line. There is a hole in the middle. There is absolutely no detection there, except by accident, spot checking and so on. This was not so very critical as long as the potential enemy had to penetrate the Pinetree Line. He had no option if he wanted to get at the retaliatory forces in the United States or at the City of New York—he had to punch through the line. The line then was believed to be deep enough to give strong opposition to such a penetra-

tion. But now we are at the point where he can shoot through the line, he does not have to penetrate it at all. Now we must make a choice. Either we must deepen the present line so much that he will not be able to shoot through it, that he will have to go in and expose himself to interception and destruction, or we have to go to something else. Now I think you would be fully entitled to get an estimate in figures of what relative costs would be. When you look at these figures, let us say the the tripling of the depths or the doubling of the depths of the present Pinetree Line, please do not only look at the cost of the installations but also remember that every one of these new radars has a crew of between 140 to 190 men. These 140 to 190 men have to be maintained, they have to be paid, married quarters have to be provided, and the operations and maintenance costs of one Canadian serviceman is \$12,300 a year. That does not include his salary or allowances, that is for operations and maintenance. You then compare the deepening of the present installation with AWACS, then look at both money and at manpower and you will be able to get a fairly good picture.

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Assume now that either decision will result in the raid being detected, then you still have the situation of whether the raid will be intercepted and whether the target will be destroyed? Now I do not think that even top secret knowledge will give you an answer to this question because this, again, depends on so many variables.

Mr. Roberts: Could I interrupt here. This seems to me though, nevertheless, to be a crucial question. Basically, how much more effective in damage limitation would the new system be? Can we make any estimate?

Mr. Gellner: It would be more effective to the extent that all interceptions and all destructions would be over the uninhabited area, in our present system at least a proportion of the interceptions would of necessity be over inhabited areas so if you talk in terms of limiting damage then the new system will in any case be better.

Mr. Roberts: It gets back to the over-kill problem. If it simply prevented us from being destroyed three times instead of twice it might not be worth the marginal expense. Could we have some estimation of how effective in damage limitation the new system the Canadian government that it will to

Mr. Gellner: This is purely my opinion. I do not believe in total destruction after a nuclear war. I think that the destruction will even then be selective. Destruction will fall on the targets which are actually hit and then there will be of course a very great number of places which will not be hit. Now objection is taken in that fallout will then kill the survivors. Against this there are of course two very strong objections. The one is that if they are high burst, as well might be the case, the immediate fallout will be very small, the late fallout will come down—I do not know when—in a month, in a year, in five years, and by then the radioactivity will have greatly decayed. Therefore it is not perhaps true that the fallout is necessarily going to kill everybody. Also, we could well do something about fallout. The simplest of civil defence knowledge will protect to a degree against fallout. Any kind of damage limiting would be to our advantage because rather than three times over-kill it may be 10 times over-kill in one place. The enemy may drop a 10 megaton weapon on one place which would totally destroy it and there may be no kill at all in another locality. So anything you can do to alleviate this will have of course some results.

Mr. Roberts: I admit that the next series of questions I would like to ask you are really designed to elucidate the point where I, and I think some of the other witnesses we have had before the Committee, disagree with you. Towards the end, just before your conclusions, you say:

... it takes a lot of sophism to argue that one kind of defence is not de-stabilizing, while the other kind is. What matters is that they are all in use, in one way or the other and to one degree or the other. The question of whether to use any of them should in every case be approached pragmatically.

I admit that I resent the word "sophism" here but I know you were writing the paper under

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pressure. It seems to me that a lot of distinguished witnesses before the Committee have taken exactly that point of view. Gen. Sharp, Mr. Yarmolinsky, Mr. Cadieux and Dr. Lindsey drew a pretty clear distinction in answer to many questions between defence against potential first-strike weapons and defence against weapons which were counter-strike weapons. And the paragraph in Dr. Lindsey's

paper, if I may read it because it puts the matter clearly, says:

In a sense, damage limiting can be regarded as superfluous, in that it will not be needed if deterrence... is successful. However, there can be a more serious objection to damage limiting if it is carried to such a degree that it drastically reduces the ability of the opponent to inflict damage in a retaliatory countervalue second strike. In this case, it would be weakening the basis of mutual deterrence and moving the balance away from stability. It is a strange twist of logic, that a defensive move to save lives can be dangerous.

And he goes on to quote from a paper by Professor Rathjens.

Various witnesses before the Committee have made this point. You have tended, I think, to say that people are claiming that we should not have any defence because there is no defence at all, and this you dismiss as a sophistic argument. But I suggest that the situation is more complex than that. If we get down to do as Herman Kahn suggests, to think about the unthinkable, we do get into a situation where we draw distinctions between first-strike weapons and counter-strike weapons and indeed many people, I think—not you—do argue that improving defences against what are essentially counterstrike weapons—if those improvements take us down to a position where we really might have a fairly complete protection against counterstrike—would not be stabilizing, as you have suggested, but would in fact be very destabilizing. Am I right? I am not trying to convince you or to persuade you but I am just trying to establish that there is a divergence between your point of view here and that of many of the people we have had before us.

Mr. Gellner: You see, the difficulty which I find is this. How can you have a defence which protects you against a first strike but does not protect you against a counterstrike; which protects you if the enemy is the attacker but does not protect you if the enemy is a counter-attacker? Because surely you have only one defence system.

Take the anti-bomber defence. The anti-bomber defences are based on the detection of an enemy attack. So you detect the enemy attack and you have defences to thwart it and these defences are in place. But you would also want these same defences which are in

place to play dead after you have attacked the enemy and the counter-attack comes in. Now this, with the greatest respect for the others, I just cannot understand.

Mr. Roberts: I would put it that it really corresponds to a situation as you have described earlier; that if an all-out attack did occur on the part of the Russians towards the United States, it would occur by their throwing everything against us. And in this stage, the detection—not the destruction but the detection—of the bombers would take place early enough that the deterrent which the United States has in hand would then be called into play before the bombers could really come into play, at least if we develop a forward-looking radar detection system. And then in those circumstances, increased expenditures on bomber defence—once we had got to the point where early detection was possible—would be money spent basically to combat a strike which could only make sense in that situation of effective ballistic missiles on both sides of a counterstrike—the defence against a counterstrike.

Mr. Gellner: I do not follow you at all, unless you would limit defence to detection only. In fact, then, to do it this way you would have to detect only but have no means of fighting the attack.

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Mr. Roberts: But as long as we are relying upon a deterrent system, what the anti-bomber defence provides us with basically—at least this is what has been put to the Committee—is a protection of the deterrent. Now the protection of the deterrent really depends upon the detection. If you detect early enough, then the opposing side will know that the deterrent will come into play; so that if you believe that the stability of peace depends upon the mutual deterrent power on each side, then any detection system which finds the bombers or the wave of bombers coming in early enough protects the deterrent in the sense that once that attack is perceived, then the deterrent comes into play. Therefore, your effective warning system provides a protection for your deterrent system. I admit it is not damage limiting but in so far as the justification for bomber defence is a protection of the deterrent, what you really require is a fairly forward advance detection system which will tell you when you are in the situation where your deterrent force is in danger from attack on the other side.

Mr. Gellner: But then you would have to rely on the attacker that in fact his attack will be aimed only at the bomber bases and not at cities and will remain aimed at bomber bases—you are talking about manned bombers—even after he knows that the other side's bombers have already taken off. I think this is assuming too much, is it not?

As far as antiballistic missiles are concerned, there is no question because the very idea of the hardening of the bases, of putting some in submarines, is one of the reasons that you do not have to react at once, that you can have a look at what is really going to happen because your counterstrike force is protected. And the Americans say they are going to put ABM's on top of the silos to further protect them. But in a bomber, you are quite right that once the enemy attack is detected, my own bombers have to take off because they are not on the hardened sites, they are not under water, they could be destroyed. But then you say, for the sake of stability I am going to stop at detection. I am not going to knock anything down and I am going to allow the enemy bombers to bomb New York or Toronto or Chicago because my counterstrike will destroy Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad. Now I do not think this is really logical because obviously, once the attack is detected, then he knows that he will not find any bombers in the airfields if they are prepared and he will go after the cities. I think we are then entitled to look after the limiting of damage.

The difficulty of theory is that it does not count with human beings. This is it.

Imagine you had a system which could only detect but could not destroy. Imagine then what terrible havoc an attack by 20 bombers could do. American bombers apparently carry up to 30 megatons each so this would be unbelievable destruction with millions killed. Yet, if you had the destructive capability, you might be able to thwart the whole attack. So I do not think that anybody can limit himself to detection.

Mr. Roberts: You argued, I think, in answer to some questions by Mr. Harkness, that it was unreasonable to expect the major powers not to continue their research activities in the development of new and improved weapons, and I would agree with that. Would you not agree, however, that there is some historical evidence, at least on the part of the United States, that there has been a readiness to limit the deployment of weapons? For

instance, I think that on both sides there has been a diminution of the number of bombers both on the part of the United States and on the Russian side which are ready to go and that the United States has kept its number of Minutemen basically stable in terms of numbers; so that one could conceive of situations in which the great powers would be willing, once they had arrived at a stable balance of

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deterrence, to limit the deployment of weapons. Would you agree with that?

Mr. Gellner: All these limitations are only quantitative. They are not qualitative. Now obviously the United States has something like 1,700 missiles available. With these 656 submarine missiles and 1,000 Minutemen and I do not know how many of Tibans still available with 1,700, a certain 1,700 obviously to increase the numbers would not be very useful, because I do not think there are enough targets for 1700 missiles. Therefore, quantitatively they are fine, but qualitatively, as you know, they are constantly increasing the potency, the accuracy and the range of this 1,700. In Polaris, from Polaris I to Polaris II and Polaris III, and now to Poseidon. Every one of these missiles has a bigger warhead and has better penetration capabilities as has MIRV and so on. Therefore, qualitatively they are being constantly improved.

The same applies to the Russians. You read about the SS-9 missile. That is a very great advance on the SS-4. Apparently it has a warhead twice as powerful. Therefore, I cannot see any restraint in the fact that they have not deployed more weapons.

Mr. Roberts: May I...

The Vice-Chairman: There are other questions, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: I know, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: I have Messrs. Guay, Winch and Gibson.

Mr. Roberts: I will try to close quickly.

The Vice-Chairman: I would appreciate it, Mr. Roberts, if you could shorten the questions and also the answers.

Mr. Roberts: I would now like to turn to your section No. 7 on AWACS. Perhaps I have misinterpreted what you have said but it seems to me that you argue that basically the United States is really going to present us

with a *fait accompli*; that they are going to go ahead with the system and that Canada therefore really does not have much choice but to go along and find some role within it. You go on to say that the question that poses itself is what Canada should do—follow suit and prepare for the transition, or stand pat with what we have and then get out of NORAD, when the Americans will have one system of defence and we another, which would make integration, of course, impossible; and that everything speaks for adopting the first alternative.

That may be so, but it is not self-evidently obvious to me that everything speaks for the first alternative, other than perhaps on grounds of national pride. Faced with the \$92 million a year cost that you have estimated, why should we not in fact say that, as an AWAC system could be operated to by United States, we might lease territory and give air rights, and so on? Aside perhaps from questions of national pride, what is so horrendous about adopting the alternative which you there reject rather summarily?

Mr. Gellner: I do not think you can combine it. If you say "All right; let the Americans have the AWAC system, but we, of course, are going to give them the facilities for it" there is no point in keeping our old system. Because the Americans are going to be in the north and are going to protect us the old system would then be superfluous. This would only be thinkable if the Americans had AWACS south of the border and we the old system north of the border. As I explained, we are interested in pushing the defensive belt farther north, and our interest in doing that is, if anything, greater than the American interest.

Mr. Roberts: Am I right in taking from certain of your comments and explanation that, for example, it might be feasible for us to lease AWACS from the United States at a dollar a year? They once sold us an aircraft carrier for a dollar and that turned out to be rather a bad bargain, I think. But it would be feasible for us to operate the system as Canadians, I think, on certain of the considerations that Mr. Laniel described?

Mr. Gellner: Yes; I think they covered this by saying that this system could be Canadian-manned; but obviously the hardware would be American-owned, but the Americans would want to have guarantees of the system being used in an emergency, because the one who

mans it works the system. So nothing has been changed.

Mr. Roberts: I have one final question, which is perhaps one of history, but it is relevant to the answer you have given. You start your paper by saying that:

... "air defence of North America is a single, indivisible problem".

which I would accept. That does not necessarily mean that we should deal with that problem through a single, integrated command rather than a joint co-operative effort. For example, although, in the past, we have dispersed Canadian personnel throughout the whole of the NORAD system, it would not have been technically impossible to organize the system so that the defence of Canadian territory or airspace was in the hands of Canadians, as Alaska is in the hands of Americans.

The development of an AWAC system would, with some kind of appropriate financial support from the United States, enable Canadians once again, within a framework of

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partnership, to survey and control the airspace over Canada and, at the same time, to provide their effective contribution to the protection of the North American deterrent, which rests basically in the hands of the United States.

Dr. Gellner: I said in the paper that under the present system this does not seem to me to be practical, but that when AWACS came in we could in fact separate; but, if we separated, that it would perhaps be more costly for us and would give the Americans less protection because they would have to cruise south of the border and rely on us to do the job in the north.

We would then come back to the same situation, that they would want to have some guarantees that this protection would work. It is technically possible, and I think I said that twice in my paper.

Mr. Roberts: I have just one further question and I admit it is a nebulous one. It involves your making an estimation of the American intention. Do you think the United States will be prepared to consider such a system, in which Canadian airspace would be controlled through the system that you and I have both described?

Mr. Gellner: I do not know.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay: I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask Mr. Gellner a question dealing with the brief he has presented to us.

First of all, the members of this Committee have received a brief, which I think was a wonderful brief, from the Voice of Women. I was going to ask him if he had had a chance to read it and, if so, briefly what were his thoughts on it.

Mr. Gellner: I believe that in my own magazine I criticized this brief which was sent to me. If we are talking about the same one.

Mr. Guay: The latest one?

Mr. Gellner: No; I have not seen this one.

Mr. Guay: This latter one?

Mr. Gellner: I think I saw a smaller one...

Mr. Guay: It is dated May 22nd.

Mr. Gellner: No, I have not seen this one.

Mr. Guay: Then my question, Mr. Chairman, relates to page five, where Mr. Gellner has told us that some aircraft or missiles could slip in undetected. I would like to quote very briefly here:

The line has virtually no capability against low-flying aircraft. (It could be given that capability by the installation of, so-called, gap-fillers, but this could be very expensive, and quite unreasonable at a time when plans are afoot to scrap all or most of the fixed radars.)

Are there really plans to scrap all radars, and is it for the purpose of implementing other safety measures such as a satellite to detect more aircraft? Or have you other means in mind when you say that "plans are afoot to scrap"? That is a definite statement you are making there.

Mr. Gellner: I refer to AWACS, of course. These are the plans which are afoot. We already see a better way than fixed installations. Therefore, to put money now into strengthening the old system, when a new system is already on the horizon and apparently, if certain kinks are taken out of it, perfectly feasible, does not seem reasonable. If I had the choice—after all, this is all opinion—I would go for the modern system in-

stead of putting more money into the older system.

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Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): But there are definite plans afoot to do exactly what you said here.

Mr. Gellner: The Americans have announced that they are investigating the AWAC System. They have already, I think, appropriated in two instalments something like \$115 million for contract definitions of the AWAC System; therefore, the AWAC System is not a dream. The AWAC System is something on which some money is already being spent in the United States and plans are being developed.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Can you give me an answer, possibly yes or no, to this question? Would this new system that you are speaking of, AWAC, solve the problem of the low-flying aircraft that could slip in?

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Do you believe that the generals should have more power given to them than they have at present?

Mr. Gellner: No.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Do you recall the statement that you made in December, 1962? Would you care to comment on that particular statement in regard to the armed forces, or are the armed forces still saddled with a task which they cannot fulfill in your estimation? I presume you recall what I am making reference to—your statement in the *Commentator* in December, 1962 when you said:

the trouble in Canada is not that the generals have too much power, but too little—there is "an unhealthy master-servant relationship"

Mr. Gellner: I understood your first question to relate to NORAD and was: should the generals have more power? My answer was, unequivocally, "no". It is not possible, because the release of nuclear weapons obviously must remain a political decision. Now, I cannot, of course, recall—being a newspaperman—a statement I made seven years ago, but if you read it to me I would probably know generally...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It is very brief; I could.

Mr. Gellner: ...the kind of—the adjective fails me, but something like “cringing”—attitude which sometimes exists between the serviceman and his political masters. This has nothing to do with NORAD. This may have to do with the type of uniform. Then you asked me a question, should the generals have more power? This first question, before you reminded me of 1962, I took to refer to NORAD and I think in NORAD they have all the power they can reasonably be given.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I find myself in a somewhat difficult and perhaps untenable position. I will not be misunderstood. I want to pay my respects to Mr. Gellner, who has appeared before this Committee on numerous occasions over many years. However, I personally—and I say “personally”—cannot accept the presentation made by Mr. Gellner today, nor his answers to the majority of questions. I believe, sir, his position is too theoretical, unrealistic and, upon some matters, not in accordance with facts known by this Committee and presented by previous witnesses. That being my thought, sir, I do not think there would be any advantage to this Committee if I were now to proceed to ask questions. Therefore, I pass.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Winch. Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Gellner, in the brief presented by the Voice of Women on May 18, 1969 there is the statement:

Reinforcing the opposition...

that is to the whole defence plan

...is the argument that the program contravenes the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty just at a time when Moscow seems interested in curbing the arms race.

Now the entire hearings that we have had on NATO and NORAD have accentuated the buildup of arms, and what physical arms we can develop. I am not naive enough to think we are all brutes for doing that, but it does strike me that the Voice of Women brief has a certain amount of cogency in making that statement. At Geneva there is a disarmament conference under way. We were privileged to visit Geneva a week before that conference took place, and I am very concerned that throughout our deliberations there has never

been any discussion of that conference. What is going on at Geneva? Have you had any information?

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Mr. Gellner: Oh, yes; the same, probably, that you have.

Mr. Gibson: I am not criticizing you, sir, but my concern is that if there is a possibility of Moscow's disarming—possibly there is not—would not these urgings on the part of our government to build up a tremendous strike force and defence of this type lend credence to the view that the United States is intent on attacking Russia, and would Russia not have that view? If so, do you not think we should tie this disarmament conference material in with our discussions so that we review both sides of the coin at the same time?

Mr. Gellner: First of all, I do not think there is any suggestion of our building a tremendous strike force. Not only are we not building a tremendous strike force, we are depriving ourselves, voluntarily and quite properly, of the one strike force we have, which is the Air Division in NATO.

Mr. Gibson: But if I may interrupt you, we are planning on spending millions and millions of dollars, and it seems to me that even in the spending of the money possibly that should be a consideration. What do you think about that in relation to these talks on defence and disarmament?

Mr. Gellner: On defence, now...

Mr. Gibson: But it may not be necessary if peace talks are progressing.

Mr. Gellner: Somebody said that whoever pretends he knows what is going on in the Kremlin is either a knave or a fool, or both.

Mr. Gibson: Well, on that theory we will never get disarmament.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, I know. My position is this: Obviously disarmament is less practical, but arms control is our immediate goal. But arms control and disarmament always follow peace. Not peace, disarmament. You first have to have the peaceful situation and then you are only too glad to disarm, but it does not follow that because you have disarmed you will have peace. I think all the historical examples which we have are to the conquered.

Now, when we discuss NORAD we are not speaking of a single offensive weapon; we are not speaking of a single weapon which is capable of reaching any place in a foreign country. We are also not saying that we are going to spend regarding Canada or lend it sums on defence in this context, because while I agree with Mr. Roberts, and as I pointed out myself, if we went into AWACS we would have to spend in the beginning more than the same, then less than we are spending now. The fact is that even if we stay put we will have to spend more, because our old equipment will run out.

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I cannot see that we are increasing our defence effort. Now, the only argument would be if you said, "There is now a very high hope of disarmament; let us call a moratorium. Let us not do thing for X years." Let us say that both sides keep a moratorium; that the Soviet Union does not do anything either. Now, if you can get a system by which such a moratorium can be inspected properly, monitored and so on, obviously such a moratorium would be a good thing. There is no indication of any slowing down of the defence effort of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, there is no evidence of the slowing down of the defence effort of the United States. The fact is that both sides are going ahead.

Mr. Gibson: The fact is, also, that the conference in Geneva is going ahead and I wonder why we get no news of it. I may be naive in asking this, but do you not think the government and the press should tell us what is going on at Geneva?

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Mr. Gellner: I assure you...

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It has been going on for 15 years.

Mr. Gibson: This may be, but the conference that is on now has not been going on for 15 years. It has been going on for about three weeks.

The Vice-Chairman: Let us have some order now. There is no doubt about it...

Mr. Gibson: I am genuinely concerned about this. I cannot see why we do not know what is happening.

Mr. Gellner: This Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament if I am correct, and I

stand to be corrected, has been sitting now for seven years. What is going on there during these three weeks is only the umpteenth session of the same conference. I believe it is a 1962 creation. Whenever significant progress was made it was reported, but you cannot expect newspapers to report that nothing happened. This conference, of course, has reporters there just as at every other conference. It is not secret. The sessions as you know are open. Of course, there are also some private negotiations. Let us say that if in the three weeks something sensational happened, it the two sides had embraced as friends, it would have been reported.

The results in the seven years have not been totally insignificant. As you know, we have the Non-proliferation Treaty now which is a creation of Geneva. It is not very satisfactory because it does not bind the Soviet Union, the United States, or any of the nuclear powers to disarm. It only says that they will talk about it. They can keep all the weapons if it limits the non-nuclear powers, and that is something. This was copiously reported. If something similar happens again I am quite sure it will make the headlines. The fact is that in the seven years they...

Mr. Gibson: All right, that is fair enough. What about the fact of detente in Europe? That is on the agenda, too. There were other matters—Nixon went over there and made overtures. The buildup in the press and the publicity is all on the defence aspect and the arms but there does not seem to be any build up in the press towards concentrating on what is going on over there and informing the public about what is happening. Would you agree with that?

Mr. Gellner: No.

Mr. Gibson: You do not agree. You think the public is adequately...

Mr. Gellner: I think there are just as many reports on actual proofs of detente as there are of actual proofs of armament. My personal opinion is that we have no evidence in Europe of an East-West detente. In fact, the Russian position is very much hardened. They have come with the theory that if the country was once a Marxist country it cannot become anything else. This is far from detente. This is counter-detente. I am not saying that they are not possibly going to change their minds tomorrow. However, I understand that my brief is concerned with NORAD and this Committee's concern is NORAD.

Mr. Gibson: Forgive me for asking this question. I am trying to keep the two things in mind.

Mr. Gellner: No. I would say that right now their only possibility if they followed you would be to proclaim an armament moratori-

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um. If such a moratorium could be inspected on both sides I think this would possibly be a good idea, but the Russians have consistently refused any kind of inspection on their territory.

Mr. Gibson: Do not the Americans also?

Mr. Gellner: No. The Americans have proclaimed that they would allow inspection. In fact, the Americans were the first to come up with the idea—the so-called open-sky policy of President Eisenhower—that foreign aircraft would be inspected.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: Is that it Mr. Gibson? Gentlemen, that concludes our list of questioners.

Mr. Laniel: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I just would like to put in the record my total disagreement with the remarks of Mr. Winch, and in the name of the Committee I want to tell Mr. Gellner that we are very grateful, the majority of us...

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Laniel: ... for your present and past appearances at this Committee and for your frankness. It was very helpful to the Committee. Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, very much, Mr. Laniel. Mr. Gellner has to catch a plane.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I would just like to lend my support to the statement that has been made by my honourable colleague. I resent the fact that a statement has been made that you presented material that is not in accordance with fact.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): As far as I know I do not agree with it.

The Vice-Chairman: I assure you on behalf of the Chair, Mr. Gellner, that those are my sentiments, too. You can see that you certainly have by far the majority of the Committee with you, and in fact, we found our two sessions with you to be most intriguing. We thank you very, very much for what I would say was a fine presentation.

Mr. Gellner: I assure you I do not bruise easily.

The Vice-Chairman: Meeting adjourned.

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APPENDIX EEE

Primarily, this paper is intended to offer comments on the evidence already given before this Committee. To make reference easier, the sequence of explanations is followed that was used in the basic working paper submitted by the Department of National Defence.

* * * * *

1. *The Need for an Integrated System.*

The working paper makes the flat statement that, "the air defence of North America is a single, indivisible problem". This is true, but requires perhaps some explanation.

The integration of North American air defence—and thus NORAD—became necessary when the point was reached where the human brain was unable to cope quickly enough with all the data which had to be digested and correlated if the defence system was to work. The increased speed of the targets, the use of ever more sophisticated electronic counter-measures (ECM), and the development of new air-to-surface weapons forced the defence to go from manual to automatic control, in other words, to take the solving of interception problems away from human controllers and turn them over, as it were, to computers at the SAGE (semi-automatic ground environment) and BUIC (back-up interception control) installations.

Especially the operation of SAGE—BUIC is, as the name implies, merely a back-up in case SAGE control is lost, and with only about one fourth the latter's capacity—is a big, complex and costly job. The SAGE installation must be located for greatest efficiency, not on the basis of political considerations. Also, with defence echeloned in depth, targets must be handed over from control centre to control centre as the attack progresses and the need for a hand-over arises. The international border can not be made the line where one control ceases and the other takes over. This would not make sense in case of actual attack.

Finally, we would have had to pay out much more than in fact we did had we looked after the Canadian portion of the air defence system entirely ourselves. As it was, the United States bore the whole cost of the DEW Line; and under CADIN (Continental Air

Defence Agreement North; see p. 19 of the working paper), paid two thirds of the cost of many other air defence installations on Canadian soil.

Since it was the automatization of present-day North American air defence based on fixed installations (land-based radars and control centres) that made it indivisible and NORAD necessary, it follows that the system could theoretically—but not reasonably—be divided again when it becomes mobile with the introduction of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). We will come back to this, later.

2. *Canada's Contribution to the Integrated System.*

The working paper states that, "Canada contributes approximately 8 per cent to 10 per cent of the overall costs of maintaining and operating the NORAD system". In itself, this ratio is not very significant at present, but may become so when the time comes to divide the costs of a reorganized and re-equipped North American air defence. For this reason only, it may be useful to look at our present contribution which, in my opinion, is quite a bit less than 8 per cent to 10 per cent of the total.

This contribution can only be measured in terms of input of money and personnel. I have no means of verifying the U.S. figures and am thus accepting the official ones given for the American input: 144,000 men and 2.5 billion dollars.

NORAD itself lists the Canadian outlay as 135 million dollars. This figure is, however, misleading, because it takes in the whole annual cost of Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake, Alberta, which comes under Canadian Forces Air Defence Command (ADC), but contains only two air defence units, a heavy radar and a SPADATS (Space Detection and Tracking System) installation. These two units, and some base administration personnel, make up only about 13 per cent of total strength at Cold Lake, say, 250 men out of 1959, as of this month. The annual cost of Cold Lake is 24 million \$, and if we calculated on a pro rata basis, only a little over 3 million \$ of this could be booked against air defence. Even if we deduct only 15 million \$

as unrelated expenditure from the 135 million \$ mentioned above, we arrive at a figure of 120 million \$ as our monetary contribution to NORAD. This is rather less than 5 per cent of the total.

As of this month, ADC strength was 10,103 Service personnel and 3,068 civilians. If we subtract such personnel in Cold Lake as are not engaged in the air defence function, we come to a figure at certainly not more than 11,500 actually available to NORAD, or 8 % of the total, at the utmost.

In my opinion, then, and as a rough estimate which could perhaps serve as a yardstick in future considerations, the United States pays 95 % of the operations and maintenance cost of NORAD, and provides 92 % of its personnel.

Only as a matter of interest it may be noted that, if we assign two points for every position of commander of a higher NORAD headquarters and one point for every position of a deputy commander, Canadian officers hold almost 23 % of the top command posts. We are certainly not badly treated in the integrated organization.

3. American Military Presence in Canada

The figure of "683 American NORAD personnel in Canada", given in the working paper, looks low but not substantially so. It would comprise U.S. Servicemen in the following categories:

(a) "Co-manning", that is, the holding of certain positions in the United States by Canadians, and in Canada by Americans.

(b) Personnel of the one control centre (Goose Bay, Lab.) and three heavy radars (Stephenville, Nfld., Goose Bay, Lab., and Saglek, Lab.), all in 37 NORAD Division, manned by Americans.

(c) Custodial personnel of nuclear weapons stored at six sites in Canada.

I would think that there would be closer to a thousand U.S. Service personnel in these three groups, but the difference, if any existed, would be of no significance.

Apart from NORAD personnel proper, the four DEW Line main stations on Canadian territory (see map, "NORAD Warning Systems", annexed to the working paper) are manned by civilian employees of Federal Electric Co. The managerial personnel is American, and so is a proportion of the operating and servicing crews. I would estimate

the number of these U.S. civilians at no more than 500. There are also 24 Canadian military, and six U.S. military, at the DEW Line main stations, which are all commanded by Canadian officers. The numerous DEW Line auxiliary stations, incidentally, are unmanned. They are periodically inspected by crews from the main stations.

4. The Bomber Threat.

A threat is present if a condition exists which *could* bring about a perilous situation. (For instance, there is a threat of typhoid fever if a condition exists at the source of a public water supply which *could* cause it to be contaminated.) If we look in this way at what constitutes a threat, then it is really idle to speculate what the intentions of the Soviet Union or of China might be. We know that the Soviets possess a significant number of manned (bombers) and unmanned (missiles) nuclear weapon carriers which can reach this continent. Soviet peaceful intentions or the threat of nuclear retaliation by the United States, it does not really matter which, may keep them out of the North American air space. What does matter is that the nuclear deterrent is not credible where intrusions by foreign aircraft are concerned. Nobody in his right mind will counter-attack—or even threaten to counter-attack—with nuclear weapons just because there are unauthorized overflights of his territory by aircraft of a potential enemy. He will first want to identify them, warn them off. In general, he will want to deny the air to aerial intruders, just as he will want to deny his territory to land, and his territorial waters to seaborne intruders. This control of the air, more difficult than the control of the land, and in some respects also more difficult than the control of the sea, is the main task of NORAD. This being so, there is no need to debate whether or not there is an imminent Soviet bomber threat, or there will be a Chinese bomber threat some time in the future.

At present, the NORAD system can exercise a modicum of control over the North American air space, but no more than that. An intruder can fly beneath the radar coverage of the DEW line and thus slip in undetected. Then there is really no coverage at all until the main defensive belt, the outer limits of which are determined by the range of the heavy radars of the Pinetree Line, is reached. This the "hole in the middle", often mentioned in NORAD briefings.

The Pinetree Line radars (for locations, see map, "NORAD Long-Range Radar Sites", annexed to the working paper) have a range of approximately 200 miles to a height of 30,000 ft. and above, and a little over half that to a height of 10,000 ft. From there down, range decreases rapidly. The line has virtually no capability against low-flying aircraft. (It could be given that capability by the installation of, so-called, gap-fillers but this would be very expensive, and quite unreasonable at a time when plans are afoot to scrap all or most of the fixed radars.) On the other hand, it has enough depth—except in some sectors—to make slipping underneath its coverage no easy matter.

In other words, with more than 150,000 men, and for an annual expenditure of upward of two-and-a-half billion dollars, NORAD is not altogether able to deny the air over North America to intruders. In case of war, some bombers would get through because the defence might not succeed in shooting them down, but others simply because they would probably never be detected. It goes without saying that if there were no NORAD system, foreign aircraft could desert themselves in the skies over North America at will, undetected and unmolested. Then, and probably only then, would a serious bomber threat arise, because what inhibits now the use of the still cheapest and most accurate means of delivering nuclear weapons—the difficulty of penetrating a defended area with manned bombers—would no longer obtain. In the meantime, and with the NORAD system working within its limitations, the writers of the working paper are no doubt right when they characterize the present bomber threat as "limited but still significant".

5. Effectiveness of NORAD System in an Emergency

North American air defence is under tight political control. At the same time, its effectiveness depends on speed of response. These two requirements—and they are both essential, because attackers and defenders would, if they ever clashed, use nuclear weapons—must be properly wedded if the system is to function.

On the one occasion when it was tested in a real-life case it did not, and it has been deduced from that experience that the pre-1958 arrangement of two national commands working in friendly cooperation would func-

tion better than the present, rigidly institutionalized, integrated system.

The facts are that at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, on the evening of 22 October 1962, the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, with the concurrence of Washington, put his forces on "Defcon 3". (Defence Condition 3, the ordinary being Defcon 5 and the highest Defcon 1—after which there is only "Air Defence Emergency" when nuclear bombs are actually falling.) The Canadian government of the day hesitated for 42 hours before it concurred in the raising of the alert state to Defcon 3. By then, the worst of the crisis had passed. Although the Canadian forces, on their own initiative and with authorization from the, then, Minister of Defence (but not the Cabinet), took some steps to improve their preparedness, the most important actions, especially in terms of deployment of forces and readying of nuclear munitions, were not and could not be taken. As a result, NORAD was not really at Defcon 3 until the early afternoon of 24 October 1962.

Nothing happened, of course, and NORAD soon went back to its ordinary Defcon 5, but the fact remains that the system as a whole reacted too slowly to be fully effective if it had really come to war. Rightly or wrongly, reaction speed was sacrificed to what was then judged to be the proper exercise of political control.

The Cuban missile crisis revealed a weakness of the NORAD system, but one which is built into any military arrangement between sovereign states. In any case, as pointed out under 1., an integrated organization is necessary because of technical reasons, at any rate as long as the system is based on static installations, and on telecommunications and data links between them.

6. Defects of Present System

The vulnerability of the present system is well demonstrated in Part II. of Dr. Lindsey's paper. I would like to add the following observations:

The likelihood that an enemy would be able to knock out one of the SAGE installations, on which the operations of the different sections of the defensive line depend, is slight—the one at North Bay, Ont., for instance (admittedly the strongest of them all), is virtually invulnerable beneath several hundred feet of rock. And even if a SAGE fell out because of mechanical failure, BUIC (see under 1.)

could do the job—or, at any rate, the essentials of the job—of computation and control. There is, however, the danger that an enemy could punch a hole in the line by destroying successive radars. No information would then be fed from that part of the line into SAGE or BUIC, and there could thus be no effective response to a penetration. A glance at the map, “NORAD Long-Range Radar Sites”, annexed to the working paper, will show that in the centre the Pinetree Line has very little depth. Punching a hole through it, there, would be quite possible, the more so as the antenna and scope arrays of these big radars can neither be concealed nor hardened.

The “hole in the middle”, mentioned under 4., is also beginning to become critical. So far, the best of bomber-launched air-to-surface missiles (ASM; also sometimes called “stand-off bombs”) have a range of approximately 350 miles. They thus can not be launched from beyond the coverage of the Pinetree Line, fly through it, and hit targets behind it. ASMs of 1,000 and even 1,500 miles’ range are, however, already in sight. These could be fired from carriers which would remain invisible to the defenders, in the “hole in the middle”. Such a development could make the system such as it is now largely ineffective. It would pretty well compel us to decide either to expand it with new fixed installations or to choose a new approach (AWACS).

Another weakness of the system—and this, I believe, has not been brought yet to the attention of the Committee—is that the defence belt is too far to the south. Interceptions would take place in many cases at the fringe of the densely inhabited area or even above it. This is unavoidable because of the limited range of land-based radar.

Paradoxically, the public is alarmed about the dangers that would supposedly ensue from the explosions over our heads of the defensive missiles of the Safeguard AMB system, when—as Dr. Lindsey rightly points out in Part III. of his paper—there is virtually no such danger. On the other hand, the fact that Bomarc, a missile with a maximum range of 400 miles, and Nike-Hercules, with a maximum range of 75 miles, would be launched from sites in the United States, and certainly in a northerly direction, and that the threat of this happening has existed for something like 10 years now, has been largely overlooked. Both Bomarc and Nike-Hercules, of course, carry nuclear warheads.

A nuclear bomb can not explode unless it is deliberately fused. Still, the crew of a bomber who see an oncoming missile on their radar, might fuse and drop their nuclear ordnance before they are hit themselves. There is also, as Dr. Lindsey mentions on p. 41 of Part III. of his paper, at least the theoretical possibility of fitting the bomb with “a special fuse causing it to detonate on the first receipt of radiation from the defensive explosion”.

It must also be remembered that Bomarc and Nike-Hercules will go after a target wherever it is. An interception over an inhabited area—inevitable in the case of Nike-Hercules, not to be excluded in the case of Bomarc—would thus result in tremendous damage from the nuclear weapons dropped at random from the bomber, and in much less but still potentially serious damage from the detonation of the defensive missile. In that way, we could, in Canada, in fact suffer the destruction intended by the enemy for a target in the United States. We thus have a particular interest in seeing the defensive belt moved farther north, and this is of course not possible with the present fixed installations.

In this connection, a further observation may be in order, and this concerning Bomarc, a weapon system which has been much criticized, even on official level. In fact, there is nothing wrong with Bomarc as such: it is a reliable weapon, relatively cheap (in manpower and money) to operate, and with all-weather capabilities superior to those of a manned fighter. It is the tactical deployment of Bomarc that is highly questionable—missiles from the Bomarc in the Buffalo, N.Y., area, for instance, would operate at maximum range just about on top of Montreal—and so is the bunching of numbers of missiles on a single, unprotected site. This is now dictated by the general nature of the defence system. There would, on the other hand, be nothing particularly wrong with Bomarcs dispersed along, say, the 55th parallel, provided it were otherwise reasonable to do this within the framework of a new and different arrangement of North American air defence.

7. *The Alternative: AWACS*

The idea behind AWACS is thoroughly explained in Part II, of Dr. Lindsey's paper. The Americans are going ahead with the scheme, and no doubt will, regardless of what Canada may decide to do. True, they have not committed much money to it yet, but—and this is perhaps more significant—they

have begun a phased dismantling of the present system, clearly with the intention of both obtaining from it as much security as possible while AWACS is not yet available and letting it run down slowly, so that the transition, when it comes, will not be too abrupt. Even in the absence of a public statement, American intentions in this matter can be deduced from their actions: they have in places thinned out their sections of heavy radars (e.g. in 37 NORAD Division); have scrapped some Bomarc bases; and are not taking the steps they would probably otherwise have taken in view of the evolution of the threat, for instance, are not installing gap-fillers to intercept low-flying aircraft. (See under 4. The Americans have, however, gap-fillers along their southern seaboard, facing Cuba.)

The question then poses itself of what Canada should do: follow suit and prepare for the transition to AWACS; or stand pat with what we have, and then get out of NORAD when the Americans will have one system of defence and we another, which would make integration of course impossible. Everything speaks for adopting the first alternative.

Without the American heavy radars, the present system would have little depth (none at all in the centre and on the west coast), but we could operate if after a fashion, taking over the remaining few U.S. installations on Canadian soil (in Newfoundland and Labrador, see under 3.). To make an all-Canadian air defence system effective, we would have to spend a lot of money, for additional automatic control centres, for instance, and for fighters and/or missiles to cover the whole length of the country. Even then, we would at best have the kind of system we have now, with all its defects, and at incomparably higher cost.

AWACS, on the other hand, if it is made to work (there is still some problem with downward-looking radar, as explained in Part II. of Dr. Lindsey's paper), would not only provide a more effective defence against attack by bombers and air-breathing missiles, but would also go far toward fulfilling the overriding mission of the Canadian Armed Forces, as set out in the Government statement of 3 April 1969, "the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines in the interest of protecting our own sovereignty".

It is expected that the AWACS long-range radars will reach out to a distance of 400 miles in all directions. In theory, then, one

patrol aircraft could keep under observation at any one moment a circular area of half a million square miles. Five such aircraft, in the air at the same time and flying in a proper pattern, would in all likelihood give us better control of our air space than all the radars of the DEW and Pinetree Lines taken together. A good rule of thumb for a 24-hour of an area is six aircraft on the ground for every one aircraft in the air. This is approximate, of course, and depends on circumstances, but one would not be far off if one assumed that 35 AWACS patrol aircraft would give us continuous and thorough control of our air space, with some degree of control of our land and of our sea approaches as added dividend. These aircraft would, of course, at the same time be the early-warning and tracking stations and the air defence control centres of NORAD. They would thus serve the United States at least as much as they would serve Canada.

Since the patrol patterns would generally be well to the north of the densely populated area, these aircraft would most economically be stationed on Canadian airfields, though they could, at the price of unproductive flying hours, also be staged to forward airfields in Canada from bases in the United States. The active air defences—the Americans currently think in terms of the F 106X interceptor-fighter—would definitely have to be positioned in Canada. Especially if the F 106X is in fact adopted (it is debatable whether it should be), these comparatively small aircraft, with a limited carrying capacity and thus limited range when ordnance has to be carried as well, would best be kept at the northernmost airfields which can conveniently be operated the year round. This would ensure that in case of conflict interceptions would take place where nuclear weapons, offensive or defensive, would not do much harm on the ground.

In sum, then, Canada should, if anything, be keen on changing over from the present air defence system, which is imperfect and in a way dangerous, to AWACS.

The objection will be made that in a nuclear war it will not really matter whence the danger comes and, indeed, what defences we have. This is a popular, but overly simplistic view. Defence in the nuclear age implies—to use Herman Kahn's words "thinking about the unthinkable". We do not know what future technological developments will be. We only know what can attack us,

not what will. To give an example, London, Ont., could perhaps come out of a nuclear war undamaged, and its quarter-of-a-million citizens alive. It may not, if a bomber whose load is ticketed for New York is intercepted somewhere in the vicinity of London by a Nike-Hercules missile from the Detroit defences. Inversely, only one enemy nuclear carrier may have Winnipeg as its target. If that carrier is destroyed somewhere over the Arctic Circle, half-a-million Winnipeggers just might survive the war. The same applies to ballistic missiles, or will, if and when some kind of active ABM defence that will work is established.

Denial of one's own air space to intruders and the consequent deterrence of further intrusion, and if the worse comes to the worst, "damage limiting" (see Part I. of Dr. Lindsey's paper) are aims that can not be dismissed, and national responsibilities that can not be shed, just because one thinks that they can not be met. The question really is not whether one should or should not try to achieve these aims, but how to do it most effectively and economically.

8. Cost of change-over to AWACS

Here everything is guess-work. All that can be said is that the book value of the present installations and equipment of Canadian Forces Air Defence Command is about \$800 million; and that some of it would continue to be usable even after the switch to AWACS, or recoverable. That extrapolating from the known cost of our maritime patrol aircraft, the Canadian Argus (\$12 millions apiece, equipped), and assuming that the airframe will be that of the DC-8 or Boeing 707, the AWACS patrol planes might cost \$25 million apiece. That the F 106X fighter might cost five million \$, or so, a copy. And that, based on these fractional figures, the sum of \$12.3 billion mentioned by former U.S. Defence Secretary as the capital investment cost of the new system over 10 years sounds believable.

Now, taking our fair share of the outlays—fair in terms of the respective GNPs—to be about 7.5 per cent, our capital investment would be \$92 million a year for 10 years. This compares with capital allotments to ADC of about \$11 million in the 1968-69 Estimates, and under six million \$ in the 1969-70 Estimates, but then no greater purchases of new equipment were programmed in these last years, and the rainy day when such purchases will become unavoidable must eventually arrive also under the present system.

Even so, there would have to be a substantial increase in the ADC budget if AWACS were adopted, at any rate in the first years. Later on, because in AWACS fewer men can do the job than are needed now, and operations-and-maintenance costs are thus less, the budget would gradually come down to its present level (in 1969 dollars, of course). Finally, once capital investment is completed, the ADC budget should be less than it is now. It should, however, be again stressed that this is speculation, the more unreliable as we do not know as yet what all will be involved in the establishment of AWACS.

9. Space Defence

The mission of NORAD was always to defend North America against attack from the air and from space. "This involves", as he, then, Acting Commander, ADC, put it in his testimony before this Committee on 28 June 1966, "The detection of *all* potentially hostile aerospace vehicles, the determination of their intent, and their destruction if necessary". "All" means just that: bombers, air-breathing missiles, ballistic missiles, orbital vehicles, or any other flying instrument of destruction that may come along.

Thus, NORAD was always engaged in ABM defence, and so was and is Canada as a partner in NORAD. The Canadian government knew that very well when it renewed the treaty in 1963, and showed it by inserting the proviso that we would not commit ourselves to participation in one phase of that defence, the actual interception of missiles. (The wording is: "This agreement will not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an *active* ballistic missile defence".) This was no doubt done in order not to be bound to paying for part of the Sentinel, or the present Safeguard, ABM system. There can have been no other reason, for we do our share in other respects: land lines and other communications from the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) run through Canada and information from it is automatically transmitted to us; we help in the detection and tracking of vehicles in space—another means of warning against space attack—in SPADATS; and Canadian personnel in NORAD headquarters is involved in space defence just as it is in air defence work.

Nor can Canadian reluctance to participate in active ABM defence stem from any opposition to a possible invasion of Canadian air space by defending missiles. As pointed out under 6., the probability of this happening is

practically nil, and, in any case, we have raised no objections against the emplacement of U.S. air defence missiles which of necessity would be launched into our air space.

As far as the weapons used in the Safeguard system are concerned, Spartan is designed to detonate in the near-vacuum of outer space, while Sprint is a point-defence weapon with a reported maximum range of about 30 miles. Even this is a slant range, along the hypotenuse of a triangle, the base of which would necessarily be even less than 30 miles. The two announced Safeguard sites, Grand Forks, North Dakota, and Great Falls, Montana, are 75 and 108 miles, respectively, from the Canadian border. Even if the pads from which Sprint would be fired were a little farther north than these locations, it follows from the nature of this weapon that it would be most improbable that they would be so far forward that the missiles could reach Canadian skies.

In his recent testimony before this Committee, General F. R. Sharp gave it as his opinion that, from the military standpoint, the Safeguard system should be part of NORAD. He is undoubtedly right. The space surveillance (SPADATS) and early-warning (BM-EWS) functions can not very well be separated from weapon control and target interception. Also, if it came to a war, there would be only one aerospace battle over North America, with each side using a mix of all types of weapons at its disposal.

This does not mean that Canada would ultimately have to operate part of the Safeguard system. Nike-Hercules, for instance, is also a NORAD weapon system, but we do not operate any of them. The point is that just as through NORAD we are co-responsible for the operation of Nike-Hercules, we will be co-responsible for the operation of the Safeguard system if the latter is put under NORAD, and if Canada is still in NORAD when this happens.

It must also be borne in mind that we can not now disassociate ourselves from the idea of ABM defence, as some people seem to think we can, but at best only from how far this idea is carried. As said earlier, we already are in ABM defence. We could only

say—and with not much logic—that this kind of defence (and why only it?) should be limited to detection only.

It could be argued that since deterrence depends on “assured destruction” (see Part I. of Dr. Lindsey’s paper), it would be best—the situation would be most “stable”—if there were no defences at all, and the nuclear powers lay open to each other’s attack. None of them, however, shows any inclination to stand naked to its enemies. This being so, it takes a lot of sophism to argue that one kind of defence is not de-stabilizing, while the other kind is. What matters is that they are all in use, in one way or the other and to one degree or the other. The question of whether to use any of them should in every case be approached pragmatically.

10. Conclusions

The present North American air defence setup makes it mandatory for the United States and Canada to operate it in common. AWACS could be operated separately, but only at the price of lesser efficiency on both sides, higher cost for Canada, and probably diminished safety for the United States. It would not be practical for Canada to continue on its own the present system on Canadian territory, when the United States changes over to AWACS. Since the latter puts an even higher premium on the availability of Canadian air space, airfields and communications than does the present system, there should be a different arrangement for sharing capital costs from that which prevailed when the present organization was established.

An added bonus from AWACS would be that it would enable Canada to maintain a proper surveillance of Canadian air space, and that it would help in the surveillance of Canadian territory and sea approaches.

The question of Canadian participation in ABM defence does not arise—we already participate. Our continuing as partners in NORAD does not depend on whether or not we take part in the operation of the Safeguard system, but the latter should in any case, even if it is entirely U.S.-operated, come under NORAD.

John Gellner

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 48

TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 1969

THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1969

TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1969

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969
(North Bay)

TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan
and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Cafik	¹ Laniel	Roberts
Carter	Laprise	Steward (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Fairweather	Legault	Steward (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Gibson	MacLean	Winch—(30)
Goyer	Marceau	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Steward,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹ Mr. Laniel replaced Mr. Foster on June 12, 1969, who replaced Mr. Laniel on June 11, 1969.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
TUESDAY, June 10, 1969.

Ordered,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be authorized to travel from place to place within Canada and that the necessary staff do accompany the Committee.

ATTEST:

The Clerk of the House of Commons
ALISTAIR FRASER

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

THURSDAY, June 5, 1969

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

EIGHTH REPORT

Your Committee recommends that it be authorized to travel from place to place within Canada and that the necessary staff do accompany the Committee.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman

(Concurred in June 10 1969)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

TUESDAY, June 3, 1969
(76)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 11.05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members presents: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Nesbitt, Prud'homme, Ryan, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (18).

The Committee met to discuss its future work program and a draft report to the House.

On motion of Mr. Harkness,

Agreed, on division,—That the Committee hear representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations; otherwise, if this is not feasible, that a Subcommittee arrange to hear them.

On motion of Mr. Harkness,

Agreed, on division,—That if Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp is invited to appear again, the meeting will be *in camera*.

With the discussion continuing, at 12:50 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Thursday, June 5, 1969.

THURSDAY, June 5, 1969
(77)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 11.05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Thompson (*Red-Deer*) Wahn, Winch (19).

The Committee met to consider a draft report to the House.

Mr. Gibson moved,

That two Subcommittees of this Committee meet during the vacation months with authority to call witnesses and if necessary travel, to further study (a) the entire field of North American Defence in its political aspect, and (b) the progress of the disarmament conference at Geneva so that when Parliament next meets in the Fall, this Committee can receive up to date reports as to information and progress reports in these Fields.

The Committee agreed to refer this motion to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure for its consideration and recommendation.

The Committee agreed to print the *Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America, Signed at Ottawa August 29 and September 2, 1958, In force September 2, 1958*, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (See Appendix FFF)

On motion of Mr. Laniel,

Resolved,—That reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to Mr. John Gellner, who appeared before this Committee on Tuesday, May 27, 1969, in the matter of its Order of Reference dated January 16, 1969.

Moved by Mr. Cafik,

Resolved,—That the Committee recommend that it be authorized to travel from place to place within Canada and that the necessary staff do accompany the Committee.

Moved by Mr. Cafik,

Resolved,—That the Committee appoint a Sub-Committee on Maritime Forces, to consist of 9 members chosen by the Chairman after consultation with the Party Whips.

Moved by Mr. Legault,

Resolved,—That the report on Maritime Forces prepared by the Department of National Defence be referred to the Sub-Committee on Maritime Forces for detailed study and comments, and that the Sub-Committee hear representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations if the main Committee is unable to do so.

Moved by Mr. Ryan,

Resolved,—That reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to Mr. Michael Sherman, who will appear before this Committee on Tuesday, June 10, 1969.

With the discussion continuing, at 12:40 p. m. the Committee adjourned until Tuesday, June 10, 1969, when the witness will be Dr. Michael Sherman.

TUESDAY, June 10, 1969.
(78)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11.10 a. m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (19).

Witness: Dr. Michael E. Sherman, Professional Staff, Hudson Institute.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Dr. Michael Sherman, and made a statement about the Committee's planned trip to North Bay on Thursday, June 12, 1969. The Clerk distributed copies of a booklet containing the itinerary and travel arrangements.

Dr. Sherman made an opening statement on the subject of anti-ballistic missile systems.

On motion of Mr. Gibson,

Agreed,—That Dr. Sherman's advance presentation entitled *A Canadian Perspective On Missile Defence* and his analysis of arguments for and against ABM systems, in catalogue form, be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (See Appendix GGG).

On motion of Mr. Legault,

Resolved,—That, if necessary, the Committee recommend to the House that it be granted permission to travel to North Bay Ontario on Thursday, June 12, 1969, and that the necessary staff accompany the Committee.

Members questioned Dr. Sherman for the remainder of this sitting. On completion of the questioning the Chairman thanked the witness.

At 1.05 p. m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

THURSDAY, June 12, 1969
(79)

(Visit to North Bay)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence assembled in front of the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, at 7:30 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Cafik, Forrestall, Foster, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Laprise, Legault, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Wahn (11).

Also present: Messrs. Groos and Schumacher, M.P.'s.

In attendance: Messrs. P. Dobell and J. Payne, Parliamentary Centre; Mr. G. Galbraith, P.C. Party Research Staff; Mr. S. Abrahams, Department of External Affairs; Mr. J. Grant and Lt. Col. L. C. Morrison, Department of National Defence, who acted as conducting officers.

The Committee proceeded by military bus and Yukon aircraft to the Canadian Forces Base at North Bay.

On arrival at North Bay the group was met by Major-General Maurice Lipton, Commander, and Brigadier General Robert B. Hughes, Vice Commander, Northern NORAD Region. They accompanied the party to the SAGE Complex. General Lipton welcomed the Committee and conducted a NORAD Operations briefing which was followed by a question period. The group then toured the operational areas.

At 12:30 p.m., the Committee recessed for a luncheon in the Officers Mess.

At 2.30 p.m., the Committee visited 446 SAM Squadron for a briefing and inspected the BOMARC Complex. Some of those who assisted with the briefings and tours were: Brigadier General W. M. Garton, Brigadier General M. F. Doyle, Lieutenant Colonel Austin, Lieutenant Colonel Corry, Major Randall and Captain Towns.

At approximately 4:00 p. m., the Committee enplaned for the return trip to Ottawa, arriving at the Parliament Buildings at 6:00 p.m. At that time the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, June 17, 1969
(80)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Brewin, Fairweather, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Legault, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Roberts, Wahn (13).

Witnesses: Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD and Mr. J. G. Grant, Superintendent Parliamentary Returns, Directorate of Information Services, Department of National Defence.

Members questioned General Sharp on subjects relating to North American Defence during this morning sitting.

General Sharp read answers to questions that resulted from his previous appearance. Mr. Grant read answers to questions resulting from Dr. Lindsey's previous appearances. Copies will be distributed to the Members. Copies of a listing of NORAD Commanders were distributed.

On completion of the questioning, the Chairman thanked the witnesses.

The Committee adjourned at 1:00 p.m., until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING (81)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 3:40 p.m. this day, with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Gibson, Gay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Laniel, Legault, Nowlan, Penner, Roberts, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (14).

Members discussed a draft report to the House, on the subject of North American Defence.

With the discussion continuing, at 4:55 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING (82)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 8:15 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Legault, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Roberts, Wahn, Winch (10).

Members continued their discussion of a draft report to the House, during this evening sitting.

With the discussion continuing, the Committee adjourned at 10:00 p.m., until Thursday, June 19, 1969 at 9:30 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, June 10, 1969

The Chairman: Order, gentlemen. Dr. Sherman has been retained by this Committee to prepare a study of questions relating to anti-ballistic missile systems. This was circulated to members of the Committee only yesterday. Copies were shipped last week by air freight, but unfortunately they were held in bond by the customs authorities and it took some time to get them out. So it is not the fault of Dr. Sherman, and I apologize to all members of the Committee. It never occurred to us that this could happen; otherwise we might have been able to get them to you sooner. It is that undefended frontier of ours.

In assessing the arguments of those advocating various types of ABM systems, Dr. Sherman has proceeded in the following way: he has set out four statements about strategic weapons that, he believes, would win wide approval with the Canadian public, but are really highly controversial among policy planners. The subjects he has chosen are: (1) the relation of ABM to the "arms race"; (2) the possible impact of ABM on nonproliferation; (3) the question of whether a "meaningful" defence is possible; and (4) the notion that Canada's view of her role in continental defence should be determined solely by her concern for the stability of the United States deterrent. As you will see this goes considerably beyond the material provided by Dr. Lindsey, who stated the limits of his own presentations.

While Dr. Sherman's study is complex, he is to be commended for having taken this complicated theme and relating the issues to the Canadian situation. Those who have had time to consider the paper will see that Dr. Sherman has opened up the subject in an interesting way by questioning certain propositions without, in most cases, taking a position himself. This work relates to the first report of the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, of which we have copies for

members who wish to study this lengthy document. It is very lengthy and takes a lot of reading.

I might add that if members of the Committee are interested Dr. Sherman would be prepared to make available as a supplement the analysis he had originally prepared of the arguments of those advocating "heavy" ABM systems, "light" ABM systems and those opposed to any ABM system, in the catalogue form in which he had originally prepared it.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Chairman, may we take advantage of that kind offer and request that it be made available for the Committee?

The Chairman: Yes, that can be done, can it not Dr. Sherman? Perhaps when it is here it might be considered desirable to have it printed as an appendix if it is not too lengthy.

Mr. Gibson: I so move, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Is it agreed that we should have it printed as an appendix?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Before asking Dr. Sherman to make any opening remarks if he may wish to, I would like to inform the members that the Committee will be visiting North Bay on Thursday, June 12, to inspect the NORAD facilities there. Arrangements have been made to depart from the Centre door of the Parliament Buildings at 7.30 a.m. and to return here at 5.30 p.m. The details of the itinerary have been circulated to all members this morning. There is place for five journalists to be included if they wish to come on a basis of requests made to me.

Dr. Sherman is a Canadian from Toronto who has retained close connections with Canada. He has specialized in disarmament questions and is author of "Nuclear Proliferation: the Treaty and After". A biography has been circulated to all members of the Committee. I think I should add that Dr. Sherman's paper does not reflect a Hudson Institute viewpoint; when personal views are expressed they are Dr. Sherman's own.

Dr. Sherman will make an introductory statement in which he will summarize his paper's main points and relate them to the relevant parts of Dr. Lindsey's paper.

Dr. Michael Sherman (Hudson Institute, New York): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me say that I am very glad to be here, and moreover I was very honoured by the invitation to appear before you.

In some ways I am in a slightly awkward situation because I am a Canadian working in the United States for an organization which is an independent and non-profit one, but which has certain relations with the American government. That in itself makes the position a little bit sensitive.

Second, the issue we are discussing today is a very sensitive one in the United States, both from the point of view of domestic and certainly of international politics. By way of echoing the Chairman's last comment, I would like to reverse the traditional situation

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in which the prisoner is told that anything he says may be used against him: This prisoner would like to plead that while anything he says may be used against him, it ought not to be used against anybody else, especially those who are still, in the jargon of the underworld, "on the outside".

On the question of what I might talk to you about today, in reading the transcript of earlier testimony which was given before this Committee I noted that there was a concern about being bombarded with a strong advocate position. I was glad to see that you were not expecting one from me, because I do not think I could have delivered on an assignment of that kind. I do not have strong positions of advocacy on almost any of these issues. Therefore, I could not have given you any, for important reasons which I will come to in a moment. I have, however, tried to be a kind of devil's advocate in the paper which was circulated to you, and I would like to make a comment on that issue as it relates to the organization of the paper before I try to summarize the substance of it.

As the Chairman has indicated, I had originally tried to prepare for you a simple catalogue of the arguments containing the pros and cons of various levels of defensive systems. However, in reading it over I had three reactions: I found it rather tedious and I thought it was reasonable to expect that you

might find it tedious; secondly it duplicated, to a great extent, material in the Senate subcommittee and other reports that either have been made available to you or are easily available and thus it would not have added very much to the deliberations of this Committee; and finally it was not, as I had originally prepared it, especially relevant to Canadian concerns.

For those three reasons I sought to restructure the paper without changing much of the substance. At least, I tried to restructure it in such a way that it would be more relevant both to Canadian concerns and interests objectively construed, and to the way the issue has been debated in Canada thus far. As we have now agreed the original form of that will be made available to you.

The structure I have settled on in the presentation which you received is one in which four propositions, or hypothetical statements if you will, central to the ABM debate both in the United States and Canada, are set out. They are then discussed with the end in mind not of proving or disproving, but simply of suggesting that they are very controversial statements. And perhaps I will let this issue of the controversial nature of the debate carry me through to the first point in the paper itself. I think this is so important that I chose on the first page of the paper to try to dramatize it by making a statement that is, I think, stronger than I really believe. It is the statement that there has never been a serious, sustained public debate on arms control in Canada.

I do not think that is a literal statement and even if it were true in the past, I do not think it is true any longer partly, I might add, because of increased activity by relevant committees and other things that have taken place in Canada in the last few years. However, I do think there has always been a habit, and probably one still exists, of jumping to conclusions on issues that simply do not admit of confident conclusions. Thus that first section of the paper is really a plea: Because neither time nor political pressure is yet pushing us into taking strong positions, I think, as Canadians, it is prudent as well responsible to try to go over the alternative possibilities quite seriously other than starting with unexamined assumptions and then proceeding too rapidly to conclusions.

In the United States, of course, a comment like that would not have very much relevance, because the issues have already been caught up in the domestic political debate.

People have staked out political positions, and it is very difficult to be balanced when you are in that kind of a situation. But as I say, this is not yet the case by and large in Canada, and I think that is fortunate for us.

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In a debate like the one over missile defence, it is sometimes believed that the crucial questions are scientific and the political questions both subordinate and simple. But let me steal a story from a friend, Dr. Ciro Zoppo of RAND. It may be apocryphal but it makes the point, and it is the sort of story that even if not true, ought to be. As you may know, before the Second World War many concerned scientists came to Einstein with a plea that he turn to the President and plead for an atomic bomb program. When Einstein was asked why these people were having difficulty either getting through or making their point when they were the experts on science and should be the best judges of what other nations were capable of and what American possibilities were, he responded by saying, "That is because politics is tougher than physics". And with the ABM, I think the real difficulty of analysis occurs in long-range political judgment rather than in the technical problems, although they are of course very important. But on most of the central issues, especially the type that I want to discuss, political judgments are the crucial ones and they are just very difficult to make.

Let me make one final point on that subject. I think in the nuclear weapons debate that we had in Canada a few years ago there were many parallels to the American ABM debate. Many of the things that have happened in the United States, of people slipping into strong advocate positions before the facts warranted it, did take place, on both sides I might add, in our own nuclear weapons debate and the political effects of that as well as the international effects were considerable.

In the light of that let me turn to the four propositions that I have suggested would probably win fairly wide approval by the Canadian public as a whole but which are very controversial ones in the ABM debate.

The first one is the notion that the Soviet and American decisions to deploy missile defences open a new round in the superpower arms race. First of all, we have a problem in defining what we mean by an arms race and assessing when we are in one. There are some specialists who will argue that what we have experienced in the last few years, at least

until the beginning of the big Russian offensive build-up, has not really been an arms race. They will point to such things as the fact that the 1962 figure for American strategic offensive and defensive forces was \$11.3 billion and that the proposed figure for 1970 is something around \$8.3 billion. Albert Wohlstetter has commented that, adjusted for price changes, the 1962 figure was well over 50 per cent higher than that for 1970, perhaps even as much as two-thirds higher. This is not to say that the high levels of budgets required to sustain existing forces are therefore a good thing. The only point here is that there is problem of definition in deciding when we are in an arms race and when we are not. I think in general, however, it is fair to say that what most people think of when they say that the opening of the ABM age signals a new round in the superpower arms race is that they are afraid of a period characterized by a volatile and open-ended competition between offensive and defensive forces; that is, once one nation (in this case it was the Soviet Union) begins to deploy any form of ABM its adversary will then feel the need to offset this by an offensive increment and, in order to achieve the position that it initially started out to achieve, the country that started first with defence will step up, and you get a spiral of this kind. This is certainly a very reasonable fear, and I do not mean for a minute to demean people who are concerned about it. It is a very serious matter. If it were to happen it would be a very "bad thing"; the best we might get is successively more expensive levels of stability, the worst we might get would be considerable instability.

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Nonetheless in the debate on ABM in the United States and elsewhere several other possibilities have been examined in some detail. For the moment the only point that I would like to make is that other possibilities, "scenarios" if you will, although I am not fond of that term, exist for the way in which ABM, or BMD, if you prefer, ballistic missile defence, will affect the question of arms races between superpowers. One possibility, for example, is that a superpower will make no response to at least low levels of defensive deployment on the other side. If they do not feel threatened or they do not feel that their requirement for what has been called "assured destruction"—which is another unfortunate term—is called in question by this level of defence, then it will at least be possible for

them to do nothing. Some American analysts, on both sides of the Safeguard question, feel that the Russians will not feel the need to respond either with offence or really with anything. This is just one possibility.

Another possibility is that rather than responding to an opponent's defence with increased offence a government could respond with increased defence. If they set out simply to maintain a certain balance with the other's strategic deployments, a defensive response to a defence could look reasonable, as reasonable perhaps as an offensive increment.

There are people, by the way, who regard what might be called a defence-defence race as a positively desirable thing in the sense that it would reduce the number of effective offensive weapons on both sides. If the defences are reasonably good they presumably degrade the offences up to some level—and the destruction that might be inflicted in the event deterrence should fail would thereby be reduced. This is one feature of what might be called the "ABM as arms control" school, which is directly opposed to the people who might be put in a school called "ABM as arms race"; that is, there are a variety of arguments that can be made and have been made stemming from a feeling that ABM can be made the basis for a more stable world in an arms control sense. This question of bilateral damage limitation is one of them; others are protection against so-called catalytic attacks, accidental or unauthorized launches, things which we can discuss a little bit later on, but all part of a view of a group of analysts who believe that it is not necessarily true that ABM causes arms races. Indeed that it may be the basis for something that we could reasonably call arms control—if one includes in arms control either or all of the objectives of deterring war, limiting damage if deterrence should fail, and also reducing the levels of arms budgets to an extent consistent with those other two objectives.

There are two final points in this area. The question of a defence-defence race without any limitation on offence is open in some ways to the same challenge, once removed as it were, as was reflected in some of my earlier remarks. That is, the defences may at some point get so good that one side or the other will feel a need to offset them with increased offence and an unstable offence-defence race will start. Therefore one feature of this "ABM as arms control" school has been to argue that ABM can be put together with a limitation on offence, whether or not

ABM is itself limited. Indeed, some of these analysts have argued that ABM would facilitate such an agreement; that is, the increased confidence that the country with some defence would feel might make it less likely to insist on as high a level of inspection of offensive forces as it would otherwise have required in the absence of any defence.

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Again, that is simply a point of view but one which has been stated very seriously and which we should include in our view of the alternative possibilities.

Another point that perhaps I might make on this issue is that the relationships of arms control to ABM and the interactions involved here do not only have to do with weapons procurement. Let me give you an example. Some ABM opponents have argued that in responding to the development of multiple warheads by one side, rather than deploying a defensive system, the other side might make a change, not in procurement, but in strategy.

One suggestion here has been to adopt what has been called a launch-on-warning strategy; that is, if you fire your missiles on radar warning then you do not have any need to defend them with ABM. Most analysts, myself included, feel that this is a very, very irresponsible strategy, but it has been proposed and I just place it on the table for your consideration. Finally I would like to make three comments about analysis of these issues. The first is simply that analytical alternatives to an offence-defence race do exist and we should examine them rather carefully in Canada. Second, in examining them we must maintain distinctions among various types of ballistic missile defence; in particular, the distinction between a ballistic missile defence which aims at the protection of strategic forces, and on the other hand a ballistic missile defence system which is designed to protect people or the industrial base. When you are assessing the possible reaction of one side to another it makes a great deal of difference what one side perceives the other to be doing, and one of the key issues in this debate is how much you can avoid the appearance of trying to protect your cities to the extent that you would then be in a first-strike position. The distinction between what we might call force-protecting and city-protecting systems is a very important one and it has to be kept in mind when

we are looking at the alternative ways in which these things develop.

Third, in Canada in most analyses that I have seen, relatively little attention has been given to the fact that both the American and Russian governments deny that the levels of defensive systems they have in mind will generate arms races. Of course, this is not a prediction that we have to take on faith. But we do have to think about it. The Sentinel system was designed and presented in a way by the Johnson administration that hoped the Russians could be convinced that it was not directed against them. Mr. McNamara pitched on the anti-Chinese formulation which we can talk about later. Under Mr. Nixon there has been an even further attempt to try to stress the fact that this is not the basis for a serious attempt to provide heavy city defence. Whether or not this will be successful remains to be seen.

On the other side as well, there are statements on the record by Premier Kosygin and others to the effect that the Russians themselves do not believe that the planned defensive systems will cause an offence-defence arms race. The best known, of course, is the 1967 statement of Kosygin:

I believe the defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race but constitute a factor preventing the death of people.

It is interesting that he even refers here to a system which has some population-protecting capability. There may be various explanations for this and many I am sure you are familiar with. The point here is simply that there is some evidence that the governments of the superpowers believe that this is something that can be controlled.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I wonder if we could have a formal resolution now that the Committee agrees to print both of Dr. Sherman's advance presentations as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

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The Chairman: We passed a rather general resolution at our last meeting authorizing the Committee to travel. It may be that it would be desirable to have a more specific resolution directed to our particular trip to North Bay. May I ask someone to move the following resolution, and if it is desirable to substitute

this specific resolution for the more general resolution that we passed the other day would you give me the authority to work out the arrangements with the House Leader? This more specific resolution would be related only to our proposed trip to North Bay, would authorize the Committee to travel to North Bay, Ontario on Thursday, June 12, 1969, and return to Ottawa, and the necessary staff to accompany the Committee. May I have a resolution to that effect, please?

Mr. Legault: I so move.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: Have most of the members now had an opportunity to read or to glance through the presentation. If so we could throw it open to questions rather than to go through the entire presentation. What is your wish? Are you ready for questioning?

Mr. Forrestall: I wonder what this recent resolution we have just passed does to the status of your subcommittee?

The Chairman: It may well be that the more general resolution can be passed. I am just not sure, so that I am asking for this at least to authorize us to go to North Bay and then we can take up the other question at a later date. If the more general resolution is passed by the House there is no problem. If it is not passed by the House then we would have to pass a more specific resolution with regard to the subcommittee at another meeting.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, if Dr. Sherman has some other points that he would like to make before the questioning I would suggest that perhaps we should hear them first.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Right. If you will proceed with the other points then, Dr. Sherman.

Dr. Sherman: Fine. I will perhaps go into these last three main sections in somewhat less detail. The second main section in the paper deals with the question of non-proliferation. The hypothetical statement that I set forth for discussion was that a failure to control superpower weapons would doom prospects for other forms of arms control and particularly for non-proliferation. This I think is another issue that is terribly complicated and very difficult to make judgments about—at least I find it difficult to make judgments about it—but about which one does see some

fairly dogmatic statements on both sides of the issue.

In this section of the paper I have simply tried to go through the possibilities and to demonstrate, first, that there are a great many alternatives, and second, that they depend so much either on data that is not available simply because it bears on events that have not happened yet or that the available data is very difficult to assess.

One is the question, for example, of whether or not countries that are displeased with the superpowers' deployment of missile defences will then proceed as a result of that displeasure to acquire their own nuclear weapons. This has been argued more or less as a straight-line sequence. I would argue that it may happen but it is certainly not a straight-line sequence. It is a long way from the point where a country feels the superpowers are wrong in opening the age of missile defences to the point where it makes a decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons. Some analysts seem to feel that non-nuclear states are going to do this more or less out of spite; that even governments that realize that proliferation is a destabilizing thing for everyone would then go ahead with a nuclear weapons program simply because they are angry with the superpowers. That sort of analysis, I think, is rather dubious.

The question of whether or not the ABM affects proliferation has often been put in terms of the extent to which it raises or lowers the premium that other countries which have not yet got nuclear weapons will place on them. On the one hand, it has been argued

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that simply by going into a new generation of weapons the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union will make it appear as if nuclear weapons are important things to have, that they are desirable for a variety of reasons, and that this creates a fashion which is really the best term to describe it, in which it seems natural for other countries to go ahead and acquire nuclear weapons. On the other side of that issue it has been argued that some level of ballistic missile defence in the superpowers will lower the premium that nth countries place on nuclear weapons. This could happen in a variety of ways. One which is familiar to you concerns the question of guarantees. Some analysts feel that a superpower cannot credibly guarantee the security of a non-clear country, if it is obvious that in implementing

that guarantee it would be vulnerable to destruction by the country that it is trying to protect against. To these analysts, ballistic missile defence appears as a non-proliferation mechanism, rather than one which enhances proliferation, because it reduces the guarantor's vulnerability. I assume that in the discussion period, many other features of the connection, if there is one, between ABM and proliferation will come up, but I will pass over them at this point.

The third main section deals with the question of whether a "meaningful" defence against ballistic missiles is possible. As I have said in the paper, I think the key issue here, as far as it bears on the Canadian debate, is the almost universal assumption in Canada that if any strategic nuclear weapon is ever fired in anger by anyone, the result is automatically what has been called a—spasm war—this term connotes a very destructive and uncontrolled strategic nuclear war.

But many of the arguments that have been used to defend some level of ballistic missile defence in the United States do so because they call into question that assumption. We cannot really understand a lot of the concern that ABM advocates have unless we too are at least willing to call that assumption into question. Earlier, I mentioned some of the issues which arise in this connection. These include the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches; the possibility of attacks on a superpower by a country that does not possess a large and sophisticated arsenal, the whole range of limited strategic war between superpowers. This last analytical category arises from the feeling that if a country feels its cities will be struck in retaliation, it will not make uncontrolled strikes on enemy cities and that this will impose certain limitations on the way any conflict is waged. This may be a limitation either on the kinds of numbers of attacked targets, but the general point here is that most discussion of ABM in Canada is based on the assumption that an all-out general war between superpowers is the only type of nuclear conflict that could conceivably be fought. That assumption is disputed by many of the participants in the American ABM debate. And for many of the other cases, the American discussion of whether a defence is meaningful turns to a great extent on what, in Canada, would be regarded as mere details of the conflict. How many forces are left? How much damage has been suffered? Will a defence keep an attacker away

from certain kinds of targets, or force him to use more weapons in order to get through to those targets?

These are very complicated questions which are obviously very dependent on the type of "scenario" one uses. The point here is simply to emphasize there is a wide variety of them, and different types will lead to different conclusions about the meaningful nature of any missile defence which can be provided.

Let me make one other point in that section, and then conclude this summary. If one accepts the assumption that all nuclear wars are spasm wars and then proceeds to design forces in accordance with it, it begins to have a very large element of self-fulfilling prophecy. If the planners feel that this is the only kind of war which can be fought, then in the terrible event that deterrence should fail, that is what we would get. Therefore, the relationship of strategic doctrine to the plausibility of various types of scenarios is a very important one.

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In the fourth section of the paper, I address a question which came up to some extent in your discussion with Dr. Lindsey but to which I wanted to return. It is the question of whether or not whatever Canada does in the field of continental defence, or whatever response we make to missile defences in the United States, should be governed solely by our concern for the stability of the American strategic deterrent. As an alternative hypothesis, are there things that we should be worried about as Canadians, which are not related only to the stability of the deterrent?

I have listed some possibilities in the paper. Certain ones are implausible, others are plausible enough, at least, to give us pause. To take only one example, consider the assumption that no attacker would have intended targets in Canada. This is widely accepted in Canadian discussions, and while it may be true, it may also be untrue. Some of the Russians' statements suggest that it is not true, because they have made statements which suggest that they do not believe nuclear war makes traditional concerns like productive capacity completely irrelevant. This is an issue for careful Canadian discussion and analysis. The only point I wanted to make in the paper was that we have a special interest in looking at this type of question in considerable detail rather than accepting on

faith certain assumptions which are made about it. I think I should be quiet now. Thank you, very much.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Sherman. I have on my list Mr. Allmand, Mr. Nowlan, Mr. Brewin and Mr. Laniel and Mr. Gibson. Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Sherman, in your remarks you stated that you are acting as a "devil's advocate". In your brief you seem to take some of the principal arguments which are raised against the ABM system and you pose counter-arguments and point out that these counter-arguments do exist and that they should be considered. I would like to ask you whether or not you have made any assessment of the arguments on both sides and whether you have not come to any conclusion? Have you not weighed these arguments? For example, the first one with which you deal is the possibility of escalation in missile defences and new rounds in the arms race. You point out that this is not necessarily so, but you do not come to any conclusion. I am now just asking you whether or not you can tell us if you have come to any conclusion that you have not mentioned in the paper? On balance, do you think that the construction of the ABM system, the sentinel system, will lead to an escalation in the arms race which is undesirable?

Dr. Sherman: In the sense of an offence-defence interaction?

Mr. Allmand: Yes, yes.

Dr. Sherman: First of all, you are perfectly correct that I have tried to keep strong personal positions out of the paper for reasons that I indicated earlier. Partly because that was my assigned task, and partly because I, quite frankly, do not have a strong position on the matter. I am not sure I could go beyond the statement that the decisions to deploy missile defences on both sides will certainly be discussed in the approaching strategic arms limitation Talks. We are not exactly sure when they will start but it appears that they will start soon. I do not feel that either side is committed yet to a certain very detailed pattern of deployment, so that in a way you have asked me an unanswerable question. Both sides are feeling each other out, and will test their own instincts as to how important it is, for example, to provide a low level defence against accidents, and that

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sort of thing. I do not think that the question can be answered at all until these talks have been given some chance. I would like to be able to give you a more direct answer, but in all honesty I do not think I can. I am hopeful, as the governments involved here are hopeful, that an offence-defence race can be avoided. Beyond that I do not really think that I would like to get off that fence, because I do not think it would be responsible to do so.

Mr. Allmand: Then if you, who have studied the arguments on both sides and have more or less dedicated your full time to doing this, do not feel that any hard decision should be made before these talks, do you feel that the same position should be taken by governments?

Dr. Sherman: But they have done so.

Mr. Allmand: I am thinking of Canada here.

Dr. Sherman: I am sorry.

Mr. Allmand: The Parliament of Canada or the Government of Canada has refrained thus far from taking a position with respect to the building of the ABM system. This Committee might make recommendations. We might say that we think this is an unnecessary escalation of the offense-defence arms race. The Government of Canada might do so. I understand they are also making a study of this. I understand you are suggesting that perhaps no statement should be made until these talks take place.

Dr. Sherman: I do not mean to recommend a course of action to anyone, and particularly to the Canadian government. I simply say that the question of whether or not either the decision by the Russians to deploy a defence around Moscow or the decision by Mr. Nixon to go ahead with the Safeguard system taken independently or in combination will cause an offense-defence arms race, it is just not possible to say at this point. It remains to be seen. I do not think there is cause for alarm, if that is closer to a direct answer, but I believe quite honestly that it is too early to say. I think the negotiations on this point will be very long and very difficult, and if we expect within six weeks or two months after the SALT talks—Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—begin that we are going to have a dramatic answer to this one way or the other,

I think we are going to be disappointed. If you look at the history of such things as the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons you will see how long it has taken us to work something out that is acceptable to both the superpowers and to the other countries: The better part of this decade, and we are by no means finished. I think we will be disappointed if we expect very early answers to the ABM question from the talks, but both governments have stressed—the United States has certainly stressed this—that they will go into these talks without an irrevocable commitment to a detailed type of deployment of missile defences. The negotiations will just have to proceed on that basis.

Mr. Allmand: I asked you, though, on the balance of arguments if the U.S. were to go ahead with the plans that they now have, which have not been approved by Congress, is this likely to lead to an offense-defence escalation or is it likely to lead to a defence-defence sort of escalation, which may not be very harmful.

Dr. Sherman: I am reluctant to come off the fence, but as you are shoving me off the fence I will say that the present system as announced by Mr. Nixon is not likely to cause an offense-defence race.

Mr. Allmand: I see. That is on the balance. You said that it would be irresponsible if you were to make a recommendation at this time, and if you as a serious person say that I wonder if it would be irresponsible if as a member of this Committee I were to make a recommendation at this time. Many people feel that if we are going to assist those people in the United States who believe that it will lead to an offense-defence escalation, perhaps Canada and the Canadian Parliament should make recommendations, and that if we wait until after the talks it may be too late. In any case, I do not want to push you any further on this point. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. Gibson: May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson on a supplementay.

Mr. Gibson: Your address is one of the most scholarly we have received a statement from, and frankly, it is impressive from the point of view of a young member of this Committee to realize the amount of brain

power that has gone into it. With some humility I will ask you, sir, whether you believe that because this is due, and with these talks going on in Geneva about which we have heard virtually nothing, whether there would be any merit in Canada taking the position that there ought to be an interim delay in the process of building up these weapons, and hopefully perhaps the matter could be brought up at the United Nations in September.

Dr. Sherman: I do not know how much more I can say, but in some of the comments about delaying deployment of the Safeguard system there is an assumption that something is going to happen very quickly which will then be irreversible. My understanding is that the first phase of Safeguard, which is largely the protection of two Minutemen and related bases in the northwestern United States, will not be completed until 1973, so it is not as if a ballistic missile defence system there would appear overnight which would then be impossible to dismantle if that should prove desirable as a result of the SALT talks.

Mr. Gibson: Even at that, sir. . .

Dr. Sherman: On the question of whether a Canadian statement should be made on the desirability of delaying even those plans that have been made. . .

Mr. Gibson: I mean on each side. Appealing to both the big powers, not just the United States.

Dr. Sherman: That is something I do not think I ought to comment on. Again, that is an area where a difficult. . .

Mr. Gibson: You see, our hands are tied. . .

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson, I think we should keep the supplementaries fairly short. I have your name on the main list of questioners.

Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: Yes, Mr. Chairman. My questions are rather related to Mr. Allmand's, but they really come from another point of view, and perhaps they are also partly related to Mr. Gibson's questions. I noticed from the synopsis of your career that you have been involved in many other areas of study at Hudson, including the spread of nuclear arms, nuclear sharing, NO strategy, and so forth. The thing that has bothered me, Dr. Sherman, since we started these lengthy

hearings on the ABM—and I appreciate it is a technical subject and lengthy hearings are being held—down South—is that primarily what this Committee or this government decides is really not going to affect the decision of the United States with respect to the program which they have announced so far for their ABM. Is that not correct? In other words, as far as we are concerned this is an academic exercise.

Dr. Sherman: I would regard my participation in it largely as an academic exercise. That is, I would be reluctant to make a policy recommendation. To answer the other part of your question, whether a decision by the Committee or the government would affect a decision by the United States, I think that is very difficult to say. I really would not care to hazard a guess on that.

Mr. Nowlan: I want to refer to the last sentence of your paper, which in my opinion resurrects something that Dr. Lindsey said here some time ago. If Canadians are really discussing this matter as a benefit or as a detriment to Canadians, and if we are talking about the type of missile ABM defence that

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protects civilians and industries in Canada, then obviously we should not be talking about the Safeguard system that has been announced by Mr. Nixon, we should be talking about whether we want these things to protect our civilian population and industrial base and have them far to the north. In other words, is that the only way we can really participate in a practical way or is there any other way in which the Canadian government is able to participate in a practical way unless it is to look to see, as your last sentence says, if Canada has an obligation to herself, rather than commenting on what our neighbour is going to do. Otherwise it is an academic exercise, is it not?

Dr. Sherman: I believe Dr. Lindsey did mention the protection that the area defence component of Safeguard would provide for Canadian cities, and that is a large technical question on which, quite frankly, I am not competent to judge. It probably is true that for areas other than those within the protective footprint of planned sites some additional protection might be afforded by some moving of those sites. But, first of all, I am not sure that we even know the answer to the first question, how much protection would already be afforded, because we do not know the

precise location of all the sites even in the present plan. Therefore how much protection Canada might get, as far as I am concerned, is still undetermined even in the present plan. The further question of whether more protection would be desirable by moving sites around, is one simply that I have tried, from a devil's advocate point of view, to raise from another perspective, and by no means to recommend that we ask for revisions in the plan or that we place facilities in Canada.

Mr. Nowlan: I agree with Mr. Gibson. I was interested in your paper and the devil's advocate approach perhaps which you took on these four premises that you posed. But now that you have given the paper I am, like Mr. Allmand, going to try to push you off the devil's advocate role into an advocate's position. Is it not correct to say, again using the terminology of your paper, that the plan that presently has been announced by Mr. Nixon is one to protect strategic forces?

Dr. Sherman: Primarily. In the March 14, 1969 statement, which was the Safeguard announcement, the President said :

This measured deployment is designed to fulfill three objectives:

1. Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.
2. Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.
3. Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source.

So that you are certainly correct that the primary emphasis of the Nixon administration has been on the first point. Of course they have a specific reason for doing this—it is to reassure the Russians that the United States is not in the business of trying to protect its cities to such an extent that they will then be invulnerable to a retaliatory strike by the Russians. That of course would put the Americans in a first strike position. So you are perfectly correct on the emphasis on force protection here.

The second and third points have to do more with the planned deployment of an area defence capability, which of course Sentinel also had, and which would address the possibility of light or unsophisticated attacks as well as a possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches coming from any source whatever.

Mr. Nowlan: But as long as their system is directed to strategic force defence then any exercise on the part of Canada, committee hearings and/or declaration by government, is an academic one, is it not?

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Dr. Sherman: I think it is probably fair to say that the American debate on whether or not a defence is necessary for Minuteman will not be much affected by Canadian statements. The Americans have as good information as we do, to say the least...

Mr. Nowlan: If not better.

Dr. Sherman: ... on the kind of threat that they are worried about, the projections into the 1970s and beyond of the types of forces that they have and should expect the Russians, the Chinese and others to have. I think you are probably correct in saying that we will not bring much new to that debate. But we do have a responsibility to try and understand that debate. Those of you who have read, or will read the presentations before various Congressional committees will see how terribly complicated the issue is and how much it is based on things like the accuracies of missiles that the Russians will have in the 1970's. This is not to say that we should not make our own independent assessment of such things. But we will not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the debate in the United States.

Mr. Nowlan: I think that is an understatement. I do not think we are going to have any effect on the outcome in the United States at all as long as it is related to the defence of their own strategic weapons. But my real point is this. If all these problems were ironed out in this fast-moving age of technology and advances in science, if witnesses had come in here this year, as they might come in two years from now, and say that these problems have been ironed out and both the missile and the ballistic defence missile have pinpoint accuracy—should not Canadians perhaps be debating whether, with this technology, positioning these stations or ABM sites way to the north of the 49th parallel could protect the continent and not just strategic forces?

Dr. Sherman: Again, as we agreed earlier, there is an important distinction between those two types of missile defences. The ironing out of questions like expected Russian accuracies would probably not solve the ques-

tion that I think you are getting at, how much does Canada need—unless of course there were offensive missiles in Canada. But the ironing out of those technical questions, those expectations, would not make it easier for us to decide what, if anything, to do. It would not solve our problems for us.

Mr. Nowlan: I have one last question, Mr. Chairman, because I do not want to take too much time. It may be an unfair question to put to this witness, but in view of your background, the fact that you are also a Canadian, and the very reasoned paper you gave here today, from your knowledge of these international problems, the fact that ABM is pretty technical and complicated and the debate is going to go along for some time, would it not be fair to say that this Committee could spend its time more profitably, usefully and constructively in looking at more practical and closer problems of defence, for example NATO re-orientation, the problems of the North and how we are going to exercise sovereignty over it, rather than involve ourselves in this academic ABM exercise which is not going to influence the Americans one bit, if it is on strategic force defence.

Dr. Sherman: That of course is only one part of it and other parts of it may affect us.

Mr. Nowlan: Is this not what a responsible defence committee, studying a defence and foreign affairs role for Canada, should have at the top of its list?

Dr. Sherman: I do not know about the top. This is not to say that the other questions you raised are unimportant, they certainly are not, but I do think that the Committee spends its time very profitably when it looks in considerable detail at a question of this kind. That is something on which I, quite frankly, do have a strong opinion. I think that the Committee, this year and in previous years, has added something that Canada had not had traditionally, which is an attempt to think

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these things through. The ordinary citizen will have trouble in making his own assessments, as you and I do. But I think, especially in the context of the nuclear weapons debate that we had some years ago, that looking at ABM's and strategic arms control is a very useful exercise for this Committee to undertake, even if it did not produce any startling recommendations either to the Canadian government or to the American government or

anyone. In other words, a citizenry that understands the issues as well as having political leaders who understand the issues is a very good hedge against erratic behaviour, against unexpected political situations, some of which I think did come up in the nuclear weapons debate. I think many people were very much confused by those issues and very much surprised by the emotion that it generated, although this is not to say that it should not have been an emotional issue. I think this is one function of a committee such as this, and I think a very valuable one. You might call it academic—and I realize that is a dirty word because it means it does not have any operational output—but that may not always be true and even if it were—I would say it would still be a useful exercise.

Mr. Nowlan: I am not going to ask any more. I would not mind pursuing that bit of history and whether the Doctor suggests that it was all erratic behaviour back in 1963 and 1964 and/or if the Committee had been really debating in an educative way—there is value in education I will be the first to admit—whether we still would have understood the Cuban crisis any better when it first broke.

Dr. Sherman: That may be so. I do not think I said—if I did I did not mean to—that anyone's actual behaviour had been erratic. I meant to say that a good understanding of the issues will protect us against erratic behaviour in future.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, in case we do not finish this morning by 12.45 or thereabouts, we have made arrangements to reserve this committee room this afternoon at 3.30. Would you be available if necessary, Dr. Sherman? Perhaps we should proceed and see how we get along but if necessary we could meet again this afternoon at 3.30.

Mr. Allmand, on a supplementary.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Sherman, Mr. Nowlan says that whatever decision we make in the Parliament of Canada is academic but in the United States, Congress has not yet voted on the ABM system and from the assessments that I have seen, the decision is up for grabs. It would seem to me that if we in Canada, a friendly ally of the United States, come out with a certain decision on recommendation to the United States on this, it could have some effect. There are Senators like McGovern, Kennedy and many others, Would the recommendation of the parliament of a friendly ally

not have some influence on the Senators' voting in the United States?

Mr. Nowlan: I would like to ask a further supplementary.

Mr. Allmand: Would you wait until that one is answered?

Mr. Nowlan: I can answer it. I can answer that question.

The Chairman: I do not know if Dr. Sherman wants to answer that question or if he feels he is qualified to answer that particular question.

Dr. Sherman: I think since it is a question about legislative behaviour I should let one legislator ask the question and another legislator answer it.

Mr. Nowlan: I can answer, Mr. Chairman, by asking the witness another question which he will not be able to answer.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan, on a supplementary to his own question.

Mr. Nowlan: Do you think that what this Committee or the Parliament of Canada does is going to affect the judgment of Senator Ted Kennedy or Senator McGovern and all the other Senators who have been leading the debate pro and con down there?

The Chairman: Perhaps we should get on with the main issues. My guess is that Dr. Sherman feels that he is not qualified to answer that question any more than the earlier one from Mr. Allmand. Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to preface my questions by saying that with the latter part of what Dr. Sherman has told us I am heartily in agreement. I think when you are getting an important strategic change in regard to the defence of North America, for a defence committee not to understand it, not to pay some attention to it would be highly irresponsible. Do you agree with that? I see you are shaking your head.

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Dr. Sherman: Emphatically. I agree with it emphatically.

Mr. Brewin: I might also say in preface that I think you have successfully demolished some of the straw men that have been raised in this but I have a few problems which were

raised in the Gore Committee and other places about this ABM system and with which I am by no means satisfied.

First of all, I understand that the scientific evidence—and I know that with scientific evidence, as with other evidence, you can have some on one side and some on the other—indicates that the development of anti-ballistic missile systems can fairly easily be countered by the development of penetration aids and a whole series of other scientific devices. I would like to suggest that if this is so, it is not a necessary conclusion but is it not a natural one that the deployment of such a system will be nullified or met by the development of more efficiency in the offence? This seems to be the conclusion of a great many distinguished scientists in the United States. It seems to me, as I say, not to be necessary but to make a lot of sense. Do you agree with that?

Dr. Sherman: First of all, the technical details of that issue are very, very complicated and in many areas I am simply not entitled to an opinion. But let me say a couple of things. One is that you are certainly correct that the scientific community in particular, as the American community in general, is very deeply divided on matters such as penetration aids. This, of course, makes it terribly difficult for the layman to know what to do. If a political scientist is asked to judge the scientific merit of competing arguments—let us say you have a Nobel prize winner like Eugene Wigner arguing with a Nobel prize winner like Hans Bethe—to ask a political scientist to come to a competent judgment on such an issue is a little bit difficult. But this, of course, is a problem not just for professional, non-technical analysts but for any citizen interested in the question.

The second part of your statement is a very, very controversial issue; and that is the ease with which a defence can be nullified. I am looking through some of the material with me for a statement by Dr. Charles Herzfeld, a former Director of the United States Advanced Research Project Agency, who is one of the most knowledgeable technical people in the field but by no means the only one. I want to delay for a moment because I want to quote him rather than to try to repeat from memory the statement that he makes on this subject, again simply to present the other

side of the argument. I am sorry I cannot find the specific quotation.

Clerk's note: The witness subsequently provided the following information.

The statement I was thinking off occurs in Dr. Herzfeld's chapter in a forthcoming book on ABM (*Why ABM? Policy issues in the Missile Defense Controversy*, edited by J.J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr.) to be published by Pergamon Press, and is as follows:

It turns out that there are no foolproof, cheap, simple, and high confidence ways to decoy the threat. The best high confidence methods are not cheap nor are they simple to execute. These methods are, however, quite feasible, but at a considerable price in the effort required to install them, and particularly to verify their effectiveness.

The main point that Dr. Herzfeld makes however, is that contrary to widespread opinion, it is neither cheap nor easy to develop penetration aids of this sort. Again one's

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definition of cheap and easy might vary. The point is simply that many people on the pro-ABM side feel that many people on the anti-ABM side have underestimated the difficulty of this technical problem. The assumption is at least debatable that the Chinese can very easily and at very little cost overcome Safeguard with very simple balloons and chaff and things like that—assuming that, by the way, those are simple, which they are not.

The question of penetration aids is something that the Americans have studied for a long time—have found very expensive and very difficult, and therefore doubt that anyone else with a technical base presumably less sophisticated than their own would find it easier. This issue like so many of these others is highly controversial, even among technical people who much more so than I are entitled to opinions. I would certainly agree with you that there are many very competent scientists who feel...

Mr. Brewin: I find to my surprise that these competent scientists often speak quite clearly in a manner that commends itself to one's reasoning. For instance, Hans Bethe in dealing with penetration aids speaks about the blackout. I think Dr. Rathjens too says that the radar part of this whole ABM system is extremely vulnerable. Surely they know

what we are talking about when they say that. From that one can deduce even without being a great scientific expert if their reasoning seems intelligible and sound that perhaps they have a real point.

Dr. Sherman: One can deduce that there is a serious scientific debate. That is undeniable, I agree with you entirely. This is not to make a judgement on one side of that technical debate as against the other side, it is simply to say that as more than interested observers we should first of all not accept on faith either side. Beyond that all one can do, I suppose, is to use whatever technical knowledge he has along with the confidence he has in other people who have more technical knowledge than he does and come to a judgment. It seems to me that the only inference that can be drawn from those statements is that the scientific community is deeply divided on this question.

Mr. Brewin: That seems to me a very self-abnegating point of view and it seems to me that some of us have to come to a judgment about scientific evidence from time to time because we have to make decisions. However, supposing we get away from the scientific end of it, is it not possible to exercise some sort of historic judgment and to recognize on this question of escalation that each new development, defensive or offensive, is used as an incentive for a reaction or over-reaction on the other side? Is it not a fact that the reputed or actual deployment of an ABM System around Moscow is being widely used as a basis for saying we must have the same sort of system?

Dr. Sherman: It is certainly a very serious question. Several things come to mind. On any issue of this kind, and maybe even more so on one that has a heavy political context, different people may be arguing for the same thing on different grounds. In the context of your remarks, what I meant was that some people in the United States may be defending ABMs simply because they feel that the Russians are in the business and that they should therefore be in the business in some way.

That by the way is not an unreasonable argument if you are worried about the uncertainties of technical developments and so on; that is, you need some sort of base for knowing what the problems are and being able to anticipate advantages that the other side might get. It is a serious concern of many of

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the proponents. In a way you might distinguish between a serious imitiveness and one which is not so serious; the second kind is the view that simply because the Russians have it we have to have it. The first kind is that you at least have a feeling that you understand the problem, that you can anticipate developments, and that you do not find yourself suddenly at a terrible disadvantage because you have no understanding of the technical problems.

On the other hand, there also were people who were arguing for various forms of ABM before the Russians went into the business. "This is by way of saying that many people will be supporting the same thing for different reasons. The Russian Galosh Missile, I believe, first appeared in the May, 1964 Parade. Presumably there was intelligence information on this earlier. The Nike-Zeus program itself precedes 1964, so that you at least have a group of analysts and planners in the United States who were in favour at least of light ABM, even before the Russians went into business, on prudential or other grounds. They would argue that they were not being imitative but that they just felt that this was a responsible and prudent thing to do for arms control and other reasons.

Beyond that, you get into the question of why is he really saying what he is saying? Is he just being imitative, is he worried about the Russian offensive threat, and so on? I suppose all of these people on both sides would feel that they cannot always choose their friends. Allies often have very different ideological and other backgrounds, and this is true in both pro and anti-ABM camps.

Mr. Brewin: Dr. Sherman, another thing that impressed me when I read some of the American evidence is that a large number of the scientists say that without adequate ability to test these weapons, and even with tests, the performance of the ABM weapons in a crisis is, to put mildly, highly dubious. In other words, they question the utility of the system. Has that been satisfactorily resolved to your knowledge?

Dr. Sherman: It certainly has not been resolved to my knowledge and I very much hope that it will never be resolved, because it will be resolved only if we actually have to use these weapons. I like to be academic in the sense that I do not want to test theories of nuclear war in practice.

The response of the defenders of the Safeguard system to that argument is that the interaction in practice between offences and defences is a very complicated one and that the offence cannot be tested realistically either, except under "battlefield" conditions. While they would certainly admit the truth in your statement that there are great uncertainties in the performance of the defence, they would argue that there is also considerable uncertainty in the performance of the offence. This fact alone, by the way, complicates the offence's job, and as some would argue, makes the system worthwhile on that ground alone.

You are certainly correct in saying that this has not been resolved. The only other comment I might make is that the defenders of the ABM feel that what the critics do is take very optimistic assumptions for the offence and very pessimistic assumptions for the defence. On the other side, the critics of the ABM feel that the defenders take very optimistic assumptions for the defence and assume very backward attackers.

The kind of penetration aids that the Chinese or Russians may have through the

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seventies and the interaction between that and the defensive system depends a great deal on assumptions. I think people on both sides would probably agree that there tends to be a certain loading of assumptions on both sides consistent with the debating tactic more than with really high confidence scientific judgment.

Mr. Brewin: I would like to change the subject to a degree. However, I am still on the question of the usefulness of this system. I understand the major purpose of the present Safeguard system—I am not talking about some further development—is to protect two Minutemen sites.

Dr. Sherman: Not the present Safeguard system in toto, but simply Phase I of the deployment will be directed by 1973 to protect an area in the northwest, about which Secretary Laird has made the following claim:

Phase I as you know just takes two of our Minutemen bases and up in the northern part of the United States it gives us very concentrated protection over 30 per cent of our Minutemen force and a thin protection over the rest of our Minuteman force.

This is primarily a force-protecting phase.

Mr. Brewin: I would like to read you a paragraph in an article in the paper called *TEMPO* which is published by The National Council of Churches in the United States. In it Mr. Allan M. Parrent says this:

The fact is that our offensive deterrent is so massive and so dispersed that it needs no such protection. . .

He is referring to protection of the Safeguard ABM system.

. . . and in fact, except for two Minuteman sites containing 350 missiles, will not receive much protection under this system. The bulk of our deterrent is composed of 646 Polaris and Poseidon missiles on submarines and 630 long-range bombers. These, combined with the remainder of our 1,054 Minuteman ICBMs and thousands of shorter-range missiles in Europe and elsewhere, provide an arsenal of deterrence to which nothing of significance will be added by the Safeguard system.

As an analyst of these matters, I would like your comment on that paragraph.

Dr. Sherman: I think the SLBM figure is 656 by the way, not 646. That is a small point.

Mr. Brewin: Let us put it this way to complete my question. This suggests that the deterrent is now so massive and so effective that the protection of two Minutemen sites adds nothing of significance.

Dr. Sherman: If it were limited to that, I would certainly agree and I think that even those people who believe that this is now a prudent thing to do are looking to the long run, at least into the nineteen-seventies and beyond. They are concerned about the apparent Soviet intentions to deploy multiple MIRV—which is a term I am sure you are familiar with—which given the accuracies that some analysts, although not all, expect in that time frame could result in a very serious threat to Minutemen. That is one point against.

The second is the question you raised about the multiplicity of strategic systems, and the fact that even if Minuteman were completely destroyed, the bomber force and the Polaris force would still survive. Planners who are friendly to ABM and who therefore support strategic force protection feel that part of the stability of the deterrent itself results from this multiplicity of strategic systems. In other

words, an unexpected failure in one type of system does not leave the country completely vulnerable. Therefore, the systems, which in a sense mutually back each other up, are simply the most prudent way to approach very uncertain problems, such as weapons performance, and so on. While part of your point is certainly correct when you say that nobody feels that—I should not say nobody; there are some—but the majority of the analysts of the community—of people who are active in this field believe that there is no first strike—if you want to call it that—threat to the American deterrent today. Some of them are more concerned about the longer-run, particularly as regards Minuteman. They would argue that this is an important component of the deterrent. In sum, they do not want to depend solely on one system, because they do not feel that it is a prudent thing to do.

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Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question. One thing that I do not notice in your paper at all is the problem of cost. We, as Canadian parliamentarians, are not primarily worried about the American taxpayers, but we do know that all defence matters involve the disposition of resources, and they are using them on one thing rather than the other. I notice that at the foot of page 24 of your paper you suggest that this system which we now have is sort of “a building block concept” and may be a prelude to an immense diversion of resources.

Dr. Sherman: I simply meant that the final form is not yet determined. But the thrust of your question goes to a very important issue which certainly concerns not only those who oppose any system, but those who are opposing this one in particular because they feel it will not be kept at the stated level. In some cases, I think the primary concern of opponents of the light ABM is that they do not believe it can be kept light. They feel that it will expand of its own momentum.

It is a difficult thing to assess. The friends of ABM would argue that the historical evidence does not support the view that it cannot be kept limited. They point to the air defence system which had a lot of holes in it. People recognized this situation but no serious attempt was made to fix it. This was not only because it was leapfrogged by the missile age but it just got up to a certain point and for one reason or another did not get any bigger. The current figure for Safeguard is \$7.8 bil-

lion. I tried to find out this morning whether that includes operation and maintenance. I do not think it does but I can check that for you. They would argue that it is not an unreasonable expenditure. By the way, many people who are strongly in favour of the light ABM oppose any expansion of it to any heavy system and some who are favourable to Safeguard would argue for expansion.

Mr. Brewin: I just have one more question. I want to preface it by saying I am not questioning your objectivity, but I do notice that Senator Fulbright was questioning your associate, Mr. Brennan—he gave evidence before the Gore Committee—and apparently Dr. Brennan told him that 90 per cent of the Hudson Institute's support came from the United States Department of Defence. I do not know whether that has anything to do with you or if you are, in a sense, just an employee and not concerned with that matter. Is that correct?

Dr. Sherman: I would have to check that figure. I think that is probably correct but it would be something that I could check. I do not think it has much relevance to my own position because no one has ever put any pressure on me from any source to believe or say something that I do not believe. I think any analyst would tell you he believes that he arrives at his conclusions on their own merit. Beyond that, I am not sure it is relevant in my situation.

Clerk's note: The witness later advised the Committee that 70% of the Institute's finances come under contract from the United States Department of Defense. Other support comes from other federal and local agencies, grants, etc.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Dr. Sherman, at this stage I am trying to separate completely the question of morale in nuclear proliferation and. . .

The Chairman: Excuse me, Mr. Laniel. Perhaps we had better find out whether or not we wish to continue after lunch or try to finish before lunch. Do other members have questions? I have Mr. Laniel and Mr. Gibson on my list. Do other members have any question, or can we think in terms of finishing by 1 o'clock?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): The problem is that some of us have another meeting at 12:30.

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The Chairman: Would you like to continue this afternoon at 3:30 in case other questions occur to members over the lunch hour? What is your wish?

Do you have any extensive questions, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: I do not think so.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: No, I have not.

The Chairman: We can try to finish off now, then; otherwise we can continue after lunch. Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: As I was saying, I would like to separate completely the question of morale, or the nuclear proliferation question from the military aspect of this. From the answer which you gave to Mr. Brewin at the end, I wonder if the problem of ABM would be, in your opinion, as great as it is military-wise if it were not a question of cost. Is it mainly a question of cost that gives so much importance to the question of morale, or the other aspect of the problem? Do you not think that Americans, Canadians or anybody would look at this problem if the cost were very much lower?

Dr. Sherman: No, I think that while the economic side of it is a very important one, in particular because of other domestic problems of the American States—people are very concerned about the diversion of effort from domestic into foreign and military problems—there would probably be a considerable amount of opposition on other grounds such as the arms race, proliferation and so on. So, if I understand your question completely, I think the economic and social concern is an important part of the opposition to ABM, but only a part. Beyond that it is hard to say how any one of the participants at this stage really weighs it. Very often they do not make explicit, and really could not answer the question as to the importance of the cost factor relative to others.

Mr. Laniel: On the question of the utility of the system, do you not feel that the questions which we are now asking ourselves about the ABM system are the same ones that were asked, maybe differently, over the other systems of defence? For example, let us just take the Bomarc system which was the air defence system.

Dr. Sherman: Many of them are certainly very similar. I think that would be a straight answer to your question. In the problem of strategic defence, continental defence, there are many parallels between the ABM and the Bomarc but across the whole broad problem of continental defence. It has sort of leap-frogged by a new generation of technology.

Mr. Laniel: Then as far as NATO is concerned, if I take your fourth proposition would you come to the same conclusion? I will just change a couple of words where you say that whatever Canada does in the field of defence, she does it in order to protect the American strategic deterrent which is the keystone of stability. Canada itself is not threatened and therefore need not defend herself in the narrow sense, which would apply to NATO, or the contribution of Canada to NATO. Do you not feel that NATO is also some kind of protection to the American deterrent?

Dr. Sherman: The American, Canadian, and so on, forces which are deployed in Europe are not a direct defence of the American strategic offensive systems, so in that sense they are not analogous. In a more general sense I suppose they are. By attempting to provide or hoping that they will provide a deterrent to aggression or war in that area, they protect the deterrent, but I think they are very different types of forces. In a very general political sense, perhaps that is true.

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Mr. Laniel: Yes, I know they are and I am wondering if I am right in assuming that it is impossible in Europe to have a limited war.

Dr. Sherman: That is a separate subject...

Mr. Laniel: I know it is, but still...

Dr. Sherman: ...and I am not sure whether we should get into it at this point. Maybe one could say that in the same way as you have a wide disparity of opinion on the possibility of fighting a limited strategic intercontinental war, you have a wide disparity of opinion on the question of the possibility of fighting a limited war in Europe. Beyond that, we get into a whole new area of questions which takes us quite far afield from the present concern.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but do you think it is possible to separate one from another, in the sense that...?

Dr. Sherman: I think it is possible to separate the question of limited war in Europe from limited strategic war, yes.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but at the same time, by protecting the American deterrent in one way or another, are we not doing more than protecting the deterrent? Are we not preventing worldwide war, and any attacks over North America, in general? Does this not contradict, more or less, your fourth proposition?

Dr. Sherman: By the way, let me stress that those propositions were set out as hypothetical statements which were to be used as talking points. They are not, very definitely, personal statements of my own. I want to make that very clear. I am not sure how much more I would have to add on your other point.

Mr. Laniel: I hesitate to even try to come to any conclusion, myself, because in talking of ABM sometimes I ask myself and I say, "Perhaps there is something wrong with that system, maybe the scientists have not gone far enough, but something else will develop in the meantime". Is it possible to think that the Americans will just sit down and wait for something else to develop and forget about the protection of the deterrent or the giving of that extra protection to their deterrent? I do not know what political influence Canada can have over that. Am I right in that statement?

Dr. Sherman: Again, I think most of that goes to the question which Mr. Nowlan and others raised earlier. I think the point you raised, about not being sure whether the Americans are willing to stay out of the ABM business altogether, because they may be concerned about new technical developments is true. We talked about my views on the question of Canadian influence, earlier. I would not have anything to add.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: When we attended Geneva we were told that President Nixon had been there about 10 days before us preparatory to the disarmament conference and that his policy was consultation rather than confrontation. I would like to ask you, sir, whether you feel, with the drift of events since President Nixon went into office, if the American foreign policy is basically still oriented in that direction or not?

Dr. Sherman: I think their aim is to try to increase consultation with NATO allies. There have been proposals for various arms control groups within NATO, and so on. The United States realizes that the ABM issue had not been sufficiently discussed with the European and other allies, but it must be because it is just too important not to discuss. I think the general answer to your question is that this is probably taken very seriously by the administration. But you would have to talk to allies to find out whether they feel they are being properly consulted.

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Mr. Gibson: Should we not be urging these governments to do more consultation and to push hard for a conference at the top level?

Dr. Sherman: Do you mean NATO conference at the top level?

Mr. Gibson: A big power conference.

Dr. Sherman: On strategic weapons control?

Mr. Gibson: On everything; on disarmament.

Dr. Sherman: Of course the talks which we discussed earlier will probably fill that bill as much in the short run as can be done, although there has also been talk of multi-power summit conferences.

Mr. Gibson: What do you think causes the delay in getting a summit conference?

Dr. Sherman: A summit or the strategic arms talks?

Mr. Gibson: No, a summit.

Dr. Sherman: I think one thing is that there is a feeling among many analysts of these problems that "summitry" as it is called was over-sold in earlier days and over-sold primarily in the sense that political leaders felt that if they went directly to each other without very careful detailed staff work they could somehow cut the red tape. Now I think a lot of people feel that some very careful preparation for summit meetings—and I emphasize "very careful"—is important.

Another thing is that a lot of people feel that the potential costs of a summit meeting are very great; that is, if a summit meeting gets a lot of play in the newspapers, creates expectations, builds up hopes, and then does not produce any startling breakthroughs, in some ways some of these people feel we are

worse off than we were before. Objectively one might not feel that way, but the dominant reaction is: "We expected a major breakthrough and did not get it." I think this has been one of the primary misgivings on this point.

Mr. Gibson: Do you think a prolonged summit conference would be a good experiment? In other words, a six week one where these leaders could get to know each other really with more confidence?

Dr. Sherman: This is one thing that Geneva may have done for disarmament; that is, regularizing, or making routine, contacts at various levels. If you mean "summitry" in the sense of the American president and his counterparts, that would be a different thing. In general the point that you make about the systematic or regular approach to meetings of this kind is much less vulnerable to the criticism I just mentioned; that is, people go into it with certain hopes, but the talks go on in an atmosphere of business as usual. If something comes out of it that is well and good, if not then there is no dramatic let down such as after Paris in 1960.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you, sir.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Sherman, in view of your scholarly efforts here and the testimony you have given today, I only have one question. I think what you have to say is pretty clear and very understandable.

On page 24 of your testimony you say: Also, an effective defence against ballistic missiles could restore some of the bomber's prowess unless AWACS exceeds all expectations.

In our Committee we have had a lot of discussions about AWACS, bomber defence, and so on. I would like you to elaborate on that if you could for a moment.

Dr. Sherman: I realize it is something that you have talked about before and I do not think we should get into it too much. In general, it has been felt that to the extent that a ballistic missile defence system works against missiles, it may make an attacker more interested in other forms of attack. Therefore, he may put more effort into bombers if he feels it is easier to beat a bomber defence system than it is to beat a missile defence system.

It is really a general point that these things are very closely related. Not that the missile

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defence problem will ever be solved in the narrow sense of the term, but some observers seem to feel that if missile defences ever get very good, that "solves" the problem. But in this constant, dynamic relationship between hypothetical attacker and hypothetical defender, as in anything else, by creating a strongpoint here you may divert him to other efforts, and the bomber would clearly be one of them. It has also been argued, of course, that an effective missile defence would create new interest in even more exotic means of delivery than bomber attack—everything from suitcase bombs up.

The only point I was trying to make there is that the question of missile defence affects not only missiles. It would be nice if it were a complete solution to the problem, but it is not, and that is the only point I was trying to make.

Mr. Cafik: In your view, then, bomber attack is a possibility—you have not said anything about now—and it could become an increasing threat if the ABMs...

Dr. Sherman: I am not sure that it would be a desirable development if it did occur, but I think it is unlikely that manned attack vehicles will disappear completely. As I say, there is some doubt in my mind at any rate about whether it would be a desirable thing that they should, because they do have certain advantages like flexibility, recall ability, and so on over existing missiles.

I think that strategic bomber defence will continue to be a part of continental defences as long as this general problem exists.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Sherman, one last question. There is an implication here that you do not have much faith in the effectiveness of AWACS. Is that implied in your statement?

Dr. Sherman: No, in some ways mine is a bad sentence. I was alluding to the problem of ground clutter, a rather technical point that the operations research people would be much more qualified to answer. All I meant there was that unless you had a perfect bomber defence the other guy would still be interested in bombers. Presumably in the same way as you are unlikely to have a perfect missile defence against a large and sophisticated attack, you will probably not develop a perfect bomber defence. That was all that was implied.

I had not anticipated what you were going to say. This was not intended as a technical criticism of the performance of AWACS.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, very much.

The Chairman: Dr. Sherman, I just have one or two very brief questions that I would like to clear up in my own mind. On page 23 of your paper you refer to a statement made by Mr. McNamara suggesting that one function of the Bomarc installations in Canada was:

... to draw Soviet ICBM's away from more important targets.

Could you give us in due course that reference so that we could look it up?

Dr. Sherman: Yes, I would be glad to. It was at one of the Congressional hearings. I would be glad to and I can find it without too much trouble.

The Chairman: Do I understand you correctly when on page 24 you indicate that although that might have been rather unlikely some years ago, yet now with the Soviets having more ICBMs it is perhaps more likely now than it was then.

Dr. Sherman: It becomes more difficult to say. The Americans have not in that time frame increased substantially their own number of launchers, and with the Russians having a significantly large number of missiles confronting the North American continent it becomes more difficult to say how many of those they could spare for anti-bomber facilities.

The Chairman: Is it a fair conclusion from your evidence on pages 23, 24, 25, and so on that the more installations we have on Canadian territory to give some protection to the American nuclear deterrent, the more danger there would be of attracting fire to Canadian territories?

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Dr. Sherman: Again it is certainly difficult to say, but in isolation a defending facility is dangerous in the sense that it can be a target. It of course meets danger by affording protection. Therefore, there is the question of what it costs you in increased danger opposed to what it gains you in increased protection.

For example, I think Dr. Lindsey addressed this question quite well when he talked about the danger on the one hand that you raise of air defence facilities being targeted and on

the other hand the possibility of weapons going off in Canada which could have been shot down or otherwise met by those defences. It becomes a very difficult interaction to assess. It also involves assumptions about the opponent's targeting priorities.

Therefore, the only thing that I would try to insist on is that you not isolate the danger side of it but put it in a context in which you try to assess the danger that you incur and the possible benefit that you may get.

The Chairman: Deriving directly from that answer, then, do you have any opinion on whether what Canada is now doing in North American defence is making a vital contribution to the defence of the American strategic deterrent? Is what we are doing now vital in your opinion? I gather we are spending about \$130 million a year on it.

Dr. Sherman: Again, that is a little bit aside from the ABM question I was talking about. I think it is a useful contribution.

The Chairman: I have one final question. On page 1 of your paper you say:

Our position under the American security umbrella is the central datum of our national existence.

That suggests that we are, in a sense, protected militarily as a result of our proximity to

the United States. On the other hand, we have heard evidence that the main risk that Canada suffers is the risk of a nuclear interchange between the United States and the USSR. It makes a little bit of difference towards your sense of obligation whether you are being exposed to risk by your neighbour or whether you are being protected from risk by your neighbour. So I would ask you: Which is the correct attitude? Is this another case of having to consider a trade-off, and if so, should that not have been indicated on page 1?

Dr. Sherman: I think that is true. What you say is perfectly true. But I am not sure in the larger sense what the policy implications are besides that we might move to another continent. You are perfectly right that we get protection that we do not have to provide and we also incur certain risks by being located where we are. In that sense I would certainly accept your elaboration of that sentence. As it appears, it does look one-sided, but I did not intend it to be.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions? If not, on your behalf I would like to thank Dr. Sherman for a very thoughtful presentation. Thank you, very much.

APPENDIX FFF
TREATY SERIES

1958 No. 22

RECUEIL DES TRAITÉS

DEFENCE

Exchange of Notes between CANADA and the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Signed at Ottawa August 29 and September
2, 1958

In force September 2, 1958

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN CANA-
DA AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA CONCERNING THE ES-
TABLISHMENT OF CANADA-UNITED
STATES COMMITTEE ON JOINT DE-
FENCE

I

*The Secretary of State for External Affairs
to the Ambassador of the United States
of America to Canada*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ottawa, August 29, 1958.

No. 159

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to recent discussions between representatives of our two Governments concerning the establishment of a Canada-United States Ministerial Committee which would consider periodically important matters affecting the joint defence of our two countries.

In these discussions due note was taken of the intimate co-operation of our two Governments in matters relating to continental defence and of the number of joint bodies of civil and military officials which have been established to consider defence problems of common concern. It was recognized that the agreement of the two Governments to integrated air defence arrangements increased the importance of regular consultations between them on all matters affecting the joint defence of Canada and the United States.

It was agreed that the importance and complexity of these interdependent defence

relationships made it essential to supplement existing channels for consultation and to provide for a periodic review at the Ministerial level of problems which might be expected to arise. It was envisaged that the periodic review would include not only military questions but also the political and economic aspects of joint defence problems.

I have the honour to propose, therefore, that our two Governments agree:

A. That there shall be established a Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence to consist:

For Canada, of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Finance; and for the United States, of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence and the Secretary of the Treasury,

together with such other appropriate Cabinet Members as either Government may designate from time to time as the need arises;

B. That the Committee's function shall be:

(1) To consult periodically on any matters affecting the joint defence of Canada and the United States;

(2) In particular, to exchange information and views at the Ministerial level on problems that may arise, with a view to strengthening further the close and intimate co-operation between the two Governments on joint defence matters.

(3) To report to the respective Governments on such discussions in order that consideration may be given to measures deemed appropriate and necessary to improve defence co-operation;

C. That the Committee shall meet once a year or more often as may be considered necessary by the two Governments;

D. That the Committee shall meet alternately in Washington, D.C., and Ottawa, the chairman to be a Canadian member when the meetings are held in Canada, and a United States member when meetings are held in the United States.

My Government believes that this further development in the essential collaboration of our two Governments in continental defence will assist in the maintenance and development of the individual and collective capacity of the two countries to fulfil their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty for the maintenance of international peace and security.

If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing proposals, I propose that this Note and your reply should constitute an agreement between our two Governments effective from the date of your reply to remain in force until such time as either Government shall have given notice in writing of its desire to terminate the agreement.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

SIDNEY SMITH
Secretary of State
for External Affairs

II

*The Ambassador of the United States
of America to Canada to the
Secretary of State for External Affairs*

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Note No. 54

Ottawa, September 2, 1958

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to your Note No. 159 of August 29, 1958 concerning the establishment of a Canada--United States Ministerial Committee which would consider periodically important matters affecting the joint defense of our two countries.

My Government concurs in the proposals contained in your note and agrees that this exchange of notes will constitute an agreement between our two Governments effective this date and to remain in force until such time as either Government shall have given notice in writing of its desire to terminate the agreement.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

LIVINGSTONE T. MERCHANT

The Honorable

Sidney E. Smith,
Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

DÉFENSE

Échange de Notes entre le CANADA et les
ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE

Signées à Ottawa les 29 août et 2 septembre
1958

En vigueur le 2 septembre 1958

[Traduction]

ÉCHANGE DE NOTES ENTRE LE CA-
NADA ET LES ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRI-
QUE RELATIF À L'ÉTABLISSEMENT
D'UNE COMMISSION CANADO-AMÉ-
RICAINNE DE DÉFENSE COMMUNE

I

*Le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires
extérieures à l'Ambassadeur des
États-Unis d'Amérique au Canada*

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Ottawa, le 29 août 1958.

N° 159

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer aux entretiens récents des représentants de nos deux Gouvernements sur la création d'une commission ministérielle canado-américaine qui étudierait périodiquement les affaires importantes intéressant la défense commune de nos deux pays.

Dans ces entretiens, il a été fait état, à juste titre, de la coopération étroite qui a existé entre nos deux Gouvernements en matière de défense continentale, ainsi que du nombre élevé des organismes canado-américains, composés de fonctionnaires civils et militaires et créés pour étudier les problèmes communs de défense. Il a été reconnu que, les deux Gouvernements ayant donné leur assentiment aux dispositions de défense aérienne unifiée, il devenait plus important pour eux de se consulter régulièrement sur les questions touchant à la défense commune du Canada et des États-Unis.

Il a été convenu que, étant donné l'importance et la complexité des rapports d'interdépendance en matière de défense, il était nécessaire de compléter les voies actuelles de consultation et d'assurer, au palier ministériel, une revue périodique des problèmes qui

pourraient se présenter. On a prévu que la revue périodique pourrait porter non seulement sur les questions militaires mais sur les aspects politiques et économiques des problèmes de défense commune.

J'ai donc l'honneur de vous proposer que nos deux Gouvernements conviennent de ce qui suit:

A. Que soit créée une Commission canado-américaine de défense commune qui se composerait:

Du côté canadien, du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, du ministre de la Défense nationale et du ministre des Finances, et du côté des États-Unis, du secrétaire d'État, du secrétaire à la Défense et du secrétaire au Trésor,

ainsi que des autres membres du cabinet que chaque Gouvernement pourra désigner périodiquement, selon les besoins.

B. Que la Commission soit chargée:

1) D'étudier périodiquement les problèmes relatifs à la défense commune du Canada et des États-Unis.

2) Plus particulièrement, de favoriser les échanges de vues et de renseignements au palier ministériel sur les problèmes qui pourront se poser, afin de renforcer encore davantage la collaboration étroite entre les deux Gouvernements sur les problèmes de la défense commune.

3) De renseigner sur ces entretiens les Gouvernements respectifs pour qu'ils puissent étudier les mesures jugées nécessaires pour améliorer la collaboration en matière de défense.

C. Que la Commission se réunisse une fois par année ou plus souvent, selon qu'il sera jugé nécessaire par les deux Gouvernements.

D. Que la Commission se réunisse alternativement à Washington, D.C., et à Ottawa, le président devant être un membre canadien lorsque les réunions se tiendront au Canada et un membre des États-Unis lorsqu'elles se tiendront aux États-Unis.

Mon Gouvernement estime que cette nouvelle manifestation de la collaboration étroite entre nos Gouvernements pour la défense du continent permettra de conserver et d'accroître les moyens, dont les deux Gouvernements disposent en vue de remplir, chacun de leur côté ou en commun, les obligations que leur imposent la Charte des Nations Unies et le Traité de

l'Atlantique Nord à l'égard de la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Si le Gouvernement des États-Unis agréé les propositions susmentionnées, je propose que la présente Note et votre réponse constituent, entre nos deux pays, un Accord qui entrera en vigueur le jour de votre réponse et qui le demeurera jusqu'à ce que l'une des parties le dénonce par écrit.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance renouvelée de ma très haute considération.

Le Secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures,
SIDNEY SMITH

Son Excellence

Monsieur Livingstone T. Merchant
Ambassadeur des États-Unis d'Amérique

100, rue Wellington
Ottawa

II

*L'Ambassadeur des États-Unis
d'Amérique au Canada au Secrétaire
d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

AMBASSADE DES ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE

Note n° 54

Ottawa, le 2 septembre 1958

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à votre Note n° 159 du 29 août 1958 relative à l'établissement d'une Commission ministérielle canado-américaine qui étudierait périodiquement les affaires importantes intéressant la défense commune de nos deux pays.

Mon Gouvernement agréé les propositions que renferme votre Note et consent à ce que cet échange de notes constitue entre nos deux Gouvernements un Accord qui entrera en vigueur aujourd'hui et le demeurera jusqu'à ce que l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement donne avis par écrit de son intention de le dénoncer.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance renouvelée de ma très haute considération.

LIVINGSTONE T. MERCHANT

L'honorable

Sidney E. Smith

Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires
extérieures
Ottawa

APPENDIX GGG

A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON
MISSILE DEFENCE

Statement by

Dr. Michael E. Sherman

Hudson Institute

to the
House of Commons
Standing Committee on External Affairs
and National Defence

10 June 1969

This paper is submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in the hope that it will aid the Committee's members in pursuing their own analysis of the ABM controversy. The paper is by no means comprehensive in the sense of presenting and evaluating all the arguments on all sides of this debate; that would be the subject for a long book. Rather, I have tried to select those points at which Canadian discussion of the problem can most usefully be supplemented. My statement does not advocate any course of action on the part of anyone, and if it has any "message" at all to present to the members, it is perhaps only to suggest that there are no easy answers to this most difficult question of the current strategic era. That in itself, of course, may be a useful corrective to some of the responses that up to now have characterized the Canadian debate.

The Strategic Debate in Canada

It is not necessarily a criticism to say that there has never been in Canada a serious, sustained public debate on the problems of modern arms and their control. It is not even especially surprising that this should be the case. Although our men have fought bravely and well whenever asked to fight, as a people we have not shown much taste for military matters. We have no traditional enemies, and most indirect threats that we do perceive are handled quite conveniently by our giant neighbor. Our position under the American security umbrella is the central datum of our national existence. Moreover, no nation depends crucially upon us for its security.

Nonetheless, we do have certain reasons for taking strategic arms problems seriously. We share the concern of all mankind that the weapons that do exist will never be used, as well as the obligation to do whatever we can

to that end. But the fact that we also happen to share a continent with a super-power means we are affected (actually and potentially) more than most nations by its arms policies. Its peacetime attempts to defend itself have involved us intimately for more than twenty years. And, as discussed below, it is not at all clear that in wartime an attacker would choose to ignore the political, economic and military ties that extend across the famous undefended frontier.

Finally, we have learned the hard way that the nature of a nation's strategic debate is never irrelevant to its politics. Only a few years ago, our Government was defeated and our foreign relations strained by a controversy over whether Canadian forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons. It has often been said that the debate on that issue could have been conducted at a higher intellectual level. Like any controversy that gets caught up in the currents of politics, the nuclear weapons debate reflected concerns other than those of strategic analysis. Nonetheless, it can be argued that another contributing factor to the diffuse and often confused nature of the debate was that the public was not prepared for it. The problems raised were new ones to most citizens, and it was unreasonable to expect them to become strategic analysis overnight.

To take just one example, a question often raised in the early sixties was whether Canada's proposed nuclear sharing schemes were inconsistent with her long-standing intention to remain a "non-nuclear power". Now, this is a very complicated question, but it was presented in the press and elsewhere as a very simple one. Those who wanted to acquire the Bomarcas, Starfighters, etc., claimed that because the sharing plans would not give Canada the ability to fire a nuclear weapon on her own, they were entirely consistent with her non-nuclear status. The argument on the other side, as it was usually presented, was that "nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons", a non-nuclear country could not logically have them under any system of control, and that was regarded as the end of the mat-

ter. The pro-nuclear faction reflected little awareness that a nation's non-nuclear virtue could be compromised in ways less direct than the acquisition of an independent capability; the anti-nuclear faction (with some notable exceptions) took a strongly moralistic line, reflected little awareness of the importance of such "details" as the type of control system, and seemed to be using a mechanical model of proliferation that envisaged Canada's two Bomarc squadrons pushing Indians, Japanese and others willy-nilly into new bomb programs around the world.

Without judging the merits of the various positions in that earlier dispute, it is relevant to the present ABM controversy. In particular, there has been a heavily moral tone to much of the Canadian discussion of missile defence. Now, one cannot deny that a question of this kind has a moral aspect; indeed, one can argue persuasively that it is predominantly a moral issue. But it is not *exclusively* a moral issue, and even if it were, that would not relieve us of the obligation to test as well as we can the factual and logical bases of our moral convictions. In following the Soviet-American ABM debate and in carrying on their own, Canadians have not, I submit, tried hard enough to understand or analyze the complexities of the various positions. The superpowers are portrayed as massive arms-producing machines, spending themselves half-consciously to ever higher levels of destructive power without realizing (or, some would have it, even caring) that they merely hasten the day of their own doom as well as everyone else's. The dominant perception in Canada of the recent ABM decisions by the superpowers has been one of steps taken by fools, or knaves, or both. Now, this judgment may be correct, but it must be supported, not merely asserted. And it is a major argument of this paper that if we are going to be responsible both to our own citizens and to our friends we need, first, a more concerted effort to understand others' rationale as well as our own interests before we criticize; and, second, a more concerted effort to understand our own motives and concerns when we do criticize. A paper of this length cannot take us very far, but at least it is a preliminary step in that direction.

Canada and the ABM Debate.

In light of the preceding remarks, I thought that rather than simply cataloguing the arguments pro- and con-ABM, it might be more useful to organize the issues in the following way.

Consider these four propositions:

1. "The Soviet and American decisions to deploy missile defences open a new round in the superpower arms race".
2. "This failure to control superpower weapons will doom prospects for other forms of arms control; in particular, for non-proliferation".
3. "Missile defences are senseless because a nation cannot defend itself against the ballistic missile, or fight a strategic nuclear war, in any meaningful sense of those terms".
4. "Whatever Canada does in the field of continental defence, she does in order to protect the American strategic deterrent that is the keystone of stability. Canada herself is not threatened, and therefore need not defend herself in the narrow sense".

I would guess that a pool of the Canadian public would reveal a rather broad consensus on these statements. But while some or all of the statements may be perfectly true, it is seldom recognized in the public debate in Canada that each of them is highly controversial, and even those that are correct may be only partial truths. Some consideration of the controversy surrounding each one may yield a better understanding of the American debate on ABM, as well as a better balance in our own reaction to it.

1. *"The Soviet and American decisions to deploy missile defences open a new round in the superpower arms race".*

It seems fair to say that the primary concern of opponents of ABM has been the danger that opening of the ABM age will stimulate a new round in "the arms race". The first thing to note here is that there are a wide variety of concepts or definitions of an arms race, and a wide variety of interpretations in any situation of what constitutes an arms race. For example, the early and mid-Sixties, generally characterized in the popular press as an "ever-accelerating spiral", are regarded by many specialists as a rather tranquil period in terms of direct action-reaction arms competition. This may be less true in light of the recent major Soviet offensive build-up, but even then, the proposed budget for U.S. strategic offensive and defensive forces is estimated at \$8.3 billion—compared with \$11.3 billion for fiscal 1962. As Albert Wohlstetter has noted recently "Adjusted for price changes, the 1962 figure was well over 50 per

cent higher than that for 1970, perhaps even as much as $\frac{2}{3}$ higher.”*

In general, however, what ABM critics usually mean when they say it opens a new round of the arms race is a period characterized by volatile open-ended competition between offensive and defensive forces. Here the central assumption is that defensive deployments by one superpower must provoke the other side to try to regain its earlier strategic position by acquiring more offense. And since there is no obvious plateau for this kind of competition if one power decides to keep it up, the best we can hope for (in this view) is a process by which although stability may be maintained by offsetting deployments, the arms race continues in the sense that levels of weaponry and of the budgets that are required to support them keep rising.

As this has been the most popular “scenario” among American opponents of ABM, so it has been the dominant view in Canada for some years. Other possible developments are seldom mentioned. One is that, to many forms of missile defense, there might not be any reaction at all, at least in terms of new weapons procurement by the other superpower. For example, advocates of a so-called “thin” area defence for the United States have argued that its obvious transparency to serious Soviet attacks would make unnecessary any Russian effort to offset it with increased offensive forces. Another possibility is that if one superpower did feel the need to respond in some way to defensive deployments by the other side, the response might be in the field of defence, rather than of increased offence: By acquiring a comparable level of defence, a government might well feel that it had regained the strategic position placed in question by the initial defensive move. Indeed, there are those who argue that up to very high levels, a defence-defence race would be a positively desirable development because it would reduce the number of effective offensive weapons on each side and thereby the destruction that could be inflicted if deterrence should fail.

The objection, of course, is that uncertainties about the effectiveness of the other side’s

defence might lead conservative planners to acquire more offence as well, and the offence-defence spiral would begin, albeit somewhat delayed. Although some advocates of “letting the defense run even without offensive limitations” reply that the defense will never be so good as to prevent one superpower from inflicting unacceptable damage on the other, the objection does raise yet another possibility, namely that the opening of the ABM age might facilitate rather than obstruct progress toward certain forms of strategic arms control. In particular, it has been argued that the confidence induced by even modest levels of defense would reduce the perceived requirements for inspection of offensive forces and expedite an agreement to limit them.

Although space does not permit any detailed evaluation of these alternatives here, three comments are in order. The first is simply to stress again that these alternatives do exist, and that while the offence-defence race scenario may be accurate, it is not self-evidently so. The second point is to insist that in assessing these alternatives, at least a gross distinction be maintained between various types of missile defense. In the public debate in Canada, critics too often ignore the fundamental difference between a missile defense aimed primarily at the protection of strategic forces and one aimed primarily at the protection of the civilian and industrial base. It is true that in practice there would probably never be a pure case of one or the other of these—for example, Safeguard is primarily to protect Minuteman, but when complete it will provide a thin area defense for all of the United States which hopes to protect the American people against light or unsophisticated attacks. Nonetheless, for analytic purposes, this is a useful distinction. That is, in assessing the probable response by one superpower to a defensive deployment by the other, it is important to ask to what extent the system protects population centers and to what extent it protects forces. To take an unlikely but “limiting” example, a system consisting solely of short-range interceptors placed around land-based ICBM’s is largely invulnerable to the charge that it is destabilizing because it undermines the other side’s “assured destruction” requirement. On the other hand, a system that consisted purely of a very heavy area defence along with many interceptors placed around cities might be very vulnerable to this charge. This was, of course, one of the primary reasons in the Nixon shift from Sentinel’s population-

* See Albert J. Wohlstetter, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1969, and supplement of May 23, 1969. This material also appears, in slightly edited version, as Chap. 6, “The Case for Strategic Force Defense” in the volume *Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy* edited by J. J. Holst and W. Schneider, Jr., to be published by Pergamon Press.

protecting character to Safeguard's force-protecting posture. The third point in this connection is that Canadian critics seldom note the available evidence that neither the Government of the Soviet Union nor the United States believes that ballistic missile defenses necessarily cause arms races. Indeed, they have displayed considerable sensitivity to the problem. The Johnson Administration designed a system (Sentinel) which, while largely "population-protecting", was deliberately so transparent to substantial Russian attack that it was hoped the Soviets would perceive no need to offset it with increased offence. In a sense, President Nixon went even further in this direction by emphasizing his own Safeguard's force-protecting character, even to the extent of denying in his extemporaneous remarks such population-protecting character as its area defence component obviously has. And on the other side of the fence, consider the following quotation by Premier Kosygin:

I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people.*

It is especially interesting to note that Kosygin here refers to a population protecting system, which, of the two general types of ABM, is generally regarded as more conducive to arms races. There may, of course, be many explanations for the Soviet attitude: The Russian traditional emphasis on defence, a simple failure to understand the real issues, etc. The point here is simply that we do not have to accept on faith either the image of ABM as producing an offence-defence race or the implications generally drawn from that model. There is considerable evidence that the governments of the superpowers believe that such a volatile race can be avoided, and while we should not accept that belief on faith either, it does suggest that the issue is more complex, and perhaps more hopeful, than has often been assumed.

2. *"A failure to control superpower weapons will doom prospects for other forms of arms control; in particular, for non-proliferation".*

Another feature of the ABM controversy has been its relationship to the effort of the last few years to control the spread of nuclear

weapons. This is again a highly complicated subject that has appeared in a very simplistic form in most Canadian discussions. Most pessimistic conclusions about ABM's impact on non-proliferation are based on the view of missile defense as the generator of a superpower arms race. From the action-reaction cycle, it is inferred that the competition in strategic arms must increase tensions between the superpowers; that the international environment as a whole must suffer because of this; that failure to control strategic weapons must hurt chances for arms control in other areas—for example, in the area of non-proliferation, either because non-nuclear countries will refuse to adhere to a treaty now revealed as blatantly discriminatory, or simply because nuclear weapons appear more necessary in a less stable world.

Clearly, there are some controversial linkages in this picture. For example, the leap from resentment against a discriminatory non-proliferation treaty to a "go-nuclear" decision is rather a long one. Some analysts come close to arguing that non-nuclear states will abandon their nuclear restraint out of spite, even though they continue to recognize the destabilizing character of proliferation. To the present writer, it is not obvious that objective nuclear incentives go up as enthusiasm for a particular non-proliferation measure goes down. There may, of course, be ways in which resentment of this sort can weaken the barriers against proliferation. It may provide a plausible excuse for a government that wants to go nuclear but would otherwise have diplomatic difficulties in doing so. Or, it may provide the pro-nuclear faction in a domestic debate with a powerful emotional argument. Thus, as we shall discuss below, it is in the interests of non-proliferation to minimize this kind of resentment even where analysis suggests that it ought not to give Nth countries a greater objective interest in nuclear weapons. But for present purposes, it is enough to note the main burden of this first model: By generating a divisive offense-defense arms race, the opening of the ABM age will have unpleasant consequences, whether in the long or short run, for the attempt to control nuclear spread.

There are, of course, other aspects of the possible impact of ABM on proliferation. One concerns whether the opening of the missile age will raise or lower the importance of nuclear weapons in international politics. It is generally accepted that if nuclear weapons appear to governments to perform a number of useful functions in world affairs—whether

* Press conference, London, 9 February 1967. Text in *The New York Times*, 10 February 1967. See also the article by N. I. Talensky in the Soviet journal *International Affairs*, October 1964.

these functions are military, diplomatic, or domestic—the premium on having them will remain high and they will continue to spread. For this reason, some analysts have recommended that the nuclear powers themselves try to minimize the role of nuclear weapons on the world scene; and critics of ABM have argued that defensive deployments by the great powers will undermine this effort. These critics feel that American and Russian defensive deployments, especially if highly touted, will enhance the perception of nuclear weapons as a badge of status, independence, or security—fostering a set of attitudes that make acquisition of atomic arms seem only natural to governments around the world. It has even been argued that if ABM's themselves come to be regarded as the new mark of first-rank national status, those advanced countries that do go nuclear will seek not only offensive but defensive nuclear weapons as well. But it could be that the type of nuclear emphasis involved in American and Russian ABM will be irrelevant to all but the most ambitious nations. Not all governments seek superpower rank. The dominant perception might be that just as there are different fashions in different social strata in domestic society, so the same applies to international society; and there may be no perceived reason, at least in terms of status, why Belgium or even Brazil should be moved to seek either offensive or defensive nuclear weapons just because the United States or the Soviet Union has acquired an ABM. More important, probably, than the arms procurement policies of the superpowers is the nuclear emphasis or de-emphasis in the way they use their power around the world.

Another faction in this debate maintains that, considered in a long-term perspective, defensive deployments by the superpowers will reduce, rather than raise, the premium placed on nuclear weapons by most nations of the world. First, they contend that superpower self-protection at least against light or unsophisticated nuclear attacks will make it more credible to provide security guarantees (whether implicit or explicit) in exchange for continued nuclear abstention. Guarantees for Asian Nth countries against China have, of course, been the example usually cited, and this argument was a principal item in the advocacy of the Sentinel system by Messrs. McNamara, Warnke and others*. By exten-

sion, it has also received support from some commentators in important non-nuclear countries. Consider the following statement by a prominent Australian defence critic:

If the United States and the Soviet Union are to provide China's neighbors with an alternative source of security to that represented by national nuclear forces, it is important that they preserve their present military ascendancy over China. If disarmament of the great powers is taken to the point where the guarantees they issue to the non-nuclear states are no longer credible, a more important bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons that the treaty itself will have been removed.**

It is worth emphasizing that this statement calls into question the conventional wisdom of most Canadian observers that any step that lowers the levels of superpower weaponry is a move towards greater stability, and a step that maintains or raises those levels is a move toward instability and perhaps to major war.

A variation of this argument holds that through protection even against light nuclear attack, it can be demonstrated that the price of gaining nuclear leverage against a superpower is beyond all but the richest and most advanced nations. In particular, it is hoped that by undermining the expected Chinese claim to have such leverage against the United States (or even against the Soviet Union), the number of states inclined to emulate China will be diminished. It may be, however, that this line of argument is either irrelevant or counterproductive in the effort to check nuclear spread. It may be irrelevant because it is doubtful that many Nth countries would regard rudimentary nuclear forces as usable, even for threats, against one of the superpowers.* And it may be counterproductive because governments will certainly take note that a relatively backward country such as China could force the world's strongest nation into a whole new generation of weapons simply by acquiring a primitive nuclear force. If such a force can threaten to alter the fundamental strategic relationship between two such nations, others may see new reasons for having one. This objection was in fact made by critics of the Johnson Administration's "anti-Chinese" orientation of

** Hedley Bull, "On Non-Proliferation," *Interplay* (Vol. I, No. 6), p. 10.

* More persuasive is the view that this argument would be prominent in some Nth country domestic debates on whether or not to go nuclear.

* See for example, Mr. Warnke's address before the Advocates Club, Detroit, 6 October 1967. (News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) #950-67.)

the Sentinel system, and the criticism seems to this writer a persuasive one. Rather than demeaning primitive nuclear capabilities in the eyes of non-nuclear nations, a superpower move to deploy defenses against such forces may do more to dignify them. If this happens, the premium placed even on "oxcart-bombs" will rise, and ABM will have had the effect of fostering rather than restraining nuclear spread.**

The Role of the Superpowers: Will AMB lead to a World of "Fortress Superpowers" or "Superpower Condominium"?

The final pair of alternative models concerns the question of whether defensive deployments will be read by the rest of the world as a "turning in" or a "turning out" on the part of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Both are plausible interpretations, and each has given analysts cause for hope or concern, depending upon their biases. On the one hand, it can be argued that ABM will be construed around the globe as symbolic of, and instrumental to, a weakening of superpower support for distant allies and friends. This line has been especially popular with Americans critics of ABM, who feel that it will be taken in Europe as a diminution of the United States' commitment to NATO: As the capability for strategic insularity from European conflict increases, runs the argument, the American willingness to intervene will decrease proportionately—or, equally unfortunate, this will be the dominant perception among NATO nations (especially Germany) who will then feel an increased need for national nuclear weapons of their own.

A pessimistic inference, of course, is not only one that can be drawn from the premise of superpower insularity. A world in which the superpowers made no attempt to extend their power around the globe could conceivably diminish nuclear incentives, either because it bolstered a tradition of defensive foreign policies or because it reduced the broad role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Also, a sense that the superpowers had turned inward might reduce at least one type of nuclear incentive, namely the desire for a modest nuclear capability just big enough to trigger one's superpower ally into the war. It should be noted, however, that the fear that a superpower's protection of its own

population will make it insular applies with diminished force to the Safeguard system, which looks primarily (although not exclusively, since it does provide area defense for the whole country against light attacks) to the defence of the strategic forces. But even if one admits the possibility that not all allied observers will make this distinction, a further observation is in order.

Although there are opportunities for compromise in many areas of the ABM debate, this may be a point of genuine irreconcilability. On the one hand, there stand those analysts who believe that America cannot credibly extend nuclear deterrence to others so long as its own population remains hostage to nuclear retaliation. Another group seems to believe that the credibility of American guarantees cannot be maintained *unless* the population of America remains hostage. Thus a policy judgment must be made here. My own guess, albeit a tentative one, is that the more American friends and allies think about the issue, the more they will come to share the view familiar in Europe since the late fifties: They will come increasingly to feel that a guarantee is incredible if the guarantor risks destruction in implementing it. It is uncertain, of course, how influential such calculations are in governments' decisions to go nuclear or not to. Some states, for example, may be so skeptical of outside guarantees that nothing could make the assurances credible to them. But to the extent that this issue does play a part, it seems in the interest of the guarantor, the guaranteed, and the cause of non-proliferation in general to reduce the guarantor's vulnerability to retaliation. If that is true, then superpower ABM deployments (especially if they develop as part of an over-all strategic arms control plan) can be regarded not only as consistent with non-proliferation but as a cornerstone of it.

As an alternative to the possibility that ABM might signal superpower insularity to the rest of the world, it could be seen as the basis for a continuation or even extension of Soviet-American dominance in world affairs. Thus, Pierre Gallois wrote of the superpowers' entry into the ABM age, that it is hardly surprising that they insist missile defences are not destabilizing, when those defences aim only to preserve the duopolistic stability of the past few years.* Although such charges bring cries of righteous indignation from the

** It should be stressed that this last point addresses a question more of declaratory policy than of deployment. It was a mistake to say that Sentinel was prompted by China, even if that was the case.

* Pierre Gallois, «La défense contre missiles (DCM) Américaine et Russe et la 'prolifération',» *Revue Militaire Générale* (February 1968) 139-150.

governments of both superpowers, perhaps a friendly Canadian may be permitted the observation that there is more than a grain of truth in the charge, and probably more than a grain of truth in the prediction that many non-nuclear countries will perceive the defensive deployments in this light. It is far from clear, however, what the impact of such a perception would be on the process of proliferation itself. If crucial non-nuclear states come to see the superpower dominance as a threat to national interests that can be protected only by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, that is one thing. But it is not obvious that they will do so; indeed, the arguments made concerning superpower deterrence of China can be generalized to a rather plausible theory that the determination of two well-protected superpowers to stop proliferation might create the most stable framework that could be devised. I am not arguing that this is necessarily the case, or that stability is the only criterion by which we should judge international systems. The point is simply to warn again against analyses that see a clear and straight line from resentment against superpower dominance to extensive nuclear spread.

3. *"Missile defences are senseless because a nation cannot defend itself against the ballistic missile, or fight a strategic nuclear war, in any meaningful sense of those terms".*

Of all the hypothetical statements listed above, this is perhaps the one that would gain the widest approval in Canada. It is central to the widespread Canadian hostility to the concept of missile defence. It is also, however, the one that would be disputed most hotly by a large group of American experts, especially those friendly to ABM. And thus an appreciation of the rationale for ABM depends importantly on an understanding of the difference between the two points of view.

The key issue here, it seems to me, is the almost universal assumption in Canada that if a strategic nuclear weapon is ever fired in anger by anyone, the result will be an uncontrolled, city-busting horror in which each side expends every available weapon to the sole end of inflicting political, economic and military destruction on the other. Assuming as they do, such enormous levels of destruction, it is understandable (although even then perhaps not justifiable) that most Canadians cannot share many of the American concerns that make even a light ABM appear sensible.

These would include (to name only a few): The possibility of attack (either in a bilateral crisis or in an attempt to catalyze a superpower war) by a nation that does not possess an immense or sophisticated nuclear arsenal; the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch, especially in a period of crisis when such an incident could precipitate a major war; the possibility of exemplary or demonstration attacks by the other superpower, aimed at communicating determination or willingness to run risks in a crisis; or finally, the possibility that in an effort to avoid the high destructive levels of a counter-city war the superpower governments might tacitly or explicitly settle on one or more of the distinctions within the concept of limited strategic war. Such limitation could apply to the type of targets attacked (e.g., cities versus strategic forces) or to the number of targets attacked, or to both. In such a case, several things would be true. First, the war would have phases, in which one side responded to actions by the other, rather than being a single exchange of total forces on each side. Secondly, the willingness of either side to terminate the war would be influenced by how much it had suffered in both civil and military terms; how much damage it had inflicted; its ability to control surviving forces, etc. In other words, the data usually referred to in Canada as the "details" of the conflict would become central, not marginal. And in such a context, a defender may indeed think his defence has been "meaningful" if (again, to suggest only a few considerations) it keeps the attacker away from certain heavily defended targets of high value; it requires him to use a very large number of weapons to penetrate to those targets, thus sparing other targets he would have had available; it reduces the payload of his boosters because of the need to carry extensive penetration aids.

Clearly, this is a subject too complex to be more than hinted at here. The essential point, however, for a paper which seeks merely to provide a "road map" to help the Committee members follow the debate, is that one cannot understand the controversy at all so long as one clings to the assumption that the first nuclear detonation is the beginning of Armageddon. That assumption must be strained to apply to confrontations between a superpower and a smaller nuclear power. As for confrontations between superpowers, one may of course argue that even a war that begins under control will too soon get out of control, and Armageddon is what we shall get

anyway, albeit slightly delayed. But that is a political judgment, not a self-evident truth. It is also a judgment with a large element of self-fulfilling prophecy: If the two superpowers believe it to be true, pitch everything on deterrence and design their forces accordingly, then they virtually guarantee that *any* war will be the last one. For a planner who likes to gamble everything that his plan for deterrence cannot fail, it is an attractive strategy. To the friends of missile defence, it is not a responsible one. As I have written elsewhere, to the Canadian consensus that "You cannot fight a nuclear war", many in other countries (friends and foes of ABM among them; would reply, "You may have to", in one or more of the contexts described above. But the present purpose has not been to defend that view, merely to elaborate it.

4. "Whatever Canada does in the field of continental defence, she does in order to protect the American strategic deterrent that is the keystone of stability. Canada herself is not threatened, and therefore need not defend herself in the narrow sense".*

As the ABM debate in the United States has developed, there has naturally been some concern in Canada over whether any of the components of the planned systems or the operation of them would have direct implications for Canadian territory or airspace. Dr. Lindsey of the Defence Research Board has addressed most of the features of this problem, but there is one that I would like to discuss a little further. It concerns not so much any detail of the design or operation of the American ABM, as it does the overall way in which Canadians seem to regard the issue of Canadian participation or non-participation in continental defence.

I have always been struck by the prevalence of the assumption, sometimes explicit and sometimes unstated, that Canada's efforts in the field of continental defence are made (and should be made) almost solely because of her obligations to the United States. Canada must not, it is said, jeopardize American security but without any nuclear strike forces capable of an offensive nuclear war or any external policies likely to provoke one, she has little to fear for herself. The present section attempts merely to show that, like so many features of the Canadian debate, this assumption may be correct but it is not self-evidently so.

* The author is grateful to participants in the 1968 CIAA-Glendon College conference for comments on a presentation on this subject.

Analysts have suggested a variety of ways, of varying plausibility, in which Canada might become a target for nuclear attack. First, there is a case based on fear of an enemy strategy of so-called "bypass attacks". At an early stage of the American debate of the merits and drawbacks of ABM, some critics of Sentinel maintained that one way of end-running the system would be to burst offensive weapons upwind of the defended area and outside the range of the defences. The object would be to attack the inhabitants of a defended city with fallout rather than with blast and fire, and the relevance here is that bypass attacks on the northern United States would lead an enemy to burst at least some of his warheads over or on Canadian territory. An attack of this kind on Seattle, for example, would involve bursts very close to Vancouver, given prevailing wind patterns. This argument received attention less because it was persuasive than because Mr. McNamara used it in his own justification for delaying defensive deployments he did not want to approve. But it was never very popular among strategic analysts; most observers felt that neither in the Soviet Union nor anywhere else would a strategy based for its effect on the direction of the wind at a certain time, win much favour with professional military planners. And the case for it has been weakened further by the improvement of long-range interceptors that promise (or so their designers tell us) considerable protection for the entire United States (as well as some of Canada) against a small or unsophisticated attack.

A second possibility is that an attack on North America might involve attacks on continental defences in Canada. Some years ago, Mr. McNamara supported this notion before a Congressional committee by saying that a major contribution of Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles would be to draw Soviet ICBM's away from more important targets. This seemed unlikely in the early sixties because of the then relatively small number of Soviet missiles. It was doubted by the critics that the Russians could afford to waste missiles against such targets. With the much enlarged arsenal of the U.S.S.R. today, it becomes more difficult to say. It is true that under a counterforce or countervalue strategy, the Soviet missile target list might give relatively low *initial* priority to the Bomarc, manned interceptor bases, and their support facilities. The Canadian debate, however, as noted above, usually stops with the "beginning" of any

hypothetical conflict. And the danger that air defence installations might be targeted by Soviet missiles clearly applies with more force to a protracted war in which the flexibility and "re-usability" of bombers are more important. Also, an effective defence against ballistic missiles could restore some of the bomber's prowess unless AWACS exceeds all expectations. And, of course if ABM interceptors or related facilities such as radars should ever come to Canada, these might have a much higher place on the Soviet list of preferred first-strike targets, and this will continue to be a prominent argument among opponents of any direct Canadian involvement with ABM.*

How one feels about such involvement, of course, depends in part on whether Canada might draw some fire for other reasons. One of these concerns the notion that from the viewpoint of a potential attacker, the United States and Canada constitute what is known in the jargon as a single target system. The assumption here is that "Owing to the close integration of the American and Canadian economies, an attempt to destroy the productive capacity of the United States would almost certainly result in some Canadian targets being attacked. . . (It) would not make sense to attack the United States and leave Canada alone".* One may wonder, of course, whether in a nuclear attack on the U.S., a primary or even secondary objective of an enemy: confronted by the immense American nuclear arsenal would be to destroy the productive capacity of the United States. In a war that is largely a test of wills, either the forces or the people (or both) of the United States might be more likely targets. Here the concept of a single target system may not apply. But the Soviets have often suggested that a nuclear war is not so different from a conventional war that traditional issues such as productive capacity and the ability to recover become irrelevant. If they really believe that, they might well have fairly high priorities for industrial targets in Canada in a protracted war. And a case can be made that at minimum, the responsible course for a Canadian Government is to hedge against this possibility by encouraging a design of U.S.

ABM deployment that maximizes the derivative protection Canada might get.

A related fear has been that Canada might be attacked under an enemy strategy of holding American allies as hostages. If it were impossible or difficult to hurt the United States directly, would an attacker look around for ways to exert pressure indirectly on the U.S.? This argument, of course, became familiar in connection with the supposedly anti-Chinese nature of the projected U.S. Sentinel: Opponents of the plan contended that protection of the American population created an incentive for China to use undefended Japanese or Australians as proxy Americans. In the present context, the analogy is that a defended United States and an undefended Canada could create a similar predicament for the latter. The standard response has been that the United States would respond to an attack on Canada precisely as if it had been attacked itself, but if such a response meant nuclear war for the United States, cynics may be forgiven for their doubts. And moreover, the fact that they had been avenged might be small consolation to any allies that had been struck. The point made by the defenders of continental defence is that they do not want to tempt fate or test the indivisibility of American and Canadian interests, by making Canada an obviously hostage ally if it seems possible to defend her.

Finally, we return to the problem of "accidental" or unintended strikes in Canada. Here the concern is not so much that Canada will be deliberately targeted, as that she may be hit even if she is not targeted. We read a great deal about the excellent control that the nuclear powers have over their forces, and about the impressive accuracy of their missiles. Could an attacker be so incompetent as to hit the wrong country? Well, unlikely as it seems, it is not inconceivable. First, unless the non-proliferation effort succeeds (and the present treaty is only a first step to that end), intercontinental nuclear weapons may spread to countries that cannot master or afford the technology of advanced control and accuracy. Second, even for those weapons that exist today, most optimistic calculations are made for forces at an alert but peacetime status: Even experts are less confident of what happens to command and control after a force has been considerably degraded by heavy nuclear attack. Thus some observers doubt that a Canadian Government could responsibly leave its people hostage to the assumption that Canada's inoffensiveness will always

* This possibility should not be excluded just because the present plan for the Safeguard system involves no facilities in Canada. Systems have a way of changing, especially those designed as this one, on a building block concept.

* R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation", *International Journal*, Summer 1962, 204.

make her proof against nuclear weapons falling on her soil.

In conclusion, let me repeat that there is no suggestion here that there are any immediate candidates for attack on this continent; or, that an attacker would adopt any of the strategies that would result in strikes on Canada; or, even if there is a chance of such strikes, that the chance is great enough to warrant the expenditure of very large amounts of money to defend against them.

The present purpose is simply to raise for discussion the possibility that in considering her response to the age of missile defences, beyond obligations to her neighbour, Canada may have an obligation to herself.

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Born in 1937, Dr. Sherman received his B.A. from the University of Toronto (Honours Philosophy and History) and his Ph. D. from Harvard (Government).

Structuring the ABM Debate

These notes are submitted to the House of Commons' Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence as a supplement to my prepared statement of 10 June 1969. At that time I indicated that I had originally intended to submit to the Committee a simple catalogue of the arguments put forward in The American debate by (a) those analysts who oppose any ABM deployment at this time (b) those who support only a "light" ABM (c) those who advocate an American deployment of "heavy" ballistic missile defenses. In this context a "heavy" defense is defined as one designed to protect a sizable proportion of the American population against a large and sophisticated nuclear attack. By "light" defenses I refer to a system such as Safeguard which does not attempt to protect American civilians against a large and sophisticated attack, but does attempt to provide a cover capable of dealing either with accidental, unauthorized, or exemplary attacks by the Soviet Union, as well as any nuclear attack that could be launched by any other country within the next decade or so. The Nixon Administration's Safeguard system is the current example, but it should be emphasized that that part of it devoted to hardpoint defence of strategic forces rather than population centers does not fit neatly into the "light" or "heavy" classification as it is normally used. It is logically possible, of course, to apply the terms "light" and "heavy" to ABM systems which protect strategic forces only, and to use those terms simply to designate the level of effort involved.

Since it is my understanding that the Committee members wish to use these notes as a rough system of reference rather than as a comprehensive analysis, I have used below a tabular form which necessarily loses in completeness and in elegance what it gains in convenience.

CHART 1 — Will Safeguard start a new offense-defense arms race?

Analysts Who Oppose Any ABM Deployment At This Time

Safeguard will start a new round of the offense-defense arms race because the Soviets will be forced to react to U.S. ABM just as U.S. responded to Soviet ABM with MIRV;

or:

Light ABM will inevitably become heavy and then Soviet need to increase offenses to offset U.S. ABM will become clear.

Advocates of Safeguard

Safeguard does not threaten the Soviets assured destruction requirement since it is largely a force-protecting system and its population-protecting capability is transparent to serious Soviet attack; therefore the Soviets need not respond to Safeguard with increased offense.

Advocates of Heavy Defense

Even a heavy ABM would not reduce expected fatalities in a large nuclear attack to acceptable levels, therefore the Soviets need not respond even to heavy ABM with more offense;

or:

Heavy ABM can be allowed in the context of a negotiated freeze on offensive forces.

CHART 2 — Effects on Deterrence

Analysts Who Oppose Any ABM

A false sense of security will encourage superpower leaders to run risks. Increased danger of miscalculation, especially as compared with the starkness of large numbers of clear hostages on each side.

Advocates of Safeguard

Safeguard will not reduce expected fatalities to levels that should even slightly increase superpower risk taking.

Safeguard will provide a sufficiently higher nuclear threshold against the Soviets (e.g., against exemplary or symbolic nuclear attacks) to provide better crisis assurance and better extended deterrence.

Increased deterrence against Nth countries.

Greater assurance concerning U.S. second-strike capabilities will reduce need for hair-trigger responses by U.S.

Advocates of Heavy Defense

Even a heavy ABM will not reduce expected fatalities in large nuclear attacks to extent that risk-taking increases.

CHART 3 — Implications for the Strategic Arms Talks

The "No ABM" School

The new developments in multiple warheads and missile defenses will complicate SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) and possibly block agreement.

Light ABM School

Safeguard is unlikely to block agreement at SALT and may even facilitate it. The first point is illustrated by the Russians' initial expression of interest in SALT after the 1967 Sentinal announcement. This has been maintained after Safeguard. Defensive systems may reduce the perceived inspection requirements for offensive systems and thereby facilitate agreement on limiting them.

Heavy ABM School

Basically same arguments as for light ABM.

CHART 4—*Catalytic and Accidental Launches**"No ABM" School*

These events have such a low probability that no system is required to insure against them.

Light ABM School

These are serious concerns. Even if low probability, their consequences are so great as to make it necessary to buy insurance against them.

*Heavy ABM School*CHART 5—*Intra-war Arms Control**"No ABM" School*

The tendency here is to give less attention to the "details" of a nuclear conflict. The issue is how to prevent war, not how to fight one. This is exemplified by suggestion of some ABM critics that response to Russian offensive buildup should be not in procurement but in strategy, specifically in adoption of a U.S. launch on warning doctrine.

Light ABM School

Arms control must seek not only to prevent war, but to limit damage on both sides if war occurs. Defenses may facilitate war termination, enable government to ride out attacks or crises, reduce need for hair-trigger responses.

Heavy ABM School

Heavy defense may facilitate certain types of intra-war arms control, such as "no cities" rule.

CHART 6—*Impact on Proliferation**"No ABM" School*

American ABM will signal a "turning in," a lessening of commitment to allies and neutrals who will then feel need for nuclear weapons of their own.

or:

Superpower defenses will be perceived as a flouting of NPT's Article VI, and weaken the chance that others will sign the treaty.

or:

Continuing emphasis on the role of strategic nuclear weapons in international relations will raise the premium placed on them and indirectly lead others to acquire them.

or:

By dignifying primitive nuclear capabilities, superpower defenses will raise premium on such capabilities.

Light ABM School

Safeguard will show potential Nth countries they cannot get nuclear leverage on a superpower with primitive nuclear capabilities, and thereby reduce nuclear incentives.

or:

Safeguard will enable superpowers to provide more credible guarantees and enable Nth countries to relax about nuclear security.

or:

Defenses will enable nuclear issues to be coupled from international relations.

Heavy ABM School

Basically same arguments as for light ABM but made more strongly, especially concerning guarantees against major nuclear powers—e.g., for Germany against Soviet Union.

CHART 7 — *Economic Implications**"No ABM" School*

Domestic and other problems are such that scarce resources should be spent in non-military areas wherever possible and certainly not in areas where requirement is so conjectural. Even \$5-10 billion projected for Safeguard is too much.

or:

\$5-10 billion will grow to 30 or 40 billion or more.

Light ABM School

While some cuts in defense budget may be desirable this is not the place to make them. Safeguard or any light ABM system can be kept light (and the costs under control) if analysis dictates this is desirable.

Heavy ABM School

The cost even of heavy ABM is not open-ended. In any case this is a top priority matter.

or:

Heavy ABM will not necessarily raise overall defense spending since it may permit reductions elsewhere, for example, in the field of offense.

CHART 8 — *"Being in the ABM Business"**"No ABM" School*

Safeguard is motivated by a mindless desire to imitate the other side. Thus when Soviets entered ABM age many Americans felt the need to follow suit.

Light ABM School

American desire to be in the ABM business if Soviets are in it is not simple imitation. Must maintain a competence in the technology, reduce danger of temporary instabilities favoring the other side, reduce the lead time for crash deployment of heavy cover if that is ever necessary.

CHART 9 — *Penetrability of ABM**"No ABM" School*

Penetration aids are cheap and easy for any country, even a relatively backward one, to develop.

Light ABM School

Penetration aids are not cheap or easy to develop, especially for a country such as China or for any country other than a superpower.

Heavy ABM School

Even for superpowers, the cost exchange ratio between offense and defense is about unity against heavy systems. That is, a dollar spent on defense buys about as much as a dollar spent on offense.

CHART 10 — *Nuclear Blackout**"No ABM" School*

Nuclear environment makes it impossible for radar to find targets.

Light ABM School

System software can utilize interrupted PAR track data. Higher frequency MSR's do not suffer as much from this.

or:

An attacker cannot count on achieving blackout with precursor bursts.

or:

Chinese will not have enough ballistic missiles for precursor attacks for several years.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 49

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1969

FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1969

THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1969

Respecting


Policy-defence and external affairs.

INCLUDING NINTH REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

71
Government
Publications



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan
and Messrs.

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Carter	Legault	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Fairweather	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Forrestall	MacLean	Winch—(30)
Gibson	Marceau	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

(Quorum 16)

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b)

¹Mr. Buchanan replaced Mr. Goyer on June 20, 1969.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

Thursday, June 26, 1969.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

NINTH REPORT

Pursuant to its Order of Reference of Thursday, January 16, 1969, your Committee has heard evidence on and has considered Canada's policy with reference to Canadian Air Defence, including NORAD. Your Committee has also conducted a preliminary examination of the implications for Canada of American anti-ballistic missile defence.

Your Committee held 19 meetings from May 6, 1969, to June 20, 1969, and heard the following witnesses (listed in order of appearance before the Committee):

1. Major General F. R. Sharp, Deputy Commander of NORAD.
2. Brigadier General N. L. Magnusson, Deputy Director, NORAD Combat Operations Center, Colorado Springs.
3. Colonel Henry M. Walsh, Director Continental Plans, Canadian Forces Headquarters.
4. Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs.
5. Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence.
6. Dr. George R. Lindsey, Chief, Defence Research Analysis Establishment, Defence Research Board.
7. Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance, Department of National Defence.
8. Mr. John Gellner, Editor, the *Commentator*, Toronto.
9. Dr. Michael E. Sherman, Professional Staff, Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, New York.

The Order of Reference of June 10, 1969, authorized the Committee to travel within Canada. Accordingly, the Committee travelled to North Bay on Thursday, June 12, 1969. They visited the SAGE Complex, participated in NORAD briefings, toured the operational areas of SAGE and received a briefing and tour of the BOMARC Complex.

The following documents were printed as Appendices to the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

- XX – Text entitled *North American Air Defence* prepared by the Department of National Defence for the use of the Committee, together with a biography of Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp.
- YY – Notes of agreement dated March 30, 1968, between the Governments of Canada and the United States of America, concerning North American Air Defence Command.
- ZZ – Text entitled *Strategic Weapon Systems, Stability, and The Possible Contributions By Canada* (Part I and Part II) prepared by Dr. George R. Lindsey, and his biography.
- AAA – Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American Defence Command (NORAD) (1958).
- CCC – Text entitled *Strategic Weapon Systems, Stability, and The Possible Contributions By Canada* (Part III) prepared by Dr. George R. Lindsey.
- EEE – Memorandum on North American air and space defence prepared by Mr. John Gellner.
- FFF – Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America, signed at Ottawa August 29 and September 2, 1958, In Force September 2, 1958.
- GGG – Text entitled *A Canadian Perspective on Missile Defence* prepared by Dr. Michael E. Sherman, his biography, and his analysis of arguments for and against ABM systems, in catalogue form.
- HHH – Comments on the Committee's working papers received from Professor Albert Legault, Queen's University; Professor P. J. Arnopoulos, Sir George Williams University; Professor K. H. W. Hilborn, The University of Western Ontario; Professor D. M. Thomas, The University of Calgary; Professor C. F. Schuetz, St. Patrick's College, Carleton University.
- III – Supplementary replies to questions asked by the Committee, presented by Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp and Dr. George R. Lindsey.

PART I – INTRODUCTORY

Historical Background

The North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formally established by an agreement between Canada and the United States which was signed May 12, 1958. Originally, it was effective for a ten-year period. It was renewed on March 30, 1968 for a further five-year period. However, it can be reviewed at any time and following such review it may be terminated by either Canada or the United States on one year's notice.

Before the establishment of NORAD, the Canadian and United States air defence forces had acted in close co-operation and co-ordination. With the development of a nuclear capability by the Soviet Union combined with the development of a long-range bomber force, it was decided that the effective air defence of the North American continent would require the unrestricted use of Canadian and United States air space by defending air forces under an integrated command.

Basically, therefore, the NORAD agreement set up an integrated command for the planning and operation of the air defences of Canada and the continental United States. The Commander-in-Chief is an American, the Deputy Commander is Canadian. They are responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, who in turn are responsible to their respective governments.

The NORAD agreement does not impose any specific commitment on either country to allocate military forces to the NORAD command. The NORAD command includes only such individuals and combat units as the two Governments from time to time choose to allocate to it.

Basic Functions of NORAD

NORAD fulfills two major functions which are quite distinct. Its first function is air defence. This includes the surveillance and detection of all unknown aircraft in the NORAD area and the interception and, if necessary, the destruction of any enemy bombers seeking to penetrate North American air space. The second function is the surveillance and detection of hostile Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's). At the present time NORAD has no facilities to intercept or destroy hostile ICBM's.

The Soviet Bomber Threat

The size and character of the Soviet threat to North America have changed very significantly since the inception of NORAD in 1958. The emphasis has shifted from a solely bomber threat in 1958 to a massive missile and more limited bomber threat in 1969.

At the present time the Soviet Union has about 150 subsonic jet and turbo-prop bombers of intercontinental range. These bombers have a two-way mission capability to any target in North America. The Soviets also have about 700 medium bombers which are believed to be targeted on Eurasia, but a few might be committed to an attack on North

America. In an unusual situation it is conceivable that something less than half of these bombers might be used on one-way missions but in view of the growth of Soviet ICBM and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) capability, this is not considered to be very probable. In this unlikely case, the obvious targets are in Hawaii, Alaska and Canada.

Although there is still no evidence of Soviet introduction of a new bomber of inter-continental range in the early 1970's, improvements in the present Soviet bomber force continue to be noted. These include the use of air-to-surface missiles with improved survivability and stand-off strike capability of several hundred miles, the development of low-flying capability making detection more difficult and the use of sophisticated electronic counter measures designed to complicate air defence.

NORAD Forces

NORAD operational forces are made up of some 144,000 personnel at some 350 locations. These figures do not include figures for the Alaska Command. Of the 144,000 personnel, 14,000 are provided by the Canadian forces and 130,000 by the United States forces. There are approximately 700 American NORAD personnel attached to Canadian forces in Canada and approximately 250 Canadian NORAD personnel in the United States.

Command Arrangements

The Commander-in-Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) is an American. The Deputy Commander is a Canadian. The continent is divided into five regions (Western, Eastern, Central, Northern and Alaska). Alaska is in a different position than the other four NORAD regions. It includes only American territory, and is a separate United States unified command under its own commander-in-chief.

American officers command the Western, Eastern and Central regions with Canadians as vice-commanders in the Western and Central regions. A Canadian officer commands the Northern region.

Each regional commander is responsible to CINCNORAD for the air defence of his region. He monitors and co-ordinates the air action, plans the use of assigned forces, and supervises the methods and procedures by which an air battle would be fought in his region.

The NORAD regions are subdivided into divisions, there being 13 NORAD divisions in all at this time. The division commanders exercise direct control over the defensive forces which include, for Canada, manned interceptors and Bomarc's, and, in addition for the United States, Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles. All divisions with the exception of those in Alaska and the 37th NORAD Division at Goose Bay, Labrador, are integrated into the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) system. The system includes computers which are capable of accepting a large volume of information and transposing it into a readily usable form for air battle management.

Under the existing arrangement of NORAD regions and divisions, with the exception of Quebec, and Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick practically all of the populated area of Canada is under the operational control of American officers.

Effective September 15, 1969, changes will be made in the regions and divisions by extending the Western, Eastern and Northern Regions and eliminating the Central region. Among other effects, these changes will extend operational control of Canadian officers to Northern and Western Ontario as shown on the attached map.

Interceptor Force

NORAD has at present assigned to it three Canadian air defence command fighter interceptor squadrons totalling 48 aircraft situated at Chatham, New Brunswick, Bagotville, Quebec and Comox, British Columbia. These squadrons are equipped with the CF 101 Voodoo Interceptor. The U.S.A.F. provides 18 squadrons of F 106 Delta-Dart and F 101 B Voodoo Fighter Interceptors deployed around the perimeter of the continental United States and in Alaska. In addition, the U.S.A.F. provides 21 other fighter interceptor squadrons manned by the National Guard and equipped with first line aircraft such as the F 102 Delta-Dagger. All Canadian NORAD interceptors are equipped to carry air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads and also have conventional capability. The fighter interceptors are directly controlled by the NORAD divisional commanders within whose area of responsibility they are located.

Bomarc Missiles

NORAD has a total of eight Bomarc B missile squadrons in its inventory. Two squadrons—one located at La Macaza in Quebec and one at North Bay, Ontario, are provided by Canada. The remaining six Bomarc squadrons are in the northeastern United States. The Bomarc missiles are on a constant state of alert and are ready to be launched within seconds if hostile forces penetrate North American air space.

Bomarc squadrons are under the direct operational control of a divisional commander. The operational concept includes a "fail-safe" system of control which assures that the launching of a Bomarc missile can only be actuated from the SAGE direction centre.

Nuclear Weapons Control Arrangements

A "two-key" procedure is employed whereby a Canadian and an American officer are each required to turn a key to make the Bomarc launch system operative. The officers carrying the two keys are on duty in the SAGE direction centres 24 hours a day. The launch system can only be activated on receipt of properly authenticated instructions from the NORAD Combat Centre. These instructions would be given by the CINCNORAD only after he had obtained authority from the Governments of Canada and the United States. The equivalent control procedures apply to all nuclear-equipped interceptors, Canadian and American, operating over Canadian territory.

Nike/Hercules Missiles

There are no Nike/Hercules air defence weapons situated in Canada. These short-range weapons are used to provide point defence of 24 major cities, industrial areas and SAC bases in the continental United States including Alaska.

Surveillance, Warning and Control Facilities

The Distant Early Warning (DEW) line is intended to provide the first detection of a manned bomber attack. This warning line consists of six major stations and 23 auxiliary stations. Four of the main stations are located in the Canadian Arctic. The military commander of each of these four stations is a Canadian and he exercises operational control for NORAD.

Warning provided by the DEW line permits NORAD to alert civil defence agencies of Canada and the United States and provides time for the strategic retaliatory bomber force of the United States Strategic Air Command to become airborne. At the same time NORAD defence forces would be brought up to an alert status prepared to meet an attacking force.

A second method of detection is provided through the Pine Tree Line of long-range radar positions in southern Canada and in the United States. At the present time there are 27 long-range radars manned and operated by the Canadian Forces Air Defence Command and 99 operated by the United States Air Force. These radars also have a control function in relation to the interceptor and Bomarc squadrons.

Canada — United States Cost Sharing

It has been recognized that the defence of the North American continent is a co-operative effort and that air defence costs incurred by Canada are for the benefit of the United States also. Accordingly, the United States and Canada entered into a series of cost-sharing agreements for certain North American air defence facilities in Canada under which, generally speaking, the United States paid two-thirds of the capital costs and Canada paid one-third. These included the headquarters, SAGE system and other facilities for the Northern NORAD Region and 41st NORAD Division situated at North Bay, the long-range radar sites in Canada, the telecommunication requirements and the Bomarc squadrons. The overall capital cost of this programme was approximately \$450,000,000, of which the Canadian share was about \$150,000,000. The DEW line facilities in Canada were entirely constructed and paid for by the United States and are maintained by the United States through a civilian contract with the Federal Electric Company. The United States bore the entire capital costs of all NORAD facilities in the United States including the capital costs of the combat operations centre at Colorado Springs (approximately \$142,000,000).

At the present time the annual operating and maintenance costs to Canada for its participation in NORAD total approximately \$135,000,000 allocated as follows:

Interceptors	— \$ 38.9 million
Bomarc	— \$ 4.2 million
Radars	— \$ 67.7 million
Control Centres	— \$ 3.4 million
Space detection tracking	— \$.6 million
Command Headquarters	— \$ 20.2 million

Rough estimates indicate that at this time Canada pays 8% to 10% of all NORAD operating and maintenance costs — roughly in proportion to population.

Suggested Improvements in Air Defence

Certain improvements have been suggested by the United States to remedy weaknesses of our existing air defence system. ICBM's could destroy any of the existing installations before the bombers arrived. Bombers with radar-homing missiles could destroy the control radars. Moreover, any system depending on ground-based radars is limited in its ability to track aircraft flying at low altitude because the line-of-sight from radar to target is cut off at the horizon.

Fixed radars determine the active defence belt in which interceptors and missiles can be controlled. If the bomber were equipped with a long-range air-to-surface missile, it might be able to launch it from just outside the active defence belt. The air-to-surface missile (ASM) is a much smaller and faster target than the bomber. However, it has a smaller pay-load and is probably less accurate. The defence problem is also complicated by the development by the Soviet of sophisticated electronic counter measures designed to complicate air defence.

The suggested air defence system designed to overcome these weaknesses would require the development of an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) which basically consists of aircraft equipped with radar and various sophisticated equipment for communication, computing, data storage and display. It would also require the development of Over-the-Horizon Radar and improved interceptor aircraft.

If the new system were introduced, it might be possible to effect a reduction in the SAGE system and in ground-based radars. There would be fewer squadrons (with the improved interceptors) to maintain and it might be possible to make reductions in the Pine Tree Line.

The Committee has been informed that the original American estimates of the total capital and operation and maintenance costs of the United States programme (including operation and maintenance costs of the residual portions of the present system) for the 10 year period 1967-77 amount to approximately 12.3 billion dollars. When the system is fully operational, the annual operating cost is estimated to be \$690,000,000 which is substantially less than the annual operating cost of the present system.

USSR ICBM Capability

It has been estimated that the Soviet Union will have achieved numerical parity with the U.S. in land-based intercontinental ballistic launchers by mid-1969 and will have a larger inventory than the United States in 1970. The Soviet Union has between 950 and 1,000 ICBM launchers operational including a significant number of SS9 which can carry a warhead in excess of 20 megatons and is the missile in which the USSR has been testing Multiple Re-Entry Vehicles.

The Soviet Union also has about 45 ballistic missile launch tubes in their nuclear-powered submarine force and a new class of submarine having 16 missile tubes is in series production. It is expected to have the capability of firing a missile at 1500 miles range therefore markedly improving Soviet strike capabilities.

A number of developments in ICBM's are now possible which are referred to in detail in testimony forming part of the record of the Committee. These include Multiple Re-Entry Vehicles (MRV), Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRV), the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), The Multiple Orbital Bombardment System (MOBS) and the Depressed Trajectory ICBM (DICBM).

Other developments are designed to improve the probability that the missile will survive attack before it is launched. The main methods of reducing vulnerability are dispersion, hardening, concealment and mobility. Already missile sites have been dispersed and hardened. Concealment of a fixed land installation is difficult in these days of reconnaissance satellites. However, it is quite possible that ICBM launchers could be made mobile, on railway cars, on road vehicles, canal barges or ships. It is also possible to mount them on underwater launchers resting on the bottom of lakes or the sea.

The NORAD System For Detection and Surveillance Of ICBM's

NORAD's capability for detection of the approach of ICBM's is provided by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) located in three sites — at Clear in Alaska, Thule in Greenland, and Fylingdale Moor in England. These were established by the United States at a cost of approximately \$920,000,000.

The warning capability of the BMEWS is between 15 and 20 minutes. The information gleaned by the BMEWS sites is sifted and correlated by computer system and relayed automatically to the computers in the NORAD complex at Colorado Springs, over cables and radio circuits, many of them in Canada. At the NORAD Combat Centre in Colorado Springs the data is processed by the NORAD computers and displayed instantaneously. Processed warning information is passed to all user agencies such as National Defence H.Q. in Ottawa, the National Military Command Center in Washington, SAC, SHAPE, RAF Headquarters, etc. In addition, NORAD headquarters receives information from a number of ancillary sources not under its direct command. These include the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) to which Canada's contribution consists of manning a Baker-Nunn camera at Cold Lake, Alberta and various sensors.

In summary, NORAD has a capability to detect, identify and give warning of ICBM and SLBM attacks against the North American continent. It has not been technically feasible to intercept or destroy ballistic missiles. In this situation, the preservation of the retaliatory force, through hardened MinuteMan Sites, Polaris submarines and airborne SAC bombers has been considered the best counter against any ballistic missile attack and the most effective deterrent to a pre-emptive first strike.

The "Safeguard" ABM System

An anti-ballistic missiles system (ABM system) is designed to intercept and destroy enemy ICBM's. It is believed that the USSR has installed an ABM system surrounding Moscow.

In 1967, the United States announced that a light ABM system later called "Sentinel" would be deployed in the United States. This programme encountered considerable opposition and was suspended. In March 1969, however, President Nixon

announced that a modified system called "Safeguard" would proceed — subject to Congressional approval and an annual review. The Safeguard system consists of perimeter acquisition radars (PARS) missile site radars (MSR's) and two anti-missile weapons — Spartan and Sprint.

The Spartan missile has a range of several hundred miles. Its effectiveness depends on the detonation of a very large nuclear warhead in the near-vacuum of outer space. It is expected that most decoys accompanying the ICBM enemy warhead would be cleared out of a large volume by the explosion of the Spartan. The explosion of the Sprint missile complements the Spartan by intercepting at low altitudes those missiles not destroyed by Spartan. Sprint has a much shorter range than Spartan — about 25 miles. Since it is designed to be used at low altitude, the Sprint has a very much smaller warhead yield than the Spartan.

The plan for the Safeguard ABM system is in phased steps. The first step is planned to be operational in 1974 and involves sites which are near Great Falls, Montana and Grand Forks, North Dakota. They are intended for the protection of ICBM and bomber bases in those areas. Subsequent options could be (a) to extend the defence of the deterrent forces against ICBM attacks, (b) to provide defence against submarine launched missiles (SLBM's) and (c) to provide light area protection for all of the United States including the population.

The totality of these options, labelled "full deployment" include twelve sites in the continental United States. If full deployment is carried out, the estimated cost is 7.8 billion dollars.

The Strategic Concept of Mutual Deterrence

The greatest military danger to Canada is a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States in which Canada would be involved because of its geographical position and because of its relations with the United States. Due to the inability of the United Nations to guarantee peace through collective security as originally contemplated when the United Nations charter was signed, the avoidance of all-out nuclear war between the superpowers has depended upon mutual deterrence. This principle may be most simply explained as follows: In order for the USSR to be deterred from aggression by the United States, it is necessary that the USSR must believe that, no matter what the USSR does, the United States will retain the means and the will to be able to destroy the cities of the USSR. In other words, the United States must maintain a capability for "assured destruction" of the USSR. Assured destruction has been defined as the ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise attack.

At the present time, it is believed that both the USSR and the U.S. do possess this capability for assured destruction of the other and it is therefore said that there is a stable system of mutual deterrence. Basically, this means that if the USSR, for example, were to launch an all-out nuclear attack or first strike against the U.S., the United States would still have and be able to use sufficient nuclear weapons, whether intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) and Strategic Air Command (SAC)

bombers, to destroy the cities of the USSR and inflict unacceptable damage upon that country.

This system of mutual deterrence would become unstable and dangerous if one side developed such an overwhelming strength in nuclear weapons that by a surprise attack it could destroy the other side's capability of launching a counter-strike which would inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor or if one side developed such effective means of defence, (whether active defences such as ABM and anti-bomber defences or a passive defence such as civil defence) that it could launch a nuclear attack without fear of having unacceptable damage imposed by the other side. The condition becomes even more unstable and dangerous if one side developed such improved offensive and defensive capability while the other side's offensive and defensive capabilities remained the same.

The more advanced techniques of both offense and defence are very complex and it takes several years to develop and put them into operational status. Even though the balance is stable and robust rather than delicate at the moment, it is natural for each superpower to look several years ahead and to ensure that it will not find itself with its "assured destruction" of its opponent gone as a result of substantial changes. It is difficult for each adversary to assess far in advance what the effectiveness of the opponents' moves is going to be — consequently, there is a natural tendency for each side to take steps now to prepare for the worst that his opponent might have ready for him a few years hence. It is easy to see how the arms race can accelerate under these circumstances. It seems probable that both superpowers will seek to react in such a way as to maintain stability so long as each has the economic ability to bear the ever-increasing military expenditures. The unfortunate situation into which they may be drawn is that each spends a great deal of time and money reacting to the other, with the only result being that a new stable balance is struck.

PART II – ARGUMENTS

In Part II of this report, your Committee has considered what it regards as the principal questions relating to North American Air Defence. The report takes up these questions in sequence and sets out the important arguments presented before the Committee on all sides. Where appropriate the Committee has drawn conclusions from the evidence presented, although the Committee has recorded its specific recommendations in Part III.

Does North American Security Require Anti-Bomber Defence?

It is within the strategic context of mutual deterrence that the question of anti-bomber defence must be considered. The original purpose of anti-bomber defence was the protection of North America and the Strategic Air Command airborne retaliatory force. The development, improvement and proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missiles on the part of both superpowers since the 1960's has transformed the strategic role of the bomber. For it is not possible – at least at the present time – to intercept and destroy enough attacking missiles to prevent the large scale destruction of population and industrial capacity. Nor, given the number, protection and dispersal of ICBM's on both sides, is it possible for either superpower to destroy the effective retaliatory power of its opponent through a pre-emptive strike. As a result the balance of deterrence now rests upon the mutual invulnerability of ICBM response. Bomber attack is no longer the primary threat to the safety of either superpower.

Such considerations lead some commentators to argue that bomber attack – and thus bomber defence – have become obsolete. They argue that any bomber attack would trigger a retaliatory response by the defender. Knowing this an attacker would launch its ICBM's immediately should it decide on a nuclear attack – and not wait until its bomber force had made a strike. This would undoubtedly call into play the defender's deterrent. Thus, on this argument, the bombers would arrive after the ICBM exchange had taken place, and it is extremely unlikely that either the bomber defences – or the bombers' targets – would still exist by the time the bombers arrived. The bomber threat is, therefore, redundant, and expenditure on bomber defence is wasted since it counters a non-effective threat.

Supporters of anti-bomber defence argue that bomber attack will only be ineffective if adequate systems of detection and interception are maintained. To dismantle anti-bomber defences – or to fail to develop adequate defences against the new capacity for low level bomber attack coupled with air to ground missiles – would revive the possibility that a bomber attack could arrive sufficiently close to its target to launch an effective air strike against the United States deterrent. Anti-bomber defence must therefore be maintained, otherwise an inexpensive and effective bomber threat would be operative. Moreover, if an effective anti-ballistic missile system were developed, bomber attack would again become the primary threat against North American security.

The maintenance of anti-bomber defence thus ensures that the bomber is no longer credible as a primary first strike weapon. Its effect is to convert bomber attack into a retaliatory, second strike force or a supplement to a first strike.

It is further argued that expenditures beyond the level necessary to transform the bomber threat to a second strike force, will either produce marginal improvement in interception which will not diminish the second strike capacity of the bomber attack or — much more dangerous — improve bomber interception to the point where the credibility of the Soviet second strike force would be brought into question.

Such expenditure would thus either be wasteful or dangerous since—as explained above—the existence of a credible second strike force in the hands of both the United States and the Soviet Union is essential to the balance of mutual deterrence.

In addition to the foregoing arguments, it is stated that the manned bomber continues to be the cheapest means for delivery of nuclear weapons. The bomber is generally more accurate than a missile, can carry a larger payload and is more flexible. The recent increase in Soviet training flights to the borders of North America may suggest a renewed interest in this means of attack, or on the other hand, the purpose of this increase may be only to collect information on North American defences or encourage North America to increase its expenditure on an expensive anti-bomber defence system.

It is further argued that without an anti-bomber defence, North America would have no capacity to exercise a policing function or to detect and intercept hostile aircraft. In the event of a bomber attack retention of anti-bomber defences gives North American defenders more flexibility and avoids the necessity of a split-second or automatic response. Moreover, North American bomber defences serve to “put up the price of admission” by forcing a would-be attacker to either concentrate all his weapons against fewer targets or to produce more sophisticated delivery systems in an attempt to circumvent the defence. For these reasons a defence against bombers will be needed as long as bombers represent either an existing or potential threat to second-strike forces.

The Committee accepts, in principle, the argument that North America must maintain sufficient anti-bomber defence to prevent bombers being used primarily as a first strike weapon but considers that expenditures on anti-bomber defence beyond that level would not be desirable.

Should Canada Contribute to North American Anti-Bomber Defence?

Having recognized the necessity for North American anti-bomber defence, the Committee considered whether or not Canada should participate.

The Committee has been informed that the avoidance of a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States depends basically upon a nuclear stalemate or balance between the USSR and the United States and that if this balance is disturbed on either side the maintenance of peace will be seriously endangered. Evidence presented to the Committee indicated that the United States has at least as much nuclear weapon capability as the USSR. It has therefore been argued that Canada should not throw its weight into the scale on behalf of the United States because this would be destabilizing.

It is further argued that in any war between the USSR and the United States, the primary targets would be in the United States rather than in Canada. Moreover, there may be disadvantages to Canada in intercepting and destroying bombers destined for targets in

the United States particularly now that the USSR has developed bombers carrying air-to-surface missiles. If intercepted over Canadian territory, Soviet bombers might discharge their missiles, which can travel for several hundred miles and destroy Canadian cities rather than their original United States objectives.

It is also argued that the United States must in any event maintain anti-bomber defences and this raises the question of whether Canada with its limited resources, should pay substantial sums for a programme which may involve serious losses to Canada and its citizens, and has as its primary function the protection of the deterrent of another country.

It is suggested that Canadian participation in North American anti-bomber defence involves serious danger to its national independence. The responsibility for defence of any country's territory and air space is an important attribute of that country's independence.

On the other hand it is argued that, while the United States would obviously be the primary target of any potential nuclear attack on the continent, Canada might be subjected to bomber attack in the event of conflict if the United States had a bomber defence and Canada did not have one. This would result from the fact that any attacker of the United States would regard North America as a single target and use the cheapest available means to conduct its attack.

It is also asserted that even without United States co-operation, Canada would still need to be in a position to deny its air space to foreign bombers intended to attack targets in the United States and not in Canada. Moreover, Canada would require a force of interceptors to inspect and identify unknown aircraft entering its air space without permission. Canada therefore should maintain an air defence system in any event. If this system were completely independent and unco-ordinated with that of the United States, it would either have to be much less sophisticated and effective than the present system, or alternatively much more expensive than the present system and probably too expensive for Canada to bear out of its own resources.

The Committee accepts the principle that Canada must maintain an air defence system and should co-operate closely with the United States on a continental basis subject to the conditions set out in the concluding part of this report.

What Should Be The Relationship Between The Canadian and The U.S. Anti-Bomber Defences?

The NORAD agreement describes the relationship between the Canadian and the United States air defences as an integrated command, under a supreme commander who, in practice, is an American officer, with a deputy commander who is a Canadian. The present NORAD regions and divisions are such that, with the exception of Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, most of the populated area of Canada is defended by American interceptors and by American crews under the command of American regional and divisional officers.

It is asserted that the present integrated command arrangements are best calculated to protect Canadian independence in a situation in which Canada is contributing less than

10% of the men, equipment and costs. Other possible arrangements open to Canada within a framework of cooperation would be

- (a) to provide all the forces necessary to defend Canadian territory, which would be excessively expensive to Canada or require a large American financial contribution; or
- (b) not to make a Canadian contribution and to give United States forces the right to operate in Canada as required, which would be a virtual abdication of sovereignty.

Given the relatively small Canadian contribution, exponents of this view argue that Canada has been able to negotiate with the United States a command arrangement which has secured at least a fair share of the command posts for Canadians. They further point out that all active Canadian units, other than the squadron in Comox, operate in NORAD divisions commanded by Canadians; in contrast several United States squadrons both of aircraft and of BOMARC missiles are placed under Canadian operational control. These same persons admit that Canada is not contributing to the active defence (i.e. Canada only contributes radars) of a large portion of Canada from Manitoba to Alberta. However, they argue that it is preferable that the limited Canadian forces should be concentrated in the most heavily populated regions of the country and where the populated areas extend further north of the border. By not dispersing the aircraft throughout the country, Canada is able to achieve the greatest operational control which is feasible given the size of the Canadian contribution. These exponents note that the capacity of the enlarged computers in North Bay will be completely absorbed in monitoring the Northern region which will be extended (effective September 15, 1969) and therefore that a further extension is technically impossible; and that even if the technical problem were overcome by enlarging the computers, a further extension of the region would distort the command arrangements and degrade the effectiveness of the overall system.

Finally, they stress that the divisions commanded by Americans which are responsible for the air defence of Canadian territory have Canadian deputy-commanders and have been chosen because the inhabited regions are sufficiently far south that United States defence forces can carry out their assignment without being based in Canada. In sum the Canadian exponents of this view, while maintaining that the air defence of the continent has to be considered as a single system, insist that the command arrangements have been carefully devised in order to protect Canadian sovereignty and that the terms of the agreement represent a considerable achievement for the negotiators on the Canadian side.

From a military point of view the Committee recognizes that the present arrangements are the most convenient and efficient method of co-operation between two anti-bomber defences.

However, in any partnership or co-operative arrangement between Canada and the United States, the Committee feels that Canada, as a very much smaller partner, must be particularly careful not to prejudice its independence unnecessarily within arrangements which, closely examined, might turn out to be not so much of a co-operative as a "take-over" relationship. Canada must be especially careful to examine very closely any joint arrangements suggested by the United States which involve such highly sophisticated

or costly facilities that their command and control can only be exercised conveniently or efficiently by a country as large and powerful as the United States, and not by a country with limited capacity such as Canada.

The Committee believes that wherever technically and economically feasible, surveillance, detection and interception facilities over Canadian territory should be under Canadian operational command. In other words, the Canadian contribution to continental air defence should, in principle, constitute a Canadian component within a framework of co-operation rather than a dispersed contribution within a basically United States structure of command.

Are Present Cost Sharing Arrangements Fair?

The Committee found it difficult to determine whether consistent principles have been followed in allocating total NORAD costs between Canada and the United States up to the present time. Cost allocation for each facility and programme appears to have been determined on an *ad hoc* basis. Canada's overall share of NORAD operating costs is between 8% to 10% at the present time. The Committee does not have specific information with regard to the percentage of capital costs.

The use of Canadian territory and the interception of bombers over Canada confer an advantage to the United States. The destruction of bombers over Canada however, would pose risks of loss from discharge of missiles upon Canadians. All expenditures for anti-bomber defence over Canadian territory benefit the United States while expenditures made by the United States to protect cities and targets south of the Canadian border do not in all circumstances confer additional protection upon Canadians.

The Committee believes that these considerations are relevant to establishing fair cost sharing arrangements.

The Committee also emphasizes the importance of establishing the principle that a clear distinction must be made between operational responsibilities and cost responsibilities. Because of its geographical position, Canada may have very extensive operational responsibilities which for sound political reasons should be carried out by Canadian forces under Canadian command. It does not follow, however, that in a co-operative arrangement for continental air defence, the entire costs involved in carrying out such responsibilities should be borne by Canada.

Should Canada Participate In The Proposed New System Of Anti-Bomber Defence?

The Committee has been told that the development on the part of the Soviet Union of a capacity for low level bomber flights coupled with air to ground missiles has seriously diminished the capability of the NORAD anti-bomber defence. Low flying bombers can under certain conditions approach to within two hundred miles of ground radar installations before detection—a range which enables them to release airborne missiles on important targets.

To meet this threat it is suggested that an airborne warning and control system be implemented—coupled if technological developments permit, with the use of over-the-horizon radar. The advantages of the airborne system are a great extension of the

effective detection range of the radar and the placing of the detection and control centres on a mobile—and therefore less vulnerable—basis.

This system might well require United States command installations and personnel on or over Canadian territory. Such an airborne system—if it is established—would become operative in the mid 1970's, probably 1974. It would involve large new capital costs. Some witnesses claim that the annual operational costs of the system would be less than at the present time.

Should the United States decide to proceed with this system in the 1970's, and should the Canadian government decide to co-operate, the Committee believes that the operational responsibilities in Canadian territory and over Canadian air space should be under Canadian command.

Should Consultation With The United States Political Authorities Form A Regular Part Of The NORAD Process?

Under an exchange of notes in 1958 a Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence was established. The exchange of notes concluded:

“that the importance and complexity of (the new) interdependent defence relationships made it essential to supplement existing channels for consultation and to provide for a periodic review at the Ministerial level of problems which might be expected to arise.”

However, this Ministerial Committee has only held 4 meetings, the last of which occurred in 1964.

It is argued that the Committee ceased to meet because relations between the foreign and defence ministers of Canada and the United States are already so intimate, and contact so frequent and easy that formal meetings are redundant. Among the occasions on which the Ministers involved meet regularly are the NATO Ministerial meetings, which provide regular semi-annual occasions for both group meetings at which international, political and security problems can be discussed, and informal contacts at which bilateral questions can be taken up. In this view formal machinery for Canada-United States political and security consultations serves no useful purpose.

Advocates of the contrary position base their case on actual experience during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. They note that in spite of the close relations between the responsible ministers of the two countries, the Canadian government was only informed of United States decisions by a diplomatic emissary at the same time as the other NATO countries. The advocates of this view argue that advance notice would have been given had it earlier been made clear to the United States Government that the activation of NORAD in circumstances other than a direct attack on North America would normally require prior consultation through the Joint Defence Committee. They also suggest that NORAD as presently constituted compares unfavourably with NATO in that it has no political forum for the joint consideration of international, political and security problems. The Ministerial Committee would be a suitable forum for the discussion of important questions of mutual concern such as the ABM System.

Should Canada Participate in the Proposed ABM System?

It is argued that the ABM system is a defensive system, that Russia has installed a similar system around Moscow and that such a system is essential to protect the American deterrent and the security of North America.

It is further argued that from a strategic point of view anti-bomber and anti-missile defence are part of a single problem and therefore the ABM System should be under NORAD. To determine whether North America is being threatened and should alter its state of alert, many types of information are wanted and should be assessed as a whole rather than piecemeal.

Strategic decisions and operations are most effectively handled as a single aerospace activity. If Safeguard or some other ABM system is deployed in North America, arrangements will have to be made for its operational control. Also, the information necessary to assess the overall strategic situation and make the major strategic decisions regarding aerospace defence must be provided. The necessary type of information is very much the same as that already collected by NORAD today; although five years hence there would probably be additional sources from new systems of missile detection and space surveillance. For this reason it might be argued that it would be desirable for any new ABM system to be under NORAD command. On the other hand, it is argued, that the detailed command and control of an ABM system are likely to be different in character from those for air defence units. ICBM's will approach speeds above 250 miles a minute as compared with aircraft unlikely to be moving faster than 10 miles a minute.

It is also argued that the cost of an ABM system may be greater than anticipated and its effectiveness somewhat doubtful in view of possible improvements in ICBM's. Although it is technically possible for a defensive missile to intercept and destroy an ICBM, it does not necessarily follow that the ABM system is an effective and advisable system to construct. With the use of penetration aids, (such as decoys, multiple warheads or jamming) or indirect trajectories (depressed, extended range, fractional or multiple or orbital) the offense may be able to overcome the defence. Although it may be technically possible for the defence to defeat the measures mentioned above, the cost of such counter-measures may be much greater than that required for offensive measures.

In addition, it is argued that the development of a "thin" ABM system is unlikely to serve its purpose while the development of a "thick" or effective ABM system might affect the present system of mutual deterrence and might set off a new arms race.

PART III – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Your Committee has reached the following conclusions and recommendations. These are based on the facts reported in Part I and on an examination of the conflicting arguments which are set out and assessed in the relevant sections of Part II above.

(1) The nature of the bomber threat has changed greatly, and its relative importance has diminished in recent years owing largely to the development of ballistic missiles and the increase in their number.

However, since the major powers continue to maintain long-range bomber capability, the continuation of a system of air defence involving surveillance, detection and interception is an important component of North American security.

(2) The Committee notes that under existing NORAD arrangements, the air defence of Canada's most populated area is carried out by United States aircraft, manned by United States crews under United States commanders and directed from regional and divisional combat and directional centres located in the United States.

The Committee also notes that under existing arrangements Canada has only limited capability to carry out, with its own forces, routine policing (as distinct from defence against enemy attack) and surveillance of its air space.

The Committee recommends that Canada should remain in NORAD and does not recommend fundamental changes in the existing arrangements due to the great expense which would be involved at this time (for regional and divisional combat and directional centres and additional interceptor squadrons) in making such changes and particularly in view of the decline in the relative importance of the threat from enemy bombers.

However, in the re-organization of NORAD regions and divisions which will become effective September 15, 1969, the Committee recommends that the principle be accepted that there should be Canadian commanders in those areas where essentially all the territory is Canadian. The possibility of extending, at reasonable cost, the Northern Region (which is under Canadian command) to include the heavily populated and industrialized area of Southern Ontario should also be considered carefully.

The Committee also recommends that any future co-operative arrangements with the United States should take into account military convenience and efficiency and also Canada's status as an independent nation and the principle that, to the largest extent feasible and consistent with Canada's security, the defence (including routine policing and surveillance) of Canada's territory and air space should be performed by Canadian forces under Canadian command.

(3) The Committee has learned that at present a system for controlling Canadian civilian air traffic by the use of computers exists only over the Eastern approaches of the country. It is expected that there will be a rapidly growing requirement for such a system.

Consideration should be given to the feasibility of a common computer system for both military and civilian air control activities to minimize the costs of its introduction.

(4) Since their function is defensive, the Committee does not object to the use of nuclear weapons by Canadian interceptors or Bomarc squadrons; or to the "two-key" system of control.

(5) The Committee is concerned about the vulnerability to enemy missile attacks of the two Bomarc squadrons, the likelihood of their attracting enemy fire and the possibility that bombers intercepted by them might discharge their missiles, including their air-to-surface missiles, on Canadian cities or populated areas.

On the other hand, the Bomarc squadrons do give some additional depth to Canada's air defence and the relative cost of continuing them is not great. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the Bomarc squadrons should not be discontinued at the present time.

The Committee notes that the Bomarc squadrons will probably become obsolete if a decision is made to establish the proposed new system of air defence referred to in recommendation (6).

(6) The Committee believes that the new air defence system now being considered by the United States which involves the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Over-the-Horizon Radar and improved interceptor aircraft would overcome some of the weaknesses of the present air defence system.

However, bearing in mind the fact that this new system is still under investigation in the United States, the uncertainty with regard to costs and the possibility of increased costs and the decline in the relative importance of the bomber threat, the Committee believes it is not desirable to make a decision at this time regarding Canada's participation in the new system. If eventually a decision is made to participate, this should be done only upon the basis of the principles outlined in recommendation (2) above.

(7) The Committee recommends that the Government should undertake promptly a review of NORAD costs, bearing in mind the principles referred to in Part II above.

(8) The detection of ICBM's does not at the present time involve important installations on Canadian territory or military operations over Canadian territory. The Committee does not recommend any changes at this time.

(9) The Committee has received conflicting evidence on the desirability of establishing an ABM System for the protection of the United States nuclear deterrent or United States cities against nuclear attacks. In view of the uncertainty of Congressional approval for the ABM System and the uncertainty of the extent to which Canada might be asked to participate, if at all, the Committee is unable to make any recommendations concerning Canadian involvement in such a System.

However, the Committee notes that the evidence presented to it indicates that these installations, as now planned, will not increase the danger to Canada.

(10) The Committee notes that the Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence has not met since 1964. The Committee believes that the present practice for political


consultation within NORAD has proved to be inadequate in the one serious test to which it was put. The Committee urges that the Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence should be re-activated.

A copy of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence relating to this aspect of the Order of Reference dated January 16, 1969 (*Issues Nos. 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman

REVISED NORAD CONFIGURATION 15 SEP 69



MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Thursday, June 19, 1969.

(83)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 9:45 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Legault, Marceau, Penner, Ryan, Roberts, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn-(12).

The Committee agreed to print the following papers as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Comments on the Committee's working papers received from Professor Albert Legault, Queen's University; Professor P.J. Arnopoulos, Sir George Williams University; Professor K.H.W. Hilborn, The University of Western Ontario; Professor D.M. Thomas, the University of Calgary; Professor C. F. Schuetz, St. Patrick's College, Carleton University. (*See Appendix HHH*)

Supplementary replies to questions asked by the Committee, presented by Lieutenant General F. R. Sharp and Dr. George R. Lindsey. (*See Appendix III*)

Members continued their consideration of a draft report to the House, on the subject of North American defence.

With the discussion continuing, at 12:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(84)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Harkness, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Roberts, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch-(15).

Witnesses: From the Conference of Defence Associations: Brigadier General W. A. Howard, Chairman; Brigadier General J. P. Charbonneau, Vice-Chairman; Commodore J. W. F. Goodchild, Past Chairman; Colonel B. A. Howard, Honorary Assistant Secretary.

The Vice-Chairman made an opening statement, introducing the representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations.

Brigadier General Howard explained the aims of the Conference of Defence Associations and read a brief submitted by his organization. He made a further statement on the subject of Reserve Forces.

General Howard, General Charbonneau, Commodore Goodchild and Colonel Howard answered questions for the remainder of this afternoon's sitting.

The Vice-Chairman thanked the witnesses for their testimony.

On completion of the questioning, at 5:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Friday, June 20, 1969, at 9:30 a.m.

Friday, June 20, 1969.
(85)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 9.35 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Marquette*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(22).

Members resumed consideration of a draft report to the House dealing with North American defence.

At 11.10 a.m., with the discussion continuing, the Committee adjourned until 2.30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING (86)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 2.45 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn—(16).

Members continued their consideration of a draft report to the House. Their discussion of the draft report was completed at approximately 4.45 p.m.

Mr. Allmand moved,

That there be a recorded vote on the report as a whole, to indicate the extent to which it was accepted in principle by the Members.

The question being put on the motion, it was negatived on the following division: Yeas 1; Nays 15.

It was agreed, *on division*, that the Chairman present the draft report, as amended, as the Ninth Report to the House.

The Committee then discussed a future program of work.

At 5.00 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Thursday, June 26, 1969 at 11.00 a.m.

Thursday, June 26, 1969.
(87)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met, *in camera*, at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Forrestall, Gibson, Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, Prud'homme, Ryan, Roberts, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (19).

Members noted that the Ninth Report to the House will be presented at 2:00 p.m. this day.

On motion of Mr. Brewin,

Agreed,—That the Chairman be authorized to issue a Press Release, concerning the Ninth Report to the House.

On motion of Mr. Brewin,

Agreed,—That the Clerk be authorized to purchase 20 copies of a pamphlet entitled *Soviet Naval Power*, from the Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, for the use of the main Committee and the Subcommittee on Maritime Forces.

On motion of Mr. Gibson,

Agreed,—That the verbal progress report made by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Maritime Forces at this meeting, be adopted.

Following a report by the Chairman, from the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, concerning the motion made by Mr. Gibson on Thursday, June 5, 1969, Mr. Gibson requested and the Committee agreed that the motion be withdrawn.

The Committee agreed to the general work program suggested for the main Committee during the fall months, as outlined by the Chairman.

On motion of Mr. Roberts,

Resolved,—That a *Subcommittee on Foreign Aid* and a *Subcommittee on the United Nations* (as a peace maintaining and peacekeeping organization) be appointed, to consist of 9 members each and who will be chosen by the Chairman after consultation with the Party Whips.

On motion of Mr. Cafik,

Agreed,—That the Subcommittee on Maritime Forces, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid and Subcommittee on the United Nations each have the power to make small purchases of publications for their own use, during the course of their deliberations.

On motion of Mr. Roberts,

Agreed,—That the Committee print the evidence taken by members of this Committee while in Europe, during the period March 8 to 22, 1969, as a separate Issue of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, at the appropriate time.

On motion of Mr. Cafik,

Agreed,—That the Committee print the comprehensive subject index to be prepared by Mr. Dobell's office, covering Issues Nos. 36 to 50 inclusive, as an appendix to Issue No. 50 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

The Committee agreed that the following documents be filed as *Exhibits* in its records:

1. Brief from the Voice of Women, entitled *Some Aspects of Canada's Foreign and Defence Policies*, presented to Honourable Mitchell Sharp on February 19, 1969. (*Exhibit No. 4*)
2. Brief from the Voice of Women, concerning the "Safeguard" ABM System, dated May 23, 1969. (*Exhibit No. 5*)
3. Brief from The Congress of Canadian Women entitled *Canada's Withdrawal From NATO*, dated March 17, 1969. (*Exhibit No. 6*)
4. Brief from The Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada, entitled *Canada and The China Problem*, (*Exhibit No. 7*)
5. Brief from Canadian Aid For Vietnam Civilians, concerning the subject of aid to Vietnamese civilians, dated November 13, 1968. (*Exhibit No. 8*)
6. Brief from Canadian Friends Service Committee, entitled *Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, dated January 24, 1969. (*Exhibit No. 9*)
7. Brief from the Polish Political Ex-Prisoners Association, Inc., entitled *Canadian-Polish Survivors of Nazi Camps*, dated December 31, 1968. (*Exhibit No. 10*)
8. Letter to the Chairman from Mr. Richard Gaunt, concerning the "1.2 Billion Maritime Strategy". (*Exhibit No. 11*)
9. Brief from the Assembly Of Captive European National, entitled *The International Situation and East-Central Europe*, dated March 19, 1969. (*Exhibit No. 12*)
10. Brief from the Ottawa Committee to End the War in Vietnam, dated February, 1969 (*Exhibit No. 13*)
11. Appeal from the National Women's Committee of the Association of United Ukranian Canadians, to the Prime Minister, February 1969. (*Exhibit No. 14*)
12. Letter from Mr. D. Orchard, Borden, Saskatchewan, dated March 20, 1969, with a covering letter from Mr. A. P. Gleave, M. P., concerning the proposed missile defence system. (*Exhibit No. 15*)
13. Letter dated February 14, 1969, and enclosed correspondence from Mr. Healey Ballans, Chairman, Friends of Rhodesia Association. (*Exhibit No. 16*)
14. Letter dated February 19, 1969 and enclosed correspondence relating to South East Asia, from Professor G. G. van Beers, University of Guelph. (*Exhibit No. 17*)
15. Letter dated April 22, 1969 from Lawrence S. Cumming, Kampala, Uganda, concerning the foreign policy review. (*Exhibit No. 18*)

16. Brief from Professor N. A. Nyiri, Waterloo Lutheran University, concerning defence policy. (*Exhibit No. 19*)
17. Brief from The National Council of the Navy League of Canada, dated April 3, 1969, concerning defence policy. (*Exhibit No. 20*)
18. Appeal from The Freedom Committee Of West Papua/West New Guinea, to the Prime Minister, dated June 2, 1969. (*Exhibit No. 21*)
19. Brief from The Communist Party of Canada, dated June 3, 1969, concerning Canada, NATO and NORAD. (*Exhibit No. 22*)
20. Memorandum on Foreign Policy, submitted by Mr. G. E. Mueller, Principal Supply Officer of the Department of Supply and Services, Koblenz, Germany, dated January 6, 1969. (*Exhibit No. 23*)

It was agreed that Mr. Dobell's office should summarize the material contained in the above-mentioned documents, for the information of Members.

It was also agreed that the Clerk should list the books and pamphlets dealing with questions of North American defence, which the Committee had obtained, and send the information in a memorandum to the Members.

Following a further discussion concerning future activities of the main Committee, the Chairman thanked Members for their past co-operation.

The Committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, June 19, 1969.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, I would like to call the meeting to order. Today the Committee will be hearing evidence of representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations on the general theme of Canadian defence policy.

I would like to say how grateful the Committee is to have this opportunity to hear and to question representatives of the Conference.

The Conference of Defence Associations is representative of a group of citizens who are important in the community, and who are closely concerned with development and effects of Canadian defence policy. It is unfortunate that because of our extremely heavy schedule the Committee was unable to arrange for them to testify earlier. I would like to mention that on March 18 Brigadier General Howard, the Chairman of the Conference, submitted a very professional brief to the Committee and that the Clerk has circulated copies to members. The Clerk has extra copies with him here should any member wish to have one.

● 1540

Representing the Conference before this Committee today are: on my immediate right, Brigadier General W. A. Howard; on his right Brigadier General J. P. Charbonneau, Vice Chairman; Commodore J. W. F. Goodchild, Past Chairman; and Colonel B. A. Howard, Honorary Assistant Secretary—in that order.

General Howard, would you like to make an opening statement before members put their questions to you?

Mr. Winch: If I may, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Before we hear the presentation may I raise a matter that has been raised upon more than one occasion. Would the witness be kind enough to introduce and explain what the Conference of Defence Associations is, its makeup, what it represents and how it works? I consider it most important, sir, that we have that first.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes; the Brigadier has that in mind, I hope. Brigadier General Howard?

Brig. Gen. W. A. Howard CD, QC (Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, we appear before you today representing the Conference of Defence Associations of Canada. The Conference of Defence Associations, which has been functioning since 1932, has a membership consisting primarily of 15 corps associations in Canada. Such member associations are formed of the various reserve units, sea, land and air. Accordingly, the Conference directly represents some 30,000 reserve force personnel, approximately 50,000 cadets, and a considerable body of informed military opinion. It reflects the views of persons from all walks of life and from coast to coast.

The objects of the Conference are to consider the problems of national defence, to assist the government of Canada in placing these problems before the people of Canada, to co-ordinate the activities of the environmental associations in matters of interest common to all environments, to make such recommendations to the government of Canada as may appear expedient, and generally to promote the welfare of the defence forces of Canada as a whole.

Here today we have, as the Chairman has said, Brigadier General Pierre Charbonneau. General Charbonneau is Vice Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations, and is currently in the Reserve Force, being Senior Militia Adviser, Quebec Region, to the Deputy Chief, Operations and Reserves. General Charbonneau is an insurance executive in Montreal.

Commodore Goodchild is immediate Past Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations. As a member of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve he was former Senior Naval Officer, Toronto Area. Commodore Goodchild is the naval representative on the executive of the Conference of Defence Associations, and is a practising lawyer in the City of Toronto.

Colonel B. A. Howard was, until January of this year, Commander of the Air Reserve Wing in Toronto. He is the air representative on the executive of the Conference, and is an industrialist in the City of Toronto.

My name is, also Howard, and I hold the reserve rank of Brigadier General. I am Senior Militia Adviser to the Deputy Chief, Operations and Reserves, for Western Canada, the four western provinces. I am the current Chairman of the Conference, and I am also a practising lawyer in the City of Calgary.

Mr. Winch: Before you proceed, may I ask whether you are officially connected with the Militia, or, as Reserve officers, what is your status with the Defence Department? I presume you understand why I ask the question.

Brig. Gen. Howard: General Charbonneau and I are in the Reserve. We are actively engaged in the Reserve, in each case as an adviser to the Deputy Chief. We are not appearing here in our capacity as members of the Conference of Defence Associations. We are appearing as interested citizens and as members of the Conference.

Mr. Winch: Thank you. As Reserve officers . . .

Brig. Gen. Howard: But we are also Reserve officers.

Mr. Winch: And are retired officers, in substance?

Brig. Gen. Howard: No. General Charbonneau and I are currently in the Reserve. Commodore Goodchild is a recently retired officer. Colonel Howard has been on the Supplementary Reserve since January of this year.

Mr. Winch: Thank you.

Brig. Gen. Howard: Have I answered your query?

The Vice-Chairman: That is fine. Thank you.

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Brig. Gen. Howard: Since March 10, the date of the brief, which we understand has been circulated to the members, there have been certain developments which will require amplification or collateral comments during the presentation. We of the Conference are grateful to the Committee, Mr. Chairman, for giving us the privilege of being present here today.

Turning to the brief, the Conference of Defence Associations represents the views of a large body of responsible men who have made, and continue to make, a contribution to the defence and security of our country. The Conference of Defence Associations, through its members, has followed with a great deal of interest the representations made to your Committee and the comments which have appeared in print as a result of your review of defence and foreign policy.

The basic threat or dilemma which faces Canada today in the area of defence matters is the question of arriving at an estimate of the threat. The first problem is, is there a threat, and, second, if there is a threat,

what is the nature of it and what can we as Canadians do about it?

The Dilemma: We believe there is still a threat to world peace in 1969, and that this threat is two-fold—first, the Communist threat, and, second, the problems of world unrest.

After twenty years of NATO, Europe is wide open to Soviet attack. The alliance is outnumbered on the central front by two to one in infantry and aircraft, and three to one in armour. The argument, therefore, follows that NATO's conventional defence would crumble in a few days, after which the West would have to use nuclear weapons or surrender.

From this argument flows the confusion within NATO about when, and in what circumstances, tactical nuclear weapons would be used—to say nothing of strategic weapons. Viet Nam proves that the Americans are unwilling to be dragged willy-nilly into a nuclear holocaust, and Europe does not wish to be first ravished conventionally and then annihilated unconventionally. In the past this argument was rejected as being alarmist, while the escapists seek false comfort in unrest among the satellites and dissensions in the Kremlin.

NATO's policy is to keep enough conventional strength to secure its frontiers, and to urge its members to co-operate in the hope that this effort will avert the threat of American and Canadian troop withdrawals.

Collective control over decisions to use nuclear weapons has eluded agreement for years and is likely to do so until NATO relies more on self-defence and less on America's nuclear umbrella.

The basis of safety is to be found only in the creation of forces roughly of the same strength as those at the disposal of the Russians.

Accepted Foreign Policy and Defence Doctrine: Canada's national aims and aspirations have been stated to be:

- (a) Maintenance and preservation of world peace.
- (b) The improvement and development of the standard of living of her people.
- (c) The preservation of law and order in society.

As a developed nation, one which is ranked as having one of the highest standards of living in the world, and as one which has contributed much of her resources and man power in two world wars in the maintenance of the democratic way of life, we cannot opt out of being interested world citizens. Not only would this be contrary to Canada's national character and destiny, but it is not possible by virtue of our geographic position, cultural heritage and highly developed economy. In the face of the threat of communism and the unrest in other areas of the world Canada has done what any prudent person would do—she has associated

herself with like-minded people in the pursuit of her national aims—thus providing Canada with an opportunity to pool her resources and energies in the attainment of a common goal.

The foreign policy of any country is concerned with its relations with other countries and defence policy is one aspect of foreign policy. Historically, in peacetime, Canada's foreign policy has been one of "non-involvement," and a Canadian delegate to the League of Nations once summed it up by saying that Canada was like "a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials".

After World War II, however, there was a shift in policy towards measures in support of collective security.

In June 1950, Canada provided substantial forces to the United Nations command in Korea. She has furnished men and equipment for peace-keeping duties under United Nations command. She has taken part in disarmament conferences, and support for the United Nations has been a cornerstone of Canadian foreign and defence policy.

Nato and Mutual Aid: Canada's first contribution to NATO, after it was formed in 1949, was in the form

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of a mutual aid programme. By 1967 Canada had contributed equipment and services to her allies to the value of some \$1,896.5 million. As Canada's allies have become more prosperous, the size of this contribution has been gradually reduced.

Membership in NATO has to a large degree dictated the size and composition of Canada's Armed Forces. The anti-submarine warfare ships and aircraft of Maritime Command, the Brigade and Air Division in Europe, and Mobile Command at home all carry out missions required to meet NATO commitments that Canada has assumed.

One overlooked area in which NATO has been effective is pointed out by Leonard Beaton in a recent article in *The Times* where he says, "In forging a weapon for securing Western Europe in the cold war, the western allies have produced what is undoubtedly the most significant disarmament organization in the world. . . No government west of the Oder Neisse line feels really insecure. And when governments do not feel insecure they are very reluctant to spend huge sums of money on armaments. They, in effect, disarm themselves from the levels of forces they would otherwise maintain." Canada is not the only victim of the disease of freedom from insecurity.

The economics of defence are more often misconstrued as the strategic enemy rather than the armed threat of our potential enemies. For Canada to evade the realism of the price of security runs contrary to national character and experience.

In our opinion, unless the threat of war in Western Europe is kept at a low level, it could well escalate to nuclear war. The fact that it hasn't for the past twenty years is because NATO, its will, its forces in being, and its integrated command structure have provided the instrument for curbing Soviet aspirations. Until a peaceful settlement is reached in Europe, until a climate of confidence and trust has been achieved, NATO and NATO forces in being will be required. Canada must continue in the alliance and must continue to provide visible evidence of its intentions by providing forces in Europe as part of NATO's integrated force structure.

Canada in North America: The policy of co-operation with the United States in the defence of North America had its inception in the Ogdensburg Agreement. Its economic corollary was the Hyde Park Declaration of 1941. The former policy culminated in the formation of NORAD in 1957 and the latter in the defence development and production sharing arrangement entered into by Canada and the United States in 1959. By the end of 1967, Canada had *bought* from the United States \$1,608 million worth of goods and had *sold* to the United States \$1,798.9 million worth.

Tasks of the Armed Forces: The regular forces must have the basic responsibility of the defence of Canada quite apart from their role in collective security arrangements or their support of United Nations peace-keeping missions.

The reserve forces must also be maintained to provide a body of trained men who are available to assist the civil authorities in local emergencies and disturbances.

If, as the Prime Minister fears, riots and disorders should spread across the border into Canada, then local reserve units must be called out to help control and suppress civil disturbances. Not only can they be quickly on the scene, but they will be local men familiar with the area and its problems.

The Defence White Paper 1964: Although the emphasis may have changed, the policy stated in the White Paper is as valid today as it was in 1964 in outlining four methods by which the objectives of Canadian defence policy have been pursued. They are:

- (a) Collective measures for maintenance of peace and security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, including the search for balanced and controlled disarmament;
- (b) Collective defence as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (c) Partnership with the United States in the defence of North America;
- (d) National measures to discharge responsibility for the security and protection of Canada.

The Conference of Defence Associations wholeheartedly supports these policy objectives.

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Reserves: The size, provision, equipping and location of Canada's regular forces must be consistent with the defence and foreign policy decision of the government. Whatever the size of these forces, the Conference of Defence Associations is firmly of the opinion that Canadian regular forces must be backed up by a strong, well-equipped and well-led reserve. This reserve should reflect the three environments—land, sea and air. The reserves must be trained and capable of providing replacement for the Regular Forces and of undertaking local defence and internal security tasks at short notice. The reserves also provide and area of involvement for the young men and women of our country. The strength of the reserves has developed to a considerable extent through the policy of encouraging and supporting a system of senior reserve commanders responsible to senior regular commanders.

In view of the financial constraints that are being imposed on the Department of National Defence, the importance of the reserves as an integral part of our defence posture deserves serious consideration, and upon that we intend to elaborate at the conclusion of this formal brief.

Land Forces: From our support of NATO as described in the White Paper, we have considered Canada's land contribution. To be of any real significance, the size of our NATO force should not be less than a brigade group, while any larger contribution would be out of proportion to the strength of Canada's land forces. This Canadian NATO brigade should be equipped and trained to the highest possible level with up-to-date equipment.

The brigade's organization should be similar to, and certainly not incompatible with, other forces with which it is deployed. As an elite Canadian Brigade, it must be maintained at full operational strength and every organizational effort should be made to provide economical logistical support in concert with our allies.

The deployment of the Brigade is a matter for the NATO Council and the Supreme Commander, but wherever deployed it should be used to its maximum effectiveness and as evidence of real solidarity with our allies.

The present strength of the regular forces is about 98,000 of which approximately 38,000 are army. Considering the present acceptable commitments, this is undoubtedly a minimum manpower ceiling. The Conference of Defence Associations accepts the present theory of forces in being in order to react quickly and effectively.

Canada has commitments for collective roles with the UN, NATO and NORAD. Canada has also its national tasks for defence of its sovereignty. It must

maintain at home sufficient mobile forces to reinforce its overseas commitments and it must have the capacity to deal with direct military incidents on national territory.

Above all, Canada must have the capacity to expand its Forces with reserves in case of emergency. The regular forces must, therefore, have the direct task of training the reserves, maintaining communications, aiding the civil power and assisting in civil defence. It would, therefore, be difficult to lower the present manpower ceilings.

Indeed, if Canada were called upon to fulfil several of its roles simultaneously, it would be hard put to mount the effort required from its regular forces.

Equipment: The White paper sets out that the budgetary objective for provision of hardware should be 25 per cent of the defence budget. For various reasons the present provision in the budget has been reduced to about 12 per cent. This is not consistent with the maintenance and development of the effectiveness of our Forces.

Economics must be found in the defence effort, but if that fails the budget must be increased.

Militia: Subsequent to the Suttie Commission, the army reserve establishment was reduced from 50,000 to 35,000. Subsequently, the White Paper at page 24 set out the role of the reserves. The Conference of Defence Associations knows that the reserves provide real value for the defence dollar, and much can be done to increase the effectiveness of the reserves.

The general configuration of the reserves should roughly follow that of the regular forces. The primary role of the militia is to support the regular army, but the actual constitution of individual reserve units needs not be identical with the regular army since they will be deployed as individual and sub-unit reinforcements to the regular forces.

The Conference of Defence Associations supports the policy of training the reserves with the regular army and with modern equipment, and urges the further implementation of this policy.

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Naval Forces: There is no substitute for conventional naval forces, that is, ships, in upholding considerations of sovereignty in territorial waters and, in general, deterring the mounting Soviet maritime threat. Ships are the only equipment which have the capability of maintaining their presence through all weathers.

No Instant Navies: The Conference of Defence Associations contends that a modern navy uses highly technical and complex equipment which cannot be created overnight, and even the "moth-balling" of

ships does not provide a sufficiently ready response. This is in sharp contrast to such land oriented military organizations as Switzerland and Israel, which mobilize citizen armies into immediately effective formations, because their primary weapons are literally in their homes. Thus, any effective sea effort should be constituted on the classic concept of a "fleet-in-being". Certainly the complexities of operating ships is reflected in the fact that many countries with conscription require longer terms for naval than for army service.

Regarding the sea threat, some critics argue that efforts directed toward anti-submarine warfare have no logical place in defence, as the principal protagonists are engaged in a nuclear standoff. This is refuted by the fact that the U.S. and others continue to make great efforts, both in men and money, to increase conventional ASW forces in the face of the substantial submarine threat of the USSR. Canadians have demonstrated their capabilities in this field, and our expertise is well recognized and valuable. Our effort may not be large, but the fact remains that everything we do in this field helps to share the burden of continental defence which we bear with the U. S. A.

Because of the "fleet-in-being" concept, the constitution of the U. S. A. provides that Congress has a responsibility to maintain a navy, but raise an army. The army cannot be budgeted for more than two years, but no such limitation applies to the navy. This recognizes the impossibility of generating an instant navy. Certainly Canada's experience in two World Wars proves this, and it was fortunate that our coastal areas were not subject to hostile action in the early stages of those wars. Because the sea threat is now greater, our sea needs have increased; the Cuban crisis demonstrated the importance of sea power in respect to North American defence.

Thus the maintenance of an ASW force with an effective air component is the quintessential maritime defence. The loss in manpower of the navy may place its efficiency in question. The Conference of Defence Associations is also concerned that we have almost abandoned measures for local defence, and have practically no mine counter-measures capability nor sufficient ships capable of performing surveillance and patrol in the extensive coastal waters of Canada. It cannot enhance Canadian sovereignty to have mine-sweepers coming to Halifax from the U. S. A. for exercise purposes, particularly when in an emergency support is unlikely to be available.

With respect to the Maritime defence task, Canada has the longest coast line of any nation in the world and faces on three oceans with the Arctic being an area of great strategic, as well as economic, importance. Like the Arctic, our coastal waters must be deemed to include the continental shelves, and the

areas over which we claim jurisdiction in respect to fishing rights. Canada's sea front is a vast area.

The Conference of Defence Associations urges that a program should be embarked on to give our maritime force the capability to cope with the functions of local defence by building a suitable type of unsophisticated vessel.

Sea transport is important and the question of providing sea-lift for the ground forces cannot be ignored. This task is primarily the responsibility of a merchant marine, as is the case with the U. S. A. and Great Britain. Although Canada now has very few deep-sea ships registered under our flag, the need for sea transport still exists. This is particularly obvious if much heavy equipment is to be transported, and in this regard the Americans have found that 98 per cent of what is sent to Vietnam has been carried by ships. Thus while a merchant shipbuilding programme would not necessarily be chargeable as a defence expenditure, it is certainly one aspect of maintaining mobility for the forces. On several UN peacekeeping missions, recourse has had to be made to the use of highly

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specialized aircraft carrier which, of course, effectively eliminates the purpose for which that vessel is maintained.

We understand that since the date of this brief the matter of the merchant service is now under study, and we hope that the national defence aspect will not be ignored.

Concerning naval reserves, normally ships do not carry a full war complement and a pool of reserves is available to fill the vacancies in complements. Furthermore, the control staff and other shore installations make demands on manpower in an emergency. The manning of a proportion of small vessels required for patrol, or local defence is a task which might well be entrusted to a certain degree to the reserves, especially in coastal communities. This policy has been followed with other maritime nations which results in a ship availability approaching that achieved for army reserve organizations such as Switzerland. In view of the high cost of maintaining Canadians in uniform, this alleviation of cost while maintaining effectiveness is recommended.

Against the declining strength of the maritime forces with the attendant reduction in maritime capability, the Conference of Defence Associations supports the concept of a Canadian maritime force with a strong reserve component.

The RCAF emerged from World War II with a distinguished reputation of having followed the singular achievements of Bishop, Collishaw, Barker and Brown in World War I. Canada's contribution to

air warfare progressed from solely individual achievement to self-sustaining air forces for strategic bombing, air defence, air transport and tactical air support. In fact, the RCAF acquired the sophistication to join in NORAD and NATO.

Our Air Forces are committed to the support of international agreements like NATO and NORAD, based on the concept of collective security. Our NORAD membership also protects our sovereignty in helping us to challenge intrusion of our airspace, and to augment the means for surveillance of our coastline and national boundaries.

Canada does not require a configuration which would permit us to "go it alone" in a war, and the Conference of Defence Associations supports the concept of collective security with a posture complementing the structure of the combined air forces of our alliances. The air instrument contributes to the means of preserving our sovereignty within these alliances.

With regard to Canada's aviation industry, the RCAF pursued a policy of aircraft designed and built in Canada, based on the lesson of World War II when the lack of an aviation industry in Canada sometimes denied Canadian airmen the best quantity and quality of equipment required for its roles. These industrial adventures became economically burdensome and politically unpalatable, and contributed to the lack of sympathy for air forces which are costly both in terms of capital equipment and technical support.

It is logical that we standardize our aeronautical weaponry with the United States on the grounds of economic supply.

An objection to such a policy could be anticipated from the Canadian aviation industry who might assume that it would be put out of business. The cost of U. S. military aircraft would be much less through volume production than the cost of a comparable Canadian aircraft. An arrangement like the auto pact would allow the Canadian aviation industry a share of military aircraft production resulting in economies for both the U. S. and Canada.

Our inventory of military aircraft is approaching the twilight of its usefulness, and planning is required to meet attrition. It would be folly to embark on an independent program for replacement without considering the requirements defined by SACEUR, Commander-in-Chief NORAD, and SACLANT. Whatever these might be, Canada should attempt to obtain roles which would permit the use of a "multi-purpose aircraft" which is not, to say, an all-purpose aircraft.

The Air Reserve has proven its ability to man sophisticated equipment ranging from high performance fighters to tactical utility transport. When there was a naval air Reserve, it also showed its capability of operating carrier borne ASW aircraft. The

adeptness of the Air Reserve was further demonstrated in the build-up to an operational status within Air Defence Command. The operation of these radars, and the control of air defence missions by personnel of these units showed the technical adaptability and capability of the citizen partner in the RCAF.

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Under the adopted NATO concept of "flexible or (conventional) response" and the success of the nuclear deterrent, the value of effective reserves becomes credible. The Conference of Defence Associations believes that "One thing seems almost certain. If nuclear general war becomes less likely, lesser forms of warfare become more." This was a quote from General Sir John Hackett. We urge the maintenance of a reserve response to the Regular Force for conventional warfare.

NATO AND NORAD

To preserve the solidarity of NATO's air warfare capability, it is essential that Canada's Air Division remain in Europe and that it have a nuclear capability in both support and strike roles.

Our air component in Europe represents a significant part of the NATO deterrent. Although numerically the Canadian Air Division may not be a formidable force, the high quality of the Air Division has consistently been demonstrated. An example of this is the fact that it has won the annual air weaponry competition among all the NATO air forces for many years. The achievements of the Air Division has established it as the "elite" both to the potential enemy and to our allies.

Any reduction in this force would be cause for grave concern to our allies in creating a gap in the NATO air capability far in excess of the apparent numerical loss.

CANADIANS AND THEIR COUNTRY

Canadians can no more live by giving to foreign aid, and by doing without a defence force, than can good people live by giving to the Red Feather, and by doing without a police force.

Because of our diffuse and sparse population, Canada must build up her Reserves as have the governments of Sweden, Israel and Switzerland. Indeed it is in the Canadian tradition to abhor compulsion and to adhere to the type of voluntary participation which constitutes our Reserves.

In summary, the Conference of Defence Associations believes that:

- (a) Canadians want world peace and are prepared to pay for their role in the maintenance of it. For the foreseeable future there will continue to be threats to world peace.

- (b) Our support of collective security arrangements with NATO and the UN contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability and we must continue to support and participate in them.
- (c) Canada does not want a "free ride" and should continue to provide forces to the active defence of North America and NATO.
- (d) Collective defence and security arrangements make eminently good sense and are the most economical way for Canada to pursue her national aims.
- (e) An alert, well-equipped and well-led reserve force based on regular support and participation is a necessary and logical adjunct to our regular forces in being and, in addition, provides young Canadians with that degree of identification in the affairs of our country which is so earnestly desired by our leaders.
- (f) Finally, Canada cannot opt out of participation in world affairs. By geography, heritage and economics, she is involved and she should continue to be involved because involvement is in Canada's vital interest.

As I mentioned earlier, we would like to make a comment in connection with the matter of the reserves and the financial constraints, referring in particular to the Reserve Force. If the financial constraints result in a reduction in the armed forces, the Conference of Defence Associations recommends the greater use of reserve forces to fulfil those unsophisticated functions that are currently being performed by the regular force. The cost of maintaining reserve persons in such functions would be approximately one-sixth of the cost of maintaining regular persons in the same functions. This policy is currently in effect to some extent, but we are recommending further extension of the policy. The advantages of this concept are manifold, some of which are:

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- (a) Maintenance of an effective military posture at a reduced cost.
- (b) Participating patriotism from a greater involvement by citizens of all geographic regions in Canada.
- (c) The exposure of our young Canadians to an imaginative and stimulating adventure in a disciplined environment.
- (d) To develop a greater sense of unity and national responsibility by involvement of Canadians in a national program.

We believe that it behooves the government of our country to explore in depth the attractive possibility of realizing our country's national aims and aspirations to an increased reserve contribution.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes the formal part of our presentation. We are available to answer questions.

The Vice-Chairman: Are there any further submissions from the officers who are with you General? If there are none then we will . . .

Brig. Gen. Howard: None at the moment.

The Vice-Chairman: . . . proceed with the questioning. The list I have is as follows: Messrs. Harkness, Gibson, Forrestall, Winch and Legault. Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Yes, Mr. Chairman. You have no doubt noted that it has been announced the strength of the regular forces is to be reduced by approximately 10,000, which will bring their effective strength down somewhere between 85,000 and 90,000 men. In view of this reduction, and what you have just said in regard to making up the deficiency thus created by an increase in reserve forces, have you made any estimates as to how much the reserve forces should be increased from their present limit of 35,000 in order, we will say, to fill this gap to some extent?

Brig. Gen. Howard: Mr. Harkness, I cannot give you a detailed estimate. Those of us here today are satisfied that an analysis should be made to look at the operation of the regular force with a view to their possible reduction and see wherein the reserve forces, possibly in base operations and elsewhere, could do the same job with no standby time being paid. I cannot tell you the numbers at this time that could be done but we think that a concerted effort should be made to study it and we think the numbers would be considerable.

Mr. Harkness: Have you any views on where the emphasis should be placed in regard to any increase in the reserve forces whether the sea, land or air components?

Commodore J. W. F. Goodchild, CD: Mr. Chairman, I think the answer to that question involves different considerations affecting the three environments you might say. From the naval point of view, or from the Maritime Command point of view, the Naval Reserve responds to the needs of the Maritime Commander. In other words, the Maritime Commander has made a study and has said, "For my war plan I need reserves in the following billets," and it is this requirement to fulfil the needs of the Maritime Commander that dictates the complement of the naval reserves. Those who serve in the Naval Reserve have a general idea to which billets they will be posted in the event of an emergency. The situation here is possibly somewhat different, a little more refined because of a smaller number than obtains in the other two environments.

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Mr. Harkness: Do you feel confident that if a strength increase, say, of 15,000 were authorized to bring it back up to the previous authorized strength of 50,000 that you could raise these forces?

Brig. Gen. Howard: Mr. Harkness, I believe it can be done if it is combined with an increased challenge and opportunity for the people in the reserve forces; I think they go hand in glove.

Mr. Harkness: That brings me to the next question which arises from the phrase down toward the bottom of page 8 where you say: "... much can be done to increase the effectiveness of the reserves." What are some of the things which you gentlemen believe can be done to increase the effectiveness, which, of course, would also tie in with increasing the willingness on the part of men to serve in the reserves?

Brig. Gen. Howard: General Charbonneau would like to comment.

Brigadier General J. P. Charbonneau (CD ADC, Montreal, Quebec, Vice-Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations): Mr. Chairman, to increase the interest and to reduce the attrition of reserve forces, there is one glaring area which should be looked at. The equipment is just not there; we are still training with 20 year old equipment. Any of the new equipment is sometimes shown to the people with a red sign saying, "Do not touch or handle in any way". The regulars, apparently, are restricted as to the availability of this equipment; therefore, the raw reserve recruit, although he has heard about all this, never gets to see it and soon loses interest. I think if you had the equipment on loan, or what have you, I think you would see quite a bit of renewed interest. Equipment is one factor.

The other factor, I think, is that the reserve being commanded by their own people could be established without the stringent requirements that are sometimes imposed in the regular force. It would certainly take much longer to train a reserve person than a regular force person, but that has to be taken into consideration and some patience shown. I think the equipment and the leadership and the pay incentive, although it only amounts to one sixth of what we consider in regard to the regular, would be quite enough to have and keep this increase we are talking about.

Mr. Harkness: I have only one other question arising from a phrase on page 11 in regard to the "Maritime Defence Task" in which you urge a program of emergency.

What would be the approximate number of personnel required to man this unsophisticated type of vessel you are talking about?

Commodore Goodchild: Mr. Chairman, we are getting into a technical problem here but I would visualize the cutter-type vessel to be somewhere in the 275 to 300-foot length with perhaps a crew of 10 to 15 officers and 175 to 200 men, depending upon the nature of the operational commitment.

Mr. Harkness: Would you envisage a great majority of those being reserve personnel?

Commodore Goodchild: We would envisage a substantial number of them. Even today our fleet has a considerable number of reserve personnel serving with it. If my recollection is correct of the last winter exercise, the fleet had approximately 130 reserve personnel serving with it in the Caribbean this winter. Of course the less complicated the vessel, the more use you can make of reserves. If the hydrofoil development turns out appropriately, although it is not the most unsophisticated vessel, it might be suitable for coastal work and, of course, it carries a much smaller crew than a destroyer or cutter-type vessel.

Mr. Winch: It only carries 25.

Commodore Goodchild: That is right.

The Vice-Chairman: Have you finished, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

The Vice-Chairman: Before we pass to the next questioner, I understand that Colonel Howard would like to add to an answer to one of Mr. Harkness's questions.

Colonel B. A. Howard (CD, Toronto, Ontario, Honorary Assistant Secretary, Conference of Defence Associations): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to comment on the potential contribution of an air reserve. In order to do this I might just refresh some memories with regard to the Air Force Auxiliary contribution subsequent to World War II, when the force numbered in the area of 2,500; I might add that it now numbers 840. During that time it maintained 16 front-line fighter defence squadrons, and were the first jet equipped squadrons in the country. I do not think this is inconsistent with our allies utilizing reserve personnel in "building a suitable type of unsophisticated vessel" for local Maritime patrol and so on. What type of vessel do you have in mind?

Commodore Goodchild: Mr. Chairman, this is a technical problem, I am speaking personally here, and my own opinion would be something similar to the United States Coast Guard cutter which does have an ASW detection capability, but at the same

time does not have the sophisticated equipment that is presently installed, and will be installed, in the new DDH's. I also think very close co-operation between the naval forces and the department charged with the operation of ice-breakers to protect and patrol the Arctic seas to the extent that they can be used for that purpose would be desirable. It may even require the use of armed ice-breakers in order that Canada can enforce its sovereign rights over those parts of the Arctic waters that are claimed by Canada, as well as those parts lying over the Continental Shelf and in the coastal parts of Canada.

We do not feel it is essential for this surveillance duty to use the most sophisticated type of AS vessel

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that might be required in time for war or other front-line situations. Where air reservists cannot be used are in environments which require, by the nature of the environment, full-time patrol-type occupation or employment. Maritime considerations, remote deployment such as the Air Division in Europe are obvious areas which cannot be fulfilled by air reservists, but the degree of sophistication within the capability of the air reserve is of a relatively high order. The build-up of personnel and the number of air crew that is available by virtue of previous cut-backs in the regular force, would be sufficient to take on a significant contribution. The exact nature of that, however, would have to be determined by the professionals who determine the exact tasking and the degree of urgency.

Mr. Forrestall: May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman, and I will give up my place in the order of questioners. It was essentially that phrase that caught my attention. I would like to pursue with the Commodore, if I may for a moment or two, the general line of Mr. Harkness's questions. Commodore, would you care to comment in light of the interpretations that have been placed upon the Prime Minister's statements in Calgary in April, in which he dealt with the surveillance of our coastal and territorial waters, in terms of the capacity of this extra fleet that you see to do any work in our northern waters. I ask the question

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from the point of view of support. For example, would you envisage this requiring the opening or the establishing of support bases in our northland, or indeed would you see this type of craft as being operational up there at all, or some modification of this type of craft.

Commodore Goodchild: Mr. Chairman, obviously the most successful Arctic patrol vessel is probably a nuclear submarine, but the cost of this for Canada, I think would be prohibitive. The next best operational vessel would be some form of icebreaker, possibly

an armed icebreaker, as I mentioned. Whether or not this would require bases in the Arctic would depend to some degree on the extent of the operational commitment. The ice-breakers that do operate, operate out of southern ports, and the commitment and the amount of traffic passing through the Arctic will presumably depend upon the results of the Manhattan project that has been happening this summer.

Therefore, it is very difficult at this stage—and I am now speaking personally, as an observer of this—to decide what the nature of the requirement is. Presumably it would be in the form of armed ice-breakers, and would depend upon the nature of the operations that were being carried on in the Arctic.

Mr. Forrestall: When you speak of the armed ice-breaker, would you extend your thinking to include the possibility, or the desirability, of the Department of National Defence taking over more than an indirect operational control of perhaps all of the Department of Transport and the oceanographic institutes vessels?

I ask that question because the Canadian government must have 300 to 400 ships under the Canadian flag. It is the largest Canadian 'armada' ever amassed; and the Canadian navy has a rapidly dwindling fleet. For the purposes of the build-up and the maintenance of the reserve, have you given any consideration to this as a possible, or desirable, direction for the government to take?

Commodore Goodchild: Mr. Chairman, probably I can best answer that question—and here again I am speaking personally—by saying that the *Labrador* started out as a naval vessel, and I know personally that reserve personnel from time to time served in *Labrador* and obtained considerable Arctic experience serving in that ship.

I do not feel at liberty to comment on inter-departmental policy of the government.

Mr. Forrestall: You are involved. Why not?

Commodore Goodchild: My own impression would be, of course, that I would like to see ice-breaking under naval control. I think it would possibly be more effective to have the vessels under one operational control than split between two departments. This is my own personal opinion. I think it would lead to greater efficiency. And it certainly would provide more vehicles for employment of reserve personnel.

Mr. Forrestall: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: General Charbonneau, I wish to ask you some questions on the reserve army, first of all

in relation to current recruiting in the reserve army. Have you any information on the present state of recruiting in the reserve army? In other words, are those units that are seeking recruits able to get them or not?

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: I can speak for the region where I operate, which is the Province of Quebec. The recruiting program is done individually by units. It is not centralized. We found that when it was centralized across the country it did not bring results. It is actually an individual, the officer com-

Mr. Harkness: But in the case of some other corps, they are not spread around in the regular force units? They actually go and fire as units?

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: That is right; or as groups of trained militiamen.

Mr. Gibson: I would like to continue a little further on this, sir. You mentioned the Province of Quebec. From your knowledge and experience, and from discussing it with other officers, do you feel there is a fairly common standard in the reserve units throughout most of Canada, from Victoria, B.C. to Halifax?

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: I think, generally, the same problems exist. As an example, in rural areas you get a number of other ranks or men, and in cities you get a preponderance of officers—sometimes more officers than a unit really needs. The professionals tend to go to the urban air.

The problems are the same across the country, I would say, in general, yes.

Mr. Gibson: Are you in favour of the government's current plans and policies in relation to Royal Military College and collège militaire, of graduating fairly large numbers of cadets as officers into the services each year? Do you think this is a good policy?

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: You ask this as a personal question?

Mr. Gibson: Yes sir. That is right. Is it working out?

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: You mean the rate of retention?

Mr. Gibson: Yes.

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: I do not think it is working out to the satisfaction of those who conceived the plan. But I suggest that there would be a closer relationship between these cadets, that they have some sort of affiliation to specific regiments of the general geographical area from which they come and that through being knit closer in their course, they might, if not to the regular forces, contribute quite a bit to the reserve. This liaison between regiments across the country and RMC or CMR does not exist now.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I find this brief by the Conference of Defence Associations most interesting. I

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manding the battalion, who invents,—because he has to—means of attracting recruits.

There are ups and downs in the recruiting graph during the year. The spring always is good because there is summer camp, where there is a bit more equipment. There is canvas and there is fresh air and there is pay over a certain period of time. I am talking about young Canadians still studying.

Mr. Gibson: Is the policy much the same as it was when some of us were in the army after war and were still in the reserve, with two weeks at summer camp and the infantry training that was given in the infantry battalions?

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: Yes; except that you now sort of skim the cream off the top and you send all the trained soldiers to a group which is in direct support of Mobile Command. Therefore, the advanced class, if you like, trains company by company to be on the first-line reinforcement for Mobile Command. The identity of the unit at camp is pretty much subdued and the groups, by qualification, are put together and trained on that basis. But they do go back to their family or their regiment. However, it is the same problem as always, with less equipment than we used to have.

Mr. Gibson: And from your knowledge, sir. . .

Mr. Harkness: May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Harkness: This does not apply, does it, to artillery units? They still fire as batteries?

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: They are still firing the guns they had during the 1939-45 war—when there are guns. Regiments at times have one or two guns—and when there is ammunition.

could ask a vast number of questions, but I will restrain myself, sir, because I know if I do not you will be after me.

First of all, I wish to refer to page 8 of the brief where the statement is made:

Economies must be found in the defence effort but if that fails the budget must be increased.

I am interested in the remark that "economies must be found in the defence effort". Mr. Chairman, we have before us four of the pretty high brass, Brig. Gen. Howard, Brig. Gen. Charbonneau, Commodore Goldchild and Colonel Howard.

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Will one, or all, of you tell us, first of all, whether you have any recommendations to make to this Committee about where economies can be made in the defence effort? You made this statement. Have you any recommendations to us on that matter?

Brig. Gen. Howard: Thank you, Mr. Winch.

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: You may not be aware of exactly our responsibilities.

Mr. Winch: No, I am going on what you know.

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: As reserve officers we advise the regulars but we have no access to budget deliberations. There is a militia vote, Mr. Harkness surely remembers that, and we are told there are so many man-days to train so many people and we have to do the best we can with that. Concerning economies, we are not entitled to go in and say we should reduce the temperature in this armoury down to 65 or 60 and therefore save. We are not equipped to do it. We advise strictly on the training end. As individuals, I think personally, if I might answer that, I find that periodically a revision of all establishments usually uncovers a little fat and . . .

Mr. Winch: Are you prepared to tell us where that fat is now? We would be interested in that.

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: From the reserve standpoint we feel that some reservists, I will take an example, drivers doing specific hours could accomplish this task as against standby drivers who are obviously paid on a regular scale basis. This is one small example. There are administration functions that could be done at night by reservists, thereby training them into the inner workings of the paperwork. This could be done.

Mr. Winch: Oh, I am sorry. I am sorry there is a misunderstanding here. I was basing this on your statement of equipment where it sets forth that 25

per cent "The White paper sets out that the budgetary objective for provision of hardware" that is the entire armed forces, 25 per cent now reduced to 12 per cent and then you definitely stated "Economies must be found. . ." You are not just discussing there, I presume, the reserves, you are discussing the total defence effort and the fact that the budget now only makes provision for 12 per cent on equipment. So my question was based on that. Have you any suggestions to make because of your statement that economies must be found, any recommendations of where we can make them, in order to increase our 12 per cent on the purchase of equipment? That is the point, sir, that I was after.

Brig. Gen. Howard: Mr. Winch, part of the problem, or the answer maybe, is as General Charbonneau has said that we are convinced there is an economic problem. We have in the Canadian Armed Forces a very large plant in effect on standby that we believe—I cannot delineate these for you at the time but we think they can be delineated—could be reduced in cost by using reserves; it may well be by using civilian or contract operations with civilian organizations. From a businessman's approach, it may be that we have a lot of plant that is not being used to its full capacity.

Mr. Winch: Do you probably mean too many chiefs compared to Indians?

Brig. Gen. Howard: This could well be a field that should be looked at.

Mr. Winch: Thank you. May I now, then, come to what I think is a most important matter, Mr. Chairman, and if I am wrong I know that our four witnesses will correct me. My interpretation of the entire brief is that you do not think there should be any reduction in our NATO commitment and forces. In part, I base my interpretation on page 14, where you state, and I quote:

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To preserve the solidarity of NATO's air warfare capability, it is essential that Canada's Air Division remain in Europe and that it have a nuclear capability in both support and strike roles.

If I take the entire brief, Mr. Chairman, and I am just tying that in as a point because we do have a separate brigade and air division in Europe, could I ask whether or not our witnesses with their experience from the Conference of Defence Associations have made a study of the change in Mobile Command? I would like to ask in particular whether any were present at the armed services demonstration at Petawawa last Saturday, where we, who were able to be present, saw the meaning of Mobile Com-

mand with the air force being the support of the Entity. Have you made a study of Mobile Command, and the new role of the air force and the army and do you think it is necessary to maintain 9,000 personnel armed in NATO, whereas it is my belief, and my interpretation, of government policy and military policy that we can greatly reduce it, not by maintaining our air division as it is now in Europe, which you ask that we maintain, but on this different basis of mobility and relationship between the army and the air force? Is my question understandable?

Mr. Barrett: I thought you were making a speech there.

Mr. Winch: No, sir, I am asking a question. I am sorry you were not at Petawawa.

Col. Howard: Mr. Winch, may I reply to that question?

Mr. Winch: Sir, any one of you could.

Col. Howard: Mr. Winch, the statement that has been submitted in this brief with regard to the retention of the air division is based on the present role that is assigned to Canada in support of the NATO alliance.

Mr. Winch: The present role.

Col. Howard: The present role. It is quite obvious that if the Supreme Allied Commander Europe elects to request a different role than is presently handled by Canada's Air Division obviously the equipment and numbers would have to be adjusted in light of that new requirement. The one thing that must be remembered is that mobility means the ability to move and Mobile Command with air power can move 400 miles now. It cannot move with the present ground support aircraft that it has in its inventory, or hopes to have to be able to support a limited conventional conflict, beyond 400 miles without taking them apart and putting them on ships.

Mr. Winch: Oh, I am sorry. I was going by what you said. I am going by what you said in your brief:

To preserve the solidarity of NATO's air warfare capability, it is essential that Canada's Air Division remain in Europe. . .

You did not say in a changed position or anything else. You just made a blunt statement.

Col. Howard: Yes. At the time of the preparation of this which was some months ago, Mr. Winch, it was prepared in light of the present roles assigned to Canada within that alliance. Obviously any change in circumstances would. . .

Mr. Winch: May I ask you, do you support the idea of Mobile Command?

Col. Howard: Yes, I do, sir.

Mr. Winch: You do?

Col. Howard: Personally I do.

Mr. Winch: May I just ask one further question, and I am sorry that Mr. Forrestall has gone because this might interest him. I had the privilege, and I want to say, Mr. Chairman, it was a privilege of being in Petawawa and seeing the exercises going on. It was one of the most fantastic things I have ever seen in my life and I want most certainly to compliment those who arranged it. Never in my life have I been so damn close to or talked to so many generals, whether they are called navy, army or air force, and I had some most interesting discussions.

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One point intrigues me very much, and I hope that the four gentlemen can perhaps assist me, because of my discussions there and because of what we anticipate is in the mind of the government about expanding North American defence. There have been statements made about going up to the Arctic. I was told that not one—not one—of our present navy ships or planes is capable of arctic work or surveillance, not even the four new destroyers or the two supply ships because the bow structure is not such as to be able to function, and that our aircraft—and I am speaking now of navy aircraft, the *Argus* and the *Tracker*—will have to be phased out by 1972, 1973 or 1974. They are finished.

Have you four gentlemen before us now, members of defence associations—and we appreciate your coming—given consideration to this factor of a greater North American defence moving into the Arctic when we do not have at the present time the ships with their bows or the aircraft able to undertake that? Have you given any thought to the cost and the types of ships and aircraft required if we do move into that field? I think that is a most interesting question, sir, and I would like to have the answer if you can give it to us.

Commodore Goodchild: Mr. Chairman, I think it is very obvious that a destroyer type vessel and a frigate type vessel, which the *DDH* is, are not suited for arctic work. They are thin-hulled and, as I have pointed out, the ideal vessel for arctic work is a nuclear submarine. As far as . . .

Mr. Winch: At \$53 million apiece we cannot afford it.

Commodore Goodchild: It is not the initial cost so much as the support logistics in setting up the com-

mand structure and the communications for the nuclear submarine which would really start to make the cost mount; so, as I suggested, perhaps what we should be considering is an icebreaker program. There are icebreakers already in existence and this is probably the next best type of vessel for operations in the Arctic.

Mr. Winch: Armed icebreakers.

Commodore Goodchild: Armed icebreakers if you intend to exercise sovereignty.

Mr. Winch: May I ask with what kind of armament?

Commodore Goodchild: Here you are getting into a technical field, but there are several types of armament. Here again it depends upon what you are going to try to do and what you will require to control your own area of the Arctic. At the moment . . .

Mr. Winch: What type of defence should we have in the Arctic? You say it depends on it. Have you any idea what type of defence we should have if we expand North American defence and Canada moves into the North? Have you any ideas on that, sir?

Commodore Goodchild: I have lots of ideas on that, yes indeed, Mr. Chairman. I thought I was trying to make them clear. If we are going to exercise surveillance, which I suggest we do, since we cannot afford the best we should try the second best, which is by means of properly equipped icebreakers. Also, there must be suitable aircraft in the inventory of the NATO nations. I do not purport to be an expert on aircraft . . .

Mr. Winch: United Nations or Canada?

Commodore Goodchild: I said NATO—in the inventory of NATO countries. Or an aircraft could be developed, but the problem of the exact type of equipments you require is one that would require a considerable amount of study by those versed in the technique of arctic operations. This is a very specialized field in which I do not feel I have the competence to give you a detailed answer and to suggest a ship design or an aircraft design that would be suitable for that purpose, but certainly it can be developed.

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The Russian probably lead the world in the development of icebreakers. They have some very sophisticated icebreakers. So do the Finns. I am sure they have aircraft also that are suitable for that type of work, because they try to keep their arctic sea lanes open as long as possible to pass ships right across the north part of Russia. But as far as saying to you that we should have this particular type vessel of this

particular design, I am just not competent to do that because this would require a study of the requirement. There is a lot of development work going on in arctic shipping and shipping design. As I say, the Manhattan project is one. The normal tanker is not suitable for arctic operations and the *U.S.S. Manhattan* is being restructured and rebuilt with a redesigned bow in the hope that it will become suitable for operations across the Canadian Arctic. They give it, I understand, a fifty-fifty chance of success. Whether it will be a success, the outcome of that event will be awaited with a great deal of interest among those who have studied the subject.

Mr. Winch: I have one more question, sir. Is it the view of your association that a proposal to change Canadian policy to expand North American defence, including the Arctic, is a reasonable one and one that you would support, even if the cost meant reducing our financial commitments under NATO and NORAD since we can only operate in Canada according to our economic and financial capabilities? What would be your opinion on that?

Commodore Goodchild: Was the question that it would obviate the release of funds to NATO and NORAD if we . . .

Mr. Winch: No. I mean that you take the view, which is now being discussed by the Cabinet in its investigation, of a greater emphasis on North American defence, which would necessarily include the Arctic, involving great expenditures both on ships and aircraft. Would you support that if it meant a reduction, because of our financial limitations, in NATO and NORAD commitments?

Commodore Goodchild: It would not reduce NORAD because the Arctic is part of NORAD; and it would not reduce our contribution to NATO because the borders of Canada are within NATO.

Mr. Winch: No, I am sorry. We do not have this expenditure on this type of aircraft and ships for that. Now if, as has already been pointed out by the Commodore, we have nothing now to do it and are expected to do it, and Canada has certain limitations in how much money it can spend, if moving into that realm meant that we had to cut somewhere on our contributions and it could be NATO or NORAD, would you support the movement into North American defence in the Arctic?

Commodore Goodchild: I would support any move that would bring more security to Canada, but I suppose that more security for Canada is more security for our allies in NATO and more specifically for NORAD because the Arctic is part of the NORAD area of operations.

Mr. Winch: That is my point. In order to do that you may have to reduce the direct commitment in Europe of our forces. Would you agree to a reduction there in order to do this?

Brig. Gen. Howard: Mr. Chairman, does Mr. Winch mean a direct commitment on site in Europe or the availability in Canada?

Mr. Winch: On site in Europe. In order to do this, on North American defence, with an improvement to our navy and our aircraft to take care, a greater participation in North American defence.

Brig. Gen. Howard: I do not think it is a matter of black and white, but within bounds I would think that the Conference of Defence Associations would be interested in expanding that field at possibly some changes in NATO, because we think they are tied together, really.

Mr. Winch: Thank you.

Commodore Goodchild: I might add to that, Mr. Chairman, from the maritime point of view, that your ships committed to NATO are also your ships that operate in defence of the Canadian waters, the Cana-

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dian sea approaches. In other words, your escort vessels, although they are committed to NATO in time of an emergency, are still the same ships that are patrolling off the east and the west coasts of Canada. When you ask about reducing a commitment to NATO, I presume you are talking about the pure commitment—

Mr. Winch: I am talking about our brigade and our Air Force on European soil.

Commodore Goodchild: It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we are getting into a very hazy area here and, as Brigadier General Howard pointed out, it is hard to put it down in black and white because although you have troops and aircraft in Europe, if you bring them back and keep them here in Canada they are still going to cost you something. Now if you are talking about eliminating the troops and the aircraft that are now in Europe entirely from the Canadian inventory—

Mr. Winch: No, I am thinking of a mobile command—about 3,000 men.

Commodore Goodchild: Then you would have to figure out just how much a saving this would be and I do not think in the over-all defence budget it would be a very high percentage.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, might I just point out that the return to the Navy of the *Labrador* which was built, to begin with, to have a naval presence in the Arctic and the possible transfer of a few other ice-breakers would mean that we could have a Canadian naval presence in the form of a patrol in the Arctic at no greater cost than at present.

Mr. Winch: We are talking about armed vessels and surveillance vessels.

Mr. Harkness: All right. All you have to do is put on these same vessels a certain amount of armament and so on. So that the whole thing really, as far as the Arctic is concerned, could be carried on at very little increased cost to the taxpayer than at the present time by the operation of these vessels by DOT.

Mr. Winch: I would just add that my hon. friend here should recognize that on the hydrofoil the armament cost is \$10 million—for one ship.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, my questions are supplementary to those raised by Mr. Winch.

Did I understand that the four witnesses are all retired today? I am sorry but I arrived a few minutes late.

Brig. Gen. Howard: No, two of us are.

Mr. Legault: Would it be possible to know the present occupation and interests of those retired?

The Vice-Chairman: Would you repeat that, Brigadier General Howard?

Brig. Gen. Howard: Mr. Chairman, of the four present, I am active in the Reserve, being an advisor to the Deputy Chief, Operations and Reserves, for Western Canada. I am still in the Reserve.

Mr. Winch: I understand you still operate a business.

Brig. Gen. Howard: Oh yes. I endeavour to be a practising lawyer.

Mr. Winch: That is what I meant.

Brig. Gen. Howard: Brigadier General Charbonneau is in the same category. He is not a lawyer but an insurance executive from Montreal. He is the advisor to the Deputy Chief, Operations and Reserves, Province of Quebec. Commodore Goodchild is recently retired from the Naval Reserve and is a practising lawyer in Toronto. He was formally the Senior Naval Officer in the Toronto area. Colonel Howard has gone to Supplementary Reserve from commanding the Air Wing in the City of Toronto. He is an industrialist from Toronto. Of the four of us, there are two still in

the Reserves, one on supplementary and Commodore Goodchild is retired.

Mr. Legault: But all the witnesses have interests outside the military at the moment. The reason for my asking this question, gentlemen, is that the Committee

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is trying to search for something practical and, in my view, you are, in a sense, the wisemen who can advise us. However, such advice must necessarily, take into account all other considerations. Mr. Winch has brought out the expenditures that have to be put out. The brief, as it stands, sets out the ideal thing. If I was in agriculture I would certainly present a brief and ask for all the money necessary to put out the program that I want. Naturally Defence is interested in the best suitable situation that we could have. Being in business on your own, do you not feel that you have to take into consideration the question of expenditure and then bring about the best solution with the means at our disposal? This is what I had in mind when listening to your brief. We definitely all support what you have advocated here, but we have to be practical.

Brig. Gen. Charbonneau: We know what you are looking for. We are citizen soldiers and our time is given abundantly because we are interested. You are seeking from us our personal views or the views of the majority of our Conference on how we would go about it. If there remains with this Committee one thought it is that the Reserves can do a job at one-sixth the cost of regular forces. If you must reduce regular forces then we supply an alternative. We would go further, we would say that there is a pool of good will in Canada towards the Armed Forces, but the Armed Forces operate in such a closed club that the citizen soldier does not always get the co-operation that he feels he should get. If we could interest more Canadian young people, and I specify the very young, in a program of adventure training, call it what you want but something that is more than parade square drill—if we could get *les gens de Montréal ou de Québec* to train in the summer, say, in British Columbia, it would be adventure training. In this way we would gain because it would do something for national unity. A well-led program would be healthy for these boys. It would also produce a measure of summer employment which would perhaps obviate the need for many bursaries. In addition, it would bring the defence problem closer to every individual household in the country. This is not being done now. People look at defence and say: "That is for a special crowd". They are surprised to see that there are still people interested through a patriotic sense of duty in what is called "Canada", ready to defend it, to organize defence and possibly youth with the same sense of being Canadian.

Mr. Barrett: Could I have a supplementary?

The Vice-Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. Barrett: If a volunteer program did not function properly would you advocate a specific draft and suggest that we incorporate this thing in our defence?

Commodore Charbonneau: I think, politically, you would all be in hot water if you reheated that one. But I would say that incentives should be given. I will use an example. If a grocery store clerk wants to go and train for two months, why cannot his employer give him a leave of absence he would be paid by the army—and then he could be trained and callable at any time in case of emergency. However, I would not advocate conscription.

Mr. Barrett: The same here.

Commodore Charbonneau: Incentive would produce large numbers, possibly more than you could handle with the facilities that exist today.

Mr. Winch: Could I ask a supplementary on Reserves.

The Vice-Chairman: You have had your turn. Mr. Legault has been interrupted a second time now.

Mr. Legault: I would permit Mr. Winch to put his question and then I will continue afterwards.

Commodore Goodchild: I have a comment on a previous question, whether the members of the Conference have considered the economic implications of the brief. As pointed out by Brigadier General Howard's opening remarks, the Conference represents a constituency of some 30,000 Canadian men who are concerned with the problems of National Defence, but

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who carry on full-time occupations not involving defence and they come from every walk of life, from every part of the country. In the Conference there are academics, doctors, lawyers, actuaries, industrialists, and men from all categories of Canada's national life. They are certainly very much aware of the economic implications of what they propound in this brief. We admit that we are aiming at the ideal, but we are concerned and we think we should put forward our views about Canada's defence posture.

Mr. Legault: Commodore, the experience of the members of the Conference is of great value, and can be of great help to a committee such as this. But about 90 per cent of your brief is what we would expect to hear from the present active military establishment. This is the point I want to make. Because of your occupations, interests, and experience you can

indicate, as Mr. Winch had mentioned, where to cut off the fat. The suggestion made by General Charbonneau is very practical, but an entirely new mentality must be developed. Because of your experience in commercial and civilian life, you should perhaps offer practical solutions to these problems, rather than concentrate on the ideal goal which is sought by all.

Commodore Goodchild: Well, I can only say in answer to that, Mr. Chairman, that this brief offers opinions for consideration. I personally had a hand in drafting it, and I might say that suggestions for the draft were made by a number of persons, none of whom is actively associated with the Department. The brief was composed entirely by men who carry on full-time professions and occupations but who are seriously concerned about national defence and who feel that if we do not have national security, then all our national life can fall by the wayside. We feel very strongly on this point.

I would suggest to you, sir, that there is no implication that this brief was ghost-written by the Department. It is strictly a brief prepared by civilians who happen to have an interest and a concern in national defence matters.

Mr. Legault: Thank you.

Brig. General Howard: Mr. Chairman, we as a Conference would be delighted to have a further opportunity to investigate this field of greater use of reserves. But you must appreciate that being citizen soldiers, as General Charbonneau has said, we are initially not privy to many policy decisions. We really end up on the receiving end of the decision having been made. We think that maybe the Conference of Defence Associations can render a service to Canada in further exploring these fields the member mentioned. But, as I mentioned, we today are not in a position to take this apart piecemeal and show this Committee some of these things in dollars and cents. But we

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would go so far as to say that we think this group which we represent has the capability to do a fair job in looking at it.

Mr. Legault: There is no doubt in my mind about that, but I wanted to know about your position today with regard to being independent and being free to criticize and perhaps to suggest to us where this fat can be cut off. Some suggestions have been made, but I thought perhaps there should be more emphasis in the brief on that particular matter from your own experience in that field and your responsibilities today as taxpayers.

General Charbonneau: I agree that this would be very desirable, and we are willing to make up what we

think is a workable plan. We can not assume the regular duties of all the regular soldiers, but we can assume some. And we think that we could participate more in matters concerning defence.

Mr. Legault: Thank you.

Col. Howard: Mr. Chairman, a further comment that I would like to add to General Charbonneau's is that by virtue of a greater reserve participation there is a side benefit here that I think is a desirable feature in our national life, and that is that our young people would be identified with a national purpose. They would be exposed to a disciplined environment. These are points which have been emphasized by Brig. Gen. Howard. This gives them an opportunity to see the other side—the other point of view—and I think it might substitute for what otherwise are undesirable influences in our society today.

Mr. Barrett: Very well stated.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I would like to discuss something about air reserve policy. You have discussed the army and the navy, but there is very little about air reserves. The expensive aspects of maintaining operational air reserve units have been brought to our attention. With the continuing technical sophistication of operational aircraft and the expense and difficulties involved in keeping up with such sophistication on a reserve basis, it has occurred to me that there is another role the reserve air forces could usefully play. Air transportation and aviation in general has in the past been of great importance to this country. Because of the nature of our country, and the distances involved, it is still important, and it will continue to be so.

It has been suggested that our reserve squadrons should be related not to operational functions but to training or, search and rescue or to small aircraft transport. Have you considered the possibility of a reserve air force carrying on an initial flying training program, perhaps under subsidy from the military or from civilian transport, and the training up to commercial license standard of young people who would form an air reserve corp, something like the Civil Air Patrol in the United States? It might even include not only basic training up to that standard but training in relation to soaring and search and rescue, including the

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possibility of air transport with the light civilian-type aircraft that are becoming ever more predominant. Have you considered this at all?

Col. Howard: Yes, the full spectrum of aviation employment has been investigated by the Air Reserve association and any tasking which would involve a greater reserve contribution is welcome. However, I

would like to refer to the initial assumption in your question that the cost of maintaining a reserve operational squadron is expensive, and therefore I assume from your question that you are seeking economic alternatives. The object of the exercise, in investigating any of these possibilities by the Air Reserve association, is not to find and make a work program for the reserves, either expensively or economically.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): May I interject to say that I am not looking for an economic alternative, I am looking for a realistic alternative.

Col. Howard: Mr. Thompson, the lesson that has been shown to us in the past is that operational squadrons can be manned by reserve personnel. In fact, a great preponderance of the front line fighter defence of the United States Air Defence Command is manned by Air National Guard. The cost of standing those fighters on defence on a reserve basis is much less than on a regular basis, provided they can be effective and operative. The Canadian air force auxiliary maintained 16 front line fighter squadrons shortly after the war. It was not until the regular force assumed those functions that they were disbanded. The sophistication required to operate them is inherent in the organization. The cost of maintaining them and their effectivity is realistic. The only time the air reserve cannot be employed in a front line operational task is when 24-hours a day, seven-days-a-week, service is required away from the reservist's home. At one particular stage in the history of the Royal Canadian Air Force Defence Command eight operational squadrons were on 24-hour standby around the clock and they were manned by Reserve pilots with operational airplanes. So, the capability of the Reserve to do this at a lesser cost is inherent in the structure. The full spectrum of aviation employment is welcomed with open arms by the air reserve, provided the criterion of effectivity is met.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): All right, I will accept your answer in regard to my preliminary statement but you have not replied to what I believe is—I was going to say “more”, but let me be fair about it—an equally important contribution that the air force reserve and the air force auxiliary can carry out, which is related to the other end of flying. I believe we have 55 Chipmunks left in this country and spare parts are becoming critical, and as far as I know the Chipmunk—and as I knew them at the end of the war—is pretty well going off the board. It is a real problem, as I see the training situation in the present armed forces. Why could the basic training that the Chipmunks have performed, and the obvious failure of *ab initio* training in economic terms, as well as in other terms, not be met to a large extent from a reserve basis? Why could it not apply to search and rescue as well?

Col. Howard: It can, Mr. Thompson. The search and rescue function was the responsibility of the air reserve up until a year ago. That was one of the roles or tasks assigned to the Air Reserve. I think you have to look into the nature of the beast when you consider employing a pilot in a military capacity to train pilots *ab initio*. If you have a pilot who is going to be employed in that fashion, he really does not identify himself with a military effort and he would just as soon go to the nearest commercial flying school and be paid a lot more for doing the same job for a commercial requirement. So, in order to stimulate the interest of air reservists they have to be identified with a purely military operational function. That is not to say that the Air Reserve does not have the capability of assuming this kind of role. However, if it was a major role, from my personal association—and this is not the position of the association—I would predict the demise of the Air Reserve through a lack of interest.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): But you have not researched this matter through, as far as the feasibility of such a thing as I am suggesting is concerned. I go back to what happened in Germany in pre-World War II. Look what we did in Canada during the early years of the Empire training scheme through the employment of civilians who could very well have been air reservists, could they not?

Col. Howard: Yes.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Is this not something that we really should be considering on the same basis that we have been talking about, the militia, as far as land forces are concerned?

Col. Howard: Mr. Thompson, I again must revert back to the theme that you must have employment for these people which is of an operational military nature and which is associated with real . . .

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What do you mean by employment? I do not follow you; I am not on your wave length in that regard.

Col. Howard: Perhaps I can describe it by saying that these people are sophisticated pilots. I am sure a great many of you have flown with them while they were at the controls of an Air Canada flight into Ottawa. These pilots are not interested in being employed in training *ab initio* pilots.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Some of them might be. I have a picture here of Captain Wendell Reid who takes off from the Montreal International Airport in his 1929 Travel-air biplane.

Col. Howard: He is retired, sir.

Mr. Forrestall: That is a pleasure.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): That is a pleasure, and he is pretty sophisticated because he flies a DC-8.

Brig. Gen. Howard: I think he checks out pilots on DC-8s, which I think is perhaps slightly different from a Chipmunk.

Col. Howard: Right now the air reservist is a very sophisticated air crew member who, by virtue of the standards imposed by the military, meets the operational readiness in the particular task he has, which is close tactical logistic support with Otters.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): That is your concept of one phase of air reservists. There might be another concept of them.

Col. Howard: I prefaced my remarks by saying that in the full spectrum any way in which these people could be employed and still have their interest stimulated is welcomed with open arms, Mr. Thompson, and I gave you my personal opinion that I felt the interests of these very sophisticated aircrew people might not be stimulated to perpetuate the Air Reserve if they were employed strictly within that capacity.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall on a supplementary.

Mr. Forrestall: From what you said a moment ago, Colonel Howard, you left me with the impression that you had a fear that we might lose the expertise that we have in our reserve corps. Under the present status, how soon would this spin-out take place?

Col. Howard: Unlike the militia, by virtue of having real hardware on inventory, the turnover in the Air Reserve is very low. The average age of our pilots is climbing, and with the present means of meeting attrition we can see the end of the road and steps will have to be taken to bring in younger and recently-trained pilots.

Mr. Forrestall: Do you mean now or within five years or within ten years?

Col. Howard: If I speculated at all it would be a personal speculation. I would say that the beginning of the dilemma is upon us.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that perhaps there is a role for an auxiliary—call it an auxiliary air force, if you wish, rather than reserve air force—that would not only do a

force at the lower training level or search and rescue level or as we mentioned even light transportation to form what might be a civil air patrol like they have had in the United States.

There is just one further question with regard to the reserve military aspect and this is militia. I noticed in today's Toronto *Star* an article about one Randy Hardy, president of the Winston Churchill Collegiate students council who could not get a summer job so he joined the militia and he has gone to camp. It seems to me that if there is one source of inspiration and practical advice in the armed forces of Canada it should be the organization that you represent in proposing a realistic militia training program. My background is air force but I started in the militia. It seems to me this Committee would welcome a report from an organization such as yours that affects the whole area of reserve and militia training whether it is army, air force, or navy, and I have in mind the civilian organizations that are doing such a good job today through cadets. It seems to me this even involves the cadet programs because there are a lot of us, I am sure it includes some of you, who look back to your own training when you were teenagers in high school before you went on further than that when the cadet program meant a lot to you; it did to me. I would like to hear something like that from your organization; maybe not now but later on.

Brig. Gen. Howard: Mr. Chairman, we endorse completely the extension of summer training for the reservists. It is difficult to ask a young lad to take one week out of the middle of the summer to attend a training concentration when if it were not for that he could have been employed for the summer.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Put him in for two months?

Brig. Gen. Howard: Right. We agree with that, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Might I ask one more question Mr. Chairman relating to NATO? I know it would interest your own support of Canada's NATO role. Have you given any consideration to a different aspect of a role for Canada's NATO contribution that rather than being a center-heavy contribution, as we have now both in our brigade and in our air division, would be what might be called a flanking role; a role that might be tied into the defence of northern Europe? It might be a very mobile type of force which would be ideally suited to our own defence needs in the northern part of our country; a completely new role for NATO as far as Canada's contribution is concerned, that would be more realistic here at home and more in keeping with our own needs.

Brig. Gen. Howard: That is our present system Mr.

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lot to encourage the whole aviation industry in Canada but would provide a tremendous incentive and interest to our young people who want to have a reason for flying and at the same time take over in a very economic way a certain function from the regular air

Chairman. We have an air transportable brigade tagged in Canada to go to the northern plant.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am thinking of an increase in that.

Brig. Gen. Howard: In fact all the armed forces of Canada are available for that same commitment.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Yes, but the role of our brigade in central Europe can hardly be fitted into that category either as it relates to equipment or to the role that it fits as far as I understand the need in Europe. It seems to me there ought to be a chance for us to develop a much more suitable role for Canada beyond where we are even today, a flanking role I suppose.

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Col. Howard: If I may comment, Mr. Chairman, any role Canada could assume, perhaps more economically than the present roles, would be desirable provided that we do not lose sight of the main thing, that we subscribe to collective security and that we do not do anything unilaterally, that we do it in concert with our allies.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): The reason I suggest it is because I see that we are not doing that very thing. Perhaps if we were concentrating on a little different role we would have less difficulty in convincing certain aspects of military policy that we do have a realistic role.

An hon. Member: We might become believable.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): We might become believable.

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman on a point of order?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: It may not be known to Committee members but there is supposed to be an organization meeting of the subcommittee following this and I am afraid that we will not be able to stay very much longer.

The Vice-Chairman: We have notification of a subcommittee on Maritime forces to be held at approximately 5 o'clock after the termination of this meeting. It is now later than 5:30 so if there are no further questioners I would like to be in a position to adjourn this meeting. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Winch: I will let my questions go, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Winch. We will sit again tomorrow morning at 9:30 but not in this room. We will sit in room 371 in the West Block and notices have already been sent out to your offices in this respect. There being no further questions I would like on your behalf to thank the officers who have come before us as witnesses from the Conference and tell them how much we appreciate their efforts and their patience in answering our questions.

Mr. Winch: I think you would be interested in knowing that the meeting which follows immediately—now four minutes late—is the organization of a subcommittee of this to go into depth on Maritime Command.

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Brig. Gen. Howard: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say we appreciate very much the opportunity of being present.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, General Howard. The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX HHH
DEFENCE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT
AND THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

by

Prof. Albert Legault, Queen's University, Kingston

In his working paper Lieut. General Sharp undertakes to paint an historic picture of the reasons behind NORAD. Pages two and three appear to me to be essential to a proper understanding of the problems dealt with. You will, then, permit me to complete this introduction by a wider presentation of the strategic facts involved in the defence of the North American Continent.

One must at the very outset try to understand the meaning of the word "defence". Then it is permissible to ask oneself "against what?"

Let us state a fact: the spectacular launching of the first Soviet Sputnik considerably simplified the terms of the nuclear equation. Indeed, since at the time we had no effective defence against the ballistic missile, the only possibly security lay in the capacity of the United States, in case of attack, to inflict on the adversary intolerable damage. The terms "first strike" and "second strike" appeared; populations became more than they had ever been in the past exposed to the menace of an immediate nuclear holocaust; meanwhile the military leaders became preoccupied, at the highest level, with the survival of their reprisal forces by burying them in concrete underground silos, if not putting them in submarines, and by dispersing them over vast geographic spaces, or in the oceans.

In 1969 the situation remains very much the same. The population is still as much exposed as it was in 1959, and the necessity for ensuring that reprisal force has a sufficient degree of assured survival (a concept that was expressed at the time of Mr. McNamara by the idea of "assured destruction") remains urgent. The eventual development of an anti-missile system, destined to protect American rocket launching pads from attack, proves in any case that we have in this concept a very live reality. It is not our intention to labour here the contradictory arguments that have been advanced to justify putting such a programme into its initial stages. Let us however retain the following point: we are not thinking of defending ourselves, much less of protecting the population, but of ensuring a sufficient back-strike to inflict on the adversary punishment to fit the crime.

The distinction seems to me important. Because, if in 1969 we are essentially preoccupied with setting up

a *defensive system* destined to ensure the survival of our *offensive forces*, we can quite properly ask ourselves what was the situation strategically at the time of the establishment of NORAD.

Let us keep in mind three arguments advanced by General Sharp on page 3 of his working paper:

- (1) "... an active air defence made penetration of North American air space by hostile bombers extremely difficult and costly".
- (2) "to guard against this danger (surprise attack) a detection system was developed to provide maximum warning for SAC bombers to get off their bases and be launched on retaliatory mission".
- (3) "the principal function of the air defences of North America during this period was to enhance the survivability of the U.S. deterrent forces (SAC) and to minimize the damage caused in any attack by destroying as many bombers as possible before they could reach their target".

In other words, the two great components of the equation were as follows:

- (1) To what extent would it be better to dissuade the adversary from any attack, through the capacity of the North American Continent to make the cost of aggression very high, if not prohibitive?
- (2) Or to what extent would it be better to dissuade the adversary by perfecting means of alert and survival of North America's own strike-back force, so as to be in a position, no matter what happened, to return blow for blow?

The first component was by nature distinctly defensive; the second was distinctly offensive. Now, as one should have expected, it soon appeared that hypotheses 1 and 2 were not at all contradictory, but that they were essentially complementary. So, they were combined in one: increase the degree of invulnerability of one's means of attack and set up a vast system of defence, destined to limit the extent of nuclear destruction. It was the easier to make a choice

favouring this third hypothesis because it was impossible to:

- (1) ensure the survival of our means of attack, and
- (2) develop a system of efficient defence without setting up a gigantic network of aerial detection.

General Beaufre, an informed expert in these matters, describes in a gripping way the period that we have just considered:

"American strategy hesitates, then, between several courses. Should we maintain dissuasion by an offensive reinforcement of the threat of reprisals, or, on the contrary by a partial neutralization of the adverse menace by creating an air defence in America? ... The great debate that opened up in 1955 ended in the defeat of offensives calling for the launching of a great programme of uninterceptable rockets. General Gavin, who advocated that solution, resigned. On the contrary, we were going to build a gigantic air defence covering America, we would develop the anti-surprise tactic of the SAC (alerted planes, etc) and we would provide it with intercontinental planes which, from the American fortress could escape the first Soviet attack ... The 1955 decision which achieves provisionally a certain stabilization, was clearly too conservative. It was to prove to be an error that would be a heavy burden on the next phase.

In 1957, the Soviets had the intercontinental missile ... they thus had a chance to catch up with, and to surpass, the Americans in the strategy of dissuasion, for the menace of their rockets could no longer be countered by the American air defence that had just been set up at such great cost and which was effective only against planes ... Strengthened by this situation, they relaunched the problem of Berlin ... and could enjoy direct defiance of the United States with regard to the Congo and Cuba"*

*General Andre Beaufre, *Introduction à la Stratégie* (introduction to strategy, Armand Colin, Paris 1963, pages 83-84

Is this to say that NORAD was the fruit of an error in assessment of the strategic situation at the time of its establishment? That would be saying a great deal, but after all, one could have evaluated better, at that same time, the superiority of the offensive compared with the defensive, and the consequences of it with regard to nuclear dissuasion. One thing is certain, the famous debate between the offensive advocates and the defensive advocates is far from finished. Two factors combine to becloud the issue.

The first, technical by nature, has already been mentioned. It is the absolute necessity, no matter 20551-4

what inclination one professes regarding the "defensive" or the "offensive", of having available a vast system of alert which alone can guarantee the survival of our means of attack, which means our nuclear strike-back. The temptation is, then, great, when one has available such a system, to join with it a defensive component whose effectiveness depends in practice, on the same military infrastructure. (a) (strike-back), alert, detection, counter attack, or (b) (defence) alert, detection and active defence, or (c) (defence-offence) alert, detection, active defence and counter attack. We find again here the three hypotheses that we brought up at the outset of this analysis. The reader has only to go back for an instant to the field of the anti-submarine struggle, to realize the complexity of the parameters of the equation involving such variable combinations.

The second factor is psychological. Both countries—the United States and the USSR—frightened by the apocalyptic vision of a world convulsed by the unleashed atom, made every effort to attenuate the effect, by taking shelter under the umbrella of gigantic air defences. In the case of the former country this was because it, for a moment, thought it could complete the horizonatal security that would confer control of the oceans by the setting up of a new vertical defensive dimension; in the case of the latter country it was because, for a moment, it thought itself menaced by capitalist encirclement and thought that war was inevitable. Now, technical progress caused such illusions to collapse.

Defence—or interception—makes no sense, in 1969, except to the extent that it works toward, not protection of the population, but reinforcement of the degree of invulnerability of our means of striking back. It is, moreover, in this context that we have put the American decision to proceed with the construction of the "Safeguard" system. Now, this system is at the same time contradictory and paradoxical. Paradoxical in the sense that we are ready to invest billions of dollars to protect our means of attack, whereas it would cost less to multiply them, or to bury them deeper in the ground. But also contradictory, because, after all, if the game is to be forever able to subject the adversary to identical devastation, it is indeed useless to multiply our means of nuclear interception, which will only add to the destruction already caused, or which is in the process of being caused, by the assailing nuclear heads. If, on the other hand, one contends that, no matter what the degree of interception-probability, to reinforce in this manner nuclear dissuasion by the fact that such an apparatus would be able to save human lives, then it would be more logical in the last analysis to build nuclear shelters.

Under these circumstances, either the American decision will prove to be an error in strategic appreciation, an error whose consequences will soon be felt, or

else the Americans are not telling the whole truth. In other words, either they do not see that they run the risk of being outclassed by their adversary in the race for strategic superiority or else they are aware of the risk but do not say so because they are completely convinced of their superiority. After all, one could not seriously think of having the luxury of a costly system of defence that could only be, in the present state of techniques, an immense accessory appendix and a superfluity, unless one is already convinced of the value and superiority of one's own offensive forces. In view of the number of experienced experts that surround President Nixon, it is difficult to believe that there could be any mistake on this point.

It is certainly in order to note, as General Sharp does on pages 8 and 9 of his brief, the considerable increase in Soviet defensive forces, but one cannot at the same time pass lightly over the comparable developments by the Americans. Indeed, all the present Minutemen (650 Minutemen I and 350 Minutemen II) will eventually be replaced by a third generation of missiles with multiple heads, each one with an independent guide system (MIRV). The same is true of the POLARIS rockets that will be replaced by a more highly perfected version, also with multiple heads—the Poseidon. If to that must be added the fact that it is highly improbable that multiple heads will be given to a rocket (the Polaris) that cannot also serve for attack purposes in first-strike, one sees that the Soviets have as many reasons to worry as have the Americans. Note too that American aviation also has at its disposal a system of multiple-head penetration, the SCAD (Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy).

The multiple-head tips, although not revolutionary, represent an important technical development, no doubt comparable to the one that appeared when the gun was replaced by the machine-gun. All these reasons, and many more, which we have no time to deal with, show clearly that there is certainly no neglect, on either side, in perfecting means of offense. These are no doubt also the reasons that lie at the base of America's confidence in the quality of her offensive arms, which would explain why there is more disposition to talk about a "defence gap" (ABM) than of a new "missile gap".

What conclusions are we entitled to draw from this analysis of the evolution of modern techniques?

- (1) The value of defence or of interception varies according to whether it is a matter of defending one's self against bombers, submarines or intercontinental missiles.
- (2) Interception makes no sense except to the extent that it contributes to reinforce the degree of survival for our means of striking back.
- (3) Only the perfecting of our means of offense can guarantee strategic equilibrium.

- (4) In any case, a gigantic system of surveillance and detection is an urgent necessity.

It is with these considerations in mind that we now tackle the problem of "defence against what?". It is possible, in the present state of affairs, to distinguish four kinds of menace:

- (1) The bomber.
- (2) The sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM),
- (3) The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),
- (4) The orbital bomb (FOBS)

Let us, then, examine the type of menace posed by these systems.

(1) *The Bomber*

This threat varies depending if we are (a) in peacetime, (b) in wartime.

- (a) *In time of peace* the adversary has some advantage in approaching our detection system as often as possible, so as to:
 - (i) discover its weaknesses (defects in the armour);
 - (ii) analyse the rapidity with which we can react;
 - (iii) gain better knowledge of our systems of command and communications.
 - (iv) perfect his own instruments of penetration and of electronic jamming (parade, counter parade, counter-counter parade, etc.).

This type of menace presupposes that NORAD is able to detect the apparatus that is approaching, to identify such apparatus if necessary and to destroy it, if necessary. In other words this is a case of strict protection of our air space; each nation, in accordance with usual recognized principles of international law, seeks to protect its own air space.

- (b) *In wartime* the menace presents itself in a completely different light. Two hypotheses are worth remembering. Either one considers the threat from bombers taken independently, or else one considers such a threat in the context of overall strategy. The first hypothesis is itself divided into two sub-divisions:

- (i) interception for purposes of defence properly speaking, and
- (ii) interception with a view to reducing the rate of destruction and of reducing our means of striking back. Technical considerations have rendered obsolete the first sub-division. It is certainly possible to obtain a high rate of interception, but, considering

that a single bomb would be enough in most cases to obliterate an entire city, one can scarcely see any advantage in such a formula. Actually, it is toward protection of our means of attack that we have been orientating our efforts for a long time, that is to say, toward interception to reduce the rate of destruction of strike-back power. Here again one can scarcely see any advantage in such a formula, considering that the United States has neither strategic bomber bases in Canadian territory nor launching ramps for intercontinental missiles.

This leads us, then, to put the bomber threat into the context of overall strategy. Strictly speaking, it would certainly be conceivable to justify the setting up of a vast system of air defence, if the strategic stakes could be put into the one equation (dissuasion equals capacity of interception plus capacity of attack). Now, as we have seen, the intercontinental missile has completely changed the components of the problem. Indeed, the strategic situation remains stable as long as the "duopolists" can ensure survival of their means for striking back.

Under these circumstances. American rockets would have left their launching ramps long before, if ever a large number of Soviet bombers appeared over the Canadian frontier. It is certainly possible to conceive that a wave of attacking bombers would be preceded by an overall nuclear salvo aimed at destroying the American strike-back rockets. But this is a situation completely different, and one that we shall deal with very soon. The arguments advanced by General Sharp on page 11 of his working paper seem to me to miss the point. Indeed, with or without interception, it is improbable that the USSR would build more bombers in future, unless it were to meet other considerations of strategic interest that have nothing to do—or very little to do—with strategic equilibrium. Actually, the USSR could double or multiply by ten its flotilla of strategic bombers, without causing any change in the nuclear equation.

In brief, the maintenance of a system of surveillance and identification is an absolute necessity. This is the only context in which it would be rational to examine the advantages and disadvantages of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) that is at present under study in the Canadian and American Capitals. Canada, for its part, should examine the advantages with a view to ensuring protection of her air space and of satisfying the requirements of American security with regard to detection and identification. If, on the other hand, the United States intends to complement this system by a vast defensive component (interception and destruction), it is not at all in Canada's interest to participate, unless Canadians can have, in exchange, major concessions either in the field of new interceptors, which Canadians must acquire in future

to assure protection of their air space, or concessions in other fields which need not be specified here.

(2) *Sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)*

The situation with regard to SLBM is today one of the most complex and one of the most difficult to straighten out. On the one hand, there are available very few elements to make appreciation possible, and, on the other hand, technical progress in this field is kept largely secret.

The best way to proceed with an analysis is no doubt to question oneself on the objectives and motives for Canada's participation in SLBM defence. Two main objectives are worth remembering here:

- (1) Ensure protection for our territorial waters.
- (2) Detect, identify and destroy, if necessary, enemy craft.

Here we leave aside the problem of protection to be given to marine convoys in time of war. Let us rather focus our analysis on the problems of force equilibrium and the problems of strategy.

Here, once more, it is quite evident that Canada does not participate in SLBM defence to protect its population and its industrial potential from nuclear attack. It is, on the contrary, a matter of protection given to means of intercontinental striking back, as possessed by our neighbors to the south. Now, detection, identification and destruction play here a primary part, for the warning period available to the American high command before striking back against a nuclear attack launched from missile-launching submarines, is much shorter than the warning available in the case of intercontinental missiles (which is something like from 15 to 20 minutes). Indeed the warning period could be reduced by three or four minutes, depending upon the trajectory of the missile fired from the submarine and the distance separating it from its military objective. In other words, the further the nuclear submarine has to fire to reach its target, the longer will be the warning period. All this means, then, that SLBM defence is today of capital importance, mainly along the seacoast of continental North America. We shall see why, in a moment.

One must however realize the political effects of our participation. On the one hand, it is quite evident that Canada thus becomes an entrant in the armaments race. Thus, exhaustion of the war budgets of the great powers is today one of the reasons most likely to lead to an understanding on the reciprocal limitation of armaments. The United States in any case is no longer at the stage where it has to count on the support of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, in order to install American medium range rockets (IRBM, Thor and Jupiter). This means, then, that our participation in the anti-submarine struggle is seen more favourably in

Washington, and it means that we have in this regard some liberty of political manoeuvre.

Since it is also probable that the Russians will develop in future some attack techniques that will be quite comparable to those of America, it is quite clear that anti-submarine detection becomes daily more important, and that Canada's contribution in this regard is indispensable. Just as in the case of NORAD, this participation no doubt permits us to make more certain the protection of our sovereign space, in this case our seacoasts. Under these circumstances, the questions that arise in one's mind seem to me to be the following: To what degree does our participation in the defence against sea-launched ballistic missiles...

- (1) entail expenses greater than those we envisioned in the first place to ensure protection of our territorial waters?
- (2) permit some specialization in functions, which at the same time reduces the investment that would otherwise be necessary if we had to ensure territorial-waters protection alone?
- (3) is it greater than our participation in NORAD, or vice versa? In other words, in what sphere is our political bargaining position best?
- (4) is it for us something that will bring political influence equal to our participation?
- (5) could it evolve into a role that is wider, or even more specialized, upon condition that other factors be considered, such as prospecting of sea-bottoms and oceanographic research?
- (3) *Intercontinental Missiles and Orbital Bombs*

No effective defence has yet been found against intercontinental missiles and it is very probable that, even if such defence were possible, it could easily be "saturated" by the enemy's offensive forces. The same problem presents itself with regard to orbital bombs, although it would be quite easy to intercept them if they had to be put into orbit around the earth (which would be a violation of the United Nations Agreement prohibiting the orbiting of military objects). In any case, it remains true that what constitute the best protection against surprise attack, preventive war or anticipated (pre-emptive) attack, are still two factors: detection and surveillance (BMEWS and SPADATS). Canada participates only very indirectly in the two systems mentioned above.

As General Sharp has so well pointed out, "NORAD has a capability to detect, identify and give warning of ICBM and SLBM attacks against the North American continent. NORAD does not, however, have any capability to intercept or destroy ballistic missiles." It is hard to see what, under these circumstances, could be the advantages of Canadian participation in the new AWACS system, unless they be those we have already mentioned during our analysis but which are notwith-

standing, less important. Actually, only an effective defence against intercontinental missiles would justify the setting up of a vast air defence against the bomber menace. The result is that Canada finds itself in an excellent position for political bargaining, either to obtain compensations of a major nature in exchange for limited participation in such a system, or to continue, to diminish, or to enlarge, its participation in SLBM defence.

Although General Sharp has succeeded in demonstrating the indivisibility of the problem of defending the North American continent (his excellent description of the detection and surveillance systems shows clearly the indivisibility of the problem), we venture to believe that this brief study will also contribute to clarification of the overall strategy context, which must be understood if we are to be able to make a pronouncement on the soundness of Canadian participation in the security of the North American Continent.

A Proposal for Revising NORAD

The implied assumption in establishing and maintaining NORAD has always been that the S.U. is an aggressive power and the U.S. a defensive. This assumption is becoming less and less valid, so that in the dawn of the new decade of the 70's it should be revised. Canada must no longer implicitly prejudice the guilt of the S.U. and the innocence of the U.S., but rather treat both its great neighbours equally.

Canada's participation in NORAD is predicated on the assumption that it enhances the security of Canada. Canada's security however does not only depend on the security of the U.S. but also of the security of the S.U. It is therefore to Canada's advantage to contribute to the security of both the superpowers, and not side with one against the other.

As it stands now the *raison d'être* of NORAD is to provide a detection system which would warn the U.S. in case of a S.U. attack. The argument is that the vulnerability of the U.S. deterrent might serve as a temptation for the S.U. to launch a preemptive attack. To guard against this danger NORAD was developed to provide the maximum warning time for SAC bombers to get off their bases and be launched on retaliatory missions. The principal function of NORAD was therefore to enhance the survivability of the U.S. deterrent forces and to minimize the damage caused in any attack by destroying as many enemy bombers as possible before they could reach their targets.

Canada's role in such scheme is to act as a forward defence appendage of the U.S., rather than as an independent entity in itself. If Canada does not aspire

to anything more than being an American buffer state this role may not be very inconvenient. But if we are to have a state identity, we must look at our security in a wider context than North America. This context must necessarily include the S.U. as well as the U.S.

Canada's geographic position is such that the only threat to its territorial integrity can only come from either of the superpowers, and more likely from the South than from the North. So far we chose to secure ourselves by virtual subservience to the U.S. We could of course continue this policy and hope that the wisdom of our great neighbour to the south will save us from anybody else.

Another way however to maintain our security without sacrificing our independence would be not to put all our eggs in the U.S. basket. Without estranging our southern neighbour we should also cultivate our northern. Rightly or wrongly the Russians are just as afraid of an American attack as the Americans are of a Russian. Since in either case Canada, being in the middle, loses, our policy should be to make sure that neither is credible. So far we have helped the U.S. in minimizing such danger to itself, but this is only half the task. We should now offer the same services to the S.U. to increase their sense of security, and thereby improve the overall security of the world.

Specifically, Canada should offer reciprocal information to both the U.S. and S.U., and convert all detection facilities on Canadian soil to warn both sides. In other words widen the North American system to include Siberia in its defence perimeter. The new SINORAD would be able to detect, identify and warn ICBM; SLBM; and Bomber attacks coming from either inside or outside its security area. It would not have the capability to intercept or destroy any such attacks. Thus Canada should stay out of any ABM or other arms buildups. Such military defense arrangements ought to be left to the superpowers. Canada should be declared a nuclear free zone and all Bomarc Missiles withdrawn.

As a middle power at best, Canada cannot aim at an independent nuclear deterrent; its best defense is an amicable foreign policy and an imaginative diplomacy. Our defense policy therefore should be predicated within the greater principles of foreign policy. Only thus will we be able to avoid the danger of military considerations dictating our political interests.

P. J. Arnopoulos
May, 1969

COMMENTS

on

STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS, STABILITY, & THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY CANADA

This paper prepared by the Department of National Defence opens its argument with a fundamental error. As the title of its first part indicates, the paper equates Strategic weapons systems, stability, and the prevention of Nuclear War.

Thus on the second page the report speaks of a "solution" that "has been found, which not only preserved frontiers and prevented the use of nuclear weapons, but has permitted a considerable degree of detente." The grave error here is a classical case of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. The argument goes that since nuclear weapons systems have coexisted with general peace in the past two decades, the former have caused the latter. Such blatant misuse of logic can hardly be excused in an official paper prepared by a government department.

It may of course be the case that the "mutual deterrence at the strategic level" has in fact prevented nuclear war. This case however is at best hypothetical. We simply do not know what are the causes of peace nor what constitutes the prevention of war. To say that Nuclear deterrence is responsible for world peace is to plead a one sided argument. An equally valid argument could be made by choosing any other fact present in the world and claiming that it has saved the world from holocaust.

The Department of National Defence could have chosen the United Nations as the saviour of the world, and there would be no way of disproving that something which did not happen (i.e. war) would have happened if something else did not exist (i.e. UN or nuclear deterrence). As it is the officials of the Department singled out deterrence and made a fair, if not an entirely convincing, case, on its behalf.

This however disqualifies the paper as an objective report of background information to be used by a legislative committee for its deliberations. In spite of its factual appearance, the paper is a disguised advocacy of a particular cause. It is quite obvious that the Department of Defence wants Parliament to endorse the present policy and continue voting funds for its extension into the foreseeable future.

It is for this reason that the first paragraph of Part I of the Report contains the unashamedly rhetorical sentence:

"If a 'solution' had been offered that would guarantee existing frontiers and prevent the use of

nuclear weapons, at the annual cost of 10% of the GNP in perpetuity, it would have been seized with gratitude and alacrity."

Is it any wonder that the Defense officials expect a grateful country to buy their guaranteed solution for perpetual peace and at such bargain instalment plan.

The military of course, know that the government is reviewing its defense policy so this paper is their plea for the *status quo*. Before we alter their proven solution for the sake of change per se, or allow it to slip away through neglect and preoccupation with other problems, they tell us to "reflect on the 15 years of peace, consider how badly (we) want another 15 years of peace, and what risks (we are) prepared to accept that an abandonment of a successful solution could lead to the loss of peace." Being put in such way what sane man would opt to risk the peace.

The military naturally enough, do not want us to be preoccupied with "other problems" such as "arms control", "non-proliferation treaties", and "comprehensive test bans" since these might rock the boat of the stable nuclear deterrent. The "stable deterrent" of course, has to be continuously fed by a perpetual arms race. The report does not tell us where will all this escalation lead the world. Just because we were able to live with such policy so far, can we live with it forever?

One wonders why the report consciously avoided presenting other methods of international relations including disarmament, peacekeeping, & collective security. If as the report claims, "nuclear deterrence is not the official policy of the Department", why was it this policy alone that was advocated and all others ignored. Perhaps the members of the Standing Committee should also raise these questions.

P. J. Arnopoulos
May, 1969.

The proposed U.S. ABM system—comment by Kenneth H. W. Hilborn, Associate Professor of History at the University of Western Ontario and contributing editor, *Canada Month* magazine.

In the controversy over anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence, it is important to be clear about the definition of two terms—"first-strike" and "second-strike" capability.

"First-strike" capability does not mean merely the ability to unleash a nuclear attack against another nation similarly armed; any government with an

H-weapons stockpile and a delivery system can do that, if it is irrational enough to be willing to see its country annihilated by the victim's retaliatory blow. "First-strike" capability means the ability to initiate nuclear war as a rational act of policy—that is, without suffering more damage and casualties than the decision-makers on the attacking side would consider a tolerable price for global supremacy.

"Second-strike" capability means the ability to respond to an enemy's first strike with such effectiveness that the resulting injury could not be regarded as acceptable.

It follows from these definitions that in order to retain second-strike (deterrent) capability, the United States must prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a first-strike one. Mutual deterrence (the present "balance of terror") rests on two basic assumptions—that nobody has a first-strike capability, and that nobody imagines he has it. In other words, mutual deterrence depends on each side possessing second-strike capability, and on each believing (or at least fearing) that the other possesses it too.

There is more than one way in which a country can endeavour to eliminate a rival's second-strike capability, thus acquiring for itself a first-strike capability and upsetting the balance of terror to its own advantage. Obvious methods include:

(1) Strengthening of one's missile striking force in numbers, in accuracy, in power ("yield") of warheads, and in sophistication of decoys and other devices designed to thwart enemy detection systems and anti-missile defences. In any or all of these ways a potential attacker can improve his chances of wiping out much of an opponent's retaliatory forces before they can be launched.

(2) Deployment of an ABM system to protect one's cities from whatever retaliatory missiles the victim is still able to fire. (A retaliatory blow—a "second strike"—would have to be directed against cities; the prospect of retaliation against his missile bases would be little deterrent to a potential attacker, because in launching the first strike the bases would already have performed their function.)

(3) Civil defence measures, such as provision of fallout shelters, to reduce casualties from any enemy missiles that are neither destroyed by the first strike before being fired, nor intercepted in flight by ABM weapons.

The Soviet Union has been doing enough of these things on a sufficient scale to worry the Nixon Administration. In addition to developing their own ABM screen (now in place around Moscow), the Russians have been proceeding with large-scale deployment of a huge intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) known as the SS-9, which is believed to be capable of carrying either multiple warheads or a single warhead with a

yield as high as 25 megatons—equivalent to 25 million tons of TNT. Such a warhead is far more powerful than anything in the American missile arsenal.

If you intend merely to pose the threat of a retaliatory second strike against cities, thereby deterring attack, the only warheads you need are relatively small ones of the American type. To use an expensive SS-9 to devastate a city would make no sense; a smaller missile could do the job more cheaply. It seems, therefore, that the major SS-9 deployment can be explained most logically in terms of a Soviet attempt to achieve first-strike capability against the U.S. deterrent. The Americans have installed their ICBMs in "hardened" underground silos intended to protect them from nuclear explosions, but no hardening will suffice against a 25-megaton warhead delivered with reasonable accuracy.

Just as there is more than one way in which a potential attacker can seek a first-strike capability, so there are several methods which a potential victim can use to maintain his second-strike capability and thus preserve the balance. The most obvious are:

(1) Improvement in the concealment and mobility of one's retaliatory forces—in particular, a greater emphasis on missile-firing submarines in preference to ICBMs in fixed sites. But in the light of Soviet anti-submarine research, the present relative invulnerability of the U.S. submarine fleet may be only temporary.

(2) Deployment of more ICBMs, so that there will continue to be too many for the Communists to knock out in a surprise first strike even with the expanding missile force at Moscow's disposal.

This policy involves risk. A rapid increase in the number of American ICBMs might lead the Soviet régime to conclude that the *United States* was trying for first-strike capability. From the Western standpoint, of course, such a capability in American hands would be highly desirable; lacking it, and thus facing the prospect of perhaps 100 million dead from Soviet retaliation, the U.S. could not rationally launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union even in response to all-out Red aggression against Western Europe. But since U.S. public opinion is plainly in no mood to tolerate the expenditures which an effort to achieve true first-strike capability would entail, there is good reason not to give Moscow the impression that first-strike capability is the American goal—an impression which the Kremlin's hawks would doubtless exploit in arguing for further acceleration of missile production.

(3) Protection of existing ICBM launching sites with ABM weapons—the plan put forward by the Nixon Administration. Unlike an increase in the number of ICBMs, this step cannot be misinterpreted as part of a drive for first-strike capability. Whereas ABM defence for cities would help to blunt a Soviet second strike,

thereby contributing to an American first-strike capability, a similar defence designed primarily to shield missile sites is useless against the Soviet Union except for blunting a Russian first strike; thus, as far as the Soviet-American strategic relationship is concerned, it contributes only to U.S. *second-strike* capability. (After all, if the *Americans* had unleashed a first strike, the silos protected by the ABM system would already be empty.)

The probable effectiveness of an ABM screen is something that can be reliably estimated only by scientists with access to secret data derived from the most recent tests. Attempts by persons without such information to question the system's value are inherently unconvincing.

Talk about a danger from ABM fallout is merely puerile—if enemy ICBMs (especially SS-9s) were allowed to explode on target, the fallout would be immensely greater than that created by ABM interceptions. As for the view that an *American* ABM system would "escalate the arms race", the view is one that makes no sense whatever—in the light of the fact that the *Soviet Union* has *already taken the initiative* in the ABM field.

I conclude that the deployment of the ABM system proposed by the Nixon Administration would be a wise precaution for the security of the American strategic deterrent, and thus for the security of both the United States and Canada. Any Canadian official stand on the ABM question should be based on that reality.

Comments on Working Paper on NORAD

The following is a brief critical evaluation of the working paper. As requested, reference will be made first to its objectivity and contents, at least in part, and then an alternative method of analysis will be suggested.

There has been no attempt to discuss the 'extremes' of policy, i.e. independence/neutrality or total dependence/integration. To do so would involve considering Canadian Foreign Policy almost in its entirety. Whilst this has to be done in order to place the NORAD question in perspective, the underlying premise of the working paper—continued Canadian-U.S. defence co-operation of some sort—has been accepted.

Criticisms

The study assumes that "the air defence of North America is a single indivisible problem." This can be challenged on the grounds that as long as Canada plays a role in *detection* she need not maintain interceptor

and missile forces as these would draw Soviet fire which otherwise might not be directed at her. However, one can reject this line of thought (for political as well as military reasons) and still disagree on the form that Canadian participation in "indivisible defence" should take.

It is these other available options that the study has failed to elucidate and consider. In part they consist of choices between various weapon systems and their deployment, but nonetheless the choice of such systems will be dependent upon the *role* that is to be played.

Roles

The study discusses the need for *active* defence against enemy air attack, as well as the need to co-operate in detection systems. We can agree with the latter point whilst wishing to modify the stand that has been taken on active defence. The premises upon which such defence is based are outlined on pp. 11-12—but they are given under the heading "what would happen if one side abandoned its bomber defences?"—thus implying that we are faced with two choices only:

- 1) Maintain full anti-bomber defences and forces capable of shooting down attackers at considerable distance from their targets.
- 2) Abandoning all anti-aircraft defences and thus giving enemy aircraft a free run which would be "destabilizing" (p. 12) as it would threaten the "land based second strike forces" (p. 12) of the United States.

This neglects a third possibility.

- 3) Retain joint detection and tracking facilities and retain a limited number of aircraft for a SURVEILLANCE and IDENTIFICATION role. These aircraft could act as a *tripwire* force and thus the land-based retaliatory forces' second strike capability would not be impaired, as warning time would be adequate. This approach would also, if necessary, entail improvements in radar coverage.

To advocate this third posture is to try and:

- a) Limit Costs—Less, and different, aircraft might be needed.
- b) Preserve Canada's ability to survey her own airspace.
- c) Canada's nuclear role could be dropped if desired. Bomarc and air to air nuclear missiles could be phased out.

It might be objected that there is a negligible difference between this course and full participation in active defence. The number of aircraft required for

surveillance might be close to the number contemplated for option (1), and the aircraft type might be similar. But one should attempt to *establish* that this is indeed the case, and if it is so then at least the attempt will have been made to maintain Canada's contribution at a *minimum* level, and to avoid significant increases. The minimum level arguments also take into account one other aspect that the study ignores, and that is the possibility that large scale defence forces would be wiped out in a first strike (by missiles). In spite of the fact that such 'defensive targets' could draw fire away from other areas (e.g. cities) the very large number of Soviet missiles presently deployed reduces the value of this stratagem, and also it is a very expensive way to create targets. This observation admittedly raises issues which are outside the scope of the present argument, e.g. the ABM system; Civil Defence; germ/bacteriological warfare, but does illustrate that one should not consider bomber defences with only one question in mind, i.e. How can we prevent the great majority of Soviet bombers from getting through? One must determine whether significantly increased costs and activity *will* significantly reduce the status of the threat—and in this case it may not.

Therefore I am in favor of:

- a) Continuing co-operation,
- b) Continuing detection systems,
- c) Running a redesigned detection system, should this be necessary,
- d) Performing a surveillance function,
- e) Phasing out present equipment.

Possible Options

The range of options has been illustrated diagrammatically. Each option will be discussed briefly below but all reasons for choice have not been included and arguments could be developed at greater length if required. It should be remembered that Chart 2 does not illustrate all variables and combinations. To do so is virtually impossible in diagrammatic form, e.g., inclusion of Soviet/Canadian relations would add a third dimension. All that has been done is to illustrate in diagram 1 the area of U.S.-Canadian concern as I see it. This area of concern has then been placed in diagram 2 as part of the independence-dependence continuum. This is simply to argue that in the case of the acquisition of new weapons and co-operative systems we *can* think in terms of independence-dependence. It is not a generalization with regard to the whole of Canadian foreign policy, although it may be indicative, i.e. full co-operation in NORAD *may* not mean full co-operation in other important foreign policy and strategic areas.

The ABM system has been placed on the chart but has not been discussed as it is a subject for separate and detailed consideration.

Option (1)

Independence/Opting out of defence role—Neutrality.

This is judged to be unacceptable both because of the International repercussions and the domestic consequences.

Option (2)

Independent Defence—armed.

An adequate level of defence would be *extremely* costly and difficult to maintain, and could impair Canadian/U.S. relations.

Option (3)

A gradual *phasing out* of Canadian forces is one move that should receive serious consideration. The greatest drawbacks of this approach are:

- a) U.S. pressure to use Canadian airspace for over-flights.
- b) U.S. reactions to such a policy.
- c) Canada's inability to control her own airspace.
- d) Effect on the status of the deterrent depending upon Canadian reactions to (a).

Option (4)

Continuation of NORAD as at present, with the minimum possible increase that would ensure adequate radar coverage and the maintenance of 'aerial sovereignty'. This has been *recommended* previously.

Option (5)

Play a larger and more active role. The difficulties here are:

- a) Cost,
- b) Questionable military value,
- c) Continued nuclear role,
- d) Use of resources in other more profitable military areas.

Option (6)

Dependence.

This is judged to be politically unacceptable.

Any significant increase in the Canadian contribution to North American air defence is likely to prove expensive, and its military value is far more questionable than the working papers indicate.

Yours very truly,

D. M. Thomas.

Diagram 1




Diagram 2	INDEPENDENCE ←				→ DEPENDENCE	
	Independence 1. (disarm.)	Independence 2. (armed)	Recommended Options 4.		Options 5.	Dependence 6.
Items Maintenance and Acquisition						
New aircraft for active role. New AWACS.	None	Run independent system. No joint control.	No new aircraft. Gradual phase-out of F-101	No	Obtain	U.S. given the task. (officially)
New aircraft. Surveillance only.	None	Covered by above.	None	Yes	Covered by above.	U.S.
AWACS for surveillance	None	Covered by above	Perhaps	Probably	Covered by above.	U.S.
Present detection system	Disband	Run own detection system	Continue	Continue	Continue	Continue
ABM system for Canada	None	None	None	None	None?	?
\$ Cost	None	Astronom- ical	Low	Unknown	Unknown. Higher than 4?	Low?
Recommendation	Reject	Reject	Possible	Recommend	Possible	Reject
Comments	Total revision of all previous policies and commitments. Damaging.	Prohibitive cost and militarily ineffective.	U.S. needs not met. Overflight problem. Airspace control lacking.		High cost, uncertain strategic value, nuclear role.	Politically unacceptable.

Some Implications of the Current
Soviet Military Posture Relating
to the Defence of North America

by

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In his working paper on NORAD which Lieutenant General Sharp has submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, three developments in Soviet military policy have been mentioned which warrant further analysis. These three developments are:

- 1) the continued improvements in the present force of intercontinental range bombers of the Soviet Union, (p. 8)
- 2) the recent increase in Soviet training flights to the periphery of North America (p. 10), and
- 3) the fact that the Soviet Union is expected to have achieved numerical parity with the United States in land based intercontinental ballistic launchers by mid-1969, and that the Soviet Union will have a larger inventory than the United States by 1970 (p. 7).

It could be argued that these or any other point relating to the Soviet military posture have little bearing on Canadian air defence because the United States is the main target of the Soviet Union, and because a missile attack could destroy most centers of the United States without doing much damage to Canada or even without trespassing on Canadian air space. Yet, even if, as a consequence, the basic assumption underlying the NORAD agreement of 1958 that 'the air defence of North America is a single, indivisible problem' is no longer as indisputable a fact as it has been in 1958, Canadian geographic and military conditions are such that a practical separation of

Canada and the United States in terms of air defence would be self-defeating.

From the testimony presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Department of National Defence, recent Soviet military policy in relation to North America presents the following pattern: firstly, a period beginning with the mid-1950's when long range bombers were equipped to carry nuclear bombs; secondly, a period between about 1960 and 1967 when some intercontinental ballistic missiles were added to the Soviet arsenal, but at a much slower rate than it was done in the United States; and thirdly a period from 1967 onward in which the installations of ICBMs has been tripled so as to create a numerical superiority over US installations by 1970.

Surely to a certain extent it could be claimed that this development of Soviet nuclear missile capacity represents a defensive build-up aimed at counterbalancing US capacity. But a purely defensive policy would be pursued on a continuous basis, it would try to aim at an approximate balance, and it would stress defensive systems like the GALOSH system rather than offensive ICBMs or MRVs.

In contrast, the development of the Soviet military posture reveals significant lulls and spurt which obviously aim at a margin of aggressive superiority. Particularly the pre-1967 lull in missile installations has its main explanation in Soviet unwillingness to waste resources on less effective weapons. Hence the current rate of installation of essentially offensive ICBMs indicates a very aggressive design.

With regard to the continued improvements in Soviet long distance bombers and especially in the light of the recent production by the Soviet Union of a supersonic long distance transport plane which could be adapted to military use, a similar pattern prevails. Indeed, the increase in training flights to the periphery of North America makes it difficult not to agree with the conclusion of Lieutenant General Sharp that this state of affairs seems to suggest a renewed interest in bombers as a means of attack (p. 10).

In this connection it is necessary to point out a major discrepancy between various estimates of Soviet submarine missile strength. According to the submission of the Department of National Defence "the number of SLBMs which could be brought to bear against North America is probably of the order of 45 as compared to 656 of the US" (p. 9). In contrast, the US Senate Preparedness Subcommittee has reported on September 23, 1968, that the Soviet Union has more than 350 submarines, both conventionally and nuclear powered, and that in recent years Soviet shipyards have been expanded for an accelerated programme for construction of improved nuclear submarines. This report certainly fits more definitely into the overall aggressive pattern of Soviet military policy

than the estimate in the submission by the Department of National Defence.

All these developments in the current Soviet military posture suggest as a principal implication that a far-reaching accommodation to the concept of deterrence has taken place in Soviet military strategy. Or, in other words, the main pillar of North American defence, the reliance on the preventive effect of US retaliatory action, is gradually becoming less effective the more the Soviet nuclear missile capacity grows.

The parallel expansion in the capacity of all attack systems further suggests that Soviet planning is preparing for the possibility of a highly coordinated all-out strike to produce the greatest destruction possible. Such planning would be in keeping with Prof. Henry Kissinger's theory that "in the nuclear age, a general war fought by purely military criteria must have catastrophic consequences". ("Problems of National Strategy", p. 16)

Finally, within the context of such an all-out attack, the training flights of Soviet aircraft to the periphery of North America could also be interpreted as preparatory of a second stage of an attack which would consist in bringing commando units or even occupation forces to this continent for purposes of achieving complete control. To many American strategists this possibility seems to be unthinkable, perhaps as a consequence of their faith in deterrence or their belief that devastation would make occupation impossible. Yet, in the logic of an all-out nuclear attack, territorial possession of North America would still represent the main prize.

In such a setting Canada cannot remain neutral but would have to coordinate her defence with that of the United States. But it should be a truly defensive design capable of facing even a highly coordinated attack. It must be recognized that the concept of deterrence is not really a defensive policy. At best it is preventive, at least as long as the enemy has not obtained equality or superiority of weapons. But basically deterrence is an aggressive concept, and as such would consume resources for a purpose to which Canada does not subscribe—to say nothing of the inherently despicable nature of the entire concept. In its actual application, the destruction of another country is not going to defend, i.e. preserve Canadian or American cities. A true defence must be based on the destruction of the attacking forces. An anti-ballistic missile system, an effective anti-submarine and anti-bomber defence, and a highly mobile military force capable of handling commando raids as well as occupation attempts should provide the best protection for Canada.

In the submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Department of National Defence such a policy, especially one using ABM systems has been described as "destabilizing" (pp. 10 and 11) meaning

that it would increase the likelihood of conflict or pre-emptive attack. Such a conclusion would be an unfortunate interpretation of Professor Rathjens' paper on "The Future of the Strategic Arms Race" quoted on page seven of that submission. What he meant to say was that the logic of deterrence requires maximum destruction for destruction's sake to make deterrence really effective, i.e. 'stable'. Elsewhere Prof. Rathjens also states that the simultaneous deployment of ABM and MIRV systems would have a 'destabilizing' effect because the combination of effective defensive and offensive systems would put a country in a position where it could disregard deterrence and use pre-emptive warfare. But to argue that a good defence might be an inducement to attack must remain a contradiction in terms even in the peculiar logic of nuclear strategy.

There are some excellent examples of relatively small countries having successfully kept an overwhelming enemy from attacking them e.g. Switzerland vis-à-vis Hitler, or Tito vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. But in all those cases the price of their freedom has been an absolute commitment to use any defensive means available.

Unfortunately Canadian commitment to defence is not as convincing as it could be.

In terms of morale, the difficulty of defending all of Canada induces a general apathy which is even further deepened as there is no real feeling of insecurity nor any feeling of hostility against any other country in the world. And the proximity of a protective big brother does not help matters either.

With regard to the existing defensive installations Canada is not particularly well protected. In the case of an all-out attack, they can do little else than tell people to say their last prayers—that is if the warning system has not been sabotaged which should not be too difficult in a highly centralized and skin-deep affair. Although centralization is necessary and useful to counteract a coordinated attack, such centralization also increases vulnerability as a few strategic hits could paralyse the entire system. In this respect even hardening of the command centers might prove futile as the entire radar and communication system might be put out of action by the electro-magnetic pulse which is produced by nuclear explosions and which can be effective over considerable distances from the impact area. To reduce the effects of such blackouts, it might be desirable to provide individual units of the defensive apparatus with an independent operational capability. Such decentralization would also permit the creation of a second or third line of defence where population and topography would warrant it.

To sum up then, the current Soviet military posture reveals a concerted effort to obtain a highly diversified capacity for a coordinated nuclear strike which would even offer a likely capability to take

possession of North America. As the adequate accomplishment of such a capacity would probably still require a few more years, Canada's defensive system, though at present inadequate, could be improved in its truly defensive aspects to be able to handle the diversity of weapons likely to be used, and the kind of

coordination to be expected if a country takes the risk of a nuclear attack against North America. It would indeed be of no advantage if her love of peace would turn Canada into a neutral backdoor through which an enemy could destroy the main supporter of her freedom.

APPENDIX III

1. *Question:* Annual United States NORAD anti-bomber defence costs excluding NIKE/HERCULES missiles, and other point defence items which cannot be of any benefit to Canada.

Answer: The answer to the question is \$1.42 billion. The premise that NIKE/HERCULES missiles cannot be of any benefit to Canada is not accepted. If NIKE/HERCULES add to the credibility of the deterrent and in this way contribute to the prevention of war, then this is of benefit to Canada. NIKE/HERCULES missiles are situated close to SAC bases to provide these bases with a close defence against Russian bombers. In providing this defence, the missiles also provide some protection to the surrounding population. Four missile locations thus protect some Canadian territory, that is, Victoria and the Kingston-Toronto-Hamilton-Windsor complex.

If the cost of the four NIKE/HERCULES locations that protect some Canadian territory is added, the cost is \$1.45 billion. If all NIKE/HERCULES defences are included the cost of U.S./NORAD anti-bomber defences for FY 69 is \$1.63 billion. These costs do not include capital or R & D.

2. *Question:* Annual Canadian NORAD anti-bomber defence costs.

This should not include the cost of military detachments which are not really performing a NORAD function as mentioned in Mr. Gellner's memo.

Answer: Approximate FY-69/70 costs: \$135 million.

3. *Question:* Annual United States NORAD anti-ICBM and space costs. This should not include any costs of the S.A.C. or nuclear deterrent.

Answer: Approximate FY-69/70 average costs:

a. Excluding SAFEGUARD — \$240 million.

b. Including SAFEGUARD — \$1.14 billion.

4. *Question:* Annual Canadian NORAD anti-ICBM costs.

Answer: Nil. (Satellite detection — Baker-Nunn Camera — \$600,000.

5. & 6. *Questions:* Is the Commander-in-Chief of the Alaskan Command under the Command of Lieutenant General Sharp in the absence of CINCNORAD and is the Commander-in-Chief of the Alaskan Command in exactly the same position vis-a-vis NORAD as the

Commanders of the Western, Eastern, Northern and Central Regions?

Answer: There are two Commands in Alaska—Alaskan Command, a joint U.S. (Army and Air Force) Command, responsible for the defence of Alaska; and Alaskan NORAD Region, responsible for air defence. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S.A.F. Lieutenant General Breitweiser, is the Commander of both Commands. As Commander of Alaskan Command he is responsible to JCS Washington. As Commander of Alaskan NORAD Region he is responsible to CINCNORAD in the same way that other NORAD Region commanders are responsible; when the CINCNORAD is absent all are responsible in the same way to the Deputy CINCNORAD, General Sharp. The situation with Lt. Gen. Breitweiser is somewhat analogous to Maj. Lipton at North Bay. General Lipton is the Commander of Air Defence Command, Canadian Armed Forces, and as such is responsible to the CDS. General Lipton is also the Commander of Northern NORAD Region, and as such is responsible to CINCNORAD.

7. *Question:* Is there an American deputy commander of the Northern NORAD Region?

Answer: Yes. Brigadier General Robert B. Hughes.

8. *Question:* Which two of the 13 NORAD Divisions have Canadian Commanders?

Answer: 41st NORAD Division and 36th NORAD Division.

Question: Do they have American Vice-Commanders?

Answer: Yes.

9. *Question:* What are the two Regions and Four Divisions where Canadian officers are Vice-Commanders?

Answer: Western NORAD Region, Central NORAD Region, 25th NORAD Division, 28th NORAD Division, 29th NORAD Division, and 34th NORAD Division.

10. *Question:* What is the meaning of a perimeter type of defence as compared with an overall defence as referred to on page 7 of Lieutenant General Sharp's working paper?

Answer: A perimeter type of defence places all of the detection apparatus, weapon control facili-

ties, and weapons along the periphery of the vital area being defended. An overall defence includes the peripheral defence but extends it in depth both inwardly and outwardly to increase the length of time the attacker is subjected to defensive action.

11. *Question:* In what NORAD Region and Division is Ottawa located?

Answer: Northern NORAD Region, 41st NORAD Division, both under Canadian command.

12. *Question:* In what NORAD Region and Division will Ottawa be located after the revised areas become effective on August 15th?

Answer: Northern NORAD Region, 41st NORAD Division.

13. *Question:* Will Alaska continue to be a separate NORAD Division after August 15, 1969?

Answer: The Alaskan NORAD Region remains unchanged.

14. *Question:* Are the following facilities "in command NORAD" or do they merely cooperate with and feed information to NORAD? The BMEWS system, the Coastal RADAR System operated by the United States Air Force, the Space Detection and Tracking System, the Space Detection "Fence" provided by the United States Naval Space Surveillance System.

Answer: All systems mentioned are under the operational command of CINCNORAD. This means that the operational activities are directed by NORAD. It does not mean that NORAD administers or logistically supports these organizations. This applies to all NORAD forces.

15. *Question:* Lieutenant General Sharp's NORAD working paper at page 22 states that approximately one-third of the capital cost of the Pine Tree System was paid by Canada. Does this mean one-third of the total cost of the total System or one-third of the cost of the Canadian section?

Answer: One-third of the cost of the NORAD system in Canada (exclusive of the DEW Line and interceptor squadrons) was paid for by Canada. The Canadian monetary investment in NORAD outside of Canada essentially is Zero.

16. *Question:* If the present air defence system were continued, it is estimated that the total cost of air defence in the US would be \$11.7 billion from mid-67 to mid-77. At the end of this period, the annual costs would be \$1.12 billion. There would be little capital expenditure, so that most of the \$11.7 billion would pay for operations and maintenance (O and M).

The modernized air defence system would have new equipment. During the first half of this period (67-77) this new equipment would be developed and procured but at the same time, present forces would have to be maintained, so that annual budgets would be greater than at present. However, during the last half of this period, after the new equipment is paid for, obsolete equipment has been phased out and the number of operating personnel substantially reduced, the modernized system is expected to operate on \$.69 billion per year. (This is roughly one half to two thirds of the present annual O and M costs). The total cost from mid-67 to mid-77 to maintain the current level of defence and to effect the transition to the modern air defence system is estimated to be \$12.3 billion. This is for the US portion of the system, and about one quarter of it would be for capital acquisition.

Over the next ten years, the costs of either maintaining present forces or modernizing appear to be nearly equal, but for longer terms, probably after 1979, the modernized air defence option should result in significant total savings due to the lower annual O and M costs.

17 (a) (i) The Spartan warhead is designed for use at very high altitudes beyond the atmosphere, and its effectiveness against ICBMs is diminished if the radiation must pass through air, but it is known that damage on the ground will begin to be appreciable if bursts were to be much lower than 25 miles. We have been assured that the burst will be well above that altitude. It does seem possible, however, that if time and space permitted an interception over the sea or over uninhabited territory, and if the warhead still retains some effectiveness below 25 miles (which we do not know), that the defence would wish to conduct an interception at a lower altitude.

17 (a) (ii) It is certainly possible that both the yield and the range of Sprints could be increased in the future. DND will endeavour to maintain a close watch on US developments in ABM defence where there are Canadian implications.

17 (b) In order to explode before it was destroyed by a Spartan, an ICBM would have to possess a trigger mechanism which could either

- (i) detonate it beyond the range of the Spartan defences,
- (ii) sense the approach of a Spartan, and explode before the Spartan exploded, or
- (iii) sense the initial radiation from the Spartan explosion and explode before the Spartan radiation had rendered the ICBM warhead inoperative.

Method (i) would cause the explosion to be too high to cause significant damage.

Method (ii) is not considered at all probable. Elaborate sensors and controls would have to be built into the ICBM re-entry vehicle, which is otherwise a simple protective casing for the warhead.

Method (iii) may be technically possible. It would depend on the millisecond reaction times of the damaging Spartan radiation and the triggering of the ICBM warhead. To judge this would require knowledge of the design and detonation process of the Russian nuclear weapon. In any case the combined effects on the ground of the two warheads detonated at such high altitude would still not be serious.

18. If an ICBM were aimed at a target in the northern USA, succeeded in penetrating the defence, and burst on the ground, then the danger from fall-out would extend into Canada. If it were intercepted by Spartan at high altitude over either country, there would be no serious danger to anyone. If it were intercepted by Sprint at low altitude, this would have to be close to the target, and therefore in the USA.

19. *Question:* Does the two-key system apply to American interceptors operating over Canadian territory or only to Canadian interceptors (Mr. Cadieux is going to give the Committee a memorandum outlining the arrangements)?

Answer: No nuclear armed interceptors may operate over Canada without the prior permission of the Canadian government and United States Presidential release. Thus the "two-key" concept is carried out. Unarmed and conventionally armed American interceptors operate over Canada routinely, but only under the control of NORAD as a part of the unified continental air defence effort.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Command and control of weapons systems in NORAD is exercised under the "two keys" concept. No interceptors or Bomarc's can be launched with nuclear weapons over Canadian territory without the authority of both the Canadian and American governments. If hostilities were to occur the CINC NORAD would first have to obtain permission from the President of the U.S. to release nuclear weapons to Canadian forces and would then require the explicit authority of the Canadian government and the President of the U.S. to employ such weapons against attacking forces. Strict procedures have been developed for soliciting these authorities. The Combat Operations Center at Colorado Springs would be directed by the CINC NORAD to contact the National Military Command Authority (NMCC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the Canadian Forces Operations Center in Ottawa to request the necessary authority to act from the Canadian and American

governments. These request from the NORAD COC are transmitted in a coded form. The validity of the messages are checked by the recipients against the appropriate code and the messages would be invalid and not acted upon if encoded improperly. Reliable procedures and systems have been devised which ensure that governmental decisions, at the appropriate level, will be taken without introducing any significant delay in the military response system.

Once properly authenticated authority to use nuclear weapons has been obtained by CINC NORAD from both governments the command and control of nuclear armed interceptors and Bomarc's would be delegated down through Region commanders to division commanders. The transmission of the necessary authorities is accomplished by coded messages to the "two key" recipients who must provide the proper coded response before the authority is valid. Different codes are used for each member of the "two key" teams and no collusion is possible, i.e. each must respond independently and properly to make the authorities valid. When the validity of the authorities passed from the NORAD Combat Operations Center, on behalf CINC NORAD, have been established by the holders of the "keys", then, and only then, can the locks be turned which will make nuclear weapons available. Therefore, before any nuclear weapons can be employed in Canadian airspace:

- a. Canadian governmental authority must be obtained.
- b. The authority of the President of the U.S. to use nuclear weapons must be obtained as well as the authority to release such weapons to the Canadian forces.
- c. Canadian military personnel must receive a properly authenticated message from the CINC NORAD providing the authority to employ nuclear weapons.
- d. The U.S. members of the "two key" teams must also receive properly authenticated messages from CINC NORAD authorizing the release of nuclear weapons to Canadians and the use of nuclear weapons against attacking forces.

There are extensive physical security measures taken to safeguard nuclear weapons. In addition, there are safeguards in terms of personnel selection and operating procedures.

Any person who has duties in any way related to nuclear weapons must satisfy the following requirements:

- a. He must be security cleared.
- b. He must pass the HRP (Human Reliability Programme) in which he is extensively researched as to his emotional stability and indoctrinated in relation to his tasks.

- c. He must demonstrate knowledgeability of his task.
- d. He must be authorized to perform his task.
- e. He must monitor the actions of the person with whom he is teamed.

The "two man" concept applies to all nuclear weapons actions. That is to say that no action in connection with nuclear weapons may be performed by one person alone. This includes actions relating to controlling or authorizing, arming, releasing, deployment, jettisoning, transporting and actual access to the weapons and the concept is applied at all stages from the stockpile to the target.

20. *Question:* Are any NIKE/HERCULES/HAWK or other missiles sited now in the United States in such a way that they might intercept bombers over Canadian territory? If so, how many such locations are there and where are they?

Answer: Yes. See answer to question 1.

21. *Question:* US interceptors over Canadian territory—how often do they fly? Do they need flight plan clearance and any other special clearance?

Answer: US interceptors operate in Canadian air space and Canadian interceptors operate in US air space under the close control of NORAD. Arrangements for such flights are fully coordinated in advance with the air traffic control agencies of both Nations. Both Canadian and US interceptors operate as required by NORAD to perform air defence functions such as peacetime identification and to participate in frequent air defence exercises of varying magnitude. The frequency of cross border operations is daily. However, they are not armed with nuclear weapons. When armed with nuclear weapons see answer to Question 19.

22. *Question:* What are the technical reasons why Southern Ontario is under Eastern NORAD Region, rather than Northern NORAD Region?

Answer: For 41 NORAD division at North Bay to effectively control intercepts over Southern Ontario would require information from radars that the North Bay computer is not now receiving.

The capacity of each computer is limited—it can accept only a limited amount of radar information, it can control only a limited number of intercepts and it can display the air situation over only a limited area of land. The North Bay computer is already loaded to capacity, and to put Southern Ontario under North Bay would require another computer. There are other technical aspects. The area covered by a computer must be laid out in squares—a look at the map of Southern Ontario will show that in order to cover Southern

Ontario, more than Southern Ontario would be involved—this would either be wasteful of scarce computer space, or would enlarge the area covered by the North Bay computer even greater than the area of Southern Ontario. In addition to the extra computer and expensive communications that would be required, additional operator consoles would be required at North Bay, and additional people. I have not been able to obtain a cost estimate, but the cost would be considerable—in the millions.

Question: What percentage of Russian bombers, under existing defences would get through if one assumed 150 to start off?

Answer: This is a difficult question to answer for two reasons—the answer depends on which of a great many variables are assumed. Also an answer, other than a very general answer, is highly classified information.

If the 150 bombers approached in a wide front for example, some via Labrador, some via the central Arctic and some via Alaska, and if they approached at high level, and if they carried free fall bombs (and therefore had to penetrate to their targets) a very high percentage would be destroyed. If on the other hand, the bombers all approached via the same route, if they carried air to surface missiles, if they came in low, a very significant percentage might get through.

The above are the two extremes—probably neither extreme tactic would be chosen. Which one would be chosen would depend on Russian estimate of the effectiveness of NORAD. The high level attack, if it could be successful, would be the best because the biggest bomb load could be delivered most accurately. The low attack on the other hand has, in my estimation, but perhaps not Russian estimation, the best chance of being successful.

If AWACS, OTH and modernized interceptors are deployed, then effectiveness against low level attack, including air to surface missiles, is planned to be as good as it is today agreement high level attack with gravity bombs.

NORAD ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

The NORAD organizational concept provides for the integrated control of U.S. and Canadian forces in the defence of the continent. NORAD Regions, with the exception of Alaska, include both Canadian and American territory and airspace. The manning of Regions and Divisions is dictated largely by the forces made available for defence. For example, in Central Region Canada provides radars and geography while the U.S. provides the active defence forces, i.e. inter-

ceptors, Bomarc and Nike/Hercules batteries. Therefore, it is logical that the Commander's position at Central NORAD Region is allocated to a U.S. officer while a Canadian acts as deputy commander. On the other hand Northern NORAD Region also encompasses Canadian and U.S. territory but Canada provides a larger percentage of radars, weapons and command and control facilities. In this instance the command of the Region is allocated to Canada and the U.S. provides the deputy commander. This manning

philosophy is used throughout the NORAD system. Normally Canadians command in Canada and Americans at those control locations in the U.S. However, there are variations on this theme at the 36th NORAD Division with HQs at Topsham Maine, which is commanded by a Canadian and the 37th NORAD Division at Goose Bay Labrador which is commanded by an American. Again the relative contribution of weapons and facilities is the most important determining factor.

MEMORANDUM

V3010-26 (DConP)
15 May, 1969

PARLIAMENTARY RETURNS

NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS

1. At the 6 May session of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and External Affairs, a breakdown was requested of the O&M costs of the Canadian contribution to NORAD.

2. The breakdown is as follows:

<i>Element of Cost</i>	<i>Estimated Annual Cost (\$ million)</i>
Interceptors	\$ 38.9
Bomarc	\$ 4.2
Radars	\$ 67.7
Control Centres	\$ 3.4
Space Detection and Tracking	\$.6
Command Headquarters	\$ 20.2
TOTAL	\$135.0

3. It is recognized that in the paper presented to the Committee before General Sharp's testimony the annual cost for the two Bomarc squadrons was stated to be \$3.4 million per year. In para 2 above, the annual cost of the same two squadrons is shown as \$4.2 million. The reason for this is that financial authorities have adjusted the earlier figure to reflect support costs provided by CFB North Bay to the adjacent Bomarc Squadron.

J.R. Beveridge
Lieutenant Colonel
SOSS/CDS

K.W. Macdonald,
Lieutenant Colonel
DConP 2
2-5976

50
Government
Publications

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE


ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

EVIDENCE

No. 50



MARCH 8-22, 1969

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
TRAVELLING IN EUROPE

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

Including

Appendix JJJ—Index of Issues 41-43 and 46-49 inclusive.

MEMBERS OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE IN EUROPE—1969

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Nesbitt
Anderson	Harkness	Nowlan
Asselin	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Penner
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Prud'homme
Brewin	Laniel	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Buchanan	Laprise	<i>Miramichi</i>)
Cafik	Legault	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Carter	Lewis	Stewart (<i>Marquette</i>)
Forrestall	MacLean	Thompson
Gibson	Marceau	Winch—(30)

Also attending: Mr. David Groos, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Fernand Despatie,
Assistant.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
MONDAY, March 3, 1969.

Ordered,—That the Members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be granted leave to travel outside Canada between March eighth and March twenty-second, 1969, for the purpose of furthering their work; and that the necessary staff accompany them.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

EVIDENCE

Nicosia, Cyprus, March 10, 1969

Mr. J. C. G. Brown, Canadian High Commissioner: I should like to welcome you to Cyprus, this island of Aphrodite and sunshine where for some years a serious problem has not only dominated the lives of the Cypriot people but also attracted the attention of the entire world. Briefly the problem of Cyprus is that since independence was attained in 1960 and in spite of the international guarantees given by the Zurich and London Agreements, the two communities of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish, have not yet found a *modus vivendi* capable of assuring peace and stability on the island and the welfare of its people. And this situation persists despite Aphrodite and the sunshine.

May I first explain briefly the programme that we have arranged for your visit to provide you with a basis for reflection on peacekeeping in Cyprus. You have already heard from General Martola and Mr. Osorio-Tafall about the role of UNFICYP and the functions of the Secretary-General's special representative. There may be some overlap between their remarks and those of Brigadier-General Leslie and myself. I can only say that they have had the advantage of speaking first and without the benefit of advice from the General and me. Tomorrow's programme has two objectives: firstly to expose you to the Contingent so that you may see the peacekeepers at work and secondly to let you meet and question the island's political leaders: His Beatitude Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic, His Excellency Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, Vice President of the Republic and the two negotiators in the current talks, Messrs. Clerides and Denktash.

This evening, Brigadier-General Leslie will follow on immediately after me with a description of the military task of UNFICYP. After he has concluded his remarks he and I will be glad to answer questions but I must remind you that at 8:15 our guests for the working dinner will be here and the time at our disposal is therefore limited. However, both of us as well as officers of the High Commission and the Contingent will be available at the tables for questioning during the evening and there will be similar opportunities tomorrow for you to put your queries to us.

The scenario for peacekeeping on this troubled island is set by its long and involved history. I intend to go back only ten years. I have already referred to the agreements of Zurich and London on which the independence of Cyprus was based. Having regard to the complicated genesis of modern Cyprus and the immensely intricate negotiations leading to the agreements, it is not surprising that the constitution was a very delicately balanced mechanism requiring the best of goodwill to work. Basically, the historic separateness of the two communities was recognized and perpetuated within the institutional framework of the Republic. For example, the president was to be Greek-Cypriot and the vice president Turkish-Cypriot, each being elected by his own community. Of the cabinet of ten ministers, seven were to be Greek and three Turkish. This ratio was used also in the membership of the House of Representatives and the public service, police and gendarmerie. For the army the ratio was set at 60/40. Separate communal chambers were established to exercise legislative power on religious, educational and cultural matters and on personal status, and taxation powers were accorded to the chambers to provide funds for these purposes. Separate Greek and Turkish municipalities were created in the five largest towns.

Independence was attained on August 16, 1960 and in the following three years a number of serious constitutional problems were encountered. Some provisions of the constitution were in fact never implemented and when the Turkish ministers vetoed the budget in August 1963 because they believed that they were not receiving their constitutional rights, President Makarios sought a way out of the financial impasse. He proposed constitutional amendments involving thirteen measures "for facilitating the smooth functioning of the State and for the removal of certain causes of inter-communal friction" but these were rejected by the Turkish side. The first shot in the intercommunal war on December 21, 1963 put an end to constitutional discussions of a constructive nature for the next four and a half years.

The constitution of 1960 was only one of a series of basic documents signed when Cyprus became independent and these and the consti-

tution are still legally in force. Safeguards were spelled out in great detail to guarantee the rights of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey were given the right of intervention and the right to station contingents in Cyprus; these troops—950 Greeks and 650 Turks—are still here. Under the Treaty of Establishment the United Kingdom retained sovereignty over two areas totalling ninety-nine square miles known as the Sovereign Base Areas. These external interests in Cyprus, guaranteed by treaties, have been in play throughout the history of the troubled Republic. Although *Enosis*—union with Greece—and partition were ruled out in the Agreements, some elements of the Greek-Cypriot community have never given up *Enosis* and some in the Turkish-Cypriot community still think in terms of partitioning the island. Pan-Hellenism dictated to Greece support for the Greek-Cypriots while strategic considerations and the protection of the Turkish-Cypriot minority determined Turkey's attitude. When the fighting broke out, both countries supported their respective communities with arms and men and, as it had been during the fifties and earlier, Cyprus was once more a flashpoint in relations between Greece and Turkey.

Shortly after the outbreak of trouble Britain acted quickly, at the request of the Government of Cyprus, to stop the fighting and to forestall the threat of an invasion of the island by Turkey. The famous "Green Line" was established on December 30, 1963 and in January the British called a conference in London to be attended by delegates from Britain, Greece and Turkey and by the leaders of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. This conference failed but meanwhile the United Nations sent an observer to the island. Plans for a NATO peace-keeping force were amended to include United Nations participation and after its rejection by the Cyprus Government this scheme was eventually superseded by the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964 recommending the establishment, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force. On March 13 the Canadian Government agreed to take part in the Force and the first Canadian troops arrived in Cyprus three days later.

UNFICYP was first authorized to stay for three months. It has been here now for almost

five years, and the current six-months' mandate runs until June 15 of this year. The first months of the "Blue Berets" were not uneventful but by May 1964 UNFICYP had gained the respect of the Cypriots and had established some control of the situation. Since then there have been two very critical periods—in August 1964 and November-December 1967 when large scale local battles occurred and invasion by Turkey was imminent—and there have been innumerable local incidents throughout.

The fighting of November-December 1967 marked a watershed in the situation because Turkey, having made it very plain that it held Greece responsible, demanded and achieved the removal from the island of General Grivas of *EOKA* fame along with several thousand Greek troops who had been here irregularly. There was also a mutual realization by Turkey and Greece that they had come very close to war over Cyprus. When on March 7, 1968, the Cyprus Government lifted its economic blockade of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, the stage was set for Mr. Bibiano Osorio-Tafall, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to persuade the leaders of the two communities to stop shooting and start talking.

The principal actors in the inter-communal talks have been on the Greek-Cypriot side Mr. Glafcos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, and on the Turkish-Cypriot side Mr. Rauf Denktash, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber. Tomorrow you will meet these two intelligent, moderate men. In their initial contacts, which were arranged in June 1968 by Mr. Osorio-Tafall, they established that there existed a sufficient identity of views to proceed to a second phase in which written proposals were exchanged on the major constitutional issues. The two interlocutors, who are soon to be aided by sub-committees, have now begun a process of painstaking negotiation in an effort to arrive at workable and just solutions.

It is certain that the talking stage would not have been reached if the United Nations were not here. Great credit is due to the patient diplomacy of Mr. Osorio-Tafall working in a quieter atmosphere created by the equally patient efforts of UNFICYP to restore normal conditions and to erode tension. Yet—and I think that you will appreciate this bet-

ter after listening to General Leslie and after your briefings tomorrow—conditions are still far from normal on the island. Mutual suspicion and fear remain and the possibility of renewed fighting must not be discounted. In these circumstances the role of UNFICYP is perhaps even more important than it was before the talks began because the smallest incident must be prevented or contained if the negotiations are to progress.

That in effect means that the job of peace-keeping has to continue so that the more delicate enterprise of peacemaking may be undertaken. This is a subject which Mr. Osorio-Tafall has already discussed with you. In terms of the island itself it involves the search for a reasonable and workable arrangement under which the Greek-Cypriot majority and Turkish-Cypriot minority may live and work together in peace. Such an arrangement must obviously provide the Turkish-Cypriots with every assurance that their cultural, linguistic and religious individuality will be protected and enabled to flourish. It must also provide the one community with assurances that the other community will not obstruct the governing of the state or the development of the economy. These are difficult objectives but their attainment is made even harder by the need to satisfy Greece and Turkey that their national interests in Cyprus will be safeguarded. And going beyond that, the ultimate solution of the Cyprus problem must be viable enough—at the very least—to withstand comment in the world at large and particularly in the United Nations. All of these factors make it seem unlikely that peacemaking will be a rapid process.

I do not claim that the Canadian High Commission in Cyprus plays an active role in the job of peace-making though this possibility should not be ruled out. However, the High Commission does provide diplomatic support to the Canadian Contingent and to the peace-keeping effort of UNFICYP generally. I should like to say here that just as you in the committee have brought the fields of External Affairs and National Defence together, the foreign service and the armed forces have worked very closely together in Cyprus. The assignment of a Canadian Forces Adviser to the High Commissioner, at present Lieutenant-Colonel W. D. Little, has been of special value in this joint task.

Since my arrival in Cyprus, just three months ago tonight, I have had the privilege

of getting to know the officers and men of the Canadian Contingent and of seeing them at work. I have heard from the island's leaders, and from others, expressions of praise for the conduct of these Canadians and gratitude for their presence. Tomorrow, at the outposts, you will see Canadian soldiers on the basic job of keeping the peace. I am sure that you will, as I do, sense the high state of discipline and efficiency which characterises the Third Battalion of the Royal Vingt-deuxième Régiment.

May I now introduce Brigadier-General E. M. D. Leslie, the Commander of the Canadian Contingent and Chief of Staff to General Martola, the Commander of UNFICYP. Since his arrival in Cyprus last August General Leslie has played a leading part in taking the heat out of the situation on the island and in moving the parties concerned towards a peaceful solution. His energy and ability have won wide praise and I have much appreciated the collaboration of this outstanding Canadian soldier.

It is as Chief of Staff that General Leslie will speak. In this capacity, for reasons that you will understand, he is privy to information which is not circulated outside the United Nations: he may therefore be inhibited from replying to questions falling within this privileged domain.

Brigadier General E. M. D. Leslie, Chief of Staff and Commander Canadian Contingent: As the High Commissioner has told you I have a dual function in UNFICYP. I am Chief of Staff; General Manager if you will; of UNFICYP and Commander of the Canadian Contingent. I am sure you will not take it amiss if I say my second job, Canadian Commander, occupies but a fraction of my time. In truth, perhaps because the battalion commanders I have been given are so thoroughly efficient, I have, in so far as Military Regulations permit, turned effective command of the Canadians over to the resident battalion commander. This, you will understand, is not because I am idle for the fact is I really am fully occupied as Chief of Staff and, of considerable importance, by keeping clear of all but essential Canadian matters, I am enabled to treat all eight contingents alike. In view of this and because you will be briefed by Lieutenant Colonel Riffou tomorrow, I will direct my remarks towards my main task and speak tonight on the broad aspects of UNFICYP.

Since the time the Committee has available is short may I, purely in the interest of indicating areas on which I am sure you will wish to question me more fully, give you some confidential opinions on the Force, its successes and its future. All these opinions are based upon and derived from personal knowledge acquired from 15 August 1968 to date—the period I have been Chief of Staff of UNFICYP. However you will appreciate that none of the opinions expressed, despite my position in UNFICYP, necessarily reflect the exact thoughts of the Force Commander or of New York. I speak here as a servant of Canada to Legislators of Canada.

Before entering into my subject proper may I, with the aid of the simple maps and charts displayed, refresh your memory on some of the salient points that effect UNFICYP. The map shows Cyprus which, for simple comparison purposes, is 3,572 square miles, that is one and a half times the size of Prince Edward Island which is 2,184 squares miles, and has a population of 110,000. Cyprius as a population of 614,000 of which 80 percent are of Greek origin and 18 percent Turkish. UNFICYP has been in business since 27th March 1964 and, since that date, perhaps 93 Greek Cypriots have been killed and 190 wounded, and 100 Turkish Cypriots have been killed and 106 wounded in the intercommunal strife. In addition some 190 Turkish Cypriots and 40 Greek Cypriots are missing. Depicted on the map are the main deployments of UNFICYP and the more important Turkish enclaves. Turkish Cypriots have with minor and, one might almost say, normal reservations, freedom of movement throughout the island. Greek Cypriots cannot enter or pass through Turkish enclaves except under UN escort. Enclaves are ringed with two rows of deployed and dug in troops—Turkish fighters inside, Cypriot National Guard outside, but otherwise are unmarked and, in many places, it is not hard to stray into no-man's land—not hard but dangerous. In places no-man's land is one narrow lane wide which, I do not have to tell you, is uncomfortably close quarters but you will see some of this for yourselves tomorrow. Seeing—you will have no trouble understanding why I seldom have an undisturbed night.

The first chart gives you an idea of the military and para-military forces on the island with an approximation of their strength. In addition to the forces shown there are British forces in the SBAs but these

are quite separate from UNFICYP's problem. You will note that UNFICYP, at least numerically, holds nothing like a balance of military power.

The last chart shows the assigned tasks of UNFICYP and it is in relation to these that most of the remainder of my remarks will be directed. Let me do this by posing questions to myself.

Has UNFICYP materially contributed to the attainment of Task 1?

Quite apart from the ceaseless watch and ward, of which you will see more tomorrow, which has a constant but immeasurable deterrent effect against what we call the local or accidental incident—the nervous sentry who shoots at shadows—I will give you two incidents where, had it not been for UNFICYP and UNFICYP actions, I consider serious intercommunal fighting might have broken out. While, obviously, since intercommunal fighting did not break out, it is possible to question the validity of this opinion, I do state to you that I am not alone in considering these two incidents were potentially very dangerous.

(a) At Meladhia on 15 January 1969 over a question of the investigation and arrest of a Turkish Cypriot villager who allegedly murdered three of his fellow villagers, who were also Turkish Cypriots. This incident is what I would describe as an accidental confrontation that escalated and, had it not been abruptly dealt with would certainly have led to local intercommunal fighting.

(b) On Naousis Street on 10 11 and 16 February over a question of patrolling by the Cyprus Police (the police of the Government of Cyprus who are all Greek Cypriots) in a very sensitive area. This incident was not, in my opinion, perhaps an entirely accidental confrontation—certainly we in UNFICYP saw it coming and, perhaps, understood some of the circumstances behind it.

Since it would be most improper for me to give public expression of my personal opinions, I would ask the Committee's indulgence that any further questions you may care to direct at me regarding these two incidents be conducted "in camera" and off the record.

In addition to these two incidents I have, perhaps because I am over-cautious, thought

it wise to raise the alert status of all, or a portion of, UNFICYP a total of nine times since I have been Chief of Staff. In other words I have feared violence and further fighting a total of nine times since August last.

What contribution has UNFICYP and its allied organization UNIVPOL, made to the maintenance and restoration of law and order?

While it is not possible for me to give a precise description of what UNFICYP and UNCIVPOL have contributed towards fulfilling this second task, I consider that we have contributed much. Certainly the mere presence of the UNFICYP military has given a degree of security, a sense of security, to many of the Cypriots. In addition UNFICYP personnel have, by persuasion and negotiation, solved innumerable disputes over such things as cattle rustling, illegal cultivation of fields, arrangements to permit both sides to harvest crops in disputed areas, questions of water rights and ownerships, and all the innumerable other difficulties which arise in any society that is seriously divided. We have arranged to transport doctors into areas normally forbidden by one side or other, escorted ambulances through enclaves, pursued the search for missing peoples presumably killed in earlier and more vicious times, arranged for the transmittal from one side to the other of public documents and records that are so essential to modern life and acted as impartial police observers in many criminal and civil investigations. Even antiquities come under our eye and UNCIVPOL has done much to inhibit the highly illegal, and detrimental, practice of tomb robbing. As you know this island is an archaeological paradise and much valuable loot is, with much wanton destruction, stolen by grave robbers.

What contribution has UNFICYP made to the return to normal conditions?

I do not think there is need for me to say more than the answers to the two previous points in a measure cover the contribution we are making towards the desired day when normal conditions will return to the island.

Another question I am sure you will ask is what is the situation now — where have we reached in the process of establishing normal conditions?

To this my view is that we have attained a

state wherein it is not likely that either side will deliberately resort to widespread violence to achieve their aims. Accidental confrontations such as Meladhia are always possible but even these, in my view, could now be contained and should not spread throughout the island. Furthermore, less accidental confrontations, such as the Naousis Street incident, are becoming less credible. By this I mean that whilst it is possible that such incidents can arise, I doubt if the responsible political leaders will permit these affairs to escalate into island-wide violence.

Another question I am sure you will ask is how UNFICYP has adapted itself to the changing situation?

As you probably know the original UNFICYP was 6,369. In May 1964 UNFICYP was strengthened by its sister organization UNCIVPOL at 173. Over the years the strength of UNFICYP has steadily declined—the last decrease was 25 per cent of the then existing Force and the strength of UNFICYP today is 3525 and UNCIVPOL 174. Hand-in-hand with the reduction in UNFICYP there have been very considerable reorganizations and redeployments. For example we are just now completing a massive static OP reduction programme wherein some 60 static OPs that have been in position for up to four years have been eliminated. We are now effecting a new deployment for UNCIVPOL which will see them deployed throughout the Island in what I call rural constabulary type posts. The object of this redeployment of UNCIVPOL is to get our police living with the people so that they, knowing the people and their territories intimately, can anticipate problems and developments. Further than this UNFICYP is constantly pressing on both sides the advantages to be gained from disengagement/disarmament measures and programmes. While these plans are not being accepted with the eagerness we had hoped, we continue pressing them at every opportunity.

Finally we are quietly moving towards a general removal of the obvious presence of UNFICYP military—this of course is allied with the redeployment of UNCIVPOL—so that the people will see much less of what is, no matter how one looks at it, an obvious foreign military presence. At some stage in the not too distant future we hope to have our soldiers withdrawn into barracks or cantonments outside of the main population cen-

tres, and Camp Maple Leaf is an example of this programme.

Perhaps it would interest you to know that all these reductions and reorganization are initiated at HQ UNFICYP and are advocated to UN HQ in New York as desirable military adjustments required to meet a changing, and improving, situation. The point I am trying to make is that while we, UNFICYP, are very much alive to the necessity for reasonable economy, the reductions we have advocated are based on a military appreciation that we can, in view of changing circumstances, carry on our task with less resources. I will even strengthen that and say that for political tactical purposes, a visible indication in the form of reduced presence, we want less troops at this stage. Later on we will want even less than now. No doubt our UN masters appreciate, as do we, the consequential economies but, forgive my saying this, economy is a by-product in our eyes.

You will, I am sure, wish to question me on UNCIVPOL

UNCIVPOL is a new organization in UN work and it has a very great potential. However, I would caution you that it is not a universal cure. Remember UNCIVPOL are unarmed policemen without powers of arrest or interrogation. Their prime duty is to effect a liaison, a police type liaison, between organized police forces. Under circumstances where there is only one, or no, police force, the UNCIVPOL concept might have little validity. Furthermore UNCIVPOL must not be taken as a substitute for UNFICYP any more than at home we would regard police as a substitute for the armed forces. Frankly I give you as my personal opinion that UNCIVPOL are now coming into their own—that prior to the last six months UNCIVPOL did many things that could have been handled by the military, which, of course, is not to say that UNCIVPOL were idle or unproductive in the past. Incidentally, policemen cost a lot more than soldiers. Now, however, UNCIVPOL are definitely coming into their own and I see the day when, as at home, the military, that is UNFICYP, will come into support of the police, that is UNCIVPOL. As a personal opinion I think this day is in sight and, again, this explains why we are redeploying UNCIVPOL right now.

I am sure you will ask me for an expression of opinion as to the future of UNFICYP AND UNCIVPOL

While you must understand that this is a personal opinion and is predicated upon my personal reading of developments—in other words despite my office as Chief of Staff it must not be taken as an official or binding commitment—these are the developments I see:

(a) Given some progress in our disarmament/disengagement programme, in particular a disengagement in the Larnaca/Scala area which is our model, I believe there is a reasonable chance that the Force could be cut by something of the order of 1,000 men. Perhaps a word on the basic planning criteria on which I am working would help. If we get a reasonable measure of disengagement, I feel perhaps the main requirement would be to position about a company of infantry into troubled areas within 30 minutes. It then becomes a question of time and space and a function of available equipment. If we had enough helicopters we could possibly meet this time and space criteria with a relatively small infantry force—however we do not have enough helicopters. At the same time, even with very considerable success in disengagement, we will still require a certain number of static observation posts covering critical areas. Without taking you through all the processes of military planning, I estimate that a military force of about 2,500 would suffice once we get well into the disengagement/disarmament programme we have proposed.

When will all this take place? Gentlemen I am sorry I simply do not know.

(b) With respect to further reductions, that is below 2,500 men, I am of the opinion that a force of 2,500 is the minimum that has a viable military potential—again this is a question of complicated military thinking related to equipment and the time and space factor I mentioned before. I think that if there were any further reduction below the 2,500 men mentioned before, a military force as such is no longer the answer. If the situation warrants a force smaller than 2,500 men it also perhaps warrants switching right straight through to a Military Observer/UNCIVPOL type of Mission. My personal estimate is several

hundred military people and about 200 UNCIVPOL.

Again, however, I caution you that this is my thinking and there are political and other reasons which could demand the retention of a small military force during at least the early stages of the Observer-UNCIVPOL phase. Undoubtedly the mere existence of such a small force might give a sense of security to the population, but, speaking as a soldier, I find it hard to visualize what effective military role it could fulfil. Having said that I hardly need to say to this Committee that soldiers are often deployed for reasons that are more political than military and that I can think of a number of very sound, in my perhaps untutored view, political reasons for keeping a small UN military force on Cyprus for as long as the troubles last.

With your indulgence Gentlemen I will, because my knowledge of French is not yet as good as it should be, respond to questions in that language after translation and in English.

Nicosia, Cyprus,
March 1969.

Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus: In welcoming you to the Turkish Sector of Nicosia I wish to thank you for giving us this opportunity to acquaint you with the Turkish Cypriot view on United Nations Peace-keeping operations in Cyprus which I understand is the main object underlying your visit. I also wish to thank His Excellency the Canadian High Commissioner and his staff for arranging this meeting.

Needless to say that UNFICYP has made valuable contribution in preventing local incidents from developing into major clashes between the two communities and in bringing about the peace and quiet that is now prevailing in the Island but for which the exploratory talks between representatives of the two communities would have never commenced. It is very important that the peaceful atmosphere which had enabled the commencement of the talks should be maintained if these talks are to continue and to come to a successful conclusion.

It is my firm belief that to maintain this atmosphere UNFICYP's presence in the Island is essential. Another factor requiring the presence of UNFICYP is that the situation is still

very delicate and precarious and with the withdrawal of UNCIVPOL the Greeks might be tempted to renew their attacks on the Turkish Community with very grave consequences and a possible war between Turkey and Greece.

In order that you may be able to make a proper assessment as to the effectiveness and the need for a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus it is necessary to have some background information about the problem of Cyprus and the factors which have brought about this problem. I shall request my friend Mr. Denktash, who is well conversant with all the aspects of the problem of Cyprus and is indeed representing the Turkish Side on the intercommunal talks, to give you this background information and answer any questions that you may wish to ask on the matter.

Before doing so, however, I would like to take this opportunity to express my and the Turkish Cypriot Community's gratitude to the Canadian Government for its very valuable contribution to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and for the active interest it has always shown in the problem of Cyprus.

Thank you.

Mr. Rauf R. Denktash, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber: Your Excellency, Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for us to welcome you here in the Turkish sector of Nicosia.

It gives me much pleasure to inform you that the word "Canada" brings to us, the Turks of Cyprus, and specially the Turks of Nicosia, pleasant memories. It brings back to us Mr. Justice Wilson, a Canadian High Court Judge, who became our first Chief Justice under the 1960 Constitution and who sat in our Courts as an honoured, respected and impartial judge bent on doing good for Cyprus. Even during our darkest days Mr. Justice Wilson did his best to keep the Courts functioning and tried to keep justice out of the political arena. He had to leave in 1964 when he found out that he could make no headway—I hope not as a disappointed man. Mr. Justice Wilson symbolized for us Canada, as a civilized country, eager to help those in need of help, eager to set up the rule of law without which there can be no peace, no settlement and, indeed, no civilized society.

"Canada" and "Canadians" also bring back memories of Canadian Officers, Sergeants and men in Cyprus, who used to enter the Turkish Sector carrying sweets and chocolates to half-starved Turkish children, while an inhuman Greek Cypriot blockade hit us all for weeks and months on end. These soldiers knew that if the Greek administrators found out what they were doing they would be ostracized and even "punished" for their good deeds; but they did not care. The starved looks of Turkish children and the sullen forbearance of their parents were too much for their civilized Canadian hearts. Being impartial but also not being able to overlook such suffering with cold indifference, are not always incompatible. We are grateful to our Canadian friends but we do not make that public, lest your boys fall into disfavour with the other side. Yes, this is, unfortunately the facts of life in Cyprus. Sympathizing with us may upset the other side...

So, Canada meant for us civilization at its best; a civilized impartial approach to our problem. And what is this problem? Why is Nicosia divided into Greek and Turkish sectors? Why the dividing "green lines", "blue shaded lines" and "red shaded lines"? What has happened to this beautiful island?

It is difficult to answer all these questions in a short space of time. I'll, therefore, try to give you a brief sketch with sufficient basic details in order to put you in the picture.

The Cyprus problem is projected by the Greek Cypriot side as a political problem which arose from Constitutional difficulties. This is not so. The Cyprus problem is a moral problem and has arisen because the Greek Cypriot side has deliberately dishonoured its signature to international agreements. Dishonesty lies at the very root of our problem.

Cyprus was part of Turkey from 1571 to 1878; in 1878 Great Britain took over the administration of Cyprus under a special agreement with the Sultan, the sovereignty still vested in Turkey. Cyprus became formally and legally a crown colony when in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey recognized the unilateral British annexation of 1914. So from 1571 to 1923 Cyprus belonged to Turkey.

After the British arrival in Cyprus a very limited number of Greek Cypriots, under the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church, began to agitate for enosis (union of Cyprus

with Greece); to us, the Turks of Cyprus, this would mean changing colonial masters for the worse. So we opposed it each time this policy was brought up by the Greek side. The two communities had lived for three centuries under the Turkish rule in harmony; but inter-communal relations began to get disrupted from the day "enosis" was made an issue by the Greek side. Over the years this policy gained ground amongst the younger Greek generations who were constantly indoctrined in this "ideal". The two communities completely differ in language, tradition, ethnic origin, religion and political aspiration. But these differences did not prevent peaceful co-existence as long as juridical and political equality was maintained between them. It is only when the Greek Cypriot side hits out for achieving "enosis", that the two sides find themselves in deadly conflict.

It is because of this "enosis" policy that the Greek Cypriot leadership rejected all offers of self-government by the British.

It is when the determination of the Turkish Cypriots to defend their homes, their historic rights and juridical status became apparent to the Greeks that a new way out was considered by their leadership, and that was a dishonest way—and that dishonesty lies, as I said earlier, at the root of our problem.

Shortly this is the position: From 1955 to 1958 the Greek Cypriot leadership had embarked upon terrorist activity against "the British" and "all those who would oppose the drive for enosis". Death was the reward for doing so. Eoka (the underground Greek organization) declared that Turks of Cyprus who opposed "enosis" were enemy No. 2, to be dealt with—

"Swiftly and effectively as soon as the fight against the British was over". We could not stand idly by and wait for our approaching fate. We organized and took all necessary defensive measures. Greece was helping the Greek Cypriots to grab and re-colonize Cyprus; we turned to Turkey for assistance. Greece was "the motherland" for Greek Cypriots; Turkey was our fatherland.

Turkey made it known that she could not stand idle while a policy of genocide against the Turks continued in Cyprus at the instigation of Greece.

It became apparent that "enosis" could not be materialized while the Turks of Cyprus continued to defend their juridical and political status and rights with full vigour.

So, the Greek side pretended to agree to a settlement on the basis of an independent Cyprus.

And the Republic of Cyprus became a reality in 1960.

This republic lacked one thing: the goodwill of the leadership of the majority to keep it as a going concern! The Independent Republic of Cyprus was doomed to die the day it was born because the Greek leadership had agreed to it as a means to an end; they were to get hold of power in Cyprus and then use it for achieving "enosis"!

That is why I say that our problem is neither political nor constitutional. It is moral.

What was the nature of the Republic of Cyprus? What was its Constitution? The Greek Cypriot side complains that Cyprus did not have "true independence": is this true? They also complain that the agreements which created the Republic and the Constitution were unjust. What do they mean?

I shall try to answer these very briefly.

The Republic of Cyprus, its agreements and Constitution were based on the realities of Cyprus.

The cause of intercommunal trouble had been the Greek drive for "enosis" and its consequential result of denying Turkish rights in Cyprus. So, the Constitution prohibited the annexation of Cyprus, in whole or in part, with any other country and set up a fair balance of administrative partnership between the two communities.

Could this arrangement work?

Yes—and indeed, it did work satisfactorily for 3 years from 1960-63, during which period the two communities separately and Cyprus as a whole made tremendous headway. Had the Greek leadership waited for another two years and allowed Cyprus to have its second election in 1965 the Republic of Cyprus would have become a strong, viable project. That is why a plan of action was prepared and put into effect at the end of 1963. The object was to remove Turkish Cypriots as a political stumbling-block on the way to enosis by a direct armed attack. Hence our problem. We proved to be immovable; Turkish resistance which was estimated by the Greek leadership to last not more than 6-8 hours still continues. And why the Turkish enclaves, the green lines and the separation?

The so-called Turkish enclaves are areas into which the Greek bandits of the early days (now they have been properly organized into a Cyprus Army under the direct command of Greek officers from Greece) were not able to penetrate because of our resistance. The green lines which mark the boundaries of these enclaves pass, in most cases, over red Turkish blood of our young men who fell defending their backyards, homes or villages. This green line, in no place, passes through Greek territory. It marks the last point of defence for our homes.

Thus the separation which you now see in Cyprus came about as a result of Greek action. Greek attacks on us gave birth to our defence lines and to the defenders of these lines, the Turkish Fighters; Greek leadership chose to declare us "rebels" because we did not succumb to their attack on us; so, we had to declare to the world that we would not recognize such a leadership as the lawful government of Cyprus. Hence the political separation. Again, in order to induce our speedy capitulation the Greek leadership, which had usurped all powers of government, refused to pay the salaries of Turkish civil servants and utilized all the budget-funds of the Republic for the Greek sectors and for maintaining an army to hit us with. We on our side had to organize into an administrative unit, as life would be chaotic without such organization. Hence the administrative separation.

More than once Turkey had to come to our rescue when overwhelming Greek Cypriot and Greek mainland troops tried to wipe us out from our homes or villages and, but for Turkey's determination to protect us, the Greek leadership would have settled the Cyprus problem over the dead bodies of 120,000 Turks long ago—hence, our determination not to cast off our ties of guarantee from Turkey.

And what of the future? Is there any change of heart in the actors of this drama? In November 1963 Archbishop Makarios gave to the Turkish Vice-President his proposals for amending the Constitution. Had we accepted these proposals our community would have become a minority in Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots would have become masters of Cyprus to the extent of choosing to unite Cyprus with Greece. Greek Cypriots claim that the 1960 regime did not give Cyprus "full independence" because preventive clauses and guarantees were worked into it in order to prevent them from destroying the

regime and re-colonizing Cyprus. I am sure you will agree with me on the proposition that each Constitution has its own self-protecting clauses and these, in no way imply that such countries do not enjoy full independence.

Be that as it may, we refused to accept any modification of our Constitution because we saw the purpose behind this request. That is why we were attacked.

This is the background story. Can anyone expect us now to agree to Archbishop's 1963 proposals after all has happened in Cyprus? I believe no fair man will do so.

What do we want?

We want peace. And we know that the way to seek peace is by having an open mind and a compromising attitude while keeping yourself constitutionally strong and ready for any eventuality.

I think I can honestly say that we have entered into the present negotiations with an open mind. We have shown willingness to compromise wherever we could. We have tried to understand the other side's difficulties and problems and we have sought ways and means of accommodating these.

But we cannot yet afford to disband our forces or eliminate the green lines, nor can we afford to disband our administrative set up. Life has to go on in administrative strata and legislative, executive, judicial functions cannot be stopped. We have to be strong if we are to be treated by the other side as worth talking peace to. We have to maintain our fighting forces because the Greek side continues to maintain its attacking force in full swing.

But can we compromise on all issues? Can we agree to all Greek Cypriot demands? I am afraid we cannot. There are fundamental issues on which we cannot compromise; questions relating to security of life and property, and the ways and means of guaranteeing these are fundamental issues for us. And can you blame us for this stand after all that has happened to us?

How do we intend to plan the future structure of our regime?

I think we must start with a Central Government in which the Turkish element will be adequately represented; we must have an independent Republic of Cyprus, the

independence of which will not again be put into jeopardy in the name of enosis; which will have adequate, satisfactory guarantees so that the 1963 performance cannot be repeated. For us the only acceptable guarantee is the only guarantee which has worked effectively during the 1963-68 period and that is Turkey's guarantee.

Each time we faced grave danger it was Turkey's action which saved us. The Greek Cypriot leadership felt itself free to interpret Security Council's resolutions in such a way as to give it the right to continue to attack the Turks in the name of good government and keeping the peace; protestation to the contrary from the Security Council and the Secretary General himself would fall on deaf ears if the Greek leadership felt that it could get away with what it was doing to us; the U.N. peace keeping force in Cyprus would be defied and even trifled with, or manhandled, once the Greek leadership decided to proceed with a pre-planned line of action. Both in 1964 and 1967 it was after such defiance of the UNFICYP by the Greek armed forces that the Turks were attacked. No one could prevent a carnage. UNFICYP could only watch and plead. In both cases Turkey had to take a limited police action before the Greeks would stop.

So we feel that there can be no better guarantee not only for us but also for the independence of Cyprus than this national guarantee. Greece should, naturally, in spite of her record on Cyprus, continue to guarantee the Greek "fears" about alleged "Turkish plans for partitioning the island".

Partition, by the way, has never been a policy per se of the Turks. It meant that Turks would allow Cyprus to be united with Greece, provided that Turks of Cyprus and their lands (we own more than 30 per cent of the arable land in Cyprus) are left out of it, in which case Turkey comes in. Partition is the Siamese-twin counterpart of enosis; it is as much alive, or as much dormant, as is the enosis campaign.

So, we want to have—

- (1) a Central Government in which we will have a fair representation with agreed rights;
- (2) our independence and security of life to be effectively guaranteed;
- (3) we should continue to enjoy our constitutionally recognized communal rights in the

field of education, religion, cooperatives etc, and

(4) we should have local autonomy; local authority government so that daily friction between the two communities is reduced to the minimum while the people are given the right to rule themselves in agreed spheres as is the case in a number of civilized countries. The extent and nature of such local autonomy must be adequate and the spheres on which the Central Government may be involved in local authority affairs must be kept at its minimum;

(5) security in Local Authority areas must be the responsibility of the local authority involved.

Are we asking too much? I don't believe so. I believe that we are not being unrealistic. I feel that we are searching for an honourable settlement in the light of our bitter experiences. And I feel that this search must continue at all costs.

And this brings me to the role of the U.N. in Cyprus.

Your forces in Cyprus are doing a splendid job. It is costing you a great deal of money, we know. But an untimely withdrawal of these forces or reduction in their numbers may well be fatal. Only some ten days ago U.N. was able to avert an incident (at Omorphita) which could easily have escalated into a major clash. I feel that we need an effective U.N. force in Cyprus until the very day of a settlement. It will be catastrophic to think otherwise and it may render valueless all your sacrifices so far, if an untimely decision of withdrawal is made.

Your boys here mean comparative safety for us. They are the eyes and ears of the international world in Cyprus and this help to keep the parties at bay; it is true that once the Greek side decides, as a matter of policy to attack us, the U.N. force—being outnumbered and outgunned—cannot do much; it has to step aside and watch. But such occasions are rare and they are not likely to occur in the future. But there are local skirmishes, misunderstandings, or attempts to pull a fast one on the other side—all these are dangerous flickers of flame in this powder-keg of a place and that is where your boys come in. They are capable of extinguishing such flames immediately and thus save the situation from escalating. We are grateful to your boys and thankful to your Government for the help rendered to Cyprus.

When is a settlement likely? I do not know. I don't think anyone can give you even an approximate date. We are trying not to waste time. But it is not an easy task that we have. We are doing our best.

Question—I wonder if you can tell me whether in your opinion the Greek Cypriots are still in some future time want to bring about Enosis?

Denktash—They have just formed, or they are forming their own parties now. The rightists. Two of the parties have declared openly that their political aim is enosis, the Union of Cyprus with Greece, and they will fight for it. These are the two political parties. Makarios has declared that in politics it is not what is desirable but what is attainable, that is achieved, and although what is desirable is there, for the moment they can only attain a particular settlement so that they must attain it. He has not come forward to say "My aim is not enosis". And he is a leader, a church leader, devoted to Enosis. When he was enthroned as an Archbishop he took a holy oath that he should achieve enosis before his death and he has never stated against it. So, as the Turkish community we feel that this enosis cause is there; it only needs an opportunity or an opportune time to flare up and to devour us. That is what we believe and suspect; that is the belief in us and that is why we want sufficient fundamental guarantees in any future settlement on the basis of an independent Cyprus.

Question—On the other hand, Sir, is there a nationalist movement in Cyprus which says, I am a Cypriot, I am not a Greek neither a Turk but I am a Cypriot?

Denktash—Unfortunately there isn't, yet There is a little talk about it. Very very mildly. I don't blame anyone for not coming out strongly because guns and not brains speak more loudly in Cyprus; and the gunmen who have the guns, who have the power are on the side of Enosis. So, that feeling that we must be Cypriots, we must work for a Cypriotism is always overshadowed. And any idea of Cypriotism is attacked immediately by the Greek Minister of Education, mind you, (not any irresponsible person) as something which de-hellenises Cyprus. And it was only two or three days ago in the press here that he categorically stated that he would oppose any idea of a university in Cyprus, a university in English language, because it would de-hellenise Cyprus and we

must stick to our Greekness", he says. We feel and believe that in saying all these things he is acting with the full consent and knowledge of his leader, Archbishop Makarios.

Question—Mr. Denktash, in view of the fact that Cyprus is divided into this Turkish Cypriot area and, of course, the Government of Cyprus, I am wondering if you can explain me something which I am finding rather difficult to understand; and this is that the Turkish Cypriots are allowed to leave your area and go into the Greek areas and yet this is not true for Greeks. Could you explain why?

Denktash—As I told you our Green Line, or the 'Lines' which demarcate our areas, are completely defensive lines. There are Greek areas in Cyprus—and these are extensive areas—into which not only we the Turks but even the United Nations are not allowed to go. Only two weeks ago about ten Turkish families tried to move to an area, close to Nicosia, where their houses had been burnt during the incidents and these people, tired of living as refugees, wanted to go and settle in their homes; this area was not even a military area and yet they were checked out and, because of it, we nearly came to clashes. Greek Cypriots said, "you can't come." Why? Because they argued, if Turks come to this area (their own homes, I repeat) and settle in this area, they will be a military menace to the Greeks of Cyprus! On our side, this area in which you are now, is where we have all our defences. This is our only military area. And we are afraid that if we open the country to the Greeks they may come in and we shall not be able to know how many have come. We shall not know whether they have come with guns or what. And if they choose not to go out and stick us from behind then what are we to do? I mean, these are areas which we have kept and maintained at great loss of life, and great loss to our people. We cannot just open them. And also the existence of these areas is the only factor on which we can bargain with these people, for a settlement. Once we open these areas we are left with absolutely nothing. Everything will be gone. Everything which the Greeks have been trying to get from us for the last 5 years. So we say if we are going to open these Turkish areas which the Greeks do not like, (they call it a government within a government and so on), if we are going to open these areas, we are going to open it after a full bargaining

and a fair settlement. Otherwise we have to stick to our areas.

I would like to take a little more time over this. It is an important point. When we go into the Greek areas we accept the *de facto* position there as it exists. But the Greeks want to come into our areas without recognizing our *de facto* position. They want to come in our areas pulling with them their *de facto* authority and pushing our administrative structure out. We have offered them to come subject to our control. This offer was turned down by the Greek administration, although a great number of individuals do come in after obtaining a permit from us.

Question—About your own taxation system. Do you levy taxation against the Turks who are in mixed villages or this only covers your own area?

Denktash—Now, taxation under the 1960 Constitution works in two ways. First the direct taxation, the income tax. The income tax was, under the 1960 Constitution, a matter for us. Each community collected its own income tax, and it is that taxation we are now collecting. We collect this from our people whether they live in Turkish areas or in mixed areas. But the indirect taxation which we pay to the revenue on cigarettes, on alcohol and everything else, necessarily goes to the Greek Revenue. And it is estimated that we pay over to that revenue about four or five million sterling a year but from 1963 onwards we have received absolutely nothing from them. And in addition we have been paying them another seven million pounds a year which we have been getting from Turkey as aid in order to be able to live.

Question—What kinds of guarantee would you get to make sure that your interest are upheld should the United Nations...?

Denktash—Well, we have lived during these five years and we have tried out several things in Cyprus. We have had for example the British for a short time trying to protect us, and to defend our rights. After two or three months they said: "This is beyond us. We give up, let's pass it on to the United Nations." We had the Security Council take a hand in our affairs, and we saw how the Security Council meets, and how those meetings can be postponed by a few members, how decision can be undermined or delayed. We live very precariously in a very small place and we are a small community. We

can't afford all that waste of time. So Security Council Guarantee is nothing for us. Then we have had the United Nations actually present in Cyprus as a force and as I told you, once the Greek leadership decides to launch an attack as a matter of policy, the United Nations can do nothing. Absolutely nothing. They are powerless, they withdraw aside and they watch and report. So, all through these years it has only been Turkish Government's interest, Turkish Government's action and guarantee which have prevented our complete annihilation. And, naturally, all these events have made us believe that there is no other guarantee for us except Turkey's guarantee.

Question—Speaking about the services that you paid for now by the Turkish community Government about taxation so forth, what about services that are necessarily provided by the official government of President Makarios such things as water, electricity, telephones and things like these, you are using these and how do you pay?

Denktash—Yes. It depends on the area in question. In some areas because they have kept our Turkish employees (in some electricity or water boards they have kept the Turkish employees working, like Famagusta) we have been paying them our dues. In Nicosia where they have kicked out all Turkish employees (they are still out of work) we use the electricity, we collect the money and put it in a deposit account pending a settlement. And our argument is that the Greek side has to pay us so many millions of pounds of compensation that it can afford to wait for our electric and telephone bills until we come to a settlement. And indeed they are affording to wait because if they cut down our electricity they know that there will be a sabotage elsewhere and they will not have electricity. It will all escalate, you see. In using electricity we are not stealing electricity from them, we are accounting, we are keeping proper accounts, we are collecting the money, we are depositing it and we are waiting for the day of settlement. We have offered them to settle these things now. We have asked them to take back the Turkish employees, and start paying our dues. But the answer is: "Oh no. Not until a final settlement". Why? Because they feel that if they accept this offer then we shall be more at ease and, therefore, we shall be prolonging our resistance to them. Whereas this is not the objective. This is not the object with which we ask them to start something for normalisation. It is because we

feel and believe that once this sort of process starts, of going back to normal services and so on, it will help other matters to come to normal. And it will help our political atmosphere, it will help our talks better. But they don't see it that way.

Question—Is it the same for electricity telephone and water?

Denktash—Not in all places. Telephones for example in the Nicosia sector were cut-off during the first days of the fighting and very few have been connected since. And those which have been connected pay their dues. Otherwise we have our own internal telephone arrangements.

Question—What about Public transport, etc?

Denktash—Public transport is private, buses and so on, of which we have adequate numbers in the Turkish areas.

Question—From what we see there is an economic gap between the two groups, with the prolongation of the present situation we have been told that this gap has increased instead of being reduced. Does this put you in a difficult situation and, also I wanted to complement this question by asking you, did that disparity exist before the troubles and what were the causes?

Denktash—The disparity existed before the troubles but not to that extent. It is because that disparity existed that in 1960 constitution we wanted to put special protection clauses into the constitution to give us the right to develop ourselves, to give us the right of having our own cooperatives and so on. Because that disparity existed due to the fact that the economic life being in the hands of Greeks we were always squeezed out of everything. There was always discrimination, there was always taking away from us and not giving to us. That is why we had the changes; that is why we wanted these protective clauses. Because we had these clauses in 1960 constitution, our community began to make headway during 1960-63 period. But, since the troubles, as I said, no development fund of even a single penny has come over to the Turkish side. All government funds were withdrawn from us and "government" which gained from Turks by not paying the Turks and from what Turks returned to it; and, also, gaining from the United Nations and from the Tourist trade the Greeks naturally surpassed us in development. I think that Cyprus is the

only country which has prospered in a civil war. Now this is one of the reasons why they will not settle it. Why they will not accept my offer to start the electricity authority, (the telephones and so on) putting these back to normal, because they believe that if they keep us in this way for a longer period, our political resistance will also collapse. And it is because we know this that we turned to Turkey and requested increased aid, not only for current expenditure but also for development, so that we can withstand this economic and political pressure on us. And that is what we are trying to do. We are quite aware of the dangers of the situation and we are fighting against it. We are fighting against it with the means we have in our hands.

Question—How is the morale of the Turks?

Denktash—Well, our morale is very strong. Our morale is very strong and I don't know why. I don't see the reason why it should be so strong but it is, and there we are. We have proved to be tougher nuts than even we ourselves believed we were.

Question—Is Turkish an official language in Cyprus? And what is the present Court structure.

Denktash—Yes. The official language of Cyprus under the 1960 Constitution is Greek and Turkish. The court language was English. Since the troubles the Greek side has gone back completely to Greek and they have discarded Turkish from everything. From my talks with Mr. Clerides my impression is that they want to speak of Turkish not as an official language but as a language acceptable in pleas, letters to the Government and so on and so forth. Which is not good enough for us. It is a major point for us. We want Turkish as an official language. Now on our side, since the troubles, our Courts use English and Turkish according to the nature of the case and that is the position about the language. As to the Courts, there was a Supreme Court with a proportionate number of Greek and Turkish Judges with a Canadian on top and this Supreme Court had under it Turkish Courts, in the sense that Turkish Judges looked at all the Turkish cases; Greek Courts, in the sense that Greek judges looked at Greek cases, and mixed courts, Greek and

Turkish Judges sat together when the question was between a Greek and a Turk. This was a practical arrangement which prevented not only discrimination and injustice but also gave some confidence to the people. The Greeks did not want this. They plotted against this although it was the only part of our constitution which worked quite smoothly without any difficulty. Now we have completely separate Courts. Completely Turkish Supreme Court, Turkish Lower Courts. What will happen in future? We say let us go back to the 1960 arrangement with certain little modifications. They say no. They insist that in spite of the language barrier, etc., a Turkish litigant whose witnesses are Turkish, whose lawyer is Turkish should appear before a Greek Judge. Why? We say that is not good enough. The 1960 arrangement was not an innovation by the makers of the Zurich Agreement. It was an existing custom which had come down to us from history. All through our judicial history Greek and Turkish Judges always set together with a British President as a kind of Umpire and they decided cases together. That was the basis of justice for so many years in Cyprus. Why change it all of a sudden? And we have real fears that injustice may be done, not in ordinary cases but when the question is a political one. Indeed, during 1955-58, when the EOKA troubles started, the British had to import their own British Judges, because on political issues these Greek Judges could not act judicially. If they did, then there was a gun at their backs. And one or two judges had to leave the island. A Supreme Court Judge was shot. Greek Cypriots are a politically minded people. Political factors will necessarily creep into the Courts for a long time to come even after we settle this dispute. The 1960 formula provides against this eventuality.

Mr. Wahn (Head of Canadian Delegation)—

Your Excellency, Mr. Denktash,

We all thank you for making so much of your time available to us this afternoon and giving us so much information, and particularly wish to thank you for your kind remarks about the Canadian U.N. Force who are on the island. We are very sorry that we cannot spend more time in this lovely country and we sincerely hope that the problems will soon be resolved.

—Thank you very much.

(Provided by the Cypriot High Officials)

Ramstein, Federal Republic of Germany,

March 12, 1969

General J. R. Holzapple, Commander 4th Allied Tactical Air Force: May I extend a very warm welcome here to Ramstein and to the 4th Allied Tactical Airforce. We are delighted to have you here and we plan to have, what we hoped is a useful informative briefing as to what we do, how we do it and the situation as we see it here in Germany. 4th Allied Tactical Airforce, one of the major air elements in NATO and of course the Canadian contribution is a very significant one to our forces here at 4 ATAF and so if you are ready we will have the first briefer who is going to give a little background as to what we see the enemy or the opposition's military position here in this sector of NATO and this will be done by Major Schaffert of the German Air Force.

Major Schaffert:

(The following briefing was of a *classified* nature and is deleted from the record.)

(Slide) Mr. Chairman, this concludes my portion, the next speaker is Lt Colonel Savage of the United States air force.

Lieutenant Colonel Savage: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, in this portion of the briefing I will discuss the nuclear or strike operations, non-nuclear or conventional operations, the reconnaissance tasks associated with these programs and the command and control or our forces.

But first I would like to review the parameters within which our offensive operations are developed. Historically, 4 allied tactical air force was equipped, trained, and postured to implement the massive nuclear retaliation strategy espoused in the early military doctrine of NATO. Guidelines for this strategy were formulated in the military committee paper MC 14/2. In 1967 the National Defence Ministers agreed to a new military doctrine that called for a balanced range of appropriate responses to cover any aggression, which was promulgated as military committee paper MC 14/3. This required 4ATAF to have a response capability throughout the spectrum of warfare: I.E. be prepared to counter any aggression from minor incursions to nuclear attack with conventional or nuclear weapons as directed and authorized by the North Atlantic Council, through SACEUR. This change in strategy was not accompanied by a commensurate change in force structure,

rather, the emphasis was placed on exploiting the total capability of all our vehicles and crews, the dual capability concept that is a major part of all of our plans today. For that reason, we must consider our offensive operations in their entirety as far as our aircraft resources are concerned, and as you will see as I discuss our preplanned programs, for both conventional and nuclear warfare, that we must utilize many of the same aircraft for either operation.

The NATO nuclear strategy is comprised of a series of preplanned programs which are further subdivided into options and categories of targets. The highest priority is given to destroying the enemy's offensive nuclear capability and those targets which are critical to the land commander in the defense of central Europe. When released by SACEUR, those aircraft and missiles on alert will launch automatically against these targets. Because of their all weather capability, which is essential for this program, and the proven reliability of the weapons system, by system I mean the aircrew, ground crew, and air frames, I.E. The total weapons system, the Canadian CF-104s are targeted against these high priority targets.

Slide—Map of Central Region

This map depicts the scope of our strike effort. 4ATAF forces of 3rd AF based in the United Kingdom, 17 AF, CANAIRDIV, and German air force southern command based in the Federal Republic of Germany, will strike targets across the central region as well as targets north and south of the 4ATAF area.

Supporting the strike programs there will be, of course, a large scale reconnaissance effort.

After the strike aircraft and missiles are launched, reconnaissance aircraft will conduct post strike target coverage requested by SACEUR and the surveillance targets designated by COMFOURATAF in support of follow-on programs.

Slide—Black

To support these programs a number of aircraft and missiles are on alert at all times. This quick reaction alert forces maintains a peace time capability to launch within minutes. SACEUR may direct the generation of the strike force to any state of readiness by specifying the number of strike aircraft to be placed on alert.

Having reviewed the strike programs I would now like to discuss the conventional mission of 4ATAF.

Slide—Mission statement

The direct support as used in the mission statement is that air action against enemy targets which are in close proximity to our ground forces and which requires detailed integration and coordination with the fire and manoeuvre of our ground forces.

The indirect air support is that air action against objectives other than enemy forces immediately engaged in the tactical battle. It includes the gaining and maintaining of air superiority, and the interdiction of targets beyond the active front.

The indirect effort is often preplanned whereas the direct support cannot be preplanned, except in general terms due to the constant movement of the land battle.

There are three fundamental areas that must be considered in the development of the conventional strategy. They are planning, aircraft resources, and command and control. We have developed plans for the control of the employment of our conventional forces from the war headquarters at Kindsbach, or a mobile facility or our alternate headquarters at Messtetten. Our plan or concept of operations that would be employed during a conventional war condition would be to launch preplanned counter attacks against enemy air fields and missile sites in an attempt to gain air superiority by destroying enemy aircraft on the ground with conventional munitions.

Slide

This is a simplified depiction of the targets and conventional mission of 4ATAF. The red triangles are the preplanned targets within 100 km of the border and the black arrows represent the interdiction missions and brown arrows the close air support missions for the central army group along the border. This shows the 4ATAF region, the area of our primary interest, but I would like to point out however, should the ground attack be concentrated in the northern army group area, our forces can and would be diverted into that area in support of the northern army group and 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force. The concept of using all assigned tactical air power where it is most needed, rather than national air forces supporting national ground forces,

is a basic premise of all our planning. The allocation of forces and control of the execution of the close air support mission will be discussed later.

Supporting the conventional battle will be the reconnaissance effort requested by the land and air commanders.

Slide

When directed by COMFOURATAF, reconnaissance missions will be flown on the NATO side of the political border, shown by red line to the west of the border. The primary mission of this reconnaissance program will be to provide the commander with updated information on enemy troop build ups, movement along the border, as well as any border violations. This reconnaissance effort will increase in magnitude as the situation escalates until, when authorized by SACEUR, reconnaissance will be extended across the border.

This expanded reconnaissance task will be to confirm or update intelligence data for use in the battle plans.

Having looked at our attack operations, let us now look at some of the forces available to support the conventional mission.

Slide—Attack Capability

Earlier you saw a slide similar to this showing our capability in all the roles. Here we see the 4ATAF attack capability only. Remembering that SACEUR has the flexibility of establishing the number of aircraft on nuclear alert which will give him the mix that he needs for a particular military situation (i.e. aircraft configured for nuclear or conventional missions). We see we have a rather large force capable in the attack or conventional role. This capability is limited in some cases by logistics or personnel training as mentioned earlier.

Slide—Black

We have discussed the nuclear and conventional missions of 4ATAF, the associated RECCE missions and the forces available to execute these programs.

Slide—Command and Control

I would now like to discuss the command and control of these forces and the tactical air control system that may be used for the direct air support mission.

Slide—Headquarters

The 4ATAF HQ's with its planning staffs for strike, attack, and air defence operations may be located at the war HQ at Kindsbach, a mobile facility or the alternate HQ at Mess-tetten in southern Germany. The signal support group is responsible for establishing communications with higher, lateral and subordinate commands with the 4ATAF headquarters.

The principle of centralized control and decentralized execution is utilized in the command and control structure of 4ATAF. Normal control of forces will be through the National Headquarters, for example 1 Air Division, and the Air Defence Sector Operations Center. 4ATAF HQ will assume tactical control of forces only when subordinate headquarters are unable to perform their functions.

Tasking of nuclear forces, both in peacetime and in war will be effected when authorized through the National Headquarters. Changes to numbers of aircraft on alert, launch plans, and additional targets will be directed by COMFOURATAF in operations orders or voice message to the National Headquarters through the National Combat Operations Centers.

For conventional war tasking, nominations for targets will come from various sources. After consideration of the nominations, in conjunction with other requirements, the allocation of conventional effort will be directed to national headquarters for execution.

For Air Defence Operations, tactical control is delegated to the commander of the Air Defence Sector Operations Center, who will direct the operation from either a primary or an alternate operations center. Tactical control, by the SOC commander will be directly with the air defence units and not via National Headquarters.

To provide direct air support for land forces, certain numbers of national forces are allocated daily to the direct air support role. The direct air support for ground forces is made the previous day. How those forces are used, pre-planned/immediate, is based on the land commanders requirements. The execution and control of the close air support mission will be shown in more detail in the next series of slides.

The tactical air control system is the organization that is used by commander 4ATAF in the integration of his air operations with the ground forces in the direct air support role.

The color code we use here reflects the national systems used in the control and execution of the tactical air missions in support of the ground forces. The red is for those units integral to German Air Force Southern Command and the blue for those units of United States Air Force Europe. Yellow is for the U.S. control and surveillance system used by all assigned tactical aircraft. These systems are primarily oriented to support of the ground forces. The air support operations center/or the direct air support center is normally co-located with the army corps it supports. Our Third National Force, The Canadian Forces, do not have ground forces of corps strength, precluding the necessity for a separate tactical control system. Any resources of CANAIRDIV that may be committed to support of the ground forces would use one of these systems for control in the direct air support role. Procedures and terminology are being standardized, to further this capability, so that all assigned tactical units can use either National Tactical Control System on an English language basis.

I would now like to discuss each of these sub systems and show how they function within the ground forces support mission of 4th Allied Tactical Air Force.

Slide

First the command and coordinating system. As I mentioned earlier, the air support operations center or the Direct Air Support Center is normally co-located with the army corps it will support. It is an Air Force staff with its own communications that works with the corps commander's staff in the coordination and control of the immediate close air support and reconnaissance effort. The Tactical Control party is a small air force forward operation team that is assigned to the ground commander at division, Brigade or Battalion level.

Slide—Tactical Air Control Party

This is a picture of a U.S Tactical Control Party M-107 jeep and communications. This officer acts as an air advisor to the ground commander and relays the ground commanders request for air support over the air request net.

Slide

The second system is the control and surveillance system. The U.S. Radar and Communications system is the one used by all forces flying in support of the 4ATAF mission. The control and reporting center is a mobile radar facility that provides continuous air situation information to the commander and performs radar control of traffic in its assigned area.

The control reporting post performs the same functions as the control and reporting center we just mentioned but it is subordinate to it. The forward air control post is a highly mobile radar facility.

Slide—This is a picture of a Forward Air Control Post

In the foreground you see the vehicle with the selective identification feature antenna and in the background the truck with the acquisition radar antenna. This unit accepts control of the Tactical Aircraft from the control and reporting center or the control and reporting post and positions it for delivery of the conventional munitions in support of the army.

Slide—Black

Having looked at the separate systems, I would like to put it all in context with this next slide.

Slide

At first glance this may appear complex but the execution of the air support mission is really quite straight forward.

The land commander originates the request for air support, the air force team assigned to him, the tactical air control party, relays his request to the staff colocated with his corps HQS, the air support operations center or the direct air support center. The ASOC or DASC will direct the launch of the tactical aircraft, utilizing pre allocated resources, the aircraft will go under the radar control of this system with that mobile radar I showed you, the FACP, positioning the mission for delivery of their weapons.

Overall, quite an efficient and effective system to give the air support they need, and equally as important, when they need it.

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We have discussed our overall offensive operations with our planned concept of both nuclear and conventional operations our aircraft resources and our command and control elements. Putting this all together you can see that by the appropriate assignment of strike aircraft to an alert posture and the realistic use of our dual capable aircraft, we can, within certain limitations, fulfill our responsibilities through the entire spectrum of warfare.

Slide—Shield

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I wish to thank you for your kind attention. That concludes the briefing; I understand there will now be a short break before the discussion period.

The Chairman: We are pleased in having General Holzapple and General Ball with us this morning and making themselves available for this period. I believe General Holzapple has a few introductory remarks before we start the questioning.

General Holzapple: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the Committee, I thought it might be in order to perhaps set the stage for the questions by making a few remarks.

As you know, the NATO strategy has been essentially the nuclear trip-wire concept and that was embodied in the military committee document—14 days—which has been the sort of overall strategy for NATO for many years. A couple of years ago, recognizing that from a practical standpoint there are many, many military situations which could and may well occur which would be much under the nuclear exchange probability that serious consideration was given and finally, the NATO strategy was amended to include the conventional operations which would be under the nuclear exchange.

The Warsaw Pact forces which are on the other side of the curtain here have certainly understood and have taken prudent action consistent with the new NATO strategy and as the Intelligence briefing indicated they have actually hardened many of their aircraft shelters. They have made it more credible. Their force is a conventional force because it takes us, under a conventional method of attack, a great deal more effort to reduce or to eliminate those aircraft on the other side of the Curtain.

We are doing the same thing. In the United States Forces we have a very active program under construction right now for the hardening of our aircraft. The Canadian forces that are moving into that are going to be stationed at Lahr and Soellingen have programs, hardened shelters for their aircraft and it is going to take a real effort on their part to actually come in and really knock out the aircraft so protected. So that, in effect, the posture that we are placing ourselves in here with our aircraft and taking prudent precaution for a surprise attack by keeping them protected, we actually have here in the 4ATAF area a very significant conventional force and I believe that this will serve as a credible deterrent in conventional areas of operation precisely as it has been in the past under NATO strategy 14.2 which certainly has been a political stabilizer in the last 20 years.

Now, with the 2500 air defence missiles, with the locations of our bases as they are, particularly the Canadian ones, which are well back in the rear of the West German area and a great many of the Warsaw Pact aircraft are going to have a hard time—it will stretch their range to even get to those bases and with the number of anti-aircraft missiles we have and with the efficient, effective organization for air defence that we have in 4ATAF I believe that we have a solid credible, non-nuclear capability here, which will force them if they exceed the thresholds of our capabilities to be a clear indication that they want to escalate it on to higher levels of warfare. The Canadian forces in particular because they are a volunteer force and an extremely high level of confidence and capability, coupled with the German forces and the U.S. forces here—the 7th U.S. army and the German ground forces here, we have and can maintain a very credible non-nuclear capability in the 4ATAF area. This does not mean that it changes at all what we have had and have been able to maintain in the past a nuclear deterrent and a nuclear capability if they opt to exercise that.

I just wanted to make these few remarks and tell you that I feel we must maintain a credible, effective, efficient non-nuclear as well as nuclear force here at 4ATAF. I think we have it. I think if we reduce to a very low level to where it would be ineffective or inefficient or unable to protect ourselves that this might encourage operations on a non-nuclear basis which we would have only the nuclear

response available to us which I do not think would make much sense from our standpoint.

I just wanted to make a few of these statements here and certainly the floor is open for you, sir, for any questions that you want to ask and we will do the best we can to field them.

The Chairman: I have about 10 or 11 questions all ready so I hope we can keep our questions short and to the point. First, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Holzapple, it has been said here this morning and in the brief that was distributed to us on the plane that the national units under command are earmarked to NATO to train and so on. However, it is only in the case of emergency that NATO takes over full command of these national units. I would like to ask you what does this mean "full command". Does it go as far as what is said in our first presentation where we would attempt to contain any aggression but this might develop to the use of nuclear weapons. Is there any means of restriction from the political point of the countries involved in the use of the two?

General Holzapple: Yes, indeed, there is. As you know, any nuclear response or any request for the use of nuclear weapons must be approved by the Council of Ministers of which the Canadian political folks are members and would have a voice in the decisions to use or not to use.

Mr. Laniel: Although you said that you should maintain a credible non-nuclear capability, do you feel personally that a conflict of any kind can be contained here in Europe where you have the two big powers confronting one another?

General Holzapple: Well, I do not know; this is certainly speculative. Anyone has their opinions. There could well be situations where it could be contained with less than a nuclear exchange. I do not want to drop a particular scenario because it might be misleading. But I can conceive of local situations here in which conventional weapons might be used and might be contained and resolved before it reached the nuclear stage. And I think that the only way you can do that is to have a viable, credible force here, a non-nuclear force, and it must be large enough that the other side takes it seriously.

Mr. Laniel: To look at the Syrian war there, the four days war actually, the destroying of the Egyptian aeroplane was a main factor in that war and the same thing would apply here I think in Europe and the fact that both sides were trying to protect their aircraft against air attack. Do you think that either side can wait long enough until they can get directives on these aircraft shelters.

General Holzapple: I hope this does not sound facetious, but I certainly would consider the Canadian, the German, and the U.S. Air Forces a bit more capable than the Arab air forces, one. And two, I think that the things we are doing here in the way of hardening and using shelters and utilizing the air defence system we have, which includes up to 2500 Hawk and NIKE, that we could do a very credible job here against even numerically larger forces that potentially could be used against us. I do not think we are vulnerable here, I do not think we are going to be just put out of the way in two or three days.

Mr. Laniel: Do you have a program of dispersion as they would...

General Holzapple: Yes, sir.

Mr. Lewis: I would like a supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I have quite a number of people on the list. I wonder if...

Mr. Lewis: It is my...

The Chairman: A short supplementary then.

Mr. Lewis: Did you do any more than change the role of the forces and equipment that were here, did you actually change the equipment, or change the forces?

General Holzapple: In 1967 we changed the strategy, more than change the role. That is a good question. And it takes awhile. I must admit you just cannot change the strategy and then suddenly have it all the way down the line. But a great many things are being done. The F-4 which is the bulk of the U.S. forces here in West Germany is dual capable. I mean they are, they can be used as atomic strike or they can be used in conventional roles. We use them in southeast Asia all the time and very, very effectively, and so the fact that we use them in close and in a conventional role, they are just as effective in that role as they are in a strike. To a large extent the same thing applies with the

Canadian equipment. The fact that they were here, had been trained and had been used in a strike role does not mean that that aeroplane does not have a great deal of capability for a conventional role. And right now the Canadian forces are every day of the year going out and training the pilots and exercising these aeroplanes in the attack role and in the conventional role and they are doing really a fine job. Regard the chart there, these aircraft have a great deal of capability if you just use them in another form. It does not mean that you have to change all the equipment. Now it does mean you have to have bigger stockpiles of conventional weapons. There is some additional equipment for certain types of conventional weapons and so forth that requires an effort and these are being done, and these are moving ahead. Training, stockpiling of conventional weapons and some minor equipment changes, and so forth. But they are relatively minor compared to the basic aeroplane.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Harkness: As far as air defence missiles are concerned, what proportion of them are conventionally armed, what proportion nuclear armed, and what proportion can be armed either way?

Brigadier General Meyers: I might answer that. The missiles we know as the Hawk are conventional. Currently NATO planning has a Hawk bill. It extends from Innsbruck down to the Austrian area clear on up into Norway. Now these are all conventional. In our case we have 48 batteries after we bring them all up. Thirty employed in depth and width. Now the nuclear aspect is in the making. Over here you get about $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent new. But the difficulty here is that if you have nuclear warheads abroad you must have a NATO council approval to use it. So you could assume that under a surprise attack or an attack that occurred before the NATO Council could make a decision we strictly have to go with conventional weapons. We do have the nuclear weapons. We do load certain numbers, but they are held and you cannot raise them without some approval. They can be used also in a surface to surface role by putting the arming clauses in and re-programming the computer. So basically we are prepared initially on both weapon systems to go conventional. We could phase over into a nuclear role. However, remember the kind of aeroplanes we are talking about here, we are talking about fighter bombers. Actually his

aeroplanes basically are converted air defence fighters. They do not have a tremendous range and they do not have a tremendous carrying capacity. So they are going to come low. So this means that the only time you can use a nuclear to any advantage is to break up large formations and keep him from out of the high skies and keep him down low so you can get at him with your Nike and with your Hawks and your other weapon systems that are assigned to the army.

Mr. Harkness: Roughly speaking, at least three-quarters of your air defence missiles would be conventionally armed.

General Holzapple: Probably more than that. More like 90 per cent. There would be a small number held back for use as a possible nuclear air defence missile, but only after the Council had approved the use of them. But I would say that over 90 per cent of them would be conventional.

Mr. Harkness: The same question as far as aircraft are concerned, what proportion of them cannot be used in conventional roles.

General Meyers: All of them can be used conventionally, except the F-102 does have a nuclear capability, and 26-B. We do use 26-A which has almost about the same kill capacity as the nuclear head, so air defence, aircraft-wise the German F104 has the machine gun and the sidewinders. The F4 and the F100 have machine guns plus the spiral and the sidewinder. The 102 as you know has a 2.75 rocket and the A26's. So essentially our air defence is conventionally oriented, because we are not against mass bomber formations. As a consequence your non-nuclear ordnance is almost as effective, except when you get into the business of nuclear flux and killing the weapon.

Mr. Harkness: As far as your aircraft which would be used in direct support of the ground forces, are they chiefly armed now with rockets or with bombs?

General Meyers: This would be a variation. It depends on the type. If you were going close air we probably would have them basically with iron bombs set at 50 lbs. or higher and also your BLU fire bomb, with rockets as backup. But when you get into close air you almost have to make a pattern because you cannot anticipate what kind of target you are going to hit. It could be a troop concentration. It could be tanks or it could be a fortification. Not many fortifications. So that would mean

that you have a tremendous problem of deciding what you are going to put on this aeroplane. Now ordinarily you could get a computer to come out with the exact type ordnance against that target, but you do not have that kind of time. That aeroplane has to be armed so that when the army commander requests it we are talking 15 minutes or less. So you would have to pick a pattern or a standard combat load as we call it. Now this would consist of iron bombs, BLU's, the fire bomb, and probably CBU, these cluster bomb units.

Backed up by rockets and backed up by machine guns. So you have a complete spectrum of flexibility. If you do get out there he changes the target on you which about 60 per cent or 70 per cent of the time he will change targets on you. Then you would have ordnance with the appropriate 2 degrees to that. It would not be optimized but it would be in the ball park.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): General Holzapple I just have three small questions that need clarification. You were saying a few minutes ago that we have a solid non-nuclear capability and I think mentioned the figure of 2,500 air defence missiles and in the presentation what was required was a stockpiling of conventional munitions which would indicate to me that we are short, that you would like to have more. Is this the case? Did I understand this correctly?

General Holzapple: Yes. You did understand it correctly. If you are going to use your force in the conventional role, in an attack role where they use nuclear weapons, it does require a stockpile of weapons for any protracted period. Right now I think all of the NATO forces have probably read and what would be prudent to have as a munitions backlog or stockpile and I know in the case of the American forces we are attempting right now to build up the stock of conventional weapons and certainly this would be a prudent thing to do with the others too. Right now we have been in a bind because of our activities out the other direction, but we are making steps to increase the stockpile of conventional weapons.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We could interpret this then as a recommendation.

General Holzapple: I think so, yes.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The second question has to do with the comparative figures. I know Colonel Savage in his presentation made a special point of singling out the numbers of attack capability aircraft and he mentioned the number 846 as being the total number. How would this compare with the Warsaw Pact attack number?

General Holzapple: I think it would be considerably less. I do not recall the exact number of all those that are potentially available in the Warsaw Pact. But it would probably be maybe one to two. But let us assume that that is the proportion. As General Meyers indicated practically all of the Warsaw Pact aircraft are converted air defence fighters and their munitions carrying capability is considerably less than any of ours. For instance the F4 in their daily operations in Viet Nam carry probably five times as much as a MIG could carry in conventional ordnance. So that the fact that they have two to one does not necessarily mean that that proportion should apply across the board. Because many of the aircraft that we have here in the 4 ATAF area are capable of carrying considerably greater loads than theirs are. The same way with range too. The F-4's have considerably longer range than the MIG-17, the MIG-18, and that is why the location of the two Canadian bases is I think very significant. It is back in practically the French quarter and a great many of those great numbers of aircraft that could be used against them are going to be hard-pressed by range to even get there and then with the NIKE or the Hawk belt that you have to go through plus the fact that we are seriously considering relocating some of the Hawks that we have back to where they can be more effectively used in the protection of the airfield. I think that we do have a credible force here and even though they are numerically outnumbered by those across the curtain, that performance-wise and organization-wise that we have a really credible force.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I wonder General if you could give us some idea of the other part of what used to be called the Air Defence team and maybe you could indicate if this is still the case. My experience in the Service was ten years ago when part of the Air Defence team was the radar net, the ADDC's and so on, and I wonder do you have such a thing around here, do they still carry out identification of the aircraft that are flying in the air? Do you send up our fighters to identify at this time?

General Holzapple: Yes indeed we do. We have a very effective air defence net here in 4 ATAF and it is also being combined with the NAD System which is going into West Germany north of here and there is an effective crosstel, the radar surveillance is such that we are able to flush and to get up aircraft in less than five minutes and actually identify those which come in which are not on a proper flight plan or give the proper identification. It works very well and we watch this surveillance border very effectively.

Mr. Brewin: General, I would like to preface my question by saying that I want to make clear that I do not want to cast any doubt on the efficiency of the forces here. I am very happy to hear the tribute paid to the competence of the Canadian component, but it is our duty to inquire into the basics that are involved here and the great criticism that has been made to our committee in regard to this role has to do with vulnerability and the suggestion that possibly in the case of high tension the forces involved might be destroyed on the ground before they could be used. Now I understand you to tell, we heard in the briefing, that the Russian Forces, the Warsaw Pact forces were stressing the active and passive defence, the hardening of sites, and so on. The question I would like to pose is whether or not, despite all that can be done, whether the sighting or the targeting of our IBM's on the site where we have our air division for example, still despite all that is done, are they not basically vulnerable to an action that might be taken? Is it possible in other words to reduce the vulnerability to a sufficiently low point that it does not remain a danger to the whole effectiveness of the operation?

General Holzapple: Well, as I tried to make clear in my opening remarks, there is no question but what if they really want to pre-empt with nuclear forces, as you have suggested here, the targeting with our IBM's and using NIKES on a pre-empt force they could probably do us all in. But, on the other hand this presumes that they are prepared to follow through with a nuclear exchange that this kind of overt action would imply. I do not think that they would do this lightly, in fact, the fact that we are all here indicates that the total capability of exchange is such that it has created a political stability here for the last twenty years. Now, what we really need is the additional capability and this is really the purpose of this enlarged or

maybe broadened NATO strategy as applied under 14-3, is to discourage them from taking less than nuclear actions, moving in with conventional forces. If we could not have a credible force and really have a reasonable change—a stalemate with them at least, that we would have only the nuclear option to retaliate, which does put us in a real sort of blackmail situation. So I am not sure I am giving you the kind of an answer you want, but I believe that unless they do this nuclear pre-emption that the forces that we have here that are protected as we are planning and proposing to protect them that they are going to be able to hold their own or at least be a credible force to where they are going to have to really come to this, to what you are guessing is a use of nuclear in order to really do us in. Maybe I missed your point, I...

Mr. Brewin: I just would like to—you are right on my point, but I would just like to follow it up with one further point. I can understand the full relevance of what you are saying for the use of the forces under your command for the purpose of support, some conventional support of some conventional defensive action in the case of some minor but not all out aggression. I can understand that, but what I cannot understand is how that is consistent with the use of a strike force which surely in itself is such a devastating blow on our side, devastating capacity on our side that it would be likely to provoke the nuclear counter-attack which you said to which there is apparently no effective defence.

General Holzapple: Well, I think that we are a lot better off if we are able to respond and respond effectively and credibly at any level whether it be a small excursion here or there, or a conventional engagement, clear up through the nuclear response, and we are prepared to do either, and I think they are too. I think the fact that we both know what the nuclear exchange really implies and the fact that it exists has been a large part of the political stability here for the last twenty years, and I think that we have got to be prepared to do it on the lower levels in addition and have it credible and I think that it will create the same attitude or atmosphere and stability that we have through the use of the nuclear forces in the past.

The Chairman: Thank you sir. Mr. Prud'homme?

Mr. Prud'homme: We are at the moment reviewing our NATO commitment. If Canada

was to decide to not stay in the *status quo* or not getting off immediately from NATO but to play a different role, how could this different role affect the effectiveness of your force at the moment if for instance part of our new role would be to withdraw our troops from the actual NATO commitment?

General Holzapple: Well, as to quote some of the figures that were given in the briefing, the Canadian contribution in aircraft is 12 per cent but I think that any reasonable assessment of its contribution to the 4 ATAF area is probably greater than 12 per cent. I do not know and I cannot say that if it were reduced by the numerical 12 per cent that this would mean the difference as to whether our overall air capability in 4 ATAF would be completely credible to the Warsaw Pact powers or not, but it certainly would degrade it, and all prudence would then indicate that if you did not provide them, then somebody else should, and whether this would be forthcoming or not I do not know. But, as with the principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization all the members in various forms and ways have all agreed to come together and collectively to provide a credible reasonable force here to create, what all military forces are for, to be the instrument of national or collective policy. I think it would be a very significant blow to our capability at 4 ATAF to have the Canadians withdrawn and I think that in order to keep a reasonable credible force here that if you did not then somebody would probably have to step in and do it for us.

Major General F. W. Ball (Chief of Staff): General, I might elaborate a bit on that role and answer your question too at the same time. There is a level of operations, when you exceed that you have exceeded NATO's capability convention. I have not heard any NATO Commander state categorically that he can take care of the hardened 50-60 divisions Russia can throw against us on the ground. Now we are talking air war. Our weapons are configured optimum for the kind of war we are talking about over here. So therefore as you go up this level of escalation at some point in time you probably will have to go nuclear if you are going to stop these people. That is accepted in 14.3 You can do this either in any one of the three phases, direct defence, a deliberate escalation, or general nuclear response. So now, let us assume that we have to have a level of nuclear capability standing by in the event that it is necessary to employ it, either atomic demolitions, missiles, the Pershing missile, the US Army and

the Germans have, or it could be air. And you have set aside a certain level of nuclear capability, now in the Canadian case that aeroplane was designed for the strike role, it is very good at it as an all weather capability and it will carry one hell of a bang. What we do since it is optimized for strike, we will give General Lane's outfit a higher level of nuclear commitment to free some of the US F4's so we can use some of those aeroplanes that are optimized for this tactical air. If we did not have the Canadian contribution we could not do that, and we could not free those aeroplanes for the conventional role. So we do, in lots of our exercises, request that SACEUR allow us to transfer these targets from the US forces to the Canadian Forces so we can free the US forces for the conventional role. So in effect it does have a tremendous rate of impact of 12 per cent, because remember this is an all weather delivery aircraft that you have here, the pilots are highly skilled at this, and it is designed for this purpose. It does have a secondary capability, but it does not approximate the F4 because of the carrying capacity.

General Holzapple: Well to summarize and to answer your question, there would be a very significant loss of capability here if the Canadian Forces were withdrawn. They have a great capability in both the conventional and the strike role.

Mr. Prud'homme: Could the fact that these planes would be located in Canada, would this reduce considerably the effectiveness of your actual plans?

General Holzapple: Well by being located in Canada, subject to being called up, well of course you know this concept is not new at all and has been used in varying degrees by various members of NATO. There is certainly a degradation because airplanes in Canada have to presume then the capability in getting them over here in a hurry, to have the facilities available when they come in to be ready to accommodate them, and as a commander I can be very honest with you I would much prefer and would feel that they would be much more effective if they were here, trained every day in the locale, knew exactly what the situation was every day and every minute, and then if they were called on they could be brought up into a state of readiness and usefulness much quicker and be better. Now that does not mean that there is not some capability, and we do the same thing in the United States force, there are

some earmarked for NATO—committed units that are in the States—we exercise them from time to time, but to say that those are just as good as in place I would, in all honesty, have to say that our NATO committed forces that are not here are not as good as the units that are right here on this base for instance.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, originally we were going to have lunch at 12.30. Now I understand there is a little bit of flexibility and that we can go on to 12.45. I get more questioners as we go on. Is it your wish then to go on to 12.45 so that we can accommodate some of these questioners? We will not be able to get them all in but perhaps during lunch we could get some answers on a personal basis. Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): General, I can accept the fact that we have had 20 years of peace in Europe because of NATO, but I cannot conceive of a political situation in Europe at this time that would involve what you call the flexible response. I cannot see either side loosing a limited war in Europe. Their positions are much too rigid and the limited response could quickly become a nuclear response. I feel that we are now in the position of having a marginal line here where our weak flank is out in the Middle East or Africa, or the Far East, or any other part of the world where limited wars do go on. I cannot see the limited war that you are talking about. I feel that you are going to be in a nuclear role within a matter of hours and in this case, your units here in Europe are not that effective or that important because you are going into the ICBM situation almost immediately.

General Holzapple: Well, you may be right. I will not say that your assessment is not valid at all. However, if the NATO forces—conventional forces—were so weak and so vulnerable that they could be quickly knocked out as in the Middle East, or very quickly brushed off as being ineffectual, or neutralized very easily, I can conceive of a possible Berlin, to use an example, or maybe elements of West Germany here that could be a tempting prize if our only response were nuclear. Now, you may be right, any encouragement of that nature might well trigger the whole nuclear exchange, but I think as more and more awareness of the real consequences of nuclear exchange are understood or realized, that prudent, sober judgments would really be very reluctant to initiate the nuclear exchange. I think that we would put ourselves

in a very vulnerable spot if, through lack of conventional capability, we allow ourselves to be so weak that if something like that were done our only response could be nuclear, and I think that we would be vulnerable and could tempt them. I think if we have a credible conventional force here in order to make an incursion, that it could not be resisted, that we would have less options than what we deserve and what, in all prudence, we should have.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): There is a big difference though between the maximum and the minimum capability that might be suitable here in Europe. Is that what you suggest?

General Holzapple: Yes, there is no question about it. Those are matters of judgment and I cannot precisely say that up to a certain point that we do not have enough and that at a certain point we have just enough and that beyond that we have too much. I think there are too many variables and kinds of situations that might occur that for me to make that clear delineation would not be very smart on my part; I could not do it. As I say, those are judgment factors. But I do believe that we should have and must have a reasonable non-nuclear capability here because without it—beyond this point, and I am not going to define it, my judgment might be different than yours—you can see that if you get below a certain point then you are vulnerable to possible incursion to which you would only have then the nuclear response capability.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the General a question that has always intrigued me. Supposing there is the early strategy of an antagonist because he is on the aggression and knowing of the results, has the strategy of early escalation into nuclear, what is your position then on account of the position of the Council authorizing you? Is there a different strategy then that if it is used before you are completely wiped out, you can move, or what is your position in that interim period of time?

General Holzapple: Our rules of engagement—and I cannot fault it really—are that we do not even respond to nuclear attack until the NATO Council and the political elements decide that we should do it.

Mr. Winch: And what would happen to you just in the period of a couple of hours?

General Holzapple: We could all get killed. We could, but on the other hand anybody that starts using nuclear weapons—starts it—had better reckon very seriously with the ultimate possibilities of exchange they might receive.

Mr. Winch: You mean exchange outside this area?

General Holzapple: Absolutely.

Mr. Winch: Oh, you mean on a world involvement.

General Holzapple: Absolutely, and I do not think, unless you get a crackpot which is, I guess, possible and it has happened before...

Mr. Winch: That is exactly what we had in mind.

General Holzapple: ...that you could get something started that way. But we live in a world with certain elements of danger all the time; there is always a crackpot around some corner that might do us in individually or collectively—I do not know. On the other hand, that does not mean that just because there is potential of a crackpot and some irresponsible action that we should be less than prudent in our normal arrangement of our affairs.

Mr. Winch: Just a brief supplementary. Does your intelligence give you any understanding as to what is the policy on the other side on a holdup on retaliation like we have when we have to wait until we get the order?

General Holzapple: That is a very interesting question and perhaps there is some indication that their political mechanism may be able to work faster under certain circumstances because of making a shorter circuit diagram. On the other hand, I think that both sides are going to be very very reluctant to initiate a nuclear exchange.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: General, for your mission here, what is your assessment for the future role of manned aircraft? Do you see a rapidly diminishing role for manned aircraft for both defensive and strike attack roles let us say within the next five years?

General Holzapple: No, I do not. I will be very candid with you. At one time when the

missiles were becoming very popular—and there is no question but what a nuclear missile has a great amount of utility, based on the assumption that you are going to use it—it is real easy to put a small hardened hole in the middle of Montana and have a very accurate inertial guidance system so that it goes with great accuracy to the middle of some place you want it to go to, but there is a great loss of flexibility with a missile. You have got to be real sure that when you press that button you really mean it and after a situation degrades to where there is a big exchange they are very useful. On the other hand, manned aircraft and we are coming more and more to that realization in the States, and right now we are in the process of getting started with a new manned strategic bomber because it does give a great deal of flexibility in the way it is utilized, not only for nuclear but for conventional use, we found with the B-52s in Southeast Asia, the fact that in very delicate situations they can be launched and recalled, targets shifted or changed enroute, and so I would say that despite some of the apparent advantages of missiles, and particularly nuclear missiles, that the role of manned aircraft because of their greater flexibility—the fact that you can exercise them every day, the fact that you can practice and you know exactly what you can do with them and so forth—that I personally feel that the role of man and equipment in the form of aircraft are going to prove through their utility a long long way down the loop. In fact I cannot foresee the time when man in the loop of machines—manned machine loop—is not going to be probably one of the most significant and major portions of our military force.

Mr. Allmand: I had particularly in mind your role here in NATO, in Europe and especially the defensive role. Do you visualize in ground to air and so forth that there will still be defensive manned aircraft?

General Holzapple: I do, and identification is just one good example. I mean the fact that man and his airplane can go up, certainly in the early parts particularly, and in very delicate situations. You see it is very difficult—when you press the button on your 9 key or your “hot” line you are finished with it. However, the manned aircraft can go up and identify and maybe take prudent action that would not be possible once you have pressed the button.

Mr. MacLean: I have a short supplementary. Is there any indication, to your knowledge sir, that the Russians are doing some re-thinking along the same lines—that they may be considering redeveloping new bombers and this sort of thing?

General Holzapple: This is a debatable question among our intelligence community as to what their future plans are for manned bombers. Certainly they have long range bombers now. They have considerable manpower and our intelligence indicates that they have the production facilities and so forth and are producing—not a great number, there is not a great expansion in their force—but on the other hand the estimated phase-down which the intelligence community has been calling for years has to be revised every year because they are not phasing them down as the intelligence estimates or projections have indicated you see. Now whether or not they are going to have a whole new replacement for their present fleet, I do not know. It is likely that it may be smaller than it was in the past before the era of the nuclear missile because they do certainly compliment each other and for any over-all total force,—a portion of each—there is every indication that they are continuing a mix just as we have and as most countries do.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): General, my question has been asked and we have been advised on it, but I would like to ask the question in a slightly different manner.

The Chairman: Would you speak into the microphone please, Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes. I believe you were asked as to the effect of the withdrawal of Canada from NATO. I believe, General, that your comments were that “it would be a blow” and later on you said it would be a significant loss. Could I change the question slightly and say, how important is it to the United States and to Europe for us to remain in NATO? I would rather that you would not look at the loss but rather the importance of us remaining in both instances (a) and (b). Could you mention your thoughts on the matter.

General Holzapple: I am sorry if I used different words because they really were intended to denote much the same thing. If the Canadian Forces were withdrawn from 4 ATAF I would consider that, as Commander

of 4 ATAF, a significant loss of our capabilities and would degrade our capability to perform this non-nuclear role. As far as the importance of Canada contributing to NATO this is certainly something that the Canadian people and your government must decide. I personally think that all members of NATO have not only a practical self-interest to provide forces but also from a standpoint of if you are going to be part of the alliance then I think that really being part of it is kind of an important thing. This is just my personal opinion and admitting that there are many ways in which this can possibly be made and I am not attempting to even imply that whatever you in your collective judgment decide as the appropriate role is necessarily wrong. But certainly the contribution that you are making and to the forces here in this Command they are important. They are very important. And I would hope that you would see your way clear to maintain forces here because the experience that we have had with Canadian Forces because of their capability and esprit and their high professional performance and so forth, as a Commander I welcome the Canadian Forces. I think they are very important to my performing my mission here and being able to do what we are being provided here for and I would hope that it would continue. I hope that answers your question Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: A supplementary from Mr. Marceau first and then Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Marceau: Do you not think that Canada should play a more useful role to protect peace such as a mediator between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. if we stay out of NATO?

General Holzapple: I would be presumptuous if I really tried to give you an answer on that. As a military man I would be much more interested in the forces here.

Mr. Nowlan: Mine is almost supplementary to Mr. Howard's. In this surveillance of the line here, here and in Warsaw Pact countries across the way has there been planned provocative incidents, I mean sort of keep the thing up some time and cool it down later for instance? In other words because it is a manned surveillance what are the possibilities of miscalculation in the surveillance?

General Holzapple: Maybe I had better preface my answer to this by saying that I have only been here for a very short time. But on the other hand having been in Wash-

ington for many years and then here previously I think I have kept pretty current with the border situation here in Germany and in general I think I would answer that by saying that there has been pretty good respect on both sides for the border situation, and I am not aware of other than certain harassments in the corridors under a very controlled condition. There have not really been any hostile things towards the border here on either side. It has been fairly steady and stable. Now that does not mean to say that since their redeployment as a result of the Czechoslovakians that they are not really in a little bit better tactical position as a result of their re-positioning than they were before. Now this does not imply in any way that this is an answer to your question. I do not believe.

The Chairman: Gentlemen I think we just have time for one more short question although I have a number of people on the list. Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: There is just one question now. Do you feel that this build-up in your conventional capability has created a situation whereby if you like you have created the conventional stalemate and now you are in a situation where if the other side attempted to do anything they would have to reckon on instant nuclear war. Do you feel that you have sufficiently made it clear that your conventional capability is such that they have no hope of any success in a conventional attack? I say this because you mentioned a number of times such things as forcing them to a higher level. This was in your short speech. You feel that then that if this was the case that probably thanks to your conventional build-up you reduce the chance of a conventional war enormously and put it entirely back into a nuclear situation?

General Holzapple: I believe that yes. I think that is really the philosophy behind the corps d'esprit but it also implies that we make the conventional force that we do have here credible and to leave them unprotected, all lined up in a row, where it just invites a very quick wipe out like the Israelis were able to do in the Middle East a year ago last summer or to have such a small force that it could be just brushed aside without much consideration. Then I do not think we are in that position. But I think that with what we have and if we take prudent action to put it under the revetments as we are programming right now to do and maintain the high state of readiness through the exercising of our con-

ventional weapon delivery, a reasonable stockpile of conventional weapons here, I think that we put ourselves in a credible position, that they know that they can have a real scrap on their hands even in a conventional way and it is going to create the kind of a political stability that the nuclear capability on each side has done in the past.

Mr. Anderson: I do not know whether I am allowed a supplementary but it means then that the various levels of escalation now mean nothing because you have created a situation where there is this conventional saw-off, this conventional stalemate.

General Holzapple: That is right and that is exactly what they have done. They have hardened their forces. So where we could go in with maybe two fighter bombers and shoot up practically a whole airfield full of airplanes, it would take half our force to really assure that you are going to knock off even one airfield with everyone of their airplanes under a hardened shelter. It works both ways.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I know all of us are sorry that we have to bring this question period to an end because of luncheon arrangements which have been made. We have already gone over our time. Perhaps those who had questions and did not have an opportunity to ask them, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Ryan and Mr. Marceau might possibly get individual answers to their questions during the luncheon period. I know all of us are most grateful to those at the table here. General Holzapple, General Ball, General Myers, and also the officers who gave us the very helpful briefings for making themselves available this morning and for giving us this information. Thank you ever so much. General Ball has an announcement, gentlemen.

General Ball: I might just explain that we are having lunch gentlemen in what is called the Vesuvio Room and it is downstairs. If you would like to leave any of your things you may leave them here and pick them up on the way out.

Lahr, Federal Republic of Germany,
March 12, 1969

Major General R. J. Lane, Commander 1 Air Division: Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen, on behalf of the air division I wish to extend a sincere welcome to you. I am extremely

pleased that you have included the air division in your European tour and only regret that because of the limited time available you will be unable to visit one of the wings where you could get a very real feel for the complexities and the operational nature of our job. In an operational command such as this, effective security, physical and otherwise, is a constant necessity in meeting the external threat to security which we face daily. We have been reminded of this particularly since the events of August. I know that you will appreciate the sensitivity associated with discussing our operational posture in an open forum such as this. I regret any inconvenience this may cause but I assure you that in this briefing and the question period to follow I will be as frank and explicit as possible within the confines imposed by NATO security.

There are many active trouble spots in the world today which hold our attention, causing all of us varying degrees of concern and no doubt your present tour will assist you in assessing the relative significance of some of these areas. While many of the peripheral areas are presenting difficult problems in the search for peace and stability, in the final analysis, only those which affect the interface of the two major nuclear powers pose a direct threat to Canada's national security. As the Minister of National Defence said to this committee on December 3 and I quote "the forum where super power interests most closely impinge on each other is Europe, and hence Europe, in my view, is the geographical region where Canada's security is most in jeopardy" unquote. Our forces assigned to Europe contribute to Canada's national security in a clear and visible manner as part of the common deterrent.

While Europe has in many ways been a model of political stability in the last fifteen years, the military occupation of Czechoslovakia reminds us that on short notice this could change dramatically. There is no doubt now that the Soviets are prepared to use their military forces when they consider it expedient to achieve their ends.

I am sure there is no need for me to dwell upon the situation which pertained in the late 1940's when the Soviets threatened to engulf all of Western Europe, whether through political subversion or by a military steamroller thrust to the Atlantic. The threat was real and response from the West realistic. The military alliance was created to defer the

threat of Soviet aggression and has been extremely successful in this regard. But—the Soviet military capability has not disappeared. It exists today as it did then—re-equipped with the latest generation of military hardware which has increased both its mobility and fire power. Thus, until such time as mutually acceptable disarmament can be undertaken, a credible deterrence is the basic strategy of NATO to retain stability in Europe. It is within this basic strategy that I shall, in my brief this afternoon, outline the air division's posture touching on five main points:

- Operational roles
- Command and control
- Composition of the air division
- Capability and achievements
- Concept of operations in the air division as it is today.

I say "as it is today" because, as you know, the new NATO strategy of responding to aggression with flexibility has been accepted and we are now in the implementation period with certain operational problems still to be resolved. I will conclude by briefing with a few words on this year's relocation of the air division to two bases and briefly expand on the new NATO strategy.

Stated concisely the air division's role is: to provide the combat ready forces required to meet that element of Canada's NATO commitment which embraces the three distinctly different air operational roles of nuclear strike, reconnaissance and attack.

Specifically, as commander of 1 Air Division, I am responsible for conducting:

First: nuclear strike operations against tactical targets using our squadrons from 3 and 4 wings;

Second: Photo/visual reconnaissance using our squadrons from 1 wing; and

Third: Attack operations, involving the delivery of conventional or non-nuclear weapons against tactical targets using our dual capable CF104's from 3 and 4 wings.

Except for a small number of training and communication aircraft, all 1 Air Division forces are assigned to NATO. Therefore, once an emergency is declared, these forces come directly under NATO operational command.

As you heard this morning at 4ATAF, the operational chain of command is SACEUR—allied forces central Europe—fourth allied tactical

air force—air division. I am operationally responsible to the commander of 4ATAF and it is with his headquarters that my staff deals daily on operational matters. Administrative and logistic support are a Canadian responsibility. For example, we maintain a very close liaison with Canadian forces headquarters on the postings of personnel to the division to assure a proper experience level in our operational units. On the logistics side, with the exception of petrol and rations, support of the air division—including engine overhauls—is carried out directly from Canada using the airlift capability of our air transport command.

Before discussing the present composition of the air division, I would like to sketch very briefly some of the highlights of the air division since it formed in 1952.

From 1952 to 1956 Canada maintained 12 squadrons of F86 day fighter aircraft on four bases in Europe. This force totalled 300 aircraft which, at that time, were the most advanced aircraft in service in Europe. In addition a type 80 radar was operated as part of NATO's air defence warning system. As the need for an all weather fighter capability became apparent, four of the F86 squadrons were re-equipped with the Canadian built CF100 which had been performing effectively the all weather air defence task in Canada.

In the early 1960's, when priority was being placed on creating a tactical strike and reconnaissance capability under SACEUR's control, we re-equipped with CF104 aircraft. These were transported from the factory in Canada to our bases in Europe in a partially assembled state using our C130 aircraft of Air Transport Command. Eight squadrons of CF104's were assigned to Europe and committed to the strike or reconnaissance roles. It was during this switch of roles that the air division establishment reached its peak of just over 6200 military positions.

In 1967, coincident with the move out of France, our commitment to SACEUR was reduced from 8 to 6 squadrons. The present commitment is 4 squadrons, with the dual capability of nuclear strike or conventional attack, and two reconnaissance squadrons. These squadrons are—in terms of numbers, but particularly quality—a very important element of the tactical air forces available to SACEUR.

To support our commitment to SACEUR the air division is organized into:

- A command headquarters
- Three main operating bases; and
- Three auxiliary units.

The command headquarters is located here in the Canadian caserne with 1 Wing providing all administrative support. Several other buildings in the caserne have been converted into a collegiate and junior high school complex. This fall these schools will accommodate over 1,400 children from grades 5 to 13. Other buildings are being used for recreational and community activities.

The first of our three bases is 1 Wing—The home of our two reconnaissance squadrons. This base is also our terminal air head for air transport command trans-Atlantic flights in support of the air division and serves as the main European staging base for United Nations operations. Cyprus is an example. In addition, with the exception of the brigade group, 1 Wing provides administrative support for all other Canadian servicemen in Europe including the Canadian forces attachés.

Our second main base is 3 Wing located at Zweibrücken near Saarbrücken. It is established for two strike attack squadrons. Also at 3 Wing are the division's main hospital and several centralized technical facilities. Plans are now well advanced on the closure of this base.

The third, and last, main base is 4 Wing, located at Baden-Soellingen, some 30 miles north of Lahr. It, also, has two strike/attack squadrons. These six squadrons, located on our three operational bases, forms Canada's air commitment to SACEUR.

We have three auxiliary units. Located at our main air head here at Lahr is 5 air movements unit, under the control of air transport command to handle all our trans-Atlantic passenger and freight traffic. Also at 1 Wing is 109 communications flight, equipped with six Dakota aircraft. It provides special flights and scheduled feeder-line service between the air division bases and other units at which Canadians are stationed in Europe. This unit is supplemented by an air transport command C130E on continuous deployment from Canada.

The last of our auxiliary units is the air weapons unit at Decimomannu on the island

of Sardinia. This unit provides the training facilities for our CF104 pilots in bomb delivery techniques and sea survival. We share the use and operating costs of this airfield and the associated bombing range with our Italian and German NATO Allies. Without this facility at Deci we would be unable to maintain the high level of expertise in our squadrons as the few ranges in continental Europe are badly over committed.

In addition to these three auxiliary units, there is a T33 instrument flight at each wing where pilots are checked out on the continental instrument flight procedures, which differ considerably from Canada, and, thereafter, complete each six months a prescribed instrument training syllabus.

I mentioned earlier that a peak manning figure of some sixty two hundred servicemen was reached during the introduction of the CF104. Since that time, due partly to the reduction in our commitment and relocation, but more importantly to improved maintenance and logistic techniques, our manning requirements and associated manning costs have continued to decrease. As a result, our new posture this Summer, of six squadrons on two bases, will require approximately thirty-eight hundred military personnel. Since 1962 our commitment to SACEUR has decreased some fifteen per cent in aircraft but our reduction in personnel is close to forty per cent—an indication of our increased productivity and attribute to the increased efficiency in the technical support area and to the professionalism of our airmen.

Efficiency in the technical support area means basically the maintenance of the CF104. This aircraft is an extremely versatile machine. It was designed initially as a high altitude supersonic interceptor and was modified for use in the low level role. I want to emphasize here that the CF104 is now in its prime—as effective in its roles as any aircraft in squadron service today and is doing an excellent job. A programme of modifications and updating of the engine and components during factory overhaul in Canada has produced what might be termed a “new” aeroplane from that we received in 1962.

Now I would like to say a few words about our achievements of the last year. There is probably a greater degree of impartiality used in assessing the air division's operational effectiveness than is generally found throughout the Canadian Forces. For in addition to

the inhouse tests common to most commands, we have an external and probably more exacting assessment in the form of annual NATO tactical evaluations. These evaluations of our operational units are conducted by a multi-national NATO team to determine our ability to perform our wartime mission. A tactical evaluation team will arrive without warning at a wing and within two minutes the wing must assume a wartime alert posture.

The wing's capability is assessed in four main areas:

- Alert posture and reaction
- Mission effectiveness
- Survival
- Support functions generally

These four areas are examined in the minutest detail and their individual assessments, added together, make up the final rating. A top rating of one is therefore a measure of every facet of a wing's operation.

In 1968 all wings received a one rating across the board. This was the fourth consecutive year that 3 and 4 wings have achieved a top rating and, for the reconnaissance wing its first tactical evaluation since moving from France.

Operational effectiveness is also determined by the various competitions held within NATO. Our strike-attack wings compete in an annual AFCENT tactical weapons meet. Here, as part of the 4ATAF team, air division personnel compete against a team from 2ATAF. Last year the competition was held at a German Air Force base and the 4ATAF team, led by one of our Canadian squadron commanders, won the overall competition for the 5th time.

On the reconnaissance side, the air division pilots and supporting personnel have been working hard to become masters in their trade. In reconnaissance, as in the strike and attack roles, annual competitions have been held for many years to determine unit proficiency. In 1966, in their first appearance at a "Royal Flush" meet, the air division squadrons came in last. At the 1967 meet, with another 12 months experience behind them, the results were much improved and the Gruenther Trophy was recovered by 4ATAF. In 1968 the competition was so keen that the two ATAF's tied for the Gruenther Trophy. The two air division squadrons finished 1st and 2nd within 4ATAF.

We have achieved these high objectives partly because we have maintained an adequate number of flying hours per pilot per year. This is important and our present monthly flying rate is the minimum required to maintain proficiency in the type of low level mission our pilots are required to fly in the European environment.

An adequate annual flying rate per pilot is also important to our aircraft attrition rate; that is the number of accidents in which the aircraft is damaged beyond repair compared to the number of hours flown. Initially with the CF104, this rate was relatively high, a not uncommon occurrence when a new aircraft is introduced and particularly so with an aircraft as sophisticated as the CF104. Based on these initial accident rates the planners felt that the aircraft could not be supported in adequate numbers beyond perhaps 1969. As we came to know the aircraft, both from a flying and from a technical standpoint, the problem areas were overcome, the number of accidents dropped dramatically until in 1967 we had only three. As a result we now have sufficient aircraft on inventory to maintain our present strength of six squadrons until at least 1975, barring any catastrophic failure in the airframe or engine.

Accidents will continue to happen since, unfortunately, that is all part of flying but we are making every effort to keep the number as low as possible and our whole flight safety programme is geared to this end.

We monitor our aircraft very closely to ferret out problems before they have an opportunity to develop. We are inspecting our aircraft for metal fatigue and a number of selected airframes are being flown at a high rate under test conditions. Any problems which are detected in these test aircraft can be corrected before the remainder of the aircraft reach the same number of hours flown. We also use a programme called the spectrometric oil analysis programme for monitoring engine performance. In this programme oil samples are drawn from engines and analysed for metal content. Using this technique, suspect engines can be removed before failure in the air occurs. This type of testing programme is a major factor in the reduction of accidents.

There are many examples of progressive technical improvement to the CF104 which I could cite but one should suffice to illustrate what I mean when I say the aircraft is in its

prime. In 1964, overhaul of the J79 engine was required after every 400 hours. By 1967 this interval was increased to 600 hours and we have just now moved to an 800 hour cycle—an improvement of 100% in four years. This latest increase—from 600 to 800 hours—will result in an annual overhaul contract saving of \$600,000.

Now to say a few words on the concepts of operation beginning with strike then reconnaissance and finally the attack roles.

To ensure that his strike or nuclear forces are not caught on the ground, SACEUR has placed certain of these aircraft on a continuous 24 hour a day high state readiness. This force is prepared to launch within minutes at any time. Pilots and supporting personnel are located in a specially guarded area. Once nuclear weapons are released for use, and SACEUR orders the launch, this special force launches automatically and is followed immediately by the balance of the strike force as aircraft become available.

All strikes are planned, as far as it is possible to do so, to ensure safety for the pilot and aircraft both for the penetration and withdrawal phases of the flight. The objective of tactical nuclear weapons employment is the accomplishment of the military task with a minimum of unwarranted destruction. Therefore, the primary targetting is directed against the enemy's military offensive capability and not against centres of population. The range of the CF104, in all its roles, limits it to tactical and not strategic employment. In addition to the special force at instant readiness, under conditions of increased tension, the readiness of the remainder of our force would be increased by SACEUR as the international situation required.

Turning now to reconnaissance, the conduct of these operations will vary with the type of war being fought. For all commanders, air reconnaissance will provide the majority of his intelligence and it is therefore vitally important that all facets of the operation work well.

During a conventional war, reconnaissance activity would be intense. Missions would be flown to identify enemy military units posing the greatest threat to Allied Command Europe and, also, in support of the land battle.

In a tactical nuclear war, post strike reconnaissance would be essential.

Now for a few words on the concept of attack operations. Within NATO "attack" refers to the use of non nuclear weapons and it is this conventional weapons capability which will be given increased attention as the new NATO strategy is applied. Our strike/attack squadrons at 3 and 4 wings now possess a dual capability and are operationally tasked in the conventional role against a variety of military targets. And division pilots have practiced conventional weapon deliveries for over two years and have developed a very high expertise in delivery accuracy.

Turning now to this coming year—our immediate future was confirmed by the government's recently announced decision to retain through 1969, our presently committed air contribution to SACEUR. This has permitted us to get on with the work required to relocate our six squadrons on two bases: Lahr and Baden-Soellingen. The squadrons will be in situ by 1 July and the base at Zweibrücken will be handed over to the host nation by 1 September. This means a very tight work schedule for us but the programme is now well underway to ensure that we meet these deadlines.

Since both Lahr and Baden-Soellingen will each support an additional squadron there will be an increase of personnel at both bases. This increase will be mainly in the operational and not the administrative or support areas. In terms of total numbers, the strength of these two bases next summer will not be significantly higher than those of September 1967, since a 10 per cent decrease in personnel was achieved at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen during the summer of 1968. Many of the servicemen moving from Zweibrücken to Lahr and Baden-Soellingen will replace those who are returning to Canada after a three year tour of duty and the number of servicemen posted from Canada to Europe this year will be less than the normal annual turnover.

From the technical aspect, there are several engineering and repair projects required to permit Baden-Soellingen and Lahr to accept the additional squadrons. At Baden-Soellingen an infrastructure, or NATO funded programme to resurface the main runway began on March 1. While this work is underway the 4 wing squadrons will operate from 3 wing. At Lahr a minor rehabilitation programme is currently underway to improve certain support facilities and to accommodate 430 squadron which has already moved from 3 wing.

Now I would like to turn briefly to the new NATO strategy which is popularly known as "flexible response". This term is unfortunately ambiguous. It does not mean a lessening of a requirement for a tactical nuclear capability in Allied Command Europe nor does it predict the likely response to a given level of aggression. What the revised guidance actually calls for is a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression and threats of aggression—it means that under the new strategy, Saceur will have a greater flexibility in the type of military response than formerly. In the final analysis, it will be the commander's judgement which determines the most effective response.

At the North Atlantic assembly's annual session in November 1967, General Lemnitzer warned of NATO conventional deficiencies, particularly on the central front where he had considered the reserves to be only of marginal strength even before the French military withdrawal. He pointed out that reduced resources meant the possible earlier employment of selected nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the critical factor was the readiness and level of forces available to him and that these were the forces which determined the credibility of the NATO deterrent. 1 Air Division is, of course, the type of force—at full operational readiness—to which he referred.

On the air side, the implementation of this concept will mean that a viable conventional contribution is required but not at the expense of the nuclear capability. The present capability was created to deter the threat of military aggression and so far, has been successful. The steamroller threat to Western Europe remains, however, and the Soviet forces in Europe today have a greater mobility and striking power than in early 1960's. The only way to create a greater conventional capability, while retaining the nuclear deterrent now available, is to make use of dual capable aircraft—that is aircraft with the capability of carrying either nuclear or conventional armament as circumstances dictate.

The CF104 is a weapons system that is dual capable and adaptable to the new strategy.

The CF104's range, performance and all weather systems are vital to a realistic conventional capability in the European Theatre. Although emphasis will be placed on the conventional role, a nuclear strike capability will continue to be vital in maintaining a credible

deterrence. In Europe, warfare could involve their tactical use. Any meaningful deterrent depends upon a knowledge by the Warsaw Pact of a willingness and ability to employ them.

In the air division, the level of expertise is very high in the strike role and we are now directing more and more effort to improving our non nuclear capability in line with SACEUR's requirement for a greater dual nuclear/conventional capability in his forces on the Central Front.

I said earlier that in numbers, but particularly quality, the Canadian Military contribution—the air division and I must not forget our brigade group—is a significant part of SACEUR's force. The Canadian contribution, at the peak of operational effectiveness, and setting a high standard for other air forces to emulate, is part of the forces in being immediately available to SACEUR. He does not have to wait for either mobilization or transportation to get them here. With a limited manpower base but an advanced technology, Canada, has been able to provide forces capable of operating and defending themselves in all types of warfare. This takes on added significance with the military threat to the Atlantic community coming from the Soviet forces—an extremely versatile and sophisticated fighting force.

I would like to end on the note that in spite of the uncertainties as to the future of the air division, morale here remains high. Our servicemen have proven themselves as professionals in the strictest sense of the word. The air division is the most effective, efficient force that Canada has ever placed in the field and our personnel know it. They are very highly motivated and are fully aware of the part they are playing in the defence of NATO.

London, England, March 14, 1969

The Chairman: We have lost a few of our members in the heavy traffic but I think perhaps because we are running a little late, we will start and the others will no doubt join us.

We are very fortunate to have the opportunity of talking with officials of the Institute of Strategic Studies and I will introduce its Director and then he will take over from here. Mr. Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute.

Mr. Alastair Buchan (Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies): Gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to offer you a warm welcome.

When Peter Dobell and the Department raised the possibility of our talking with you they thought that perhaps the most useful thing that we could do since we are outside—we are an independent Institute—rather than get into questions of NATO policy and so on, would be to have some discussion with you on the sort of general context of east-west relations in which the kind of decisions with which Canada is faced will have to be taken. My colleagues are, on my right here is our Deputy Director, Brigadier Kenneth Hunt who has had long experience with NATO force planning. On his right is Mr. Malcolm MacIntosh who is one of the leading experts in the world on the Soviet armed forces and he served with the Soviet army during the war and has written two definitive books on the Soviets and on Soviet strategic policy in general. On the Chairman's left is Dr. Christoph Bertram, our Assistant Director, who is an international lawyer from Germany, and on his left is Mr. Philip Windsor from the London School of Economics who is an expert on eastern Europe and on central European questions. He and I wrote a book in 1962 together called, "Armed and Stability in Europe" and we have just published an extremely good paperback study by him on the Czechoslovak question.

First of all if I may, Mr. Chairman, just say a word about the ground rules as I understand them. This is an entirely informal discussion, that we are not in any sense giving evidence to your Committee. I think you found in your bundle of papers first of all an annual publication of ours which is called "The Military Balance" and I suggest that if we want to get into questions of figures it might be useful for you to turn to Table 2 at the end which is the one that has the various force strengths of east and west in Europe. We have roughed out an agenda of four questions. The first deals with the question of what is going on inside the Warsaw Pact.

What I propose, if you are agreeable, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee is that we should invite some discussion within the panel on the question and then after a very brief discussion we should submit ourselves to your questions. Is that agreeable?

The Chairman: That would be fine.

Mr. Buchan: The first thing I think perhaps we ought to talk about is the question of what is going on inside the eastern bloc. For many years we talked about the eastern European countries as the satellites of the Soviet Union. How do we look at this relationship today in view of the very contrary explosions of Romania and Czechoslovakia. Here is Romania for four years pursuing a very critical policy of the Soviet Union. It has expressed an opposition very analogous to that of France, to multilateral pacts and it got away with it. Czechoslovakia expressed her loyalty to the Warsaw Pact, but pursued an internal policy that moved not only towards economic liberation, but also appears to be moving towards political democracy.

What do we think about the next 10 years? Do we think there are going to be explosions similar to Czechoslovakia? That the Warsaw Pact contains within itself now the seeds of its own breakup. Is this a dangerous phenomenon? Is it a western interest to see the breakup of the Warsaw Pact or to see its maintenance and perhaps its gradual internal evolution and liberalization? Perhaps I could ask Malcolm MacIntosh if he would like to start on that.

Mr. Malcolm MacIntosh: I think the main fact about the Warsaw Pact is that it can go two ways in theory. When the Warsaw Pact was founded in 1955 the Soviet Union envisaged it as a command and control organization, both in the field of foreign policy and in the field of military affairs.

It envisaged the Warsaw Pact as a co-ordinating and administrating agency through which the Soviet line in foreign policy in any given way—in any given matter could be communicated to the east European countries and upon which the east European countries could act. On the military side the Warsaw Pact was set up not really as an operational military organization, but rather as what used to be called in this country the War Office. As a co-ordinating agency to administer the armed forces of the east European countries.

As the Warsaw Pact developed the main feature was that some of the east European countries, notably Romania, but also Czechoslovakia, came to believe that the Warsaw Pact could be developed into a genuine classical alliance system. As a forum for discussion among the east European countries with the Soviet Union and among themselves. The Soviet Union which had never intended this

development to take place found itself opposing it all along.

The reason why the Romanians were able to take advantage of this situation was because Romania is the one country of the east European allies of the Soviet Union that has an economic base. Namely, related to its resources and oil which enabled it to pursue a policy which was separate from that of the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union could not impose its will on Romania through economic methods.

At the same time Romania had no direct frontier with any NATO or neutral country and therefore was not in the front line in the military sense. What has happened in the Warsaw Pact is that Romania has pursued its policy of independence from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was completely unable to find a convincing and successful way of preventing the Romanians from seeking a genuine forum status for the Warsaw Pact. In other words turn the Warsaw Pact from a command and control organization to a classical alliance where each of the members had equal rights to discuss and propose things. Both in the field of military affairs and in the field of foreign policy.

What has happened within the last year is that a crisis grew up in eastern Europe which was not strictly-speaking relevant to the Warsaw Pact at all, because the one thing the Czechoslovaks never said they were going to do was leave the Warsaw Pact or in any way become disloyal to the Warsaw Pact. They always insisted that whatever they did internally, their alliance was with the Soviet Union, that militarily their armed forces were devoted to the Soviet Union and to the Warsaw Pact alliance. In a curious way the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 was not closely related to the real crisis in eastern Europe. It was a divergence, it was a different kind of crisis and now that the Czechoslovak crisis is over temporarily and in the short term settled in the interests of the Soviet Union, in the sense that the Soviet Union now occupies Czechoslovakia militarily and has—is in a position to force her views on the Czechoslovak government, we are back in the old crisis—the pre-Czechoslovak crisis within the Warsaw Pact in which Romania and the Romanian ideas of independence are once again coming to the fore and I think that the Soviet Union's dilemma, as far as the Warsaw Pact and as far as eastern Europe is concerned is really—

can it find an answer to the continuous pressure from Romania and from several other countries in eastern Europe as the east European people become better educated with a higher standard of living with improved economic opportunities and this is going on all the time and exercises a great deal of pressure on the east European Communist Governments and on the Soviet Union itself. Can the Soviet Union find an answer to these pressures and can they develop their east European alliance system into something which is more lasting than the original idea which was the Command and Control system in the military and political field and I think to end very briefly on this point, I think that the Soviet Union in the short-term has taken the view that it must put the claw back, it must return in the lives of Czechoslovakia and Romania and so on, it must return to the solution returning the Warsaw Pact to a Command and Control organization. Whereas the longer term and more promising trend from the Soviet point of view and from the European point of view and hope would be if the Soviet Union would come to terms with the pressure from Eastern Europe and would genuinely turn the Warsaw Pact into a classical alliance with the quality of consultation and discussion and weight of decision-making in the alliance, and I believe that the Soviet decision turning the alliance back to try and review its function of the Command and Control organization is going to mean continued tension in eastern Europe, continued pressure to change from eastern Europe in spite of Czechoslovakia, and I think that the Soviet Union is going to be faced in the next five years with some extremely serious but not very easily identifiable pressures and crises coming from the east European allies.

Mr. Buchan: Thank you, Mr. Windsor would you like to comment on that?

Mr. Windsor: In east-west relations generally, the detente between the two central powers became more recognizable, more definable in certain terms so that as the importance of the Warsaw Pact in east Europe increased it became more necessary to the Soviet Union to extend the range of activities, and the degree of co-ordination inside the Warsaw Pact partly perhaps as a mechanism for political supervision of the activities of the east European allies, and I think the reason is a fairly simple one in that the very existence of detente gave countries like Romania but not only Romania, including

Hungary and Czechoslovakia, greater scope for diversifying their relations with the western European states. They raised the question of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and other east European states at that time.

In order to maintain some kind of framework of definition on the range of policies in eastern Europe, the Soviet Union began to reactivate, as it were, the Warsaw Pact, proved that it might be given an increasing emphasis on this consultative committee which is essentially I think in political form and on its military integration as well and partly perhaps the military reason, partly certainly I think as a means of co-ordinating sectors of foreign policy. So that the importance of the Warsaw Pact grew with the detente and not in spite of detente and these two things in fact went together. The same question that I would like to mention is that the history of Czechoslovakia is one where firstly Czechoslovakia as Mr. MacIntosh suggested remained loyal to the Warsaw Pact. It advertised its loyalty on every possible occasion, was publicly deferential to the Soviet Union on questions of foreign policy particularly with regard to Germany. But at the same time although the Warsaw Pact itself was not relevant to this eastern European crisis which arose out of Czechoslovakia it was made relevant to Czechoslovakia. It is an extraordinary threat perhaps that if one compares it with Hungary the Soviet Union in 1956 felt perfectly able and felt it was convenient, to intervene alone in Hungary. By 1968 it went to tremendous pains to reassure Warsaw Pact members and to present this as a Warsaw Pact exercise and to present Czechoslovakians in some sense or other as traitors to the Warsaw Pact.

In fact it seems to me that one of the chief concerns in the period before the invasion of Czechoslovakia was to ensure the kind of Warsaw Pact framework which would enable it to continue to impose, as it were, the ground rules of interstate behaviour in eastern Europe. I do not think that this means by any means that the states in eastern Europe have reverted to being satellites or are even conceived of as satellites by the Russians. I think it does mean that the Russians have extended their own freedom of interpretation about the actions of the eastern European states. One interesting aspect in this is Romania itself. Romania is frequently compared with France, Romania playing the role in the Warsaw Pact that France does in

NATO and with some justification. But in fact the mechanics of these two countries' operations are entirely different. France leaves the NATO organization, France insists that its political differences with other NATO members make it difficult to co-operate with the NATO military planning and so on. Romania insists, on the other hand, that other Eastern European states ought to have a greater voice in the affairs of the Warsaw Pact. It also foreshadows I hasten to add the day on which the two alliances will disappear. But while the true alliance is lost, Romania appears to be pressing for greater integration if anything, in the Warsaw Pact with a greater eastern European voice, while France presses for a looser association of states within the framework of western alliances and a smaller degree of integration.

But it seems to me that what this is about is that Romania is precisely attempting to avoid, or has been attempting to avoid the use to which the Warsaw Pact has been put as a political frame of reference and it has failed. But the end result of this, the Romania and Czechoslovak experiences together have been that the Soviet Union has allocated to itself a certain freedom of action in determining what constitutes the threat, of the social system in eastern Europe, to the interests of the Soviet Union or any other social state itself, but it has enunciated this in the form of the version of doctrine of the socialist common world for limited sovereignty, or whatever one prefers to call it, and that it has now announced that it will feel free to intervene in the affairs of any other state in eastern Europe when it, the Russian Government, conceives the activities of that state are a threat either to socialism or to the interests of any other socialist state. And in this it has been not at all supported even by its most loyal allies, even by Poland, even by East Germany. In other words, the Soviet Union, I think has now drawn apart from the other members of the Warsaw Pact into a position of super-national authority, and this raises a number of other questions which are on the agenda in terms of the super power detente and the relations of the eastern European and western European powers themselves. But I think what is important to know in this particular point perhaps is, that the new position of the Soviet Union is that it does not insist that the other powers should revert to being satellites, but it does insist that the decision-making centre in Moscow is a kind of super-national authority or commission as it were,

for the whole of eastern Europe and this is a paradoxical situation in which the eastern European states are continuing to claim freedom of action, to promote their own room for manoeuvre and to be allowed to do so by the Russians, but the Russians at the same time have set themselves up as arbitrators in the position which nobody else can challenge.

The Chairman: Mr. Hunt, would you like to add anything particularly . . .

Brigadier Hunt: Well it seems to me that the issue of super-nationality is a very interesting one. You will recall this concept which was really first implemented in the European communities very much because the smaller nations wanted a super-national authority. The smaller nations in Europe such as the satellite countries believe that their voice was stronger in the super-national setup. And quite the reverse is happening in the Warsaw Pact as Mr. Windsor has just indicated and Mr. MacIntosh too. It seems to me the reason for this is that in fact super-nationality applies to a system where you have conceivable areas of majority and conceivable areas of disunity. But with a member state as strong and powerful as the Soviet Union—strong and powerful in the sense too that it can rally to its own views, smaller countries, majority voting or super-nationality in the international context does not work. And therefore I think this paradox which apparently the Rumanian position reflects, that wanting a greater east European voice but opposing super-nationality is dissolved, is precisely the fear that particularly the countries of the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact might form a sort of holy alliance with the Soviet Union in order to overrule what the southern tier or the Hungarians, Romanians and now the Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians want to do. And so you have a strange reversion of political structures and of motives for political structures in this sense.

Let me just add one other thing. It is quite interesting when you look at the development in the Warsaw Pact that your western fears in a way have not been totally justified. I mean the western fears that while the Soviet Union would be quite prepared to dismantle the Warsaw Pact for what seemed to be a European security system, they would still retain their control through bilateral arrangements within the Warsaw Pact and all the specialists for the last ten years have repeatedly pointed out that even if the Warsaw Pact were dismantled and still this network

of bilateral treaties, bilateral arrangements between the various Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union would remain. Now it seems and this I think is an interesting change, that for the Soviet Union itself, the Warsaw Pact as a collective organization suddenly becomes more important and I doubt very much that nowadays the Soviet Union would be prepared to propose a dismantling of the Warsaw Pact in exchange for a very vague—still very vague concept of the European security concept.

Mr. Buchan: Thank you very much. I would like to invite your question, gentlemen. I would like to ask you to comment briefly on that.

Dr. Bertram: Mine is a very brief comment but the sense of the Warsaw Pact is in Russia. However one describes the Warsaw pact at the centre of this enormous country, whether one calls them satellites or not, and if Russia wishes to exert the command and control that Malcolm MacIntosh described, it can do it in one of two ways.

Either by the party or by putting soldiers on the spot and it had no difficulty at all in controlling eastern Germany because there were Russian divisions sitting there. It had no trouble with Hungary once it had put its soldiers there and similarly with Poland. When it found that in Czechoslovakia its control by the party was not enough, it put soldiers back. Therefore, in simple practical terms the problem of command and control in the short term is what does Russia need to do to exercise its control? One found in Czechoslovakia it needed by attendance standards to put troops back.

It is possible, it seems to me, for a country like Romania, distant in the southern tier to exercise a good deal of freedom, but it can only get to a certain point. It goes up to the point at which it risks itself having troops put in. For many many years Yugoslavia has permitted itself a good deal of freedom because geographically it was a long way away and that sort of freedom is not available to a country which is on the Russian borders.

One must accept the fact it seems that in the short term that Russia has made up its mind that it must control by one means or another. It either controls through the party where it feels confident it can do this and in Czechoslovakia it wavered and decided it could not and put in soldiers. It seems to me

one has to face this rather elemental truce in the middle, that you have an element of Russian imperialism inside what we are pleased to call the Warsaw Pact.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, gentlemen. We are open for questioning and I have a number of names on my list. Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: I cannot direct this to any specific person. I will put it to Mr. Buchan and he can pass it on from there. There is one thing that you have not talked about and I would be just interested in some comments in respect to what is happening in places such as the Ukraine, within what is commonly considered the sovereign area of Russia. Secondly, and I brought this up earlier today in my questioning. I am very much concerned with the possibility and I cannot see this ever happening where Russia can start to loosen up a little bit because of this liberalization tendency. It would seem to me that they would simply open the doors to their own destruction and...

Mr. Buchan: Could you clarify that? Do you mean inside the Soviet Union?

Mr. Cafik: Inside eastern Europe and would include the Soviet Union itself. I cannot conceive how we can ever reduce the tensions when this is such a strong possibility. They have such a strong fear in this regard. Perhaps you could comment on those points if you would.

Brigadier Hunt: Would it be as well... Malcolm, would you like to—I think I will only answer one question if I may on each point. I think this is one of the key questions of the next 10 or 20 years in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. There are forces working and I will come to the Ukraine in a minute.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Brigadier Hunt: But the general question first. There are forces working for a loosening up and a liberalization in the Soviet Union and in eastern Europe and there are forces working against. I think the forces working for in the Soviet Union could be described as the rising standard of living. There is no doubt that the Soviet standard of living is rising and is going to go on rising in spite of the enormous sums that the Soviet Union is spending on defence.

A higher proportion every year of the Soviet population is getting better-educated

and is going to higher institutes of education, universities and so on. These people are reading more, are listening more and with quite small things such as the Soviet acceptance of west European cultural programs for their television and so on.

More and more people in the Soviet Union are discovering and learning more and more about what is going on in the rest of the world and this inevitably means acquiring more and more information and contact with the things that we describe as the basic freedoms of our type of society.

Forty years ago and for something like 85 per cent of the population of Russia—the Soviet Union lived a hand to mouth existence on the farm and did not move more than a few miles away from the homestead for their entire lives. Although quite a large proportion of the Soviet Union population still lives on the farm, more and more people—there is a drift to the towns and more and more people who are staying on the farms are getting more and more education, information and knowledge of things outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union. This is—just to take one sort of symbolic fact in favour of a general loosening up because when people know more they ask more questions. They become more inquisitive and eventually they demand more.

The main forces working against liberalization is the age-old Russian tradition of autocracy. Whether one likes it or not there has never been a democratic government in Russia. Russia has always been governed by a central authority which insists on dominating everything from religion to agriculture and from control of public order to education. In the 50 years or so the Soviet Union has if anything, intensified the age old Russian determination to run things from the top by a central authority. In present day it boils down to 11 men, members of the ruling politbureau of the Communist Party.

I should add to this idea of forces against loosening up, the enormous bureaucracy which this centralized authority needs to run a country of 230 million people stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

There is a tremendous element of inertia in the way everything is done in the Soviet Union. Things are done by precedent, the machinery of government ticks over at a very slow pace by inertia. The pressures for change in the Soviet Union are relatively far away from the top—from the people who

make the decisions. It is very difficult for the pressures which are much nearer the surface, in eastern Europe, in a country like Czechoslovakia or Hungary with so many western traditions. The pressures for change are much nearer the decision-making process. In the Soviet Union they are enormously distant from the decision-making process.

To turn to—not to take up too much time, to turn to your specific question of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian case is an extremely interesting one because the Ukrainians are a more turbulent people by temperament than the Russians. They are more interested in change for change sake. They are more lively, they are more—in many ways they are quicker intellectually than the Russians—than the Great Russian people. They are therefore more restless.

In the case of the Ukraine which has never in its history had a separate national sovereign existence as a state, except for a month or two during the Russian civil war. In the case of the Ukraine this restlessness and intellectual quickness is allied to a certain linguistic difference with the Great Russians which is sometimes described as a totally separate language and other times it appears to be something more like an accent—a provincial accent.

If you get Ukrainians to discuss this they will probably tell you their language is as different from Russians as for example Bulgarian or Polish. In fact...

Mr. Buchan: The Canadians are probably very familiar with this. They have a large Ukrainian population.

Mr. Cafik: There is one in my riding.

Brigadier Hunt: So that in the case...

Mr. Cafik: You are talking to one too, by the way.

Brigadier Hunt: If I may just finish on the Ukraine, you have this very lively, highly intelligent, restless people.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Brigadier Hunt: I think I said this before, which feels not only that it is more lively and quicker than the Great Russians and they do feel a certain linguistic difference with the Russians and therefore there is a strong possibility that one of channels, slow though it may be, through which change may ultimately come in the Soviet Union could well

be through the Ukrainians. Not only the Ukrainians in the Ukraine, but the Ukrainians who have moved to Moscow and have come up in the Party. Such as Krushev, he was not strictly speaking a Ukrainian, but he had Ukrainian associations.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: If I could ask, Mr. MacIntosh Sir, in your statement you said this I believe, that you believe the Soviet decision was advanced to the command control idea as to cause tension and the Soviets will be faced with serious, but not easily identifiable crises. Could you elaborate on what you mean by these crises and why they are not easily identifiable? What form of crises do you have in mind there?

Mr. MacIntosh: Yes, the form of crisis briefly can be summed up really in the word "nationalism". That is to say the force of nationalism is eastern Europe, Bulgarian nationalism, Polish, Czech and so on. The reason why it is not easily identifiable is that a great deal of east European nationalism is wrapped up in Communist ideological terms and therefore the Czechs for example put their problems last summer during the critical period, in terms which looked as though they were doing more for Communism than the reverse.

This is the reason why they are not easily identifiable because they can be wrapped up in ideological terms. I think perhaps that is the answer.

Mr. Buchan: Would anyone else care to comment?

Dr. Bertram: The difficulties about this whole question of liberalization in both the Soviet Union where it has been intermittently going on and Eastern Europe, is that liberalization where it equates with nationalism in Eastern Europe is *ipso facto* a threat to the Soviet Union and must be suppressed and naturally it does equate with nationalism in Eastern Europe almost everywhere. Though nationalism does not always equate with liberalization and as in Poland it equates with repressive tendencies in the regime rather than the reverse. The real difficulty is that while the Soviet Union is engaged on a very long term in a very difficult and tricky kind of political experiment, trying to marry social and political and economic criteria off, and to produce some kind of compromised program between these. Any tendency in Eastern

Europe which threatens to go faster, which makes the Russians themselves appear a kind of dependent variable in this, to use the term in political science jargon, in itself threatens the position of the Soviet Union as a state in Eastern Europe and predisposes a disposition towards crisis.

I think crisis will come in situations precisely where the Eastern European countries themselves are trying to do the same kind of experiment as the Russians. Where they too are trying to meet various conflicting requirements and where their sense of their own interest might lead to a conflict of interest with the Soviet Union. I think the state where this might perhaps be most likely at the moment is Hungary which has already had enough, heaven knows, but where it could easily happen again and where, I do not mean to say in the sense of bloodshed, but in the sense of a long drawn-out political crisis with the use of Soviet troops as a political instrument and where the Hungarian Prime Minister, alone I think, of the prime ministers in Eastern Europe, has insisted that the events of Czechoslovakia and the developments inside the whole bloc since that time have not made any difference whatsoever to the Hungarian policy of trying to seek a pragmatic day-to-day cautious, practical rapprochement with individual states in Western Europe. And this kind of thing, it seems to me, could if things went badly either in economic or political terms turn towards crisis very quickly. Which does not mean, of course, that it is inevitable.

Mr. Buchan: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to mention, are we going to cover number four topic this afternoon? The first is the one we are on now, relations within the Warsaw Pact, the second is Soviet strategy towards Europe, the third, change in Europe and four, the consequences of Soviet American negotiations.

The Chairman: I have three or four questioners on my list now. If you want to pursue this, if they all relate to this first point, this first phase, fine, we will take them now. Otherwise I wonder whether we should after hearing Mr. MacLean's question go on, and perhaps hear the discussion of the second point and I would hold the names of the questioners on my list. But if they relate specifically to this first phase then perhaps we could deal with them rather rapidly. What is your wish on that. Mr. Allmand, Mr. Howard, Mr. Marceau and Mr. Harkness, do your

questions relate specifically to this first aspect or are they more general and could they be picked up as we proceed.

Mr. Harkness: Mine relates really to all of them to some extent.

The Chairman: Well probably we could pick that up later. How about yours Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Well mine relates to this and to the Warsaw Pact.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard and yours is more general. And Mr. Marceau, is yours more general?

Mr. Marceau: It is a matter of budget, the Russian Budget.

The Chairman: Well perhaps it does relate, if I could interrupt Mr. Marceau, it does relate to this specific item perhaps and yours Mr. MacLean does it relate to this first phase?

Mr. MacLean: My first is finished and then the second relates to subject two.

The Chairman: I see. Well then Mr. Allmand and then Mr. Marceau, and then we will go on to the second...

Well then could we deal with those two questions rather briefly perhaps and then have a five minute break... Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: I would like to have the panels' assessment of the following events on relations within the Warsaw Pact. The first of these is the recent border incidents between China and the Soviet Union and the growing power of China, and related to that the fact that as a result of Czechoslovakia, Albania, a satellite of China, which left the Warsaw Pact and its very personal proximity to the Warsaw Pact countries. The second event is that while there is liberalization within the Warsaw Pact countries, we have on the other side of the fence possibilities of strong socialist governments or things like communist governments coming to power in the NATO countries. Now I think of a possibility of a communist take-over in Greece as a result of the civil war or even communists sharing in the government of Italy and how, as these events, China on the one side, and growing socialization perhaps in the West, have an effect on the Warsaw Pact relations?

Mr. Buchan: I wonder if I could try myself to start the ball rolling on that. I think that there is a connection between stability in

Europe and China-Soviet relations but it is too early to tell exactly what it is. I think we are all simple-minded in saying that as the Soviet Union got more concerned with China-Soviet relations it would wish to calm things down in Europe. This is too facile. The Soviet Union has a very complex set of interests in Europe which are only moderately affected by her relations with China, and there has been some transference of nuclear resources to China but frankly this is something the Soviet Union could manage, without really debilitating its nuclear position in Europe. Albania, frankly you cannot accept as a joke, I think. It is a splendid, beautiful accommodating state, a little rugged mountain state and the fact that it has left the Warsaw Pact means it has really come to the end of a long, long, quarrel with the Soviet Union and the other East European countries. It was egged on by China but all ideas of Chinese missile bases in Albania, I think, are ludicrous. However, it is an aspect of something that does concern us very much, I think, which is that as the authority of the Soviet Union is more in question in the socialist system generally, and as the circumstances of the American authority in NATO is not as unchallenged as it was ten years ago, Southern Europe does in some respects become a more dangerous place again. There are a number of troubled relationships in the Balkans, Greece and Bulgaria and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Greece and Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania and so on, and this always rather unstable area has the possibility of local trouble which has been somewhat raised I think, perhaps because of the number of uncertainties over Soviet action in the Ukraines, partly by the fact of the build-up of a strong Soviet or a moderately strong Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. So that I think we may be more concerned with trouble particularly in Southern Europe than in the past. I am afraid I personally am not particularly, have not given very much worry or lost sleep about the possibility of a communist government in Western Europe. You mentioned Italy. The Italian party is now on terms of daggers drawn with Moscow as a result of Czechoslovakia and perhaps also in Greece. A communist take-over in Greece is the same kind of thing that I was mentioning. The possibility, one of the things we have to watch for, is not only the old Greek-Turkish conflict but also of internal conflict in Greece and this is an aspect I think of this possibly growing

instability of Southern Europe. Would anybody else like to speak on this.

Brigadier Hunt: I would only like to add one point I think that the feeling that Russia automatically supports communist parties in other countries may have given way to the idea that Russia perhaps courts the existing regimes. She showed no signs at all of supporting, for example, the French communist party in all of the troubles in France last year. On the contrary she kept her links open with de Gaulle. She has shown no particular wish it seems to me to exercise power through communist parties in quite a number of countries.

Mr. Allmand: Is it competition with Chinese communist countries that is a factor? Is that a possibility?

Mr. Hunt: Yes. But not I think to the extent of prejudicing relations necessarily with the government of that country. I think at the moment her tactics may be to keeping contacts with the government of that country, than trying to influence the communist party inside that country to take over. I think we are going through a period now where she regards contacts with certain communist parties...

Mr. Allmand: I am thinking of Greece.

Mr. Hunt: Well in the case of Greece, it is a difficult one certainly but this is something where she might make a positive gain.

The Chairman: Mr. Marceau.

Mr. Marceau: What is the ratio of the Russian national budget with most of the other different peoples, for military purposes?

Mr. Buchan: I have not got the piece of paper in front of me but if you turn to about two tables back you will see it. It states it in that *Military Balance* in front of you. It is in the order of ten or 11 per cent. It is about ten or 11 per cent GNP. I think so. 9.6, the same order of magnitude as the United States. This figure is calculated by taking in defence expenditures and not the defence budget alone. It does not cover more than a fraction of defence expenditures. And there is a footnote explaining some of that, the problem of moveable conversion and things like that.

The Chairman: On our schedule we have a 15 minute break scheduled, set out for this period. Are we causing any problem by continuing with the panel discussion.

Mr. Buchan: Well shall we turn then to the question that is perhaps even more simple. Oh I am sorry, finish off that one.

Mr. Hunt: Just a brief remark on the position of communist parties in Western Europe in relation to the Soviet Union. I think there have been sporadic congress reports from the press in October, where it was quite clear that the communist regimes in Eastern Europe tried to plead with the communist parties in Western Europe that their problems were quite different, and trying to push off the criticism of the communist parties in Western Europe concerning events in Eastern Europe. And it seems to me too that if you look at the action of communist parties both in France and in Italy where they are strongest that what you see is something entirely different from what happened in the Warsaw Pact. Not only as far as the invasion of Czechoslovakia is concerned, but look at for instance the assessment of what the Common Market is. Where the Italian communist party for instance has been one of the moderators and exerting strong influence on Eastern Europe the Common Market was something to be accepted and to be dealt with and to be gotten in contact with by Eastern Europe and similarly the same applies, on a different level I agree, but nevertheless with the French communist party where you had in the instance last May in fact a tacit coalition between the Gaullists and the communists to get rid of the incidents and to restore law and order. It seems to me that this is rather significant of the way the communist parties see themselves in the system of Western democracies. They are much more domestic-minded than in fact they are, necessarily, as communist parties in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Buchan: Gentlemen I think perhaps we should turn to the question of Soviet strategy in Western Europe, toward the West as a whole. As you know from your own experience, the Soviet Union deploys very, very, very, powerful military forces in this part of the world. Last autumn there were 40, over 40 Soviet divisions west of the Soviet Union. The figure may have gone down one or two since the stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. It is of that order of magnitude, plus the various bomb and tactical air forces. There are about one thousand medium range missiles targets on every major airfield, city, communication point, in western Europe, considering its role. What is it all for? It is very

costly. Is a large part of this military strength to keep eastern Europe under control, to maintain this military command control system—to control the pace and direction of change in eastern Europe? Is it as Khrushchev used to suggest, to hold western Europe as a hostage to American caution and good behaviour in a crisis? Or does the Soviet Union really fear attack of some kind from the west European base? Do they really believe their own propaganda about German reconnaissance? If they do—do they really want to see the NATO system break up? Do they want American troops out of Europe? They talk on both sides of their minds on the subject in public and in private—and this is the question I think—since it is very close to your own preoccupations—that perhaps we ought to turn to. Perhaps Kenneth Hunt would like to speak.

Brigadier Hunt: Very, very briefly. I think there is an element of all the reasons you made clear here. I think it would not be unreasonable to suppose that they do fear or did fear attack. If all there was a country which wanted to have a whole lot of aircraft carriers and strike aircraft hovering around within range of one's shores, if one had missile submarines and if one had some intelligent tactical missiles on one's soil, if one had long-range strike aircraft as NATO has with tactical missiles, one would be disposed to say now one must do something about defending against these things. These cannot be all defensive. You do not, so to speak, defend the west by having long-range strike aircraft. I am sure, therefore, both historically and tactically there is an element of sheer defensive fear in the Russian mind. It seems to me not unreasonable. We organize our own forces to defend in the opposite way against similar things. Clearly there is an element of keeping eastern Europe under control—this is really why there are divisions to the extent now allowed in certain of the eastern European countries. One can justify Russian divisions in eastern Europe in terms of defending against NATO but clearly one does not always justify all of them simply by some of these concerns. Just for example, those in Czechoslovakia which are now concerned with keeping control of that country. One might say that those in Poland are in order to make quite sure that the supply line between Russia and Germany is kept open. It has something perhaps also to do with making quite sure that the Polish regime is an acceptable one. Controlling the

pace of change in Europe it seems to me is evidently a Russian influence. The status quo for the most part, that is to say the political position as it now is, suits the Russians rather better than perhaps it suited the Germans—to put it simply—and they would like to see change, if change happens to their advantage rather than the other way. It was never then necessarily a Russian interest in keeping either the status quo or getting something better and Russian forces have a certain amount to do with that. I think holding Europe hostage to American caution is something which may have exercised their minds many years ago when the Americans were talking of rolling back and there was a black and white picture of all communist subversion. I doubt if it is quite as bad now as it was, when one sees that the Americans are concerned with a dialogue with the Russians. I suspect that they feel now that the Americans are in fact extremely cautious individuals. Why does one not suspect that the Russians are not cautious individuals? Undoubtedly, once upon a time there was this hostage element there but I come back to fear of attack. I do not believe they fear ground attack, talking in vivacious terms, in the sense that they fear the Germans have any power at all of themselves to attack. They may fear a conjunction of German ambitions with American power—they may even fear, if one accepts that nuclear war is unlikely, that some form of fighting below it is possible. They may fear that there is a certain element in German thinking, which England has a problem indeed solving, and would perhaps wish to see solved one fine day, and the Russians with vivid memories of what happened in the last war just as the Germans have memories of what the Russians did in the last war. Perhaps to see these things in black and white terms, if one talks to a Russian he sometimes talks of rape, and burning buildings and he is still thinking in those sorts of terms and it seems to me a number of Russians, older men, have got in the back of their minds this sort of thing. I believe there is this sort of element in their responsive speech which harks back—it is not rational—but lots of things in politics are not rational the Lord knows. One is preserved from hell by things which were politically viable and valid twenty years ago, not necessarily now, but domestic pressures exercise themselves.

The Chairman: Thank you. These views are not held, I suppose, by people who are younger than we are, remembering that probably half the Soviet population is much too young to have any memory of the Second World War.

Dr. Bertram: Well, I think that when one looks at this possibility or one looks at what affects the Soviet threat in central Europe today, one wonders if it still is or ever was concerned with overrunning and integrating western Germany into the communist system. This is the first point I would like to make. It seems that not only for the east Europeans but also for the Russians a reunified communist Germany would really be a nightmare—a nightmare for the east Europeans because they already resent the increasing economic and political power of the east Germans in the world today, and a nightmare for the Russians because they find it is already quite difficult to deal with the East Germans in the east—the communists in East Germany—and I doubt very much whether they would like to tackle this together with their difficulties with China—a unified communist Germany. It seems to me that therefore, the probability of an all-out attack on West Germany, in order to win over or to occupy and integrate West Germany in the Warsaw Pact system is one that cannot be totally discarded but one that seems not altogether likely. Now Kenneth Hunt has already mentioned this question of the fear of Germany and it seems to me that if one cannot interpret Soviet policy as being directed by the desire to have a unified communist Germany at least what one can see is the desire to isolate West Germany—isolate it from NATO—isolate it from the Common Market—isolate it from the Western Concert as such. And one of the reasons why, in fact, the West Germans always find themselves particular bogie men of Soviet propaganda I think is this. The fear that Germany as far as it can trigger off—that is what the Russians seem to believe—trigger off major war, not only concerning Germany but concerning the West against the East. This is something that they are worried about and it seems they are not at all worried about, or much less so, about an isolated Germany. They seem to be quite prepared to deal with that and to be quite confident that their power is sufficient to deal with an isolated West Germany. But of course, it is in their interest to get West Germany out of the collective structure much more than I think it is in their interest to dissolve the collective structure itself. It

seems to me that while NATO is something that they are worried about, not so much that they fear the attack of NATO, and if you look at the tables in the military balance you will find that as far as ground forces are concerned there is very little likelihood of NATO being able to conduct a successful campaign against eastern Europe—but they are worried about NATO because they seem to believe, and this is evident whatever they say about Germany, they seem to believe that Germany due to its economic power and its efficiency and whatever have you, will be able to influence the collective structures in Europe to an extent where all the other countries will very nearly have to go along with it. So it seems to me that the Russian interest in western Europe is much more one of isolating Germany. This is the prime interest. As far as the dissolution of NATO is concerned again there seems to be a major difference between what east Europeans think and what the Soviet Union thinks. For east Europeans I believe that NATO provides indeed something like a containment of German integrative structures in the west and is regarded or more and more regarded, as a means to control the Germans rather than give them additional power. And there is a last point which I would like to make. The fear the Russians have of Germany is quite genuine and of course the Germans have done all they could to make us feel they are strong enough. However, it seems to me that today the exploitation of this fear of Germany in eastern Europe is something that has less integrated power than it used to have. For the east Europeans, relations with West Germany are what might be called normal relationships. And indeed, Poland, if you look at Poland 1956, where the Poles were quite ready to have diplomatic relations with West Germany without West Germany recognizing what they had in mind. I think this does show you the extent of evolution in the Warsaw Pact away from the rather rigid Soviet solution.

I think rather, too, that the Soviet propaganda about the dangerous Germans is a very dangerous one for cohesion of the Soviets in the Warsaw Pact too. Because what you have seen since the Germans so radically changed their policy towards eastern Europe is that the desire for independence for more nationalistic structures and regimes in eastern Europe has made the relationship with Germany an issue of almost domestic policy—a symbol of independence and I think here

indeed there is a grave danger that the Soviet insistence on the German militarism and verlanism may backfire.

The Chairman: Thank you, sir.

An honourable Member: Sir, there are two points I would like to make. The first is that I definitely do not agree with you when you say the policy of the Soviet Union is to isolate Germany from western Europe—it seems to me that on the whole the Soviet Union has shown that it is opposed to accepting the major conglomerate of western Europe into a federal republic. But what is most interesting it is to prevent the Germans from ascertaining and defining their own role in east-west relations in Europe. The German question as far as the Russian is concerned is settled. That is to say, their progress towards greater security understanding, a gradual rapprochement about the division of Europe and so on. Without a preliminary acknowledgment of the division of Germany. Meanwhile the federal republic has in many ways appeared and certainly I think it has attempted to create a more flexible position with regard to East Germany and has made innovations toward East Germany, stored up for the future so to speak, and the Soviet Union is determined to prevent this from taking place. It is a constant endeavour to make the federal republic and its allies recognize that the only way forward is through some kind of recognition of East Germany. This I think is the first point and towards this a great deal of the penetrative Warsaw Pact is directed, the revival of the Warsaw Pact has taken place in the past few years which I mentioned earlier, and the Warsaw Pact and anti-German propaganda have both become more important as the détente proceeded. In this way, I think it is always hard to distinguish between Soviet military intention and political purposes to which they put their military preparations but in the particular case of Germany, I think the military preparations have a very strong and a very clear political motivation. But on the whole a reasonably successful one. But the second point I would like to make is certainly to agree wholeheartedly with Christoph Bertram that the greater the extent to which the Russians stress the German danger the more they force eastern European states on the whole to examine the realities of this German danger which for the moment consists of getting a great deal of very good hard currency and being able to expand one's economic and

therefore one's political base and to subordinate everything to a somewhat artificial question of security which is cast in the light of revulsion and the importance of the Warsaw Pact is in fact it seems to me to invite a kind of Subterranean revolt in eastern Europe. This is not only true in the countries where the states themselves have rebelled against Soviet indicatives in this matter as in the case of Rumania, to some extent Czechoslovakia, to some extent Hungary. This is also the case in a country like Poland where it is one of the issues which has split the Polish party wide open and where it has helped to bring to power a regime which is based on a kind of compromise between over anti-Germanism and covert anti-Soviet feelings and where this kind of compromise could still lead to a continuing internal crisis and work out either way. And here, I think is the Soviet exclusive emphasis on West Germany which is what it has become. The Russians have begun to treat West Germany very much like the Western powers treated East Germany for so long, as the only obstacle to a kind of ray of sweetness and light all over Europe which is beginning to backfire in almost exactly the same way. That is, until the question of how we trade with that country is settled, all kinds of internal difficulties within the Alliance and within the states of the Alliance are going to go on.

An hon. Member: Thank you very much.

Dr. Bertram: I would like to summarize the Soviet outlook in answer to this question in perhaps four very short priorities recognizing that Soviet policy tends to be rather simple and rather primitive in its main lines. First of all, as has already been mentioned, the defence of the U.S.S.R. in depth is the role of Soviet forces in Europe.

Second priority, the maintenance of something like the present political and military status quo in Europe, and this I think includes—and I would be prepared to argue this point later—the continued existence of NATO and the continued American presence in Europe.

The third priority: keeping as many Soviet political and military options open as possible because I do not think we should forget the Soviet option of using their influence in Western Europe to weaken and disrupt and subvert Western Europe as well as, of course, the obvious military options in the event of war or hostilities becoming imminent.

The fourth priority, I would say, is to keep Germany divided. I think the thought on Germany is extremely simple in the Soviet Union, that no Russian government—let alone Soviet government—would ever be prepared to subscribe again to the 18 million or so Germans—the bloc of 18 million Germans in the centre of Europe with all their intelligence, their hard work, their business capacity, capabilities and so on, of ever being run and administered by one central government again. This, I think, is Soviet policy towards Germany.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean was your question directed towards this particular part of the discussion? Mr. Brewin, I think, has a question on this too. Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: I would like to have some more expert opinion as to what the Russian foreign policy is. What is their motivation? I think that is the subject we have been talking about. It would seem to me that there is a mix of perhaps two motivations: one, a kind of a nationalistic one dating back as far as the days of the czar and, secondly, the idealistic one like world communism and I would be very surprised if the military might which they maintain at the present time in Eastern Europe has anything to do with any concept of world conquest or even European conquest in the historical sense, but that its main purpose is to keep Eastern Europe in line. Secondly to maintain a threat to Western civilization in the hope that perhaps eventually the West will become tired of maintaining a constant defence posture and that their real ambitions would be in the line of the struggle for mens' minds. In a belief that their type of ideology is more viable than ours is and that ours can be weakened and will perhaps destroy itself anyway, but this process of destruction can be encouraged by subversion and the Russians are constantly fishing in troubled waters all over the world from time to time.

Mr. Buchan: I think, myself, that the ideological element in Russian policy began to die out some time ago, although as in all countries—we all have an ideological element in our policy—it will remain. The amount of effort and expertise that the Russians put into subversion is now very little indeed. It seems to me they behave more and more like a traditional great power. I think this is emphasized by the fact that she came to the conclusion in 1965 that the traditional display of the great powers is as strong as their best naval

force—the ability of a flotilla in Lagos or Bombay. My own feeling is that she is conceiving of her place as a super power, because that is what she is. But on the other hand Czechoslovakia throws some interesting light on this and I would like to ask Philip Windsor to comment on this because in a moment he has to go to catch a train.

Mr. Windsor: I think one can see this in several ways. In one sphere, the Soviet Union does behave like an ideologically motivated power. In Eastern Europe it has shown itself concerned to hammer out a kind of ideological line with which it can afford to confront the Chinese, with which it can be imposed on the Eastern European states as well and is at least part of the reason for the intervention in Czechoslovakia. More precisely, the Czechoslovak government seemed to be diluting the ideological agreements to a point where it was becoming almost impossible to define. On the other hand I think it is awfully good to say that since 1962 there have been some catastrophic defeats to the Russians sent to Cuba and they have been determined to act like a world power and gradually to become a world power. I think one of the paradoxes in the Soviet position, until recent years, has been that it has been a super power in terms of ability to intervene at a distance, to influence defence in other parts of the world; it has been much less of a world power, say, than Britain or France has been and it is now becoming a world power as it were to catch up on its super power status in a very classical sense. At the same time, the complications of a super power status is such that it is gradually being forced to recognize that it is in its own interest to recognize a series of tacit or open understandings with the United States about division in Europe, about the necessity of constant control and strategic regulation in the arms race, about where conflict is permissible and where conflict must be regulated and where conflict is forbidden. In all these ways the Soviet foreign policy seems to be operating at a number of different levels and there is a kind of analogy one can draw from it, perhaps some Freud, in the sense that there is an ideological European Id, which is good old basic drives and aggressions and there is a kind of world power ego where the Russians relate to other people in the world and there is a kind of super ego which is just trying to keep the other two in order and which, at the moment, seems to be taking the upperhand.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchan mentioned that Mr. Windsor has to leave to catch a train. On your behalf I would like to thank him most sincerely for making himself available. Mr. Howard and then Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): I just have a very brief question, Mr. Chairman. I would like to come down to the day to day events and ask how the Soviet strategy operates when they come to the simple matter of closing off the road to Berlin. Why do they do this kind of thing? What is there in it for them, and do they not by so doing merely stir the pot up and encourage our side to be more vigilant and spend more money on defence and all this sort of thing?

Mr. Buchan: Subject to correction by the experts, in the last instance it was not them who closed the road to Berlin, it was the East Germans and there was every sign of considerable Soviet reticence about this development because throughout the last Berlin sally caused by the German presidential election in Berlin, they would show everybody although they could lay hands on that they were not going to cause any trouble in Berlin.

I think one thing is clear. Berlin offers a unique chance for the Soviet Union to put pressure on the West, but I think they are not terribly afraid that showing too much force would revive the spirit of defence and cohesion within Western Europe. I mean, if you look at the Czechoslovak invasion, the result has not been totally discouraging for the Russians to that extent, but I would agree with what Mr. Windsor has just said. I think that the last Berlin crisis as indeed, the one last year and in June was much more an affair of the East Germans and the significance of this was the power that the East Germans could yield within the Warsaw Pact to make the Russians look on to what they were doing, to make it impossible for the Russians to stop this thing at all and one would have expected from the start that the Russians were less interested as to the question of the super power dialogue than of destroying the impact that Czechoslovakia had made on all the West. Still the interesting facet of this crisis war is that the East Germans forced the hand of the Russians and that the Russians felt obliged to do little in order to please the East Germans. Indeed, this may become the real significance of Berlin as a means of the East Germans to put pressure on the Russians rather than the Russians putting pressure on the West.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Do you think it possible that the Soviets were not unhappy that the East Germans did at the same time play the game? That is the impression I got from it.

Mr. Buchan: My impression is that this is not the case. It seems to me that the Russians are quite aware of the resentment towards Eastern Germany in the Warsaw Pact. The Russians are quite aware of the fact that if they abide too much by what the East Germans want them to do this would make cohesion within the Warsaw Pact even more difficult than it is now. The resentment, for instance, in Poland or in places like Czechoslovakia or Hungary towards the East Germans is quite considerable and both fear of their economic power and their influence with the Russians is something that East European leaders are very much concerned with. It seems to me that from this point of view this was not a very welcome crisis to the Russians. Now this does not exclude that Berlin offers the possibility to the Russians to separate the men from the boys, to separate the Germans from the allies in Berlin. If you look at the crisis last year in June and, indeed, the crisis just now, you will see that the restrictive measures imposed by the East Germans did not hamper in any way the access of the allies to Berlin or the position of the allies in Berlin, but did hamper the access of the West Germans to Berlin and of Berliners to West Germany. It was really this that seemed to be in the focus of the matter.

Brigadier Hunt: I had wanted to wait to make this one point, which Mr. Buchan has just made, but I think Russian policy can always be looked at as: is it directed against the Germans or is it directed against the West? By and large the Russian policy is almost always directed towards Germany. It stopped short, it seems to me, of directing itself against the Americans. Clearly at the moment, in the last analysis it was ably agreed on the part of the Russians not to confront the Americans. They were waiting for the Americans to agree to arms control talks and so on. There is something, therefore, which stops short of wanting to confront them. They did not want to confront the Americans also in the Middle Eastern war when this took place, but the opportunity to single out the Germans so to speak and to hold them hostage is always I think an attractive one and occasionally of course they also have to pay some sort of lip service to the

East Germans too, and this can be seen I think in the same context.

Mr. Windsor: Yes, I very much agree with what you said. I think one of the factors is that the Berlin situation was inherited by successive Soviet governments from the post-war situation, and the Russians over the years have tried various experiments over Berlin in 1948-49 and tried to force us out by intimidation. In 1958 and in 1961 again they had other attempts to throw us out one way or another or to get us to leave.

I think that the Russian attitude to Berlin since 1962 has been made up very much with an attempt to cut off West Berlin from West Germany, to break the links between the West Berlin state and the Federal Republic and to try and do what they can by economic and other measures to reduce the economic viability of West Berlin as an economic entity by allowing or encouraging the East Germans to raise tolls on goods, and forbid different kinds of goods going from the Federal Republic to West Berlin and back again.

But with particular relation to the last crisis, I agree with Kenneth Hunt very much that one of the reasons why the Russians were so anxious to go around telling everybody that there was not going to be a real crisis about Berlin was simply because they are very anxious to get into bilateral talks with the United States. There are two other background factors I think about Soviet attitude to Berlin which are important.

One is that it does give them an opportunity to show their strength from time to time. To show the Western Powers what a strong position they have in Eastern Europe and in particular in East Germany. And secondly, they are very anxious I think for the West to retain its position in Berlin because the Russians have never given up since 1945, their residual interest in all German affairs. As long as there is a Western British, French and American presence in West Berlin there is a vestige of the old four-power control over Germany. This enables the Russians then to say so—and this may be important in the future. At any moment the Russians can say, because we recognize the four-power position in West Berlin and so our 1945 four power interest in the whole of Germany, in all German affairs still extends. This offers them an opportunity to interfere in the future in political and other ways in what is going on in West Germany.

If the Russians got us out of West Berlin and West Berlin was absorbed into East Germany, the last vestige of four-power control in Germany would disappear. The Russians would therefore find themselves, with no legal peg on which to hang an interest in all German affairs in the future of Germany as a complete—as an integrated two states. I think for this very important reason, the Russians will not press in the future, for the West, for the British, French and Americans to leave West Berlin.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin was your question directed to this particular phase or do you want to hold it until we deal with the next part of the program?

Mr. Brewin: It relates to this phase all right.

The Chairman: Then why do you not proceed?

Mr. Brewin: I think this question should be directed to Brigadier Hunt. We just came back from a very brief and hurried trip in Europe where we met with a number of allied troops.

Yes, I will not argue with you about that, on the continental part of Europe, shall we put it that way. We were told when we were getting advice about what should be the military posture, or military division of the Western countries, that the Soviet possession of offensive weapons—weapons with great offensive potentiality—that the intention of this could not be reduced except from the capacity that was evident there, and therefore we have to build up an adequate force to meet it. I was wondering if amongst these reasons the Russians are building up their military strength would be essentially the same argument from their military men. I quarrel that in Europe we have on the West side a tremendous concentration of past nuclear weapons for example. Is it possibly just a sort of reaction to that sort of advice which is responsible for the Russians building up a threat, and perhaps an offensive threat in Europe. I think perhaps you dealt with that.

One final connected question is this. Is there anything in the Russians purposes that seems to be inconsistent with a gradual nuclear reduction of military concentration in there?

Mr. Buchan: On the last point there is no evidence I think that the Russian defence effort has gone down. On the contrary, from

time to time it has gone up and when mutual force reductions have been offered as indeed they were offered by NATO this past year and the year before in no sense were they taken up by the other side. So for the moment therefore the Russian intention here has been to maintain what it has or indeed modestly to increase. Their defence budget has gone up rather than down.

On the business of who is defending against whom is a difficult one. One has to go back in history, but certainly if you look at the postures on either side you can see a distinct asymmetry. You can see it and you can go way back to the 1940s. Massive Russian conventional forces which could simply well afford and have no particular defence against them except atomic weapons in the early 1950s. Then you can see the build-up in Europe of the NATO armies and they are required to use their weapons as a means of defending themselves against what were much stronger conventional forces. And as part and parcel of this the Russians in building up their conventional forces paid great attention on the one hand to close support aircraft to support their armies going forward. On the other hand, they paid great attention to interceptor defence aircraft to defend themselves against what NATO was given, which was deep strike aircraft.

Conversely, the Western side being confident that they so to speak could not defend themselves conventionally acquired these many nuclear weapons and of course also nuclear strike aircraft in order to take out the airfields from which this massive close support aircraft came. So you have an asymmetry building up. At the same time you have the Americans acquiring polaris and acquiring carrier-strike forces and so to speak menacing the Russian mainland and indeed acquiring ability to strike at it.

They strike at it from a distance incidentally which was rather greater than that of the close-support aircraft from the Russian mainland. So you have a Russian feeling that it was administered certainly in strategic terms from outside. Who maintains the defence against whom I do not know, but I can postulate one simple thing. The West most certainly could not attack Russia except with nuclear weapons. Napoleon conduct is that you cannot walk to Moscow so to speak, and if you look at the Western forces you would find they simply are not geared or numerically strong enough to advance more than a

relatively short distance. There is no conceivable question so to speak of their attacking Russia.

The Russian forces if they wish to attack only have to cross Germany, a distance which is a minimum of 80 miles and at the greatest point is only a matter of 100 or 200 before so to speak they can get to the Rhine on the one hand or get to the capitals of the various major countries on the other. So you do have a great asymmetry. But there can be no doubt that the Russians are concerned with the nuclear strength in strategic terms on the one hand and with the 7,000 missiles on the other. There is equally no doubt that Germany in particular and the continental countries are concerned with the MRBFs which is a target on Europe and the numerical strength of the Russian conventional force. How you break yourself of this fear in which each one is scared of the other I do not know.

What you would have to do is to look at the political motivation. Once upon a time there was a strong ideological motivation which one supposes the Russians had sweeping across Europe. There was an ideological motivation on the American side which was to roll back this sort of regime if the opportunity offered itself. This has long since really stabilized itself into an acceptance really of the *status quo*. What one feels on the Western side is that one has a level of force which is sufficient to prevent the Russians from doing what they want except by major attack. This major attack would bring in the problem of escalation and nuclear weapons. This is what they feel. I feel perfectly certain that the Russians feel that they have achieved a *status quo* too. That we cannot so to speak attack them and so we have this established picture.

This is rather a confused answer to your question but it is really to try and elaborate what each must have felt as they built up their positions. But the Russians do actually maintain their forces—they do not show any signs of running them down. We, I think, for budgetary reasons would like to run ours down, but on the whole the offer has not been taken up.

The Chairman: We have a problem. We have covered two of the four items. I have on my list of questioners Mr. Harkness who has been very patient and has been waiting a long time. Then Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Prud'homme. Mr. Harkness is your question related specifically to this or could it be general?

Mr. Harkness: As I said it relates to all of the aspects really.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness would you like to question now then?

Mr. Harkness: Some reasonably knowledgeable people in regard to these matters have expressed to me the view that the present Russian Government is a weak government. On the one hand this militates against the possibilities of arriving at arrangements of any kind with the Soviet government, and on the other hand, it presents the danger or the threat in the event of a crisis developing which might call the more warlike or hard line elements in the Soviet government to take over and use that crisis perhaps in an irresponsible way as far as actions are concerned. I wonder if you would comment on that theory if you want to call it that, or that point of view?

Mr. Buchan: If I may just say, sir, we had better end on the question—particularly the question of negotiating with the United States, I think that this is very relevant.

The Chairman: I wonder if we could not complete that now Mr. Buchan. If it would be possible to summarize the views of your panel on those remaining two items and then perhaps give ten minutes or twelve minutes to each one.

Mr. Buchan: There is another question on this question of what the Soviet force is for in Europe, or what the function of this force in Europe is and it goes far beyond that.

I may say that a number of intelligent American defence officials have pointed this out to them on many occasions when the Russian forces are being restructured. It has been so far a singularly unprofitable exercise.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, but what you have not indicated today is whether it is an excellent historical reason or not. You have not indicated what might be their present thinking and why have these Americans have not influenced them although they are obviously people like themselves.

The Chairman: Before we deal with Mr. Anderson's question how have we left Mr. Harkness' question. I am a little confused now.

Mr. Buchan: Mr. Harkness' question has been irrelevant to this question of simplified

negotiations in this sort of context of simplified détente of an agreement. It has been irrelevant, do you not agree, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Yes, as I said I think the question was applied to all four of these questions that we are dealing with, to some extent.

Mr. Buchan: Let us take this question now. First of all is the Soviet Government at the moment a weak government of the kind that will find it hard to reach constructive agreement with the West. And, second why do the—why is the Russian top level in Central Europe so much higher than we think is necessary for them?

Brigadier Hunt: Yes the answer to the first question is that the present Soviet government is a polygon with all the disadvantages and some advantages of a polygon. It is a—you could hardly call—not really it a collective government as they call it themselves because it is very much subject to government by a committee. It is committee government. Exactly, now it so happens that most of the members of the Committee which is in existence now are,—it is difficult to find the right word, not exactly conservative but are open to inertia in the way they look at, and the way they should run things. They are slow moving, they are extremely suspicious of what is going on in the outside world and what is going on inside the Soviet Union. They are extremely suspicious for example of the intellectual inside the Soviet Union and I believe that it is not entirely accurate to envisage the Russian, the Soviet government, in terms of hawks and doves with the hard line down the middle dividing everybody on the left into a hard line and everybody on the right into a soft line. I think the evolution of the committee comes rather slowly and with a great deal of inertia involved, to decisions which tend to be cautious and tend to be unimaginative and tend to be not very decisive, not in the sense that Stalin took dramatic decisions and in the sense that Khrushchev took dramatic decisions. And, therefore, you have to think of the Soviet government as wrangling among themselves over practically every issue large and small, internal and external, political, defence, economic, agriculture, everything that comes to it, and sometimes a harder line consensus emerges as it emerged over its implications in the Czechoslovakian crisis. I do not believe for example, that the hard line has won over and suppressed the soft line as when they went into

Czechoslovakia. I think the consensus of the 11 men gradually became convinced that Czechoslovakia was endangering communism or the events in Czechoslovakia were endangering communism. So that I think that you have a group, a committee of slow moving, rather backward looking, rather very suspicious people whom it is rather difficult to get through to with new ideas, and even when you can get through to them, it is very difficult to get them to realize. And, therefore, I think, I would not say they were a weak government and I would not say that they are a more difficult group—just more likely to be overtaken by a hard line policy, and I think this is it—this really has to be judged on its own merits; you just cannot draw a picture of the present Soviet leadership which fits all situations.

And, this leads me to answer the second question, and that is, the question of over stationing of troops in Europe and why do they not listen to reason and that sort of thing. First of all, it is a very old Russian tradition and it goes way back to time of the czars—that you over insure in everything you do. Soviet operational groups in the Second World War would take on one German Division when they had ten of their own. And this is a feeling which is part of their suspiciousness and their general pessimism which is very difficult to eradicate because it goes into the deepest roots of the Russian character. And, therefore, I think you would be almost impossible on intellectual or practical or financial grounds to point out to the Russians that they have too many troops there for the political military jobs they want to do with any hope of getting them to accept. The second reason, is that the way they are structured and financed they have no budgetary restraint and they do not feel a pinch by the stationing of ground, air and naval forces in European theatres such as we do. They do feel a pinch, of course, when they go into the field of very advanced technology like anti-ballistic missiles systems and so on. But the stationing of 10, 20 or 30 divisions in a place like Europe does not cause financial or manpower or administrative hardships to the Soviet Union. They do not feel a pinch here, so the combination of these two factors will make them go on forever insuring themselves, over insuring their position, remembering always that they want to keep as many options open as possible. They want to be able, in other words, to try thinking in pure military terms, to fight defensively, to fight at

the conventional level, to fight at the tactical nuclear level or to fight at the all-out nuclear level. They want to keep all those options open and they over insure by nature which is part of their temperament.

Mr. Harkness: Mind you you are putting that dramatically, am I not correct that the force is very well placed for the next 6 or 7 years? The 17 to 21 age group in the Soviet Union is doubling I think I might say between 1967 and 1975.

Mr. Buchan: They can take between 800 and 900 thousand men into the forces each year, if they wanted to. They have the manpower available, without hurting the economy and without quick notice. One has to consider the danger of a Russian offensive not just a war with words, but the function of their military forces of course is also concerned with the internal structure of the Warsaw Pact and with the ability to keep a certain amount of control there and to secure regimes in the various countries. There is an inertia in the question of what they are defending against, and there is also inertia in the way they look at the structure of the Warsaw Pact, and I think this should be seen as an additional incentive to keep the troops that they have there at the moment.

The Chairman: I think perhaps we had better get on with these other items, if we could, Mr. Howard?

Mr. B. Howard: I think there is one last important item which we would very much like to discuss with you which is this question of security. For nearly a quarter of a century these two great international systems have confronted each other in the middle of Europe. Until Czechoslovakia it was possible to construct a respectable political hypothesis I think, but if you could keep it fixed and low both between super powers and between the European states east and west, that the word security forces as it were, involving pride, culture and political matters which were making for a more pluralistic European society and that you could certainly construct on paper the ground work of something that you could call a European security system, in which the two alliances look more like systems of crisis management rather than military-integrated military machines that conceivably will build a bridge between them and thus illicit the term super-power guarantees of territorial services in Europe.

Mr. Buchan: Well now, Czechoslovakia has really changed this whole concept of peaceful engagements for the moment. But, of course there is another aspect to the program. As you all know as well as we, this question of Soviet-American dialogue on the strength particularly of ballistic missiles defence systems has now become a matter of real urgency and it will be probably a matter of weeks before President Nixon visits Moscow, and this has been announced perhaps for the summer. We—probably today sometime, Nixon will be announcing—even making his decision on the anti-ballistic system in the United States and my hunches is that he will defer the current controversy.

Now I think one of the things that concerns us in Europe very much, is what is going to be the effect of the liaison getting into a negotiation of this kind. Is it going to be purely about American and Soviet relations, about strategic weapons, or is it to be about one of the implicit crises and possible urgent matters like the Middle East and perhaps the American expectations in Vietnam. Or is it also going to lead to some kind of arrangement, and I use the very broad word, between the two super powers; that recognize they each have a separate sphere of influence which would, of course, have a damaging effect upon German reunification. Is there a danger that super-power agreement which we in this country I think have always encouraged, may have the effect of easing suspicions between say the United States and her European allies. I think this is the question that we ought to very briefly discuss and Christoph Bertram I wonder if you would like to tell us how it looks to you?

Dr. Bertram: Is is a very difficult question and I am not at all happy with being asked to answer it and I do not for a second suppose that I can. It seems to me that there are two considerations. The first is that, everybody wants disarmament and all the countries in Europe and elsewhere who have in a way, even those that have been voicing some opposition to the non proliferation treaty for instance, have at the same time urged the two great powers to do something in the field of disarmament. Disarmament is something that seems the only long-term answer to get out of this deadlock which we find ourselves today, in Europe particularly, that it is quite understandable why everybody has said this would be something that would be useful to the situation.

For these smaller countries, some sort of super-power arrangement that was going beyond the limitations of arms but reached into areas such as the Middle East and possibly into areas like Europe would mean that one was more or less attached to a system without the possibility of getting out of it. And, it seems to me indeed, that even before the two big powers there are two sides to the coin. One is their desire to avoid conflict and to get some sort of arrangement to make it possible to find common ground in problems like Vietnam, like the Middle East. And, at the same time there is the question, how far can they impose solutions, how far can they control their sphere of influence, and whether or not the notion of spheres of influence is not a very old fashioned one, that no longer applies.

While you have the two super powers being indeed, super powers in the strategic and military sense and the economic sense too, you witness at the same time due to their fear of getting in conflict with one another, their inability to control countries who think to the extent that they would like to do it, and, therefore, the fear of the smaller countries is that a super power arrangement over their heads would likely be to reduce their own freedom of manoeuvre it seems to me is exaggerated, and it seems to me that if one finds the ground for some sort of superpower agreement this could only be beneficial and I do not fear for a second that this would lead to a permanent division of Europe. But, of course, what you will have at the same time is that the interests of the superpowers will be directed in another direction than those of the smaller powers and I am thinking again of smaller European powers. For all West European powers and East Europeans to that extent it is desirable to find some sort of grey area where agreement does not mean division for the superpowers and agreement in Europe must necessarily be a division of Europe. I see there a certain danger of the smaller countries in Europe floating away from what the superpowers and the assistant superpowers try to set off and floating away and making it more difficult at least for the countries that have the choice, as those of western Europe have, to stick to their alliance to the same extent as they did before.

Brigadier Hunt: I think there is just one point I would like to put and this really refers to the Soviet outlook, what the Soviets hope to get out of the talks or the relationships with the other superpower, the United States,

and that is that the Soviet Union is now basically a status quo power and interested in good order and discipline throughout the world, good order and discipline in the sense that it could create a situation in which their ideological activity although it has been said much reduced but still nevertheless is a part of Soviet policy overseas in which their good order and discipline serves Soviet security and Soviet policy aiming at increasing Soviet influence wherever it is appropriate in the world. Therefore, the Soviet Union is basically interested in talking to the United States as potentially the other power which can induce good order and discipline in, if you like, the non-Soviet world. The Soviet Union has always been interested in talking to the other real power in the world and always been interested in finding in that power a willingness to get its will, the joint will of the two superpowers imposed on the other smaller countries of the world. And, therefore, what the Soviet Union would really like the United States to do would be to come together in circumstances in which the Soviet Union says we guarantee stability in that part of the world which acknowledges in one way or another our authority or our influence. If you will guarantee the same in that part of the world which looks to you politically, economically, sociologically and so on, so that the Soviet Union basically is going into discussions with the United States not only for reasons of controlling crises or of preventing enormous expenditures on weapons systems such as the antiballistic missile system which the Soviet Union does not want to, not only from the point of view of gaining the prestige of a superpower and talking to the other superpowers at the same level but also because it hopes that the other superpower, the United States, will induce the same kind of good order and discipline in its area of the world which the Soviet Union is prepared to try to offer for its part of the world and I think this is a very important aspect of the Soviet motive in wanting to talk.

In other words, in one word, the Russians are interested in a superpower deal I think: Very briefly, I think the interest of the superpowers is concerned with their own security and their own interest, perhaps the smaller power too.

Dr. Bertram: I have two points to make, first, of all, the interests of the smaller powers are not exactly the same. Germany obviously has a much greater interest in the future of Germany than does, for example,

certain other countries but the interest of the smaller powers in security in Europe is very much bound up with the American commitment to Europe and therefore whatever emerges from the Russian-American talks the European nations would not wish in any way to weaken the American commitment to Europe and this seems to be an essential point to take and in terms of the interest, is that Germany subsequently and I think a number of other countries too, would not want an agreement between the two super-powers to be an agreement to maintain the status quo. They want in fact somehow political change in Europe to follow from it and in a sense if possible to be tied to it.

The Chairman: I have two members who have questions, Mr. Buchanan who has been very patient and Mr. Lewis, and I think on that note we would have to end because I believe the members of the panel have to leave at 5.30 p.m.

Mr. Buchanan: This question basically Mr. Chairman, was prompted by the remarks Mr. Windsor made when he indicated as I gathered it was a foregone conclusion that the disappearance of both the alliances in the relatively near future or perhaps that was the interpretation I put on it, was almost a certainty. I was going to ask Mr. Buchan to comment on that.

Mr. Buchan: I do not think it is quite bad enough to say that.

Mr. Buchanan: When the two alliances disappear you stated somewhere along—

Mr. Buchan: I think this is a reference to a theoretical proposition that you find in the positions of some eastern European countries particularly Roumania.

Dr. Beriram: I would say it is not a theory that is totally beyond the political discussions but I would say at the present time there is very little likelihood of the two alliances disappearing. Now, they may change and their actions may change and their outlook may change and the structure they have given may change but I think there is very little likelihood that any of the western Europeans would like NATO to disappear and would feel more secure in a different arrangement nor indeed the east Europeans would as has been said at the beginning, there is this tendency in eastern Europe to try to exert more influence through the Warsaw Pact.

Indeed I think there are very few illusions in eastern Europe that they have a political choice of opting out of the Warsaw Pact as is shown quite clearly I think by the way the Czech government during the crisis conducted its own policy but it seems that there is interest behind the structures and even if there was not the structures have the ability to stay on for a long time even if the interest has vanished.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis, do you want to wind it up.

Mr. Lewis: It is up to you, sir.

Earlier this afternoon, Mr. MacIntosh made a comment which seemed to me very interesting. He promised to argue it later in the afternoon but he has not yet done so, whether he did not have the opportunity. If I remember correctly, and I think I do, he suggested that the Soviet Union and indeed the Soviet combination was interested in maintaining the western alliance rather than otherwise. That was one of the priorities of the Soviet policy and as I say, he said he would be prepared to argue it later. I would like to take this opportunity—

Mr. MacIntosh: No, that was an important point to clarify.

Mr. Lewis: To elaborate your point.

Mr. MacIntosh: I think it was a view we all held.

I think that the Soviet Union realizes that a great deal of potential uncertainty in the European theatre has been avoided since 1949 at the end of the Berlin blockade in 1948-49 and the creation of NATO by the existence of a well-established and firmly-based alliance system in which the United States, the world's strongest power, economically and militarily, is firmly committed to certain principles, the establishment of certain principles in Europe and there are certain American and other NATO guarantees too, which are effective, which would come into effect if certain things happen in Europe, for example if the Berlin crisis exploded into military action. I think the Soviet Union while it takes the ideological view that the United States has no business in Europe and would like to see American power withdrawn from Europe completely and this would in their view allow healthy forces to take control of western Europe. In practice, this is, in effect, an ideological Communist viewpoint. In practice the Russians who are realists see the value which

the western alliance structure has brought to this situation in Europe and therefore, I think they look at the alternatives. The alternative is the disbandment of NATO or the serious weakening of NATO, for example, the loss of certain members of NATO and I think that they would conclude and I admit I am oversimplifying the argument for reasons of time and space, they would conclude that the alternative is worth it, that if you had no NATO structure, no American presence in Europe, no American guarantees to Europe you would have a very much more unstable situation. You could have, for example, renewed dangerous tension between France and Germany, between Britain and Germany and between Britain and France. You could have Communist parties coming to power in Europe which would be not subject to Soviet influence which would be Titoist, for example. A French Communist party in power might well be more Titoist, more Titoist than Yugoslavia. The same with the Italian communist party and the range of uncertainty in a word of the alternative system without NATO, without American presence in Europe is something that would worry the Russians very considerably. And in their caution and to some extent arising out of their inertia, they would prefer the present situation to exist, to go on, always allowing, of course, that they are permitted to where appropriate, where possible, to subvert individual areas and countries in western Europe and by propaganda and other means to try to undermine the structure but basically I think they would like the alliance to continue.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, before asking Mr. Buchan to adjourn the meeting there are one or two administrative announcements. I wish to pass them on to those members who are not here at the moment. For instance, all members will be called at 7.15 a.m. The bags must be down in the lobby no later than 8.00 a.m. We are leaving the hotel at 8.30 a.m. so if you want to have breakfast you make your arrangements accordingly. To repeat that, the call is at 7.15 a.m., the bags must be down no later than 8.00 a.m. and we leave the hotel at 8.30 a.m.

The High Commissioner has very kindly mentioned that there will be refreshments in his office for those who wish them after the meeting has adjourned.

On your behalf I would like to extend our sincere thanks to Mr. Buchan and Mr. MacIntosh and to Brigadier Hunt and to Dr. Bertram

for being here this afternoon. We have been dealing with pretty basic matters and I can assure the panel that we realize how complex the situation over here is. I am sure that the information we have received will be most valuable to us.

Mr. Buchan: Thank you very much indeed. We are extremely pleased to have been able to participate in this discussion with you. I am afraid our discussion has been very general. I do not know if it brings us any nearer to being able to make up your minds on Canadian points of defence policy.

**Geneva, Switzerland,
Saturday, March 15, 1969.**

The Chairman: Just a word of explanation about the simultaneous translation, two for English, deux pour Anglais, and trois pour Français and if you wish to speak put up your hand, press the button in front of you and wait until the light on the microphone comes on. You press the black button on the base of the microphone and wait until the light above the black button goes on.

Gentlemen, there are one or two administrative announcements before I introduce His Excellency, Mr. Ignatieff. First of all I have had a very important communication from Canada on the occasion of the opening of a new tracking station to send very important greetings to all of us on the Standing Committee. Apparently the line was poor but the person who took the message thought he said that Mr. Kierans asked that his best wishes be conveyed to the visiting MP's on the occasion of their deliberations with regard to NATO and defence policies. I know you will want to thank Bob McCleave when you get back to Toronto. Incidentally, after that very good lunch that His Excellency provided for us, I would advise none of you to look at that Church which is up on the ceiling because if you do you will think perhaps you have had one drink too many because no matter which way you look at it, it seems to be on a slant, and depending which way you look at it, it slants differently.

Gentlemen, I am sure that we all wish to thank the officials of the United Nations who have made this Council Chambre of the Palais des Nations available to us with the excellent facilities. I also know that you would want me to thank our Ambassador for the wonderful reception he has given us, and

Mr. Ignatieff will be making an initial statement; I believe he intends to speak of the United Nations to which he was the Ambassador, as you all know, and particularly perhaps the prospects for peacekeeping; we have a particular interest in that, in our Committee, and I believe he may also say a few words about disarmament which is his new interest of course. But knowing Mr. Ignatieff I know you will realize that he will be quite happy to accept questions on almost any subject which may occur to you so do not feel limited or restricted in any way and if he feels that he should not reply—I know he does not need any protection from me, he is quite able to look after himself and that he will always answer diplomatically. So Mr. Ignatieff.

Mr. George Ignatieff: Mr. Chairman, I should like to welcome you here. Through the courtesy of the administration of the *Palais des Nations*—Are we on channel 2? The room we are in is one of the most historic in the world. It is here that the Council of the League of Nations once deliberated, between the two world wars. Now that the United Nations Organization has succeeded the League, this room is used not only by the United Nations but also for such highly important conferences as the Korean armistice talks, the 1954 talks on Indochina, and the 1961-1962 talks on Laos. The Four Power Conference on Berlin was also held here.

It is here that the Disarmament Commission conducts its important work, begun in 1962. On these walls, you will see the murals by the famous Spanish painter, José Maria, which, if I am not mistaken, represent man's titanic efforts, over the centuries, to eliminate war—efforts which, since we must be honest, have been more or less frustrated so far.

With your permission, I shall now speak in English in presenting an analysis of the disarmament situation, the current Canadian attitude, and the prospects for the maintenance of peace through the United Nations; as your chairman has been good enough to point out, I shall be at your disposal to answer a few questions you may wish to put to me.

[English]

I should now like to say how happy I am to appear before this Committee. I recognize from the standpoint of first-hand experience and security in disarmament matters over a period of some 28 years, I realize only too well how complex, difficult are the matters which are under your review, in fact appearing before you as a Civil Servant reminds me

of Samuel Johnson said about women preachers; like a dog trying to walk on hind legs, while it is remarkable, it is not that it is well done or done badly but that it is done at all. And also speaking as a Civil Servant to legislators I am reminded of something which I keep always close to my heart and that is the rule of the whale that you are most vulnerable to the harpoon when you are on the surface bounty. I have however, an understanding that my introductory remarks, if the gentlemen of the press so desire can be attributable but I must ask the leave of the Chairman and members of the Committee that if they put questions to me which require me as a Civil Servant to express opinions, which have to be off the record, I shall ask that my answers be so regarded. And I will then indicate in each case.

I assume that we all agree that the starting point to disarmament and defence policy are essentially two sides, the same coin, part of the total currency used in the conduct of Canada's foreign relations. In other words, I take it the starting point of foreign policy is inseparable from defence policy and disarmament from both.

Just as a lasting peace is the ultimate objective, this obviously cannot be assured by arms alone anymore than it can be achieved by disarmament alone, particularly in a heavily armed international environment with nuclear weapons as we have them today. Therefore, the first point I wish to make in my introductory remarks is that Canadian disarmament policy has of necessity to be consistent with our defence policy and both have to serve the general foreign policy of Canada.

The most important aspect for the background against which our disarmament policy has to be formulated is the current nuclear stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union. I say that the security situation is based on stalemate rather than on stability because the hard fact is that the arms race is still going on. And each of the nuclear powers is trying to obtain an advantage in armament and armed forces. Robert McNamara, nine years Secretary of Defence in the United States, in his remarkable book "The Essence of Security" explains his attitude on this question of the arms race and its relation to disarmament in the following striking language: I quote Mr. McNamara.

We do not want a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union primarily because of the

reaction phenomenon which makes it foolish and futile. What we would much prefer to do is to come to a realistic and reasonable riskless agreement with the Soviet Union which would effectively prevent such an arms race. We both have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess of a credible ashore destruction capability. These arsenals have reached that point of excess in each case for precisely the same reason. We have each reacted to the other's build-up with very conservative calculations.

This excess of capacity has been described by the specialists in the subject as "mutual ashore destruction" or mad for short.

Now, located geographically as Canada is, between the two nuclear powers and on the shortest distance between the nuclear powers as intercontinental missiles are apt to fly, Canadians of necessity cannot afford to regard the arms race, or the disarmament negotiations which are now going on in this Chambre or will be next week, in the rather detached way we did when the disarmament talks were going on right here in this Chambre in the 1930's.

In those days Canada was protected by the oceans which were regarded by the navies friendly powers, and there were no intercontinental missiles. If through some frightful miscalculation war were to break out in present circumstances, involving the nuclear powers, and the use of intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads, Canada would not help but be effected immediately. It is above all the risks of what would happen to Canada in the event of a general war in a nuclear environment that makes our participation and disarmament negotiations so important. The stalemate I spoke of arises from the fact that at present the avoidance of nuclear war ultimately depends on the capacity of the two super powers to inflict unacceptable damage on each other because both have what is called second strike or retaliatory capabilities. They do not possess first strike capabilities, that is that neither the United States or the Soviet Union has the power to knock out the other with a sudden strike. But they do have the power to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.

A series of confrontations, including Berlin, Canada the Middle East as well as Vietnam have lead to a realization on both sides of the tremendous risks of the two nuclear powers becoming involved in hostilities. Moreover in

a world with increasingly swift communications, there is a growing realization by other governments that such confrontations involve unacceptable risks not only for the nuclear powers concerned but for themselves, and this realization in turn generates pressures which makes negotiations on arms control irresistible. I am therefore basing the trend towards arms control negotiations not on benevolence, the great powers or any other powers concerned but on their necessity. These negotiations however have to be within certain limits, reasonable limits, that is that if the powers directly concerned wish to avoid a disturbance of the existing equilibrium, the military power between the two sides which might precipitate a crisis, this is one of the essential assumptions on which all arms control discussions are based, that they must not only be a preservation of balance but an assurance about verification of that balance at any given time. Against this background Canadian policy is to endeavour to contribute in every way possible to the reduction and eventual removal of the high risks inherent in the present dangerous nuclear stalemate and to help end the arms race through negotiation. The ultimate objective of Canadian policy is general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately the objective is distant in the present state of distrust and tension in the world. Meanwhile Canadian arms control and disarmament policies have to be designed to accommodate Canadian political defence as well as commercial interests. That is to preserve not only our contribution to international negotiations on disarmament, Canadian independence, but also to maintain the necessary collaboration with the United States in defence and commercial matters, as well as promoting Canadian export of nuclear fuels and technology in view of the Canadian important potential in fuels as well as nuclear reactors and technology. Now, Mr. Chairman, you asked me to say something of the prospects of disarmament as I see it. I will be frank to admit that some of the momentum of progress obtained last July at the signature of the non-proliferation treaty has been lost in the intervening months. This has been mainly due to the presidential elections in the United States and the ensuing change in the United States' administration. The arms control and disarmament agency in Washington has been seriously dislocated and affected as well as the State Department, the Defence Department. All three having changed their executive heads and their immediate colleagues.

The immediate objective therefore in the disarmament negotiations is to try to recapture that momentum. The present and principal impediments to arms control are twofold. First, political. That is distrust and suspicion between the nuclear powers and between the allies. Secondly, technical disagreements over inspection and verification techniques and procedures. Nevertheless confrontations having been tried by the nuclear powers in the circumstances that I have mentioned, and I speak with personal experience because I was in NATO when the confrontation over Berlin, over Cyprus, over Cuba, and recently in the U.N. over the Middle East. As I say, confrontation having been tried by the nuclear powers and having been found such a risky proposition in a series of crises, negotiation on reasonable terms not only becomes feasible but necessary. The new President of the United States has said the area of confrontation must be replaced by an era of negotiation. The question now is to what extent these discussions between the super powers will involve the interests of others and how the others will be effectively represented in these discussions. It is because such discussions will obviously involve the interests of others in an important way that President Nixon came to Europe to give assurance to his allies that they would be consulted, as well as being kept informed of such negotiations. Now the main channel for representing Canadian interests in these matters is not only of course the 18 nation disarmament conference here in Geneva. There is also the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, as well as the bilateral channels which are used through our mission in Washington and the U.S. mission in Ottawa. The political objective must be to work towards a genuine détente and its political objective. Technically the objective must be to develop dependable verification techniques in support of disarmament agreements. Canada will do everything within its power to make such progress possible and I hope that we will be in a position to exercise some leadership in both directions, but particularly in the matter of technical verification procedures.

Now, in present circumstances, because of the preponderance of military power as well as military circumstances the vital key to immediate progress in armaments control and the reduction of armed forces and armaments is in the strategic arms limitation talks which take place between the United States and the Soviet Union. Conciliatory and accommodat-

ing attitudes on the part of these two super powers would denote better than anything else their determination to end the arms race. This is the top priority in disarmament today. In the Canadian view these two super powers having incurred an obligation in this direction arising out of the recently negotiated non-proliferation treaty. Obviously, non-proliferation is important as an end in itself, but it is not up to the treaty to disarm the unarmed as a French authority has said. Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty which was before the House of Commons called upon the nuclear powers to pursue in good faith negotiations to curb the nuclear arms race. At the last general assembly the Canadian delegation stressed the importance which Canada attaches to Article 6 being implemented in good faith. The Canadian government will continue to place emphasis on this expectation when the conference on disarmament opens next Tuesday. The development and deployment of ever more sophisticated and automated nuclear weapons delivery systems and launching facilities would make limitation or make verification of limitation ever more difficult as well as contributing to international tension without a compensating increase in international security. This is why the beginning of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union is of such vital concern, especially to Canada. Now the greatest achievement in arms control to date has been the non-proliferation treaty and the limited test ban. The word now on the non-proliferation treaty. The effectiveness of the non-proliferation treaty will largely depend upon the accession to it of the majority of near nuclear nations. These are India, the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, Australia, and Israel. It was partly in the hope that these other near nuclears, that is with countries with nuclear potential as Canada has, would follow our example and put the easing of world tension through arms control ahead of their nuclear option. Canada acted quickly to be among the first to sign and ratify this first postwar arms control agreement containing an effective verification system under the International Atomic Energy system of safeguards. We also acted from the belief that the coming into force of a non-proliferation treaty would act as a gateway to further measures of disarmament, particularly, nuclear disarmament. Non-nuclear powers signatures of the non-proliferation treaty, having given up the nuclear option themselves, are in a strong position of demand as a

quid pro quo that the nuclear powers live up to their promises of disarmament under Article 6 of this treaty. We had hoped the process of bringing the treaty into force by the ratifications of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and 40 non-nuclear states which is the requirement under the treaty would have proceeded more rapidly, but it was unfortunately slowed up by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We are however encouraged by the fact that 87 countries have signed the treaty. Nine nations beside Canada have now ratified it. The United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland, Nigeria, Camerouns, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Mexico. Perhaps, of course, most important of all the United States Senate approved the treaty unamended just two days ago by a vote of 83 to 15. And we can reasonably expect that the Soviet Union will now follow the Americans in short order. These actions by the super powers should give a significant momentum to the coming into force process, which now requires ratification by the Soviet Union plus 32 non-nuclear countries.

A word about the comprehensive test ban. The comprehensive test ban which would prohibit underground nuclear tests is unlikely to be concluded until the two super powers agree to limit strategic weapons for which nuclear warheads, so they say, need to be tested underground. Therefore progress on the comprehensive test ban depends on strategic arms limitation talks. As soon as a strategic arms limitation, SALT as it is called, agreement is in sight the CTB or the comprehensive test ban will be vitally important as one of the only means of verifying that the nuclear powers have indeed actually stopped warhead research development programs. Consequently Canada supports the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date. The comprehensive test ban would have the effect of putting an end qualitatively to the nuclear arms race since the armed forces of the nuclear powers would be unlikely to rely upon new designs of weapons which have never been tested. A related measure which would follow more strategic arms limitation talks and the comprehensive test ban would be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, known as the cutoff. We expect a number of delegations of the coming session on disarmament to show an active interest in promoting the cutoff and Canada will continue to press for the negotiation and an appropriate agreement. Now these three

measures, the limitation on the deployment of nuclear missiles arising out of SALT, the Comprehensive Test Ban and the cutoff would be the milestones marking the end of the nuclear arms race and setting the stage for actual reduction in arms and armed forces. We are also concerned with stopping the proliferation of weapons in new environments, particularly the seabed and outer space. Canada expressed its support at the United Nations for collective measures to ensure that the seabeds and the deep ocean floor are preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. This is to be a priority item in the 18 Nation Disarmament Commission meeting on Tuesday because of the desirability of prescribing this environment before its potential military purpose is exploited along with developing interests in exploiting the economic resources of the seabed. The position that we are taking is that the area to be reserved for peaceful purposes need not be co-extensive with the area to be inter-nationalized for economic purposes but could be larger. While purely defensive and especially surveillance devices of the sonar type should not be ruled out defensive installations for launching nuclear missiles should be prohibited.

A word now on conventional armaments and in the NATO context. If, as we hope, progress is made in the strategic arms talks this summer between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty is followed up, disarmament talks will move increasingly from nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to more conventional weapons. Now the most important prospect in this field is the NATO project for balance force reduction. Canadian participation in NATO gives Canada a chance to have a voice in this regional arms control project which essentially involves reciprocal reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. It should be remembered that membership of the 18 National Disarmament Committee, when it was set up in 1952, from five members each from the Warsaw Pact and five from NATO, constituted a balance in membership with eight non-aligned representing the interests of the non-aligned members of the world community. Canada is therefore expected in the 18 nation disarmament committee to consult with its NATO partners, especially on regional arms control matters, such as the reciprocal balanced reduction of forces, while working for Canadian objectives such as stopping the arms race and reducing

the risks of war through global disarmament measures. There has been a temporary setback to discussion of reciprocal withdrawals as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

However, the studies and preparation for it are continuing in NATO. There have been discussions on possible verification procedures in Brussels only a few days ago. And Canada will support this project of balance force reduction which largely depends on the prospects of a détente in Europe, as well as contributing to the techniques of verification.

A word now on chemical and bacteriological warfare which poses another form of mass destruction weaponry. A United Nations study of this form on warfare was commissioned at the last session of the UN General Assembly and a Canadian expert is now participating in the study of this project. Canada was a signatory of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of these weapons. We, of course, do not favour any action which might weaken in any way the Geneva Protocol, but we will support any steps to strengthen it and ensure that it covers satisfactorily the developments in this kind of warfare 45 years after the negotiation of the Geneva Protocol.

As I said, general complete disarmament remains the ultimate objective of Canadian policy. At present the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee has as its more immediate objective the problem of slowing down and trying to end the nuclear arms race, i.e. the arms race by those who are most heavily armed, the super powers. This is the priority objective. If there is success in partial arms control, as we hope there will be through the Strategic Arms Limitation talks, a more appropriate atmosphere for disarmament discussions may open the door for more fruitful negotiation on general and complete disarmament. I should now like to say something in response to your Chairman's request on peacekeeping.

The factor which has a direct bearing on Canada's impact on disarmament negotiation is the leading part which Canada has played in UN peacekeeping operations. For progress in disarmament beyond a certain point is obviously dependent upon the availability of effective means that collective security through the United Nations replacing reliance for security on alliances as well as national armaments now in forces.

What are the prospects? Of course as long as the UN exists it is bound to have a role to a greater or lesser extent in the maintenance of international peace and security. The extent to which the UN are allowed to have an effective role. An effective role in any case will depend on the decision of governments either in the Security Council its most powerful members, the permanent members, or in the Assembly of the majority. Thus member states from time to time are bound to use the UN as an intermediary in disputes which cannot be worked out bilaterally or through the intervention of other powers.

We must be frank to admit that we are a long way from being able to depend primarily on the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security as envisaged by the charter. While controversy within the UN over peacekeeping has led to confrontations in the past and has seriously divided the membership, I can at least say this in the light of experience, particularly in the last six months at the United Nations. There now seems to be a tacit acceptance by the permanent members as well as by the smaller members that present peacekeeping operations notably the operation in Cyprus, UNFICYP, and the Middle East, UNTSO and the operation in Kashmir, UNIGYP, may be continued for some time and that new peacekeeping activities may be required in the future, particularly as part of a settlement in the Middle East.

The effective exclusion of the permanent members of the Security Council from participation in such peacekeeping operations, although not from observer groups I should stress, is likely to continue because of the concern of small states at the possibility of having forces of the larger members, the major powers, on their territories even under UN auspices with its connotation of dangerous intervention in domestic affairs.

The burden, therefore, of providing forces or observers as they may be required is likely to continue to fall on smaller countries, particularly those with past UN peacekeeping experience. In the light particularly of the traumatic experience which these potential contributors to UN peacekeeping went through as a result of the financial crisis in the abortive assembly. Some of you may remember in 1964-65 the traumatic experience of the withdrawal of UNIF on the eve of the June war in 1967 in the Middle East. There is likely to be a reluctance to accept

new commitments for UN peacekeeping on the part of these members, including Canada, which may be asked to make contributions unless there are new assurances about the sharing of the burden and the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation.

Indeed, taking these traumatic experiences into account as well as the fact that the UN has rather divided for peace, instead of uniting for it as provided by the UN General Assembly resolution, during the past 23 years. It seems likely that future peacekeeping will now proceed on the basis of a generally acceptable principle that all permanent members of the Security Council as well as the other members of the Council will want to ensure that the requisite financial and other support is available before member governments are asked to commit themselves to any new peacekeeping operation.

If that assumption is correct it must surely imply, given the well-known Soviet and French position that the exercise in the future of more control rather than less over peacekeeping will be by the Security Council, rather than the Assembly. It also implies that the spelling out of the exact terms under which any peacekeeping operation is to be carried out will be by a Security Council resolution in the first place and those exact terms would spell out the exact period for which the peacekeeping operation is authorized by the country accepting the peacekeeping force.

Last year at the United Nations Canada took part—a leading part in the working group of a committee of 33—in trying to work out an agreement on a model which might serve as a basis for such a Security Council resolution when the need arises in the future.

In the first place a model has been worked out to cover observer groups. But subsequently models for peacekeeping forces of another kind is expected to be negotiated. The fact of big power corporations within the framework of the Committee of 33 suggests that arrangements for peacekeeping in the future may be based on an understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as of France and Britain to co-operate. This co-operation may not extend to providing forces for UN peacekeeping except for observers which may continue to fall on countries acceptable to a host government in a particular case, but the important thing is that this

great power of co-operation would at least ensure that any peace co-operation in the future had the support of the permanent members of the Council including their financial support.

In these circumstances the Canadian aim has been and continues to be to take an active part in working out the guidelines or models for peacekeeping operations through the Committee of 33 which is meeting at present in New York. Meanwhile the standby arrangements which have been developed over the years by Canada in support of UN peacekeeping with particular emphasis on training for observer missions is being continued.

You may well ask what does all this gobble de gook add up to. In trying to summarize I will say this. Peacekeeping operations on a voluntary basis like those undertaken in Cyprus or in the Middle East, or in Kashmir which are essentially peacekeeping operations as an adjunct to diplomacy to permit a mediator or mediators to try and bring the parties of an international dispute to an understanding. That kind of peacekeeping which may take the form of an observer group or the group as in UNFICYP, that kind of situation, that kind of peacekeeping is likely to improve the prospects of peacekeeping, is likely to improve if as I hope the models which I have referred to are worked out, that is that the Council will have at its disposal the basis of agreement of how to mount an operation of this kind, how to finance it, how to organize it.

I do not suggest that type of peacekeeping which may extend to enforcement action to resist aggression. The kind of operation that took place in Korea. The prospects of that kind of operation is not at all good. For the very same reasons that the membership of the UN remain divided on this point as before. The limitation of the powers of the permanent members to undertake that kind of exercise is particularly evident.

A few conclusions if I may be permitted to put them to you, Mr. Chairman, before I answer questions. Expenditures for military purposes as well as the risks of military confrontation with nuclear weapons and missiles is making the need for progress in disarmament ever more urgent. The most recent estimate of military expenditures produced in a report by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in December 1968

which is the latest available, it seems that global military expenditures continue to rise. This report states and I quote:

From \$132 billion in 1964 they rose to \$138 billion in 1965 to \$159 billion in 1966 and estimated \$182 billion in 1967 and preliminary data suggests a continued rise in 1968.

The same United States publication also says and of course this is available and I quote:

The dominant influence of the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers on the world's arms race became more pronounced. The two major military alliances accounted for nearly nine-tenths of this rise in expenditure in 1966 and 1967 the increased outlays of the two leading powers in these two alliances; the United States and the Soviet Union, made up \$35 billion of the \$44 billion increase from 1965 to 1967 in world military spending.

For an explanation of this phenomenon I suggest to those of you who have not looked at it to see the explanation offered by Mr. Macnamara to what he calls the intrinsic dynamics of the nuclear arms race and the essence of the nuclear arms race and the essence of the nuclear arms race. Pages 57 and 58.

This trend towards increased military expenditure shows I think that the efforts to stem the arms race are still inadequate and that effective international co-operation to achieve a balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces is not something that is likely to thrive and prevail against the encroaching pressures of the arms race without a more determined and concerted effort cultivating what is obviously a rather undernourished and feeble plan.

In other words, if we really want to slow down and stop the arms race there has to be a more determined effort to work at it and in the nuclear age I suggest more effort has to be invested in what I call war prevention by every means. It being recognized that in the nuclear missile environment defence policy cannot be concerned with winning a war. The need to make progress is clear enough. It is of course to reduce the risks of nuclear war arising out of military confrontation between the nuclear powers and because of our geographic location between the two chief nuclear powers we have a vital stake in stopping the arms race. There is of course the added and important benefit of reducing our own and other countries defence budgets in order to release resources for other more

useful expenditures, but making progress in disarmament has proven to be an exceedingly difficult and slow process.

At one extreme it has to be recognized that an unbalanced and unilateral disarmament could upset the uneasy equilibrium of military power in a strategically important area such as Europe or the Atlantic in a way which might endanger world peace. On the other hand the other extreme, the accumulation of further weapons of mass destruction, the use of which as a means of settling political disputes is ruled out for the simple reason that they threaten annihilation on both sides if used—obviously threatens peace.

Inherently progress has to derive from a multinational effort with the heaviest responsibility falling on those nations which are most heavily armed, particularly the nuclear powers and also on those who have the greatest potential to develop acceptable solutions to the many complex problems of disarmament, both political and technical.

Although not among the heavily-armed nations, comparatively speaking, Canada stands high on the order of potential for contributing to disarmament for the following reasons. First, Canada's major nuclear potential has existed ever since the last war and it placed Canada on all disarmament negotiating bodies. Second, Canada's geographic location between the two most powerfully-armed nations on earth, including intercontinental missiles and all that goes with them makes disarmament of vital interest to Canada.

Third, Canada's favourable international political position, including its favourable relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as the developing countries. Fourth, Canada's technological experience and know-how gained from Canadian participation in military alliances such as NATO and NORAD. It is the resources of scientific skill in the assessment and analysis of armaments and armed forces contained in several departments in Ottawa. Lastly, easy access to the larger store of technology and technical information in the field of disarmament, especially available through the United States Arms Control Disarmament Agency. In the light of these factors I would like to suggest that it is the Canadian potential that contributed to the progress of disarmament which stands in need of development to be exploited to the full. The opportunity to use this potential will present itself increasingly

if progress is made in the strategic arms limitation talks and in the implementation of the non-proliferation treaty which are the highest two items on the agenda of disarmament today.

Canada already has an important expertise and developed technology in the seismic field and in applying seismology to detection of nuclear explosions, not only detection but identification.

We may have less expertise in relation to anti-ballistic missile defence in which the United States and the Soviet Union have principal responsibility. The disarmament discussions as I have indicated will tend to move from the nuclear field to the comprehensive test ban as well as to the control and reduction of the more conventional forms of armament. In these areas Canada should be able to participate in a more independent role as a leading authority with a capacity for initiative. It will, however, take time and effort to organize and focus the necessary expertise to enable Canada to realize this full potential. For this purpose it may be desirable to consider setting up a special panel or continuing task force composed of representatives of all the departments and interests concerned, including National Defence, External Affairs, Mines Energy & Resources, Defence Research Board, National Research Council. It is essential in order to reconcile competing and conflicting considerations to have a collective continuing inter-departmental effort of this kind so that the decision-making process should take into account the parallel political, defence, legal, scientific, commercial and other economic and political Canadian interests concerned. So it goes without saying the Canadian policies and arms control disarmament should be decided on the basis of a balanced assessment of all Canadian vital interests, and by bringing together the necessary specialists on a continuing basis, political, military, scientific, economic and legal, to develop fully Canada's potential in the disarmament field to help in consultation with other governments, to back-up disarmament negotiations.

I think we should get this kind of balanced contribution at the staff level, to decision making, because it is badly needed. The main objective of this continuing task force should be addressed both to reducing the risks of war as well as to a balanced reduction of the economic burdens of defence. In this context

the task force could for instance turn immediately to a consideration of the problems which arise directly from the non-proliferation treaty. For example, the implementation of the safeguards article will require the negotiation of a network of safeguard systems within the international atomic energy agency. Machinery must be set up to implement the undertaking of the nuclear parties in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions as provided for in article 5. The expansion of nuclear systems has to be studied, and perhaps most importantly of all, how the operation of security assurances to meet the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear nations arising from assurances given by the nuclear powers should be assured. The aim of this panel in short would be to provide the decision making process with a full range of well considered and studied options. The only sure security any nation like Canada can hope to enjoy in the long run has to include negotiation between the principal military powers of the world on agreements for the limitation and control of armaments and armed forces rather than the unlimited pursuit of superiority which is now going on in an unending arms race. The present arms race has led only to a stalemate, does not arrive at a stable balance, as I have indicated in the figures I cited, and a mounting military expenditures. To attain a balanced reduction of armament and armed forces it is necessary and urgent to use the present state of strategic stalemate between the NATO and Warsaw powers to bring about through negotiation the permanent improvement in West-East-West relations as well as global and regional balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Mr. McNamara, who as I say served for nine years as Secretary of Defense, and who should know what he says and whereof he speaks, says in his *Essence of Security*: "In the end the root of man's security does not lie in weaponry, it lies in his mind, and what the world requires in its third decade of the atomic age is not further arms but a race towards reasonableness." I would be happy to try to answer your questions.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, your Excellency. Mr. Ignatieff has indicated that he will be prepared to answer questions, if necessary continue until about six. That might be a little bit of an imposition, but we should plan on perhaps finishing by 5.30 or 5.45. May I remind members that when they wish to ask a question to raise their hand so

that the sound technician behind them can see them, if they press the black button, wait for the light to come on and would they also please announce their name when they start to speak because even though I call their name the sound technician may not hear me. Mr. Prud'homme, did you have a point of order?

[Translation]

Mr. Prud'homme: I would like to know—Your Excellency, would it be possible for you to give us copies of the report you have just made? I will not ask for them today, but at some future date. Would it be technically possible for us to have such copies, or is it confidential material? I think it would be very useful to us if we could have copies.

Mr. Ignatieff: I have no copies, but I can give the original to Mr. Dobell. He could have copies made. I can give the gentleman all the notes, including a few replies, I hope.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Marceau, the first question.

[Translation]

Mr. Marceau: Mr. Ignatieff, I believe that Canada is playing a role not only within NATO, but also by having a peacekeeping force that is playing a particularly vital role in Cyprus. If you had to choose between a position favouring participation in NATO, and one favouring the establishment of a mobile force like the one we have in Cyprus, which position would you choose, always assuming that both are useful?

Mr. Ignatieff: If you will allow me to reply in English—Yes?

[English]

This is a reply which I would ask be off the record because I am giving a personal opinion in response to a request by a Member of Parliament using my experience in NATO and in UN peacekeeping.

[Translation]

Mr. Marceau: Mr. Chairman, could I have a ruling from the Chair as to whether we are entitled to several questions or to one?

[English]

Are we allowed to question only one time, or...

The Chairman: We have quite a number of questions, Mr. Marceau. Could I put your name down at the bottom of the list and we will come back to you? Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Ignatieff, how can we expect any real progress towards general

disarmament between the two great powers vis-a-vis each other when both of them might have some fear of a growing powerful China which is not participating in the disarmament discussions? In other words, although they may not fear each other or they may agree to disarm themselves, it would appear to me that they would not do it because there are others who are not disarming who are really a greater threat in the future.

Mr. Ignatieff: The participation of both China and France is essential to any global disarmament scheme, and we would hope to see that and work towards that end. I think that the point at the present moment is that in a way the move towards disarmament on the part of the two super powers may indirectly be encouraged rather than discouraged by the state of relations with China. The situation which is getting some grounds for hope in the immediate future, in nuclear disarmament, is the fact that, which is very fully revealed by Mr. McNamara in his treatment, that you have a situation where the nuclear powers of the Soviet Union and the United States have reached a sufficiency to ensure the destruction one of the other through retaliation. Now sufficiency is always questioned and I do not mean that I am the authority on sufficiency because there has just been a decision for instance to increase certain protective qualities of the second strike capability by going into this sentinel armament scheme. But by and large the situation is that you have both countries which can do each other vital damage in retaliation. You have a very important economic consideration vis-a-vis the two because the Soviet Union rightly have half the gross national product of the United States, but is spending—and it is difficult of course to run down the exact nature of the expenditures under various categories but is spending roughly the same order of magnitude as the United States minus the expenditure of the United States on Vietnam. And this is putting a very great strain on the Soviet Union. It is notable that with more strain between the Soviet Union and China, it is the Soviet Union which has asked for, and is pressing for strategic arms limitation talks. *Isvestia* published I think it was three days ago a public request that these talks take place soon. We know that the nature of the approach to the United States and the United States has not turned these down. They have said that they are on the agenda. To what I said about the Soviet Union I would only add that as far as China is

concerned, its prospective power to do disastrous damage to the United States, according to the kind of authority which a qualified speaker such as Mr. McNamara has said are things for five or ten years hence. In other words, it is important of course to bring China in. It is even more important that the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, should start ending the arms race now. China and France have taken rather similar positions in regard to taking part in such talks. China has never totally refused to take part. What they say is that they are not going to take part in what seems to be philosophical exercises if the nuclear powers decide to reduce. If they stop the arms race and decide to reduce they are there to take part. And so far from the figures I have cited the United States and the Soviet Union have not agreed to reduce, they are still continuing the arms race. So in answer to your question I would say that the first priority is that the United States and the Soviet Union taking into account the factor of the danger that you mention from China in the future, if they do not do this, also the economic consideration, the political one of the desirability of trying for a détente in Europe if the United States and the Soviet Union set the example to start strategic arms limitation talks to end the arms race, then there is a perfectly reasonable chance to associate in the end with both China and France, once they stop the arms race, to move into the field of mutual reduction.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ignatieff if I might be permitted to make a non-related remark. May I just say it is of great significance to me personally to be here. For 15 years I served directly under the little man who sat in your place and made that historic statement, in 1936 that God and history would not forget, that I think has so much relationship to us today even though it came from the Emperor of Ethiopia at a time when disarmament and all that we are concerned with in our Committee did not mean quite so much to us. I would also say, Mr. Chairman, I think it is a great honour for us, at least I speak for myself, to have with us today the statesman that, Ambassador Ignatieff is—his great experience in NATO in disarmament and in the UN peacekeeping gives us a great privilege.

I was impressed by the statement you made, Mr. Ignatieff that defence and disarma-

ment policies are one and the same, that defence and foreign policies are inseparable, that disarmament is part of both. And I think this is a very important statement to us as we are considering Canadian policy. But as you have said as well that Canada has an important part to play in any disarmament arrangement because of her great nuclear potential, do you think that as long as we are directly participating in NATO equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, as we are, that that role in disarmament is seriously effected by this fact and is there any other position which you could see us in NATO where we might enhance or strengthen that role which you referred to so effectively?

Ambassador Ignatieff: Thank you Mr. Thompson for those kind remarks. I am particularly happy you mentioned the fact that the Chambres included history, the Emperor of Ethiopia making this plea for collective security just at the time when that country was invaded. This also is the hall where Mr. Riddell of Canadian fame came. I would say in reply, or trying to reply to Mr. Thompson's very pertinent question, I would say there would be no contradiction between Canadian membership in NATO and our participation in ENDC so long as NATO is committed as I understand it to be and pursues the policy of negotiation with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact for a détente, for regional disarmament, arms control policies. It is important to bear in mind that if Canada was not in NATO, Canada would have no other international body through which Canadians could project their views, and influence in a region whose security has proved vital to Canada in two world wars.

It was Canada's original policy in NATO when we joined in 1949, that its members should under Article II seek to harmonize their political and economic aims as well as to provide for their collective defence. Now the aim of harmonizing the policies of the alliance and seeking a peaceful settlement in Europe, I believe is more important today than ever before. Because military confrontation has shown through a series of crises which I lived through in NATO Berlin and Cuba, how risky and futile such crises are. In the end the principal confronters had to back down. The objective therefore of seeking the détente through negotiation rather than through confrontation is I believe, fully compatible with seeking global agreements on the reduction—balanced reduction limitations on

armed forces through the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee, and indeed an essential concomitant of it.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel then Mr. Nesbitt. Mr. Laniel?

[Translation]

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Ambassador, you mention non-proliferation and disarmament, and I am wondering whether, in speaking of non-proliferation, we are really getting to the heart of the problem, in view of the fact that the great powers are retaining their arsenals and their capacity to destroy the world? Unless they agree to sign some kind of disarmament treaty, I do not think very much progress will be made, especially in view of the philosophy currently existing between NATO and the Bloc, mainly on the NATO side, concerning the use of nuclear weapons; you were telling us just now that the Disarmament Commission is presently leaning towards the reduction of conventional weapons—well, the feeling in NATO seems to be that non-conventional weapons do, after all, provide protection against world destruction. I should like to have your comments on that?

To sum up, must we really think, first and foremost, of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons? Or again, must we try to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons? In speaking of wishing to do it first of all in the field of conventional weapons, are we not running a risk, the risk of losing the buffer that would make negotiation possible, should a conflict ever develop in Europe?

The Ambassador: Mr. Laniel, I believe I share your point of view entirely; that is, the non-proliferation treaty is meaningless if it does not involve obligations under article 6, and if the major nuclear powers, meaning the Soviet Union and America, do not take their obligations seriously and make a start, this summer, on the planned negotiations on strategic arms limitation.

Having said that, I fully agree that progress towards disarmament is an absolute priority. As I have said, however, the disarmament must be balanced; in other words, no action must be taken that would seriously threaten the balance. In Europe, there is one great military power. There are a few secondary powers from a military point of view. The Soviet Union, which was attacked by Germany during the second world war, was not interested in being a great military power in Europe, but once attacked, she ended the war as a victor in Europe. She stood at the centre

of Europe, with completely overwhelming power. The essential point about NATO is that the Europeans, finding themselves confronted by a conquering power, of a size they had not seen since the time of Napoleon, asked America to restore the balance. A strategic balance of a kind was arrived at, with America on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, and both sides supported by a few other participating countries with conventional and tactical nuclear weapons.

But the balance involves strategic weapons, together with what is included in the term "second strike capability", and it is these that form the subject of the major discussions between Washington and Moscow. If there is an agreement—and as I have said, there is, for the first time, a willingness to achieve some practical results in the reduction of tension—if not, I agree that there is no point in disarmament in the field of conventional weapons. Here, we come up against a big question mark. As a result of circumstances, and economic pressures in Russia, there is a desire for an opportunity to secure a relaxation of tension in Europe based on the status quo. The danger of a confrontation between Russia and China means that there is now a possibility of significant talks between Moscow and Washington. But those are the priorities.

[English]

Mr. Nesbitt: First, I have one question Mr. Ignatieff. It is in two parts. But the first part I think you have answered already to Mr. Thompson, but I would perhaps pose it again just to be sure. If Canada were to withdraw from NATO

(a) Would she likely be able to remain on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and if I am not mistaken you have already indicated in the negative. And

(b) Assuming that Canada were to withdraw from NATO, and were to rely on the United States of America for our protection as some suggest, so that we could divert our energies to United Nations peacekeeping and foreign aid, do you think our forces would then be acceptable by the United Nations, since we might well be regarded by others in the U.N. as a quasi province of the United States?

Mr. Ignatieff: If I may reply, my reply to this question would be off the record, if I may ask that it should be so.

Mr. Nesbitt: If Canada were to withdraw from NATO and were to rely on the armed forces of the United States of America for her protection as some have suggested, so that we could direct our energies to peacekeeping operations for the U.N. and increases in foreign aid, I said, "Do you think our forces then, our peacekeeping forces, would be acceptable to the United Nations, since we might well be regarded by many U.N. members as a quasi province of the United States?"

Mr. Ignatieff: Well that is a rather loaded question. But I would say this, sir, that, trying to answer it, is that the acceptability or otherwise of participants in the U.N. peacekeeping field is becoming increasingly tied to the view which members of the United Nations, particularly those who may be involved in the area where there is an international dispute, the extent to which that country is regarded is more or less independent. That is that if it was thought under the kind of circumstances that you had hypothesized Canada was in any way acting as a stooge or representative of the United States then we would be regarded as such and would not be accepted. There is, as I said, in my previous remarks, a question, yes it would be a question that...there has been some discussion as to what countries are or not acceptable and what countries, whether in a region for instance, the regional members are likely to exclude Canada or not. I think that in any given region there is a tendency not to include people from the region because they are too interested. That is one point. This turns up in the Middle East, not only in the political but in the economic. I was once asked to take part in a meeting for Middle East assistance and I said "Well, Canada is not directly in the Middle East." They said, "Well, it is no use having a dairy without a cow." But they want disinterestedness. They do not want people from the region who might sharpen their knives on the situation and exploit it that way. They do not want the Great Powers, because when they go in there they might exploit the situation and intervene. And so this is a very important consideration in our likelihood of being asked to take part in peacekeeping operations, that we are at the present moment regarded as relatively able to stand on our feet even though we may lean one way or another like that tower up there.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos and then Mr. Forest. Mr. Groos.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would permit me also to say how fortunate I think we are in having Mr. Ignatieff today. A very happy combination of diplomatic and military experience. Diplomacy I take it is inherently a cautious art and in this exercise that we have been conducting we politicians are finding that we are entering into the political-diplomatic field. You gave us the examples of a quotation from Samuel Johnson, Mr. Ignatieff, and you spoke also about the whale, so perhaps I will be permitted by the Chairman to say that in my day I used to read some Damon Runyan and he had I think an example of extreme caution which he used and if I recall it it went roughly like this:

Son, there is no such animal as the sure thing. Some day, somewhere a guy comes up to you and shows you a brand new deck of cards on which the seal ain't never been broken, and he is willing to bet you then and there that the Jack of Spades will jump right out of that pack and squirt cider in your ear, and he is willing to bet you a thousand clams. Do not bet him, because as sure as you do you will get an earful of cider.

Now that is an example I think of extreme caution which perhaps as diplomatists we should not follow. We also have the example of the other extreme of the turtle who never gets anywhere without sticking his neck out. I think that as Canadians we have succeeded, have been successful over the past twenty years in producing safety in our alliances and our dilemma as I see it today is that our contribution is for us a major one when weighed in the balance of the total requirements of a still developing country with the added complications of our geographic position next to the United States, the most wealthy and the strongest military nation on earth, who is also the keystone of western security. On the other hand our present contribution is not however vital to our allies, if I can use that word "vital" in its ultimate sense. What we see here, I think, is not necessarily a unilateral sweeping change of policy which would alienate us from our friends and our allies, but perhaps a single initiative—a single step perhaps—in a new direction; a new direction which, hopefully, might be the beginning, or just the beginning, of a long journey towards the goal of universal security. During that journey we might possibly be joined by other like-minded nations if the journey continues to show promise. We all

agree, I think, on the need for new steps but we seem to suffer from a combination of both paucity of initiatives and of the almost overwhelming pressures of the status quo. Now, Mr. Ambassador, you have been briefed far better than we could ever be for your present job and your experiences are lengthy and varied, perhaps you could tell us what ideas have echoed around these halls in the last 40 years? Surely there are some that we should be able to consider sticking our necks out over. Would you care to give us some of these ideas either on or off the record?

Ambassador George Ignatieff: Mr. Chairman, I am very flattered by the invitation. I agree with Mr. Groos that he has stated the state of our frustration as well as I have heard it stated: that here is Canada, in my view, in one way in the most tangible position namely that we live in the fork or on the fringe of the most powerful nation on earth from which we derive certain fringe benefits of assured defence, security, which has been so since the United States began to abandon isolation under Franklin Roosevelt; the first important step being the Ogdensburg statement and the agreement which assured Canada that the United States would not stand idly by and so on. This has been built on. The Hyde Park agreement, our Secretary of the Post Hostilities Planning Committee—if it is of any interest to anybody—in 1944-45 had to work on the various post war plans including the one of continued co-operation, building on the Ogdensburg agreement. The question of what regional alliances, what dependence on universal global system security should be, were all examined. We opted, as you know, for a universal system only to have it dashed by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union primarily and East and West, and the Security Council failed to provide that security; we had out of necessity to turn to this alliance.

Now, you mention the question of paucity of initiative and what do we do from here. I have, over a period of some years, found attempts at initiatives not lacking. I can assure you, some have been tried in this chamber. I have been present when they have been tried. I would like to tell about it someday. But I suggest the following factors: first, that Canada is in the most dangerous position in respect of the arms race of any country in the world as to its consequences. This is my considered view. That is, that if the arms race were to get out of hand by a miscalculation

the consequences to Canada would be catastrophic. The pressures of the arms race in terms of its economic consequences are very far reaching on our economy as it is on the American economy. The dangers of failing to alleviate minor conflicts which arise, which has been my responsibility at the United Nations is likewise extremely serious. I am aware of the fact that in the Middle East there is potential confrontation between nuclear powers involved in the continuing hostilities. I also am aware of the fact that the geographic situation that we are in makes it inevitable that if there are such confrontations, that Canada in some way or another will be involved. Therefore, I say as regards the overwhelming pressure of the status quo, and I very much liked the way Mr. Groos pointed this thing straight at me so I could not avoid it, there is an overwhelming pressure of the status quo in every thought, in every department, as there is in every establishment. My suggestion, and it is one which I have thought over considerably, is that I think we must—I quite agree with you—get the best brains that Canada has, addressing itself to two main problems: how to reduce the risks of the nuclear arms race which is going on right over our heads. I advise those of you who have not studied the current issue of *Time* magazine, which has just come out which examines the current phenomenon which the President of the United States announced, those who see it will see that to deal with a Sentinel system requires antiballistic missiles, to deal with intercontinental missiles coming in over the shortest route and this shortest route according to *Time* magazine has a nice circle starting from the left to the right: the U.S.S.R., Alaska, Canada and then it reaches something called PAR and then the ABM site SPARTAN, missile site radar SPRINT. This is something which needs studying; the implications of this needs extremely the best brains which can be brought to bear on this. It cannot be done by unilateral disarmament, I have had some experience on this, that you cannot get powers who fear the consequences of being less than the super power to release or reduce their power except under the terms that Mr. MacNamara suggested, that is called riskless verification or assurance. Whether we can ever get riskless is something, but I would suggest that arms control studies could help in depth producing studies on detectability on verification procedures and also know more about what the implications are of the arms

race which is going on. You can read a great deal about what the sentinel system is in Mr. MacNamara's reading in the congressional report in *Time* magazine, but the implications for Canada are very considerable. Therefore, I would say that as far as overcoming the overwhelming pressure of the status quo and moving in the direction of initiatives and overcoming the positive initiatives, I believe that there should be an interdepartmental continuing task force to study the reduction risks of the nuclear arms race and of also considering the whole economic implications which are very considerable. That is the only way I can see it; I see no short cut to this.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Ambassador, my question is relatively brief in content because it is a secondary question; others that I have had in the back of my mind as you have gone on have all been answered. I must say you have done extremely well in cutting down our side of the job. Could I ask you, Mr. Ambassador, if you could briefly describe for us what the repercussions would be, if indeed any, of serious consequence, if Canada in acting unilaterally did withdraw from NATO physically its presence in Europe for example?

Ambassador Ignatieff: I think that I would ask to go off the record on this, because if I am to answer that honestly I have to.

The Chairman: It is now 6 o'clock, we still have four questioners, can we go on for a few minutes Mr. Ambassador? Whose names can come off, Mr. Asselin, Mr. Prud'homme and the last questioner is,—what about your question Mr. Lewis, do you want—Mr. Ryan has the final question then.

Mr. Ryan: The vice-chairman cannot go on in the face of those remarks.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, just before thanking Mr. Ignatieff, just a brief announcement. A number of members have suggested that possibly it would be desirable to have a general Committee meeting tomorrow at 11 a.m. We have certain points to discuss, and also, perhaps to discuss the form of our proposed report, this would be for those who are interested I think, and many of you would be interested from what I have heard. If that is satisfactory, we will make arrangements to get a small sitting room at the hotel, and if you inquire at the desk, you could perhaps be informed as to what that room is at 11 a.m....

Mr. Lewis: I will not attend the meeting, personally, I just intend to walk around and get some air,

The Chairman: I beg your pardon, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: The hour you suggested does not affect me, because my personal plans are merely to walk around and get some air. But why—some people will be going to church, why do you come into the middle of the morning like that. If we have to leave at 3 o'clock, whatever the hour is, why do you not make it half an hour or an hour...

The Chairman: Gentlemen, let me know what is the convenient time, and we will arrange it at that time?

Mr. Lewis: I do not mind myself...

The Chairman: Shall we make it 1 o'clock then?

Gentlemen, I am advised that we have to leave for the airport. We have to leave the hotel for the airport at 1.50 p.m., which is one of the reasons why I suggested that we do it before lunch, to give us more time, but if you want to make it say, at 12.30, this will be satisfactory.

Mr. Allmand: Have you planned any meeting of the steering or drafting committee before that?

The Chairman: Yes, I was going to fix the time of this meeting of the Committee and then work back from that to a meeting of the steering committee—Can we settle now a time which will be reasonably convenient to—

Well it is 1 o'clock then, that will give us time. Gentlemen, I am advised that will be satisfactory as long as you check out before we start our meeting. You must be checked out of your rooms before 1 o'clock.

Mr. Allmand: If we have the sub-committee meeting at 12, would an hour not give us sufficient time to get something done?

The Chairman: Well, I was going to suggest that the—I think the sub-committee meeting I hoped, would be very short—could be reasonably brief and I was wondering whether we could have a sub-committee meeting say between 8.30 and 9.00 tonight, so as to give us time to make arrangements for the main Committee meeting tomorrow morning.

It would be—I hoped it would be a brief meeting, is that reasonably satisfactory, at 8.30 tonight? And, perhaps that meeting could be held in my room at the hotel, the steering sub-committee meeting. Let us say 8.30 tonight and we will keep it brief, I hope, and the general Committee meeting then 1 p.m. tomorrow and if you will inquire at the desk, you will obtain information as to the room.

I would like to thank, on your behalf Mr. Ignatieff for his information and his assistance and also, of course, for his hospitality. He went to a lot of trouble, I know, in obtaining guests for the luncheon today, and conversations with those guests, I know they were most helpful. I would also like to thank an old friend, His Excellency John Louis Delisle, whom I have known for many years, for being there at the airport to meet us. Thank you very much Mr. Ignatieff.

The meeting adjourned.

**Stockholm, Sweden,
Monday, March 17, 1969.**

The Chairman: The purpose now is to receive some instruction from our local representatives, headed by our ambassador, His Excellency Arthur Andrew and assisted by Counsellor, Robert Edmonds and Canadian Forces Attaché James Arnott.

His Excellency has been in our External Affairs Department since 1947. He was a First Secretary in Bonn, Chargé d'Affaires at Prague and Vienna, Ambassador, or maybe High Commissioner at Cyprus and Ambassador at Israel, and for three and one half years Ambassador at Stockholm.

We are interested particularly this morning, your Excellency, in your experiences in Sweden with particular reference to the neutrality of Sweden. And I would ask you therefore to let us have your presentation, if you would, at this time.

His Excellency Arthur Andrew (Canadian Ambassador to Stockholm, Sweden): Thank you very much, gentlemen. First, I should like to welcome you to Sweden and to say that your Embassy is entirely at your disposal. We hope that the people you will meet here will be able to provide you with the information you require and in addition to those that will come to speak to you here and the Parliamentary Committee which you will have lunch with. We are having a dinner this evening, a

selection of people, some of whom you will have met, either here or at the Riksdag, and you will have a chance to speak to them more intimately and talk to them at greater leisure. Of particular interest this evening we will have Madame Myrdal who is the Minister without Portfolio, responsible for disarmament questions. Also will be present a Mr. Petrie who has just returned from China, Peking, where he was the Swedish Ambassador and he has also been quite closely involved in the process of Sweden's recognition of North Vietnam. Those of you who meet him this evening, I think will find him to be a very interesting person.

We have prepared some documents. I hope they give a little bit of the background of the sort of vital statistics in the areas in which you are interested. I hope they will be of some use to you.

[Translation]

On behalf of your Embassy in Stockholm, allow me to welcome you to Sweden. You will find that almost all your contacts speak English and, less often, French. If you experience any great difficulty, please let me know, and we shall give you all possible assistance. I hope the documentation that has been prepared will be useful.

[English]

In accordance with what I understand to be your wishes, I will confine myself to suggesting some areas in which you might find it useful to probe and to indicate some points of similarity and difference between the two countries, Canada and Sweden, which you might think worth exploring. I will then shut up and my colleagues Colonel Arnott and Mr. Edmonds and I will constitute ourselves a panel for the purpose of answering your questions.

The following are the topics on which the Committee have expressed an interest and in which Sweden might have something of interest to offer. The first is United Nations peacekeeping and collective security arrangements. The second is the possibilities in the field of civil defence. The third is neutrality and the non-alignment option. And the fourth is the prospects for disarmament.

On U.N. peacekeeping operations Swedish experience has been virtually identical to our own and your questions in this area will be readily understood as will their responses.

On civil defence you will find that the Swedes have developed their thinking and their preparations well beyond what applies

at present in Canada. I should like only to enter one word of caution. Swedish civil defence should be looked at in its context. That is as a part of the concept of total defence. It is not intended to be a passive thing, but an active contribution to their total defence effort. I think the people that you will be meeting will always be careful to put it in this context, and I think it would be a mistake to try to remove it from this fact which implies that it is not merely a question of survival but of preservation of the ability and the will to resist and fight back.

On neutrality and non-alignment, I shall try to be careful not to try and promote my own views, if any. At the same time I think I would be failing in my duty as your friend at court here if I did not bring to your attention a few of the points which you might like to bear in mind and on which you might like to obtain the views of the Swedish experts who will be coming before you.

The first point relates to the underlying assumption of Swedish neutrality. How do the Swedes see the world around them? How do they imagine that their neighbors see them? Is Sweden a threat to anyone in any respect? Are any neighbors a threat to Sweden? Above all, is Swedish territory, or any part of it, of significant importance to any world power, as a strategic area?

When you have had these questions answered and have compared the answers to those that you would get if you put the same questions to yourself in respect to Canada, I think you would be in a fair position to judge the relevance of the Swedish example to the Canadian situation.

The next question that I would advise asking relates to Sweden's defence strategy. Is declared neutrality by itself a sufficient guarantee against aggression? Or even more likely, is it a guarantee against bullying or blackmail? If not, what additional means, presumably military, are needed to support a neutrality in war policy. And that is what the Swedish policy is. It is not an abstract neutrality. I do not think they even particularly like to be regarded as non-aligned. Their policy is a pragmatic one that they will be neutral in any war, and they declare it in advance.

You will of course wish to apply these answers as well to the Canadian situation to determine to what extent they may be appli-

cable. There is another aspect of interest, but one in which it would be difficult to obtain a Swedish opinion. And that relates to the psychological requirement and the psychological effects of being neutral. Swedes are different. Not only from Canadians but also from their own neighbors. Their genius is a special, a very special one, and it is widely and justly admired. They have by their intelligence and diligence created a very clear conception of themselves, particularly abroad. And undoubtedly they have been themselves affected by this conception. There has been feedback. And there is a relationship, an interlocking relationship between the external Swede and the internal, the psychological, Swede. Above all, Sweden is a homogeneous country. More than any other country I can think of it is homogeneous. The policy of neutrality is not debated seriously by any intelligent Swede, although not all are equally certain of its ultimate wisdom.

The last question, but one we can only ask ourselves is whether Canadians are prepared psychologically for the Swedish model.

If it is the Swedish model we are thinking of we will find that it is more than a policy or a strategy. It both demands and reflects a certain state of mind. On the matter of disarmament, the last item that you mentioned as being of interest, well we come very close to the Swedish position. We co-operate with them almost daily, certainly weekly, on this question. We are members with them of the 18 nations disarmament committee in Geneva. And there are surprisingly few differences in our points of view considering that we are NATO members and they are neutral. The differences that do exist are more of emphasis and style than of substance.

That is all that I had in mind to say at this moment. And I should be glad with my colleagues to attempt to answer questions that may be put by the Committee. Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Perry Ryan): Thank you, sir. I have four, now five questioners. Messrs. Wahn, Howard, Laniel, Groos, and Allmand in that order. Mr. Wahn.

Mr. Wahn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your Excellency, you have indicated the similarities in some respects between Canadian and Swedes, they are peaceful people interested in peacekeeping and activities of the U.N., with an interest in disarmament and so on. The Swedes as I understand it believe they are

performing a very useful, making a very useful contribution to peace by acting as a buffer between Russia and other countries in western Europe. In view of Canada's geographical location between the United States and Russia, is it not possible that Canada could perform a rather similar function as a buffer between the two armed super powers?

His Excellency Arthur Andrew: You tempt me greatly, sir, but I would like to try to confine myself to the Swedish situation and let you draw the conclusions from it. I do not think... I think the Swedes do not see themselves as a buffer. I think we see them as a buffer. I think the Russians may or may not see them as a buffer and this is a good thing to know. But the Swede would say that his function is simply to preserve Sweden from the evils of war. The best way of doing this is I think to declare that they will not fight in a war in advance and hope that their country is not sufficiently important to anybody else for them to come in on it. Whether this analogy can be applied to Canada I do not know. Whether Canada is sufficiently unimportant strategically I think is out of my area of expertise, but I think the Swedish analogy—to apply the Swedish analogy to Canada you have to know that Sweden bases its position on two things.

The first is that their territory is not strategically important and the second that to the extent that it may be important they will defend it and they are able to defend it. In other words, they augment their natural unimportance by being an extremely prickly object to try to handle. The extent to which this works, the ultimate answer can only probably be found in the Kremlin on the assumption that NATO does not intend to invade, but they have to be credible. The important thing to Swedish neutrality is that it must be believed in by both parties, by both the power blocs. The Swedes have to be able to tell the Russians: if you try to invade us you will be in an extremely undigestible piece of territory.

At the same time they also have to tell the Russians: we will not allow our territory to be used by NATO against you, and that has to be credible too, but whether it is credible, whether this in fact is believed and does work nobody, I do not think anyone, can give you a positive answer or positive assurance. The answer will depend on circumstances

that may not be possible to envisage and it is locked in the bosom of the Kremlin.

I have not answered your question, sir, I realize that.

Mr. Wahn: That is very helpful, thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: Is that all, Mr. Wahn? I have six more questioners and we have 25 minutes, so it may be advisable to limit each questioner to one good question and I may take one or two more. I have not any members of the Conservative Party who have indicated—I have one now. Thank you, Mr. Forrestall. The next questioner, Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): How can you anticipate that any nation would come to its assistance if it were attacked by any other nation or group of nations?

Mr. Andrew: It would be no, in practice I think. If you put this question you may get a little nuance in your answer that will suggest that they do regard themselves as being under the NATO umbrella. I speak quite freely out of ignorance, but I would think that the NATO strategists in Brussels would consider that Sweden was a part of their trip-wire area and that a Soviet invasion of Sweden would be taken as tantamount to an invasion of any NATO territory, but obviously the only reason they are coming, that they would invade Sweden would be because they were on their way to Norway. It would put the whole NATO apparatus into gear and to this extent I think the Swedes—of course they would yell for help and you would then get a NATO reaction. To this extent I think the Swedes do feel they are under the edge of the NATO umbrella.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Are they paying their price for being in the club when they do not belong to NATO.

Mr. Andrew: They are not paying the political price, but they are paying more of a—paying a higher military bill than they probably would have if they were in NATO. I think the per capita on defence in Sweden as compared to Norway is much greater. This is so I am told.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel.

[Translation]

Mr. Laniel: Your Excellency, may I ask some questions in French?

Mr. Andrew: A little, yes.

Mr. Laniel: Just now, in your presentation on neutrality and non-alignment, you asked the question: how does Sweden regard the world, and how does the world regard Sweden? I am wondering, myself, how Sweden regards Canada, particularly in the light of her geographical position and of the fact that she is, after all, a minor power belonging to an alliance like NATO in which her participation is, perhaps, more or less symbolic.

Yesterday evening, I was chatting with a young political science student in a discothèque; it was not the most suitable place, perhaps, but anyway the young man was saying that he was a conservative while engaged in his studies, but what with the Vietnam question and other world problems, and the attitude of the United States, he had become a socialist; finally, he ended up by saying that he identified Canada with the United States, seeing Canada as an American satellite that was subject to outside influence in all its policies. But since we have worked with Sweden to preserve peace and are a member of NATO, but have nevertheless tried to retain the image of a peaceful country all along, how does Sweden stand—what is Sweden's opinion of Canada's position in the world?

[English]

Mr. Andrew: This is a very large question and a very interesting one. We are not identified with the United States. In the foreign ministry when they are kidding me and they do sometimes, they refer to us as the extra neutral. The Swedes officially at least do intend to give us the benefit of the best of both worlds, of being within NATO when it is convenient and not in NATO when it is inconvenient.

The Swedish attitude towards us in general?—politically I think we have no problems—but hockey? Psychologically there is a certain envy. This is highly subjective, but from an impression I have that the Swedes do not generally envy anyone, but to the extent that they do envy anyone they envy us. We sell shrimps cheaper than they can produce their own. We could if we wanted to, drive them out of the forest products field, practically. We can undersell them in most work markets on pulp and paper products. They do not like this naturally, but they are interested and intrigued by it and sometimes the criticism that we get I feel is in a way back-handed flattery. In the international field our co-operation could not be any more complete. I

will do a little special pleading while I have you here.

Our small embassy cannot deal with the number of requests for help that we get from every department of government in Canada and it works both ways. The Swedes are asking us too—we have regular flows and it is more than we can deal with.

I do not know if I have dealt with the question, but it is a very large one.

Mr. Laniel: On the military side of it, are they concerned about our attitude, our evolution, such as our present study. Does that concern them?

Mr. Andrew: No, I do not think so, but I would be interested if you would ask them. I think—I would like to hear what they would say on this, but my feeling is I do not think they are concerned, but they are very concerned about NATO. They would be extremely unhappy if anything happened to NATO. Whether we were in or out they would undoubtedly say politely that it is our business and they have no opinion, but I think if you pressed them a little beyond that it would be interesting.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, my first question is really to you. I wonder if it would be possible for us to have a map of Canada with an overlay somewhere on it of Sweden to give us some idea of the disparity in size between the two countries.

Mr. Andrew: I will try to arrange this. You are now at the same latitude as Port Churchill.

Mr. Groos: It felt like it this morning.

Mr. Andrew: Half way up the coast if you will look at the map, a place called Omioz, there is a bulge in Sweden and that is Frobisher Bay. Then when you get up to the extreme north at the largest centre you are beyond Aklavik. You are well up into the high Arctic, but they have the Gulf Stream so the climate is not comparable in any way, although we tend to think it is. We send experts here to study their Arctic conditions, but I do not think they have any permafrost in Sweden.

Mr. Groos: Another question to the Vice-Chairman. I wanted to ask if the military attaché could give us a very brief run down

on the Swedish armament industry which I understand is self-contained and if he would specifically answer the question of an estimate of the cost of the country and the comparison between the armament industry of Sweden and the armament industry in Canada.

Colonel Arnott: They do have a self-contained armament industry to the extent that 85 to 90 per cent of the Swedish military purchases are made here in Sweden and perhaps 15 per cent is an off the shelf purchase from outside. I am sorry I cannot say how this actually compares to the Canadian industry. I know we are more specialist in Canada and sell or build the various parts in bits and pieces of the military industry. For example parts of aircraft and so forth.

Mr. Groos: Could you give me some estimate of the cost to the country.

Colonel Arnott: The military—the cost per year to the military for their purchases here in Sweden?

Mr. Gross: What are the costs keep the armament industry going?

Colonel Arnott: I would say...

Mr. Andrew: I think this is a very difficult question for anyone to answer because there is a lot of feed back on it. You might try that with someone from the Ministry of Defence this afternoon, but I doubt if you would get a really precise answer because a lot of it is really not a direct and complete outlay. They get it back in other forms. From sales abroad and so on.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, we will have to speed up a little bit. I now have a total of 11 questioners all together. Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Andrews, you said that the policy of neutrality was seriously followed here now, but if I remember after the last war there was quite a bit of criticism against Sweden because it was felt they did not come to the assistance of the democratic countries when they were threatened by Nazism. How do the Swedes feel when they see the possibility of their kin in Denmark and Norway being overrun as they were in the last war by an invader. These people are very closely related to them. Do they not feel that they have a sort of moral duty to protect and help people that are very close to them culturally and historically.

Mr. Andrew: The answer is no. They do not feel in any way obliged and in the last war they allowed the Germans to transport reinforcements across the east territory to help them out with their job in Norway. Norwegians have not forgotten it. The Swedes are quite regretful but nothing interferes with their policy of neutrality, that is firm and they have served notice on everybody look after yourself, we will look after us.

Mr. Allmand: Was it not after the last war because of some of the criticism from Norway and so forth, the question was raised again in Sweden as to whether it was a good policy?

Ambassador Andrew: Yes, but it worked, they profited by it and it never really—I will let Robert speak on the subject. I do not think we have ever—it was ever seriously a question, it was debated but I do not think it has been seriously debated.

Mr. R. B. Edmonds (Counsellor): I think the answer there is that Scandinavia has traditionally been a neutral area. Norway and Denmark were neutral during the first world war; they were obliged by circumstances to get involved in the second world war, and there was a feeling in all the free countries that they should get back to the tradition of a specific northern area, and there was a very serious thinking triggered largely by Mr. Lange, the foreign minister of Norway, about the possibility of a Scandinavian defence pact. This led to some very serious negotiations in 1948 prior to NATO. Sweden was interested, but only on the condition that it was an alliance free pact. That is to say it would be a Scandinavian alliance not linked with NATO. Scandinavia would be an area of neutrality bound by common ties. But the idea was eventually overruled in Norway and Denmark when they joined NATO. But as you say there was a very serious consideration given in the two or three years after the war to restoring a Scandinavian neutral area, armed and ready to defend itself.

Mr. Lewis: The question I intended to ask follows naturally from what Mr. Andrew has said. I have been unable—Mr. Edmonds I am sorry—to understand efficiently why the difference between Norway and Sweden. And Denmark as well. But Norway in particular, what is there, either historically or in the national character, if there is such a thing, that makes that difference?

Ambassador Andrew: I can only tell you that they are different and they both agree. The story goes of a Norwegian—someone spoke to him, an American asked him if he was Swedish, he said, no I am Norwegian but I have been sick. This is the sort of relationship here.

Mr. Lewis: There must surely be something in the historical development producing this reaction.

Ambassador Andrew: This is history, they are totally independent of each other. They had a union pressed on them by paradox at the beginning of the last century, and they dissolved it at the beginning of this century. And their language is very similar but they have developed quite differently. In fact the Swedes have looked east and the Norwegians have looked West. I think to sum it up and I do not know—it is a long story, I might be able to tell you but I think it would take me a little while. I am limiting it of course in my mind to the international relationship. If one is eastward looking the Swedes were a Baltic power and a continental power, the Norwegians were a maritime power, they are a maritime westward outward-looking people.

Mr. Winch: Could I raise a point of order, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: A point of order, Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: I just mentioned the point of order because I think it is rather important, I note the reference "Swede" now is it discourteous to say "Swede" instead of "Swedish", it may be important in our questions afterwards.

Ambassador Andrew: They call themselves "Swedes".

Mr. Winch: That is fine, I just wanted to get that clear.

The Chairman: Are you finished then Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: If the Ambassador is, I am.

Mr. Edmonds: I could go on, but I do not think I should.

The Chairman: It will likely come out anyway in further questions. Go ahead Mr. Edmonds.

Mr. Edmonds: Well, I think that the one very short answer to that question is the

experience of war. The Norwegians realized that they had been invaded and they realized the virtues of defence. And they saw it in wartime. We had Norwegian flyers in Canada and so on, and I heard Dutchmen say exactly the same thing about their own country, they were neutral in the first world war, they took time to grow after the war as refugees because they were neutral countries, but the experience of the invasion of Holland convinced them that they needed collective security.

Mr. Brewin: You mentioned the psychological attitudes of Sweden which you said, I think both grew from the fact of neutrality and also supported and buttressed the idea of neutrality and you put the question whether the Canadian attitudes I think you the question, or suggested it to us, could be similar. I would think one of the difficulties, at least one of the differences might be the fact, or is it a fact that the Canadians have the very closest relationship with one of the super powers, namely the Americans. We intermarry, there is a tremendous flow of pioneers, a tremendous flow of personnel across the borders for vacations and business and one thing and another. Is there any similar close connection between Sweden and Russia, or any other super power. Is that one of the psychological differences?

Ambassador Andrew: Yes, I think it is. I think the Swedes are, I said they were homogeneous and they are, not only homogeneous but they are based in Sweden, they travel, they have interests all over the world. It is one of the contradictions in the make-up of the Swede that he is an inward-looking person, and an outward-looking person. Their relations with Russia have been historically that of enemies. The Vikings were the first people to go down the Volga, they went right down to the Black Sea. The Swedes know the Russians, but not on terms of intermarriage unless you use that term extremely loosely. They visited them several times and the Baltic was a Swedish lake until Peter the Great got out at then, St. Petersburg, Leningrad. The Swedes have not even—I do not think that you would say that there is very much intermarriage, considering the similarity between all the Scandinavians. I do not think there is very much—there is a lot of official contact but the personal contact is small. I have this impression, I do not know if my colleagues would agree with me, on that, but I have this impression.

Mr. Brewin: It is more economic.

Ambassador Andrew: It is growing. There is a conversation going on at the moment for a thing called Noric to develop economic relations, a sort of free trade area in the north.

Mr. Brewin: With Russia now?

Ambassador Andrew: No, no, not with Russia.

The Chairman: We can move on now to Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Ambassador I wonder if I might ask you, it might not be fair to ask you to comment on this. Would an open declaration of alliance with the east, drive them further away from us?

Ambassador Andrew: No, I do not think so. I think that the possibility of war, you mean, whether this would drive them away, no I think the Swedes would try very much to maintain foot in both camps.

The Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme?

[Translation]

Mr. Prud'homme: Has there been any talk—have conversations taken place between the Canadian authorities here and the people responsible for foreign policy, regarding a possible Canadian withdrawal from NATO? What do the Swedish authorities think of a possible Canadian withdrawal from NATO? Do they seem favourable, indifferent or opposed?

[English]

Ambassador Andrew: Well someone asked me a question similar to that a minute ago and I...

[Translation]

Mr. Prud'homme: I would like you to elaborate.

[English]

Ambassador Andrew: I would like to hear the Swedish views. If you ask this to one of the foreign military people, I would be very interested in hearing what they say.

Mr. Prud'homme: Exactly for this reason, sir, I would like you to elaborate a little bit in order for us to be able to ask them more precise questions, for information.

Ambassador Andrew: To me they give the polite answer which is that this is for you to decide. It is a question for Canada to decide. We Swedes are not effected by this, you decide. But anything that hurts NATO they would not like, this is my impression because they regard NATO—they are in a position of

a keystone in an arch, I would say. If one—if the pressure comes off on one side they fall, and if they thought that Canada was vital to the strength of NATO, they would be very interested in us staying in it. Because I do not think they would want NATO to be weakened if it would affect their position. But I think it would be interesting to know whether they think that our departure would weaken NATO; I do not know what the answer to that one is.

The Chairman: Mr. Asselin?

Mr. Asselin: Mr. Ambassador, yesterday I was reading the documentation you provided, and I found that this country, Sweden, pays very dearly indeed for its neutrality. In the list, I saw that some six per cent of the gross national product is allocated to defence. I have always thought that a country could become and remain neutral by signing non-aggression pacts with its neighbours. In the case of Sweden, do you not think that, if Sweden belonged to a club like NATO, she could reduce her military expenditures considerably? From another angle, I believe that if Russia were to invade Sweden, on one pretext or another, this country does not now have the necessary military strength to repel aggression on the part of Russia. Do you not think that it would cost Sweden less to belong to NATO, and have NATO protection, instead of maintaining a military force that is, in my opinion, meaningless in view of her proximity to Russia?

Mr. Andrew: Well in terms of strict economy, in terms of money it would no doubt be cheaper for them to be a part of the NATO system. They would get more bang per buck that way. But in a way they are also prisoners of their past decisions. At this moment in time it would be more difficult for the Swedes to enter NATO, politically it would be more difficult for them to enter NATO than it would be for Canada to get out of NATO. The Russians would react extremely strongly if not against Sweden then against Finland and there is something I should have said earlier, that the answer to many Swedish situations is Finland. Because Finland is a necessary buffer between Russia and Sweden and the Swedes are very solicitous about the Finnish situation and they would not want to embarrass the Finns because if they do the Russians would move just that much nearer to Sweden. So many Swedish decisions can be seen in this context as not really directly affecting Sweden itself but as affecting Finland. Now

one of these things would be if they went into, if they came into NATO. It would produce if not a reaction against Sweden itself, it would produce quite a serious reaction against Finland. I do not know if I have adequately covered your point but it is a very interlocking thing.

AFTERNOON SITTING

Monday, March 17, 1969

The Chairman: Gentlemen, could we get started. It would be best if you would take the second and third rows, where the microphones are available.

This afternoon we have the pleasure of a discussion with officials from the Swedish defence department, and our Ambassador has arranged to have as our invited guests or witnesses, Mr. K. S. Olhede Under Secretary of State of defence who will deal mostly with Swedish security policies; Mr. B. Dahlberg, Chief of the Swedish Planning Secretariat of the defence department and Major General P. Ljung, Chief of the Army Materiel Department, who will be able to answer any questions with respect to army procurement. In addition, we have some supporting witnesses that may be called upon by any of these three. We have the first of the three that I have mentioned, he will be making his presentation and I suggest that we do not—that we hold our questions to all three, until they have completed their presentations. Then, it would be simply a case of indicating which man you wish to put your question to.

So without further ado, I would call upon Mr. Olhede to make his presentation.

Mr. Olhede: Well, I am very pleased to sit across from so many Canadians and have not done so before since I have been in Montreal where I have been frequently in my life. I know that you are very pressed for time indeed and, therefore, I have made some pictures or something to show what is the Swedish security policy. First of all, we have in writing to explain what is the aim of the Swedish security policy, and this has been accepted by the Government to secure national freedom of action in all situations and under such forms that we choose ourselves, in order to obtain and develop within our own borders, our social life, our society in political, economic, social, cultural and terms and every other respect in accordance with our own desires and in that connection to work for peace on the international scene, easing international tension and promoting peaceful development.

It is however not only—it is one thing to say what is your security policy but it must be based on, first of all, the power situation in the world and Sweden's strategic position. And, we must furthermore go through that what is the development of the military strategic doctrine. First, when we have gone through that, we can decide upon our foreign policy line of action, and secondly, on the defence policy line of action.

To start with the power policy situation and the Swedish strategic position. First of all, you must face this as we did on the following facts. The international political scene is essentially formed by the great powers. Sweden can, as a small country, only make a limited contribution to influence that scene. We have to adapt ourselves to what is considered to be the requirement of the scene, that is to say, that although we will do the utmost to change the international milieu, the scene, we must accept that we nevertheless, are a small country and must adapt, adapt ourselves to what is really the scene which is defined so to say by the actions of the great powers. Another fact in Europe at least, that there are two power blocks in Europe with at least partly-contrary political influence, and we also consider as a fact that on the whole, a balance of power exists between the two blocks and a considerable degree of parallelism exists between the military resources. The forces of the two blocks of power are vis-à-vis each other. Only limited resources can be adapted for an attack against us. There is nothing, of course, in our defence to say that we have our arms to defend ourselves against one of the two blocks. We consider that there are bound towards each other in a balance and only limited forces can be allocated in an attack towards us. And, we have the following assumptions and it is of an absolute necessity that any assumptions made must be reasonable. It must be a reasonable assumption. When the great power blocks endeavour to assert their interests several disputes can arise between them and military forces may be employed. While we have seen that in Vietnam, we have seen that in other parts of the world and we think this is a correct assumption. None of the great power blocks wants Sweden. I have simplified this expression although we can see that we have a potentiality, economic potentiality on that point of view, but we want to state, that an attack against us must be seen in the light of the strategy of the great powers. There is no other circumstances where we consider we

can come to a compromise, and from that point of view there is also a reasonable assumption to believe that the value of the advantages one of the great power blocks would achieve by occupying the whole block of Sweden. This is first and foremost determined by the disadvantages such an occupation would cause the other great power block, namely the main opponent. If we also state a logic on this, if a conflict should break out in our proximity, the strategically most important area of the Baltic Strait and Northern Scandinavia, the importance of government supposed to be neutral.

This is then, thus a power situation and from there we also have to consider the development of the military strategic doctrine. A lot of people mainly said that why on earth should Sweden have a defence? The first day there will be an inter-continental atomic war and, consequently, Sweden will immediately be dragged into such a war and, consequently, there is no reason for us to put any emphasis on conventional weapons. However, when you consider the development in the world in this connection you will find the following facts.

The military strategic doctrine of the United States on massive retaliation which was varied until the beginning of the 1960s has been replaced by a doctrine with greater possibilities of choice in conflict situations. The doctrine of flexible response or the so called escalation doctrine.

The great blocs aim at creating and maintaining a balance of power which would act as a deterrent on attack at every war level. In the event of a conflict, endeavours should be made to induce the great powers to agree to negotiations before escalations of the next level is made. The possibility of negotiations must always be left opened, and there is a consequence of this. I think, it is an important fact to state that the conventional forces have hereby gained increased importance. The nuclear weapons have become more a political instrument than a military instrument of force, and also on the next page you will find also a very important feature in the whole strategic doctrine development.

Measures have been taken to guarantee that decisions on employing nuclear weapons will be taken on the highest political level and not be made by military commands, and consequently, we can from these facts which

undoubtedly offer—we can draw the following assumptions.

The balance between the strategic forces of the United States and Soviet Union. The realization of what a nuclear war means as well as steps taken make it less probable now than earlier that an inter-continental nuclear war will be started suddenly and deliberately. And for Sweden's point of view the following conclusions. If however a nuclear war should break out, the first attack with nuclear weapons against Sweden is not very likely. There is hardly any reason for one or the other of the powers to use nuclear weapons against Sweden for the purpose of forcing the main improvement to come to the negotiating table. I would add, that this can be a wrong assumption. It can be that we will have a nuclear war from the first stage, and also, it is a possibility that we will be dragged into such a war but in that case it will not be a defence in our opinion, it will be more a matter to survive. And I am also convinced that how much we spend on defence we cannot defend ourselves from everything. Not even the great powers can do that!

From this glance we have formed our political foreign policy line of action. And, I am aware of Mr. Ryding has spoken about foreign policy today but I think I will go rapidly through this just to get it in the proper connection with the defence policy.

First of all, we state that even if Sweden is a small country it cannot by an appreciable degree improve its national scene. We aim at diminishing the distrust between the great powers; preventing a proliferation of nuclear weapons to still further nations; reaching an agreement when a comprehensive nuclear test band and an effective control system are reached; reaching an agreement on balanced disarmament. That is to say, to bring down armament to a lower level while maintaining the balance of power between the great power blocs.

I should say, we tried to do this in Geneva, of course, together with other nations but we think it is the main thing to do everything possible to minimize the mistrust between the great powers and also you may be aware, we have just had under construction here in Sweden, where the money comes from the defence department on a cross which will, in our opinion, be an instrument able to really differentiate if there is a test of nuclear

weapons on the ground or if there is an earthquake in any respect. Just to make sure that this mistrust is no longer valid so we can go ahead on this policy. And in this situation we have formed our policies in the sense we free them from alliances. I do not know whether this is a correct English translation. It is a non-alliance policy in peace in order to preserve neutrality in war. I prefer myself to always state that Sweden is not neutral in peace because neutrality is, in my opinion, very difficult to define in peacetime. You have the Austrian situation where Austria has defined neutrality in the treaty with Russia, with England, France and the United States and Canada as well and you have the Finnish neutrality which is defined in an agreement with the Soviet Union. You have Swiss neutrality where the Swiss do not even participate in the work of the United Nations but Sweden still does. Her policy is to take these standpoints in the United Nations and consequently we can take standpoints and therefore we are not neutral. But what we have said we have alliance-free policy in order to preserve neutrality in war. Because neutrality of war is defined in The Hague convention of 1902 and there is no doubt about that with this combination you have a clear combination of the two situations. Well this is not the goal for the Swedish foreign policy or security policy. It is just a phrase which specifies our absence in two situations, during peace and during war. And, of course, it is most important for us to make this policy good working. Will you change to the next slide. Our main task as a non-allied state is not to do anything in our proximity that can destruct the balance of power between the great power blocs. The great power blocs must be convinced that we shall fulfill the obligations of neutrality in the event of war in our proximity. That is to say that where the will, the power and ability to meet an attack by diligence by violating Swedish territory. The great powers must be convinced that Sweden, that in Sweden there is a definite majority among the people for this foreign policy line and that the climate for this situation is so stable that the foundation on which the security policy rests is firm. While in that respect you know we have almost all the time had the same government for 37 years so I think it is quite firm, a firm situation at least.

The next, of course, in this connection is the defence policy line Act, which has built

up as a consequence of what I have said up to now. The national defence shall be so framed as to support our foreign policy. It should aim at the maintenance of peace, that is to say, it should be stabilizing and a war-preventing factor in different political situations. It will express the will of the people to maintain our independence. The national defence shall enjoy the support of the Swedish people and it shall be the concern of the people, that is to say, it has been based upon the principle of compulsory military service. This is, in my opinion, a fundamental democratic idea. The national defence shall be so organized and made up that parts of it can take part in the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations at short notice. I want to stress this point and it corresponds to the last sentence in our security policy, the aim of our security policy. The next point is freedom from alliances and neutrality that non-alliance policy and neutrality require that it should be possible to defend the whole country. We cannot say consequently that we leave this part out, that the defence can concentrate its power on different parts of the country and in different directions as the situation changes. Special attention should, however, be paid to the strategically important regions in the north and south of Sweden. This is a consequence of what we in Sweden consider most important, being the most important strategic area in this between the great powers. The national defence must have such a composition and strength that it cannot happen that the great power blocs by findings deficiencies in the Swedish national defence are misled to distrust the declared foreign policy of the country and our ability to ward off violations of this neutrality if war should break out in Europe. For example, if we did not have an air force, if I can take that as an example, then of course the Eastern block or the Western block may think of us, they do not have an air force, consequently there must be an agreement between Sweden and one of the others saying that all right there must be some help or I take this example of an air force, there can also be other parts and consequently to make our policy true work it is so important that we have a balanced defence. So no one can say that you have a lack in your defence system there and consequently you must have an agreement with somebody who will fill that gap if it comes to a war. The structure of the national defence must be such that it cannot be regarded as a threat against any country.

Our national defence shall be a conventional defence and therefor not equipped with nuclear weapons. There are two important sentences in this point, and furthermore we must have a structure that it cannot be considered as a threat. Let us take for an example our aircraft. We could make them longer but the flying characteristics of that aircraft will not change. In fact it will improve a little bit. But by making it longer we will have considerably longer endurance and we say this is not necessary. For defence purposes in Sweden we have enough endurance of that aircraft and by making better endurance it could be considered that it would be a weapon carrier of some sort outside the border of Sweden and consequently we take this line of action and that is if you go through the whole of our defence you will find that there is nothing which can be considered as to be used more or less in an attack on another country.

And then the national defence can be too strong. That the value of the advantages, one or the other great blocs wishes to steal by concentrating marginal resources against us, would not be compatible with the resource losses which would be the result of such an attack against Sweden. The two power blocs can thereby restrain from attacking the country and we have this requirement that there is no doubt that we have such a strong defence so it will not, if I may use another term which probably is not proper in this connection, but does express it, it will not pay off to attack us. It will cost them too much for the advantages they will gain to do it and we consider that we have such a defence. Up to now you have, I hope, realized that I have rational reasons and tried to be as helpful in a logical and rational way. Because we have considered that even in a war there is anyhow some sort, something of a rational state. But this last point, on a rational thinking should, of course, by the potential enemies lead to a conclusion that they knew worthwhile attacking Sweden. But this last point even takes the irrational into consideration one could say. The national defence shall be so built up in such a way as to make a tough and persistent resistance possible if in spite of our will for peace and declared neutrality we are nevertheless attacked and consequently we both have a defence at the borders, shall we say, and a deep defence. We cannot have one or the other. We need both types. Well I thought that it might be good to

go through the entire position of the three security policies which lead to our foreign policy, foreign policy line of action and to our defence policy line of action. And, of course, after if there is any questions I will be very pleased to answer them. And I leave now the work to Mr. Dahlberg who is head of the Planning Section, Planning Bureau in the Defence Department.

Mr. Dahlberg: Gentlemen my object is to speak a little about Sweden's defence budget. Sweden is one of the two countries which did not disarm after the Second World War. In the main we kept up our organizations built up during the war. No great modifications were made prior to 1958. All the defence positions prior to 1958 fixed the expenditure only one year in advance of the time. The size of the defence budget remained about the same from year to year. As the general level of prices was steadily rising this meant that the fixed organization was being steadily undermined. The Defence Act passed by the Swedish parliament of 1958 demonstrates the fundamental change of policy as compared to its predecessors. It was the first multi-year defence act. The government deemed it necessary to introduce spending for several years in advance. This was in order to consolidate defence planning and bring the strength of our military defence up to date. This Defence Act of 1958 was based upon an agreement within the parliamentary committee on defence, between the foreign office and the parliament. This covered three years extending up to 1961. The Act defined the current budget for the fiscal years 1958-59. All the expenses were totalled to give a certain big sum. Two important modifications were introduced. It was decided to increase this big sum by two and a half per cent each year during the time of the Defence Act in order to compensate for the steady increase in expenditures due to technical developments. Moreover the real value of this basic allocation was to be kept constant by compensation for changes in prices and wages. The 1961 Act, Defence Act, was based on the recommendations of the 1960 Committee on Defence which was also a parliamentary committee. This Act covered two fiscal years up to and including 1963. This Defence Act confirms the principle which had been accepted by the 1958 parliament and also extended them. Not only the current budget but also the capital budget was now included.

In other words the 1961 Defence Act gave the Ministry of defence a joint financial plan

for the current and capital budget. The 1963 Defence Act was based on the recommendations of the 1962 Committee on Defence. The financial allocation for defence was extended to cover four years up to and including the fiscal year 1966-67, and again confirmed the principles which have been accepted by the 1968 Parliament, i.e., a yearly increase by $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent due to technical development and compensation for changes in prices and budgets. The 1968 Defence Act covers also four years. It gave us however the three main aspects from the previous three Defence Acts, firstly there is no four-party political agreement behind the Act. It was impossible to get political unanimity on the defence expenditure within the 1965 Committee of Defence appointed to prepare the Defence Act following the 1963 Defence Act. The three opposition parties did not agree upon the suggestions worked out by the representatives of the majority and the government party the Social Democrats. The Act is consequently based on the government proposals only.

The second difference is that there is no compulsory increment by a certain percentage due to technical development as it was before by the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent yearly increase.

The third, and I would say main difference is the way in which the expenditures for a four year period were worked out. The committee first calculated the amount of money needed to meet already-made engagements and other commitments, e.g., normal yearly basic and refresher training of general conscripts, service for about 50,000 persons serving in the forces of this non-commissioned officers and civilian personnel. Further maintenance of war materials in stock and in use and payments for already ordered but not delivered war materials. Expenditure on these objects were, as I said, calculated and called basic military defence expenditures.

This picture shows the calculated need of sums for these basic expenditures. As you can see from the picture the amounts needed are decreasing through the four year period which is quite natural because payments for already ordered material will decrease at the end of this year.

The next step—This is Swedish million kroner, 70,742 million kroner which means, divided by about 5 to get American dollars—by 4 it is?

The next step we are defining the total expenditure on military defence was to estimate the needed complements to acquire a satisfactory balance within the armed forces and to create a freedom of action in the long run, either to increase or decrease the organization in various ways. The complementary defence expenditures for military purposes are estimated as shown on this picture. These figures are also in million kroner. The first object is something for the development of aircraft, 47 million, a reconnaissance version. The second object—development of our defence systems, either surface for our missiles or our aircraft fighter interceptions.

The third object—the development of aircraft, 47, a reconnaissance version and further aircraft, 47, a strike attack version and also for the development of a missile.

The fourth object—Completion air defence command systems, base systems, communications, etcetera. Then ammunition for the army, and then new standup vehicles, motorcycles, and for the army units, completion equipment for armoured brigades, completion equipment for infantry brigades, completion equipment for artillery and communication units which is also for the army, and then modernizing anti-aircraft artillery, and then general resource and development, and then miscellaneous.

The total military defence expenditure during the four year period will be as follows on this picture. This means the total figures will be 19,090,512 million kroner during the four year period.

Mr. Wahn: Excuse the interruption, Mr. Dahlberg but it is still an average of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Mr. Dahlberg: No one per cent. All these figures are calculated at price level May 1967, and the Defence Act also includes this time compensation for changes in prices and rates.

Can I have the next picture please?

This figure shows the rising trend of defence expenditure in current prices since 1958. You can see different Defence Acts, what they have meant. This is in current prices, the magnitude of this increase may seem alarming, expenditure has risen more than 90 per cent during the eleven years since 1958-59.

This picture relates military defence expenditures to the annual total budgetary expenditure and gross national product. You can

see the decrease in the proportion of the total budget allocated to military defence. It was 1.84 per cent for 58-59 but has fallen to estimated about 12.1 for 1969-70. However, this decrease is not, of course, really related to the strength of our defence. My just stating that a certain percentage of the national budget is devoted to defence expenditures is, of course, misleading. It does not convey an accurate picture of how strong our defence is or to what extent we need a defence. The expenditure on the basic pension scheme and on the whole educational system has also greatly increased, but this does not automatically imply that we need a stronger defence, i.e., keeping the same percentage of the total budget. I think you get a more realistic idea of defence expenditure when regarding its relation to the gross national product. Expenditure has risen very steeply as I mentioned before, more than 90 per cent, but so has the gross national product too. In 1958 our gross national product was 57,000 millions kroner, the figures for 1968 were 141,000 millions kroner. This represents an increase of 150 per cent. The result is that the percentage of the gross national product going to defence expenditure has decreased. It had fallen from 4.9 per cent 1958-59 to an estimated 3.8 per cent in 1969-70. For comparison I want to tell how defence expenditure has developed in other countries. The first row is the figure for defence expenditure in actual currency in the country's own currency. The second row for each country means defence expenditure as represented by gross national product, and then thirdly, the third row means defence expenditure per inhabitant in United States dollars. This is for Sweden, this is for the Balkans. 1967 is the last year which we have got figures for. This is from the OECD definition of gross national product which slightly differs from our own definition. This is the reason why the figures for the part of the gross national product differ slightly from the figure I showed just previously.

This figure shows and gives, I think, a more realistic idea of the trend of the defence expenditure in Sweden. The table shows the actual value in fixed prices for the annual expenditures from 1966-69 up to 1971-72. The last Defence Act, the 1968 Defence Agreement or Defence Act, covers these four years as you can see there is a small rise of 1 per cent. There is an increase of 1 per cent for the coming four years, in comparison to the 2½ per cent increase previously.

Between 35 and 40 per cent of total military defence expenditures is normally devoted to the purchase of new equipment. This table shows the defence expenditures through wages, purchases of equipment and miscellaneous. In comparison with foreign countries this procurement of equipment is fairly high and it is mainly due to Sweden having no standing forces. There is a decrease as you can see from the figures in the Tables. In 1958-59 we had 46.5 per cent for procurement of equipment. It has fallen now to 43.8 per cent. Of course we have noticed this and we are working to bring a proportion between consumption and investments; and the next figure we will show you in another way. If we split our budget into consumption and commitment. We have split the defence budget into two parts—first, consumption current consuming expenditures and under consumption we have training of already existing units, maintenance of equipment, fortifications and buildings. This takes 44 per cent of our budget. Then investments—besides investments in new equipment we invest in fortifications buildings, interceptors, and also research and development. For research and development from this figure you can see 10 per cent which is quite high. Totally we have 56 per cent for this investment in comparison with 44 per cent for consumption.

Major General Ljung will later talk more about the breakdown of the equipment. I would only like to show the next picture which shows that we have a very strong air force. These figures for combat aircraft in certain countries are coming from the *Military Balance* for 1969.

The United States Third Tactical Air Command has, of course, quite a few more combat aircraft. Thirdly, there is the figure given of \$12,500,000 and, then, of course there is the Soviet Union \$3,700 CVO, that means defence.

The two latest defence acts had also covered expenditure for civil defence purposes for a four year period. Grants will amount to about 600 million kroners. The civil defence forces comprise about 230,000 persons mainly women aged 16 to 67, and men 16 to 18 and 47 to 67. Purchases of equipment was \$200 million for these forces, which has been authorized during the recent four-year period.

The program for the construction of nuclear shelter centres is also financed under this heading. You will get more about this tomorrow I think on your program.

In 1969-70 civil defence expenditure will amount to the same volume as 1968-69 in real terms, that means about \$145 million dollars.

Economic defence is a term used to denote methods for maintaining economic activity in wartime. It includes the stocking of food and strategic material. From this picture you can see military defence for the next fiscal year, 5.370 million; civil defence 145 million kroners; economic defence 125 million kroners; miscellaneous 75 million kroners. That means that our various groups of items of a defence nature, e.g. psychological defence, the equipment of emergency hospitals for civilian use, and the development of certain communications. As you can see from this picture some 90 per cent of defence expenditure is devoted to military defence.

Finally I will table our central government's expenditures in the coming fiscal year. This is the block budget and the different objects are grouped according to its purpose. You will also see the changed figures in relation to the budget for the present year.

The Chairman: Major General Ljung.

Major General P. Ljung: Gentlemen, I am pleased to give you a sketch of the Swedish organization and the principles and comments on our military equipment.

My statement will follow the divisions shown by this picture. After my statement, representatives of the army, navy and air materiel department are prepared to answer your questions and if your time permits it, they are also prepared to show you some slides about some modern materiels produced in Sweden. A copy of my sketch also will be handed over to you.

This is the organization of the materiel procurement which has the materiel administration of the Swedish armed forces, the FMV in this organization.

Which is the organization of the material procurement and which position has the Materiel Administration of the Swedish Armed Forces (FMV)

The Materiel Administration of the Swedish Armed Forces is subordinated to the Swedish Government and carries out technical and economic activities necessary to provide the Armed Forces with ordnance and quartermaster materiel. The mission of the FMV is based on a Royal Instruction. In fulfilment of its mission the FMV shall follow the directives given by the Supreme Commander

of the Swedish Armed Forces and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Services concerning the respective activities.

As to development and long-range policy the FMV shall follow the directives for long-range planning given by the Supreme Commander and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Services.

In connection with procurement and maintenance etc. of ordnance and quartermaster materiel the FMV collaborates with other defence establishments: The Medical Board, the Royal Fortification Administration and the Civil Administration. The distribution of similar functions between the establishments is arranged in a way to take advantage of the total resources and competence in the best way.

As far as concerns studies and evaluation of new materiel and human engineering the FMV cooperates with the Research Institute of National Defence and the Institute of Military Psychology.

In the procurement and maintenance activities etc. the FMV also collaborates with interested domestic and foreign industries, which are to a great extent involved in the projecting and development activities and the manufacture.

Furthermore the FMV is responsible for the central management of all ordnance and quartermaster service as far as subordinated authorities are concerned.

Organization of the FMV

The FMV has a Management Board, with a Director General, as chairman of the Board, and at least six other members, specially appointed by the Government. The Director General, for the present S. Wahlin, is chief of the FMV. The FMV includes five main departments, the Army Materiel Department, the Naval Materiel Department, the Air Materiel Department, the Quartermaster Materiel Department and the Administrative Department.

The Director General and the chiefs of the main departments form the Management Council, dealing with and informing on questions concerning more than one main department.

Functions of the FMV

See fig.

Long-range planning

The King in Council stipulates the objective of the Defence and establishes the limits of the economic and personnel resources.

On the basis of the economic and personnel resources the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has strategic and technical makes up forecastings of the development of our own and that of the adversary for the planning period and carries out studies and evaluations of different alternatives for the organization of the armed Forces.

The studies and evaluations result in principles for defensive methods at the end of the planning period. These results are concentrated into directives to the Commanders-in-Chief for the continued development of the Defence. The directives result in a preparation by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective fields of responsibility of long-range plans for the wartime organization, and consequently long-range plans for peacetime organization, materiel, investment and personnel.

The long-range requirements plans of the Commanders-in-Chief are used as a basis for detailed materiel plans which are prepared at the FMV.

The Procurement Course

Procurement of materiel for the Armed Forces does not cover the purchase only but has a broader meaning. The different phases of the procurement course are seen on the picture.

Prior to projecting and ordering a series production of some extent the FMV must obtain the permission of the Government.

A very important basis of the cooperation between staff and administration are the tactical-technical-economic requirements, gradually drawn up in the course of the procurement, which define the more and more fixed requirements on the materiel to be procured.

Value of materiel procured during a 7-year period

The value of materiel procured during a 7-year period is seen on this picture. Actually the principal part of the procurement is applied to aircraft materiel.

Annual costs of materiel and maintenance and value of available materiel

The annual costs of materiel procurement and maintenance is seen on the upper part of this picture.

The value of the available materiel is accounted for at the bottom.

Where is the materiel procured

The FMV has no industries of its own but procures the materiel at domestic or foreign industries. The approximate percentage distribution of the materiel procurement is seen on this picture. About 15% of our materiel is procured either directly or indirectly through Swedish sub-contractors.

Which are the basic principles for materiel procurement?

The procurement of materiel covers not only purchase but also research, development, design and questions connected therewith, e.g. the rights of ownership and use of designs and licence agreements.

The 1952 Government purchasing proclamation applies to all government purchases. It says among other things that the offer totally seen most favourable to the Government has to be accepted. In this respect no preference is given to Swedish products rather than to foreign ones.

As to procurement of standard materiel competition is as a rule prevailing, in most cases facilitating a good result, technically as well as economically. In order to take advantage of the competition possibilities market researches are carried out.

For procurement in case there is no competition the Royal Ministry of Defence has in 1968 issued directives for procurement of defence materiel. According to these directives cost contracts with variable profit have to be drawn up in absence of competition. The fundamental idea is to obtain the best product on conditions most favourable to the Government through suitable forms of agreement e.g. by giving the contractor higher percentage profit at lower costs of the order.

Development of our own or purchase from abroad?

Estimation of the fields within which we should not carry out a development of our own but depend purchase from abroad or manufacture under licence has to be made in each specific case.

The decisive factors not to pursue development of our own seem to be the following:

When we are aware that development abroad is going on to such an extent that a safe procurement situation results without our activity in the field, and when we are

expected to have safe possibilities to buy the materiel to be developed.

When the development costs required for a development in Sweden seem to be disproportionately large in relation to the series costs, or when the development costs seem to be so large, that they cannot at all be included in our budget.

When our resources within the country of research scientists, technicians and manpower do not cover the requirements in order to develop a project within the time required and with necessary safety.

When procurement from abroad can be made without repercussion on the confidence in our policy of non-alignment.

The materiel of which we *should* carry out development of our own and manufacture within the country seems above all to be the following:

Materiel, that cannot be purchased from abroad for purposes of security (e.g. jamming, jamming protection, crypto and electronic intelligence equipment).

Materiel that has to be particularly designed considering our geographical and climatological conditions and our military service system.

Materiel of which war production is necessary and where a development of our own is a condition for the production.

Materiel influencing the tables of organization

(a) of such importance, that we dare not await a possible foreign development with the risk of being without materiel at a point of time when need arises according to our war organization plans,

(b) concerning which we cannot—considering possible aggravation of the world situation susceptible of rendering impossible planned import of war materiel, or considering our policy of non-alignment—make ourselves all too dependent of procurement from abroad.

Certain development resources may also need to be assigned in order to create such a volume of knowledge that materiel purchased from abroad can be received and maintained in a rational manner, and that we can appear as competent buyers.

Within the country resources for long-range planning, studies and research and for development and manufacture of war materiel are

required. We must be able to develop and maintain a defence of such a technical standard, extent and preparedness that the non-alignment policy and the system of military service defence, demobilized in times of peace, achieve their war-abstaining function. Functions of the Materiel Administration of the Armed Forces

The Functions of the Materiel Administration of the Armed Forces are given in a Royal Ordinance.

The materiel administration shall within its responsibility:

- Procure materiel and other supplies
- See that the supplies are suitable and serviceable and stored in a proper way
- Follow the technical development, analyse materiel collected and provide information in this respect

The materiel administration of the armed forces shall follow:

The directives of the supreme commander of the armed forces

- In order that the functions of the administration shall satisfy
- The operational activity
- Concerning long range planning
- Concerning budget proposals

The directions of the Commander-in-Chief

- In order that the functions of the administration shall satisfy the activity connected with mobilization, training, tactics, organization, equipment and personnel, directed by the commander-in-chief
- Concerning budget proposals

Basic Principles for Materiel Procurement

The 1952 Government purchasing proclamation states

- that the most favourable offer to the Government totally seen shall be accepted
- that no preference shall be given to Swedish products rather than foreign ones

Creation of competition situations through among other things market researches

The 1968 directives for procurement of defence materiel in absence of competition,

- cost contracts with variable profit, that is to say higher percentage profit at lower costs of the order.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman. In the original presentation to us, a matter came up that I would like to enquire into. The NATO doctrine seems, unless it was recently modified, seems to have been that the strength of the USSR in conventional weapons is so overwhelming that any all-out attack, or any major attack, might have to be met very early by use of tactical nuclear weapons or at least deferred by the possession of tactical nuclear weapons by the NATO forces. I understand that Sweden has deliberately opted against the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. I would like to enquire as to why and wonder whether it is because you reject the soundness of the NATO doctrine or because you feel that either the political or military situation in Sweden makes that NATO doctrine inapplicable?

Mr. Dahlberg: I should not, of course, discuss the applicability of the NATO doctrine. But in our opinion for the Swedish defence system, we feel that even the use of tactical atomic weapons will not hit Sweden in the beginning of the stages and we also feel that we have such defence that we are prepared, we can resist even such limited numbers of tactical weapons, but we feel that we do not need to have such weapons for our defence purposes. And we have felt that the contribution we could make politically in this respect is to say that we will not arm our forces with nuclear weapons and so we have done.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Wahn.

Mr. Wahn: It is apparent that the Swedish air force is a very large defensive air force. I wondered if you could tell us just how you would anticipate it would be used. In Canada we have been told that the Russian bomber threat is a decreasing threat and I am interested in knowing just how this very large and presumably very efficient Swedish air force will be used in the event of war.

Mr. Ohlede: Well, the main force—our air force—is, of course, mainly air defence, but a part of it is attack aircraft. We feel that up to now we have had a very very great part for air defence, but just now we are reconsidering a little bit. We have a special committee working on the air defence problem and also what is indicated here by Mr. Dahlberg in our budget that we will consider the mix between air defence aircraft and missiles and see what will come out of that. I cannot say now if we will change very drastically the

amount of air defence aircraft. I will certainly wait for that committee to come up with its considerations before any decision on this subject is taken. One reason for having this committee just now is the following; that I do not know if you know, that the main body of air defence aircraft has dropped just now—the Swedish Dragon as it was just named recently. And we have now gone into making this big aircraft—the Thunderbolt—and this is a platform aircraft for three purposes. It is a platform for a tank aircraft, for reconnaissance and for air defence purposes. The decision to continue—and we have decided now to go on with the test version and the reconnaissance version and a decision is to be taken on the air defence version, must be taken, early in March 1971. There, the government, based on what the Committee finds and also, of course, other considerations, has to say if there will be a beginning of this version and if so how many. I cannot state here how many aircraft we will go into in the future, but today we have this many.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: I was particularly struck by the low percentage of your total military cost devoted to personnel. It is the exact reverse of our situation in Canada. That leads me to ask what percentage of your military personnel are permanent force or regular soldiers, sailors and airmen, and what is the general rate of payment for your conscriptive personnel?

Mr. Dahlberg: As I mentioned before, we have around 50,000 persons in the service who are commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and civilian personnel. They are paid at the same level as civilians. The conscriptive personnel are paid around \$1 a day during their first training period which is about nine months. Then, of course, it differs between the services. In the air force most of the people are commissioned people—pilots: Also in the navy there is a large proportion of serving people, but in the army, in the field of artillery, I think there is about 85 per cent which is conscript.

Mr. Harkness: What is the total size of your forces?

Mr. Dahlberg: The wartime forces?

Mr. Harkness: I mean in relation to this budget.

Mr. Dahlberg: The budget as such for personnel is 50,000 people in the armed forces. They are employed by the regular forces—50,000.

Mr. Harkness: In the regular force.

Mr. Dahlberg: That is just the regular force. And every year we educate 50,000 boys so that is the combined forces, 100,000 I should say in peacetime. During war, the forces are considerably greater, but I consider that we would have a greater budget in a war.

The Chairman: Are you finished, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: I have another question but perhaps I will wait till the second round.

The Chairman: All right. Mr. Groos?

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if our host would be kind enough, I was very interested in that projection he had on the screen of the OECD figures for various countries, and I wondered if perhaps we could see that again.

In the meantime perhaps while they are looking that up, I could ask a short question. I would be interested in hearing something about the Institute of Military Psychology. It is a new type of institute to me; certainly the name is new. I wonder if someone could tell me what goes on there?

Major General Ljung: One of their missions is to help us. And for the right education of them we must have a correct place for them in our educational system. We make tests and those tests are constructed by individuals for psychology.

Mr. Groos: Thank you very much. I think that explains it. I had not run across the expression before and I see now what the purpose is. Thank you.

The Chairman: Are we ready with the map now?

Mr. Dahlberg: For the reason, that we are only 8 million people, we are rather high compared with some others.

Mr. Groos: What confused me was when I saw the U.S. dollars and the Swedish budget of almost five times. I see, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt? Then Mr. Guay.

Mr. Nesbitt: Most of my questions have been answered by our very excellent host, but I still have two very brief ones that I would like to ask if I might. In your military costs do you include for accounting purposes, the cost of, say, roads, airfields and even perhaps some merchant shipping that you would not ordinarily construct but that would perhaps serve both a military and civilian purpose?

Mr. Dahlberg: I should say the following in reply to this question: as you have probably heard, we use our big roads to a certain extent as airstrips and runways during the war. This is planned and preplanned and made an arrangement around these routes and in some part they may be strengthened due to this fact but very limited, but there are arrangements where such things are paid but not the roads themselves. Of course, of the merchant ships we had very few merchant ships with billets for military purposes, but there are some ferry ships which go between the islands where we can have them prepared by putting rails on them rapidly for the navy. And, of course, if there is any additional cost in this respect we pay them and also prepare for these rails to have them ready.

Mr. Nesbitt: But all these costs are included in your military budget and not included elsewhere?

Mr. Dahlberg: That is included in the military budget.

Mr. Nesbitt: My only other question is perhaps not too important but I believe it was the information that the General gave us a little while ago that 11 per cent of war materials was secured from abroad while 65 per cent was secured directly from Swedish manufacturing firms. Do you have any idea of what percentage of materials that these manufacturing firms use would come from abroad?

Mr. Dahlberg: Well, this is very difficult to speak generally about, because if you go for instance to an aircraft you will find, for instance, some very important parts may be made in foreign countries or even licences obtained. The Legion aircraft, for instance, we have a Pratt and Whitney engine, Pratt and Whitney basically but it is built on licence in Sweden and also modified for our purposes. It may differ, I should say, from zero or up to about—could you give some figure?

Major General Ljung: We did a case study based on the 1958 budget and I think, if I remember rightly, that 35 per cent was made in Sweden and 65 per cent came from abroad.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Deputy Minister, in Canada we do not have compulsory military training and some people have advocated it over the years, others are against it. You stated in your presentation that a principle of compulsory military service was a fundamental democratic principle. Could you explain that statement a little, please?

Mr. Ohlede: Yes, I added though, "in my opinion" because there can be many opinions about it. For me, as I stated, defence must be the case for the people—for the people themselves. In my opinion, if we build a democratic country where the people shall have a right to say how this country shall look and take an active part in it, they must then get the feeling that this country will accept themselves as being able to build—is worthwhile defending and with that background feeling that it is worthwhile defending this country they shall in my opinion also take an active part in the defence of the country and as a consequence of this I feel from the logic that it must be logical that they really have compulsory military service. Surely they have a real interest to defend this country.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): You do not feel that this would be done as well by a voluntary service?

Mr. Ohlede: No, from the democratic point of view, from my democratic feeling and opinion I feel not.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I have one other question if I may, Mr. Chairman. In Canada we have gone through the unification and integration of our armed services. Have you thought of that here? Are you planning anything such as this, or have you looked at our set up?

Mr. Ohlede: In some ways we were ahead of Canada in this respect although we did not go so far. We can say we have a Supreme Commander which really, first of all we have, all the plans for the war situation are under him and he has six military districts or what you want to call them where we appoint one as the military chief and he commands all three forces in that area and the Supreme Commander commands the entire three forces which we call the chief of the navy, the chief of the army and the chief of the air force;

they are in fact only chiefs during peace time. They are what you could call in Canada chiefs of operations revue. They are just educating the people in peacetime and in wartime they are not acting as chief of the army, chief of the navy and chief of the air force.

May I say in this respect we have been earlier than Canada although we still have to name a chief of the army, a chief of the air force and navy. Therefore, it is just in peacetime and we prepare for war in another way. On the materiel command side, the materiel command department, we did just one year ago combine the three army materiel commands, navy materiel command and air force materiel command and navy department into one single unit—although you have them in a single unit with Maj. Gen. Ljung. We have gone there as well as you have in my opinion.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you very much.

Mr. Ohlede: But we have not the same uniform. I think the navy uniform is nice.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: If you have not been in a war for over 150 years and you belong to no military alliances how do you keep in touch with modern military techniques and tactics? Do you have exchanges or observers with other countries who have been involved and are involved to a greater extent?

Mr. Ohlede: Yes, we have had peace for 150 years and of course that is a basis anyhow for our thinking, but we chose what we have chosen. I do not think military tactics are secrets. We have exchanged with our officers visiting foreign countries—there are exchanges of views and the military schools—I have visited military schools in all the different countries and I do not think anything can be kept secret in military strategy or military tactics, but perhaps Gen. Ljung can give some idea in more detail than I.

Maj. Gen. Ljung: I do not think so, but I just want to add that we have to pay a lot more for a system, studying the problems, and material problems in nations who have wartime experience.

Mr. Allmand: The same would be true as to technology I suppose.

Maj. Gen. Ljung: Yes, you exchange information and technology.

Mr. Ohlede: Then I will add that we have had Swedish boys out in the United Nations forces and seen how they acted there and we have heard that they behave and act just as good as any other nation. There is no problem in that connection.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: I would like to ask some questions of the General, or anyone else really and if it is a little uncomfortable I do not intend it to be. I was interested General when you were giving us your outline that at one point you said something like the following: You said:

We evaluate and forecast our own situation and the situation of the adversary.

I am pretty sure those are your words and in view of your policy when NATO members make that kind of evaluation the adversary is very well known. It is the Warsaw Pact and I was seriously interested in knowing what you meant when you said that you were evaluating the situation of the adversary. Who in your estimation is the adversary?

Mr. Ohlede: It is necessary for me to say that you know the adversary. We have to stand against both forces, but we are limited and we have to begin with one of them and it is up to you to decide which one.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: As a matter of fact General mine is almost a supplementary now. I have two questions I hope you can give me the answers to. One, as I say is almost supplementary, although you recognize that the military policy and strategy is governed by your domestic and your foreign policy. First to have a strong military as a justification for maintaining your neutrality. You have also said for a defence. Defence means aggression from outside. Do you actually in the back of your mind from a military point of view on defence operate on the basis that in that eventuality you are under the rim of the NATO umbrella and being a democratic country—a Western power country if I can put it that way—I would anticipate that they would immediately come to your aid. From a military point of view.

Mr. Ohlede: My reply is the following: we do not build up and I thought I stressed that very strongly, build up our defence, meaning that we shall get aid from west or east. We do not say that we are under the NATO umbrella. We can say we are within the

nuclear umbrella of both parties. We calculate on the balance of power. I mean, I will supplement that and here we have to consider an attack from one or the other side. We can construct an attack from the south. Who is in the south, we do not know. It can be just south on the map or there can be others in the south that are just sitting there now. They can be from the east in a certain situation, from the west, those who have the real power in the south. You know what it was during the last war when Germany was sitting on the west of us.

There can be all combinations of possibilities and there is nothing which I thought I expressed very clearly that we do not consider morally involved in this security thought. It goes—I can see where some fights for his life when it is east or west. We can be under pressure both from the East and the West. In the north and the south it is obvious we can be. It is only and our purpose is to build up the defence so the west believes definitely that the Swedish defence is so strong that the Russians will not attack Sweden and consequently we have no fear that the Russians will manage to come over the Baltic Straits or attack over the north and vice versa.

The Russians must feel that we are so strong and to our willingness we will defend ourselves so they feel sure that the opposite will not occur. Even in a war situation both powers are fighting for their life or death and must be in a situation where there really is a balance of power so they will not put any forces into an area where it is not absolutely needed for their self defence. That is on the assumption which we build our defence on.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, just a brief question for purposes of clarification. You mentioned and I think you called it a platform which is capable of reconnaissance, attack and defence. I am not quite certain what that is. Would you mind giving me the details.

Mr. Ohlede: Yes, I talked about the present aircraft which we now have started production on. The Swedish name of this aircraft is Veegan, translated into English it means approximately Thunderbolt. This aircraft is an aircraft, is a platform of the basic structure of the aircraft itself. So we can make this aircraft in three versions. One version which we have already decided upon is the attack version—the strike version and the second version which we have also decided upon is the reconnaissance version of this aircraft.

We have the engines, the body, it is only to change the equipment in the aircraft and made slight modification for such a version. The third version of this aircraft will probably be—as I say the decision has to be taken in 1971 on this. It will probably be an air defence aircraft—the interceptor.

Mr. Winch: Its basic composition is adaptable to all three and I presume it must be...

Mr. Ohlede: And it is the third generation of JET aircraft which we have succeeded. To give you a figure of the development costs of this aircraft, if you want to hear that figure. It is a very high cost when we talk of a little country like Sweden, but internationally it is a very very low cost. So when Englishmen were over here and I gave them the cost, they hardly believed me. And, also the Americans have a very difficult time to believe the cost. But it is definitely true what I said to you now, definitely true. That it costs us \$1,700 million Swedish kroner to develop this aircraft and the production is now started and is, I should say, the first really modern aircraft in this area which is flying in the western world today.

The Chairman: Well that is the end of the first round of questioners, we have two more on the second round but I would like to advise the Committee that we have possibly 10 minutes of fine slides that we can look forward to and I ask that on the second round of questions that you be brief if possible. Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: There are 2 questions I would like to ask, one which is really a follow-up one. We have found in Canada that our research and development costs for the more sophisticated modern weapons is getting beyond us and my question really is, how do you manage to keep your costs down for research and development for something such as this jet aircraft that you have been talking about.

Mr. Ohlede: Well, to this aircraft, first of all I must say the following: First of all we had good technicians, of course, the second is, which I think is very proper and correct to state that we were helped from the beginning with our limitations, if you understand what I mean. Limitations and capabilities and limitations in money and consequently we did not that is to say dream for the moon, that is, what we consider will be the possibilities of Sweden to develop. And if by some other

project abroad, in my opinion has possibly tried to reach the moon, well now they have reached the moon, but this is little—and they are not defeated and I think a realistic view means one thing and I also say that traditions, a very good tradition in Swedish technology in the field where we have built aircrafts a long time ago and done more or less of a continuous program with highly skilled workers and scientific people, has lead to this and then I must add we have had a share of, very, very good luck as well and that, touch on wood, that is probably the one thing which has helped. I mean the conception of a vision is the construction, it was unique in one way and also the biggest is a double wing. Well I must say that the future is a little bit cumbersome, we have to really look into this, if we can continue with these high costs. But I would dare to say here that we can or that we cannot, put that is my answer. It is cumbersome in this field and there is one thing more which I want to add. When you talk about the basis of production, it has always been the trouble in our general industries, of course today. Sweden is a small country and it cannot produce cheap because it cannot have the long series of production. But if you see the number of aircrafts down here, you can see that we do not have the short series of production. We are, in fact, almost in the group being the third in the world in production of aircraft and so we have had a long series of production and we have—this is a typical example, where we say try to make a platform for three purposes not to split this so we have kept up with that.

Mr. Harkness: My other question was, what are you doing, if anything in regards to chemical, and bacteriological warfare?

Mr. Ohlede: Well it is a very difficult question in many ways. But I would say the following that there has been much talk about chemical and bacteriological warfare but a fact, if you go back in history, a lot of these chemical things although there has been bacteriological things has been worse now than ever before but it was not really used as you say in the second as in the first world war. It was not used in the second world war and it is not, in my opinion, considered really to be used if, God forbid, there should be a third war. Because the risk for the other side, a realistic risk, and therefore I think they would hesitate indeed to start such a war and, in the escalation principles I do not find where this escalation would come in and cer-

tainly not in connection with Sweden because if there should be an attack on Sweden this very territory or for strategic reasons and no one as I said and we feel will have Sweden, want Sweden, it is just in the strategic sense they want to acquire and I think that it would be a very, very unrealistic war, if they do this, all right, but we have, I would like to add, we are working hard between what is the name, protection act in our scientific laboratories.

An hon. Member: In other words, sir, whatever I say, you will carry on and this is why you are building in a defensive nature.

Mr. Ohlede: Definitely defensive.

An hon. Member: Mr. Chairman, we spoke earlier on in the day about peace keeping duties and we have been associated with Swedish forces in peacekeeping duties many, many times and, the point has often occurred to me that when we go in, I would just like to put this question to our host. That when we send, when the United Nations send peacekeeping forces to separate regions really you—solve only one half of the equation, the second half is how do you get out of there, and I would think that the time has come when people who have, such as our two countries, have the experience in taking part in peacekeeping operations, should sit down and consider this problem whether there is some economic way out that we should commence as soon as we get into such an operation, or perhaps something else and I throw this out just as an idea because it is a long way when we walk in there. We do not know how long it is going to take and we really do not seem to have any plan of getting out.

Mr. Ohlede: Well, I can answer this question a little more sophisticated. Of course, someone is talking of war and when we do not know how to come out of it that has been the trouble in many cases. If we can go on preventing a war and we feel that all right, it will be difficult to come out of it. This is in my opinion a less concern. We can remain for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years and you know the situation in the United Nations that even if it is basically healthy that policy that all other nations not participating should pay for this. You know as well as I that they have not got paid. They have got some paid but not to the fuller extent. But I think that—I do not think first of all quite honestly that we can sit down and write under which circumstances we can jump out of it. We can sit down and write

down rules when we can jump in that possibly is all right, but we cannot write rules when to strike back with our forces, and this is a difficult problem but I think it must be handled in the United Nations together with the United Nations and not by a separate country. Of course, I must say both Canada and Sweden and all the others have of course the right to take home their forces whenever they like, that is always one of the requisites before we enter because, the political situation may change so rapidly that we do not feel that it is in the interest of peace, or in the political situation of the world that will remain there with our forces as you might well understand. But, all right, I do not think we can write rules when to take them out.

An hon. Member: I think, Mr. Chairman, I would not like my question to be misinterpreted as there is no one more in favour of the United Nations peacekeeping forces than myself. What I had intended to suggest was that perhaps with the experience we have now had, it might be a useful exercise to sit down and see if there were not some constructive measures that we could take as we go into a country to try and create and help create conditions which would make it over a long time easier for us to withdraw.

Mr. Ohlede: Well, it may be an idea. I think that it may be an idea and I think it can be taken up by Sweden or by you or we can discuss it. There is you know possibilities of a Committee of the United Nations which can take this up. I can guarantee you that if Canada put it into constructive means it would be considered by Sweden and we will take part in the construction itself.

The Chairman: Thank you. We can go on then now with the next subject. Major General Ljung will present the slides that he has.

Major General Ljung: Yes, we have the slides, to show if you are interested about our modern Swedish forces. Here you have the anti-tank missile. It is in service with our armed brigade. It has a range 400 to about 2,500. It can be carried by one man and it penetrates about 20 inches. It is sold to Switzerland. Here you have our most modern anti-tank weapon. It is the light anti-tank weapon, and is entering service as a squad of anti-tank weapons in our brigades. It weighs 6 lbs., its firing range is about 200 yards against moving targets. The minimum is the short weapon with a high explosive hand grenade.

Our modern main tank is the S tank. It is developed and manufactured in Sweden.

It is entering service with our armoured brigade. Its weight is about 86,000 pounds. Its armament is the 105 millimeter high velocity automatic gun and the machine guns, and its crew is only three men.

An hon. Member: Who are the three men?

Major General Ljung: One of them is the chief of corps, one is the driver and one is the operator of the guns but that is the best concept of this modern tank. Everyone of them can operate all three duties from his place. The same person can drive the tank and can fire the gun. It is an automatic gun therefore you need no loader for it.

Mr. Harkness: You have 360 degrees of traverse with this gun? It is a fixed gun?

Major Gen. Ljung: It is a fixed gun. Forgetting the low silhouette and forgetting the highest possibility to protect against shot, you have to have a very very low silhouette and you have very flat armour in it, and for special work you have to have a fixed gun and you have a system directing the gun which is done by levering or lowering the whole (car).

Mr. Harkness: How do you hit your target if the car is moving? As an old gunner I look on this with suspicion.

Maj. Gen. Ljung: You can see you have a Centurion tank and you have an "S" tank and I suppose if you are a gunner—and if you are an old gunner and you are a thousand yards in that direction which target will you hit first—the Centurion or the "S" tank?

An hon. Member: There is no question about that!

Maj. Gen. Ljung: The thing is that the whole vehicle can move around as quickly as you move the towers and you can adjust the gun and you also have a longer gun which will give you a longer shot and you can move exactly as you move a Centurion tank—you move the tower—the whole gun and the tank can be driven as far backwards as forwards. It does not matter. There is just one limitation you cannot shoot with the gun while you are driving. With a Centurion tank you can shoot when you are driving. You can do that with the "S" tank but the velocity of the direction is the same as the tower tank.

Mr. Harkness: How fast is the tower tank?

Maj. Gen. Ljung: It is 30 miles per hour and the velocity afloat is 4 miles per hour.

Here you have our modern armoured personnel carrier. It is developed and manufactured by Egmont. Its weight is about 30,000 pounds, its armament is shown on the slide.

Maj. Gen. Ljung: Here you can see our modern self-propelled 155 guns, manufactured by the force which are in service. Its weight is 110,000 pounds. The gun has a calibre of 155 mms, is automatic with 14 round magazines. Its firing range is about 15 miles and its firing rate is rather high.

Here you have our other carrier. It is in service with our brigades in the northern part of Sweden where it is an extremely good cross-country vehicle and its mobility is most valuable. Its weight is about 9,000 lbs. Its carrying capacity is 1,800 lbs or eight soldiers. It has a towing capacity of a mortar and an anti-tank gun or about 15 skiing soldiers. Its velocity on the road is 25 miles an hour and up north its velocity is 1 mile per hour.

It floats without special preparations. It has been sold to Norway and to the United Kingdom. This shows our transceiver radio set, a lightweight radio used in our brigades and our reconnaissance units. Its weight is only 15 pounds. Its range is about 8 miles and it operates with nearly 1000 channels.

Commodore Lindquist: We have during the last years ordered the building of submarines, torpedo boats and minesweepers. We have also bought helicopters and we have under construction a mine-layer which is a submarine shape. There are submarines which are under delivery, we are building five of them, three are delivered, two will be delivered this year. The submarine has a submerged displacement of about 1,100 tons. It is armed with torpedo tubes of 21 inch size and it has conventional diesel electric machinery, that is in every respect very modern. This is the latest torpedo boat.

It has displacement of about 200 pounds. It is armed with six torpedo tubes, 21 inches, and has an aircraft gun of 57 millimeters. The boat is driven by three gas turbines with three propellers and has a speed of about 40 knots.

We are designing a new type to this but with a more modern gun. Now there is another picture of the same boat. These torpedo boats have very good maneuverability and very good sea thickness.

We have built 12 minesweepers of this model with a displacement of about 315 pounds and a length of 145 feet. They have been in wood with laminated parts glued together in order to have a light hull. All equipment is made of anti-magnetic material to a large extent. The main machinery is not 100 per cent anti-magnetic but they are of a good design.

The Swedish board of shipping and navigation is building an ice-breaker of this size. She will be delivered this autumn from a shipyard in Firth in England. She has four propellers together with 12,000 horsepower. Some of our destroyers are armed with ship to ship missiles 508 and this map shows the installation on board. It is a homing missile constructed by France and manufactured here in Sweden. It is a long range missile and we are now interested in missiles with a range of about 50,000 metres intended for smaller ships.

Though I have no slides of it I may mention that for the new series of the torpedo boats we are now constructing a 57 millimeter gun with a firing rate of 200 rounds per minute. Our torpedo boats and also our destroyers and submarines are armed with two types of modern torpedos. Mark 61 which is a guided torpedo and Mark 41 which is a homing torpedo. Type 41 is also intended to be used from helicopters.

I now pass to artillery where we have evidence of various capital labours in fortifications and also in mobile installations. Our light coast artillery is now modernized. We have 7.5 millimeter guns in fortifications, specially constructed to resist the effects of nuclear weapons. The 508 is used in the coast artillery as well as on board the destroyers and here we see the missile and its launching ramp. The coast artillery also uses small guided missiles of the types SS11 and SS12 from France.

And I will pass to Major General Oeliden, Air Materiel Department.

Major General Oeliden: This aircraft has a very high speed at low levels. It weighs about 12 to 15 tons and the thrust of the engine is about 6,700 and with an afterburner of about 12 points. It is a single seater and it has got rather sophisticated equipment to help the pilot with his navigation and for his shooting with guns, rockets and missiles. We have the cunard wing to get very good aerodynamic effectiveness and to get low speed and good

handling during landing and even during the sonic region. We operate from a short radius and will be stressing the short take-off and landing. We even have a rather unique system for stopping even when the runways are slippery. As you see we have used the same double configuration. Then we have armament and I will show you some of it later. This is a missile, of low altitude and mostly for ships. This is a missile from aircraft to ground targets and it is steered by the pilot. This is the brain in the aircraft. It is a digital-computer and it is the pilot for all things, calculating the course, the fuel consumption and so on.

There is some more representation. It is the radio equipment and navigational equipment. This is the rocket part.

For this fighter aircraft, we started development in 1955 and ceased production in 1960 and then we have developed the weapons system from rather simple fighter equipment until the last version which is equipped with missiles and good radar and site equipment. This is the main fighter in the Swedish Air Force. This is an integrated display U35.

And now we have a trainer version, it is a 105. It is a twin engine aircraft and its main purpose is for training the pilots. They will only fly about 25 hours in the prop aircraft, after that they go on to the jet aircraft for the training. We can have some with missiles, even guns, and then we have the reconnaissance version with cameras. Then to complete the system we have a rather good I think air defence system with radar and all that and from centres to lead all the aircraft systems and the missile systems too. If it will interest you, we have some pamphlets we can give you afterwards to know more about this aircraft.

The Chairman: Well, that will conclude this afternoon's proceedings. I would just like before we close to thank you Mr. Ohlede and Mr. Dahlberg and Major General Ljung, and your assisting officers, very very much indeed for this very fine presentation that you have given us. It certainly added to our education and you have left us, I think, rather gasping with the amount that a small nation such as Sweden can do in the realm of independent defence. Your manufacturing techniques must be magnificent to produce all these weapon carriers that we have seen produced on your slides. Thank you very very much.

Mr. Ohlede: Thank you. I will only add that it has been a real pleasure for us to be here

with you and I regret very deeply that your stay here in Sweden will be so short. It should have been a very great pleasure for us to show you part of our defence plant and also the manufacturing processes, and to see how our interests are met there, but I imagine your time is unfortunately so short that you cannot do this. However, before you leave we have some pamphlets here which you can get. First of all we have the Swedish produce, the total Swedish produce in all branches in English, and you can read there especially about defence but also about other parts of Swedish produce. We have here also a pamphlet "The Total Defence of Sweden". You will also find some pictures with our equipment for the Navy and also an explanation of how we can go as you know into the rocks with our Navy. And we have also other papers written in the French language which can be delivered. I hope you will read it and I think you can get some new information about us which we did not have time to give you here.

The Chairman: With respect to the Swedish budget, we have only 12 copies of it so I would suggest that we give them to our clerk and any party that wants a copy ask him for it. Is that agreed? Well if there is no further business let us adjourn.

Roserberg, Sweden,

Tuesday, March 18, 1969.

Mr. L. Sundelin (Director General, Civil Defence Department): To Swedish people Canada is a country of resources, all the abundant richness of the land with a people full of daring. I imagine that Sweden as a country to most Canadians is a country of a long-forgotten phase of Vikings, of a history which is not much past the 17th century and people who are unhappy to the limit of suicide, until they settle down in Manitoba or Alberta. It is a pity that you do not give us an opportunity to show you a little more of Sweden. Could it be that such a short stay as this one which is in Sweden should be called a French visit. Anyhow, we are happy to see you here and we are very anxious to make this short hour worthwhile and Mrs. Lindstrom will start with a briefing on the outlines of our organization and system. You have one hour for questions and we have a meal which I certainly hope you will not compare to what the Ambassador gave you yesterday.

20553—7

Mrs. I. Lindblom, First Secretary: Civil defence in Sweden has as in all countries short traditional background. We can look back on only 30 years of activities, but unlike other countries, with first-hand experience Sweden has continued since 1937 with its uninterrupted civil defence work. Civil defence is led from the civil defence administration. The Board is responsible to the King in Council and specifically to the Minister of Defence. The administration underlines in its declaration of policies that its organization is civilian and humanitarian. That its main thought is to protect and save human lives and property, no matter if the country is attacked by conventional or nuclear weapons. We believe that if civil defence measures fail, even the strongest military defence will be without meaning. Our goal is to construct a civil defence system that would make an attack upon our country more expensive than profitable, that it would maximize the cost of an enemy. Swedish civil defence is basically built on three components. Shelters, evacuation and rescue, in other words in the widest sense.

Shelters and evacuation are aimed at reducing the impact of enemy action through passive prevention. Rescue implies subsequent active intervention.

In Sweden we are lucky to have both granite and distance. We are at liberty to form our protective policy with the knowledge that both of these closely interrelated components, shelters and evacuation can be given full consideration.

The name of the shelter program is Standard Shelters. These shelters are built in all new apartment houses of more than two stories and the obligation applies to all cities and towns of more than 5,000 people. Besides these shelters the law obliges sector units, schools, hospitals and municipalities to build shelters according to specifications.

For the last ten years Sweden has had and still has an additional shelter program in operation. I am referring to rock shelters for the central parts of our 14 largest cities. These rock shelters were originally planned as a substitute for standard shelters in central parts of large cities where the buildings were so old-fashioned and easily wrecked that standard shelters were deemed dangerous. But now the situation has changed. All city planners are re-building the central areas so quickly and giving them such resistance that standard shelters will from an economical point of view be the option. Also in order to

keep the decision for a wider choice between extensive evacuation and shelter occupancy, the establishment of the obligation to build standard shelters in the centre part of the 14 biggest cities seems to be a necessity.

Should the administration deem it to be necessary, they will approach the government to re-establish the requirement of including standard shelters to be built when new houses are constructed in the central parts of the cities.

The evacuation planning is drawn up in detail. Evacuation towns are divided into suitable sectors. Housing areas have been investigated and evacuation centres have been planned and the training of personnel is going on continuously. The public is informed in our telephone books and pamphlets and through voluntary courses in self protection. This picture shows the evacuation plan for one sector and it is found in the telephone book for the people living in that region. Most evacuees will be accommodated within 10 to 30 miles from their home town. Only evacuees from our three largest cities will have to travel up to 250 miles.

Here we can see where the people living in Stockholm will go in case of evacuation.

Permanent quarters will be provided mainly in private houses. Fundamental prerequisites for successful evacuation are the will and capacity of the individual citizen to do things for himself. To take initiative and independent action and to be ready to help others. He will if possible arrange for himself, his upkeep, transport and billeting. He will use his own car. Families are to keep together as far as possible. School children evacuate with their relatives. The evacuation planning affects 3.8 million people, almost half of our population.

Let us now come to the question of evacuation policy. Our policy is intimately interwoven with our shelter policy. The government's position of assignment of funds for shelter building is to a large extent influenced by its appraisal of the accessibility or existing plans for evacuation. And on the other hand, freedom of action, perhaps the most valuable asset in time of war is greatly enhanced if the government is in a situation that they can differentiate their decision in accordance with the shelter situation. In both the living and the receiving end of the evacuation line. Here we touch the mainspring of our evacuation policy. Complete flexibility in all possible respects. The plans themselves call for com-

prehensiveness. They must be complete to be able to offer the implementer the benefit of choice, but in no way do the plans expect the responsible authority to give any automatic or immediate concurrence with the formed plan. This must be emphasized as misconceptions have crept in here and there. The evacuation plan does not mean that half of our population automatically must leave their homes in case of war. The plan means instead that freedom of choice is given, from a lesser order to move certain categories from the centre parts of the town to an orderly execution of this evacuation. It may concern only one province or spread over the whole country. It may in one place be the question of a fluctuation because of fall-out. In another recommendation it may be to begin voluntary evacuation.

Shelter space is more than sufficient for a population after preliminary evacuation, but only 60 per cent can be sheltered at present before such an evacuation. As shelters based in urban areas increases stress on evacuation they may decrease. Another important factor in our policy of maximum freedom of choice in evacuation in rural areas. As yet no obligation lies on the population outside towns of 5,000 people to build such shelters. Nevertheless civil defence now provides the government with the authority to decide which preparatory arrangements should be put into effect.

The third main component of our civil defence is rescue. Time does not permit that I present these particulars. On the whole it corresponds to similar organizations in other countries. Personnel necessary to man the organization is recruited by compulsory enlistment in peacetime. This comprises all citizens, men and women between 16 and 65 years of age, health and physical strength permitting. This may sound as though recruiting was an easy matter, but it must be borne in mind that the other branches of our total defence, that is military, economic and psychological take their big toll, especially of male ingredients. A large group in civil defence are men who have passed the upper age limit for military service, 47 years. Smaller groups are those exempted from military service or granted respite as well as conscientious objectors. About 20 per cent are women. Exempted are women taking care of children below 16 years. In practice we enlist women between 26 and 38 years. A special group are those enlisted in the regular mobile columns.

They will use only transferred military personnel, conscripts, about 35 years, with basic military training and certain categories of officers with voluntary enrolment.

The administration faction gives binding directions to the provincial government. In war time a new authority would exist, 24 provinces are grouped into six co-ordination areas with one of the governors acting as regional civil co-ordinator. He co-operates on the same level as his military counterpart. On the local level our country is divided into a hundred civil defence areas, five to six to each province. Each area is led by a controller responsible for all activity in the area. Both the co-ordinator and the controller are designated in peacetime and given proper training. The controller has at his disposal six services, command, rescue, fire-fighting, ambulance, constabulary and guard. These are local services. On the regional level there are three types of units, the mobile columns, the volunteers and those specialized in rescue work. They are located for action near certain cities in case of calls for outside help. Groups from the voluntary air force will be used for reconnoitering, supervision of traffic, fire-watching, indicational radio activity, transport and communication service. There are 28 such groups. Twenty-one sanitary platoons will mainly be used for supervising sanitary conditions among refugees. I said before that this organization is a civilian and humanitarian organization. We have in our services only one group of men who are armed and that is the constabulary service. They will be taken over by the State Police Force soon.

This picture shows how many people we have in each service.

As I said before, the Civil Defence in Sweden is a young branch of our total defence system, only 30 years old. To begin with, emphasis was mainly on gas protection, latterly the concept spread through the nation that civil defence was not merely an egotistical question of personal self-help but a necessary organization covering many aspects of our community. During the war we grew to a rather over-burdened organization with 800,000 people put through training of some sort. After the war there followed a long period of continuous activity. The aims of the civil defence organization however were not clearly defined and as a consequence it had mushroomed outwards and perhaps should have been let under the responsibility of other authorities. A parliamentary investigation

was initiated in 1953 and put forth its plan in 1958, and it was adopted by our Riksdag the year after. The aims were now more clearly defined as the eventual tendency was to cut down the organization and make it more effective. A measure of this concept of quality instead of quantity can be seen in the fact that personnel was cut down to half but the appropriated funds were doubled and are now four times bigger. All these new activities were begun in 1961 with a ten year plan for its completion in view. Funds have not been outcoming to a full extent, but have been quite acceptable and we now stand more than half-way with 4 or 5 years left before the plans can be fully realized.

It is self-evident that the responsible authorities do not sit back complacently awaiting the completion of a ten year program according to plan, on the contrary, constant analysis is being carried out at the various levels of different kinds of things that can affect the structure of civil defence. The future policy includes changes in the rescue and relief units, strengthening of the emergency alarm system, and of that proportion. Evacuation has just been revised, shelters will probably have to be built according to stricter criteria especially concerning the nuclear protection.

Re-introduction of the obligation to build standard shelters in central parts of the major cities is, as I said before, being weighed. Individual protection in the light of new chemical warfare must be substantially increased and supplemented by an effective detection and warning system. Gas masks should be accumulated for the whole population.

One method in the works to achieve this is the new way of application of grants that will be used for the fiscal year of 1971-72. The King in Council has enjoined that civil defence as well as other total defence authorities create the basis for a better balance within the total defence. This new basis should also give the government a bigger freedom of action and a better instrument for the long term development of total defence. The budget system now in force is to be considered more or less as an expense and cost budget. The new system is a budget aimed at civil defence as it progresses, that is a performance budget. This implies that today's 15 traditional grants will be replaced by five programmed elements. These elements are command in war, evacuation, protection for the population, rescue and administration.

The picture here shows reservations between plans in a system of performance budget. For the five program elements the administration shall draw up program plans for the following five years. These program plans are to be considered as a long-term budget which one by one will be transformed into performance budget applications. In addition to the program plans, the administration shall work out a prospective plan for year 6 to year 15. The plan shall be an outline of ideas for the alternative shaping which the defence program can display beside the different levels of the source supply. The prospective plans are to be revised at four to five year intervals, and will be the beacon for program planning. In order to get a foundation for the prospective plan, extensive studies and research will be necessary. In one field this work has already begun. The commission is working on protection for the population. The purpose of this investigation is to study external conditions in the form of conflict aggression and attack from different aggressors which ought to be implemented and to be considered by civil defence. That civil defence is an integrated and necessary complete part of our total defence system is nowadays left without dispute. But it is quite another question to find a valid method of estimating the relative role of civil defence to other components of our total defence. These studies should bring us nearer a definition of what we might expect in a given case of aggression, and the sort of integration of our defence system that would give the optimal effect.

Mr. Sundelin: Now is it time for questions. May I introduce Mr. Orterstrom and Mr. Bergelin, and we will all four of us try to answer your questions.

The Vice Chairman (Mr. Perry Ryan): Well members of the committee we have Mr. Art Sundelin, the Director General; Mr. Bergelin, the Head of Research Department; Mr. Orterstrom, Chief Information Officer; and of course we have Mrs. Inga Lindblom who has just addressed us, and all four are ready and willing to answer our questions. I have Mr. Wahn, Mr. MacLean. Mr. Wahn?

Mr. Wahn: What would be the total cost to all governments in Sweden, that is federal or provincial or municipal governments of civil defence per year, approximately?

Mr. Sundelin: The total expense for civil defence this year is 125 million Swedish

Crowns, that is from the State and then the communities help to pay part of the shelter buildings for headquarters and so on and that will be around 10 million Crowns. Then we have the shelters built in the private houses and that will be about 60 million Crowns. And then the factories have to pay for their industrial civil defence organization, and that will be about I think it is around 6 million Crowns. It is around 200 million Swedish Crowns for civil defence every year.

Mr. MacLean: According to a little pamphlet here there are roughly 2 million urban inhabitants, in 1967 $4\frac{1}{2}$ million. Is there any planning or attempt to direct growth of urban centres to spread them out or have the growth in smaller urban centres or is it like Canada where the bigger the city the faster it grows?

Mr. Sundelin: There are no plans in Sweden in civil defence to direct the people, not at all.

Mr. MacLean: Not in any branch of the government?

Mr. Sundelin: I think it is in some branches of the government, but that is to try to get the industries localized, dispersed. Yes, sometimes, but not for defence purposes.

Mr. Nowlan: I have a question I wanted to ask, but this is a supplementary. Is there an estimate of what the program has cost you in the thirty years which you have been in operation? You got 200 million Crowns this year, I wonder if there is an estimate of what was actually spent on the program while it has been in force, presumably for thirty years?

Mr. Sundelin: I do not have the figures but I think it is about 1,500 million Swedish Crowns.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Members are interested in the financial point as I am, while your government is spending a lot of money and I believe that you are, your shelters are par excellence. I am wondering how effective is the organization and the reaction of the people themselves. That is, I am presuming that your organization is mostly volunteers.

A Witness: Compulsory.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): All right. Then what is the reaction in the case of your people in these various areas—How effective is it to their reaction in case of an emergency. Do you, are you satisfied that they are well

aware of it and that they will follow the organization methods that you have?

Mr. Sundelin: I think I can say they will follow our organization and our plans, but perhaps Mr. Osterstrom can say something more...

Mr. Osterstrom: I think that they are pretty satisfied. We are trying to measure opinions continuously and we figure that the population will follow, as you put it.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Do you have any exercises to make an assessment of it.

Mr. Osterstrom: We have had exercises as well, yes. Mainly to try the plan, to control the plan but the population involved has been very loyal I must say and we have had no objections. As a matter of fact you might say that Swedes are as loyal now as when they started by voting themselves into civil defence so long ago and are accepting the program as a whole.

Mr. Ryan: I think he means, have you had any test runs? Have you evacuated any populations Mr. Osterstrom? Have you done it in a small way at all?

Mr. Osterstrom: We have. Of course you cannot—You will never be able, not in Sweden at least, raise money enough to pay a test evacuation of a whole town or a city or something of that kind. But we have tested evacuation planning in Stockholm, in Sweden, in one of the bigger towns as well. And in a couple of other smaller towns and it has all turned out well. We know now that the planning is all right and that the population will stay loyal if needed.

Mr. Ryan: And follow instructions.

Mr. Osterstrom: And follow instructions, yes.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: I was not quite sure if I heard correctly in respect to evacuation. Were we told that in an evacuation, people are encouraged to use their private automobiles and what I also wanted to know, as a status quo do you have some kind of co-ordinated plan to use buses, trains and airlines? And how do you make sure that people who do not have automobiles get proper transportation.

Mr. Osterstrom: People who do not have transportation are instructed to gather to

what we call evacuation stations, which they will. And from there we will transport them by buses directly to the area where they are billeted or to a train and other transport means.

Mr. Allmand: The supplementary question was that if the emergency occurs during the daytime when children are at school and mothers are at home and fathers are at work. What kind of instructions do you give to try and get the family together or do you try and not have the family brought together before evacuating? Do you try and evacuate the children from the schools, housewives from their own districts and the fathers from their working districts? Because I presume in a big city like Stockholm they could be spread out over the whole city.

Mr. Osterstrom: We are planning to bring the families together and we are not believing in an emergency of that kind. The planning is based upon the thought that we get what we call strategical warning in time so that we will gradually carry through the evacuation plans.

Mr. Allmand: You feel you have enough time to bring the families together before evacuating.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Are the shelters hard shelters? Are they capable of withstanding bacteriological warfare? Or are they just for radio-active fall-out?

Mr. Osterstrom: The standard shelters, you mean?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The shelters that we saw this morning and other shelters that you have. What are they prepared to withstand?

Mr. Osterstrom: The standard shelters are built to resist conventional weapons of bombs up to 1,000 lbs. And then we have in the modern standard shelters, we shelter for a little, not the high level, shock from atomic weapons, 14 p.s.i. for the modern standard shelters.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): And radio-active protection?

Mr. Osterstrom: It is a balance in the different shelters, working from these atomic weapons.

Mr. Sundelin: I think it something like 1,000 times the reduction of the radio-activity if around 1,000, I think.

And the shelters are gas proof and equipped with air purifiers.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): And hat about bacteriological?

Mr. Sundelin: It is just what the shelters give, but I do not think they can take all types of bacteriological weapons.

Mr. Laniel: Yesterday I got the impression that when you spoke of civil defence it was mentioned that it was not passive defence as the way it was interpreted in Canada. Could you tell us really what you mean. This morning you spoke of shelter protection for the population, but that is not the complete portion of your civil defence. Is there not a portion of the civil defence where your non-conscripted people will also defend the land and where they come in as to the authority of the control and all that.

Mr. Osterstrom: No. As a matter of fact the organization and the whole system is as Mrs. Lindblom said humanitarian and all personnel will not take part in fighting whatsoever. May I add that, as Mrs. Lindblom also said, but to make it clear, the only part of the organization which is armed is the so-called civil defence police forces. What would you call it, the constabulary and guard service. But we have been fighting for years and years to get rid of that task but still we are hoping and we have a basis for that, hoping that we will get rid of that part of the organization and thus be peacified, or what is the word, altogether.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman, I think in Mrs. Lindblom's chart she mentioned within towns of over 5,000 apartment buildings and factories with 25 employees or more must have shelters constructed in them. Now, are the costs of constructing those shelters a cost which must be borne by the owner of the apartment building or the owner of the factories or do you have some program whereby someone else assists in the construction costs?

Mr. Sundelin: The household owner has to pay for the shelters.

Mr. Buchanan: No subsidy at all from the government?

Mr. Sundelin: No. But they take it into account when they are renting out the flats.

Mr. Buchanan: What about private homes?

Mr. Sundelin: We have not been doing this in one-family houses. It has to be an apartment house with more than two floors.

Mr. Buchanan: And now I gather from the chart roughly half of your population is in shelters, is that correct?

A Witness: That is correct.

Mr. Buchanan: So that your hope is that over the next ten to twelve years, a quarter of a million a year should accommodate them all.

Mr. Osterstrom: As Mrs. Lindblom said, we are building shelters in all cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants and in some smaller cities. But we are not building shelters out in the countryside. As we today have about 3.5 million seats in shelters that is in cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants and that means that they have shelter space for more than half of the population in the cities.

Mr. Buchanan: What about people in the country? Do they...Is any provision...

Mr. Sundelin: We have some plans for constructing in time of preparedness, to construct fall-out shelters in the countryside, yes.

Mr. Nowlan: You do not have a program on the type of structure that should be built or is someone instructed to go around and inspect it.

Mr. Sundelin: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: My question is sort of a supplementary to this one. Do you have any form of protection for livestock and food supplies stored in the country? Apparently you have no shelter program for the farm population. Is there any program to protect livestock and food?

Mr. Sundelin: That is not in the civil defence program in Sweden. We have a special administration for what we call economical defence and they are responsible for food and for material for the industries too. They have some stocks of food, a lot of stocks with different kinds of material for the industries. Some of the stocks they store are in the country too.

Mr. Harkness: I was thinking of your milk cows and things like this, you see. To protect your milk supply. You have nothing?

Mr. Sundelin: No. No shelters.

Mr. Legault: My original question has been answered but one thing that was brought to our attention this morning was the fact the public shelters are used as garages at the moment, and there is a charge. Now, financially speaking, is there any relation in the rents or the moneys received as to the payments of the expenditures of those shelters?

Mr. Sundelin: Oh yes, yes. No shelters are built by the community, you see, it is built by the City of Stockholm and they have got money from the State for this construction, 2/3 of the cost are paid by the state, but it is not 2/3 of the total cost, it is 2/3 of the cost for the shelter building after we have reduced this cost with the peacetime equivalent of the shelter as a garage, and that means that the City of Stockholm can rent it out to a firm and take the money they get for this shelter and use it for themselves, it is not for the government.

Mr. Legault: They pay 2/3 of the deficit, in other words?

Mr. Sundelin: Yes. For the peacetime use it amounts to 5 million, so we pay 10 million and the community 5 million.

Mr. Laprise: I am going to ask my question in French, I believe.

With regard to the training you give the personnel, is this training of use in the case of other disasters, such as fire, and would it be useful for giving first aid in cases of accidents and things like that?

Mrs. Lindblöm: Yes, we have two other kinds of training: we have some people who are trained in civil defence work, and others who are trained on a voluntary basis. All those who have had life-long training can be employed in time of peace. However, we do not call on these people in cases of fire or...

An hon. Member: Disaster.

Mrs. Lindblöm: ...disaster, no, they are not involved in such cases.

Mr. Laprise: Are they trained to give first aid to the wounded?

Mrs. Lindblöm: Yes, some of them are trained for that.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I was interested in the answer given to the question of one of my colleagues, that the evacuation plans

would take some time and it was anticipated there would be advance I think the word used was "strategic" warning. Now I was wondering how long that warning would be, and I was wondering if it was anticipated how long the process of evacuation would take and whether it was realistic to anticipate that any adversary would presumably be fairly close to this country, not a great distance, would give any strategic warning knowing of your plans. If they would not take advantage to launch a surprise strike if they were contemplating an aggression on Sweden.

Mr. Sundelin: We are not planning for an isolated attack against Sweden, and we do not believe in such an isolated attack. We presume that if there is a war that Sweden might be involved. It will be on a much much bigger scale and so we are aware of certain evacuation planning. This is just for instance say in Germany they are going to bomb, you might ask the Germans what they are planning for taking people over to Holland for instance, which is one of the very interesting details in the German plan. The Russians have got plans of the same kind, and so have other countries. If it is going to be a war, other countries which are more interested in that war than we are have got we presume to secure their population first and that will be probably months before anything really starts. That is one of the basic factors in our planning that we should be observing international affairs and what is going on in other countries be able to judge the situation to come. We can say to ourselves, all right this is the moment, now we have got to start, if not more but to start just to show that we are able to carry through what we have been planning for so many years, and to show that we are taking this training seriously. That is a thought which in the United States also has been planned whereby the United States might evacuate part of cities or part of areas just to show that this is possible and that what they want, what they are talking about on the international theatre should be taken seriously.

But our plans for mobilizing the civil defence organization say that our organization, civil defence organization can be mobilized in six hours most of it from now and the whole organization can be mobilized in 24 hours. There could be mobilization of the giving of alarm on the radio and on the usual radio net, and the part of the organization that has to work with the emigration, this part can be mobilized within six hours and

the emigration can start in six hours if it is necessary to start it so fast, we do not think it is but our preparedness means that this is possible. Our shelters are used in peacetime as garages or for other purposes but the standard shelters they shall have the preparedness to be used as a shelter within 24 hours. What is in the shelter in peacetime shall be taken out and it is necessary to have food and water and beds and other things in it and that must be done within 24 hours. That is our plan. The big public shelters that you saw today shall be prepared as a shelter within 48 hours, equipped with what is necessary as a shelter. It is very fast to take the cars out but you have to take in the beds and some walls you have to set up and so on.

Mr. Forrestall: Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, we heard that there had been not an awful lot of interest in this program on the part of the people of Sweden up until about two years ago when there was, if I remember the word, an intensification of interest. What caused that, what happened two years ago that all of a sudden brought about a realistic interest or this tremendous interest in civil defence in your country?

Mr. Sundelin: I do not know what it was two years ago but the Defence Committee presented what they had worked out to the government two years ago and at that time it was just a big discussion in the papers and TV and so on, but not only civil defence even the military defence.

Mr. Harkness: But there was no one specific thing that happened.

Mr. Sundelin: No.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness, did you have another question?

Mr. Harkness: Another question I had in mind was in regard to the special firefighting equipment that you have for civil defence, does that consist of fire engines and regular firefighting equipment which you keep solely for this purpose and which is not used under ordinary circumstances?

Mr. Sundelin: In time of preparedness civil defence take over the responsibility for all firefighting even what we call peacetime fires, and the peacetime fire forces are involved in the civil defence organization, both personnel and material. But added to that we are stockpiling material for firefighting, pumps and hoses and a lot of those things, and our fire-

fighting forces in wartime will be about I think eight times as big as in peacetime, something like that.

Mr. Harkness: You must have stockpiled then quite a lot of extra equipment.

Mr. Sundelin: Yes.

Mr. Nesbitt: My question is very similar to Mr. Brewin's. I would like to follow a little further if I may, the speed at which these arrangements can take place and the fact they can be made in six hours to get us from the original warning time. Has any adjustment been contemplated, or have any arrangements been thought of in the event that Sweden might well be attacked very speedily, as for instance the invasion of Norway in World War II which came very quickly indeed or as seen more recently when Czechoslovakia was occupied, although I realize that is not quite as likely because of the water barriers between any potential adversaries, but is consideration given to this factor that any potential adversary might very likely make a very sudden move on Sweden in order to take hold, or are arrangements made to allow for this possibility.

Mr. Sundelin: I am not quite sure I got the question right, but we really do not think that Sweden will be attacked as the first country in the world, if there is not a war going on somewhere else in Europe or other places. As soon as something happens in Europe, I do think we would mobilize our civil defence and our armed forces too and we would be prepared at that time for an attack against Sweden, but we do not think it will start with Sweden.

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Guay, a supplementary.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I feel that your country are the experts in this particular field. It may very well be that your encirclement formation is the same as what prompts your national defence. But my question therefore is this. We have several witnesses and experts who have come in front of our Committee where they have warned us that the 20 minutes, particularly in the NORAD program, that 20 minutes warning would be cut down to less and even possibly no warning at all of an attack. My question is to supplement what they said and that being the case, surely you must be aware of it that these things can happen and if you are planning so well, surely you must have taken that into consideration as a possibility even though you are a

nuclear nation. And if with all the preparations that you are making and then you do, let us just suppose that there could be such an attack in such a limited time, then surely you must have a measure to cope with the situation and could you explain that particular aspect of it to us.

Mr. Sundelin: I think Mr. Bergelin can tell you just little bit of what we are planning today.

Mr. Bergelin: It is not possible for Swedish defence to be optimum in every case of attack. We have to study the values, kinds of attacks that are possible to Sweden and now in front of a new system of planning we have started up a group for analysis and investigation about their internal and external conditions that may influence Swedish defence policy and planning. The government has directed us to study four cases first hand, but the investigation may take up other questions.

The first conditions we shall study is attack. We shall describe the effect on the inhabitants following the combating of military targets in Sweden in an invasion where the attacker only uses conventional weapons.

The second attack case shall describe the effect on the inhabitants following a combination of military targets in Sweden in an invasion when the attackers may use atomic or nuclear weapons to such an extent they find it necessary for their purpose.

A further attack case shall describe attacks when the attacker tries to obtain political advantages by political means, combined with threats and demonstrations of strength.

And the fourth case shall describe the effect in Sweden from a nuclear weapon in Europe between great powers.

We have a possibility to take up other cases and we think that we shall have some fuse attack cases that may govern the planning and policies for defence and we may have a lot of cases that may make it possible to analyze the situation. Besides these attack cases we expect certain planning elements fixed in ways. That means that we are now studying these problems. We are certain of investigations into these questions, and we will make a plan that makes it possible for Swedish defence to be the best in every possible attack case against Sweden. We cannot forget those blitz attacks. We may have a level that makes us optimal in every possible case against Sweden.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I would like to, would not like to, but I am going to ask a very morbid question. In the shelter that we were in this morning I understood that in an emergency it can accommodate 15,000 persons. Now in that emergency you are going to have a great many who suffer from claustrophobia, from hysteria, from shock. I would like to ask, what is the provision for medical assistance supplies and the disposal of the beds? May I just say that I am interested in this because some three years ago I was one of a number of House of Commons members to spend a couple of days in the Command fall-out shelter about 50 miles from Ottawa and there, we all noticed that even then there was a certain amount of hysteria and shock and in an emergency I discovered that they had the accommodation to take care of one person who died. Now that is the reason for my question, because I think it is important for claustrophobia, hysteria, shock, the heart attacks.

Mr. Sundelin: It is a very, very important thing to plan for how to manage such a situation and we have plans for it. The shelter has to be divided into a lot of smaller rooms. You cannot have such a big hole for 15,000 people. That is not possible. It will be divided into smaller rooms. There must be special rooms for sick people. There must be special rooms for the dead people and it is necessary to have a special staff to run the shelters, with a commander, and with people on special posts and in each room in the shelter responsible for just this part of the shelter.

Mr. Winch: How are you going to dispose of your dead, because in 15,000 in an emergency like that you are going to have them, because you need your ice for the purification of the air. Is there any other provision?

Mr. Sundelin: We have to bring them out.

Mr. Winch: Bring them out.

Mr. Sundelin: Yes.

Mr. Winch: If it is nuclear fall-out then—your whole shelter has gone then, has it not?

Mr. Sundelin: No, no. You can go out for a short time, even when you have a nuclear fall-out. It depends on how strong it is, but you can go out for some minutes, some hours, perhaps a day to take it. You do not have to go out very long. You have to bring such things as dead people and other things out from shelters, out, but still underground.

Mr. Anderson: Is it true that NATO forces in these areas stockpile food for over a year.

Mr. Sundelin: No. It is not stockpiled food for a year inside the cities.

Mr. Lewis: There is an economic defence hike and we say yesterday I think \$125 million kroner for one year. I assumed that that was for some kind of arrangement for stockpiling food and distributing food in the case of war. Do you have 125 kroner every year for a number of years or a lesser amount of a higher amount? That is a very large budget for that kind of work.

Mr. Osterstrom: But, that is not only for food, that is for some special things you need in the industry too. And gasoline, and fuel too.

Mr. Lewis: Fuel and industrial materials and everything.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What provision have you made in your overall civil defence program for emergency hospitals, field hospitals, out into where your evacuation has taken your population? Have you provision for that? Do you have emergency hospitals and stockpiles?

Mr. Sundelin: Yes. But in the civil defence organization we are responsible for taking care of the victims on the spot and bringing them to the hospitals. For that reason we need what we call first-aid stations for shock treatment and fixing of broken legs and so on, to bring them after that to the hospitals and the medical board in Sweden is responsible for planning for hospitals in wartime and they have plans and equipment for hospitals, especially arranged in wartime out in the countryside.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Supplementary. Are they in the shelter? The hospitals.

Mr. Sundelin: They are out in the countryside and not in the shelters. We have some rock shelters in some of the hospitals inside the cities. But most of them in wartime will be out of the cities, out in the countryside and they do not have shelters.

The Vice Chairman: Well that is the first round. We have Mr. MacLean on the second round and then Mr. Wahn and Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. MacLean: Is there provision for these people who operate from highly protected underground headquarters—I am thinking of

the government itself, some local governments—and if there is special permission along this line...

Mr. Sundelin: Yes there are arrangements for the government, for the governors of the provinces or the civil defence leaders in the civil defence districts.

Mr. Wahn: What training courses do you have for adults and in the schools in connection with civil defence?

Mr. Osterstrom: In the schools we are giving three different courses, not in civil defence actually, but in what they call self defence, fire fighting, simple fire fighting, at home first aid and what we call individual protection involving evacuation, some knowledge of evacuation, planning, how to behave in shelters and protection against ABC warfare. The population as a whole got the opportunity voluntarily for such self-defence courses as well. We started that in 1961, I believe, and up till now something like 1.1 million people have taken those courses. Of those about 700,000 have taken this course in individual protection.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): What does the compulsory part of the training consist of? It has been mentioned that some of the training is compulsory.

Mr. Osterstrom: That depends on the training we have been giving the individuals. Now, as Mrs. Lindblom said, we are aiming at an organization of 220,000 people supplemented by 10,000 military conscripts being transferred to civil defence and also by what we might call advance protection, industrial protection, or something like 60,000 persons all together. As a whole this organization will involve 300,000 persons. We take them according to the civil defence law if we need them. We take the individuals we need and we pick them out basically so that we get people with some professional knowledge of the course he or she will be given by us. And they get the training needed to make them fit to carry through their duties.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Another supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Smith.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Do they receive any pay while they are taking the training?

Mr. Osterstrom: They are being paid, yes.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I do not know if this is considered a fair question but I wonder if in the planning and discussion of the civil defence program that the reason there is so much emphasis in this country because of your non-allied status, in other words, if you were allied and thus going to be involved very quickly in any hostilities, would you still be placing as much emphasis on civil defence? Or would you think of it as practical as you do, or do you hope to escape an exchange between two leading powers?

Mr. Sundelin: I am not quite sure what we should do in such a situation in an alliance but I do think that we would pay and do the same in the defence. I do think so and have a look at Norway, it is about the same, I think, as Sweden.

Mr. Nowlan: The only reason I ask the question is that one of your defence officials yesterday did point out that with your geographical position, let alone your status, you hoped to avoid the exchange between two blocks.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): We have not had explained the exact function of the centre as we are in here now this morning. Would you explain that to us and have you other similar centres in different parts of the country?

Mr. Sundelin: Oh, yes. We have five centre schools for civil defence and this school here is one of them. This place just here in this palace is what we call a staff college in civil defence.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Senior staff.

Mr. Sundelin: Yes. And here at one time we take 60 students at this school. We are building a new building here and will take 90 at the same time. It will run the whole year. Then we have another school here in Roserberg too for conscripts for our mobile columns which would take at the same time about 200. Then they have out in the country one school taking 120 students at one time, another for 90 students and one for 60 students. That is the essential schools. Then we have a school also in the provinces too.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions? Well then I would just like to ask a question or two if I might, Mr. Sundelin.

Mr. Sundelin: Yes.

The Chairman: In the 48-hour period that you supply your shelter like we say this morning, what do you put in there? Do you put in food for a certain length of time? Do you put in standard beds? Do you put in air mattresses or sleeping bags or stuff—what is the order of your provisioning?

Mr. Sundelin: We put in food and standard beds and necessary equipment for first aid or for sick people.

The Chairman: From how long a period?

Mr. Sundelin: I think it is for four days.

The Chairman: And out in the country, when you evacuate your populace, do you put them up in temporary sheds that are erected or what would be the nature of their dwelling when they arrive there?

Mr. Sundelin: They will be taken care of in the ordinary homes by the people living out there.

The Chairman: Well that seems to be it then. I guess we can adjourn for lunch ahead of time. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: We are running a little late. We have this morning with us, our Ambassador His Excellency Mr. R. P. Bower and I think he has a few remarks that he would like to make to us outlining background information and other facts and then if time permits we will be able to ask questions.

Mr. R. P. Bower: Thank you Mr. Wahn. First of all I welcome you all to Bonn. I do not know how many or for how many of you this is your first visit to Germany but this is a quiet ex-university city with not a great deal of night life but it is an interesting historical place and I hope you will enjoy your brief stay here. Unfortunately, for you and for us, there is to be a debate in the Bundestag today on foreign affairs and defence. Many of our star witnesses are going to have to be present at the debate. We did not hear about this, we did not hear about the withdrawal of some of these chaps until four o'clock last night so our program has had to be altered rather drastically. It is a great pity because some of the best people, of course, are the ones that are going to be speaking in the Bundestag and therefore cannot be with us today. It is going to impair I am afraid the effectiveness of this meeting. Now we also

thought that it might be useful if instead of giving a rundown on the people who will be speaking to us, after they get here that we should do it now and that when they come, they will simply be asked to stand up when their names are called, so you will know which is which, but there will not be any rundown of their background. We will do that now so that you will know who it is that will be talking to you. If you want to have this information for direction later on obviously you can have it. Now I have to go through this list to make sure of the ones that are not coming.

Dr. Walter Kiep, he is a member of the Christian Democratic Party which is the leading party as you know in the coalition. He is a parliamentarian who has been able to combine an active career in business with one in politics. He has been in the insurance business since 1949 and in parliament since 1965. He has extensive contacts in the United States and he was one of the names mentioned recently as a possible German Ambassador to Washington. He is on the Defence Committee of the Bundestag. He has also visited Canada and he was in Ottawa early in 1968 for talks on defence and foreign policy matters with Canadian officials.

Nor Mr. Peter Petersen also a member of the CDU. He is a trans-Atlantic traveller. A market researcher by profession. He has been in the Bundestag since 1965. He is also a member of the Defence Committee and was in Canada early this year when he had talks with Canadian officials on defence and foreign policy matters.

Now in the SDP Party, Social Democratic Party, Helmut Schmidt maybe. We are very much hoping that he will be here. He is the leader of the SDP caucus in the Bundestag. He is an economist by profession. He was first elected to the Bundestag in 1953. From 1961-65 he was Minister for Internal Affairs in the State Government of Hamburg. He returned to the Bundestag in 1965. He has been a member of the executive of the SDP since 1965 and he is a member of both the Foreign Affairs and the Defence Committees.

Now Dr. Karl Mummer, is he coming?

Yes. He is coming.

Mr. Bower: Dr. Mummer who occupies the position in the SDP caucus which might best be described in English as the Whip. He has been involved in politics in one way or another for a long time. In 1933 he was sentenced to 21 months in prison for subversive activi-

ties against the Nazi regime. He then went into exile. After his return to Germany in 1946 he was active first in the government of the American occupation zone and later in the economic council of the combined British and American zones. He is one of the few parliamentarians who has been in the Bundestag continually since it was founded in 1949. Dr. Mummer is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag.

Is Schultz coming? Schwartz?

Yes Professor Schwartz is coming.

Mr. Bower: Professor Schwartz is one of the academics coming. He is Professor of Sociology at the University of Cologne. He has studied in both Germany and the United States. He is a frequent visitor to North America. Last autumn he was in Toronto where he gave a lecture at York University. He has written several sociological works, the most recent of which is an analysis of student unrest in Germany. Besides his interest in sociology he is a keen student of foreign affairs. Wagner is coming is he?

Mr. Bower: Dr. Wolfgang Wagner is one of Germany's leading authorities on foreign policy. He is a Director of the Research Institute of the German Society on Foreign Affairs. He is also editor of the Society's publication *European Archives*. The Society is the German equivalent of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Dr. Wagner is also an author. His most recent book being "*Europe Between Awakening and Re-Action*" which appeared last year. In addition he writes articles on foreign policy for various newspapers and periodicals and is a frequent commentator on radio and television.

Now we come to the journalists. We have two here. Dr. Gunther Mugenberg. He is familiar to most Germans since he has been the Chief Correspondent of the West German television for the past four years. Previously he was the Bonn correspondent of the West *Deutsch Alacamanaziten*. In this position he also covered international conferences. He is also familiar with both sides of the Atlantic having studied in the United States. See if Sommers is coming?

Mr. Bower: Well that is the lot. Again I must say how sorry I am that we are not going to have the turn out that had originally been planned. Nevertheless you must not construe this as lack of interest either in your visit or in foreign policy as a topic in Germany. In fact I would say that the average

German is much more interested in foreign affairs than is the average Canadian. He is much better informed. No German citizen is really much more than one hour away from a foreign country. I suppose the most central part of this country is no more than one hour's drive on the autobahn from some foreign country. The Germans next to the Canadians are the world's greatest travellers. Canadians are by far the world's greatest travellers. I think they travel 50 per cent more than the next country which is the Germans. A great deal of our travelling, of course, is done to the United States. But here the travelling is done through France, Czechoslovakia, Spain and even to North America. Our tourist bureau located in Frankfurt organizing package tours to Europe has sold out for the whole of 1969 already. Now this is not cheap. And maybe there should be more package tours. But the fact remains that the package tours that have been organized for Germans in Canada this year are already sold out. They have the largest tourist agency in the world as a German concern. So these people are accustomed, their history is one of relations with foreign neighbouring countries. Not always happy relations but they are much more conscious of the fact that there are other people in the world besides themselves than they are in Canada. In the case of industry, while our exports per capita are greater than the Germans exports per capita, our exports are handled by a handful of internationally-minded concerns, the aluminium companies, the nickel companies, the flour millers, the lumber people. Whereas the average man in the street in Canada is not directly involved in international affairs, at least he is not apparently directly involved in international affairs, as the average German so obviously is. The consequence of this is that foreign affairs problems are of much greater interest to the average German and your presence here is of interest to the people who unfortunately will not be with us today. I do not want you to believe, to think that because they are not present that it is any lack of interest on their part, it is definitely not.

Well, of course, German foreign policy like our own foreign policy is designed to achieve basic national objectives and the basic national objective of Germany at the present time of course is security. They are more concerned about their security than about anything else. Historically they have got good reason to be concerned about this. Secondly, I would say their main preoccupation is the

reunification of their country and they will view their relations with any other country in the light of how these relations will further these two basic objectives. The third basic objective is, of course, the Western European economic community, enlargement of the economic community. At the end of the war the primary German objective was to keep alive. To make a living out of the mess that was left at the end of the war. This problem they have solved. It no longer has the top priority. Their economic problem has been solved. The top priority to the Germans today remains their security, reunification and the unification of Europe. And they will view their relations, as I say, with other nations from the point of view of how these relations will further their basic foreign policy objectives. There is fair unanimity in Germany about what has to be done to achieve these objectives. There are different views on the method of approach but there is not much difference of opinion about the basic objectives themselves. Now perhaps if you have any questions you would like to ask before our visitors come we should start off with those now.

The Chairman: We have until 10.30 a.m. First I would like to mention that we are all delighted that Mr. Bower could be here this morning. He has not been well during the last little while and that was the reason why he was not able to meet us when we came in yesterday. So we are delighted Mr. Bower that at least you are feeling sufficiently recovered to be with us this morning. I think that it may be an effort although you are looking extremely well sir. Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman I would just like to ask about what he thought of Germany's aim and that has to do with reunification. Is this still as much of a central theme of their policy as it was say ten years ago? For when you come driving into the city of Bonn and, you know, you see fairly substantial and solid looking structures, I just wonder are these temporary buildings or are they getting a firmer foundation and perhaps getting reconciled to the fact that reunification may still be a long way away?

Mr. Bower: I think no German expects reunification especially after what happened last August to come very soon. It has always been my belief that this is a disappearing problem but the Germans assure me that I am wrong about this. They say would it be a disappearing problem in your own country if

an outside power were to move in and dominate one part of it, take one part of it away, would you ever accept this, would your children ever accept this? Historically they will not accept it and we would not accept it. I suppose that is a natural re-action. If I were a Canadian and this happened to my country I would re-act that way. On the other hand, Germany is a difficult country to define. One of its main problems is that it has never been possible to define what Germany is. Do you define it linguistically? Obviously not, otherwise you would take in Austria, you would take in Switzerland, you take in the low countries. You would even take in parts of the Crimea. It has no natural boundaries such as Italy has a natural boundary of the Alps to the north. It has been one of the major historical problems of Germany. Now there was a time when it was considered inconceivable that the Germans would accept the separation of Austria. This is now accepted. So it is conceivable, I think, that when the current generation of people who knew life in Eastern Germany, who were born there, brought up there or whose parents were brought up there disappear, that they will lose interest in regaining it. At least they are not prepared to go to any great lengths. Furthermore there is an undercurrent of resistance to changing the status quo but nobody feels it is patriotic to say so. For example, if there were unification today, it is almost certain that the C.V.U. would be a minority party because the inclusion of East Germany would bring the Socialists into the picture. It is also certain that the religious balance between catholic and protestants would be upset. This does not mean so much in our country. It still means a very great deal in Germany. A third thing would be that if there were re-unification tomorrow, the burden of restoring East Germany, because it would be a depressed zone, would fall upon the West Germans. There is an undercurrent of people who are quite happy to let things stay the way they are but it is not patriotic to say this and occasionally even politicians come out and suggest that this might be the trial balloon, if you will, to test public opinion.

Mr. Nowlan: Would this be stronger with the younger generation?

Mr. Bower: No, I think it is getting weaker.

Mr. Nowlan: I beg your pardon?

Mr. Bower: I would say it is getting weaker.

Mr. Nowlan: I mean would the feeling of status quo and permanent division be stronger with the younger people.

Mr. Bower: I have discussed this with quite a few Germans and one or two have said, "Well, I will not say it to anybody but you but I think so". They will qualify this with another statement that the extent to which European unity advances will affect their attitude towards it, if they find Germany is an aggressive, progressive, vital, energetic country. It has always had difficulties containing itself within its own boundaries. Right now the problem of Germany is to export to find markets for the stuff it is producing. If you have an enlarged European trading zone, free trade area or economic community, the opportunities for Germany will be greater. If this does not work German energies are likely to demand movement towards the East.

The Chairman: I have now Mr. Forrestall and Mr. Buchanan. Is there somebody else now in that list whose name I did not get? Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Further, Mr. Ambassador, to the question Mr. Nowlan has opened up. It was suggested to us in Ottawa by one of our distinguished witnesses from Germany that there was a growing feeling that re-unification of Germany would not fully come about or be realized or be a practical thing to pursue with hope until some of the other European problems are cleared up. Would this be a valid impression? Particularly with the Eastern European countries.

Mr. Bower: I beg your pardon?

Mr. Forrestall: Particularly with the Eastern European countries until some of the political problems there...

Mr. Bower: You have talked about the Oder-Niesser line. I do not think any German, Kiesinger himself, has said they ever expect that they will get back the land on the other side of the Oder-Neisser Line. This they accept. What they are saying is that it is not up to West Germany to accept at this time, until there is reunification, any new borders but when that day does come they make it quite clear that they do not expect to move into that part. What I do think they expect now would be to take over what is today East Germany, certainly not the lands which Poland is now occupying on the other side of the Oder-Neisser Line. Is this what you are after?

Mr. Forrestall: More or less except, Mr. Ambassador, without pursuing it because it gets complicated more or less. It was whether or not you had to resolve the German problem before you could resolve some of these other problems lying outside the country or whether the other problems had to be resolved first. It is simply the order of resolution.

Mr. Bower: I think that you could say that the prospects of re-unification with East Germany are nil unless the countries of Eastern Europe are agreeable to it and one of these of course would be a settlement with Czechoslovakia on the Munich Agreement, another would be the settlement of Poland on the question of the Oder-Niesser Line, so that it can only come when relations between Germany and the Eastern countries and particularly, of course, Russia when—the future really lies with Moscow—things have reached a better point than they are today. Under today's conditions it is impossible but it is correct to say it will not happen immediately so Germany has been working on the policy of détente with these Eastern European countries with some success prior to Czechoslovakia. Perhaps it was too successful. They managed to achieve a pact with Yugoslavia and with Roumania but they were moving perhaps a bit too fast and perhaps gloating a bit over Czechoslovakia and this was a setback. Does that answer your question?

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, one of the reasons which has been advanced to us as being one of the strongest reasons for Canada remaining in NATO is the concern that if Canada withdraws there might be similar movements in other countries, possibly Norway, Sweden and, say, reduction in the American commitment and that one of the results flowing from this action would be that the downgrading in the capability of the NATO forces would so concern the West Germans that there would be a very strong push or drive to secure their own nuclear deterrent. In other words, they would be so concerned about their number one item, as you point out, their security, that there would be virtually irresistible pressure and, of course, the other concomitant to that is that this would so alarm the Russians that we might well be into a real crisis situation. I would be interested in your comment on that line of reasoning?

Mr. Bower: If you think that Germany would be pressed by a Canadian withdrawal from NATO to demand a nuclear force, I would say that is wrong. We do not think that is in the cards at all. It will undoubtedly heighten their concern about their security and they would seek other assurances. I do not think we need to be too concerned about the German desire to go nuclear. What the Germans really feel, I think, about this is that perseverance is what is required. Perseverance and patience. What has become of polio? Whatever became of polio? It was the result of perseverance, nothing else, and their attitude is that we must not let our guard down at this particular moment. We must persevere and they hope that we will be with them in this perseverance. If we are not with them in this perseverance, it will automatically colour their attitude toward the usefulness of Canada to them in all matters because they are committed to solving this problem in conjunction with their allies. Not alone. They do not want to be alone. They do not want to choose between France and—they do not want to choose between France and the United States. They do not want to choose between France and the United States. They want to tackle this problem. This is the main objective, gentlemen, and I think as long as this can be preserved the pressure to go nuclear will not be followed.

Mr. Laniel: In 1964 I was here with the NATO Delegation. We were invited to Berlin and then, I do not know, I really got the impression that the German prime concern was to emphasize the division of Germany, they were put really to shame by the wall that divided Berlin and all that and it seems to me, anyway, to be overdone in the sense that they were more or less asking the world and asking us to look at this problem and be scandalized by it. Do they still give that kind of priority to that problem. You did partly answer it. What are their views concerning the Berlin problem and how far are they willing to go like they did the last time before the elections?

Mr. Bower: Berlin is symbolic to the Germans, to German unity really, I think, and they realize that this also keeps the occupying powers with them. You have British, French, and American troops there, not enough to repel an invasion, certainly, but enough to commit those countries if there should be an incident and they value Berlin as a token of the unification that is so important to them.

Then also, as I say, the commitment of allied forces which is involved there. I think it is rather a pity that the Committee is not being given an opportunity to see the wall and wire. You know, here you are in a civilized country where everything is much like it would be in western Ontario or any part of Canada but you only have to see the frontier at Kassel or anywhere along here or in Berlin, of course, to realize just what an evil, absolutely evil thing this whole separation is. I have done it, made the trip a number of times. I think the most depressing time was when I went to Kassel. I will give you an illustration of what is involved here. At Kassel or nearby Kassel there is more land taken out of cultivation through this long strip that runs around Germany than there is in the whole of Luxembourg. That is the amount of land that is withdrawn from cultivation to maintain this strip. All right, in this particular place this river running through and on either side of this river there is a village that straddled the river... Most of the people on the western side had been baptised in the church that is now on the other side of the river and when I was there an old lady on the western side died and she asked to be buried in the churchyard along with her husband on the other side of the river. Now, they had to go 400 miles to get to that church. You could see the church over there but they had to go 400 miles beyond to the check point, 200 miles down the check point, cross over and come back again. Standing along this road were soldiers with bayonets and anybody who comes within a certain distance—the houses on this side are pockmarked with bullet holes where people have been fired at because they got too close to the front line. You can understand that this sort of environment is not forgotten by anybody who has seen it or anybody who is experiencing it or any person who has relatives on the far side or has this sort of a problem so that it means emotionally a great deal more to the Germans than it can mean to us. This may seem difficult to grasp but if you presume it happened in Canada, how would you react? They regard this as the capital of their country. It is historically the capital of Germany and fortunately it is western, at least part of it is western and they want to keep it there in the hope that from this will grow the unity. I would like to make a suggestion that if any of my colleagues here in the office wish to comment further on this that they should do so. Have you any comment to make on this Jack?

Mr. Wolfgang Wagner: No. I would simply agree with everything that you have said, Mr. Bower. I think that it will take a very long time before the Germans would accept division under present circumstances whereas it might be possible to accept division if East Germany had the independence of, say, Austria and if it were within some wider European federation.

The Chairman: Mr. Laprise.

Mr. Laprise: Your Excellency, I should like to ask you a question that is quite closely related to NATO. In the white paper we were given yesterday, page 14 reads, and I quote:

...a major problem facing the Alliance is that of counterbalancing the difference in political and military importance between the United States of America and the other members.

In your relations, do you believe that West Germany feels a need, or is trying, to increase its military manpower in order to expand its participation in the NATO Alliance?

Mr. Bower: No. It is not my view that they want to increase the Bundeswehr in order to increase their contributions to NATO. They might feel that they had to increase their troops if other countries withdrew to fill the gap. Today the ratio of the Warsaw Pact to NATO forces is about six to one, that is along the frontier, and they would feel that that is bad enough and if there is any weakening here that they should make some effort to fill the gap.

Mr. Peter Petersen: This is related to the question that Mr. Buchanan asked earlier. I agree entirely with the Ambassador. The Germans do not want to increase their military forces if it is avoidable and this is an important element as far as they are concerned in the presence of troops from other NATO countries in Germany. The balance is already in their eyes bad. If there are fewer troops here from other countries then they will have to make up the difference.

Mr. Lewis: I just wanted to know this Mr. Ambassador. You said earlier that if there were unification East Germany would be a depressed area and that West Germany would have to take care of it. It is my impression from reading that the situation in East Germany economically has been much improved in East European terms. I am not thinking in

terms of consumption, of the way in which people live. It is normal Communist practice not to worry too much about that, but it has been my understanding that their economy as an economy is a very strong one now. Was I wrong?

Mr. Bower: You are absolutely right, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: In what sense then would it be a depressed area?

Mr. Bower: It has the highest standard of any country including Russia behind the Iron Curtain but this is still appreciably below the German level. It is still the highest behind the Iron Curtain. It has been rising very well but it is still considerably below the West German level so that if it became part of the West German level in terms of the unified group it would be a depressed area but it is still the highest on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Mr. Lewis: If the economy there is strong and is higher than in other European countries...

Mr. Bower: Other East European countries.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, other East European countries and the economy is stronger and has a capacity for wider consumption if the regime wanted to permit it, if it were less interested in defence expenditures as it is and in what they call capital formation as it is, then why would that be an issue in West Germany, reducing the desire for unification or did I misunderstand you.

Mr. Bower: Well it is a question of the West Germans not wanting to share or to take up this extra burden. It might result in increased taxation or a general lowering of standards in this part in order to bring that up. That is all. It is a selfish motive if you will, but it is a factor which is obviously present. If not expressed it is there.

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Ambassador if you were to take the hypothetical case of NATO being dismembered completely and the Treaty being terminated. This would cause I would think, greater consternation in West Germany than perhaps anywhere else. Would you agree with that point of view?

Mr. Bower: Yes. The danger has to be seen I think a little closer at hand, to be appreciated. The risks of an incident on the periphery I think are frequently underestimated. By the

periphery I mean the Dardanelles or the Baltic. One of Russia's main problems is access to the sea and in both areas in Turkey and in the Baltic these sections are controlled by somebody else. In the Baltic the Russian, East German and Polish forces consist largely of landing craft, marines and rocket-firing ships. There are only 40 miles of German coast on the Baltic. It is impossible to get out of the Baltic by submarine because the Skagerrak and the Kattegat are too shallow. They have to come to the surface. So that here is a vital place in case of trouble. Russia wants to control the Baltic and be able to get out on the sea. To Germany to see that she is out-numbered out there 40 to 1, not 60 to 1, but 40 to 1 in this area, with the Russian East European capability obviously designed to cut across the Peninsula, she wants more than her own forces to help her or protect her against this. Denmark probably is also concerned about this particular aspect with Germany but you can understand that they are in the front line. We are a long piece away but they are in the front line and they feel that if the NATO forces, if NATO were disbanded, the risk that the Russians might move in some small area and try to negotiate from that position, negotiate from the occupation of the Dardanelles, or negotiate from the occupation of the Peninsula and present the West with an ultimatum. Certainly nobody is going to press the button in the United States and send the rockets over if this happened and there they would be in the position of strength. The German argument would be that it is better to have conventional forces to prevent this happening. It is the greatest safeguard against somebody having to press the button.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Ambassador, numerous witnesses that we have heard have talked about one of the purposes of NATO which is to confine German, perhaps military ambitions that it may or may not have. I wonder how sensitive the German people are to this argument and whether it is the kind of argument that is brought out in the open or only talked about quietly when the German authorities are not around?

Mr. Bower: Oh very much so. It is mentioned by the Germans themselves. They discuss it quite freely. It is mentioned in the papers and it is the subject of constant discussion. In view of their past I do not think they trust themselves completely. Their intentions are very good but they like to have this

additional safeguard. Oh yes, this is not a touchy subject at all.

Mr. Cafik: They are not the least bit insulted by NATO allies talking about the question and treating it as a real thing.

Mr. Bower: Oh yes.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you.

Mr. Bower: There is no shyness there at all.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Ambassador, yesterday I read an editorial in one of the British papers which implied that because of the election of the new Social Democratic President there would be a consolidation on the right in Germany and probably a re-emergence of the right parties. How strong is the right in Germany?

Mr. Bower: If we are talking about the extreme right, not very strong, nor do I think the election of a Socialist President will have any effect on that group at all. It may mean that your CDU which is the right of centre will close ranks, and tighten up their organization, because they may see this as a threat to them. But if you believe that this is likely to be a stimulus to another Nazi type movement in Germany it would not be that at all. I would not be too influenced by that. One of my colleagues came here and he used to say one of the greatest problems of Germany was the editorial. More people wrote about more things that they did not know about and I would never say that the recent election was a gift to the extreme right wing.

Mr. Nesbitt: Mr. Ambassador, would you care to comment—there is a certain analogy between peacekeeping operations in other parts of the world in which Canada always participates and NATO itself inasmuch as without the NATO forces I suppose there are a number of countries certainly which have so far been able to act as a restraining hand on perhaps the Russian penetration into various parts of Western Europe or indeed perhaps have a certain restraining hand on the revival of militarism in Germany which the Germans might very well be obliged to do for their own protection if there were no other allied forces here.

Mr. Bower: I want to make sure I understand this question, Mr. Nesbitt. You are asking how I think...

Mr. Nesbitt: If you could care to comment on whether you would see any analogy

between United Nations peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the world in which we have always participated and the NATO forces located in West Germany inasmuch as they have actually kept the peace in Western Europe by acting as a restraint on Russian penetration which might well have taken place, and probably would have otherwise, and also at the same time acting as a preventative from the Germans themselves to a very large extent for their own protection and with perhaps consequent problems.

Mr. Bower: I would regard our participation in NATO as a peacekeeping operation and it is rather difficult to distinguish between the effectiveness of one arm with the other. I think they are both effective. If I had to make my choice and this is without the knowledge of all the facts I would think that our contribution to peace in NATO is probably—I mean we can make a greater contribution to peace by being in NATO than we can by being in the Middle East with the Gaza Strip. For one thing I think there are others who will fill the role in the Gaza Strip and there are not so many options open to membership in NATO.

Mr. Nesbitt: Is there not, sir, also a vital distinction between the peacekeeping operation in what NATO does in Europe as far as Canadians are concerned?

Mr. Petersen: In peacekeeping operations we have been concerned with the security of other small areas of the world. In Europe we are concerned with Canada's security as well directly.

Mr. Anderson: Sir, we have heard a great deal about how well-integrated the German officer corps is with the NATO command structure and I think perhaps they have heard far too much about this. How long would it take them to withdraw their forces from NATO, re-organize and become an effective national military force? My personal view is it would take a question of hours perhaps but perhaps you could comment on this.

Colonel Weeks: It would be very difficult to make an accurate assessment of how long this would take because it would depend very much upon the circumstances under which it took place. If it occurred in the circumstances of no outside direct military pressure it would happen extremely quickly because the Germans are very capable of re-organizing them-

selves under difficult situations. We have seen this time and time again. Their present forces—12 divisions worth—are at the moment entirely integrated into the NATO structure so far as their role is concerned, but they are not entirely integrated into the NATO structure in so far as their sources of supply are concerned so from a supply point of view it would not be difficult to achieve but the length of time that they would be then capable of supporting themselves would be questionable without outside assistance. Recently they have achieved or they have started a re-organization of their forces. Previously the territorial defence command which was purely national troops which they had designed to maintain the security of rear areas for NATO operations. This organization which is about 220,000 strong and consists of cadres which are present of regular force people, stores of equipment in central depots would be filled, I would say, within a period of 7 days with reservists to form new units. And, this would instantly increase the strength of the army—of the armed forces from the present approximately 450,000 to somewhere close to 700,000, and this would happen very quickly, I would say in 7 days this could be accomplished.

Now, recently this territorial defence command which was formerly a separate command has been put under the control of the army which they now call Land Forces, so it is no longer a separate component. It is now an integral component of the land forces and this has had the effect of blurring the formerly sharp division between what there was in terms of National forces and what there was previously in terms of what they call the assigned forces. Forces assigned to NATO. The headquarters, for example, around the country have been combined so that the NATO corps commander is also the commander of the territorial troops. He wears two hats. He takes his corps off to fight in case this is required and his deputy retains command of the rear area. Formerly, this was a clear split. This re-organization started on the first of February and is to take place over a period of three years and, not a great deal has happened with respect to it yet except that the territorial defence command has come under the army. This would facilitate achieving what you have asked, that is to say, the rapid establishment of the forces under a separate command. I would say, however, to revert once again to the question of supply that this would be the central problem, that

they could unquestionably supply themselves for a while, that they would very rapidly run out without the support of the NATO main supply depot.

Mr. Wahn: Col. Weeks, could you tell me how secure, in your opinion, are the nuclear weapons maintained under American control on German soil.

Col. Weeks: I would say that they are just as secure in NATO as the nuclear weapons which are held in the United States of America, because they are under American control.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions. Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: I notice in this white paper of the Germans that it is suggested that, the personnel strength for Warsaw Pact division, is generally only two thirds of that of the NATO division. There is no such appreciable difference between the two as regards their combat effectiveness. Now, in other words, is the suggestion that they are able to man the division with two thirds the number of people, would it be just as effective as we are with half again as many people?

Col. Weeks: Well by and large they tend to have greater fire power within a Warsaw Pact division. They have more weapons and fewer men whereas, we plan to have more men and fewer weapons. But, it is totally unfair, however, to make the analysis in terms of any one division because it is what is behind the division that counts in terms of artillery, and in terms of tanks and in terms of the types of divisions that are involved. I do not know what the quantitative strength is, I would have to look at the type of organization to know exactly what there was on each side. But I would think that what is implied and from what you have read is that the fire power of a Warsaw Pact division tends to be greater than the fire power available to a Western division. If you take it on a division, to division basis then it just balances the change in numbers to proportionately—a greater proportion. Yes.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I am sorry to have to interrupt here, I believe some of the German officials have arrived and since it is now just past 10.30, perhaps we can bring this portion of our proceedings to a close and proceed with the next item after their arrival. We have time for a stretch.

Colonel Weeks: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we are delighted to have German officials and parliamentarians with us this morning and I will ask our Ambassador, Mr. Bower, to introduce them to you.

Mr. Bower: Gentlemen, I should say, first of all that we are not going to give a biographical sketch of each one of you because we have already done it. Before you came here we told all the good things and bad things about every one of you, in order to save time, and fortunately, there were no bad things. I am going to suggest that when I mention your name that you just stand up for a moment so that the members of the Committee can see who you are.

First of all, Mr. Walter Kiep, a member of the CTU. Unfortunately Herr Schmidt is not here but we are hoping he will show up later. Dr. Karl Mummer, Mr. Peter Petersen, Dr. Wolfgang Wagner and Herr Muggenberg. I think that is everyone.

The Chairman: You forgot Professor Scheels.

Mr. Bower: Oh, yes Professor, I am sorry. Very sorry, well your name is here, I see it but it has been written over by Dr. Muggenberg, I am sorry.

The Chairman: I wonder then, if I could call on Mr. Kiep to make a short introductory statement, Mr. Kiep.

Mr. Kiep: Gentlemen, it is a privilege and an honour to be here and I must admit though, that I was not advised to prepare a statement but I will try to give you a very brief introductory note which perhaps could lead us into a debate. We have recently had a very interesting and encouraging discussion about the future of NATO and I know that in Canada the question of Canadians participation in NATO, is a matter of great concern and has been the subject of a great deal of discussion in your country.

We have reviewed our policy of the past and we, this is the CTU parliamentary authority, has come to the conclusion that the security of Western Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany can only in future years be safeguarded by a closer cooperation with NATO, and that any weakening of NATO, any withdrawal of forces that are now integrated into NATO would be detrimental to the security not only of the Federal Republic but of Western Europe. We have studied the

policy, or we have tried to assess the policy of the Soviet government at this time, about 10 months after the Czech invasion, and we have come to the conclusion that our assumption would be moved towards more freedom in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union would continue gradually, peacefully, without violence and that at the end of this general trend there would be a chance for talks for co-existence in the true sense of the word. We have come to the conclusion that this development will take place in a different form and in a far more dangerous way than we had hoped and anticipated. We feel that the present Soviet administration will definitely tend to suppress any movement of more freedom within the Soviet Union and within their sphere of influence by either police or military methods. That, therefore, assuming that the trend, and that the desire for more freedom will continue, that this would take place underground, so to speak, with the possibility of violent eruptions of military actions, possibly even of limited war and we, therefore, feel that the coming years, are particularly dangerous ones and that it will be necessary to make absolutely sure that the West stands as united in its preparedness to defend itself against any sort of aggression as we have in the past. Then, I also fear, and we fear that under the new doctrine of the Soviet government an invasion of certain territories is still within the realm of possibility namely, USSR, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Albania. And, it is for this reason that we fear that at this point, there is absolutely no sign that we have actually entered an area of co-existence but that we are in the middle of a new consultation out of which we hope to proceed towards a time and a point in our relations with the East where co-existence becomes possibly meaningful, talks about disarmament, which we all desire should become possible. As far as our relations with Eastern Europe are concerned, you realize that we have been advised by the Soviet Union, at this particular time, any such move towards an improvement of relations will be considered a hostile act, by the Soviet Union. We, therefore, can only show our readiness to talk with anybody who is willing to talk and we can, on the other hand try to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. Indications at this moment are that no immediate agreement and no immediate success are in sight.

To sum up I will try to say in this brief introductory that we fear the security of Germany and Western Europe can only be safe-

guarded and guaranteed by NATO, by integration of our armed forces into NATO and, if possible, by the strengthening of NATO. Any withdrawal, any weakening of NATO at this point might prove to be disastrous and certainly, might endanger the peace in Europe and world peace. Let me close in adding that we have found some understanding with the new administration in the United States on this particular point, although we fully realize that in the long run, the United States will want to reduce their commitments to Europe. But I think there is understanding and agreement with this particular point. There is no way to retrace any American withdrawal from NATO and that the Americans for the time being are ready to continue to contribute their present share to the defence of the continent. Thank you.

The Chairman: Now, Mr. Kiep, you may not have been prepared to make an introductory statement, but you were certainly most eloquent and I can only apologize for having called upon you without notice.

Mr. Kiep: I can also too apologize.

The Chairman: I do not know whether any of the other men at the head table wish to make an introductory statement or whether you would prefer just to have questions asked.

Mr. Lewis: Is Dr. Mummer in general agreement or is there any difference in attitudes.

The Chairman: In regards to what has been said?

Mr. Lewis: Yes.

The Chairman: Would any of you gentlemen care either to make an introductory statement of your own or to comment upon what Mr. Kiep has said? I should have mentioned earlier that we do have simultaneous translation in both English and in French together with the earphones and the microphones, and if you wish to use the French translation, you turn the little button over to the left and for English to the right.

Were there any further questions, did anyone at the table wish to comment upon what has been said or make an introductory statement?

Mr. Lewis: I asked what Dr. Mummer would say representing the Social democrats.

The Chairman: Mr. Mummer?

Dr. Mummer: Gentlemen, we have a government coalition here in Bonn. As Christian Democrats and Social Democrats form this government and, I think that coalition would not be possible if the parties of the coalition had a different defence policy different one from the other on important points and, I am happy to say that, in that field of defence, we have the same attitudes that we have made during these last 2½ years and earlier. This same policy that is the security and maintenance of peace in Europe is based on the existence, the continuance and certain fortifications of the strengthening of NATO. During the time before the 21st of August last year, the date of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact forces, there was a tendency not only in this country but everywhere to think that the threat of the other side had so much lessened that the—well we have to begin to be less intensive in our armament and in our defence measures but just this event of last year was an earthquake for our political conscience yet on the continent especially in this country so nearby to what happens there and, I must say, that again after those events it was apparent to all of us that this big military power of the Soviet Union is able to invade and—if they think that it profits them is willing to use military force—to use military forces not only against friends as the Czechs were, but would be prepared if it were possible to use military force against us for instance. Against France also who offered them the usual declarations and arrangements. We could say that and base ourselves that way, but that they had the right given by some old article of the United Nations charter to intervene in Germany if they could show up nationalistic or militaristic tendencies. This interpretation of theirs showed us also that it would be a mistake on our side to lessen or reduce our forces.

Everyone here understands French in this room, I think it is easier for me to speak in French.

It was someone from Quebec, a colleague from the Province of Quebec! It would be easier... So, we have seen, from these very events in Czechoslovakia, that it is not possible to combine defence efforts. But they must be maintained at such a level that the other side can never get the idea that an attack on the West could be profitable. Aggression must not pay; that is the essential point.

On that, I have a remark to address to our Canadian visitors, which seems to me the most important thing in everything we are

doing in NATO. Defence policy, and all the tremendous effort that has to go into defence, have no real meaning if, once a war has started, this military strength is to be used to win it. The goal of contemporary defence policy here in Europe, where great powers, with their atomic weapons, would be involved—there is only one real purpose in this defence effort, and that is to prevent war from breaking out, to preserve peace. That is the true purpose of our defence effort. This is only possible, gentlemen, if there is such an array of forces on our side, both from the technical and the national point of view, that there could never be any mistake on the other side like the mistakes Hitler made in 1939, when he thought that an attack could be over quickly, and that the Americans and Canadians, for example, would never have the time to intervene.

What is so valuable to us in having Canadians on our soil is that a potential aggressor must always be telling himself that an attack on our borders would trigger not only the defence forces of the country directly attacked, but also the massive defensive machinery of all the nations in NATO. And I believe that, although this means a great sacrifice for you, and I am sure that it is a great sacrifice, now that the war has been over for twenty-four years, to spend these enormous sums and to have your young people here, so far from home, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that, when you make this sacrifice, it is probably so much better, so much less costly, and involves so much less sacrifice, than would be the case if these efforts were not made, and we risked Moscow's making a mistake and attacking. You would then be in a worse position, far worse than during the first or the second world war.

In conclusion, therefore, I am fully in agreement with my colleague in the other school of political thought, and I would stress even more the importance I ascribe, in my view of the situation here in Europe, to the presence of the NATO allies, including the Canadians.

[English]

The Chairman: Before calling for questions I believe Dr. Wagner has a few remarks.

Dr. Wolfgang Wagner: Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief, but I should like to make two points. First on the importance of NATO to Western Europe and to Germany in particular.

The importance of NATO for Western Europe and for Germany in the field of security has been stressed by both speakers here, but I should like to ask that NATO and the presence of United States troops in Europe dependent upon NATO has some other importance also.

The American troops in Europe I feel are part of the provisional settlement of European affairs, provisional in this sense that European problems—some European problems are still unresolved. If United States troops should be withdrawn from Europe, for example, the German troops in the Bundeswehr would no longer be integrated in a common defence community and this very fact I think would change a lot of things in Europe, however unjustified fears for Germany might be, but I feel that some European nations not only in the East, but also in the Western part of Europe will be somewhat excited about Germany. The presence of United States troops and the existence of NATO does contribute to a situation of stability, also of political stability. I think this is a point you should know when you go back to Canada and have some deliberations on NATO.

My second point is the importance of Canada being a member of NATO. I think you are quite familiar with feelings that were recited of American domination. I think you have this in Canada and we have it probably in Europe. As you know we are close friends with the United States, but there is a certain feeling that a very strong American domination in Europe might not be so very favourable and also for this reason we would like to say that NATO should be maintained as it is. Being an alliance, not only between the United States and some European states, but an alliance between some non-American States—the United States and Canada and some European states. We prefer this situation.

Certainly there will be changes in NATO, but we would not like to see the number of NATO members being reduced and Canada for example dropping out. In order to impress this I should mention the idea of a European caucus. This idea was suggested by the British government in Bonn. I think most people feel that this is not quite so good an idea because it might be leading to a feeling of frustration in Canada and in some other countries such as Greece and Turkey. If a smaller European group within NATO should

be formed, Canada and other countries might be persuaded. This is one of the major reasons why we do not like the idea of a European caucus.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I mentioned earlier that we had a number of German parliamentarians with us and I should have mentioned that we have someone from the University as well and also someone from television as well—the media. I believe Professor Schuring has a statement he would like to make or a few remarks he would like to make.

Professor Schuring: Only two points. One with regard to internal developments with the Soviet Union and one with regard to developments here in Europe. There has been a certain tendency in the developments with the Soviet Union to liberalization and thus leading to a better international understanding. A point Mr. Kiesinger has made.

There are a number of reasons to say that the more strange these unions are the greater degree of autonomy in the field of economics and bureaucracy and daily this develops. The more difficult the situation gets for the Communist Party itself. As a matter of fact you might somewhat overemphasize this when you say that the Communist Party quite rightly feels it becomes superfluous and this is a very dangerous self-diagnosis for international relations.

To stress the point again the Communist Party is a form of aggression in terms of its influence. In judging what we can do and what we cannot do we have to be more aware of the interest position within the Communist world and the developments in Czechoslovakia have pointed out one factor clearly, that though you may continue to pay lip service to Communism and Socialism much as Christians pay lip service to the church, the influence of this institution on daily life and the degree of authority it really does have in ordering change is extremely limited.

It is like for one example, public opinion polls in Czechoslovakia at the end of June and the beginning of July in 1968 which asked whether it should continue relations with the Soviet Union or establish preferential relations with the west. The results were 98 per cent for the west and this is of course an intolerable situation for the Soviet Union. Secondly, I wish one could spell out the implication of this still further. It means one has to depart from some notions of foreign

policy and move toward liberalization leading to less tension.

In the west, we had been thrown back on a nation state's type of existence due to the fact that certain mechanisms of supernational integration more or less came to a standstill and this exposed a structural weakness in which Germany finds itself. The relative weakness of the social structure primarily of Italy and secondarily of France makes Germany relatively too stable or too strong. To some degree this applies also to Great Britain. From our point of national interest one might say our situation becomes entirely justified, if the nation state existence continues the other states remain relatively weaker in terms of expansion than we are. It is politically impossible for Germany to be the most stable and the most expansionist country and thereby relatively increase its position vis-à-vis its neighbours. From this point of view it is a question I think in the long term of our own existence to put ourselves into a greater framework that makes it possible for us to keep expanding and this will also help to overcome whatever structural weaknesses there are in Italy, in France to some degree and in England to the least degree, I think personally. Those structural weaknesses do not add up internationally and stimulate each other. On that point of opinion and that perspective it becomes essential that some form of international integration, whatever form of mechanism may have been developed will avoid Germany being thrust again in the position of being an unbearable neighbour for east and west.

The Chairman: If none of the gentlemen at the head table wish to make any further statement at this point perhaps we could commence calling questioners. First, Mr. Asselin and then Mr. Allmand. Mr. Asselin.

Mr. Asselin: I will ask my question in French if you do not mind.

In the event of a partial or complete dislocation of NATO forces, could West Germany arm herself quickly enough to confront Russia with a valid deterrent?

Mr. Schucht: I could give a reply. I am remembering what Professor Schultz said, that there is not only the problem of defence against an aggressor, there is also the question of this country's position among the other countries of Europe. For this country to have an armed force capable of defending it against the armed might of Russia is unthinkable. In such a case, Europe would break up,

there would be nothing left of the Common Market, nor of the co-operation that exists between our peoples, nor of the reconciliation that has taken place since 1945.

From the political point of view alone, it would be unthinkable to assemble a force strong enough to oppose the great nuclear capability that Russia has. In addition, I believe it would be impossible from the point of view of men, money and technology. After all, we are now one part of a divided nation. We have a population of perhaps 59 million, and I believe that in an arms race with the Soviet Union, which has about 230 million inhabitants, the race would be lost right from the start; we are in a weak position, and we would never be able to catch up with the Soviet Union.

However, I would stress the political aspect of the matter, and I was very grateful to the Professor. He introduced the point of view into our debate that, for us, NATO is also the framework within which we can contribute our share to the collective defence of the West. Any thought of national defence is politically disastrous and financially and economically impossible.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you Doctor, Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: I would like to put this question to Professor Schucht—I do not know if I am pronouncing the name properly—While the German government might be a strong supporter of NATO, and want all countries to maintain their support, what is the attitude of the man in the street, the people, and especially the younger people because I understand you have a certain contact with younger people, to the stationing of so many foreign troops on German soil, also the placement of atomic weapons on German soil? Is there a sort of an attitude against this among the people, and especially the younger people?

Professor Schucht: The stationing of foreign troops has never been an issue and is not an issue. They are not considered as occupational troops.

The importance of the alliance in the minds of the population is a direct function of the actual threat. The occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops led to a considerable increase in apprehension and a considerable increase in the responses that emphasize the need for Germany to have close co-operation specifically with the United States which after all provides the essential military

guarantees but with the west in general. To some degree of course public opinion is always reacting to decisions their politicians make so I would not be too nervous about reading polls going up or down 20 per cent on one score or the other. The underlying attitude is this, that Germany cannot stand alone. Amongst the youth a distinction has to be made between the majority of the youth and those on the university campuses. They are drifting further apart. The majority of the youth more or less reflect the types of feeling I described before. For the university students the question of communism, liberal communism has become a functional equivalent for Christianity to some degree, to put it pointedly. It is a moral issue. The east somehow does not exist and although it pretends to be an international movement to some degree it is fantastically provincial by looking at its own ills only, quite irrespective of the relative merits or demerits of your society. I think this is basically irrelevant to pay attention to this. What is relevant here in this context is the degree of lack of self-confidence in the leadership in Germany and what is termed the establishment here, although we probably have less of this than some other countries, the establishment here displayed vis-à-vis a moral challenge. This I would pay attention to, to which degree the leadership will keep on leading and defending themselves. University student unrest is current phenomenon.

Mr. Buchanan: Both Mr. Kiep and Dr. Schucht referred to the potential loosening of what we call the Russian hold on the peoples of eastern Europe. They suggested that it was a long way off and cited as evidence the actions against the Czechs, but I was wondering if there might be another feeling evolving now. The situation has changed appreciably even within the last half a year. Last August the Romanians for instance were trembling in their boots for fear that they were going to be next on the Russian's list. Now, they are of course pursuing a very independent course and going off to Belgrade and so on and do you feel that the fact that the Russians are most anxious for this detente, that they are concerned about the—particularly about the Chinese menace on the eastern flank, might well speed up and expedite the loosening process on the east, purely because they are reluctant to antagonize the west by actions comparable to Czechoslovakia again?

Mr. Kiep: This is a very difficult problem I think you have raised. The present situation in Romania of course is very difficult for us

to assess. We really have no way of knowing exactly what has happened in the talks between Tito and Ceausescu, nor do we know exactly what the Russians have in mind. The only thing is that the pressure is still on and obviously at this particular point the Soviet Union not having completely digested the Czech problem is not too anxious to get involved in another problem and therefore I think one must not mistake the present lull in Soviet-Romanian relations or the resistance of Romania and the apparent reluctance of Russia to press its point as a sign that Russia is letting up. We have had indications to the contrary. We have had indications that the Breschnev doctrine which is at the bottom of all this, was restated and restated and restressed. At the same time we have indications that history once more is being changed retroactively in the Soviet Union behind a re-emerging Stalin who is suddenly being made into what he used to be, being put back where he was until the 21st Party Congress and one must not misinterpret or misassess the problem of the present Soviet leadership in living up to certain commitments and statements that they have made because if they do not, in the long run they will have trouble within their own camp and they will therefore I fear have to maintain pressure. I think it is most unlikely that anything will come until after the Czech matter has been settled in the Soviet sense. It is that the question of the confrontation with China enters into this as well and one might even speculate as to the possibility that Ceausescu is becoming stronger as the confrontation in the east gets more important. But these are all speculations and I think what remains for us is the fact that the invasion of Czechoslovakia seen in the long run and seen in the context of developments for the next 10 or 15 years is a sign of Soviet weakness. One might argue, of course, that one more sign of weakness and the Russians will be in Paris, but I think it is still a sign of weakness. A weakness which of course poses a great danger to us and there I would just like to repeat what Dr. Mummer said a minute ago, and that is, the danger in the state of mind of the Soviet leadership at this moment is that the possible reaction of the West could be misinterpreted, could be misunderstood, and, therefore, I think for a time to come unity and a clear deterrent force and deterrent strength of the alliances are of the greatest importance for the maintenance of peace. And this, I think, also if I may add one sentence to a question the gen-

tleman put before you the question of the psychological situation in our country, and I think Professor Schucht answered this perfectly. There is only one point I wanted to add and that is the alliance among younger people, and I am not speaking of the campus people, I am not speaking of the radical left, I am speaking of the general youth of this country which has lost a lot of its glamour. It has become a rather gloomy affair because it is being associated with withdrawals; with people—desires—leaving the integration with problems of atomic weapons; with accusations of American dominance, and all these things. And, therefore, I think it is our job as politicians to make everything clear to our younger generation that we have a duty to support this instrument of peace because it is the only thing we can do to maintain peace in the coming five or 10 years. And then I think we should also stress that NATO is not an end in itself and that we will be the first ones to talk about changing the military structure; about abandoning the alliance; about reducing forces; about scrapping arms when the time has come. But between this day and today lies a very dangerous period of consultation. Those who want to preserve peace must support the deterrent force of the alliance.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, since the events of Czechoslovakia in August last, there has very naturally been an emphasis on unified defensive action within NATO. Before that it was considered that NATO could be used as an instrument for the negotiating—the mutual reduction—of the concentration of armed forces in Central Europe and for measures of arms control. Since August that has been pretty well in the background I suppose in Germany as well as elsewhere. There has been a repeated statement that one is still interested in that but I would like to know whether the German government—Germany—would support a renewed effort within NATO to bring about this arms control or to offer at any rate—to speak for one side—to offer measures towards reduction of this, it seems to me, a tremendous concentration—a dangerous concentration—of firepower in Central Europe.

The Vice-Chairman: Perhaps Mr. Petersen would like to answer that.

Mr. Petersen: To this point I would make one thing quite clear, we are all politicians, and in our case in Germany we are standing for re-election this year. It is always much more difficult to stand up before the taxpayer—and I do not have to explain this to colleagues—and tell them we need airplanes and tanks and guns instead of building this road or that hospital. And we Germans, all of us, would much rather spend these 20 billion marks, which is about \$5 billion American dollars per year, on hospitals and roads and universities and other things than on tanks and guns and planes. As my friend, Kiepe, has just pointed out, we would be the first ones to try to find a way to reduce the immense burden on our people which this participation in the framework of NATO in financial terms requests. But you need, I believe, not to forget two points.

One is before August 21 last year, there was a lot of very wishful thinking abroad, also in this country. Nobody could conceive that anybody ever would use tanks again in Europe in order to achieve political or economic ends. And when we pointed to the Czechs that in conventional terms, apart from the nuclear field, the Warsaw Pact countries are superior to the NATO forces in Europe, the ratio is about three to 1, we were always reminded by many people inside Germany and outside that after all the intentions of the other side are peaceful and therefore we could relax and we could use our alliance—the military pact—in order to start, what you, sir, pointed out to come to some kind of an agreement to get these birds off our fence.

This phase in a certain extent has been shattered. But I would say that today it is a very difficult, if not impossible job to try to assess the motivation of the men in the Kremlin, it is almost like astrology. Because in the old days when Stalin or Khrushchev was in power you had to deal with one man and you could try to assess his probable reaction to A, B, or C. Today you have a Central Committee within which you have “hawks” and “doves” and you have obviously changing majorities within the Central Committee, the average age of which is 60. It is a group of old men who have reached their power on the road under Stalin and have been taught by that mentality. And of course as Dr. Mummer has pointed out quite rightly, it is far more secure to deal with a partner who is safe, confident, sure of himself, knows exactly what he wants, than to deal with a partner who is insecure and who might react this or

that way. Therefore, I believe we have to endure the cold, hard facts counting noses, guns, tanks, planes here and in the Warsaw Pact. We have to keep the risk of any limited or larger scale war for anybody who might play with the idea and the temptation to use these means to achieve political ends, to keep the risk for anybody who would consider that they were entitled to them and that we can only do in the framework of an alliance where the other side knows. May this intrusion be small or large he will not be involved only with a German regiment or an Italian division, he will immediately be confronted with the whole free world. And there, if I may be permitted to add one last word on the specific role of the Canadian forces, you have 11,000 troops here in my country and we are grateful that they are there. I may add that their personal relations—I know it from Southern Germany, my own constituency, they are first rate ambassadors in this country. But apart from that point it is not the 11,000 troops as such but the Starfighters, the Lockheed 104 and the Division you have in the North. But it is the effect of the tremendous moral authority of Canada and the world. Nobody can blame you of being imperialistic or colonialist or any such thing. You have the image in the world of a country which is primarily concerned with peace. You have established this image in actions like Cyprus and in other parts. And if the Canadians were to decide that their contribution is not all that important for maintaining peace, and if they were to decide to withdraw, many people in the world—Scandinavia or Mr. Mansfield and his friends in Washington—but especially here in Europe, they might think, and they probably would think, now the Canadian main concern according to your image is peace. If Canadians think for the maintenance of peace NATO is not all that important why should then we not try to find a different road. Gentlemen, we have to face the facts in this world in which we live that peace and freedom are not to be maintained cheap; there is no cheaper way unfortunately. The questions that we politicians of course have to answer before history is what we do with the time the armed forces are able to buy for us but that of course is a different field.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Legault?

The Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question could be for Professor Schucht, if

that is the correct pronunciation, and it relates to some extent to what Mr. Kiep and Mr. Petersen have just said. It concerns what is now taking place in Geneva. At the moment, discussion centres on the intentions and doubts that exist. My question is this: would West Germany be prepared to make certain concessions, should the talks indicate an intention to reduce Warsaw Pact and NATO forces?

[English]

Mr. Irwin Schucht: I do not know if I am the right person to address this question to, I doubt it. From what I know from my American friends of course we should have to make a clear distinction between the arrangement that is reached with the Soviet Union on the limitation of certain futuristic weapons, and this is one thing that does not affect at all the question of the conventional forces, since we are out of the running, for the time being at least, about these futuristic kind of tools, the question can only be properly related to conventional weapons or rather armament for conventional war.

What kind of conclusion politicians will draw you have to ask them themselves. One variable which is in the game which is hard to assess is how great an annoyance value Yugoslavia will be; Romania, I think, is fairly irrelevant. Again not so much as a country that defines a central headquarters on international politic terms rather a country which is upset internally because of certain social experiments which add to the dissent within the Soviet Union. Should the annoyance value of Yugoslavia increase drastically I think all deals are off, and I think that has to be kept in mind, and if I were to act I would buy time, I would not do anything right now.

An hon. Member: Would you clarify that, please?

Mr. Irwin Schucht: Yes I think one, we should state that we would welcome an agreement in Geneva. We think that a new acceleration of the arms race would be detrimental not only to the Soviet Union and the United States but also to peace because in this new arms race, apart from the wasted money that is involved, there is the danger of a sudden change and switch in the now existing balance of nuclear power and if one power, for instance were to assume temporarily the ability to protect its own territory from nuclear attack this would automatically, of course, shift and unsettle the

presently existing balance of power. And, therefore, we would like to see these talks succeed.

Two, we would like to see these talks succeed because we feel that the United States of America, who after all are our most important ally in the North Atlantic organization need all their strength and all their money to overcome certain problems which they face at home. This is another consideration.

Thirdly, as far as we are concerned we, of course, are ready to discuss conventional arms limitations at any given moment, provided that these discussions were met on a basis of full reciprocity and safeguarding also the right of inspection by some means which would have to be devised. In other words, we do not believe in unilateral concessions of the west in weakening NATO, but we would be ready to talk about actual limitation of conventional arms and troop levels in Europe at any moment if reciprocity is guaranteed. And how the Soviet Union reacted in the past to unilateral concessions is best demonstrated on the subject of Norway. Norway joined the NATO alliance under two conditions: number 1 was no atomic weapons on Norwegian territory and number 2, no foreign troops to be stationed. This was the condition of Norway joining NATO back in 1949 and this is still the condition today. No warheads and no foreign troops.

It is interesting to see how the Soviet Union reacted to this rather unique unilateral concession of the Norwegians. One would expect that the Soviet Union, which has a direct frontier with Norway so that satellite problems are not involved, would respond by reducing their opposing forces on the other side, but if you look at the facts and figures in northern Norway, the absolute contrary has happened. In fact this today is one of the very weak points of NATO and steps are being taken to remedy this situation.

Lastly on the question of the nuisance value of Yugoslavia. The problem I think that the Soviet leadership is facing today is translated into medieval terms, the problem of being pope and emperor at the same time and they find the two roles rather difficult to maintain at this particular phase. At this moment they are still trying to do both at the same time. I think in the long run they will find that in performing the one job it will be difficult enough.

Mr. Petersen: May I add one sentence?

The Vice-Chairman: Proceed, Mr. Petersen.

Mr. Petersen: I just wanted to add one point to this very important question. You see in May, 1967, the NATO Council decided, even though it did not say so in so many words, that we would unilaterally weaken NATO in the hope that the other side would follow suit. Between May, 1967 and August, 1968, 80,000 allied troops were withdrawn from this country. I need only to remind you of rotation like this scheme of the reduction of the British Rhine army, the Belgians and others. What actually happened was that in that same period the budget for armament in the Soviet Union was increased by 18 per cent. So this obviously did not seem to work so well. Then, of course, the NATO decisions after August, 1968, have stopped this trend. There was a lot of hope. I was at this conference and there was a lot of hope in our Council that if we would start substantially reducing that the others—we said after all the Russians have other important things to do also and they need to increase their standard of living and so on, they do not like this burden just as we do not and the fact was that the opposite was the case, obviously they were encouraged. They were thinking and they might have thought that there is a situation developing here which, of course, is the most dangerous thing if you want to maintain this.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Petersen. Dr. Wagner would also like to speak to the question.

Mr. Wolfgang Wagner: Very briefly, I should like to come back to a point raised here and that is the point of the concentration of weapons in Europe. While this seems to be dangerous, I feel up to now it has not proved to be that dangerous. The immediate danger we had in the past—and I am particularly referring to 1968—the danger was more in the grey areas of Europe; that means Yugoslavia, Finland and perhaps Austria, particularly after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. There was no immediate danger in all the areas where Soviet troops and American troops were immediately confronted with each other. But nevertheless we here in the Federal Republic do favour arms limitations. We do not only favour the negotiations at Geneva, but also the forthcoming bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations. There will be no impediment, I feel, from the German side toward these bilateral negotiations between the United States and

the Soviet Union. It all depends on the problem of reciprocity. There should be no troop reductions unilaterally from the western side, but it should be made mutual east and west.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman I would like to direct my first question to Mr. Kiep.

In your opening statement you mentioned that there was some kind of an understanding reached with the United States that it would not, at this moment, reduce its commitment to NATO in Europe. I wonder if this was brought about during the recent trip of the President to Europe and what sort of reductions do you anticipate and when do you think it might reduce its commitment here?

Mr. Kiep: Number one, there have been several statements made by the new administration to indicate that they are not considering withdrawing at this point or reducing their commitment at this point. They are depending, of course, upon the settlement of certain outstanding problems like the offset problem, which is a major obstacle in the internal discussion in the United States in connection with the maintaining of troops here. If there is a solution—I hope a long term solution is in sight. As far as their plans for the more distant future are concerned, I think the Americans would like to reduce their commitments substantially. I think the United States are aware of the fact that they will not be able to continue at the present level forever, offset or no offset. It is for that reason, I think, and this is just my assessment not based on any facts or figures or documents, that President Nixon was very interested to stimulate a new spirit of European co-operation, hoping that by closer European co-operation both in the political and the military field, the United States might find it easier, at some future time, to reduce their commitments, because something would have developed by then that would replace any withdrawal of U.S. troops. But I do not think the United States would consider such a move under the present political circumstances in Europe and with the present attitude of the Soviet Union prevailing. When and if that changes is hard to say at this moment. I think a significant breakthrough in arms talks with the Soviet Union might be a moment where the United States would take a new look at this. You know of course that the present administration which does not have the majority in both Houses in Washington is under constant pressure. Senator Mansfield has taken up the question of troop reductions

again after a six month period of silence after the Czech invasion. This will keep coming up; the pressure will be on, but unless there is a significant change in Soviet attitude, I do not think that the administration would consider undertaking a reduction of forces here.

On the question of rotation and dual base system. We of course have certain doubts as to the value or let me put it this way. We have certain doubts as to the ability to maintain the necessary deterrent strength under such an arrangement, because we have seen what happened in Czechoslovakia; we have seen that the warning times that we have built up and based our planning on have proved to be rather fictitious and I therefore think that there are certain limits to what you can do, big lift rotation-wise and I think the Americans are more realistic about this than they were some time ago.

The Vice-Chairman: I now have Messrs. MacLean, Nowlan, Lewis, Stewart, Anderson and Laniel in that order, remaining in the first round.

Mr. MacLean: I have a brief question for any person who wishes to answer it. I should preface my remarks by saying that I agree 100 per cent with the point of view expressed that the maintenance of NATO at the present time, especially is the only thing the west can do, but countries like Canada and the United States and Britain have not only the direct cost of maintaining troops here, but they also have the rather politically-damaging factor of drain on their balance of payments as a result of the contribution they make. What progress is being made, or might be made towards relieving this aspect of the contribution of troops to Germany—which are stationed in Germany under the NATO plan by Canada for example?

Mr. Petersen: This has been for a number of years a very thorny problem in particular to the United States, because in 1968 the Americans had a negative balance of payments of \$4 billion and we Germans, little Germany, had a positive balance of payments of exactly the same amount of \$4 billion. Our export has been so successful that even last year we had a positive balance of payments of \$16.3 billion marks which is again a little over \$4 billion. The Americans figure that they spend about \$900 million per year here in this country which goes into the German Federal reserve bank in terms of dollars and so much of it adds to our foreign exchange

balance that that in itself is not a very comfortable position to be in, currency-wise, in terms of an inflationary pressure which of course comes from this.

Now we are spending about \$100 million a year in training German soldiers in the United States; \$100 million for schools for pilots, for rocket specialists and others, therefore you have a difference of about \$800 million and that is the basis on which we talk. There are two aspects in which we have tried to solve this problem. One is buying equipment in the United States for modernizing our weapon systems and so on. We have made a number of decisions since last summer which involved a great deal of money, like buying 88 Phantom bombers rather—a reconnaissance version of the Phantom and like buying 132 medium-sized helicopters and modernizing the Pershing system and others, this has brought amounts up to the amount that I have mentioned—this would add up to the amount that I mentioned. The other aspect that we are talking about and that we have not had an agreement on yet is the fact that the Americans are spending \$125 million per year in wages for Germans employed by the American 7th Army, workers and white collar workers and all sorts of different areas, and for the first time the United States Government has come up with the idea whether we would not support the budget of the 7th Army by meeting the payroll, the budget being 3.6 million dollars per year. This is the budget of the 7th Army stationed in this country, you see the size and the scope of the problem.

Now I know that with your government, sir, we have had a number of talks about the question whether you could sell us products which we could use in our armed forces. We had very much hoped that you would participate in developing the new aeroplane which is going to be a tremendous object which we call the NKF, an aeroplane which will in the mid-70's replace the Star Fighter which you of course operate also. We have then to put it quite bluntly. We have been very disappointed for a number of reasons that your government has decided to pull out from this project. Whether there will be developments, I know that government officials from Bonn have been in Canada recently. I have not had a report yet as to what has come out of these talks. But on principle we would be delighted to cooperate as much as possible with your industry, especially in the field of advanced technology. Because we, as you know, are at

one point in an identical position. We always have to decide and you gentlemen being in the same committee as we are know that we have to buy equipment so to speak off the shelf in the United States, tried and tested in the price we pay, that the thing will fly or operate, or whatever it has to do, or spend a lot of money in research and development in our own industries, and I wish we could come down to specific projects which we could develop together on a bilateral basis, Canadian and German industry. Of course there is one problem which you gentlemen have to figure out which I do not know the answer to. That is that if you look closely at Canadian terms related with this kind of hardware production very often the majority of the capital is in the hands of the United States and therefore big United States corporations. Therefore whether this hope of mine is practical, I think has to be decided on specific negotiations and specific questions. But in this field of development the balance of power is not held as it is in the United States. I think we could find a way together which would bolster our near balance of payments problems as contributed by the 11,000 troops in the country as well as developing together in an amity which in time would compare our industry to the United States which would benefit both.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you Mr. Petersen. Mr. Bower would also like to comment on this question.

Mr. Bower (Canadian Ambassador): I would like to make one comment on this. We are talking here about offset payments. The question of Canada, Mr. MacLean, the question of Canada also making an offset arrangement with Germany has come up. It has invariably been resisted by our office and the decision has been taken not to proceed with the negotiating of an offset agreement. My reason for this, one is that these offset agreements are in question between Germany and United States, between Germany and Britain whenever they negotiate. It is an annual festering sore and we have avoided it. Secondly our balance of payments with Germany has been favourable, but nevertheless I think there is something to be said for continuing a watchful eye on this tradition. We do not want the existence of offset agreements with others to prevent us from getting business which we would have a legitimate right to claim. For example, if we are competitive in certain material and we have found cases where we are not getting the business. If we are com-

petitive we do not want to lose that business because we do not have an offset agreement and somebody else has then they are using this material to sop up some of the fat. Now this . . . We have a number of cases where this happens. All we can ask is we do not want you to buy from us if our prices are high. We do not want you to buy it from us if our quality is poor, but we do ask that where we are competitive that we should not be prevented from selling because of the existence of an offset agreement with somebody else. There have been I think in the past occasions when we have not had our fair share of these things, but we made our point of view known. They have taken a look at it. Now you have mentioned here this new multi-role aircraft.

I am prepared to make a bet with anybody here that it does not get off the ground. I think this thing is just about one month from folding up. Now it is true that in its original conception we had a chance to participate, maybe it is folding up because we are not in it.

Mr. Petersen: Mr. Ambassador, if you did not have a higher salary than I have, I would take you up on it.

Mr. Bower: You do not know what my salary is. The fact remains that this multi-role aircraft did offer an opportunity for us to co-operate but my bet is now that this multi-role aircraft, NFG (NKF) will never get off the ground.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question to the panel and see if there is any difference of view between the elected members of the panel and the intellectual panel, and it has—which sometimes happens in Canada too, by the way, and it has to do with the very real political question of the re-unification of Germany, and on the premise that in Canada political parties from time to time get boxed into positions that frankly are behind public opinion, I would like to ask the panel as divided, if in fact in the political parties there is any difference on this view and I gather there is not, but if in the new generation which has never experienced a united Germany if there is not a bubble of discontent about the present policy of the parties and outside of the parties if there is any—if the public opinion are really vitally concerned about re-unification where Western Germany has been so productive and so progressive in the last few years?

Mr. Schuch: This is a more serious question than the balance of payments problem, re-unification is rather more intellectual. The structural problem could apply to a more reconstructive measure which we invent. There is a move on, by the way on the drawing board by Germany through scientific research with United States which will also ease the balance of payments problem. But the structural problem is that as long as the race of inflation in the various countries continues to differ to the degree that they do, this will be a festering sore, re-evaluation or not. And the only long-term solution is economic and military, a rather close kind of operation economically between various countries. The main structural problem that I see here is that the Latin countries are determined to continue with a degree of easy-money policy that other countries find unacceptable. But unfortunately the whole problem has not become enough yet to be fully tackled so the question is premature for the next few years and we have got to invent little things, like buying this or that.

Now to the second question on re-unification. What little we get from public opinion in East Germany, they are conducting their own research now, people have accommodated themselves to the regime without loving it. It is not so terrible that you would like to incur great danger to do very much about it. I hope I make it precise enough. I do not like it, but it is relative to the other countries, fairly acceptable. They are, well the figures are compiled with the Central Committee unofficially, anyway I heard is you put the standard of living in East Germany at 100, you put Czechoslovakia somewhere about 90, and Poland is about 60, and that provides enough of a contrast to feel relatively happy even though you would put officially West Germany at 140. From our side, certain intellectuals of different ages, physical that is, rather than mental, make the question of the recognition of the DDR into a moral issue. And the lack of moral courage to send a document favourably recognizing it as a legal entity. From what I hear from the population, the politicians are fairly free to do this or not do this as the situation will warrant. There is not great pressure to come to any form of dramatic action, in the government. And the main concern is that of family relations and of personal contacts with East Germany. The estimate is that about one-third of the population here has fairly close personal ties with a person on the other side. One would like to have this less interrupted that it is.

Have I then got this question off the ideological hook? Thank you.

The Vice Chairman: Is there anyone else on the panel who would like to speak to this question?

An hon. Member: Of course. We are defeated.

Mr. Petersen: I would take issue with the difference you make between intellectuals and politicians.

On this point, you are quite right, a whole generation has grown up that does not know from their own experience the living conditions in East Germany. On the other hand you must understand that sometimes we get the feeling that our friends do not quite appreciate how deeply this tragedy sits in our heart, so to speak. I personally went to school on the other side. I was not aware how much I felt but the fact is, it is far more easy for me to go to Canada, Ottawa, than to Leipzig which is part of my country. There is a lot of frustration in Germany, I believe in all age groups, more pronounced though probably in the youths, frustration that politicians have taught at every occasion about re-unification as being our great national aspiration, without being able to do anything about it. And if you talk about this for 25 years people get cynical, fed up. We have one day in the year, the 17th of June, commemorating the day when there was an uprising in East Germany against the Communist regime and that was folded up under Russian tanks. I had occasion for a number of years to make a speech every 17th of June at a big rally and every year I get more uneasy as to what I tell those people. And the other thing is we have jointed the Atlantic Alliance, the alliance of the free world, and our allies have promised us on paper and they repeat this promise every once in a while that they would help us to somehow solve the German problem. And the suspicion is rising, the conviction is rising, that there are very few people in the East or in the West who would pull out their legs, as we say in German in order to re-form a country in which 75 million Germans would live as a national entity which of course would immediately be the most powerful—quite apart from the military aspect—economic country in Europe, which nobody in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, France or anywhere else is so terribly keen about. We understand that. Therefore for a great number of years we have said the only road

towards the solution of the German question is a road via a politically united Europe, because on the day when Belgium, Holland, Italy and West Germany become provinces of the politically-united Europe then East Germany and Hungary and Czechoslovakia and so on will be other provinces and there will not be one overpowering national state. I do not think you will find anybody in Germany who thinks that we will have again a national *Reich*, a national state of the whole of Germany. The tragedy is, and that, I think, has led to real spiritual crises, especially again among the younger people, that the cry for a politically united Europe which was taking up this tremendous enthusiasm after the war has bogged down and the united Europe today is a question for many people of the price of cheese and of technical agreements between the various partners. Men like Dr. Mummer, who has been one of the pioneers of a politically-united Europe, came into a position—now you have to speak for yourself, sir, but—came into a position where it is almost impossible to show a concrete road towards a united Europe and the nationalism—to be again quite blunt—which has led the policy of France over the last years in intoxicating directions across this river which goes right by this hotel. There we are politically, in a very difficult position right now, trying to maintain the drive towards uniting Europe. We sacrificed a great deal in order to achieve a politically united Europe and yet this goal seems to be very far away. In this respect you might point out that we have not been very wise sometimes; we have given rise to the suspicion that we wanted to become Europeans in order to forget our dirty past, forget that we are Germans and by being Europeans we will all be loving one another and that does not quite work that way, and we come to the point that we realize that we have to become better Germans in order to become Europeans. But those questions, the solution of the German question, re-unification, and the unification of Europe and the power of the communist ideology and the power, the military power in Eastern Europe today, all those questions are inter-related and it is dangerous as it is done sometimes in political circles of this country to just look at one of them and then of course blame the stupid politicians because they have not been able to achieve anything.

Mr. Prud'homme: What are the conditions in East Germany?

Mr. Petersen: Reports we have indicate that, as Professor Schucht has pointed out that the people in East Germany have accommodated themselves to their regime. They are proud of things that they have achieved and built up, in which they have been very successful compared to their neighbours in the East, but it is quite obvious that what Hitler succeeded in doing with me personally and with my generation in getting our enthusiastic support in the Hitler Youth, Ulbricht has not been able to achieve with the communist youth movement in East Germany, in fact he has a great many headaches with his university campuses, with his communist youth organization, as many report to me.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Petersen. Dr. Mummer would like to have a word on this.

Mr. Mummer: Gentlemen, the difficulty is this: in dictatorships, there are no free elections or Gallup polls and it is therefore impossible to know what people are thinking. However, there are certain indications that enable us to form a judgment.

In Berlin, for example, there is a demarcation-line consisting of a wall, is there not, a wall that cuts across city streets? And in Berlin, on the western side, there are free elections. On the other side of the street, they have communist-style elections. On this side of the street, there are fewer than two per cent of the people who are communists, even in the former communist areas of the Republic of Germany; there are less than two per cent in perfectly-free elections, with a legal communist organization, and all the support they get from the other side—money, of course, as well as through communist radio and television; they still get only two per cent of the votes.

On the other side of the street, they also have voting for their Parliament, the *Volkskammer*, which is always unanimous, with the communists getting 99.998 per cent of the votes. Well, what I mean to say is that, among democrats, it is difficult to speak very meaningfully about the state of mind in a dictatorship. For myself, and speaking with some experience of dictatorships—we have now had several in this country—I will say: give us three months of freedom, and allow our democratic parties into that territory to compete with the communist party, and they will get perhaps even fewer votes, after those three months, than the communists receive

here on our side; they get two per cent of the votes in the various organizations they have here which are, in fact, communist.

Well, so much for the question of public opinion over there, where there is a dictatorship, and one cannot speak of free public opinion, because it is not allowed to form, to organize, or to express itself. A comment on German reunification: I personally believe that this feeling of belonging to a single people still exists, and will continue to exist. Mr. Schucht pointed out that there are some thirty per cent or more of the population here who have relatives on the other side, and this is a very important fact. Secondly, it must not be forgotten, after all, that everyone on the other side is aware of the fact that the régime they have there is not a régime established by the Germans themselves, but one established by the Russian divisions, and backed by them. There are twenty divisions there, and they are even more essential to keep the régime in power than are the Russian divisions in Czechoslovakia to keep that country within the Warsaw Pact orbit. That régime, imposed upon the population, is fairly oppressive; its restrictive, narrow and bureaucratic nature impinges constantly on the people's awareness. Nor is it necessary to have democratic education in the schools and in every aspect of public life for people to realize that they are oppressed, that they are not free, and that they cannot do as they wish. Mr. Petersen was saying that it is easier to go to Toronto than to Leipzig. That is true, but for the people of Leipzig, it is far more difficult still to come, say, here to the banks of the Rhine or to go abroad; after all, they are completely deprived of freedom. Imagine, in Berlin it is impossible for a mother living on one side to go and visit her daughter living on the other, and for the daughter to go and visit her mother. It is impossible for West Berliners to go and see relatives in another city in the DDR. All this depresses the people; the standard of living is rising there too, and people are going on vacation and travelling more and more. They can visit other countries within the communist bloc, though not Czechoslovakia any more—that is dangerous; one's loyalty to the communist party is endangered by spending two weeks vacationing in Czechoslovakia. And do you think that all this can continue for years and years, without this reaction developing all the time?

Of course, the day of freedom will come, I am convinced of that; nothing is really settled

that is settled by force. When will it come? We do not know; we have no illusions. We know that we do not have the means to bring about freedom here next year, or in ten years, or even in twenty years; we have no way of knowing. All we can do, as Mr. Petersen so rightly said, is to prepare ourselves politically, with regard not only to the East but also to the West, to make German reunification acceptable. We realize that today, the Federal Republic is already becoming a problem for its neighbours, because of its economic power. For our friends in Paris, they are becoming too strong, and our strength is a source of irritation. It is possible, is it not, to imagine what would result from a reunified Germany with 75 million inhabitants? It is because of this, as well as for reasons of national interest, that we are for Europe, that we are confirmed Europeans, and I do not mean the little Europe of the Six. The little Europe is too small, we are too big and too wealthy for it. We are strong advocates of a big Europe, of British entry into the Common Market, and of a Europe of abundance protected by a system of collective defence in which German armed forces will be not national, but European forces, thus giving no cause for alarm either in the East or in the West. That is why we can be relied on to support European integration.

In short, we are not giving up; we know we cannot name the date, but the future will bring freedom.

[English]

Mr. Nowlan: May I ask, especially in the generation where they have never experienced a united Germany, if the fact of re-unification would upset the economic balance, the present political balance of opposition parties and upset, as I understand it, perhaps the religious balance within the country? With this imbalance and the unification and the help that the West Germans would have to give to the East Germans to bring them up, that there was not a mood developing within a group of people, or perhaps within a newer generation within the parties to explore removing a lot of these festering sores that you so eloquently talked about, sir, and irritations and problems in transportation to see relatives, rather than trying to resolve the fundamental problem itself. In other words, to explore accommodation as a political reality, as a substitute for perhaps the irresolvable problem of political unions. That was my point.

Mr. Ryan: I wonder if we could have a view from Mr. Muggenberg?

Mr. Muggenberg: I might start by saying that I find myself in a strange position—agreeing with our politicians—part way anyway. It was mentioned the feeling of belonging together in both parts of Germany is still very strong despite the fact that the political outlook is rather bad. I must say that German politicians in the last couple of years—there was another time about 10 years ago—or the last three or four years at least, are very realistic. That means they do not try to sell any prizes on saying that unification is just around the corner if you just let them. I think they are very fair to the public and to the electorate.

Coming back to what was said about the feeling of belonging together. I think this is partly due to the fact that a stream of information is going from East to West and West to East, though we have the Iron Curtain and the Wall, and this is mainly due to the fact that radio-television goes over the wall and over the Iron Curtain. As you know, the East German government does not allow selling of Western newspapers, but they cannot stop the radio waves. So we reach four national radio programs, 100 per cent of the East German public, and 75 per cent of East Germany, in technical terms, can be reached by German television—by West German television, and we know that at least 40 per cent of those people in East Germany listen every night to German radio or German television, and I think it is very important that both parts of Germany know more or less exactly what is going on in the other part. This will, I think, keep up this feeling of belonging and strengthen it despite the fact that unification may come about in 10 or 20 years or even later.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I want to raise a question which has worried me throughout my trip and particularly here today. I heard a number of you refer to Czechoslovakia as being a sign of something sufficient to frighten everyone about Soviet intentions, more than one was frightened before August. In fact one of you gentlemen even said that you had reached the stage where you did not think this would ever happen, at the same time that you describe very fully what the Communist dictatorship always is. And when you cannot help but

remember that you had a similar situation in East Germany in 1953, if my memory serves me right, and in Hungary in 1956 and in Poland in 1956, I find it awfully difficult to understand how mature and obviously very intelligent and knowledgeable people could have been so surprised at what happened in Czechoslovakia and present that as a reason for a new kind of policy. It seems to me that what happened in Czechoslovakia is something that could have been foretold and that can still be foretold and that it may represent merely Soviet determination within its sphere of influence and not represent anything that is an additional threat to the West. I say, an additional threat, because I realize the others. I would like to understand better why it is that so many people in Europe, perhaps it is because I live in Canada far away that I was less touched by it, you have a border with Czechoslovakia—why this event has had, apparently, this kind of result in your minds and in your hearts. Finally, may I apologize for this lengthy introduction but I think it is an important question, I wonder whether all of us may not be using the Czechoslovakian invasion as a means of further propaganda to strengthen certain other policies that we want to strengthen, and whether in speaking of Czechoslovakia we are not really talking about East Germany with a more direct concern that the Russian divisions in East Germany might be increased. I just do not accept the proposition that Czechoslovakia was such a traumatic experience.

Mr. Kiep: Sir, I think the question is a very difficult one and it should come up in a discussion like this. Perhaps we make the mistake of just mentioning Czechoslovakia without explaining fully what we mean when we say sudden change or sudden conditions. Let me deal with the psychological problem first.

Many people politically interested in Europe and in Germany and perhaps in other parts of the world, certainly also in Eastern Europe, were watching the Czech experiment with great hope. They were hoping that out of this might emerge what one might call co-existence. The possibility of a Communist system, a socialist state, with freedom. This is why this is so fascinating and this is why everybody was watching this development which started in January of last year and finally, temporarily ended in August of 1968. This was not only the intellectual pleasure of seeing a process out of which might emerge a combined system which would allow freedom and Communism to co-exist, but also for

many, particularly Germans of course, the hope that out of this might emerge a model for a solution of the German problem. A solution of the German problem by way of a certain measure of self-determination, under a Communist system with a socialist economy, with state-owned enterprises and so on, but with freedom. And when these hopes were shattered with the Soviet invasion on August 21, of course, this caused and brought about quite a reaction; this is the psychological part.

Now, the political part—and this is the one that I tried to explain and bring out in my opening statement is of course that up to August 21 many people had believed in the West that the move toward more freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would occur gradually, peacefully, without eruption, without violence and that therefore our policy ought to be directed towards promoting these efforts, supporting these efforts by conducting a similar policy ourselves—by liberalizing trade with Eastern Europe, by exchanging delegations of Parliament, by extending traffic in every form and shape. August 21, and this I think is the political meaning of it—the political impact of it, showed that the Soviet Union was not willing to let this occur, that they would move in by force, stop such a process. And this move was then made and legalized and formalized by the document which declare all countries within the socialist sphere of influence have a limited autonomy and cannot by their own free will or decision, leave the camp or even change certain structures like allowing free press, allowing opposition, allowing free exchange of visitors and so on. I think it is that reason, that fact, that has made August 21 important. Of course all we talk about are the military aspects, about divisions being in places where they were not before. Let us leave this to the military people to decide. But politically speaking, I think, this is the importance of the Czech event. This shows that the government and the Soviet Union is reactionary in the sense that it has decided and determined to maintain its present status quo internally in the Soviet Union and in the socialist camp with police state methods and use military force where and if necessary.

Mr. Lewis: Does that surprise you?

Mr. Walter Kiep: Yes, this has surprised some of us and I do not want to go into details describing the German political scene prior to the 21st of August, but Mr. Petersen

already mentioned that there were people with certain illusions and they were not bad people; they were people who really believed that this was the road toward co-existence and progress and that we were already there. There were others who said that we were not there yet and whether we would get there would depend on our permanent decision to maintain a strong and united West. Now this is not a subject to discuss at this point, but I assure you that the political impact of the 21st of August is the fact that there is no hope at this point in the present Soviet administration of achieving full co-existence with Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union and that we are back, politically-speaking, realistically-speaking, to where we were in the early 50s where the only person you could talk to was in the Kremlin in Moscow. You could not talk to the man at Prague or Warsaw or Budapest; you could only talk to the man in the Kremlin. We are back at precisely that point. This, I think, is the impact of the 21st of August and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The impact was very very severe on the people in East Germany. I am still able to go to East Germany occasionally and I hope I will continue to be able to do so. I was there in September, shortly after the Czech invasion and these people were really in great distress because the Czech invasion, which was carried out with the help of East German troops, to them was the most incredible thing that could have happened. They were watching this Czech experiment with great anxiety and with great hope and, of course, with illusions because they saw more freedom for themselves. And if I may answer your question, sir, that you put, I think to young people in West Germany and in East Germany, the problem has assumed proportions of a human problem more than a political or a national problem and these people saw in Czechoslovakia something emerging which would help them. Then all these hopes were dashed by this invasion and when they saw their own troops participating, this was really something of a shock from which I do not think they have recovered yet and many many young people in East Germany who were ready to accept the Ulbricht regime have not yet forgiven Ulbricht for participating in this attack on the neighbouring country.

To sum up, I think Czechoslovakia has had a very sobering effect and many illusions have disappeared and I hope that out of this

will come a more realistic policy towards the East, but I think we should not lose sight of the fact that the move towards more freedom is going to continue. It will continue and we have many indications of that, even indications from the Soviet Union. I only remind you of the event which we saw in the spring of this year. All this will continue. The present Soviet government is trying to stop this by force. This makes the future dangerous and full of risks throughout, but I think in the end we will come to a change of mind on the other side. I am afraid you are right in saying we are a long way off.

The Chairman: Members of the panel and the Committee, there is no intention whatsoever to curtail this discussion and your lunch has been arranged to allow it to continue. We have some who wish to make a reply to Mr. Lewis' question. Perhaps in view of the fact that we have four more questioners as well; Messrs. Stewart, Anderson, Laniel and Thompson remaining in the first round in that order, perhaps now would be a good time to adjourn, have an aperitif and then continue when we sit down to lunch. Would this be agreed? We will adjourn then to the dining room.

Paris, France, March 20, 1969

[Translation]

The Chairman: We are very happy to be here this morning. I shall now ask our colleague, Mr. Laniel, to be acting chairman for this morning's meeting Mr. Laniel?

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Laniel): First of all, gentlemen, I am pleased to welcome the Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Black, who will be addressing us and will make some comments regarding the various meetings we shall be having during the day. I wish to introduce to you and welcome to us, Mr. Black, he is the Minister of the Embassy who will address us and also give us some comments concerning the different meetings we will have during the day. Maybe this is the worst that I should be called to do this job. I will do my best with your kind co-operation. Thank you. Mr. Black.

With Mr. Chairman's permission, I think we could start at once by asking Mr. Black to make his short presentation.

Thank you for your kind remarks, Your Excellency, and thank you particularly for having agreed to be with us today. I know your health has caused you some problems in recent weeks, and I hope these few hours

with us will help you to regain your strength. As His Excellency has just said, Mr. Black, if you would be good enough to proceed, the members of the Committee will be able, afterwards, to ask some questions about our meetings today.

Mr. Black: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Acting Chairman: I would appreciate it very much if you would accept to say a few words to the members of this Committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Black (Minister Plenipotentiary): First of all, the Ambassador has just arrived.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Ambassador, we were about to begin our meeting, and I was going to invite Mr. Black to address us, but I believe it would be appropriate to ask you to say a few words to the Canadian delegation, and perhaps set the pace for us on what will be an important day in our meetings and discussions.

The Ambassador, Mr. Paul Beaulieu: Mr. Chairman, members of the National Defence and External Affairs Committee:

Needless to say, you are welcome visitors to the Embassy. As you know, France is playing a very important role—one that is sometimes a little enigmatic for Canadians—in NATO and in the fields of disarmament and security. Personally—for we are mainly expressing personal opinions—I believe that this attitude and this direction in French policy are largely due to a European concept or philosophy that is different from the one we hold in Canada, perhaps, and is not shared by all European countries.

But as you know, this vision of Europe is the work of a head of state who has played a significant role in Europe, and whose reputation wins him very wide acceptance in France, as demonstrated in the last election after the disturbances in May; however, this does not mean that France is not seeking a formula for European and Atlantic co-operation. It is a different formula, but as you know, the recent visits of the United States President and the West German Chancellor seem to have opened up some new approaches. At this stage, it is difficult to determine exactly how far these new approaches can be defined, and at what point, for instance, the United Kingdom could be integrated into Europe.

I am giving you these few pointers simply to show you that, in a sense, French policy is

more difficult to define than those of other European countries you have visited, or are going to visit. We thought the best way to proceed, if the members of the Committee agree, would be to start with a short presentation given by the Minister from the Embassy, Mr. Black, who has been dealing with these matters for a number of years and will, I believe, be able to give you more precise guidance.

Later, of course, my colleagues and I will be happy to try to answer your questions insofar as we are able, since we know we are dealing with experts, and experts sometimes do better than diplomats.

[English]

Mr. Black: Gentlemen, first before beginning my presentation perhaps I could just introduce you to three of my colleagues who will help me in answering any of your questions afterwards. First of all our service Attaché, Col. H. P. Lagacé, next our political counsellor Mr. W. M. Wood and Mr. J. Dupuis, our Counsellor in charge of NATO and European matters.

We are particularly glad to see you here, gentlemen, because our feeling that in a trip such as yours which is primarily one of information—to give you a balanced idea of the various currents of policy on defence and political questions it is essential to visit France which in a sense is the opposition. Opposition in the sense that its views on defence and on many of the European political questions of today are at variance with those of their immediate neighbours. I do not need to press this point, you are as aware of this as I am.

What I would like to do this morning in my briefing is to set out for you what we consider to be the main elements of de Gaulle's foreign and defence policy. In order to enable you, with your questions that you will ask afterwards, to be better able to understand the French officials and ministers who you will be hearing later in the day and also better able to pose the various questions which no doubt you will wish to pose.

I am not entering into any criticism of French policy. I think you are perfectly able to do that yourselves and in any case I am sure you have heard a considerable amount of it in your trip so far and you certainly will again when you go to Brussels. My briefing will take about 12 to 14 minutes and it will be in French which is the working language of this embassy.

[Translation]

Mr. Black: As far as we can judge from the writings and words of General de Gaulle whose personality has dominated French political life over the past ten years, it would seem that a certain idea of France has constituted the primary inspiration of his political thought and the principal motive of his action. De Gaulle places the ideas of state, country and national sovereignty above all else. For him, the organization of international life makes sense only if it proceeds from the free will of free nations. With regard to France, it is understood that in the Gaullist concept her place and role must correspond to the prestige, experience and human and cultural resources she has accumulated over more than a thousand-year history. For the President of France, the position France occupies in the world has always been an essential reference point and for ten years his policy has tended towards one major objective: to give France the means for a new role and new mission in the world and particularly in Europe.

French foreign policy has first of all a universal dimension due to the fact that France has interests which extend beyond her borders and those of Europe, that she continues to occupy an important position in the world economy both through her trade and the extent of her foreign aid and that, taking into account her possibilities, the spread and influence of the French language and culture remains an important reality. And I insist on this point. The other traditional dimension of French foreign policy is European, or better, continental; it is this second dimension which interests us more today. The Gaullist concept of a national and free foreign policy was to meet with much opposition in a struggling, postwar Europe. At the time of his accession to power, General de Gaulle assumed control of a country which for ten years had lived politically in the Atlantic world and whose military forces were integrated with those of NATO. Accordingly, from the Gaullist point of view, France despite herself had entered the system of hegemony created by the Yalta agreements which had divided Europe into two rival zones of influence (these are General de Gaulle's words, not mine), the American and Soviet, obviously two rival zones. In the eyes of de Gaulle, this double hegemony constituted an inadmissible barrier to the freedom of France and still prevents the European nations today from seeking among themselves a settlement of the problems inherited from the war. For the past ten

years, therefore, France has concentrated her efforts within the Western world on freeing herself in all areas from American ascendancy over the destiny of France and Europe. At the same time, she wanted to spark a similar process in Eastern Europe, particularly through bilateral contacts. General de Gaulle often stated that this policy was not anti-American: it was French and European and sought to avoid at all costs a Europe divided up between the super powers who would decide on its future together without taking into account the vital interests of the European countries. The objectives I have just named have inspired France's entire European policy over the past ten years in the strategic, political and economic fields.

What France wanted to accomplish in Western Europe was what was first of all called "l'Europe des patries..." and then "l'Europe européenne". For Western Europe, General de Gaulle was forced to accept the Treaty of Rome but he nevertheless attempted to change it and succeeded in preventing the evolution towards supra-nationality which the authors of the Treaty held as essential. For the idea of supra-nationality he wanted to substitute a personal concept. The object of the plan was a division of world and particularly European responsibilities between the United States, on the one hand, and a renewed Europe in which obviously France was to play a key role. To the structure which she then proposed, France wanted to give not only political jurisdiction, but also powers in the field of economics and defence. (It is important to emphasize that it was an equal sharing of responsibilities between Europe and the United States that General de Gaulle seems once again to have proposed to Mr. Soames, British Ambassador to Paris, during a famous interview last February 4 and to Chancellor Kiesinger the following week.) To this idea of a Western Europe as an equal partner with the United States was grafted an old, personal dream of which de Gaulle had spoken in his war memoirs, that of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the opinion of General de Gaulle, the Soviet Union would sooner or later discover its European vocation and seek to establish both with the United States and Europe a lasting *modus vivendi* which would enable it to face the greater danger threatening it from outside, China. Thus the Gaullist regime believed in a progressive liberation of Eastern Europe which the USSR, for political

and strategic reasons, would be forced to accept. Its policy of a *détente* with the East is in accordance with this line of thought and General de Gaulle continued to state, even after the events of Czechoslovakia, that although the evolution desired by France was temporarily thwarted, it is good because it exists and because, basically, it remains irreversible.

In the field of strategy, NATO like the Warsaw Pact have always represented for the President of France the military instruments of the American and Soviet hegemony in Europe. Even before acceding to power, the General had condemned the military organization of the Atlantic Pact which, in his opinion, involved the integration of the French forces in a system entirely run by the United States. The major steps of the Gaullist policy in relation to NATO may be roughly summarized as follows.

(a) First of all, the General was to propose on several occasions an organization involving France, England and the United States which would be responsible for making joint decisions on international problems and which, in the military field, would grant each of these three countries an equal voice "in common decisions on the use of nuclear weapons".

(b) This proposal, several times renewed, was to be rejected by Washington. The General thus concluded publicly in 1959 that the only defence possible was national defence. Again in 1959 he was to withdraw French forces in the Mediterranean from NATO control.

(c) In 1962, the General was to propose unsuccessfully to France's partners in the Common Market the Fouchet Plan which provided for a European political union involving responsibilities not only in the economic and political fields but also in the military sector. The same year, following the Nassau Agreements, de Gaulle refused to commit the French nuclear dissuasion force to a multilateral forces project integrated within NATO, the famous M.L.F. (Multilateral Nuclear Force). The same year he was to withdraw all the French naval forces from the NATO combined command.

(d) At the beginning of 1966, all the French forces were withdrawn from the integrated command of the Atlantic Alliance. France, however, still remains a member of the Atlantic Alliance but her political role in it has become minor.

To fully understand the situation of France in relation to NATO it is important to emphasize that the French government has been able to move away from the Atlantic Alliance without compromising her higher interests. One might even say that France could permanently leave the Atlantic Alliance at very little cost if international circumstances, and particularly relationships between East and West, lent themselves to such action. Indeed, France's geographic position in Europe is a strategic one and even if she left the Atlantic Alliance, she would nevertheless continue to benefit not only from the protection of American nuclear weapons but from the shield of the standard forces of the NATO countries which surround her. What is more, France has no need of the pretext of NATO to maintain troops in Germany, a right she possesses on the same grounds as the United States and Britain as a result of the postwar agreements. In other words, the Atlantic Alliance needs France more than France needs NATO. Even in the political field, it is through American nuclear protection and the protective shield of the Atlantic Alliance that she has been able to pursue a relatively autonomous policy with regard to the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. For the immediate future, it is fairly unlikely, however, that France will leave the Atlantic Alliance. In fact the events of the past year including the serious internal crisis followed by monetary difficulties as well as the events of Czechoslovakia have helped to bring France closer to her allies. De Gaulle clearly indicated to Messrs. Nixon and Kiesinger that international circumstances would not justify France's withdrawal from NATO.

In strategic matters, General de Gaulle has wanted to give his country the means for an autonomous, French defence system, that is, a nuclear defence system. Gaullist France does not feel that the United States would risk a final nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union to defend European interests which are not vital from the American standpoint. When Mr. McNamara substituted for the doctrine of massive reprisals of Foster Dulles the concept of a graduated riposte, General de Gaulle saw there new evidence that France and Europe must rely only on themselves for their safety and defence. The Gaullist regime, moreover, continued to support the nuclear doctrine of Mr. Dulles. In summary, from the French point of view, the existence of a national dissuasion force places France immediately behind the super powers among the number of nations who can rightfully

participate in the discussion of major, international problems. In Europe, the dissuasion force constitutes for France a powerful political tool, particularly with regard to Germany. Finally from the French standpoint, the nuclear weapon which might be used unilaterally greatly reduces the chances that the United States, in certain circumstances, might prefer the destruction of Europe and France to a nuclear confrontation. I shall give here a few statistics on this national form of dissuasion: at the present time France possesses a force of 60 bombers (Mirage IV) equipped with 50-kiloton atomic bombs. (These bombers may be reinforced with 12 planes obtained from the United States.) Next year she will have the first missiles of a squadron of ground-to-ground, medium range missiles equipped with atomic warheads of a yield of 50 kilotons. In 1971, 27 of these missiles will be at her disposal. The same year, she will launch the first nuclear submarine equipped with 16 missiles provided with atomic warheads of a force of 500 kilotons each. Other atomic submarines will be added to this force at the rate of one every two years.

The above figures take into account delays in nuclear production made necessary by the budgetary reductions decided on in recent months. In summary, if the French programme proceeds as planned, France in 1971 will have nuclear power equivalent in megatons to that of an American minuteman. In 1975, the French nuclear force will have the equivalent power of a Soviet intercontinental missile.

Although it has not yet been officially adopted by the French government, the doctrine of "all azimuth" defence which caused much stir in the international press last year would appear to be a logical corollary of the Gaullist strategic theories. As early as 1959, General de Gaulle had publicly broached certain aspects of this doctrine by stating that France must have absolute control of her own means of defence and that this defence was to be valid everywhere in the world. In 1967, General Ailleret, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, was to develop this theory in a famous article, doubtless with the approval of the Chief of State. He was to maintain that for a long time, French national defence had been oriented towards a particular enemy, England first of all, then Germany and then the Soviet Union. But as the Soviet Union was more interested in the development of her economy than in war with the western

countries—this is the General speaking—France no longer had any designated enemies; national defence was therefore to be orientated, like that of the other great powers, against any possible aggressor, anywhere in the world. It is therefore to be an “all azimuth” expenditure. The “all azimuth” defence program is not dead. It is presently being discussed within the Defence Board. An “all azimuth” force could only develop over a period of ten years. It could include intercontinental ground-to-ground missiles or atomic submarines equipped with long-range missiles or both.

The strategic objectives of the Gaullist government, particularly that of developing a national dissuasion force independent of external pressures account for France's attitude on the question of disarmament. Since 1962 when it refused to participate in the Commission of Eighteen, the French government has reiterated that it would only be interested in international discussions involving essentially the nuclear powers and aimed at the conclusion of a world agreement on total disarmament involving the banning and destruction of bombs, stocks and vectors and providing for complete international control. With regard to the French position on peace-keeping operations, this forms part of General de Gaulle's theory of the role of the United Nations. For him, only the decisions of the permanent members of the Security Council on which the great powers sit, count. The Security Council is the only organ of the United Nations which is capable of ensuring respect of its decisions on the international level and it alone should have the right to decide on the use of multi-national forces in operations designed to maintain peace in the troubled areas of the world. This explains French policy in the Middle East at the present time.

From the necessarily simplified summary which precedes a few conclusions may be drawn. First and foremost, General de Gaulle wants to establish equal relationships between the United States and Europe but on his own terms in Europe. Secondly, with regard to European defence, France has been able to move away from the Atlantic Alliance without affecting her major interests. As we emphasized earlier, it is obviously not the same for other countries. Thirdly, on the political level Gaullist ideas on relationships between East and West appear, at least at the present, to have relied too much on a liberalization of the Soviet bloc, as witnessed by the

events of Czechoslovakia. For the future and whatever the divergences over east-west relations and the security of the western world, France, as General de Gaulle said so himself, has no other alternative but that of remaining “in the camp of freedom”, that is, in the western camp. She could not, even if she wanted, break away entirely from a certain solidarity which is the essential condition for her security, her prosperity and even her influence.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The Acting Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Minister. I am convinced that this outline you have just given us will be of enormous assistance to the members of the Committee and we shall now proceed immediately with the questions. We have until ten thirty when our programme provides for a coffee break, fifteen minutes before the arrival of General Gallois.

[English]

The Acting Chairman: I would ask if there are any members interested in asking questions. Yes, Mr. Lewis.

[Translation]

Mr. Lewis: Would it be possible to obtain copies of this speech?

[English]

The Acting Chairman: I guess it would be interesting to get that as early as possible.

An hon. Member: If the photocopy machine holds up.

[Translation]

Mr. Asselin: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The Acting Chairman: Yes, Mr. Asselin.

Mr. Asselin: Can questions be addressed to Mr. Black or to everyone?

The Acting Chairman: To everyone. You can address them either to Mr. Black or to the Ambassador, whatever the case. Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Your Excellency, my question does not concern NATO at all but it is a question which is much more important from my point of view: our relations with France. I am aware that your predecessor had a few problems with the Government of France—little things, but all the same things which were insulting to us. I

am wondering if you could tell us what are our relations from this point of view; are our relations good or is France going to continue to manipulate the Province of Quebec?

Mr. Beaulieu: Sir, obviously this is a question which is very difficult to answer in definite terms. There are certain indications that the Gaullist government attaches primary importance to what it calls *la francophonie* of which the Province of Quebec is a part. One of the problems which Canada must face is that of convincing French authorities that Canada is also a French-speaking country.

As you are aware, a few years ago we signed a covering agreement providing for exchanges of students and teachers. Very recently in Paris there was a meeting of the Joint Franco-Canadian commission, Canadian in the wide sense of the word, following the visit of Mr. Cardinal. In the opinion of all those who took part in it, a spirit of optimism emerged. It seems, not only seems—considerable progress was in fact accomplished. It is perhaps not all we would like for the moment but—and this is subject to correction by my colleagues as they will perhaps have something to say on the matter—there seems to be a willingness to facilitate things.

The Acting Chairman: In view of the importance of this question, we can at this point allow additional questions.

Mr. Marceau has another question.

Mr. Marceau: Your Excellency, is it correct to say that the present policy of France with regard to Quebec is the policy of General de Gaulle; this is in fact the policy of France at the moment, and that when the General will be replaced, there will be certain variations, certain methods and even certain principles which will be changed at the time of the hoped for or unhoped for withdrawal of the General.

Mr. Beaulieu: I feel that since I am just newly-arrived here in Paris, perhaps Mr. Black who has been here longer can answer your question more precisely as he is aware of the past context.

Mr. Black: I feel that we might say that any policy, any international policy of France, is the policy of the head of the government and, pardon me, not the head of the government but the head of state, and that this has been true for eleven years now; it is as true for attitudes vis-à-vis Canada as it is

for attitudes vis-à-vis Europe, no matter what. As for the future, then... Your guess is as good as mine.

The Acting Chairman: A further question, Mr. Asselin?

Mr. Asselin: A little while ago, Your Excellency, Mr. Stewart used the word "manipulation" and I do not feel that France is manipulating Quebec. For example, I feel that Mr. Stewart perhaps used the word in another sense but I should like to know, Your Excellency, whether relations between France and Quebec are not presently proceeding along the lines provided for in the 1964 covering agreement, an agreement which was to the effect that Quebec could carry on relations on the international level in matters of culture and education.

Mr. Black: It is certainly true that in almost all areas, relations between France and Quebec have fallen under the covering agreements which include the Franco-Canadian covering agreement first of all and the Franco-Quebec agreement secondly, but it is also true that after the Cardinal visit, there were certain letters which were signed which, from the point of view of the Canadian government as you are aware, and it was my minister who stated this before you in the House of Commons. This is our point of view beyond these cases. I am speaking particularly of the problem of telecommunications by satellite.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Asselin.

Mr. Asselin: A further question. Would it not be better Your Excellency, instead of having personality conflicts—I am thinking of the conflicts of personality between Canada, between Canadian leaders and French heads of state—to revise the agreements between the Province of Quebec and the Canadian government to facilitate relations within the framework of federalism?

The Acting Chairman: I believe, Mr. Asselin, that your question is somewhat political. It passes judgment on the leaders, on our diplomats. Now if you would like to rephrase it, I should be glad to accept it.

Mr. Asselin: No, I shall not rephrase it. It is the ambassador's privilege to refuse to answer.

[English]

The Acting Chairman: Are there any other supplementary questions on this point before we leave it? Mr. Laprise.

[Translation]

Mr. Laprise: Your Excellency, it was announced quite recently, I believe it was yesterday, that there will shortly be a referendum in France. Do you feel that in this referendum the question concerning external affairs, both NATO, the NATO alliance, and the matter of *la Francophonie* will be raised?

Mr. Beaulieu: No, the referendum concerns only the reorganization of the Senate and the creation of a new system of regionalism by which the regions will have more freedom or authority to decide on certain projects which concern them. As you are aware, the French State is a very centralized State and, I would not say the least detail, but what often seem to us to be details must be referred for final decision to the responsible minister who is in Paris.

Now in this referendum, General de Gaulle is seeking to reform the Senate by granting it certain powers and taking other powers away from it and by granting the regions more, I would not say autonomy, but more freedom of action in areas which concern these regions immediately. I could give you many examples, but I believe that the newspapers are full of them.

[English]

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: It is on another point. When we arranged the meeting, Mr. Ignatieff said that France did not take up its place on the 18 nation disarmament conference for several years now though its place is still open. And this morning you have said that this is explained by the fact that France's general policy is to believe that disarmament should only be discussed by the great powers. I think that is what I understood you to say. To me this does not sound very believable. Is this—I mean, I would like you to give me if possible the real reasons. If France is really interested in disarmament, why are they playing this game of keeping their place on the ANDC and putting forward these reasons? Are there other reasons you see behind this pose, this position that they take with respect to such an important thing as disarmament?

Mr. Black: I hope I will not be quoted outside this room...

Mr. Beaulieu: I may add to what Mr. Black has said. As you know, when the gun restriction treaty was discussed, the council in NATO, France made it very clear that they were not prepared to sign that treaty both

because they do not want to be prohibited from doing their own studies but also because there was a flaw in this, some sort of agreement which was supposed to be given by the four great powers and that succinctly included France or the permanent power and this is why they are not in disagreement toward the United States, the UK and the Soviet Union—were prepared to make this commitment, but not France.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if in the light of the particular French relationship with NATO and the doctrine that one's national interest should prevail, whether the French government leaders have expressed any views at all about the problem that faces this Committee and Canada's contribution to NATO. We have heard in the other countries very definite opinions on this matter and I wondered if the French have expressed any views as to whether they thought Canada's contribution was essential or are indifferent to it. This might help us in the line of questioning that we might put later.

Mr. Black: This is a very good question. I might first of all say that they have never expressed any view. They take the line that it is up to us. They also point out that they have the integrated military side of the alliance therefore it is not for them to express an opinion. And I have never heard an official opinion. However they undoubtedly have views and I think this is a very valid question to be put to, in particular to Mr. Mesner and Mr. Lipovski this afternoon. Now whether you get a response I do not know. The response may well be the one I have just said. It is really up to you. But they obviously officially must take the line that not only is it our business but that they are no longer in that game and therefore it is not for them to... They have taken a certain position and because of their own particular national reasons, as I tried to point out...

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Ambassador, what progress, if any, has been made in the settlement of American and Canadian claims for damages incurred by reason of the French notices to them to vacate their French bases?

Mr. Black: I think I am right in saying that there are two claims. There is the multilateral claim by everybody and then there are the bilateral claims, one by the Americans and obviously one by ourselves which we have on

individual bases. Now the multilateral claim has been put in and is in the process of negotiation, I think in Brussels and in Brussels they may be able to give you more information on that. On the bilateral one, this is still under study—both the American one and ourselves. I think there is a general feeling of everybody that it was wiser to settle the multilateral claims before one got on to the bilateral claims. But this is still unfinished business, let me put it that way.

Mr. Ryan: It is still very much alive?

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is it true that while officially there has not been any change at all since Czechoslovakia last fall—is it true that, for instance, in the naval operations particularly and possibly even quietly in the land operations there has been a little more interest in perhaps reviving the integrated military involvement?

Mr. Black: If I could ask the Military Attaché to reply to that one. Mr. Legacé.

Mr. Legacé (Military Attaché): We have noticed that there is a changed attitude on this. They are working more closely with us and I will be able to exercise with them on the Mediterranean this summer. The French previously had kept it more quiet and this is our firm belief that France possibly decided that it was good to talk about it more. But you are right, I think, to assume that from the military side there is a very long way to go to be friends with us.

Mr. Buchanan: A supplementary, Mr. Chairman. I believe it was our understanding in Germany that there is still a substantial number of French troops on German soil. What is the intention then in the event of any conflict? How would these be used. Is there an announced desire of how these forces are going to operate within NATO or outside of NATO or co-ordinate at all?

The Acting Chairman: Before the answer is given I think it might be... would it be possible for you to come close so that we could hear your interest in this discussion.

Mr. Legacé (Military Attaché): As you are aware, last year there was roughly 50,000 troops in Germany—in Southern Germany. Last year, after France decided to pull out definitely of integrated military command, discussions began between the French Chief

of Staff, and SACEUR. It was agreed eventually after lengthy discussions that the French troops in Germany would under certain strictly-defined situations, would fight with NATO. But the main thing that the French wish to avoid was any automatic commitment to a NATO alert. There again, I think as Mr. Black said to the other question, I think you may as well get further details in NATO. But this basically was the nucleus of the matter, that France objected to any automatic commitment so, as you can see, this made it difficult for NATO planning. They never know where they stand with the French troops.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Nesbitt on a supplementary.

Mr. Nesbitt: What exactly is the status of the French troops that are now in Germany? Is it by some agreement with the German government or are these in the nature of occupation troops as a result of World War II or what?

Mr. Black: They were originally there, of course, under arrangements not so dissimilar as our own arrangements for troops in Germany. When they...No...It is part of the NATO forces under the NATO status of forces agreement. Obviously when the French left the integrated side of the alliance this had to be changed and the bilateral—and correct me if I am wrong Colonel—bilateral arrangements were worked out between the French and German governments for the stationing of these troops. The Germans wished to have French troops remain in Germany as before.

Mr. Lewis: A further supplementary, Mr. Chairman. Are these troops in any zone other than the French zone? Are the French troops anywhere in Germany, other than what was the old French zone?

Mr. Black: They are still in the French zone, and in Berlin. In Berlin they are under a quite different status.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Laniel): We have reached your name, Mr. Lewis. Will you ask your questions?

Mr. Lewis: I try to read and understand the French position vis-à-vis NATO and I am afraid I still and despite the very excellent resumé given this morning, I am still at a loss to understand the basic reason for it. If a

country that remains in NATO that is right in the centre of Europe, that withdraws from the integrated military arrangement, but after it withdraws still wants to maintain some relationship with the military arrangements of NATO was the basic reason for the act, the objection to American leadership of the NATO forces?

Mr. Black: This is certainly one of the reasons. The other, of course, is the General and his conception of how nation states should operate. He does not believe that in any form of supernationality and of course an integrated command it goes directly contrary to this belief. Another reason obviously was that because France's vital interests, such as I tried to explain are not affected. It gave him much more room to manoeuvre on the diplomatic front. He has always said that alliances are ephemeral and he looks at the NATO alliance or the North Atlantic Alliance and the French make a distinction here which is not really a valid legal one, but it is one they will make and you will hear it today, NATO—when they say NATO, they mean the integrated military command and when they talk about the alliance that is something separate. They claim that they signed the alliances in the good nineteenth century fashion and it remains that sort of alliance and that the concept of an integrated command was something that was created merely by the Americans afterwards which in point of fact is true. It was created in 1951-52 and the Treaty was signed in 1949.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Asselin.

[Translation]

Mr. Asselin: Just some clarification. Do you not feel that as a result of the events of Czechoslovakia as mentioned earlier, and as a result also of new political developments and alliances between the United States and France, that France will decide, within a short time perhaps, to play a new role within NATO?

Mr. Black: You know, Mr. Asselin, I would be very surprised if there were any change in the basic ideas of General de Gaulle. Although bilateral relations with the United States have improved for other reasons, French reasons, and also the end of the war or rather the beginning of the end of the war in Vietnam, and other reasons, I do not believe that he will change his ideas on an organization which is integrated. Indeed, I would be very surprised.

Mr. Beaulieu: All the more so as in the press release or in statements, General de Gaulle has been very, very discreet; he said that France did not intend to leave the Atlantic Alliance but he never gave the least indication of a new participation in the military domaine. As you are aware, General de Gaulle is a man who is very careful to weight his statements and I feel that, if my colleague is in agreement, it is perhaps to a certain extent an indication of his profound thought.

Mr. Asselin: Is this one man's thought or that of the whole Cabinet?

Mr. Black: I feel that it is fairly fundamental in all the Gaullist thought and this is much more widespread than the General with regard to the supranational. (sic) It is a personal idea, but I feel that it is so.

[English]

The Acting Chairman: Gentlemen, I still have one name that was given to me ahead on my first list but I have quite a few people that want to ask supplementary questions. I will call upon Mr. Cafik for his question and if you want to carry this on during the coffee break because we have reached the coffee break for ten minutes. I have decided to extend our time of questioning because of our late start, because we are expecting General Gallois within five minutes or so. So I will call on Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Ambassador, about three or four weeks ago a statement was made by a French official here in Paris to the effect that Separatism was a problem for the Province of Quebec, for it to make its own decision, but in the event that it did decide it wished to separate that the French government would give it all the support that it might require in order to achieve this objective. Are you aware of this statement and if so what is being done about it, if anything?

Mr. Black: I think I can perhaps help you out Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Debré in answer to questions at a lunch about three weeks ago took the position which has been taken regularly by the French government that Quebec problems or Canadian problems are a matter for Canadians and Quebecois to solve, that naturally France has special ties with Canadians in the French-speaking language. If you would like to pose this question but not perhaps quite in the same way but in terms of asking just what is French policy towards the federal government and towards Quebec to Mr. de Lipkowski who is Mr. Debré's number

two and also a minister and a member of the Cabinet this afternoon I think we would be as interested in his reply as you.

Mr. Beaulieu: But I do think that the statement was not worded in the way you indicated. I do not think that the statement was worded in the way you reported. I think that there was a reference but he was talking of general assistance to Quebec not to an independent Quebec. This is the way I have read the statement, but as...

Mr. Black: If we could—the text is perfectly available. We have it somewhere in the embassy if you want to read what he...

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I would certainly like to see the exact text because I only have a newspaper report on this thing and it may or may not be accurate.

Mr. Black: Well, we have the correct text which was given at a lunch for journalists and we will certainly try and find it for you.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Prud'homme: Your Excellency, this afternoon we shall be meeting Mr. Jean de Lipkowski. Our information, whether erroneous or not and this is what I should like to know, is to the effect that Count Lipkowski is apparently an ardent supporter of a certain political separation for the Province of Quebec. Is our information correct? Are our fears justified? Or again, as Mr. Cafik stated, is it a result of reading newspapers and incomplete texts that we arrived at such a conclusion? What should our attitude be towards Count Lipkowski this afternoon? If we follow the development which has taken place over the past while, are our fears well-founded? And on what basis should we discuss with him when the time comes?

Mr. Beaulieu: I believe that the question of discussion obviously is open. Personally, my contacts with Mr. de Lipkowski lead me to believe that he is following the same general policy as General de Gaulle and expressed by Mr. Debré to the effect that it is an internal Canadian problem which has to be settled, that his aim, as the minister responsible for relations between France, Canada and Quebec, is to promote exchanges. I do not believe that I can read his mind further than that.

Mr. Marceau: If it were on the question of NATO, Mr. Black, we have heard during our

trip, especially in Germany, that France seemed to be regretting its attitude towards NATO and that it was planning a rapprochement. Is this the feeling here in France or is it merely an interpretation that might have been given in other countries?

Mr. Black: I believe that from the standpoint of the present government in France, there is no intention of changing their basic policy which I tried to explain and that the feeling is linked more to closer bilateral ties with the United States than they have had in the past three or four years, but that as far as NATO is concerned, I do not believe there is any basic change. But that does not alter the fact, as Colonel Lagacé has already stated, that there is a feeling on the military level that they have to be slightly more prepared than before.

The Acting Chairman: Gentlemen, we will now call off the meeting and wait for the general. It might give you a minute or two to stretch your legs.

Mr. Anderson: Could you tell us when we are going to get to see the report of the steering committee or the drafting committee? Could we pose our questions to whoever is on that committee?

The Acting Chairman: Do you mean to study our draft report? You had better ask Mr. Wahn who is next to you. I do not think that it can be done before we get to Canada. Could I have your attention please? In your name I wish to thank Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Minister, Mr. Black for their kind co-operation with the Committee this morning and all through this day.

On your behalf, I wish to thank the Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, thank you, Mr. Black. I am sure that each of the members of the Committee is perhaps counting on you and on our subsequent meetings during the day, perhaps, to help us and guide us somewhat in our discussions with the French representatives. Therefore, I thank you and I adjourn the meeting for the moment.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, come to order, please.

Mr. Beaulieu: Gentlemen, parliamentarians. We thought that one of the best ways for you to examine the problems of European security in France would be to have you meet two French dignitaries whose careers are very

different but whose reputation, competence and intellectual integrity are recognized not only in France but also abroad. We have therefore invited for the open discussion which is to follow General Pierre Gallois, who is on our Chairman's right, whom you obviously already know. About him, I will simply say that after a very brilliant and very fruitful military career in the Air Force in which he rose to the rank of General, he became commercial director of the Marcel Dussault general aeronautical company. General Gallois is not only a military man who has become a businessman, but he is basically a thinker and a strategist who has published several works including "l'Europe au défi", "Stratégie à l'ère nucléaire" and "l'Alliance atlantique". He is a member of the large editorial staff of the newspaper *Le Figaro* for which he covers military and strategic questions. He also works for several magazines and teaches at the Institut des Études stratégiques. Professor Jacques Vernant, who is on the General's right, is the other French dignitary who kindly agreed to participate in our discussion. A professor of international renown, he is a graduate in law and a professor of philosophy. He taught philosophy at Clermont-Ferrand and Marseille. Since 1945, he has been general director of the Centre d'Études de politique étrangère and since 1956, director of studies and professor of political sociology at the Ecole pratique des hautes études. He has published several works including "Les réfugiés dans l'après-guerre", a work which was written at the request of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Responsible for the editorship of the magazine "Politique étrangère", he also works for the magazine "Revue de Défense nationale". Before turning the meeting over to our two distinguished guests, and I am sure you will have many questions to ask them, I wish to extend to them my sincerest thanks for having kindly accepted our invitation despite their busy schedules.

Mr. Wahn: Gentlemen, all the members of our Committee are very pleased to have this opportunity to discuss various topics of common interest with General Gallois and Professor Jacques Veernant. You have already received biographical notes. We already know that the discussions will be interesting and profitable. Now, I would like to ask our colleague, Mr. Asselin, to act as acting chairman of the meeting this morning.

The Acting Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our guests, General Gallois and Professor Vernant, have implied that they each want to make a short opening statement; they would have preferred rather to answer your questions. Therefore, we are going to hear General Gallois first, then Professor Vernant and after that, you may ask questions.

Mr. Gallois: Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, first we wish to thank you for this meeting because we are very pleased and very honoured to be here among you. We know that on such vital questions as those concerning our security, neither of us can but benefit from an exchange of views with you. However, I wish to point out that any analogy between the problems concerning security which arise in my country and those which arise in your country may be of a different nature in view of the respective geographic, economic, social and human situations of the two countries. However, I shall add that we are all, if I may say so, in the same boat because there are general problems common to all humanity, namely those created by the advent of new weapons. In any case, we should, I believe, deal separately with the general problem and then with the impact of that general problem on the respective situation in our two countries. What we note, without having yet analyzed, it, is that formerly, when major conflicts broke out, all countries were directly concerned; today, essentially because of the advent of new weapons, it seems that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor, and that the advantages of peace, like the horrors of war, are no longer shared equally. Some countries have succeeded, mainly through their good fortune, to safeguard one against the other to the point where they know that henceforth, their territory can be sheltered from war. This security permits them to intervene more vigorously in matters outside their own country, either to preserve acquired rights or to acquire others, and this outside activity is all the more vigorous and more frequent when such countries know that they are risking nothing at home and that they are sure of impunity. This new world situation leads to forced stability in some countries and increases instability in others. That is why, although there was an average of four or five conflicts, coups d'état, insurrections, crises a few years ago, we now have twelve or fifteen a year. Thus, while some countries which have become increasingly stable and which face ever decreasing danger, the rest of the

world finds its military in stability growing. That is the general situation with regard to our country's policy; as I understand it, it is as if we were seeking at any cost to safeguard ourselves so as to defend the vital minimum, our national territory, and to emerge from this area of instability into which a part of the world is unfortunately plunged. Those, to us, seem to be the facts of the present situation; I hope that from the questions you ask, we shall be able to proceed to an analysis of the problem and consequently, draw therefrom the points for a synthesis. I thank you for your attention.

The Acting Chairman: Thank you, General. Now, I am going to ask Professor Vernant to make his opening statement and we shall then proceed to the questions.

Mr. Jacques Vernant: Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I wish to add my thanks to those already expressed by my friend, General Gallois. I greatly appreciate the honour which has been conferred on me by being invited to discuss with you problems which arise in Europe and in Canada within the framework of questions touching on security and all related questions. I would like to limit my statement to a certain number of points which seem essential to me. Point one: all these points refer to the principle of French policy in this matter; I think that is what you are most concerned about during your brief stay in Paris. Point one, as you know, the general direction of French policy regarding defence, as in purely policy matters, in matters of military policy and in matters of political policy, is towards the idea of independence. The French Government, at least since 1958, has stated that independence had to be assured in every sector and that there could not be political independence without independence, or autonomy, in defence matters. You may think that if it had appeared that there was a complete contradiction between that desire for independence and concern for security, the French Government would have been induced to modify its position. But the French Government's assessment is that independence in political matters and autonomy in defence matters is perfectly reconcilable with the concern for ensuring security and that this is reconcilable for the reasons which General Gallois will explain to you much better than I, if you need explanations which are due to new technical conditions which have been created because of the existence of new weapons, to the balance

between the two great powers and to a political evolution which has been taking shape in the world since 1960 at least, and of which we have had evidence day after day, particularly in the past few weeks. It is in terms of such principles that the French Government decided, as you know, to terminate its participation in the integrated NATO organization while continuing to affirm its desire to participate in the Alliance. The integrated NATO organization was considered as a stumbling-block to military independence and consequently, to political independence. To the contrary, maintaining the Alliance is considered, at least for the future, as being imperative to security, security from the standpoint of French national interests and security from the standpoint of Western global interests.

My third point will deal with the assessment that can be made by France, in my opinion, of the nature of the threat. I feel that well-informed circles in Paris think that for some years now, that threat has been much smaller, in the past few years at least, has been much less military than political in nature and that even on the political level, in recent years, pressure on Western Europe has been decreasing rather than increasing.

You know that the French Government had summarized its policy towards Eastern Bloc countries, since when threat is mentioned, it essentially refers to Eastern Bloc countries, in three words: *détente* which is our present situation, understanding which was to be the subsequent stage, and finally, cooperation. The assessment made in Paris of the evolution underway was that sooner or later, it would bring the countries of Eastern Europe and the countries of Western Europe to a formula for co-existence and even co-operation.

It is interesting to recall in this connection that as early as 1962 and 1963, at a time when such predictions seemed rather amusing and made some people laugh, the President of the French Republic had announced that because of the inescapable confrontations between Red China and Soviet Asia, the Soviet Union would be forced to seek formulas for cooperative co-existence with Western Europe, apart from other motives which might prompt them to find a solution along that line.

Of course, the events of last August, August 1967, in Czechoslovakia, struck a blow to that political assessment and they wondered in Paris, as elsewhere, how that unusual action by the Soviet Union was to be interpreted since it was the first time since the end of the

war that the Soviet Union had used military intervention; although that military intervention did not degenerate into actual armed conflict, it was the first time that the Soviet Union had used military intervention against one of its allies.

The prevailing interpretation here is that it was more a defensive and preventative operation by the Soviet Union against the dangers of disintegration of its empire than an offensive operation which would lead up to subsequent expansionist action. The future will tell whether this interpretation is legitimate or not. Nevertheless, the fact remains that despite the Czechoslovakian incident, it is thought in Paris that the general interpretation prevailing before August 1967, 1968, was still valid afterwards and that while there was still mistrust, an attempt was being made to find ways and means to follow a policy of contact and if possible, of co-operation, with the Soviet Union, much in the same way, it seems, as that professed by the new President of the United States.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for these few minutes.

The Acting Chairman: On your behalf, I wish to thank General Gallois and Professor Vernant most sincerely for their statements. I have several speakers on my list, the people want to ask questions; therefore, I am going to ask you, nevertheless, to ask your questions slowly in order to give the translators and our hosts a chance to grasp the question. I now turn the meeting over to Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: General, our presence here results from the Canadian Government's decision to re-examine its foreign policy regarding defence mainly and our trip is connected, in particular, with Canadian participation in NATO. I put my question to you in particular because I would like to cover the security rather than political aspect. Since the beginning of our trip, it has been reiterated in each of the countries, even in Sweden, a non-aligned country, it has been reiterated how important the solidarity of NATO and its integration of command are for the security of Europe and the security of the world in general. France opted for a more autonomous policy, both on the political and military level, and I wonder whether this does not endanger the security of the world because automatically, I believe, at least, that decision weakened NATO and however, I ask my question as a citizen of Canada which is contributing to that alliance, I ask whether, in

your mind, as an experienced military man, you can predict whether in the near future, a similar alliance will not be as necessary and whether the countries of Europe will be able to cope alone with security right here on the continent.

General Gallois: I feel that there are actually two NATO's. There was an organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which went from 1950 to 1961. Then, there was another which began in 1961. For us, these two organizations have nothing in common. Until 1961, the American Government had undertaken, in commitments and on the territories, to defend Europe unconditionally by using, if necessary, all the most appropriate weapons including the most terrible ones. We felt in Europe that we were protected in the same way as any citizen on American territory might be protected. There was no difference in security between Ankara and St. Louis, between Chicago and Hamburg, between New York and Paris. There was a fundamental reason for the risk that America was taking with regard to Europe; it found itself militarily and strategically beyond reach, the risk was small. But after 1961, the United States realized that for the first time in their history, they were as vulnerable as any country in Europe; they had lost the invulnerability that geography had afforded them. The Russian experiments in the Caspian Sea and the China Sea had shown that the Russians were mastering the techniques of the long-range missile and that henceforth, America was threatened at home without its being able to imagine any check. The natural consequence was for the United States to modify its strategy regarding Europe and to inaugurate the second phase of NATO, that is, a second North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Instead of Europeans being defended unconditionally, Mr. Kennedy explained to us that we would be defended only conditionally. This meant that henceforth, there would not be an automatic reaction to aggression but that the American Government would deliberate and decide on what it thought was the right thing to do.

From that time onwards, we understood that there was a law for the rich and another for the poor and that if America, for just cause, kept the atomic arsenal for the defence of its territory, it preferred to defend Europe with conventional weapons.

Confronted by an opponent who has nuclear weapons, the deployment of conven-

tional weapons makes no sense; it is even a military absurdity. The use of conventional weapons is based on concentrations of people and equipment, on long delays in using them, on vulnerable, costly logistic support, on time to manoeuvre, to mobilize men and industries. Nuclear defence precludes any concentration of people, a concentration of equipment does not need a vulnerable and costly logistic system, is not designed in terms of a long, drawn-out war, does not permit manoeuvring or mobilization of men or the mobilization of industries. There is complete incompatibility between the two systems over the same theatre. This is not a French discovery; it was American experts who, from 1950 to 1960, endeavoured to explain it to us. Consequently, the moment we militarily entered the second NATO, we felt that the military system offered to us was absurd. The only guarantee that it gave us was the presence of American troops on European soil. But actually, it was not the American troops that were our guarantee, it was the danger of American blood being spilled, to the extent that jokingly, we could say that it would suffice to replace the American divisions by American schoolchildren; the result would be the same.

It was under such conditions, confronted with the fact that the military system was invalidated and that in our opinion it had lost its credibility, among other reasons we left NATO. But with regard to the Europe of tomorrow, it seems inconceivable to us French that it is guaranteed indefinitely by the continued presence of foreign troops, even if they are friendly troops, which are under a command 6,000 kilometers away with other concerns in the world. When the war in Indochina came to an end, it was explained to us that the conventional forces could be reduced because there were too many of them and as soon as the war in Indochina was less important and because the American forces seemed too numerous, it was explained to us also that it was absolutely necessary to raise the level of forces deployed in Europe. All that was not serious.

In addition, little by little, the military organization deployed in Europe also became an agency for economic compensation. The British, for their part, left their troops on the Rhine provided that Germany paid. Likewise the United States deport (sic) in Germany provided that Germany paid and spent for armaments in the United States each year more than France devotes each year to its

own nuclear programme. This is not the way to build the Europe of tomorrow.

And therefore, for military, economic and then political reasons, I believe that my government adopted the attitude that it did. The military integration of conventional forces confronted by a nuclear power is an absurdity. We are convinced that because of the dangers inherent in the possible use of new weapons, such weapons cannot, in any case, be the weapons of a military coalition. They are valid only for the defence of the quick works of the country possessing them and never for the profit of interests outside such countries. To the arsenal of traditional conventional forces in the world is added the nuclear arsenal, but the two systems do not mix; they are as incompatible as water and fire. The nuclear system defends the national life, national territory, national sovereignty of the country which holds those armaments; as for conventional weapons, they can be used by such countries, outside their own territory, to acquire marginal interests, to defend others in conflicts which could be lost without endangering national life. Because the immensity of the nuclear threat is now increasingly apparent, we are convinced that those armaments cannot be, in any case, the armaments of an alliance system. Therefore, the words "military integration" seem as ridiculous to us in the world of today as the use of a group of archers or the use of the Roman balista. It is a system that belongs to the past.

The Acting Chairman: Thank you.

[English]

Mr. Wahn: My question is directed to either of the two witnesses. I understand the desire for détente leading to entente, and also the reasons given in answer to Mr. Laniel's question. I would like to ask, remembering our interest in deciding a similar question which they have already decided, if they could tell us, why did France, give specific reasons why France has decided to withdraw from the NATO integrated command, and remembering that sometimes in Canada we feel oppressed by the friendly but almost overwhelmingly American influence, could they tell us whether in their view the NATO integrated command is dominated by American, by America, and also whether if Canada withdrew its forces from the NATO integrated command and perhaps performed its NATO commitment to North America, would NATO be seriously weakened, or would European security be seriously weakened?

[Translation]

Professor Vernant is going to reply.

Mr. Vernant: Yes, I am going to add a few points in reply; there are probably other technical reasons which General Gallois will give you more accurately than I.

One of the reasons which motivated the French Government's decision, which, I repeat, was announced in 1963 already, in press conferences, which poorly justify the astonishment of certain governments when those decisions were carried out after prior notice. I believe that, as I see it, the essential reason which motivated the French decision is that it was not considered necessary and consequently, it was no longer considered possible for the French Government to not fully assume sovereignty over its national forces and over its national territory. You know that participation, being a member of the integrated NATO organization, had certain consequences, not only from the point of view of the structure of the command but certain other consequences, the presence of American bases in France, the utilization of those bases and the utilization of those bases under conditions which did not meet the requirements of French sovereignty; for example, it was recalled in Paris that when the American Government had to use forces for operations in Lebanon, for example, it used means of transport from airports that it had at its disposal in France. Therefore, this was an encroachment on what was considered in Paris as the requirements of full sovereignty over French policy. On the other hand, it was hoped in Paris, it was hoped mainly after we began to actually have nuclear weapons at our disposal, it was hoped that we could preserve the right, which is recognized by the North Atlantic Treaty, to decide on the way that each of the members of the alliance would participate in the joint effort. The existence of the integrated command which, in fact, obeyed the directives of the President of the United States more than any other directives, the existence of such territorial encroachments reduced to almost zero the remains of sovereignty which were contained in the treaty of 1949. The French Government therefore planned to put the alliance back into force, both in letter and in spirit, by ridding itself of what it had become, for reasons which were probably justified, considering the dangers of the 1945-1965 period, but which, by the same token, no longer seem justified. The French Government thought, consequently, that it was necessary or prefer-

able where it was concerned to withdraw from the integrated organization, and in addition, that that would not result in considerable modifications from the viewpoint of security.

A voice: Thank you, sir.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Harkness.

[English]

Mr. Harkness: Yes. I would put my question in the simplest form in this way. What is the purpose of the French nuclear force, primarily military or primarily political, and to be a little more precise—do you consider that your comparatively small nuclear force as compared with that of the United States and the U.S.S.R. is a credible military deterrent or on the other hand do you take the position that it gives you a great deal more political leverage we will say, than would be the case if you did not possess it?

[Translation]

General Gallois: In truth, contrary to public opinion, the new weapons are not political instruments. In French we often say that we can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. Well I would say that it is just the opposite for the atom and atomic weapons. The only thing we can do with them is to sit on them because it is not believable for one second that any country whatsoever will use them for anything other than defending absolutely vital interests. Consequently, such weapons are not available for foreign policy or for diplomacy. They are weapons for the defence of the vital minimum, that is the survival of a state. For that reason they will never constitute the weapons of an alliance and in an alliance, the leader of the alliance will never use them to the advantage of an ally.

Now, respecting the credibility of the armaments we have, I shall refer to a statement by Mr. Kennedy, who, when the Pentagon asked him for additional funds, had answered: "How many thousands of times will we have to be able to kill the same Russian for you to feel safe?" The American and Russian military arsenal does not correspond for one moment to any military reality. It is so large that it too is absurd. I shall remind you that to destroy the equivalent of 1,400 Hiroshimas and so to send 140 million human beings to another world, in theory 28 megatons are sufficient. However, the American stockpile is estimated at 400 thousand megatons. No one

has yet explained to me the reason for the difference between the 28 essential megatons and the 400 thousand existing megatons, unless it is the desire to discourage other states from doing the same by explaining that 400 thousand megatons are essential for any form of security based on nuclear arms.

Furthermore, I shall remind you that in 1962 at the time of the Cuban Crisis, the Russians did not have 100 weapons capable of reaching American territory but the Americans had five thousand weapons, thanks to NATO, which could reach Russian territory. So, I find that the objectives of the war, or rather the Soviet war objectives, were to keep Mr. Fidel Castro in Cuba and the American action was intended to get rid of him. I find that Cuba was in American territorial waters and 10,000 kilometers from Russian waters. As a witness to the incident, I must ascertain that in spite of the overwhelming American qualitative and quantitative superiority, Mr. Fidel Castro is still in Cuba and even if the Americans did succeed in having the weapons, which were waiting there to be installed in Cuba, withdrawn, inversely it seems that they promised not to install any in Europe. As such, we are now faced with 700 Russian medium-range ballistic missiles without any equivalent missile on European soil.

History will judge the Cuban invasion severely. It was presented as an American victory but appears to us to be a bloody defeat. Yet the proportion of forces was 1 to 30 which goes to show that what counts today, much more than the size of the military establishment, is the political will.

There has just been an example of that. Until now we believed that the United States was the master of the Mediterranean. We have just discovered that in spite of that overwhelming superiority, they have now agreed to share control of the Mediterranean with the Russians. If the 6th fleet had had ten, twenty or even thirty more or less ships, nothing would have been changed.

To conclude, we think that our nuclear inventory will contain the equivalent of 2 to 300 megatons and that, in view of the military and political value for France, no one will dare place her in the desperate situation in which she found herself in 1940, knowing that as a last resort measure she could release her 200 megatons and kill several million people in the aggressor country.

That policy is not a prestige policy, as is believed, but is rather a humble policy. The prestige policy was what we practised when, with standard numerous forces, we waged war in Asia and Africa by supporting some 50 million non-French people. Today, within the context of the humble policy, we are content to defend what is sacred to us—the homeland and because we know that if France is invaded or subjugated by force, the course of the world will not change, we think that it is easier to use the atom to defend a small or average-size country, whose disappearance would not be decisive, than to defend a very large country whose removal from the map would give a world victory to the other. It is in that context that the efforts which we are making must be understood.

[English]

Mr. Harkness: General I presume you would agree that what is important is not the amount of megatons possessed by a country but the ability to deliver that on target?

[Translation]

General Gallois: I do not at all think so, sir. I have only to see the efforts which the Russians and the Americans are making to impose the Non-Proliferation Treaty on other states. Those states will not be in a position for a long time to have weapons such as the Minute Man or Titan missiles or the Russian T-three or T-four missiles. Nevertheless, Russia and America are doing the impossible to prevent the spread of that armament. They are not afraid of the carriers but they fear the existence of the explosive itself. A small country, such as Israel, with about ten Boeing 707's which have the same autonomy and speed as the B-52, tomorrow can represent an enormous potential for aggression. The carrier, the quality of the means of delivery, is a ploy used for the past twenty years by the great powers to discourage others from following the same course. However from the point of view of military fact, it falls down under cursory examination. The proof of that is seen when in Cuba Mr. Fidel Castro had hung onto 40 old "Il-28's" which are airplanes designed in 1945... all America was afraid. On a Pentecost Saturday at midnight, no one could have prevented about twenty of those airplanes from flying 30 meters above the ground and from dropping twenty atomic bombs on twenty American cities. There is no power in the world which can halt such a surprise assault. The Americans, like the Russians, are well aware of that.

Mr. Anderson: Well, you have explained France's highly logical theory very well. However, my question is this: do you feel that that logic and theory is just as logical for Israel or another small country?

General Gallois: Of course. Obviously the theory is valid for all states. France does not have a monopoly on it. I am even convinced that as you descend the hierarchy of states on a power scale, it is increasingly valid.

The Acting Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Lewis. Do you want to add anything, professor?

Mr. Vernant: No, but perhaps for two minutes I will simply add a point on that subject to qualify the statement.

I believe that Gallois is perfectly right in saying that from a logical point of view what he has just related respecting the French position is obviously valid for other countries. It is still a fact that politics is not logic and decisions made by politicians are political decisions and not logical ones. That means that the French government made a political decision respecting a particular situation, that of France, and it is not true, in my opinion, that that same particular situation occurs when other countries, small or large, are involved.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Lewis?

[English]

Mr. Lewis: I think I followed your military analysis and explanation but I cannot understand where it leaves us in the world. If I understood you correctly one of the objections you have to remaining in NATO was that the idea of retaliation was abandoned and that meant that the United States would no longer be ready to defend some European countries in a proper way. What kind of war do you visualize, what kind of confrontation do you visualize that would ever justify the massive retaliation? Why do you by implication reduce to nil the nuclear weapons which NATO now possesses on European soil? And what difference in a nuclear war does it make whether you have to pick up a telephone in Europe and speak to the President of the United States which you can do in one minute, across the Atlantic as easily as you can do from Marseilles to Paris but you can get to the President of the United States much more easily from Brussels than you can from Paris, all this military analysis that you

did, if I may say so brilliantly leaves me a poor citizen of the world completely at a loss to know what it is you are after.

[Translation]

General Gallois: Of course I can answer you very easily.

In Europe, because of the Russian power, we cannot imagine the Russians attacking West Germany, for example, along conventional lines. Therefore, there are two assumptions: either we do not resist along conventional lines and we are lost or else we resist. If we resist, we cannot for one minute imagine that if Russia launched a full-scale attack on us with conventional forces, when faced with our conventional resistance that same Russia will withdraw its troops, excuse herself and send flowers to the chancelleries saying that that was not what she wanted! That assumption of Mr. McNamara's is not feasible in Europe. It is out of the question because it is absurd.

If the Soviets should launch a full-scale attack on Europe, it will be to achieve their war objective. If we resist conventionally, as Mr. McNamara hoped, I cannot see what will prevent the Soviets from including in their stockpile twenty small French bombers with the same power as the French bombs because with twenty atomic bombs our conventional resistance is ended. Conventional resistance is based on a concentration of airplanes, on a concentration of manpower and on fuel pipelines. All that is vulnerable. A small bomb would leave five supply ports, Hamburg, Bremen, etc., in ashes. With twenty to thirty 20 kiloton (megaton?) Hiroshima-type bombs, there is no longer a conventional defence in Europe. It is finished. For that reason, we shall not be able to tolerate the system.

The use of 7,000 tactical weapons, which you were discussing, is not conceivable with the type of military installation which exists in Europe because I cannot believe for one minute that we shall be able to drop 7,000 atomic weapons on Russian troops without the Russians doing likewise. If they respond in the same way on the type of armament which we have, thirty seconds will be sufficient to destroy the accepted force in Europe.

On the same plan, you cannot have the conventional installation desired by Mr. McNamara and the use of 7,000 tactical atomic weapons, which you were discussing. That is like mixing fire and water. It is impossible.

[English]

Mr. Asselin: I have a very short supplementary.

The Acting Chairman: I am sorry I have a long list of questioners.

Mr. Asselin: I am sorry I think it is important to pursue this, and if that is true and I agree that it might be, please tell me where the French nuclear armament would be any more useful in any war which the Soviets start in Western Europe.

Mr. Lewis: It is because the same logic applies, if you throw your two or three hundred megatons, they will throw more.

[Translation]

General Gallois: We cannot imagine a Russian command concentrating conventional troops along the French borders knowing that the command stands to lose its troops in a matter of seconds. I am talking of troops not of Russian cities.

I cannot believe that the Russian command would be stupid enough to mass standard forces against us knowing that with our vitals threatened, we risk, as a last resort measure, like that we would have made when faced with Hitler's tanks in 1940, destroying its battle corps in a few minutes with our atomic bombs and low-altitude airplanes.

Consequently, the Russian command would be forced to disperse. If it disperses, it cannot concentrate itself. Therefore, it is no longer the threat represented by its numerical superiority. It cannot put sixty dispersed divisions along the same stretch of territory. Rather it will mass ten divisions but is then not a danger and knows it.

An attack on French national territory by a volley of Russian nuclear weapons is possible just as an attack on American or British territory is possible. If we only have traditional weapons, the sole difference is that we know that our divisions scare no one and the only way they will reach Moscow will be as prisoners of war. However, no one can be certain that our Polaris missiles and our airplanes, flying at a low altitude, will not reach Moscow or another Russian city and cause more damage there than even we intend. An unbalanced situation would be created. Russia would have to take revenge for our reaction by destroying that which she wants to conquer—which is ridiculous. Russia would have to rebuild its ruins while America, on the one

hand, continues on its road to prosperity and China, on the other, continues on its road to power.

To capture France, Russia would be specially penalized and that would not bring her a great deal. That is why our system appears sound to us. We no longer pretend to defend ourselves conventionally with a conventional installation like that of NATO in Germany especially. We do not understand what purpose it serves.

The Acting Chairman: Thank you. Warren Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: You are no longer in NATO militarily but you are still a member of the Alliance.

I do not understand the value of that participation. Why are you still part of the Alliance?

General Gallois: We belong to a community of states which share the same moral, social and political ideals. Therefore we are friends and allies. However we are convinced that against Russia, who has nuclear arms, any military system, whether united or ununited, based on traditional weapons, makes no sense at all. We hope to defend ourselves on our own and alone.

Mr. Allmand: What will you get out of that alliance? What will you give in return?

General Gallois: Perhaps I did not make myself clear enough. If all countries truly consider atomic weapons as only being intended to defend the vital interests of a state when threatened with death—as France was in 1940 and I know that that is a special case which is hard to understand in America—we have been in a situation which explains our present behaviour.

People do not find themselves in such extreme circumstances every day, month or year. Therefore the political alliance has its merits for all alternatives other than that vital threat. If there is a vital threat, that is our business. However, fortunately such vital threats are not common occurrences. Every day, month and year of the national existence, we have to deal with situations which do not endanger national survival. We are facing such a situation in the case of a political alliance. We know very well that if we were threatened with death, no one would come to our aid because we can no longer beg for security in the world today. The risk is

too great. Previously the danger for America was sending an expeditionary force 4,000 kilometers away from home. Today, in her own words, the danger is of losing 50, 100 or 200 million inhabitants. Soliciting aid in that field is forbidden because it is not warranted. Security cannot be asked for when the danger which one's ally must run is not the loss of an expeditionary force, an army or a province or payment of a tribute but rather is national genocide. For that reason we cannot seek protection in such an extreme situation from the United States or from anyone else.

The Acting Chairman: I believe the Professor wanted to add a few words?

Mr. Vernant: Only a few words to complete the answer by adding something to what Gallois has just said. Actually I am not sure if what I am going to say is absolutely necessary. Why has France remained in the Alliance after having quit the organization? She quit the organization for the reasons which I pointed out to you earlier and which are relatively clear.

What does France get from the Alliance that she did not get from the organization? The Alliance is insurance. The Alliance was mainly defensive and is insurance which has a certain role to play by covering a certain number of assumptions, as Gallois said. If you will, that reinforces the potential for political-military dissuasion which plays against the enemy, should the enemy have to be dissuaded. Similarly, nuclear weapons, our nuclear armament is an insurance. As Gallois said, it is a mainly defensive insurance not only for us but for all who have such weapons. They are defensive from the point of view of vital interests.

Consequently, there is no contradiction in our having nuclear arms and our remaining in the Alliance. There are only apparent contradictions. We shall remain in the Alliance as long as we feel that the European situation requires that kind of insurance in the face of an ever-present threat.

The Acting Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Laprise.

Mr. Laprise: In the light of the relatively clear statements which you made, I would like to know if the Russians should attack Germany, for instance, whether France would participate in the defence of Europe. If so, how?

General Gallois: Probably with a few traditional forces, if that made any sense. With nuclear forces? No, no more than would America or England.

Mr. Vernant: I could perhaps add something to your question. I believe that you asked your question in a much too general and somewhat theoretical way. It is obvious that everything depends on the way in which your assumption would occur and the interpretation which would have to be given to it. Many situations which would cause Soviet military intervention against the Federal Republic can be imagined. Everything depends on the circumstances. I do not know whether Gallois would contradict me, but it can be thought that if the attack involved a mass penetration of Soviet troops into Germany for the purpose of starting a real battle, a conquest of Western Europe, the French government would possibly not wait until the Russian troops reach the border before using her arms. I think you understand that kind of assumption. The context in which the situation would occur must be seen to some extent.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Laprise, do you have a related supplementary question?

Mr. Laprise: I understand that France decided to withdraw her troops from NATO which she was fully entitled to do. In what way would France see other nations, Canada or Germany for example, withdrawing from NATO?

Mr. Vernant: That is a very interesting question for both of us.

I believe that here again the question must be considered in the light of its logical and political aspects. If Canada makes such a decision, it involves Canada. If the Federal Republic should make such a decision, it involves Germany. Canada and Germany are not the same thing. France and Germany are not the same thing. When we made our decision it was argued: "If you make that decision, others will follow suit". The argument may have been useful at the time but is not justified because we were legally and politically in a position to make such a decision without creating worry. It is obvious that it would not be the same thing if Germany were involved because then it could be asked what is behind such a move.

Respecting Canada, I do not think anyone would wonder what was behind such a move

and the French government would see no objection in view of the fact that it is Canada and because of the obvious interpretation we would give to such a decision.

[English]

Mr. Gibson: I could understand your reasoning, sir, if it were not for the fact that the Warsaw Pact countries outnumber us 3 to 1 in armed force, at least conventionally. Now, if there is this large superiority of conventional force opposing us now and if neither side is going to use nuclear weapons, why I ask you sir, why do you not advocate equalizing the balance of conventional force and then striving for disengagement on both sides rather than unilaterally?

[Translation]

General Gallois: I have already answered that question somewhat.

Due to the fact that the Warsaw Pact countries are conventionally three times stronger than we, a standard defence against them makes no sense.

I cannot believe that the Warsaw Pact forces, with a superiority of 3 to 1 over us, would move off towards the West and that when faced with the miraculous resistance of the standard NATO forces, which are weaker in a one to three comparison, would excuse themselves and return to their barracks. To win a victory, they would probably be the first to take the initiative and use their own atomic weapons.

As we would be all the more vulnerable for having resisted them and strongly banded together against them, our own forces would be liquidated in a matter of seconds or minutes. Victory would immediately belong to the Warsaw Pact forces. That is not what we are seeking. On the contrary, we want just the opposite.

Consequently, we feel that the whole system of conventional defence is without foundation. Furthermore, it was so in the minds of all the American generals beginning with Gruenther and Norstad until 1961 when America began to feel vulnerable at home. Norstad left. Gruenther left. For ten years they explained to us that it was just the opposite.

However, it is not because Russian missiles can now travel from Kiev to San Francisco that the strategic situation or the vulnerability of conventional forces has changed. That is of no consequence. America can simply no

longer take the same risks as in 1961. Therefore she changed her strategy and through a great propaganda effort tells us that the new strategy is as good as the old. For ten years she explained to us that a conventional defence of Europe was absurd. She was right.

[English]

Mr. Gibson: Are you not flooding us with propaganda to just get out of here and let it all go and take a big risk.

Mr. Asselin: Mr. Gibson, I am very sorry, is this a supplementary, because I have got many questions on my list? Has your question been answered? What did you wish? Will you repeat your question, please?

Mr. Gibson: I say, are you not flooding us with propaganda to weaken the whole structure of the conundrum, basing it entirely on the concept that any conventional attack would be answered with nuclear attack?

[Translation]

General Gallois: It was the policy which supported the American generals until 1961 and rightly so, we believe. However no one has been able to explain to me why that policy which was valid in 1961 then became bad policy. I have never heard an explanation other than the vulnerability of American territory. I do not care. I am sorry but I am French and what interests me is the vulnerability of my territory.

The Acting Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme?

Mr. Prud'homme: General, your final words leave me completely dumbfounded. First of all, I would like to know what role you think Canada plays. We believe that we are here on behalf of the community. We are not here: Canada, Germany that concerns you. Canada, Belgium, that concerns you. Canada, France.(?)

I believe in Canada's participation in NATO. Our country is located thousands of kilometers from here. I think it is a useful role. Otherwise we might say: "Well yes, Canada, as Canadians, is withdrawing because the general has clearly indicated: I am speaking as a Frenchman". However it is as a member of the Western World that I am asking my question on behalf of the community of nations.

Anything that affects Europe has always in the end affected America. There have been two World Wars in which probably very few

people wanted to participate; nevertheless, in spite of this, in spite of events and desires, in spite of isolationism, we have been called upon, against our will, to get involved in both these Wars.

My question, then, is this: obviously, if you consider it to be a matter of one country facing another, obviously I would suggest that we retire from NATO. But, the reason is that I think we are playing a useful part. And I believe that France is playing a useful part. You see, when you said to us just now...

The General has brought up so many subjects that it would take the whole day. When you told us that 1,400 Hiroshimas would take 20 megatons, or 28, but the 1,400 Hiroshimas are not situated in the same area? For me, that is enormously important.

The Acting Chairman: Would you kindly elaborate upon what you just said?

General Gallois: I understood what you wanted to say; I am very touched...

The Acting Chairman: It is very important; it is a very important question.

Mr. Prud'homme: The General seems to have understood my question.

General Gallois: I am very touched by the position that you are taking; it seems to me to be a sentimental position, to which I, as a Frenchman, am just as sensitive as you are. Yet I must say to you that my country has, all the same, been, since my generation, a kind of door-mat on which the others have wiped their feet, for 50 years, and we think that is enough. Fortunately you have not known that, in your country; put yourself in our position. That is the first point.

The second point is that we are not the ones who invented a new technology that changes the traditional strategic facts. That was done outside our country. What we are trying to understand is the significance of that for our security; and I know very well that these new arms are very disturbing, that we do not understand their meaning. That is normal. Armour was condemned in the 14th Century. But in the 17th Century armour was still worn. The lance was condemned by the musket in the 17th Century. But in 1938 there were in the regulations for manoeuvres of the British Army 33 pages devoted to handling of the lance; and there was in Verona, in Italy, a cavalry regiment of lancers.

In 1939 Mr. Mussolini decided to replace the lances made of wood by lances made of iron. The colonel commanding the regiment committed suicide. That is normal; Technology is not assimilated brutally; it takes years. Now, nuclear armament is sufficiently revolutionary to place its consequences beyond comprehension. In order to have a good understanding we must know what those consequences are. I shall make a fast resumé of them for you.

The first is that the power of populations no longer counts. It was because Napoleon led the most populous country in Europe that he conquered Europe. It was because America had 150 million inhabitants that she was capable of mobilizing 12 million soldiers in 1941. It was because Russia had 190 million inhabitants that she was able to lose 22 (sic) and still recover. When Mr. Paul Nitze, the American Minister for the Navy, put to sea his 12th submarine, in 1961, he wrote the following letter to Congress:

Of these 12 submarines, eight are constantly in service. With these eight submarines we are capable of inflicting from 30 to 40 million deaths upon any potential adversary of America.

Now, these eight submarines have, each of them, a crew of 200 men, that is to say, the submarines in all have a total of no fewer than 2,000 combatants, served ashore by 50,000 specialists. Mr. Nitze, with one stroke of the pen, deletes the importance of demography.

The second factor was heavy industry. America needed Pittsburg and Cleveland to forge arms by the thousands, by the tens of thousands, by the millions—for soldiers. Russia needed Magnitogorsk to arm her soldiers. Today, to make 10 submarines it is not necessary to have heavy industry; what is needed is a small industry consisting of specialists. And thus the great iron metallurgy complexes are condemned, the big plants in Cleveland, Pittsburg, Magnitogorsk, in the Ruhr, of Schneider-Creusot complex in France.

A third fact to note concerns the dimensions of territory. When Hitler went to Stalingrad he saw the meaning of the thousands of verstes that he had to make his soldiers travel. When Napoleon went to Moscow he realized what distance meant.

Today if there were a conflict between Russia and America, and if a missile were

shot from California to Irkutsk, or Odessa, the difference in the trajectory would amount to two or three minutes. That no longer counts. Finally, for Russia, old General Winter played a part. Hitler and Napoleon noticed that. The arms of today bear no relationship to atmospheric conditions; today's arms are indifferent to such conditions.

Thus the great nations, because they are great nations, were the first to invent armament that robs them of the benefit that geography, economics, industry and population made possible. They opened Pandora's Box, from which burst a technical flood that deprived them of advantages which they alone possessed. For, America and Russia were the only nations that had vast territories, great heavy industries, massive populations and were conveniently located on the map.

Well, it was they themselves who invented an armament that deprived them of these privileges, and you can no longer consider the strategic positions in the same way as before such inventions, because of these upheavals. After the invention of the simple firearm, the stronghold chateau disappeared. After the invention of the atomic explosion, upheavals of the same nature exist; they must be exploited.

Mr. Prud'homme: Thank you, Professor.

Mr. Vernant: May I add a few brief words in response to your anxiety, my dear Mr. Prud'homme. I should like to add a few words in reply to the anxiety that shows through in your question. I believe that Mr. Gallois has made an excellent resumé of the military consequences of nuclear armament, armament that constitutes a revolution of which we are often not aware. Such armament has consequences; but it is still true that your question remains; what, then, is there left of solidarity? And if I understand correctly, you asked: do these consequences, these technical revolutions, as they are interpreted by Mr. Gallois, simply mean that the Western World is dissolving, that nobody any longer thinks of anyone but himself?

I do not think so, because there are other phenomena that occur at the same time; France remains an Occidental country, we remain in solidarity with the Western World, just as we and Canada stand together. This is something different. The military hypotheses that Mr. Gallois conjured up are, if you like, the exception; and the armament in question, he tried to explain, are valid only in exceptional circumstances.

As for the rest, the field for cooperation, the domaine of interdependence, remains considerable; it is stable, and there is even nothing to prevent its being developed. In other words, one must not believe that, just because we are becoming aware of a revolutionary reality in the military sphere, with its potential consequences regarding alliances, we are purely and simply returning to a kind of international jungle where nobody thinks of anybody but himself.

The Acting Chairman: Obviously there will be an enormous number of questions to ask still; there are still people on the list; Mr. Marceau seems to have a supplementary question; I can admit two supplementaries. Mr. Marceau?

Mr. Marceau: First, you have dealt with so many ideas, General, that I am lead to call you, as Mr. Lewis did, General de Gaulle; as he told you just now, because you seem to personify France's policy. But I cannot conceive of anything in particular. You say 200 megatons, with a gesture of despair, we can shoot forth that much. Have you considered that, before the actual launching, others could do the same, and that you would no longer be there to launch anything? Which means, in my view, that the only solution is the equilibrium of forces; and France, through its decision to retire, throws the forces into disequilibrium, and thus she... Have you considered that your decision could bring about a world war? Or was your thought merely: France's sovereignty?

General Gallois: Well, I shall answer this way: First, the nations, beginning with the largest, that is, with the United States and Russia, use, for their defence the principle of indirect defence. They no longer defend themselves from their frontier limits; they put their bombers, into the air, their submarines under the seas and, probably, their satellites into the cosmos. That is to say, these nations have learned that the extent of their territory is already too limited. They use international space to protect themselves, by putting their arms into permanent movement there. But I and you have the same right as they have, to do this. We are all equal in the matter of utilization of international space. So much so that, if I put my armament there, it benefits from the same advantages as the armament of the Americans or the Russians, the British, or the Chinese, tomorrow. To destroy simultaneously and preventively is

impossible, because simultaneous localization is impossible.

Then, if the Russians, as you say, destroy my country, they simply provoke a reaction of despair against their own country, and I do not know of any Russian leader who would be fool enough to destroy France—French territory—leaving intact half a dozen submarines, for example, or a few satellites that would be brought down on their heads a few hours afterward; no, that is unthinkable. It is the same system that is created, that is used, by the Americans, the Russians themselves, the Germans, the Chinese tomorrow, the English. Consequently I cannot follow you in that direction for one minute.

Secondly, once again, such armament has no meaning if we were to find ourselves in the situation of despair in which we found ourselves in June of 1940, and during which nobody came to our rescue; for, in spite of everything, we were the ones who endured four years of occupation. We endured four years of occupation and there was no way of avoiding it; we were paying for our faults. Well, we had to wait four years.

As a result, situations such as the one in June of 1940, come about, fortunately, only very rarely in the life of people. That is the reason for my saying to you that with nuclear armament we can do nothing except "sit on it" and wait. But, regarding all the rest of international life, for all the other ties and actions in the world, and which do not put our social existence in peril, well, we are, I believe, fraternally allied with the United States, with Great Britain and with other nations, etc.; that is very obvious.

One must comprehend that the advent of the atomic explosion does not, for us, change the meaning of international cooperation; it gives us some assurance, some insurance, which we take out if the house is on fire; but the house is not on fire all day; it happens, even, very seldom. It is indeed in this spirit that one must consider the French effort. It is to avoid having someone put us in the situation in which we were placed in June of 1940.

Mr. Marceau: It was said that the French, during the period of the occupation, prayed and said: "Liberate us; but not too fast", which left the supposition that they were finding some profit in the occupation?

The Acting Chairman: I have been told that we absolutely have to conclude. I must in your name thank General Gallois, as well as

Professor Vernant. I think that this is one of the liveliest sessions we have had since the beginning of our trip.

I should like to thank you, General, as well as the Professor, for your information and for your presentation. We hope we shall see you later during the day, to continue, not the debate, but the questionnaire. Thank you very much.

[English]

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Brussels, Belgium,
Friday, March 21, 1969.

The Chairman: We are very fortunate that the Canada's permanent representative to the NATO Council is here this morning to give us a briefing following which Mr. Campbell is very happy to answer questions. We had expected Admiral Murdoch to be here as well but he has not been able to make it this morning because of weather conditions. I call upon His Excellency Mr. Campbell.

His Excellency Ross Campbell: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I welcome you here after your fatiguing journey around Europe. I am sorry that Admiral Murdoch could not be here to answer some of the questions on the military side. However, defence planning in NATO is a civilian function and the execution of the plans is a military one so I will endeavour to cope with your military questions as well.

May I just give you one word of guidance about the use of these microphones in front of you. They will go on after the Chairman has identified you as the next speaker or questioner. In order to operate the translation system which I advise you to do at least for amplification purposes. It is useful in this room, if you put it to "A" for English or "F" for French on the dials in front of you and on the right is a rheostat for the degree of sound. In order to assist the Chairman if you would hold your pencil like this if you wish to speak and then when you have been identified as the speaker if you would hold it high above your head so that they can see.

Gentlemen, although your Chairman said I was going to give you a briefing. I think you must have been briefed to death in this trip around Europe therefore, I do not intend to

do that but rather to leave the maximum time for question and answer.

The only point that I do think worth drawing to your attention as a sort of introductory remark is that since you embarked on this enterprise there has been perhaps the most significant development in East-West relations in the postwar period. I am referring to President Nixon's lightning visit around Europe with this significant new message of his which is no more or less than an all-out attempt by the United States to move from confrontation to negotiation with the Soviet Union.

To my knowledge this is the first time in the postwar period that a United States administration has committed itself to an attempt at accommodation with the Soviet Union. President Nixon was here and he spoke for an hour and a half with the 15 permanent representatives to NATO in a rather confidential way, and therefore, I would be very grateful if anything that I tell you of that conversation be treated with a certain care.

The significant thing to me in President Nixon's presentation here was that this bold enterprise that they are about to embark upon is not based on any assessment that there has been a change in Soviet objectives. They have assessed the situation. The United States looks upon the development, for example, in Czechoslovakia and in eastern Europe as showing no change whatsoever. In Soviet policy in Europe they are still applying immense pressure in that country to make it conform to Soviet wishes. They have extended that to Roumania in a slightly less overt form and they are exerting pressure on Yugoslavia. They continue to exert enormous pressure on the Federal Republic of Germany. They are still mobilizing their east European satellite states and any progressive governments in this world—progressive in quote marks—under the slogan of an anti-imperialist campaign, namely, anti-us among others, although that term does not really fit and never did. They are still using subversion as a main instrument of Soviet policy throughout the world and especially in the western world and they are proceeding unabated with a massive arms build-up on a global scale.

This is the American judgment that none of the Soviet objectives have appreciably changed. It is legitimate therefore, to ask why have they chosen this particular moment to

embark upon a serious attempt at negotiations with the Soviet Union. Judging from President Nixon's comments here the answers are many but they are principally three, in my judgment, sorting out in retrospect what he had to say while he was here.

I would put first on the list their assessment that China has become possibly the principal menace of the future in Soviet planning and that this is conflicting with their ambitions in Europe and other parts of the world.

Secondly, the Americans assess that financial problems and resource allocations in the Soviet Union are becoming a major problem and particularly are inhibiting their ability to maintain their momentum in the arms field.

Thirdly, that liberal and national ferment in eastern Europe and liberalism within the Soviet Union are now permanent phenomena of the eastern European scene that are going to more and more demand expression. Those satellite countries want the technology of the West. They want more materially-satisfying societies; they want more democratic societies even though they are under Communist minority regimes.

These three factors as far as I can see are those that have impelled the Americans at least to conclude that even though the objectives of the Soviet Union have not changed their ability to carry them out and achieve them has been circumscribed by these three developments. The implications for this alliance of the American decision are important. The United States believes, and I think correctly, that in embarking on this ambitious endeavour they are responding to the wishes of the majority of the members, indeed all the members of the alliance. But the Americans are not doing it unconditionally or unilaterally. They offer to us, that is, the rest of us in this alliance continuous consultation throughout the negotiation process so that it is not just a unilateral American endeavour but a collective western one to resolve the main problems of the East. They are prepared to maintain, of course, their protective umbrella over Europe and to maintain their forces here in Europe while this process goes on but they want from the rest of the allies also an undertaking or at least an understanding that they too will maintain political solidarity and adequate defence preparedness during the negotiating period. This means that the Americans are approaching this endeavour with great caution and I must say

very pragmatically. They are committed to start these negotiations but as far as I can see they are not committed to end them on any preconceived basis and make it quite clear that neither their security nor the security of the allied countries is negotiable, only the terms of a settlement of outstanding political problems; therefore, they are not going to give anything away in these negotiations. They are only going to trade away both arms and political position in exchange for arms reduction or real political concessions from the Soviet Union.

The implications for Canada of this state of affairs, this new era that seems to be opening, is that since it is only the members of the western alliance that are going to be the consultative partners of the United States as the principal negotiating member then it is only from within this alliance that Canada can have really any influence on the course of those negotiations.

It seems to me that our choice is whether we want to be in political terms, part of a process that I am certain is going to dominate the next five years of the international scene and a process that in my judgment directly affects our security too, or whether we are going to be outside that process trying to make our own voice heard alone in the world.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman. I am sure everybody knows about the structure of NATO and all these routine things and I do not want to bore the Committee with them.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Campbell.

The first questioner is Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Nesbitt: Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct a question to Mr. Campbell and it is of a military nature. Since he volunteered to provide information in this regard I am sure he will be able to do so, that is why I put it.

In Canada and during our trip a suggestion has been made, marked principally by those perhaps without too much military expertise, but also by others, that Canada should remain in NATO but that she should have a different sort of role as far as forces are concerned. I think we should have entirely air forces in The suggestions here vary somewhat. Some NATO and no army and vice versa and some have suggested some sort although it has never been clearly defined, of a light mobile force which might be usable. As I say, the terms of the mobile force have not been defined as far as I know. I wondered if you

would care to comment as to whether you think our commitments, should Canada remain in NATO, be the same type of military commitments that we have now, or do you think it should be varied with particular reference to what is sometimes termed as a light mobile force.

Mr. Campbell: Mr. Chairman, in reply to Mr. Nesbitt's question I have seen these suggestions aired before and I think that there are some possibilities in this direction. May I say first that Canada's contribution to NATO is partly mobile; two battalions of the mobile command in Canada are assigned to the Eighth Mobile Force and from that same mobile command in Canada we derive the source of our other mobile obligations in this world, for example, to the UN if necessary.

If the proposal about mobile forces is to convert the present mechanized brigade to a fully mobile role I think we have to take a number of factors into consideration. The first is that the present life of the heavy equipment of the brigade and, if you like, of the air division too, have a useful life until the mid-70s or a little later. We would face re-equipment of costs in changing our role and we would face the problem of deliberate wastage of still usable equipment.

The second thing is that the brigade, where it is now in its present location and role, is undoubtedly playing a useful part in the most sensitive area of the East-West front, namely, in Central Europe and in Germany.

Thirdly, I think we have to take account of the fact that we are part of a collective military endeavour. The purpose of that collective endeavour is to checkmate the even slightly heavier forces that are ranged on the other side of that line. We would have to be quite sure that in changing our role it was one that was as militarily effective and useful as the one which we are discharging now. We would have to make sure that the Supreme Allied Commander thought that it was a useful role and we would have to make sure that our allies thought that what we were doing was in the collective interest.

Having said that, I do not really rule out that some such change might come about. The ideas in this Alliance about what Allied Command Europe is for, are evolving all the time. For example, it is now thought less likely than it was a few years ago that there will be a direct, deliberate and massive attack across frontiers even in Europe. That means that the

role of the forces in the Central front can perhaps be regarded as more to cope with a limited front or, war by accident or miscalculation, or any high risk policy on the part of the Soviet Union anywhere along that front rather than against a massive attack which almost certainly would call for outside forces, not just those stationed in Europe.

If this is the changing assessment, and this is not yet fully agreed in the Alliance, then there might be a requirement for lighter more mobile forces stationed in Europe, but available for use anywhere along this frontier to cope with these lesser kinds of conflict. If that were so, Canada would be particularly well suited, I think, for that sort of a role and if our role were cast northwards I think we would be particularly welcome to the people that we would be assisting—mainly, Norwegians, or possibly Norwegians—most likely Norwegians, I would think.

Mr. Nesbitt: May I interrupt just for a moment? Would we be permitted to be stationed in Norway under those conditions?

Mr. Campbell: No, Mr. Nesbitt. It is possible that we could station some—I do not know what you would call them—headquarters, that is, peacetime standby staff in Norway, but the Norwegians have pursued a policy of no foreign forces on their soil in peacetime. It would be a matter of prepositioning perhaps some equipment and having tight liaison and staff arrangements in advance. But the point is that the forces to be useful would still have to be in Europe, possibly based in Germany or the U.K. or somewhere nearby. So there are some possibilities here and there are even possibilities, I suppose, of combining the air division and the brigade to give us greater national identity which is one of the things that is attractive to Canadians, but on the other hand it is sort of a denial of the collective security and the best use of available forces that has always been the principle of this organization.

In my judgment perhaps in entertaining the viability of some of these ideas we could perhaps look forward to a gradual shift to such a role rather than throw away our present equipment when it is still usable, we could simply move gradually to this mobile role as attrition reduced the size of the units bearing heavy equipment that we have now in the central front and in the air division.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Ambassador, I would be curious to know what is the attitude amongst the NATO members towards the re-unification of Germany. Officially maybe they are for it, but unofficially is there a general reluctance to see Germany put together again?

Mr. Campbell: I think the answer to your question is that there is a total reluctance to see Germany reunified violently in any way, but that there is an awareness amongst all our partners here in Europe that as long as Germany is divided, forcibly divided, into two parts—one forcibly communized and the other by its own free will a democracy—you are going to have a cold war front running through Europe; it is almost impossible to conceive of settling the issues between East and West without some resolution of the German problem. The thinking has been for a long time here that the re-unification of Germany is a long term project, that it can only come about as a result of, rather than as a precursor of some fundamental change in the relationships between the Communists and the non-Communists in this country—on this continent. That is to say, as long as there is as much hostility being shown by the Soviet Union, especially against Germany, it is impossible to conceive of the re-unification of Germany. We look forward to this happening at a time when perhaps the Soviet Union has realized that it is pursuing too tough a policy in Europe in drawing these strict ideological lines through this continent and is prepared to see a greater movement between the two sides.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman, more from the point of view of the NATO members, are they concerned about the existence of a re-unified Germany?

Mr. Campbell: No, I do not think so. Of course, there are memories of World War II that are present in everybody's minds, but anyone who is analyzing this matter seriously realizes that even a re-unified Germany is bound to be, in some ways, limited as to armaments; it cannot become a military giant or a military threat. If our Western partners are worried about Germany it is because it has become a dominant economic and financial power and there you are into a realm that one really cannot discuss in an Alliance of this kind. I believe myself that it is the economic power of Germany that is feared

far more than the military power, both by the East and the West.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: The report as I understand it, said that the peace and stability in Europe rested in using the NATO Alliance constructively in the interests of detente. You have told us about President Nixon's general approach to this, and seeing that he represents a great nuclear power, presumably he is thinking partly in terms of dealing with the problems of strategic nuclear balance, but you could say in a little more detail than we have had an opportunity to hear, what is the planning within NATO in respect to that aspect? I presume it took something of a setback with the Czechoslovakian invasion, but is it still going forward and will the forthcoming NATO Council meeting be directed to this end? Will it be made clear to the outside world that this is a real function and not just a verbal function of NATO?

Mr. Campbell: It is a very real function, Mr. Brewin. Prior to the Czechoslovak invasion we had spent an entire year in this Alliance—the whole of 1967 was devoted to a review of precisely that second function of the Alliance, namely, the active promotion of detente. What had happened was that until—I can only answer this thing in historical terms, really one has to see it in this way—1962 when we had the Cuban missile crisis, and the year before when we had a Berlin crisis, it was perfectly obvious that the Soviet Union was pursuing high risk policies and they gave us ample reminders, periodically, we would have Berlin crises on a regular basis or they would invade one of their own partners again as they did in 1953 in Germany and 1956 in Hungary. There had been a long history of aggressiveness on the part of the Soviet Union. Following Cuba we seemed to come upon a very long period of more sensible policies on the part of the Soviet Union. So much so that by 1967 this alliance had concluded that perhaps the military side of this organization could become just a holding operation and practically all its energies could be devoted to promoting actively the creation of those conditions that would lead to a negotiated settlement of all the problems left by the Second World War, including frontiers, the division of Germany, and a sort of new deal in Europe that would allow us to dispense with this organization. By the beginning of 1968, we had embarked upon an active

policy—a co-ordinated one—within the Alliance of stimulating a multiplication of contacts at all levels with the East European countries and the Soviet Union in an effort to break down the barriers and to create that normal interchange between the two halves that would eventually lead to the conditions I described.

It had reached its culmination in the development by the Alliance of a proposal for a balanced reduction of forces, which had been very deeply researched in this organization and for which we made an offer at the meeting in June of 1968, to proceed with the Soviet Union and the East Europeans to a negotiated balanced mutual reduction of forces in Europe. Well, we all know what the response was. The response was Czechoslovakia. Far from wanting to reduce forces, the Soviet Union invaded one of its own allies. I know it is said that this was not the end of the Alliance and we know that. But what it did do was to upset the very basis upon which we had been proceeding. It destroyed many of the assumptions of the preceding five years. We had thought that they would never use force again for the attainment of their ends. We thought that they were reconciled to the need for greater liberalism within their own country and within the satellite countries, greater nationalism, greater materialism. We thought they were reconciled to this process of convergence between the two systems that would render military measures unnecessary. We were wrong and they proved that we were wrong. What they did in Czechoslovakia really showed that the Soviet Union is, when it can be, the same predatory power that it was and has been since 1939. In that period the Soviet Union has either absorbed into its own body politic or established satellites or made territorial claims on 12 out of its 13 neighbour states. We do not know whether they have abandoned these objectives. The history of their behaviour does not show it. We are uncertain as to what the Soviet intention is after this display of military might in Czechoslovakia and it was not just Czechoslovakia. They not only moved in with their troops of which they have moved out most of them, but they have continued to digest that country to progressively profess liberty. They have gone on to exert pressure on Romania and Yugoslavia for example it is now going on almost today, going almost on to a full

mobilization basis. They are so uncertain as to what the Soviet intentions are. Prudence is what we have to absorb. We cannot draw any final conclusion.

Mr. Cafik: Ambassador Campbell, on the policy of balanced force reductions the thing that rather puzzles me is that if the Warsaw Pact were to agree to this policy does this mean that you would reduce arms in the same proportions on both sides and if so in view of their marked superior strength in terms of arms would this not leave NATO in an even worse position that it is at the present moment or just what do you have in mind in terms of balanced force reductions?

Mr. Campbell: I would dispute your comment about the marked superiority that they have within mobilizable regions of the frontier between the two.

Mr. Cafik: This is what we have been told Ambassador.

Mr. Campbell: Who told you three to one?

Mr. Cafik: In terms primarily, Ambassador, if I may say, in terms of conventional forces I think this meant more than nuclear forces.

Mr. Campbell: We have—this is a slight digression—we have under way now an intensive study called the relative force capability study. There has been a great deal of nonsense talked about the disparity between the two sides. They are stronger but as nearly as we can judge now it is a bridgable gap between the two. It is not even a particularly dangerous gap. After all, that gap has existed presumably over these years and whatever strength we have had, has been sufficient to prevent adventure on the other side. So I do not agree with the basic premise that there is a huge distance between the two. Therefore, it does not become a dangerous act to think in terms of mutual force reduction. These would be in a limited area of the front—the most sensitive area. One thinks in terms of Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia perhaps. I cannot go into the details of the dozen or so odd models. There has been a most exhaustive study done of exactly what constitutes equivalents on each side between various types of forces. I can assure you that it is possible to envisage a system whereby you could arrive at norms which would ensure that any reductions or withdrawals were balanced and were mutual. We would have to make sure that they were balanced not only

as to quantity but as to timing of withdrawals. There is a very difficult problem of inspection involved in this problem and on that you may have heard of Exercise First Look that was run in the United Kingdom last year and we are now mounting an international—in all likelihood we will be mounting an international exercise of this kind to look at exactly the non-intrusive means of controlling and verifying any such mutual production plan. Certainly this is the way, the only safe and prudent way to proceed with a reduction of tensions in this Continent.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Ambassador, you paint a picture that seems to be at paradoxical variance. You speak of the American's new posture or new expressed intent at least of proceeding on the basis of negotiation rather than confrontation. You speak from the opposite side that there is no hope of detente that the present situation is grim. What new policies, what new approach is the American's change going to produce or is producing already in NATO particularly in view of the fact that you have said that this is not just a unilateral thing, that this is an American initiative, something which involves the entire NATO participants. How is this going to change?

Mr. Campbell: Mr. Thompson, I do not think I said there was no hope. I would agree with you that what I have been describing is not detente. Detente is a most misleading term which I think should be thrown right out the window as soon as possible. It means relaxation of tension and as somebody says everybody talks about detente but nobody feels relaxed. It has been equated with the word peaceful co-existence on the other side and it is nothing of the sort. When we talk about detente we are talking about normal relations between states, where there is free interchange, and there is no fear involved. When the Soviet Union talks about peaceful co-existence it means that it continues to hold exactly what it has and to control the lives of 100 million people in Eastern Europe according to the needs of the Soviet system, and to deal on a limited basis with the West, just only according to its own needs and interests, mainly to acquire Western technology. So if we could just have an understanding that I believe that the word detente has been misleading but then not to assume that what I am describing is a hopeless situation. It is not a hopeless situation or the Americans for one

would not have embarked upon this new endeavour of theirs and I think I outlined at the beginning of my statement why they think that there are grounds for expecting that the Soviet Union might be prepared to come to some arrangements of a more tolerable kind with the West. It is because they are being forced to do so by forces of change within their own sphere of influence. These are going to compel the Soviet Union. That is going to compel them and the fact that they are falling behind in the race to provide their people with a 20th century standard of living. These are the things that are going to break down the barriers between East and West. It is a matter of the Soviet Union leadership coming to the realization that they are condemning their people to a stagnant antiquated form of life unless they enter into more open relations with the rest of the world.

Mr. Thompson: My question, Mr. Chairman, was what new policies, what new changes do you see taking place within NATO as the result of this new policy that is being advocated by the Americans?

Mr. Campbell: I think you will find at the April meeting, Mr. Thompson, of the Ministers—I cannot anticipate what the Ministers will decide—but there will be a prudent resumption of contact with the Eastern States. I am sure that they are going to endorse this but the accent is going to be on the word prudence. We are going to try within limits to restore the climate that existed prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia which was a very hopeful period from 1962 to 1968. We are going to patiently try to reconstruct that hoping that in the meantime the Soviet Union will have learned some lessons from the errors it made in Czechoslovakia and that these other pressures on them will induce them to allow a freer exchange with the West. Not just confined to acquiring our technology but removing the whole pressure and the fear that exists in this Continent.

The Chairman: Mr. Marceau.

Mr. Marceau: Excellency, I should like first to thank you, for my part, for your inaugural declaration, which, I think, brought to us some new and very interesting elements, that are, in my view, very important.

During our visit to France a few days ago, we thought we discovered that France's decision to retire militarily from NATO was in part based on the absence of personal deci-

sions, or the absence of participation in the decisions of NATO, leaving the supposition that the Americans made decisions without consulting the Allies. You spoke of the part played by Canada in the new orientation of American policy. It is well known that Canada, militarily, plays a part in NATO. I should like to know whether, from the point of view of participation, Canada, in your opinion, really plays a part; in other words, does the United States take an interest in our point of view, do Americans discuss matters with us, and are they prepared, in this new policy, to consult a country like Canada and to accept the opinions that such a country might express?

Mr. Campbell: I think that there has been—I do not agree with General de Gaulle's assessment of the situation as it was before. I believe that that was rationalization after the fact as an excuse to make an anti-American gesture and to seek to play a more independent and dominant role in Europe. The fact is that nearly all of the great powers within NATO have been guilty of moving in their own national interest without proper consultation endless times in the past. When the French wanted to move forces massively into Algeria they moved them without consulting this organization prior to 1962, back in the period of the Algerian war when the British fought at Suez, when the French fought at Suez, they did not consult anybody here. When the Americans went into Vietnam they did not consult anybody here. This has been the practice in the past. It is a practice which I think is on the sharp decline now as the interdependence of all of these major world issues becomes more obvious day by day and certainly the Americans appear—I will be a little cautious—to have drawn the conclusion from their Vietnam experience that they never again want to enter into a major military enterprise or any other kind of enterprise in this world without allies. One hears words like, no Roman solution to the world's problems and by that they mean precisely the lonely role that they have had to play in the Far East. I believe that President Nixon has drawn the conclusion that the United States must move in company from now on and not try to be the arbiter of all the world's troubles alone. Of course there is a financial aspect to this as well. I think they found it a very costly enterprise, politically and financially.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall, and then Mr. Lewis and Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder because finances keep coming up and it seems to be the basis of our quandary at home, the efficient use of our money, whether or not there has been any appreciation done by NATO particularly the countries immediately involved here in Europe, whether or not they would or would not pick up some of the tab particularly, Mr. Ambassador, for the civilian employees of our land brigade and two air groups, for example.

Mr. Campbell: Whether the Europeans would pay us to keep them here as mercenaries, is that the idea?

Mr. Forrestall: No, not quite.

Mr. Campbell: That is what it would amount to, I think.

Mr. Forrestall: That would be your appreciation?

Mr. Campbell: Yes, that would be my appreciation, Mr. Forrestall, but that is a slightly flippant comment on my part, which I did not intend. I think what is wrong with that whole approach is that it fails to take account of the fact that we are not here to protect Europeans. I think a case could be made that it would be a valid expenditure of Canadian defence money to be here only to protect European interest, because the prosperity and freedom of Europe is of direct consequence to us, as it has been proved in the last couple of wars. But it is not in that sense that I think we should justify our participation in the integrated force structure in Europe. It is because it is only here that there exists both the power to reach Canada, namely in the Soviet Union, that can cause us physical harm. It is only from this continent, from the Soviet Union that that power exists. It is only here that the two superpowers are in such direct confrontation and have such vital interests at stake that a nuclear war could start. It is for this reason that Canada has its forces here. It is to prevent little wars, by accident or miscalculation or by a risky thrust by the Soviet Union on any part of the front, from escalating into the kind of war that can harm Canadian territory. We are very directly protecting our own interests, our own security interests by participating here.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Campbell, one has a lot of questions to ask, but may I ask you this. You were talking about there having been some contact between NATO and the Eastern countries prior to all this in 1968. And emphasizing that at the next meeting of the NATO ministers in Washington next month that policy, you are quite certain will be re-stated and the activities resumed. Arising from that I would like to ask you two related things. One is, were there such contacts? Was it more than a statement by NATO that they wanted them, or were there actually some contacts in being before August 1968, if so, what was their nature.

Secondly and very much related to that, I have had difficulty ever since last August to understand logically why Soviet action within its own sphere whatever it may be, without of course condoning it, feeling as angry about it as anyone else, why Soviet action was limited to its own sphere whatever it does, in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, or Albania or what not, why that should have such a deleterious effect on our search for an understanding or some relationships with the Soviet Union. What was it in Czechoslovakia that caused this re-thinking and the re-awakening of fears?

Mr. Campbell: There are several questions wrapped up in yours, Mr. Lewis. The nature of the contacts before all this in 1968, I did not mean that the two alliances as such were holding joint meetings; not at all. What I meant was that it was the policy of the member states of this alliance actively to pursue a multiplication of bilateral contacts at all levels. Ministerial visits were taking place back and forth between Belgium, Holland, all these countries, to countries behind the Iron Curtain and that policy was actively espoused and developed in this alliance. That is what the Harmel study was about.

Mr. Lewis: Did they stop at all? Did those bilateral contacts stop?

Mr. Campbell: Almost entirely at senior levels they have been stopped. About all that has gone on since Czechoslovakia has been commerce where that was serving clearly Western interests and a certain amount of low level cultural exchanges.

Mr. Lewis: That is a terrible phrase.

Mr. Campbell: Which? Low level cultural exchange? I did not mean it was low culture that was being exchanged. These countries

had to express their displeasure and their fear somehow and they did it by interrupting contacts with them, as indeed we did too.

You say you cannot see how it made matters worse there, but first of all I think you would recognize that the policy of spheres of influence is something that cannot really be condoned where independent states are concerned. What happened in Czechoslovakia was the denial of the very principle of the United Nations regarding sovereign independence of states. There was no external threat whatsoever involved in the case of Czechoslovakia; what was involved was that the virus of freedom had broken out within the Soviet bloc and this virus evidently is considered such a menace to the Soviet Union that it is prepared to have recourse to force to suppress it. If they will use that kind of tactic against their allies, what are they not prepared to do against people to the overthrow of whose system they are overtly dedicated. They go on repeating it every day that their object is the overthrow of the present system in all of the free countries of this world. It is as if the United States were preaching all day long the overthrow of our system. That is how the Europeans feel vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and as if the United States had suddenly decided to take over British Columbia, or to do something to the Dominican Republic.

Dominica, I do not want to go into Dominica, but there is a difference between Dominica and Czechoslovakia.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I have a large number of names still on my list. The period for this particular discussion has ended but there is an opportunity for further questions later on, so possibly I could just carry these names forward and give them priority at our next discussion period. We will be joined almost immediately by senior officials in NATO. Is that satisfactory?

AFTERNOON SITTING

Mr. Tremblay (Canadian Ambassador in Brussels): Honourable Minister, Gentlemen, it is a pleasure and an honour for me to introduce to you Mr. Wahn, the Chairman, and Mr. Ryan, the Vice-Chairman, as well as all the members of the External Affairs and National Defence Committee of the Canadian House of Commons.

Their presence in Brussels has set a fortunate precedent and illustrates, I believe, in a

quite striking way, how much political consultations between the leaders of our two countries have increased in recent years.

You are already familiar, Honourable Minister, with the matter and I do not want to evoke the reasons, but you know that Belgium has nothing but friends in Canada and that the diplomatic role of Belgium is of the greatest interest for us, since we are countries that it has been agreed to call medium powers. I know that the members of the Committee will benefit from the reflections you will kindly express for them on the problems of the Alliance, in the present circumstances, and especially on the active part that Belgium is taking in solving those problems, under your enlightened direction.

Honourable Minister, I thank you for having so amiably consented to arrange for the members of the Committee the pleasure and advantage of this meeting with you and your colleagues. Thank you.

Mr. Harmel, Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen, I hope you will permit me to address myself first to a friend, Ambassador Tremblay, to tell him that I am very happy to see you (sic) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in your capacity as representative of your country, as a member of the Canadian External Affairs and National Defence Committee. I must evoke, in your presence, after Ambassador Tremblay, the cordial, and why not say the friendly, bonds that your Ambassador in Brussels maintains and cultivates daily between our two countries, and also I must mention the bonds of very sincere confidence that have never ceased to exist between the Foreign Affairs departments of your country and ours. There is no need for me to evoke the personal remembrance that I retain of Mr. Martin, nor the very vivid impression that I had when I was welcomed last October in Ottawa and met Prime Minister Trudeau; and my meeting since then, several times, with the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Sharp; I wish you would agree to serve, with many other voices, as my interpreter before them, to salute them, first, but also to tell them of the great pleasure and honour that you confer on us by coming to work together here this afternoon.

Gentlemen, I do not know how things are in your country, but here in Belgium we have had enough of so-called masterly exposés, and we prefer the question period. Since you are at the conclusion of a sojourn in Europe—a

stay that has certainly filled your mind with reflections, but also perhaps with final questions—I would indeed like to try my hand at the game, to try to answer the questions, with the collaborators that are here and who have already begun such an exercise with you today; and thereupon, distinguished Ambassador, I forthwith take advantage and disobey you by not making any introductory exposé, and by, on the contrary, answering questions—Chairman Wahn—that you yourself and the Honourable Members of the Delegation will want to ask.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Honourable Minister.

Mr. Laniel: Honourable Minister, this morning our Ambassador to NATO, Mr. Campbell, told us of the change in the approach of the United States to the situation in Europe; the President of the United States apparently said that the American policy would be directed less toward confrontation and more toward negotiation, in future; at the time, Mr. Campbell presented the fact with much optimism. And then, knowing that you were one of the persons who helped, at least, to put forward a formula for reduction in the forces that face each other in Europe, a reduction paralleled on both sides, knowing that for this very reason you are greatly interested in the question, I wondered to what extent Mr. Campbell's optimism was justified. Does the simple fact that the President of the United States said, "Well, tomorrow we shall launch out into negotiations", mean that one can hope that the other side will be in a hurry to engage in dialogue, especially when it is known that in the months preceding the Czechoslovakian crisis, NATO had already studied the question, had already, through diplomatic means, let it be seen in the East that there was a possible intention to disarm mutually—can one hope that, at present, progress is taking place, simply because the President of the United States made that declaration; or, what is more, could there already have been a reply of intention from the other side?

Mr. Harmel: Mr. Chairman, do you want me to make a one-time reply, or do you want me to reply to each question?

The Chairman: Yes, I think that would be better.

Mr. Harmel: Then, I shall now reply. Well, I do not believe that it is necessary to take

into account exclusively the inclinations of the new head of the American administration. It is an important phenomenon to have seen, to have heard, the declarations by the President of the United States; and even if it had been an isolated phenomenon, it would nevertheless be important. But it follows a continuous effort of 15 countries in the Alliance, which at the time when they prepared the exercise on the future of the Alliance, wished to give to that Alliance as much political force as defensive force, as much power for the diplomacy of co-existence as for military defence in case of attack, and that, in this perspective, and after describing it, have prepared themselves; and I repeat, the United States—but you also, Gentlemen, and we with you, and with what interest and conviction, have prepared ourselves to make propositions to the countries of Europe which belong to the Communist world. And during the whole of the first part of the year 1968, from January to the day after that meeting of the Alliance which gave the Alliance's agreement to this new perspective of two pillars—defence and relaxation—the interior committees have worked on models that you are very familiar with, models of parallel reduction of conventional and nuclear regional forces in Europe; and it was an event that has certainly already been much stressed during your conversation, and which you know very well yourselves—it was an event that in its meeting in Reykjavik last June, the Alliance devoted a whole document to formal negotiation proposals with the Eastern countries, namely the "USSR and the other countries of the East", said the recommendation of last June, to obtain a parallel reduction in armament. And you know that that was sufficiently well prepared so that technically one could already compare, within the Alliance a certain number of models of parallel reduction in armament. There was one from your country, there was one from ours, one from the Federal Republic, one from Great Britain, in short, there was no lack of models, that is to say, of details for parallel reduction of armament.

And I might add that, without having completed, I presume, Mr. Ambassador, these studies, the Permanent Council at the ambassadorial level, continues to analyse the document that has just come out of the meeting in Budapest, this time on the Eastern side, in order to ascertain if there is any convergence or resemblance, if it is an echo from proposals that were made by the North Atlantic

Pact—and what value it has. I can, then, add, to be very precise with your very precise question—I could add that for our part, and in the hope that the Alliance could proceed in this direction, that is to say in the direction of a relaxation of armaments, and with the thought that there is no accord on security as long as obvious signs in disarmament matters have not been given—even a sign ever so slight, but a concrete sign—we have during the preceding years taken note of the fact that Poland, in Mr. Rapacki's plan, and then that of Mr. Gromulka, also searched in this direction, still informing our Alliance partners, and Poland furthermore notifying the Pact partners—its partners in the Warsaw Pact—we considered it possible, not to enter into detail, but to take soundings of the interest of the average people in the Communist world in connection with such a project; and I think I can say here that at a certain time, that is, before June 30, we really felt that there was enough interest in that world, for that kind of proposition, to assure some echoing of it. Alas, since then there occurred the Prague crisis, which put many things in question again. However, as you know, at the last meeting of ministers in November, at Brussels, the Reykjavik proposals were, without being described again, confirmed by the Alliance.

It seems to me that there has since been a back-and-forth movement that is very significant of the will of the Atlantic Alliance in favour of a reduction, of a "freeze" in armaments, a progressive and parallel reduction in armaments.

An hon. member: Mr. Minister, I have a rather frank, perhaps blunt question to ask. If Canada were to withdraw her NATO forces entirely from Europe, if...

Mr. Harmel: Would you ask your question again? Because, when you were asking it I was not listening to it, I was instead looking for the translation. Excuse me.

An hon. member: Yes. I said, Mr. Minister, that I proposed to ask a rather frank question, perhaps a blunt one. If Canada were to withdraw all her NATO forces which are now in Europe what would be the effect on and the reaction of the smaller countries of NATO, countries the size of Belgium and secondly the general effect on the alliance, as a whole, and thirdly, in your opinion, how would this be read by the Warsaw Pact?

Mr. Harmel: There, indeed, is a very frank question; and permit me to reply with equal frankness.

The question is in three parts. What would be the reaction of small countries if a country the size of yours were to withdraw all its NATO forces from Europe? That is indeed the first part of the question.

Well, the effect would be deplorable, in the opinion of our population, and it would cause great trouble, for several reasons. First, because we believe, and you will allow me to be frank up to the point of mutual brutality; this is to incite you to brutality in your questions, because we believe that we are each and all of us, Canadians, Belgians, Hollanders, Italians, it matters little which, we are one and all faced with the same problem. In any case, the essentials of defence of our countries in case of attack do not necessarily lie in the conventional category, from the point of view of the final result of a war; these essentials are, alas, outlined around the nuclear problem and the problem of intercontinental nuclear arms. If there were no intercontinental nuclear arms, as possessed in large quantity by the Russians, and which the United States, on the other side has, too, then it is clear that the problem would present itself in different terms. But we are all in the same boat, because if the nuclear deluge—I hope I may so express it—were to be let loose, it would indisputably reach the collectivity of Alliance countries, whether they had or had not troops at the outset of the conflict in Europe.

But what we find it hard to understand is that the general system of defence, involving an existing intercontinental nuclear defence, the advance posts of the intercontinental nuclear defence system being in Europe, and being made up on the one hand of the Warning System, of the alert system that covers the advance posts, if I may so express myself, of this defence that Western Europe constitutes for the United States and for Canada (sic.) That, participating in the benefits of this Warning System, Canada and the United States do not participate simultaneously to assure such a benefit on the ground, and to guarantee the ground upon which, from which, the Warning System is organized.

Indeed, I repeat, it seems to me that the greatest danger for the collectivity of our countries remains, finally, nuclear destruction, from which none of our countries will escape.

It is for protection against this danger that there exists an advance defence; another reason is to avoid having the European countries succumb in the first minute. But, if the European countries happened to succumb, the Warning System, would disappear at the same time, or, in any case, would be considerably reduced in efficiency so far as the United States is concerned, that is to say for the whole of the Atlantic coast of the United States and of Canada. In that event, it is hard to understand, since we are mutually insured and since we are in a mutual insurance system, how these systems of mutual insurance are not themselves insured by all the parties that are covered by such insurance, are not guaranteed by everyone thus insured.

Secondly, we do understand because we have, for our part—and I do not understand exactly the scope of your question—is it a matter of simply withdrawing their forces from NATO, or is it a matter of retiring from NATO?

An hon. Member: It is withdrawal of the forces in Europe.

Mr. Harmel: It is withdrawal of the forces in Europe, while remaining in NATO. That is precisely it. Well, to that question, then, I reply mainly by what I have just said.

The general effect on the Alliance, well, I think the general effect on the Alliance would be serious. It would be serious because it is being wondered why, if Canada did that, then why would not the United States do the same thing. And why would other countries not follow the example, saying: "We are going to decrease our guarantees", one and all; consequently, it is clear that the Alliance would find itself considerably deprived of force and reduced in its impact.

Consequently—to deal with the third of your questions—it would obviously be greatly appreciated by the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact could only rejoice at seeing the integral system of defence dismantled; and, as for us, we consider that, being small countries and having taken a great many risks, and assumed responsibilities by accepting on our territory the general system known as SHAPE, that is to say the general headquarters, having taken responsibility politically vis à vis our people, by accepting the Atlantic Council in Brussels—we are a small country and we thereby put ourselves, let us say, in a quite apparent position to find the large countries ceasing to be directly interested in our

efforts, our own effort, as Europeans, efforts that we have put forth for ourselves. We made these efforts relying upon the solidarity of the large North Atlantic countries. To find that we had come to that one day, I repeat, would cause a great disturbance in our country, great joy in the Warsaw Pact countries, and a deplorable effect on the Alliance.

Mr. Asselin: A supplementary question: Approaching the argument another way: Canada, as well as all the countries of the Alliance, spend considerable sums of money to be members of the North Atlantic Pact. And for my part, I think, still, that the best defence of the American Continent continues to be the show of a dissuasion force in Europe.

But what would happen if, one day, Russia decided to attack Canada? Would the forces of NATO have enough mobility to come to our assistance?

Mr. Harmel: You know the Atlantic Treaty as well as I do, and you know the terms of its Article 5. What you would do to defend another country in the Alliance, would call forth from the other countries in the Alliance the same treatment with regard to you. Article 5 leaves great freedom of action for the Alliance countries to go to the assistance of the other countries. And in the same way, I answer you by saying that, indeed, if we maintain our solidarity in integral defence now, there is obviously much more of a guarantee of total mutual protection than there would be if we withdrew from the system of mutual insurance, on the part of one country with regard to the forces integrated during a period of peace.

Mr. Asselin: But, have the integrated forces of the Alliance a sufficiently supple mobility, and a sufficiently rapid mobility, to be able to ensure our defence in case of attack?

Mr. Harmel: I should simply like to state that before the alliances, you have shown that when there were no alliances there was no mobility, that when there was no integration, there was no mobility, and I remember the time which the Belgians will never forget, when on two occasions, during the first world war and the second world war, the Canadians came to our help. But we all know how many demands that creates by way of a slow mobilization. On the contrary, the mobilisation and the defence become more rapid, to the extent that the forces are integrated.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: When the Committee was in Paris we certainly received the French view on NATO, on the Atlantic Alliance and the European Common Market. Now to me personally what I heard seemed to place France in a position of being somewhat isolationist, nationalist, or obstructionist.

I would like to ask in view of what we heard yesterday both on the military and the economic policy point of view of France, what is the view of Belgium in this apparent antagonistic approach on both the military and the economic field and what is your approach in tackling what must be a difficult situation for your country?

Mr. Harmel: I was not quite sure of the translation and I apologize to the translator and would like to thank her, but someone gave me the synthesis of your question. Gentlemen, we have had experiences in the military field and we have had all the experiences in the field of economics. For countries of our size and for the majority of the European countries, for prosperous countries like ours and for peaceful countries like ours, there is no independent action or independent economic existence, meaning, economic stability and real defensive protection in what I would call isolationism or in neutrality.

And I will start with the military aspect. You know it, because so many of your fathers and uncles have shed their blood on our soil; twice, you know it; until 1914 we had occupied a position of forced neutrality. It did not protect us; that neutrality had been guaranteed. It had been guaranteed by the countries that surrounded us. That did not prevent us from being the first victims of an invasion in 1914, or from being the area, mainly with France, on which the war raged the most.

With respect to the 1939-1940 war, we again had chosen a policy of independence since 1936, which we had called the policy of independence, meaning that we had no engagement before having been the victims of an aggression. History has shown that that position did not protect us.

Since then, the circumstances of defensive aspect of Nations have changed to such an extent that we feel sure that for countries of our kind there is a choice: either disarmed neutrality or integration. We have chosen integration, that is clear, and we believe that

it is also a gesture of solidarity, in fact, maybe of *self respect*. In fact, if we counted on others or on the existence of an alliance which the others would guarantee in order to guarantee our own independence or, what you might call our nationalism, we would believe that that would be just an idea, or that it would not be suitable. Since then we believe that by participating in one large integrated organization of nations that have a desire to get along, because they are defending the same ideals in life, we are creating the conditions not only for our defense, but also for the flow of exchanges of all kinds favorable to our country, that are, in our opinion, also favorable to other countries.

In other words, we believe that with respect to the military aspect of things we cannot shut ourselves up in so-called position of political independence, because we had the experience on several occasions, and because we believe that under the present conditions of the defense systems there are no more countries that can really guarantee their defense, except in the case of a war in a system, or in the case of a crisis in a system that is mostly prepared in advance for that defense.

Finally, with respect to the field of economics, Belgium, since the last war, has formed an economic union, first with the Netherlands and with Luxemburg, called the Benelux. We then noted that this was not large enough and we wished to participate and said that we would seek a solid economic integration of the six countries. And we have said and will continue to say: it is still not enough. And we should have a larger hinterland than what we are having, to answer the dimensions of a contemporary economy.

And since we have had burdens as well as benefits, because it required from us, especially in agricultural matters, largely the support of the French agriculture and of the agriculture of other countries than our own, we have paid for that burden gladly, because the homogeneity of a large economic area seemed to us to be to the advantage of the whole world, including our own advantage, with the result that we are, therefore, very multilateral. We are, therefore, convinced that multilateralism in the military field and in the economic field has great advantages, which is our experience. We have had experience with both of them and, as far as we are concerned, the balance is overwhelmingly in favour of multilaterality.

An hon. Member: May I ask the Minister if you have any hopes or anticipation that the United Kingdom will eventually be allowed to enter the European Common Market?

Mr. Harmel: I do not look very often in the crystal ball and, consequently, I do not wish to say what are my hopes and my worries, but I am going to tell you my convictions. But I would say, to the representatives of France, because they are the only ones who oppose the start of negotiations with Great Britain for its entry in the Common Market, that Great Britain will enter in the Common Market. I am not the one who is saying it, the French leaders are saying; only, they are saying: not now. And we are saying, as far as we are concerned, since it will take time at any rate to adjust the greatly differing economies to each other—the economy of the Common Market which was built up over a period of twelve years and which is not yet complete, and an industrial and agricultural economy which is quite different in Great Britain—it will take time to do it, which is an additional reason to start the negotiations.

But, gentlemen, we are true and faithful partners of treaties that we have signed and we know quite well that we cannot cause the opening of negotiations, other than by a unanimous vote. We observe that the Common Market Commission and five countries are in favour of the opening of the negotiation; we observe that one country is not in favour and within that multi-lateral democracy we respect the veto voice. But that does not prevent us from keeping the problem open and, I repeat, I believe that one day it will happen.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Harmel, you have been the champion of the multilateral approach to détente between East and West as against the bilateral approach. I am wondering what your view is about President Nixon's proposal to have talks with the Russians at the super-power level, talks which—there is some indication—are upsetting some of the West Germans at least, talks that certainly do concern NATO, in the European area in any event. I would like to have an indication of your reaction to this American proposal and to the further proposal to change confrontation in Europe to negotiation. In this respect I would like to see how you see the evolution of NATO in the next five years. Will NATO

itself become a negotiator for the West or will the lead always come from the United States, and will that country always be the negotiator?

[Translation]

Mr. Harmel: Thank you very much for that question. I believe that President Nixon, like all the other representatives of the countries, believes that there is a level of negotiating that is truly bilateral with Russia, which is in the field of the ABM weapons, meaning the anti-missile weapons. Negotiations can only be conducted between countries that have inter-continental weapons. Consequently, since there are only two countries that really have inter-continental weapons, it is very important on this exact point, to obtain the signature and then, above all, the ratification of a certain number of parliaments of the treaty concerning the non proliferation of atomic weapons. It is good that negotiations take place and that they take place between partners to whom we have given a special responsibility. I have said a special responsibility in nuclear matters, because we have given them those responsibilities mainly in the intercontinental field, some sort of privilege and, consequently, responsibility.

And do not forget that we have said to several nations, to those super powers, that the non-proliferation treaty would not exist five years from now, if the nations that had agreed to the non-proliferation treaty, to not have atomic weapons in their countries, unless they saw a progress in the disarmament of atomic weapons of the large powers. We have to be logical and admit that that negotiation has taken place between those having inter continental atomic weapons.

As to the remainder and with respect to the problem of regional disarmament, especially the disarmament between the communist world and the democratic world in Europe, because that is the site where the big confrontation existed during the past 50 years, it seems to be clear to the whole world, and President Nixon, like the Alliance nations, has said, that that was a problem for all of the European nations. And I should like to draw your attention to the day on which there will be an agreement on the reduction of weapons. It is clear that this will not be a negotiation between the United States and Russia alone, but that it will be a negotiation in which the European nations and Canada, and Canada and the European nations that are Alliance members will participate, but also

eight or nine non-aligned European nations, meaning neutral nations, not participating in any alliance. As you know, that starts with Finland, to continue with Sweden, then down to Austria and on to Switzerland, to Yugoslavia, and a relative non-alignment of Albania, on to Spain to go north to Ireland. I have just mentioned the European countries not belonging to either of the two groups.

Consequently, it is clear that it is not up to one single super power to persuade the European nations to reduce their armament, but all the European countries with the United States, with Russia, with Canada, that must settle this problem together. Consequently, I believe that President Nixon is not planning to refer the negotiation to NATO, and it seems to me that he already has made several statements in that sense. Will NATO then be the negotiator, in five years, for the West with the nations belonging to the Warsaw Pact? On that point I must say that we have not yet reached agreement. I am not sure that a negotiation on the reduction of armaments in Europe or in the Atlantic area and in the area of the Warsaw Pact should be conducted through the channel of the Secretariat General of the Alliance. I am certain that the large countries will be associated with it, as the result of the fatality of things. Will all nations participate in a global conference? It is likely that this would be preceded by many steps, approaches, if I may express myself in that manner. But, I repeat, NATO will not be absent from that great event, nor will the countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact be absent, and it is clearly understood that the hopes of countries like ours and its problems which affect us all, will not be dealt with in our absence.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Minister, I would like to come back to the economic side of the picture for just a few moments. You have already answered my question in regard to Great Britain's admittance into the EEC, but what is the view of Belgium towards bringing in the extra nations—the other seven—or even to enlarging the economic community to include Canada or the United States, or on the other side towards being able to bring in some of the Warsaw Pact countries into the economic détente that is probably more feasible than the military as a means of breaking through to the larger objective. What is the view of your government in this regard and

the possibility of expanding the economic aspect of NATO out of European co-operation or North Atlantic co-operation?

[Translation]

Mr. Harmel: On that subject I should like to answer as follows. I believe that I must give two different answers with respect to the countries from the East and with respect to the economically highly developed countries, like your country and like the United States, and like some European countries belonging to the EFTA area.

If you do not mind, I will begin with the countries of the East. I believe that I must advise you that until a short time ago, the Common Market as such, appeared in the panoply of the Western arms against the Communist world, as an additional Trojan horse. I mean that the Communist world was extremely hostile. I am forced to observe that for some time now, the success of the Common Market has caused several of these countries to change their point of view. Several of these East European countries are now taking a great interest in the success, if I may express myself in that manner, of the Common Market and I will quote as evidence, so to speak, the requests on the part of Yugoslavia to enter into associate relations, or at any rate, into relations of privileged commercial status with the Common Market.

But other East European countries are expressing the same interest, although still somewhat embarrassed, because things and the change have been too recent. With respect to the relations between the economically integrated nucleus and the countries of Eastern Europe, there is little else for the time being, than the unified commercial system that still must be worked out be the Common Market. Until now, we are living, in the Common Market countries, with individual bilateral commercial agreements, if you please, with the countries of Eastern Europe. And these commercial agreements have all multiplied during the last years. I am unable to speak for other countries, but we actually have commercial agreements of Belgium, the UEBL, Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, and often also with the Netherlands, with almost every country in Eastern Europe.

The volume of economic exchanges, and you are correct in saying that that is where the easing of the situation starts, is increasing. There is obviously always the problem of the balance of payments, which is always

very difficult to solve for those countries, because they have few products which they are able to import in our country that are of interest, and the reverse is only too true, but, nevertheless, the curve is growing. We have tried to improve the situation on a multi-lateral basis and the Economic Commission of the United Nations for Europe, at Geneva, has tried for the past two years to thaw relations between the countries from the East and the Common Market European countries. Therefore, countries with a State-controlled economy and countries with a market economy brought their points of view closer together, and only since then, during the past one year and one half, has the Geneva Commission been able to establish freer relations, if I may express myself in that manner, on a multi-lateral basis.

And I believe, to finish, that this is, therefore, a very slow process, this getting together of economies that are so different in their system and principle, but that that getting together is making progress, first on a bilateral basis and then by the start of multilateral ways.

With respect to the EFTA countries, and *a fortiori* with respect to the more developed countries, yours and the United States, you know that the relations between the Common Market and these countries are expressed in agreements that are not always easy in their execution, especially with respect to the Kennedy Round agreements. Progress was made, last year and, with respect to the EFTA area exclusively, the West German federal republic had proposed, and France had also proposed—but in a slightly different tone—that commercial agreements be studied to lower the privileged tariffs, with respect to other European countries. And that proposal is still being studied in the Common Market. We know that the Common Market is not a closed entity and that, consequently, the more it develops its economic potential the more it will have to open up for the economies of highly developed countries and also for the economy of underdeveloped countries or countries developed to a lesser extent than our own.

And I cannot tell you at this point how far that will go, let us say, that expansion of the privileged commercial relations of the Common Market with countries. I just stated to you how we are standing with respect to the countries of the East and I just told you that with respect to the EFTA countries a

proposal had been made by the Federal Republic for privileged commercial agreements, for a lowering of the tariff that would have started with approximately 30 per cent; and with respect to the United States, we are still within the limits of the Kennedy Round.

[English]

An hon. Member: "Would you expect the application for associate status from some of the other countries to be approved by the EEC?"

[Translation]

Mr. Harmel: That should be higher, because Norway and Denmark have already applied and Ireland; they have applied not for the status of associates but for the status of adherence, with Great Britain. You know, therefore, the three systems that are possible, meaning: joining, which means being full members associating, which is a status that will normally lead to a term membership and then there are the privileged commercial agreements which are specific in nature.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Minister. One of the areas which is giving consideration is that of whether or not there are useful alternative roles that Canada could be playing within NATO and I realize that you would not want to tell us what we should be doing but I wondered from your experience if you would be prepared to suggest some other credible roles that Canada might possibly play within the NATO framework?

[Translation]

Mr. Harmel: I do not think your delegation demands to play a full membership role in the general NATO effort to develop and maintain its defence potential, but to considerably increase its diplomatic power. And within that framework, it is clear that the presence, the wisdom and the independence of Canada, and its preferred position, if I may say so, in certain respects, because it is looking from a somewhat greater distance at the difficulties we are having in the building of a European integration, it is clear that Canada can play an extremely important role, somewhat because of its distance, and consequently, because of its perspective.

But in this problem of easing, in the problem of an intensification of the relations of peaceful coexistence between countries of differing regimes, I am well aware of the psy-

chological changes that are taking place in your country in that respect, as in most of the other countries, and we need your psychological support and your moral support for that action.

The Chairman: Mr. Marceau?

Mr. Marceau: Sir, there are four points on which I should like to have your opinion. Canada can be compared to a certain extent to Belgium, in that it is, let us say, a small power. Do you sincerely believe that Canada is playing truly a role within NATO or that it is rather a symbolic role? Does our country, like Belgium, really participate in NATO? In other words, is it important?

Second question. We have been told in France, and in rather clear terms, that a conventional force is an absurd thing. Do you truly believe and is it your accepted point of view, do you believe that in case of war were to be started, that it would be a conventional war at the beginning, or a nuclear war?

Third question. Do not believe that Canada is playing a different role within NATO, in your opinion, than the role the United States is playing, or that these roles blend into each other? And finally, what do you think of the Berlin question? Do you believe that the situation at present is better under the circumstances, or that the unification of Berlin would be a cause for additional problems, or an occasion for an easing?

Mr. Harmel: I thank you for the four questions. Belgium is truly a small power. I cannot compare it with Canada, which is, in our opinion a nation for which we have a great respect, due to its size and, I repeat, due to the role of elder brother which it has played twice in our national history. But you are asking me if the small powers, like ours, and the big powers, like yours, are able to truly play a role and not a symbolic role within NATO. Sir, I can only answer for Belgium and for what I have seen. I have the privilege of having on my left the ambassador de Staercke, who knows the whole history of NATO since its beginning. I am only acquainted with the last three years, and I would contradict myself if I were mistaken.

I have the maybe naive impression, but I do not believe that it is so, that the small nations have been able to play a role almost equal to the role of the big powers in the whole development of the last three years, especially around the twentieth anniversary of the

Alliance, meaning especially the anniversary of this year, and notably in the effect upon the future of the Alliance and in the strengthening of the diplomatic and political pillar within the Alliance, and also especially in the orientation of the efforts of the Alliance toward an easing of the situation.

I do not know whether in saying so, we are expressing ourselves with pride or whether we are expressing ourselves with immodesty, but what I am saying for Belgium I am saying for my colleagues of the Foreign Affairs of Canada whom I have seen successively in the person of Mr. Martin and Mr. Sharp, whom I have seen act within NATO. And I wish to testify that, never at any time, did I have the impression that we had different thoughts on the goals we were pursuing.

I, therefore, confirm that during the last three years we have not at all had the impression to be followers; on the contrary, we have had the impression sometimes of running ahead of the party, of which Mr. Ambassador de Staercke may have been the victim at times. Consequently, we have at times felt that we were not at all being taken in tow. This being the case, it represents the answer to your first question.

You said that they told you in France that a conventional force was something absurd, because there would be no further conventional war and that it would be a nuclear war. Gentlemen, that is exactly the problem of strategy which has been studied by the Alliance during the last years, as well as of the choice to be made between the immediate use of the atomic bomb as soon as a confrontation starts between countries, or, on the contrary, the idea one may have that there may be at the start a conventional action that might run the risk of rapidly changing into a nuclear action, if we are not successful in halting the fighting where it has started. I should like to tell you that we have been witnesses in a few wars or a few confrontations lately. We have seen in Korea, in Vietnam and now, unfortunately in the Middle East and a great conflict within Nigeria-Biafra, and we are witnessing confrontations on the Amour river, and I do not observe that in any of these situations nuclear weapons have been used at the start. That is all I am able to tell you, and, at any rate, the system which we have chosen is a system in which conventional weapons are used to the largest extent possible, in order not to proceed with the

destruction of the world as from the first minute.

In the third place; is Canada playing a different role from the role the United States is playing within NATO, or does it blend with the role of the United States? Gentlemen, let me say that you have, it seems to me, to play a role that is quite different from the role of the United States. You are never mistaken for the United States with respect to your person and I may be saying something that does not please you or that does please you, I am telling you the truth. The truth is that you are a nation with defence problems of the North American continent, which defence problems of the North American continent are common problems. And we readily recognize that they have grown during the last years, not to say during the last months, and it is clear that when your Atlantic defence is assured, there still remains the Pacific defence. That is another problem in which you have specific military solidarities, or rather in which you have known and legitimate military solidarities with the United States.

But within NATO, the position of Canada appears to resemble, as far as I can see, the position of the biggest nations that are not the United States. And the role which I see the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Canada play in the Atlantic Council or by the Ministers of the National Defence, if you permit is comparable to the role played by the Minister of Great Britain, or of the Federal Republic or of nations of that size. And when I say, play, I mean a role of authority and it is clear that when Canada does not agree, much pain will be taken to find a point of view that is common to all the countries.

Finally, you asked me a question on Berlin. You know that each time when there is a war, the seed for the following war is left behind. The previous time it was Danzig; this time it was Berlin. There is always a corridor, there is always an isolated city, there is always an impossible situation and that impossible situation was this time the one we know. Do you believe that the Berlin problem will be solved before the whole German problem, meaning it is part of the whole problem of peace with Germany, and of our philosophy of easing, we have always said what I am going to summarize:

1. During the first phase we must start with a coexistence, as you have just said, an eco-

nomic, technological and cultural coexistence, in short, at an extremely multiple level of relations that may be increased and decreased depending upon the possibilities. We must try to move forward and, as I have just said, we have made quite a bit of progress. It seems to us that the second test must be the military easing, meaning the beginning of a reciprocal and parallel reduction of arms. When a certain number of results have been achieved in the economical-technological-cultural field, followed by results in the field of disarmament, we can then start with the third phase, which is the phase of the political problem. To try to put the cart before the horse is an utopia.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: What do you think is the significance for NATO of the statement made in Budapest, this week? Do you believe that it is a new sign of liberalization in the Warsaw Pact or of closer ties between Russia and its partners?

Mr. Harmel: There is a sentence in that document—I do not have the document before me, but I have read it again this morning for the Ministers Council—there is a sentence which is very characteristic and which surely can be used as an argument when Russia is questioned concerning the Breshnev doctrine.

In fact, the doctrine according to which the independence of the countries must be subordinated to the benefit of the socialist community, seems to be contradicted by a sentence in that document which lays the foundation for the relations between the European countries concerning the respect for their independence and their free decision. That is, therefore, a controversial element, if I may express myself in that matter, which can certainly be used to try to cancel what was unacceptable in the position of the Breshnev doctrine.

2. Our analysis is not finished. It will only be finished when the ambassador de Staercke will have told us what have been the results of the discussions between the allied countries, and we are waiting to learn also the point of view of Ottawa. Our first appreciation was that the tone had changed greatly, with respect to the Federal Republic, when it is compared with the Bucharest statement of 1966 to which this document refers. The tone has changed very much and the ambassador for peace, who is present, said in his analysis:

in comparing the 1966 and 1969 texts, there is obviously a desire to be tactful and to soften the brutal accusations which the 1966 documents still contained. Basically there is no change with respect to the Federal Republic. They want a recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. They want equal recognition of the Federal Republic and of the DDR as nations. They want to divide Germany; this has still been said, but they have said it politely.

Finally, they are proposing a conference on European safety. We have said that, as far as we are concerned, conferences on European safety would have been useful a long time ago, when we would have been sure that they could succeed, but that we should avoid like the plague the getting together of a large number of persons in order to come only to the conclusion that there are only disagreements and no single point of agreement. And that, consequently, the best test would be to prepare them on the basis of what the Atlantic Council has advised, especially in the field of a reduction in regional armaments in Europe, and that texts should be prepared having a great consistency. And, consequently, if you ask us if this is a sign of a liberalization in the Warsaw Pact, I will answer that I think this declaration to be, on the contrary, an admirable screen of the divisions and difficulties which they have experienced among themselves. It is much easier to make a showing of their good understandings when addressing the West, than by taking positions concerning the identity of the communist or socialist convictions of the various countries. And I believe that in that respect this is not necessarily the liberalization of the Warsaw Pact, but that it is an indication of the fact that they must show a united front on a point, on the point of the easing.

An hon. Member: You said earlier, I believe, that you would regret it if Canada withdrew its forces from NATO or seriously reduced them. In your opinion, if that did happen, is it likely that Belgium and other western European countries which are so close to Russia would reduce theirs? Or is it more likely that, in your opinion, that they would increase them to fill the gap? And the second completely unrelated question is this. In your experience, are the important political and military decisions in NATO made in effect by the United States, or are they the result of co-operative decision making? I ask this latter question because, as you know, people in our country are sometimes concerned about the

degree of dependency of Canada upon the United States.

Mr. Harmel: Excuse me again. Well, as to your two questions I would like to answer quite candidly, Mr. Ambassador.

You asked if, in our opinion, when Canada withdraws or considerably decreases its forces, Belgium and the other countries would increase theirs or if, to the contrary, they would be discouraged? My candid answer is to tell you that we have never thought of it, because we do not think that this may happen.

I have said it under different conditions than two years ago, when the Head of the French Nation said that he would remain within the Alliance when he pulled his peace-time forces out. The other fourteen countries, and I must remind you that Canada is among those fourteen, decided to remain integrated and to maintain their effort *a fortiori*, because it is obvious that on the day the Alliance becomes a loosely woven entity and the countries are beginning to count on the others to increase their forces, to assure their own defense and also their defense in the case of a crisis, it is obvious that that loosely woven connection will be much less sure than the tightly knit entity.

Second question: Do the United States make important military decisions in cooperation with the other countries; there is truly a worry in all the countries concerning a real dependence.

Gentlemen, that is one of the reasons why the United States has asked us on several occasions to better identify the answers of the other countries, other than the United States, in such a manner that Europe, and I hope Canada, might have one single voice to express their needs which would have a greater weight in the Alliance than if there were one super power and other powers having different forces, but that speak different languages. And I, therefore, believe that it all depends upon the cohesion within the Alliance of medium and small countries.

For the rest I am going to turn to the ambassador de Staercke to ask him if he truly has the impression of, as we say in my country, being minorized very frequently. He does not give me the impression of being distressed. He never gave the impression that he had inferior complexes, but if he has a confession to make, I will gladly let him

speak. If he really could unburden himself to us, I believe that it would do him good, if such were the case.

Ambassador Staercke: That is not the case. On the contrary, I have the impression that sometimes the United States are distressed, because we sometimes take positions, with respect to them, that are quite distinct within the Atlantic Council.

Mr. Harmel: I believe that what Mr. de Staercke has said to you and what Mr. Campbell would tell you, who are with the Alliance all the time, is very important, believe me.

We are there twice per year, in the sessions of the Ministers Council, and we see the preparatory documents and the rest, but the daily life is illustrated by ambassador de Staercke. But I can confirm that there is the same feeling with respect to the Ministers Council.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I believe that brings the period of questioning to an end and before turning the meeting back to His Excellency, I would just like to thank you, on behalf of all the members of our Committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Harmel: I would like to say just one word, gentlemen. I will not have the privilege of seeing you again during your visit. I truly wish to tell you how highly we have estimated, my colleagues and I, your visit and your frank questions, which, I hope, have been answered equally frankly.

I would like to tell you what has not been said at the beginning, because I had hoped that the circumstances of the debate would permit me to do so. I would like to say, first of all, that I thank you for your appreciation addressed to the Foreign Affairs Department. They are particularly appreciated by the Secretary General of the Department, Ambassador Vave, who is sitting here on my right, as well as by the Director General of policies, Baron van der Straaten, who is here, and by ambassador Forthomme.

The Chairman: I would like to thank Ambassador Tremblay for having arranged this meeting. I would also like to thank the Foreign Ministry for having made available this committee room with its excellent facilities. I would like to thank officials of the Foreign Affairs Department for being present, and particularly Mr. Harmel for having answered our questions so fully and so helpfully. Thank you.

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††1761— " HHH, Comments (Arnopoulos)

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**1756-9— " HHH, Comments (Legault)

***1758-60—Appendix HHH, Comments (Legault)

†1763-5— " " (Thomas)

††1774— " III, Supplementary replies (Sharp and Lindsey)

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*1762—Appendix HHH, Comments (Hilborn)
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